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Other documents randomly have
different content
completely as they have done. No affair has given me so much
pain since my return to this place, and I foresee that out of it
will grow serious complications and an end to those friendly
relations between England and France that are so advantageous
to both countries and which have had an important influence on
the politics of Europe.
What provokes me is that sales tripotages should be at the
bottom of it all, and upon that I have reliable information. I
know of all the jobbery and pots de vin that are passing, and
yet it is to fill the pockets of half a dozen rascals, just as in the
case of Mexico, that the Emperor allows himself to be dragged
through the mud and to imperil the most manifest interests of
France.
The policy of the French Government is perfectly understood at
Berlin, where the leading object of Bismarck is to detach us
from France. We might to-morrow, if we pleased, enter into a
coalition with Prussia against France for the protection of
Belgian independence, which is a European and not an
exclusively French question; but we will do nothing of the kind
so long as there is a hope that France will act with common
honesty. I wish you would speak seriously to La Valette about
the tripoteurs, and represent the disgrace to his Government of
playing the game of such people, which will all come out and be
known in the same way as the Jecker bonds are now
unanimously acknowledged to have been the cause of that fatal
Mexican expedition.
I send you rather a curious despatch from Loftus. Bismarck's
ways are inscrutable, and he is never to be relied upon, but he
has had a union with us against France in his head ever since
the Belgian business began, for Bernstorff, who never speaks
without instructions, has said on more than one occasion to
Gladstone and to me that though Prussia would not undertake
to defend Belgium single-handed, as that country concerned
England more nearly than Prussia, yet that we had but to say
 the word, and we should soon come to terms. I treated this, as
did Gladstone, rather as a façon de parler and a ruse to detach
us from France, which is Bismarck's main object, as I did not
choose that Bernstorff should have to report the slightest
encouragement to the suggestion, but it may come to that after
all.

Colonel Walker, the British military attaché at Berlin, whom Lord

Clarendon considered to be one of the most enlightened and
intelligent men of his profession, was in London at the time, and he
reported that there was not the slightest sign of any active military
preparation in any part of Prussia, and that the idea of war was so
much discouraged by the military authorities that it was no longer
talked of in military circles, whereas formerly it had been the only
topic of discussion. The manœuvres were to be held in the Prussian
provinces most remote from France, and there was a fixed
determination to give the latter no cause for offence, not from fear
of that country, for there was a conviction that Prussia would have
the best of a war, but owing to internal difficulties. Colonel Walker
added that the mutual indisposition of the North and South to each
other was becoming so manifest that the unification of Germany was
far distant.
This comforting piece of intelligence Lord Lyons was instructed to
communicate to the French Foreign Minister.
The Luxemburg Railway difficulty was finally disposed of by a
Commission at London, but before this took place, the Belgian
Liberal Minister, M. Frère-Orban, found it necessary to pay a visit to
Paris.

Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon.

 Paris, April 28, 1869.

Frère-Orban had a farewell audience of the Emperor this

morning. He tells me that his Majesty was very gracious. Frère
appears to have insinuated that the business was finished. The
Emperor expressed a hope that something good would be done
in the Commission. The Emperor dwelt upon the necessity of
France and Belgium being upon the best terms in order to put a
stop to all the ideas of annexation which certain journals were
continually putting forward. His Majesty said that the annexation
of Belgium to France would be disagreeable to England, which
would of itself be a reason sufficient to make him averse from it.
His Majesty had on his table the Arcolay pamphlet which asserts
that Prussia would be unable to defend South Germany against
France. He said that in an answer to this pamphlet published at
Berlin, the Belgian army was counted among the forces to act
against France, and observed that France and Belgium ought to
be on too good terms to render such an employment of the
Belgian army possible. Frère said that His Majesty had only to
make Belgium feel convinced that her independence was safe,
in order to ensure her sympathy with France. Frère appears to
have been much pleased with the audience on the whole,
though he would rather the Emperor had said distinctly that he
did not expect any result from the Commission, and looked
upon the whole question as at an end. He is very well satisfied
with the result of his mission to Paris, as he has placed the
relations on a friendly footing, and conceded absolutely nothing.
The great points now are for the Belgians not to sing songs of
triumph, and for us and everybody to avoid all appearance of
having exercised any pressure. The Emperor cannot safely take
a snub from any foreign nation, and he feels this very strongly.

