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NEWPORT INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CURRENT RESEARCH IN
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Volume 5 Issue 1 Page 43-50, 2025

https://doi.org/10.59298/NIJCRHSS/2025/5.1.435000 Page | 43

Does Board Accountability Influence non-performing loans of

commercial banks? Empirical Evidence from Commercial Banks in
Western Uganda

1
Sewanyina Muniru, 2Nyambane David, 3Ongesa Tom and 4Manyange Michael

Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Business and Management, Kampala International

1, 2, 3, 4

University, Uganda
Corresponding Author Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT
Non-performing loans have been an issue that affects the performance of commercial banks across the globe. Using
Agency theory to examine the influence of board accountability and Non-performing Loans of commercial banks
in Western Uganda. A mixed method approach (Quantitative supported by Qualitative) was adopted. A sample of
232 respondents was drawn from a population of 550 people using stratified, purposive, and simple random sampling
approaches. 195 respondents were responsive from 3 commercial banks which yielded an 84.1% response rate. The
hypotheses were tested and revealed significant positive associations between the study variables. 6 participants were
purposively selected from 3 commercial banks and interviewed using interview guides. Using Nvivo software and
Miles & Huberman (1994) - approaches, interview data was managed and analyzed which revealed that the
respondents understood corporate governance practices and non-performing loans in terms of the Extent of board
interference in loan processes and the board’s role in solving NPL issues. They concluded that having in place a
well-established board of directors who are responsible and accountable to their duties and responsibilities is key in
fighting non-performing loans of commercial banks and commercial banks should be very sensitive when instituting
boards by selecting board members who can perform their duties with high level of integrity. This will reduce the
level of board members involved and influence the loan processes by favouring themselves and their close friends
and relatives which at times brings non-performing loans However, further studies should be conducted using factors
that affect NPL where possible to tap salient issues from the respondents.
Keywords: Board Accountability, Non-performing Loans (NPL), Commercial Banks, Corporate Governance, Loan
Processes

