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Name:

Course Name: The Politics of China

Course Code: CHIN3231

Why did the Chinese government during Mao Zedong’s era suppress religion?
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The suppression of religion in China: A focus on the Chinese government during Mao
Zedong’s rule

Introduction

The suppression of religion nurtures a malevolent legacy in China that can be traced back to
the authority wielded by the Communist Party of China (CCP) under Mao Zedong, who
upheld religion as irreconcilable to the enrichment of the socialist endeavors of revolution
and the proletariat freedom. Founded in 1921 after the May Revolution of 1919, the CCP
bore an abhorrent lens to religion that was inextricably tethered to the Marxist-Leninist
tradition as epitomized in the slogan “Down with the Confucian shops” (Yang 2012, p.49).
The reverence of Confucian philosophy permeating every aspect of Chinese society started
waning with the consolidation of CCP rule under Mao Zedong and intensified nonetheless
during the Cultural Revolution. Incentivized by the pursuit of subverting the overarching
influence of the Western powers and the orchestration of economic development of the nation
by submerging the feudal structures and the complete eradication of class structures, Mao
Zedong spearheaded structural reforms and strategies that threw into question the social
equilibrium of the preceding decades. Mao Zedong’s attitude towards religion can be
foregrounded through Marx’s blatant rejection of religion, “I hate all the packs of Gods…who
do not acknowledge human self-consciousness as the highest divinity” (cited in Zuo 1991, p.
100). For Marx, religion impeded the class consciousness of the proletariats, eventually
catapulting the path towards critical self-reflection on the objective realities of their living
(fraught with oppression and appropriation of their surplus labor). Such self-reflection
constitutes the precondition for the waging of revolutionary action that ultimately dismantles
the class structures and consolidates the path towards communism emblematic of an
egalitarian, classless society. Bearing proximity to Marx’s blatant rejection of religion, Mao
was galvanized by the pursuit of localizing Marxism bearing the indelible marks of European
tradition and is evidenced in his assertion, “We can put Marxism into practice only when it is
integrated with the specific characteristics of our country and acquires a definite national
form” (cited in Gong 1989, p.364). In light of the above-mentioned arguments, the Chinese
government’s repression of religion under Mao cannot be perceived as an exclusion of his
deep-seat mesmerization by Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

The topic of the suppression of religion by the Chinese Government under Mao Zedong’s rule
was selected because the CCP rule under Mao propelled tectonic shifts that transitioned
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China from a land immersed in religious doctrines (particularly the Confucian philosophy
that bore incremental influence on the Chinese people) to a land that found itself susceptible
to the contradictions between preservation and destruction of tradition. This contradiction,
intensified during the Cultural Revolution that witnessed the denunciation of religion to the
extent of closure of religious sites and the quelling of religious practices is an important
period that offers interesting insights into the disjuncture visible in China and how religion
came to be perceived as a deterrent to the envisioned proletariat (peasant) revolution. This
essay explores the motivations behind the Chinese government’s suppression of religion
under Mao Zedong by dividing the essay into three themes that nonetheless bear a mutually
constitutive religion. The first theme is an exploration of the ideological framework
underpinning this suppression (Marxist-Leninist philosophy) that led to the positioning of
religion as an impediment that immobilizes the proletariats in a realm detached from their
objective realities, functioning as an instrument of domination that perpetuates the sustenance
of the hegemonic rule of the elites. Following this, the essay looks into the theme of political
strategy that demystifies how the suppression of religion eventually paved the path towards a
political religion that invigorated the transcendence of Mao to the realm of God as visible in
the chanting of the “Great Leader” and the “Great Commander”. Finally, the essay examines
how eradicating feudal structure to set the path toward modernization constituted a primary
motivation for religious suppression. The essay argues that Mao’s suppression of religion
represents a distinctive period in Chinese history, where religious suppression displaced by a
new religion around Mao incites imperative questions on how far this displacement was
purely driven by the motive of achieving the liberation of the proletariats (peasants).

Ideological underpinnings of Marxist-Leninist philosophy catalysing the suppression of