It is to the Emperor's credit that, in spite of disastrous failures, he

always seems to have preserved a courteous and amiable
demeanour. In this particular case, it is probable that he did not
know clearly what he wanted himself, and that, misled by
unscrupulous advisers, he entertained vague notions as to the
possibility of annexing Belgium, and then withdrawing, as best he
could, when the difficulties were realized. At all events, the sole
result was a rebuff and an increased want of confidence in his
integrity. In short, the mismanagement of this railway affair, which
should never have been allowed to attain so much importance, and
the collapse of his previous attempt upon Belgium, justified the
sneer levelled at him by Bismarck, who, as recorded by Busch,
remarked in 1870, 'He (Napoleon III.) should have occupied——and
held it as a pledge. But he is, and remains a muddle-headed fellow.'
A still more scathing definition was applied to him by his
distinguished countryman, M. Thiers—une immense incapacité
méconnue.
The private correspondence in 1869 with Lord Clarendon, who was
by far the most voluminous letter-writer amongst English Foreign
Secretaries, contains references to many topics besides the relations
between France and Prussia, such as Tunis, the Eastern Question,
Spain, the internal situation in France, the inauguration of a new
Prussian seaport, the Suez Canal, and a host of other subjects.
Amongst these may be mentioned two projected visits of exalted
personages. The Khedive Ismail was expected in England, and there
was some uncertainty as to how he should be treated. In the
previous year he had ingratiated himself with the Sultan of Turkey by
agreeing to pay an increased tribute, and as a consideration had
obtained the title of Khedive and the privilege of securing the
Viceroyalty of Egypt for his own family. Being of a vain and
ostentatious disposition, however, he had now fallen into disfavour
with his Suzerain by reason of the royal airs which he assumed and
of actions which seemed to imply that he considered himself to be
an independent ruler. 'Pray let me know,' wrote Lord Clarendon, 'how
the Viceroy is received at Paris. The Turkish Ambassador has been
boring me with protestations against the royal receptions already
given to him and which he fears may be repeated here. He
yesterday showed me a telegram from Constantinople, saying that
l'effet serait fort regrettable if the Viceroy was lodged in the same
apartment at Buckingham Palace that the Sultan occupied. He
declares that this voyage through Europe is to dispose Governments
favourably to recognize his independence, and that he will be backed
by France against his suzerain.'
Upon making inquiries at Paris it was found that the same question
had been raised there, the Turkish Ambassador having made a
remonstrance against the Khedive being lodged in the Elysée, and a
special request that at least the room in which the Sultan slept
should not be desecrated by his obnoxious vassal. The French
Foreign Minister had thereupon advised the Ambassador to consider
the remonstrance about the Elysée and the bedroom as non avenue,
as it could only serve to make the Ambassador and his Government
look ridiculous. Nevertheless, M. de La Valette admitted that the
Viceroy was taking too independent a line, and that the proposal to
neutralize the Suez Canal was an Imperial question which should
originate from the Porte, and not from the Egyptian ruler.
The other and more illustrious traveller was the Empress Eugénie,
who was desirous of attending the inauguration of the Suez Canal,
and who unexpectedly intimated that she wished to make a tour in
India. Upon this becoming known, Queen Victoria caused her to be
informed that her presence in any part of the British dominions
would always be most welcome, and that every arrangement would
be made for her comfort and convenience.

'The Empress talked to me last night,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'for a

very long time and with great animation, not to say enthusiasm,
of her project of going to India. She gives herself two months
away from France, during which she proposes to go to Ceylon
and most of the principal places in India except Calcutta. She
repeated her thanks to the Queen and to you, and said that as
the Queen had never been herself to India, she herself, as a
Foreign Sovereign, could not think of receiving Royal Honours,
and besides, that she particularly wished for her own sake to
 observe the incognito and to be allowed to go about and see
things in the quickest and most unostentatious manner. I told
her that she had only to let us know exactly what her wishes
were and every effort should be made to carry them out. She
particularly begged that her idea of going to India might not be
talked about, lest it should be discussed and criticized in the
papers. I cannot suppose she will ever really go to India, but
she is full of it now. La Valette will stop it if he can, for his own
sake; for he depends a good deal upon her support at the
Palace.'

This journey, of course, never took place. La Valette prevented it by

representing to the Empress that if she went to Suez she must also
go to Constantinople, and thus sufficient time for a tour in India was
not available.
A trivial incident in French high society which occurred about this
time serves to show with what extraordinary facility the most
exaggerated statements can be circulated and credited. Writing to
Lord Lyons, Lord Clarendon stated that he had been informed that
the former had been placed in a most disagreeable position at a
party given by Princess Mathilde, at which a recitation had been
delivered marked by the most furious abuse of the English, and that
the Emperor had gone up to the reciting lady and ostentatiously
complimented her.

Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon.

Paris, May 9, 1869.

The only foundation for the story you mention is the fact that I
was at a party at the Princesse Mathilde's at which a play was
 acted and some verses recited. The room however was so small
that only the Emperor and Empress and some of the principal
ladies had seats in it. The rest of the company were dispersed in
other rooms. For my own part I was two rooms off, entirely out
of sight and out of hearing of the performance and recitation.
Among the verses was, I believe, an old ode of Victor Hugo's in
praise of the First Emperor. I have never read it, but I dare say
it is not over-complimentary to England. I hear the Emperor was
affected to tears by it, but it certainly neither placed me in an
awkward situation, nor gave me any emotion, for it was out of
sight and hearing, and I did not know it had been recited.

In June Lord Lyons received his first request to take part in a division
in the House of Lords. As far as is known, he had never made any
declaration as to his political views, but apparently he figured on the
Whip's list as a Liberal or Whig, and Lord Clarendon wrote saying
that the Conservative Lords had determined upon the suicidal course
of throwing out the Irish Church Bill, and that as the House of
Commons was 'capable of anything' it was imperative to prevent
such a disaster; that every vote in the Lords was of value, and that if
he had no serious objection it was desirable that he should come
over and vote on the second Reading. The answer to this appeal
strikes one as a model of common sense.

Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon.