INTRODUCTION
Non-performing loans have been a huge concern for all the nations. For example, seven years later, the Central Bank
of Ghana revealed that the NPL ratio, which measures the ratio of loan losses to gross loan advances, worsened from
14.7% in December 2015 to 17.3% as of December 2016 [1]. The Bank of Ghana has expressed concern about an
NPL ratio of 17.3% in the Ghana banking industry. Large financial institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa were on the
verge of failure owing to weak corporate governance, but national governments refused to intervene to preserve the
banks [2]. As a result, effective corporate governance is critical to society as a whole. To begin, it encourages the
effective use of scarce organizational and financial resources. Previous research has missed corporate governance
concerns associated with non-performing loans [3]. Furthermore, shareholders, firm managers other staff, and the
board of directors are all part of the complicated structure that constitutes the corporate management process of
banks [4]. In the cacophony of the discourse regarding Africa's growth, or lack thereof, the state of corporate
governance on the continent is regularly criticized [5]. African countries' accountability, audits, and responsibilities,
nonetheless, given the biased nature of the present literature, much more study on the impact of corporate
governance on non-performing loans in Africa is required [6]. Although African economies are strengthening,
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nothing has been done to aid other countries. In South Africa, amid the apartheid period (pre-1994), South Africa's
managing an account segment was characterized by racial isolation and restricted to money-related administrations
for the lion's share of the populace. Non-performing credits were not a major concern for commercial banks amid
this period, as loaning exercises were frequently coordinated towards the white minority and set up businesses. With
the conclusion of apartheid and the move to popular government within the early 1990s, South Africa experienced
critical financial and money-related changes. The liberalization of the money-related segment is driven by expanded
competition, a section of modern banks, and the development of managing an account administration to already Page | 44
underserved communities. In Uganda, According to the Bank of Uganda, the continued rise in NPLs has also
resulted in the closure of some commercial banks, including Teefe Bank (1993), International Credit Bank Ltd
(1998), Greenland Bank (1999), Co-operative Bank (1999), Global Trust bank (2014), National Bank of Commerce,
which was sold to Crane Bank1 in 2012, and Crane Bank1 itself, which was taken over by the central bank in October
2016 and later sold to Development Finance Company of Uganda (DFCU). The rise in non-performing loans has
also had a negative impact on bank lending practices, resulting in a decrease in credit growth, for instance, the rate
of loan growth decreased from 13.7% to 3.2% in the years 2011 to 2012 and from 19.7% to 3.7% in the years 2015
to 2016 [7]. The concern of incurring losses from the increase of NPLs, which might quickly result in the bank
going bankrupt, is what's causing the loan expansion to slow down.
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
This study was guided by agency theory developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976. Agency theory regards firm
management as an agent for shareholders who will act in their best interests, rather than as a knowledgeable and
sensible party who is fair to shareholders [8]. The bank faces many risks, including the possibility of counterparty
failure to meet obligations. This risk results in a non-performing loan (NPL). NPL, also known as credit risk, is a
risk generated by debtors' failure to complete their commitments as required by creditors [9]. The greater the NPL,
the poorer the credit quality of banks, which increases the number of non-performing loans, and as a result, the
likelihood of a bank being insolvent is increased. [10], said that the non-performing loan ratio achieved is 5%, and
if it surpasses 5%, it will undermine the soundness of the bank involved.
[11], evaluated the influence of non-performing loans on corporate governance. They finished their research by
looking at average banking influence, international private banks, local commercial banks, and state-owned banks.
They observed that corporate governance had a considerable influence on NPLs in all categories. Among corporate
governance factors, board size is positively related to non-performing loans, whereas board independence, ownership
concentration, and government form are adversely associated. Their study raises a conceptual and contextual gap,
contextually, the study was carried out in Pakistan and conceptually the study did not look at board accountability
as a construct for corporate governance which the proposed research considers and it will focus on commercial banks
in Uganda. According to [12], there are conflicting effects of corporate governance factors on the loan loss
provision. They concluded from their investigation that regulation and board member attendance at meetings had a
favorable and significant influence on the loan loss provisions of Indian banks.
[13], investigated the influence of corporate governance on non-performing loans of listed banks in Sri Lanka from
2013 to 2017 and results demonstrate that whereas other corporate governance factors like board size, board
independence, and CEO duality have no significant impact on non-performing loans, board actions have a substantial
impact on non-performing loans of listed banks in Sri Lanka. The academics, researchers, decision-makers, and
practitioners in Sri Lanka and other nations like it are expected to gain something from this study. However, his
study was not specific, it looked at board activities in general and was only focusing banks in Sri Lanka, this study
is looking at board accountability in particular and it will be focusing on banks in Uganda particularly those in
greater Bushenyi districts, this raises conceptual and contextual gap.
[14], investigate how well banks' corporate governance can cut down on non-performing loans. Onel GMM estimate
is used for 184 US commercial banks between 2000 and 2013. The whole sample of US banks is separated into three
asset-size classes due to the different risk profiles of the various bank size groupings. They sequentially incorporate
four corporate governance factors and the bank-specific and macroeconomic variables in separate regressions for
each asset-size group of banks. The main finding of this study was that small banks tend to have a weak and unstable
corporate governance framework, which negatively affects the quality of their loans. a strong corporate governance
structure for midsize banks was established. Regarding huge banks, it should be noted that their corporate
governance mechanism has been neutralized. Due to the high amount of liquidity, huge banks engage in excessive