The ideological lexicon underpinning the Communist Party of China (CCP) under the rule of
Mao Zedong was inextricably bound up in the Marxist-Leninist philosophy that viewed
religion as counterproductive to the coveted social revolution that would dismantle the
otherwise tenacious class structure of the Chinese society. Preceding the ascent to power by
the CCP, the legacy of Confucianism with its teachings on filial piety, respect for the elders,
unfettered loyalty to the government, and endurance of hardship nurtured its unshakeable grip
in the People’s Republic of China (Gong 1989). However, what was once perceived as an
indomitable legacy of Confucianism in China was challenged and conscientiously subverted
by Mao Zedong, whose commitment to Marxist-Leninist philosophy was incompatible with
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Confucianism that perpetuated economic hardship without upholding a critical lens towards
their enshrouded objective realities (Gong 1989). Zedong contemptuously viewed
Confucianism that irreplaceably offered the governing logic for the endurance of hardship by
instilling a sense of disillusionment, which in turn, played an incremental role in deterring the
collective consciousness of the working class to subvert the oppressive conditions of their
living. In tandem with the Marxian understanding of religion as the ‘reflection of human
misery and a sickness of society’ that sustained the oppressive social order, the succession to
power of the CCP witnessed the consolidation of these ideological presuppositions in
governing the next decades in China. As Zuo (1991) underscores the CCP circumspectly
integrated the Marxian blatant rejection of religion by pronouncing religion to be a
‘superstition’ that must be subverted with the Marxist doctrine. In this respect, extricating the
working class from their immobilization in a realm of superstition can transpire only through
the denunciation of religion and Zedong took it upon himself to orchestrate actions directed at
disrupting the tenacity of religion. Zedong’s underlying interest in the Marxist-Leninist
philosophy that ostensibly viewed religion as perpetuating the false consciousness of the
people by immobilizing them in a realm of superstition was carried forward as visible in the
ongoing decades. This repugnant lens towards religion was intensified during the Cultural
Revolution which marked a new stage in China’s suppression of religion. In hindsight, the
suppression of religion by CCP under Zedong’s rule cannot be unveiled in exclusion of the
Marxist-Leninist philosophy that riveted religion to the realm of superstition, partaking in
debilitating the critical consciousness of the working class.

However, the above-mentioned literature fails to interject the points of connection and
departure of Mao’s ideological underpinnings that rationalized religious suppression from
Marx. In this respect, the literature of Walder (1997) builds the foundation to understand the
points of connection and departure of Zedong from the ideological underpinnings of Marx.
This, in turn, would help to contextualize the underlying reasons catalyzing Zedong’s
unremitting focus on suppressing religion (visible in the Cultural Revolution). Walder (1997)
notes that while Marx upheld the view that the inherent contradictions in the capitalist mode
of production (or any economic system) would spearhead the path toward revolutionary
change, Mao preceded a focus on human will and determination. Castigating the blind and
unscrutinized application of Marxism that is tethered to a European context, Zedong broke
away from the Marxian recommendation of the urban working class being the agents of
social change (Walder 1997). Instead, the predominantly agrarian economy of China drove
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Zedong to contend that the poor and starving peasants indignant at the unfair treatment by the
landlords and government would act as drivers of potential change (Walder 1997). Zedong’s
faith in human will and determination as eventually leading the path to change is perhaps
most visible in his Report on the Peasant Movement in Human enumerating that “it is the
peasants who made the idols, and when the time comes, they will cast the idols aside with
their own hands: there is no need for anyone else to do it for them prematurely” (cited in
Palmer and Goossaert 2011, p.142). In Zedong’s view, class analysis that challenged the
overarching authority of the landlords in charge of the culture should supersede a focus on
dealing with the cult themselves. Against this context, Zedong issued orders for the
confiscation of all “public” temples, church property, and lineage halls that were under the
ownership of foreign clergy or members of the local elite (Palmer and Goossaert 2011).
These properties were either turned into public educational structures, halls, and sources of
income for the peasants or were distributed to the landless. The changes in effect built the
scene for the Cultural Revolution that marked a shift from Zedong’s original optimism on
human will and determination to catapult the path to revolution to his sidelining of the
revolutionary ideological underpinnings of Marxist-Leninist tradition that undertook
overarching measures in repressing religion.

The intensification of religious suppression was most visible during the Cultural Revolution
in his nationwide campaign, directed at eliminating the “Four Olds”, old customs, traditions,
habits, and ideas. Here, the reading of Gao (2008) offers a jumpstart into understanding the
Cultural Revolution and the consequent strategies and interventions in place to repress
religious traditions and values. Gao (2008) sets the tone of the chapter by underscoring that
the “Cultural Revolution has been condemned as a ten-year calamity for the Chinese people”
(p.13). Ravaging unprecedented destruction and calamity, the Cultural Revolution under the
CCP legacy carried forward the dialectical opposition between nurturance and destruction of
Chinese tradition and culture and enshrouded in the desire to extricate China from the depths
of economic downturn. However, the author highlights that the Marxist-Leninist philosophy
underpinning Mao’s Cultural Revolution bore the most unpropitious effect on the Tibetan
culture vulnerable to the ongoing ideological onslaught on account of the intertwined
character of its culture with religion (Gao 2008). The destruction of Tibetan temples
spearheaded by the Chinese Red Guards was part of the CCP’s “systematic, methodical,
calculated, planned, and comprehensive destruction” (Donnett, cited in Gao 2008, p.24). The
author underlines two contradictory arguments on the brutal assault against religious temples
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in Tibet by foregrounding the assertions of Shakya and Wang. While Shakya interjects a
colonialist and imperialist dimension to the egregious destruction of the religious sites as part
of Mao’s broader project of religious tradition alongside the acquiescent participation of a
few Tibetans, Wang’s assertions put these routine acts of religious suppression within the
broader philosophy nurtured by Zedong. Wang highlights that few Tibetan participation can
be gauged through the proletariat appeal of Mao’s vision of social revolution that would
orchestrate the path toward submersion of the continuing indignation at the hands of the
landlords. While presenting these two arguments, Gao offers a comprehensive understanding
of the dominant perceptions of the adverse effect of the Cultural Revolution on Tibetan
religion.