Paris, June 6, 1869.

I am very much obliged by your kind consideration in not

pressing me on the subject of coming over to vote on the Irish
Church Bill. I will frankly say that I have a very strong
disinclination to do so. The professional objections are too
 obvious to mention, and I have another feeling which would
make me hesitate. I have as yet never taken any part whatever
in home politics. If I ever come to live in England, I shall of
course endeavour to take a political line and to be of any use I
can. In the meantime I should have great difficulty in
reconciling myself to the idea of now and then giving a sort of
blind vote, either for the sake of party, or from deference to
friends however much I might value and esteem them.

In other words, he knew scarcely anything about the merits or

demerits of the Bill which he was expected to support, and was, of
all men, the least inclined to give a vote on a question with which he
was unacquainted. Lord Clarendon, however, doubtless much against
his inclination, was compelled to return to the charge.

Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

June 12, 1869.

I am writing in the Cabinet room, and by the unanimous desire

of my colleagues, to request that, unless you object to the Irish
Church Bill, you will come over and give us the benefit of your
vote on Friday.
It is not often that the vote of the Ambassador at Paris is
wanted, and if I remember rightly, Cowley only once or twice
sent me his proxy; but proxies are now abolished, and the real
presence is necessary. Every vote is of importance, as the
question is one of great gravity not only as respects the Irish
Church but the conflict between the two Houses that is
impending, and that must if possible be averted.
 Gladstone has just expressed a strong opinion as to the duty of
a peer not to abstain from voting when he is not disabled from
doing so, and does not admit that diplomatic convenience is a
sufficient reason against his doing so.
I hope therefore you will come over if you are not opposed to
the Bill.

It being practically impossible to resist an intimation of this kind

from an official chief, Lord Lyons reluctantly went over to London to
vote, and as he had not yet even taken his seat, took the precaution
of asking a trusty friend in the Foreign Office to find out what the
necessary formalities were. The following somewhat naïve
communication possesses a modern interest as it discloses the fact
that backwoodsmen were as much in existence then as they are
now.

Mr. Staveley to Lord Lyons.

Foreign Office, June 16, 1869.

Not being able to get any reliable information in the Foreign

Office as to your modus operandi in regard to taking your seat
to-morrow, I have been down to the House of Lords this
afternoon and saw one of the clerks in the Crown Office, who
says that all you have to do is to present yourself at the Peers'
entrance to-morrow not later than 4.45 p.m., when you will
receive from the clerk in attendance for that purpose the
necessary writ to enable you to take your seat.
Nothing further is necessary, and many peers presented
themselves and took their seats for the first time this session,
 for the debate of Monday last, with no further formalities.

The obvious comment on this incident is that Mr. Gladstone and his
colleagues were totally wanting in a sense of proportion, and their
action justifies the belief that the eminent persons who govern this
country are sometimes literally incapable of looking beyond the next
division list in Parliament.
If a British Ambassador is to inspire confidence in his countrymen it
is all important that he should not be a partisan or dependent in any
degree upon party favours. The majority for the second reading of
the Bill was 33, and no fewer than 108 peers were absent from the
division unpaired. Yet because the whip (probably a person of very
mediocre intelligence) said that he wanted every vote that could be
obtained, the Ambassador was sent for, made to figure as a party
hack, and forced to give a vote on a question of which he had
admittedly no knowledge, and upon which his opinion was valueless.
It will be seen later that similar attempts to force him to vote were
subsequently made by people who ought to have known better, but
fortunately without much success.
Towards the close of April, 1869, the French Legislative Session
came to an end, and with it expired the Chamber elected in 1863.
The General Election took place in May, and, as an insignificant
number of opposition deputies were returned, owing to the
unscrupulous intervention of the Executive, the results were received
with much satisfaction in Government circles. It was generally felt,
however, that even the huge Government majority would be more
independent than in the late Chamber, and that a very real control
would be exercised over the Ministers. It was even expected by
some that the Emperor would formally announce the acceptance of
the principle of the responsibility of Ministers to Parliament.
 Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon.

Paris, May 25, 1869.

I understand that the result of the elections gives pleasure at

the Tuileries. The Imperialists generally seem very well satisfied.
They consider the result to be a complete defeat of the
Orleanists, a defeat of the Legitimists and a defeat of the
moderate Republicans; the Chamber being thus divided into
supporters of the dynasty and Ultra-Republicans. They think the
prominence of the Spectre Rouge will frighten and unite the
people at large, and cause them to rally round the dynasty. I
cannot help being afraid that there are more rouges elected
than is very safe, and the election of such a sanguinary socialist
as Baucel both at Paris and Lyons is an uncomfortable symptom.
The opposition will not be inconveniently numerous, and its
violence will be in all probability simply a source of weakness.
I could not get Rouher to listen to any hint to propose to Prussia
that a French vessel should be sent to Jahde,[14] though he
seemed willing enough to send one if invited. You have,
however, I think, entirely prevented them having any suspicion
of our having been coquetting with Prussia, or having been
willing to curry favour with her at the expense of France.

Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon.

Paris, May 29, 1869.

 It is very generally believed that Rouher will be made the
scapegoat and placed in the honourable retreat of the
Presidency of the Senate. Since the great rally of the Moderates
to the dynasty it has become the fashion to throw upon Rouher
personally the blame of all the measures which he has had to
defend. I don't know who can be found to take his place as
Government orator.
Speculation is occupied in divining how the Emperor will take
the elections. Some think that, finding himself in front of an
opposition of Rouges, he will again take the part of the Saviour
of Society and begin a new epoch of Cæsarism. Others, looking
to the comparatively large number of independent members,
whose elections the Government did not oppose, and to the
liberal professions made even by the official candidates, expect
a formal announcement of the responsibility of Ministers to the
Chamber, and Parliamentary Government in form and in fact. An
opinion not the least probable is that His Majesty will make no
change, but appoint Ministers and direct his policy more or less
in deference to the Chamber, according to circumstances.
I hope Beust's meddling in the Belgian question has been
merely an awkward attempt to curry favour with the Emperor,
but it may have had the mischievous effect of encouraging fresh
pretensions on the part of France. Jealousy of Prussia will for a
long time to come ensure sympathy between France and
Austria.

The complacent feelings with which the election results were at first
received at the Tuileries soon gave place to very different emotions.
M. de La Valette was under no illusion as to the unimportance of a
victory over the Orleanists, and had frequently assured the Emperor
that they had no real backing in the country, and that His Majesty's
extreme susceptibility with regard to the attention shown to the
Princes of that House by the Court and by society in England was
totally unnecessary. The more the elections were considered the less
they were liked. It began to dawn upon the Emperor that it had
been a mistake to help the Reds with a view to crushing the
Orleanists or Moderate Liberals. A majority in the Chamber was
indeed secured to the official candidates, but the moral weight of the
votes given for them was small, for the influence of the Government
had been unsparingly and unscrupulously used to secure their
return, and even the official candidates had, with few exceptions,
been forced to issue very Liberal addresses. Fear of the extreme
men might bring the officials and the independent members
together in the Chamber, but it was generally realized that the
Government would have to go at least halfway to meet the Liberals.
In short, it was difficult to conceal the fact that the elections had not
resulted in a manifestation of confidence in the Imperial
Government, and that they had shown that the party bent upon
revolution at any price was dangerously large. Under these
circumstances it was not surprising that the French Government
showed itself alarmed and irritable, and although the country
appeared to have declared against war there were not wanting
Imperialists who would have been ready to look upon a provocation
from abroad as a godsend.

Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon.

Paris, June 8, 1869.

The elections of yesterday in Paris seem to me satisfactory, for I

certainly prefer Orleanists and Moderate Republicans to Reds,
and it is a great thing to be rid of all the questions Rochefort's
return would have produced. In the Provinces the official
candidates seem to have had the worst of it.
 The lessons to be drawn from the general election are not
pleasant, for it is impossible to find anywhere a symptom of
approval of personal government. It is not that the French
desire a Parliamentary government à l'Anglaise, but they are
tired of the uncertainty and disquiet in which they are kept by
the fact that peace and war, and indeed everything, depend
upon the inscrutable will of one man whom they do believe
capable of giving them surprises, and whom they no longer
believe to be infallible. I don't like the look of things. I dare say
we shall be quiet for some time, but like the French public, I live
in dread of a surprise.
It is true that Fleury is likely to go as Minister to Florence,
though it is a secret. He would keep his office of Grand Ecuyer,
but he would go because he felt that he had lost his influence
with the Emperor and would not choose to stay here only to
look after horses and carriages. I don't think his departure a
good sign. He has lately been rather liberal in politics, and he is
one of the few men who would be certainly true to the Emperor
and brave and resolute if it came to actual fighting in the
streets. The object of his mission to Florence would be to
manage the withdrawal of the French troops from Rome. I have
no doubt the Emperor wants to withdraw them, but he wants
also to be sure that the Pope will be safe without them. I dare
say, too, that His Majesty is angry about the conduct of the
clergy in the elections. They voted according to their own
predilections, and certainly did not make the support of the
Government a primary object.

General Fleury, a man of charming personality, and a prominent

figure in French society, was the author of the celebrated rejoinder,
Pourtant, nous nous sommes diablement bien amusés, upon an
occasion when the Second Empire was severely criticized some years
later. Lord Clarendon was another of those who felt misgivings over
the elections. 'I feel precisely as you do,' he wrote to Lord Lyons,
'about the elections and the danger of a surprise that they create.
Cæsar thinks only of his dynasty, and I expect he foresees greater
danger to it from responsible Government than from war. It is not
surprising that the French should be exasperated at always living on
a volcano and never knowing when it may burst out and what
mischief it may do them. The Bourgeoisie and the actionnaires must
fear revolution, but they must be beginning to weigh its evils against
those which they are now suffering from. Fleury was a friend of
peace and of England, and I am very sorry that he should so much
have lost his influence as to make him accept a foreign mission.'
The elections were followed by a certain amount of rioting in Paris,
and some hundreds of persons were arrested, but the only effect of
these disorders was to strengthen the hands of those who advised
the Emperor to hold fast to absolute and personal government. The
latter was quite willing to sacrifice individuals to the Chamber, and
was aware of the necessity of making some concessions in a Liberal
sense, but he continued to resist any extension of the power of the
Legislative Body. The latter might have obtained what was desired
by calm and patience, for no minister would have been strong
enough to successfully withstand the demand, but it is not in the
nature of Frenchmen to achieve practical successes without noise
and ostentation, and it was plain that troublous times were ahead.
Had Napoleon III. been wise he would have taken the bull by the
horns and announced something that would have satisfied the
Chamber and the country. Unfortunately, the one thing he refused to
give up was the one thing which his opponents were determined to
wrest from him—personal government.
In July the Constitutional agitation was advanced a stage by an
important interpellation of the Government demanding that the
country should be given a greater share in the direction of affairs
and asking for a ministry responsible to the Chamber. This demand
was very numerously signed, and much to the general surprise
amongst the signatures were many names belonging to the
Government majority. It was evident that the country and the
Chamber were determined to put some check on personal
government.

Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon.

Paris, July 7, 1869.

We are going on here à toute vitesse, whither, it is not very

pleasant to think. A new form has been agreed upon for the
famous interpellation.
More than a hundred Deputies have signed the demand, and
among the signatories are to be found even some of the regular
courtiers, such as Prince Joachim Murat and the Duc de Mouchy.
It is entirely illegal for the Corps Legislatif to discuss the
Constitution, but things seem to have gone much too far for
such scruples to have any weight. It would be amusing, if it
were not rather alarming, to see the eagerness among men of
all parties to be forward in the race towards Liberalism. Rouher
preaches patience and moderation, but the Oracle from St.
Cloud gives no certain response to the many votaries who try to
extract a declaration of its views. This it is, which has been one
of the main causes of the falling away of the Imperial Deputies.
To keep the majority together, it would have been necessary
that a distinct mot d'ordre should have been given them, the
moment the Chamber met. No one is willing to take the
unpopular side without some assurance that he will not be
thrown over by the Prince he wishes to serve; and what is
worse, the want of decision shown has very much diminished
confidence in the resolution and ability of the Sovereign, and
consequently the willingness of politicians to throw their lot in
with his. When one looks at the position in which things stood, I
 will not say before the election, but between the election and
the meeting of the Chamber, one is astonished at the rapid
descent of the personal power and the reputation. Whether
concessions will come in time to enable him to stop before he is
dragged to the bottom of the hill, is even beginning to be
questioned.

The Prince de La Tour d'Auvergne, the French Ambassador in

London, who was much astonished at the number of persons who
had signed the Interpellation Demand, told Lord Clarendon that the
French Government had brought it entirely on themselves by the
scandals perpetrated at the elections. Both he and Lord Clarendon
were convinced that Rouher was destined to be the Imperial
scapegoat. In this they were correct. Rouher resigned; and La Tour
d'Auvergne himself changed places with La Valette.

Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

Foreign Office, July 14, 1869.

When France enters upon a new road it is difficult to guess

where it will lead her to, and revolution may be looming in the
distance, but I think and hope it may be staved off for a time.
The Senate will probably put on as many checks as it dares, and
the Emperor will have a good many dodges for defeating his
own programme, but he has proceeded so unskilfully that he
must have shaken the confidence of those whose support he
ought to reckon upon.
He should at once, after the unmistakeable verdict of the
country against personal government, have made up his mind
how far he would go with, or resist public opinion, and not have
 left his supporters without that mot d'ordre that Frenchmen
cannot dispense with; but his silence compelled them to speak,
and no one will now persuade the people that he has not
yielded to the threatened interpellation.
If they are once thoroughly impressed with the notion that he is
squeezable they will continue to squeeze him, and the language
held even by his immediate entourage is ominous. The middle-
class fear of violent charges, and, above all, of the Reds, may
come to his aid, but he must be sadly in want of sound advice.
Rouher's retirement, even though it be temporary, is, I
conclude, indispensable, but I hope the Imperial confidence will
not be given to Drouyn, who besides being the most
untrustworthy of men, is the most dangerous of councillors. The
point which concerns us most is the successor to La Valette,
whose resignation Prince La Tour bears with perfect equanimity.

The ministerial changes seemed to produce no beneficial effects as

far as the Emperor's position was concerned, and the letters from
the Ambassador became increasingly pessimistic.

Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon.

Paris, July 27, 1869.

I grieve to say that the Emperor seems to lose ground. His own
partisans seem more and more to doubt his having energy and
decision enough to hold himself and them. What is serious is
that this doubt is strong among the generals. They would stick
to him if they felt sure of him, because a reduction of the army
is one of the leading doctrines of his opponents. Prince
Napoleon has found an occasion for having a letter published
 repudiating all responsibility for the conduct of the Government
of late years. I have been told very confidentially that the
Empress complained bitterly to the Grand Duchess Mary of
Russia of the inconstancy and ingratitude of the French people,
and said that if the people were tired of her and the Emperor,
they were quite ready to leave the country and save their son
from the dangerous and thankless task of trying to content
France. No one seems to apprehend any immediate danger. The
general impression is that if the Senatus Consultum is a fair
execution of the promises in the message, things will go on
quietly enough until the meeting of the Chamber, which may be
safely put off till December. The most hopeful sign to my mind is
the reasonable and Constitutional way in which the French seem
to be getting accustomed to work for Reforms. If the Emperor
sees pretty clearly what to yield and what to keep, and will
express his intentions in time and stick to them, all may go well
yet. But can decision and firmness be inspired, if they are not in
the natural character, or the reputation for them, if once lost, be
recovered?