However, the literature is short on drawing interconnections between the Cultural Revolution
that marked the onset of religious suppression and Mao’s underlying ideological framework
driving the revolution. As Reardon (2019) highlights Mao’s ideological shift from the
bureaucratic Stalinism and enlightenment atheism of the 1950s that affixed religion to the
rhetoric of ‘backwardness’ and an ‘illusory’ to the militant atheism of the 1960s and 1970s.
This shift to militant atheism during the 1960s and 1970s that coincided with the Cultural
Revolution era witnessed a break from his optimism on human will and determination to
ascend a focus on overarching radical actions underpinning the objective of appropriating the
growing nationalist fervour to build his political religion.

Political strategy and the consolidation of power

The Cultural Revolution marked the onset of intermittent radical actions undertaken by the
CCP for eliminating traditional religion, categorized as “feudal superstitions” by Mao.
Christianity was exposed to brute force and was typified as a ‘Western, colonizing religion’
that formed the rationale for the closure of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement Churches and
the forced renunciation of their Chinese faith (Rowe 2024). Similarly, Zuo (1991) paints a
picture of the surging religious oppression witnessed in the tearing down of the images of
Buddha, even in the National Museum, the purposeful destruction of religious temples, and
the cessation of any Chinese academic work on religion. This paints the picture of the
repugnant assault on religion that was inextricably bound up in his Marxist mode of thought
that denunciated religion for instilling a sense of disillusionment (Yang 2012). However, the
ideological orientation of Marxist-Leninist philosophy cannot only suffice as the sole
rationale for the cascading suppression of religion. Here, the literature of Tao (2017) offers
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interesting insights into the paradoxical character of the Communist rule under Mao Zedong,
where the public condemnation and suppression of religion intersected with the
instrumentalization of the symbolic importance of faith-based secret societies and religious
groups to spearhead their own ideologies. By citing the in-depth research conducted by
Kataoka (1974) on the party’s official publications and documents during the first half of the
twentieth century, Tao (2017) highlights that while the early legacy of Chinese communists
was marked by atheists, they made use of ‘mediums’ that were not necessarily atheist. This
paradoxical nature continued even during the rule of Mao, where we find him discrediting
religion as ‘superstitious’ yet instrumentalizing the same appeal implicit in religious doctrines
and philosophy to consolidate the path towards a political religion. This political religion
shielded the transcendental element indelibly associated with religion that instilled a sense of
comfort upon the believers of coming into contact with God through good deeds and found
its expression in Mao’s political religion that positioned him at a similar transcendental and
symbolic level as God and other religious deities.

Ironically coinciding with the unremitting communist efforts at denigrating religion that
immobilized people into the realm of superstition was the initiation of a new religion that
centered around Mao Zedong. Zuo (1991) highlights that Mao was glorified as the “Red
Sun”, the “Great Leader”, the “Great Teacher”, the “Great Steersman” and significantly the
“Messiah of the People” (p.101). A sense of unification inherent to religion among the
devotees and followers was rampantly visible during the Cultural Revolution as the posters of
Mao were put up on every corner of the streets with their subsequent veneration and the
chanting of the ‘O! Leader’. Mao’s works became “Holy Writ” in the sense that his
contentions were celebrated as the teachings of God, witnessing the displacement of the
religious fervor with a nationalist fervor inextricably bound up in the fanatic devotion of
Mao. In a similar light, Wardega (2012) highlights that Mao’s portrait were cheerfully
paraded almost at the same plane as a religious image in a procession. With respect to his idea
on cults and the reverence of leaders, Mao was of the view that a “squad should revere its
leader, it would be quite not wrong to” (p.182). However, this reverence of Mao that was
underway inherently bore a contradictory relationship to his rationale on the denunciation of
religion that perpetuated the belief that reverence of religious figures or God dilutes the
critical self-reflection of the peasants on their oppressive realities. This, in turn, deters their
capability to orchestrate a true revolution that ends their passivity once and for all. In this
respect, the suppression of religion cannot be solely attributed to the ideological realm but
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also entailed a political ambition of establishing one’s hegemonic authority that was
assiduously obfuscated from the public view by the CCP members. While the above-
mentioned points encapsulating the veneration of Mao almost in parallel with religious deities
might offer a half-baked picture entailing an element of ‘agency’ to the followers of Mao, this
picture is nonetheless disrupted by Zuo (1991) upon highlighting the blatant use of force
against the dissidents of Mao. The punishment of challenging Mao’s ideological
presuppositions with the death penalty foregrounds a picture of coerced brutality towards the
dissenters. However, no prior literature illuminates on the synergy between the
materialization of this political religion revering Mao and his commitment to a peasant
revolution.