In spite of the evident deterioration in Napoleon's position and of the

growing distrust in him which was now universally felt, unfavourable
rumours as to the state of his health caused something resembling a
panic. The French funds, which were higher than they had ever been
before, fell suddenly in August. They had risen because the
Constitutional concessions were believed to make it certain that the
Emperor would not make war: they fell because alarming reports
were spread about his ill-health. As a matter of fact, he was
suffering from rheumatism, and there was no real danger, but there
is always a difficulty in ascertaining the truth about illustrious
invalids. Much inconvenience and delay, however, were caused by his
indisposition, for it seems to have been his habit to retire to bed at
any hour of the day, if he felt unwell, and there was no certainty of
seeing him, even when he made an appointment. As his plans
depended upon his health, and as there was further a certain
amount of complication caused by the projected visit of the Empress
to the East, nobody quite knew what would happen, and the joueurs
à la baisse profited by the situation to bring off a big coup on the
Bourse.

Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

Weisbaden, Aug. 31, 1869.

I hope the report given to you of the Emperor's health is

correct. The banker has told me to-day that he had not
remembered for years such a panic at Frankfort as was
produced by the news that he was dangerously ill. If his illness
is not serious and he soon gets well again, the fright will rather
do good as making people awake to the enormous importance
of his life. Even, however, if he lives, your able despatch
describing the state and the prospect of affairs in France gives
cause sufficient for anxiety, and I have an instinct that they will
drift into a republic before another year is over.

Had Lord Clarendon lived a few months longer he would have been
able to congratulate himself upon one of the most accurate political
prophecies on record, for the Republic was actually proclaimed in
Paris on September 4, 1870. It should be added that his voluminous
letters show a thorough knowledge of and profound insight into
French politics.
The political situation in France at the end of August, 1869, was, on
the whole, apparently somewhat more reassuring than had been the
case earlier in the year. The Emperor's message announcing a great
Constitutional reform had been read in the Corps Législatif in July,
and was followed by a general amnesty for all political and press
offences. The change of Ministry was well received, because it
involved the retirement of M. Rouher, the ablest supporter of the old
system of government, although it was known that many eminent
deputies were unwilling to take office until the Constitutional change
had come into effect. The general impression produced upon the
public was favourable, and although many Liberals were careful to
declare that they accepted the proffered changes simply as an
instalment, only the ultra-Republicans and irreconcilables affected to
repudiate them and treat them with contempt. Even the latter,
however, were obliged to express approval of the amnesty.
Meanwhile the country had remained calm, and so far, the stream of
reform appeared to be flowing swiftly and with unruffled surface.
Close observers, however, were under no illusion as to the critical
situation which was concealed behind these favourable appearances.
The preservation of the Monarchy and of order in France depended
as much upon the Emperor as it had done during the early years of
his reign, and he was far from being as strong as then. He had been
at the head of the Government for more than eighteen years, and
the temperament of the French seemed to preclude the idea that
they could tolerate any rule for a lengthy period. A young generation
had sprung up free from the dread of the bloodshed and disorder
which accompanied the revolution of 1848, and eager for change
and excitement. The Emperor's foreign policy had not of late years
succeeded in gratifying the national pride, nor had his recent
concessions done as much as might have been expected to recover
his reputation. The ultra-Imperialists believed that if he had shown
resolution and decision immediately after the General Election, no
reforms would have been necessary; they thought that the reforms
became inevitable simply because he vacillated and gave his
majority no assurance of support. The Liberals had not much belief
in his good faith, and the friends of the Empire entertained a well-
grounded fear that the new powers granted to the people would be
used for the purpose of overthrowing the dynasty and establishing a
republic. On the one hand, there was an impression that the
Emperor had no longer sufficient firmness to resist these subversive
attempts; on the other, the Liberals found it difficult to believe that a
sovereign who had for many years exercised so directly, in his own
person, absolute power, could ever be brought voluntarily to
abandon it. Thus there was apprehension on both sides, and while
some feared that the Emperor would be led from concession to
concession until he had no power left, others feared that, finding it
impossible to reconcile himself to his new position, he would have
recourse to some violent expedient, such as war or a coup d'état, in
order to extricate himself from his difficulties.
It was generally taken for granted that the choice lay between the
Bonaparte dynasty and a republic of an extreme character. The
Emperor still retained some personal popularity, but he no longer
inspired the fear and the admiration which had hitherto prevented
revolutionary attempts. His best chance seemed to lie in foreign
Governments treating international questions in such a way as to
enhance as far as possible his reputation, and it was certainly not to
the interest of England that he should be displaced, for his own
commercial policy was decidedly liberal, and it was highly doubtful
whether the Corps Législatif would be equally so, when it came to
dealing with Tariffs and Commercial Treaties.
When Lord Lyons returned from his leave in November, he found the
Emperor in good spirits, full of amiable sentiments with regard to
England, and very cheerful about the political prospects in France.
He did not appear to know much about the Porte and Khedive
question, which had for some time been giving rise to considerable
trouble, but responded at once to the Ambassador's appeal to his
own amour propre in favour of the Commercial Treaty, which
seemed to be in jeopardy. The Empress had gone to the East, and
he was consoling himself for her absence by giving small dances at
the Tuileries for some American young ladies.

Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon.

 Paris, Dec. 3, 1869.

I am more than ever impatient to settle this Khedive affair

because I am afraid that I see symptoms of the French Press
taking up his cause against his lawful master. La Tour
d'Auvergne's tenure of office is very precarious, and if he goes
before it is settled, his successor is as likely as not to take the
popular side, which in France is undoubtedly that of the
contumacious vassal. La Tour d'Auvergne is himself uneasy, and
it is apparent that it is only the desire to act with us which
keeps the Emperor from taking the Khedive's side decidedly. If
the Porte plays many more of these pranks, it will bring about
the independence of Egypt, or a quarrel between England and
France on the subject.
It is in vain to draw any conclusions from the proceedings of the
Deputies, or the innumerable commentaries made upon them.
The Ministers profess to be delighted with the elections of
President and Vice-Presidents, but then I cannot forget that
they were enchanted for the first few days with the results of
the General Election which produced the present Chamber. My
own hope is that out of the chaos a working Liberal-
Conservative majority will be developed; but who is to be the
Minister? Emile Ollivier seems to be losing, not gaining ground
in the Chamber. If the Emperor goes straight and throws himself
a little more on the classes, who, having something to lose, are
naturally conservative, he may do well yet. There is certainly a
return of goodwill towards him. The fear is that he may hope to
strengthen himself by coquetting with his pet ouvriers, who
have so little gratitude for the really important services he has
rendered them. If reproached, they answer, he has done
something for us, but what have we not done for him? What I
mean by coquetting with them, is trying to gain by their
support, power, and popularity at the expense of the Chamber.
 I can't pretend to say whether the new majority will hold
together when the question of distributing the places arises;
whether they will find it possible to get on with the Emperor, or
(which most concerns us) whether they can and will maintain
the Commercial Treaty. I am afraid we shall never again, either
in political or commercial affairs, have as good times as we had
under the personal power of the Emperor—by we of course I
mean the English.

With this sentiment Lord Clarendon fully concurred: the Emperor, he

said, was parting with power so reluctantly that he would create
distrust, but 'I quite agree with you that we shall never have such
good times again under a Parliamentary instead of a personal
régime.'
A few days after this letter was written, La Tour d'Auvergne and his
colleagues were already anxious to resign, although the Emperor
wished to retain them. It was supposed that Drouyn de Lhuys would
be one of their successors: 'Angels and Ministers of grace, defend
us!' was the comment of Lord Lyons upon this rumour, which Lord
Clarendon received with equal apprehension. Another political event
at this juncture was an announcement by the Empress that she
intended to keep aloof from politics in the future, and to devote
herself to works of charity—an announcement which did not carry
universal conviction at the time.
The Cabinet, which was in so shaky a condition, contained some
nominal free traders, and it was feared, not without cause, that the
new Government might denounce the existing Commercial Treaty,
although La Tour d'Auvergne expressed confidence that such would
not be the case. 'I have my misgivings,' wrote the Ambassador,
sadly, 'for I am afraid the country is Protectionist, and I think the
Free Trade zeal in the south will cool, as they become aware that we
shall not retaliate.'
 Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon.

Paris, Dec. 21, 1869.

Nothing but absolute force will turn French Ministers and their
wives from their sumptuous official palaces. La Tour d'Auvergne,
whom I should indeed like to keep, is really anxious to go. I
don't feel sure that any of the others are. I suppose the
Emperor must change the Ministry as soon as the verification of
powers is over, but he has not made up his mind yet, and his
hesitation is doing him harm in all ways. There is, I believe, a
Conservative reaction, or rather a revival of the fear of the red
spectre in the country. The Emperor may turn this to good
account, if he will govern constitutionally through a
Parliamentary Ministry, but it will not sustain him in a return to
personal government.
I don't think things look well for the Commercial Treaty, and the
notion of some Free Traders that it should be denounced on
account of its origin, and with a view to making a greater
advance towards real free trade, will probably give the coup de
grâce to it. The difficulty of passing new free trade measures
through the Chamber would, I should think, be infinitely greater
than that of maintaining the present Treaty.

The formation of the new Government was not actually completed

before the end of the year, although the Emperor in true
Constitutional fashion wrote a letter to M. Emile Ollivier in his own
hand, asking him to form a Cabinet. There was a feeling that his
Ministry would not be long lived, and moderate men shrank from
joining it, thus playing into the hands of the revolutionary parties.
Amongst those who thought that the new Government would be
short-lived was Lord Clarendon—
 'Ollivier's task,' he wrote, 'requires tact, experience, firmness,
knowledge of men, and a few other qualities in which he seems
singularly deficient, and I cannot think his Ministry will last. La
Valette thinks that the object of the implacables is to discredit
the Chamber collectively and individually, so as to make its
dissolution appear a necessity; then to pass a new electoral law;
then to have a General Election with which the Government
would be prohibited from interfering; then to have a Chamber of
Rocheforts and Raspails, which would be more than the
commencement de la fin.
'This is rather a gloomy view, expressed confidentially, of
course, and we must hope that the Emperor will be able to
defeat intrigues of the existence and gravity of which he must
be well aware.'