The rejection of feudal culture to catapult the path to revolution

The CCP’s suppression of religion under the rule of Mao Zedong was inextricably bound up
his vision of extricating China from the tenacious grip of feudalism, exacerbated nonetheless
by religion that has diluted the peasant’s critical thinking abilities. As discussed above, the
launching of The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution by Mao Zedong himself was a case in
point of his objective of catapulting a true socialist revolution. As Yang (2012) highlights to
remove the “feudalist and capitalist elements, Chairman Mao mobilized the youth, who
formed Red Guard groups across the country” (p.68). As the architecture of religious sites
was torn apart, classical texts and religious scriptures burned, and the religious artifacts
smashed, Mao centralized complete control over the CCP and China contemptuously viewed
any deviation from his ideological doctrines as a betrayal of nationalism. Furthermore, the
suppression of religion was tethered to his ambition of a prosperous China without external
interventions from the imperial powers. Concurrently, Mao issued a call for orchestrating a
‘strong socialistically modernized country’ that entailed a modernization strategy distinctive
to its local context (Socialist China 2021). According to Mao, efforts should be underway to
“build our country…into a great industrialized country with a high standard of modern
culture” (cited in Socialist China 2021). At the center of his vision of building a modern
China, science and its consequent valorization of rationality were indispensable and bore an
irreconcilable character with the current realities of the time. These current realities involved
the submersion of the rationality-driven minds of the peasants in religion. To this effect, this
inherent irreconcilability was disrupted by Mao through his unremitting efforts to suppress
religion to consolidate the path toward a socialist, modernized China.
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Conclusion

To conclude, the suppression of religion by the Chinese government under Mao Zedong was
driven by three underlying themes. These themes allude to the ideological orientation of the
Marxist-Leninist philosophy that contemptuously viewed religion as detaching the peasants
from their objective realities of living, and in the process, immobilizing them in false
consciousness. The second theme pertains to political strategy and consolidation of power
encapsulating the establishment of a political doctrine that bears resemblance to the
transcendence element intrinsic to religion and their deities. Lastly, the theme of rejection of
feudal culture to catapult modernization foregrounds that Mao’s ambition of a socialist,
modernized China was to be achieved through submerging the inherent contradiction between
science (and rationality) and religion by prioritizing the former.
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References

Gao, M 2008, ‘Debating the Cultural Revolution’ in The Battle for China’s past: Mao and the
Cultural Revolution, Pluto Press, London, pp.13-30.

Gong, W 1989, ‘The legacy of Confucian culture in Maoist China’, The Social Science
Journal, vol.26, no.4, pp.363-374.

Palmer, V & Goossaert, DA 2011, The religious question in modern China, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago.

Reardon, LC 2019, ‘Religious regulation in China’, Oxford Research Encyclopaedia.

Rowe, PS 2024, ‘Faith, hope, and power’, International Journal for Religious Freedom,
vol.13, no.1, pp.13-28.

Socialist China 2021, The totality and emphasis of Mao Zedong’s four modernization
staregies, viewed 30 October 2024, https://socialistchina.org/2021/11/14/the-totality-and-
emphasis-of-mao-zedongs-four-modernization-strategies/

Tao, Y 2017, ‘The historical foundations of religious restrictions in contemporary China’,

Walder, AG 1977, ‘Marxism, Maoism, and social change’, Modern China, vol.3, no.1,
pp.101-118.

Wardega, J 2012, ‘Mao Zedong in present-day China: Forms of deification’, Politics and
Religion in Contemporary China, pp.181-197.

Yang, F 2012, Religion in China: Survival and revival under communist rule, Oxford
University Press, New York.

Zuo, J 1991, ‘Political religion: The case of the cultural revolution in China’, Sociological
Analysis, vol.52, no.1, pp.99-110.