As an instance of the general uncertainty prevailing, it may be

mentioned that M. de La Valette, until the contents of the Emperor's
letter to Emile Ollivier became known, was convinced that Imperial
indecision would take the form of resumption of absolute power.
The new ministry was finally completed in the early days of January,
1870, and proved to be considerably stronger than had been
believed possible. Some of the new Ministers had curious
antecedents with regard to the Emperor. Ollivier himself had
previously been an opponent of the Empire, and his father had been
sentenced to be deported to Cayenne, while Count Daru, the new
Foreign Minister, had actually voted for the Emperor's impeachment.
It was creditable, therefore, that personal matters did not exclude
men from office. What chiefly concerned England was the line which
the new Government was likely to take with regard to the
Commercial Treaty which was about to expire. According to the
Emperor, there was nothing to fear, and he assured the Ambassador
that he had come to an understanding with Ollivier on the subject,
but it was ominous that several members of the Cabinet were ardent
Protectionists, amongst them being the Minister of Public Works. In
conversation the Emperor spoke cheerfully about the political
situation, quite in the tone of a Constitutional Monarch. The
Empress, on her side, declared that she had no caractère politique in
the State, and enlarged on the enormity of the attacks in the press
upon a person so entirely without political position, attacks which
were certainly odious, and generally directed to matters
unconnected with politics. As for the Ministers, they all praised the
Emperor, and declared that their relations with him were perfectly
Constitutional and satisfactory; everything seemed going smoothly
until the death of the journalist Victor Noir at the hands of Prince
Pierre Bonaparte once more threw politics into confusion. After a
certain amount of rioting, however, and much trouble caused by
Rochefort, things resumed their usual condition for the time being.

Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon.

Paris, Jan. 18, 1870.

I am one of the hopeful, and I see or fancy I see signs of the

success of the present Ministry in their attempt to found
Parliamentary Government. But people are very uneasy, and the
tactics of the Revolutionists are to keep up an agitation enough
to paralyze trade, and make the peaceably-disposed think that
the present Government is not strong enough to be worth
having. These manœuvres might lead to a resumption of
personal power, which would be almost as dangerous as a
republican revolution.
People seem to find it difficult to believe that the Emperor will
abstain from intriguing against his Ministers. They say it is in his
nature to do so, and remind one that he set up a newspaper
against Rouher. The Ministers themselves, on the other hand,
 seem to be thoroughly satisfied with His Majesty. Daru says that
he and his colleagues are confident of success; that they would
have two or three difficult months to pass, but that they expect
to have convinced the Republicans by that time that a revolution
is hopeless. He spoke with great satisfaction of the complete
adhesion of the middle class at Paris to the Ministry, and of the
offers they make of their services in case of need.
Claremont saw the Emperor this afternoon. He thought His
Majesty looking fat and heavy. He found an opportunity of
making a remark to him on the necessity of the Ministry being
supported by the Chamber, which seems to have been taken in
good part.
I hear on good authority that the Empress professes to find
much greater good than she expected in the Parliamentary
Government, and that she says the Pierre Bonaparte affair
would have been much more disastrous under the old system.
Several of the new Ministers and their wives appeared last night
at a ball at the Tuileries for the first time since 1848. The
Empress, as well as the Emperor, was particularly gracious to
them.

It may be mentioned in connection with the Tuileries balls, that the

Ambassador used to receive very numerous applications from
persons in English society who were desirous of being invited to
these entertainments, and it was usually not possible to satisfy their
wishes. After the fall of the Empire, this particular species of
application practically disappeared, there being apparently no
overwhelming anxiety to attend the Republican social functions.
Before the end of January an important debate took place in the
Chamber on the Commercial Treaty, M. Thiers appearing as the chief
Protectionist champion. Free Traders professed to derive some
encouragement from it, as a vote against the denunciation of the
Treaty was carried by 211 to 32; but it was obvious that these
figures could not be taken as a test vote of the strength of the Free
Trade and Protectionist parties, since the votes of the majority were
influenced by a variety of considerations.
 CHAPTER VII

SECRET PROPOSALS FOR

DISARMAMENT

(1870)
It will be remembered that in October, 1868, the French Government
had practically suggested that Her Majesty's Government should
'give advice' to Prussia on the subject of disarmament, and that Lord
Stanley, who was Foreign Secretary at the time had resolutely
declined to do anything of the kind. A fresh effort was now made in
the same direction, no details of which, so far as is known, have
ever been made public.
Mutatus mutandis, there was a curious similarity between the
language held at Paris and at Berlin respectively. The French
proclaimed that they would not go to war with the Prussians,
provided the latter did nothing objectionable. The Prussians replied
that they did not want to go to war with France, provided they were
allowed to do as they pleased, and both asserted that the
maintenance of peace depended upon England, which they
explained by affirming that England had only to declare that she
would join against whichever Power broke the peace; the real
meaning of this being that at Paris it was expected that England
should announce beforehand that she would side with France in case
of war, while at Berlin it meant that she should announce beforehand
that she would side with Prussia.
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