lending practices without considering the resulting unjustified losses. This work makes a significant contribution to
the financial literature by experimentally demonstrating that the effect of a bank's corporate governance on the
quality of its loans depends on the size of the bank.
The literature does, however, point out methodological and contextual limitations. None of the studies were
conducted contextually in the Uganda setting with the studies for example, [15, 14, 13]. All the research utilized a
quantitative methodology, precluding a thorough examination of the results. These limitations highlight the
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importance of this study, which will use a mixed research methodology to examine whether board accountability
impacts non-performing loans of commercial banks in Uganda.
METHODOLOGY
The study adopted cross-sectional research and correlational research designs. [16], defines a cross-sectional
research design as one in which data is collected once over a period of days, weeks, or months in an attempt to
provide answers to a research question. The cross-sectional design allowed the collection of data using different
modes of data collection such as self-administered questionnaires and face-to-face interviews [17]. Still, the study Page | 45
being cross-sectional, data gathered represented what was going on at a particular point in time thus helping to
obtain useful data in a relatively short period saving time and costs of data collection [18]. For the correlational
design, this involved the exploration of the correlation between corporate governance practices and non-performing
loans of commercial banks. Quantitative data was the basis for drawing statistical inferences by relating the
independent and dependent variables. The population of the study was 550 comprising Bank managers, board
representatives, loan officers, and credit clients from three commercial banks in Western Uganda. Hence, these
provided appropriate data and were collected using a questionnaire and interview guide.
After the data had been collected, the researcher first carried out data processing. The processing of quantitative
data involved coding, entering the data into the computer using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS
24.0), summarising them using frequency tables to identify errors, and editing them to remove errors [19].
Quantitative data analysis involves the calculation of descriptive statistics and frequencies for descriptive analysis.
For inferential statistics, correlation and regression analysis were used in the testing of the hypothesis at a 5% level
of significance [20]. The qualitative data collected was coded and grouped according to the study objectives and
emerging themes. Analysis was done through discursive and thematic methods [20]. The discursive method
considered the detail of the text, interpreting the analysed text and attributing meaning.
RESULTS
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics on Board Accountability
Statements N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation
The company discloses its corporate governance policies or 189 2 5 3.95 .901
guidelines
The company has a separate chairman and CEO 189 2 5 3.90 .870
All executive board members own shares after excluding options189 2 5 3.90 .923
held
The company discloses a code of ethics for senior executives 189 2 5 3.81 .960
The board or a committee is responsible for CEO succession189 1 5 3.76 1.068
planning
All members attended at least 75% of the board meetings 189 2 5 3.71 .883
The company has failed to adopt the recommendations of a 189 1 5 3.71 1.078
shareholder proposal
Non-executive board members have a formal session without189 1 5 3.67 1.042
executives once a year
Board members are subject to annual election by all shareholders 189 1 5 3.33 1.325
All non-executive board members own shares after excluding 189 2 5 3.14 .943
options held
Overall Mean and SD 189 3.69 0.999
Primary data 2024
From Table 1 above, the findings also indicate that respondents agreed that banks disclose their corporate
governance policies and guidelines as indicated by a high mean of 3.95 and confirmed by a low standard deviation
of 0.901 in the same regard, the findings indicate that banks have separated chairman and CEO as indicated by high
mean of 3.90 and confirmed by the low standard deviation of 0.87, also the findings show that all executive board
members own shares after excluding options held as indicated by high mean of 3.90 and confirmed by the low
standard deviation of 0.923. Findings also indicate that banks disclose a code of ethics for senior executives as
shown by a high mean of 3.81 and confirmed by a low mean of 0.96, also the findings show that a board or a
committee is responsible for CEO succession planning as shown by high mean of 3.76 and confirmed by the standard
deviation of 1.068. in the same regard, the findings indicate that members attended at least 75% of the board
meetings as shown by a high mean of 3.71 and confirmed by a low standard deviation of 0.883.
Furthermore, the findings show that banks have failed to adopt the recommendations of a shareholder proposal as
indicated by a high mean of 3.71 and confirmed by a standard deviation of 1.078, also the results indicate that non-
executive board members have a formal session without executives once a year as shown by high mean of 3.67 and
confirmed by the standard deviation of 1.042. The findings also indicate that board members are not subjected to
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annual election by all shareholders as shown by a moderate mean of 3.33 and supported by a standard deviation of
1.325 and lastly, the respondents were neutral about that all non-executive board members own shares after
excluding options held as shown by moderate mean of 3.14 and supported standard deviation of 0.943. the overall
mean of 3.69 and standard deviation of 0.999 shows that most respondents agreed with the statements that were
used to measure board accountability. Understanding the relationships between the research variables was aided by
Pearson (r) correlations. These outcomes, which addressed the study objectives, were derived from data that had
previously been gathered and examined using the SPSS program. Page | 46
Table 2: Correlation Results on Board Accountability (BA) and Non-performing Loans (NP)
NP BA
NP Pearson Correlation 1 .779**
N 189 189
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
BA Pearson Correlation .779** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 189 189
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
From Table 2 above, the results show that there is a strong positive relationship between board accountability and
non-performing loans of commercial banks (r=0.779, P=0.00<0.05). The relationship is statistically significant at
0.05, meaning that when members of the board are accountable by performing their duties following the guiding
principles and policies, the non-performing loans of commercial banks are reduced and the reverse is true
Regression Results
Table 3: Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate

1 .779a .607 .605 .33141

a. Predictors: (Constant), BA
From Table 3 above, the results show a strong positive overall relationship between board accountability and non-
performing loans of commercial banks as indicated by R= 0.7749, and board accountability contributes 60.7% to
non-performing loans of commercial banks as indicated by R2= 0.607, meaning that when board members perform
their roles very well, non-performing loans reduce by 60.7% and vice versa. The adjusted R square shows that a unit
change in board accountability causes a 60.5% change in non-performing loans of commercial banks.
Table 4: ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.

1 Regression 31.722 1 31.722 288.827 .000b

Residual 20.538 187 .110

Total 52.260 188

a. Dependent Variable: NP
b. Predictors: (Constant), BA
From table 4 above, degrees of Freedom (df) indicate how many separate pieces of information are used to compute
the sum of squares. In the case of the Regression, the df is 1, which is equal to the number of independent variables
(predictors). The entire number of observations less the total number of predictors is the residual's df, which is 187.
Calculated by dividing the total of squares by the number of degrees of freedom, or mean square (MS). The residual
MS is 0.110 and the regression MS is 31.722.
F-value = 288.827 is the ratio of the Regression MS to the Residual MS. A greater F-value suggests that the model
explains a considerable percentage of the variation. Sig.: This stands for the p-value, which is used to determine the
statistical significance of the F-statistic. A score of.000 indicates that the predictors significantly explain the
variation in the result, suggesting that the model is highly significant (p < 0.000). The dependent variable may be
well explained by the independent variables (predictors) taken together since the model has statistical significance
(p-value =.000). With an F-value of 288.827, the model cable to explain a significant portion of the variation in
comparison to the residual, or unexplained variance. Out of the total variation of 52.260, the model explains 31.722
of it, leaving a residual variance of 20.538 unexplained.
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Table 5: Coefficientsa
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 1.423 .152 9.384 .000
BA .689 .041 .779 16.995 .000
a. Dependent Variable: NP Page | 47
Without normalizing the units, they show the true effects of each independent variable (predictor) on the dependent
variable. The value of the dependent variable when all predictors are zero is called the intercept, and it is 2.917.
Keeping all other factors equal, non-performing loans rise by 0.254 units for every unit increase in Board
responsibility. The variable representing non-performing loans rises by 0.748 units for every unit increase in
financial disclosure. These coefficients are obtained by standardizing the variables by placing them on the same scale
so that comparing the relative importance of each predictor is made simpler. Board accountability appears to have a
moderately beneficial impact on non-performing loans (standardized beta = 0.689, t = 9.384, p = .000<0.05), this
implies that the null hypothesis (H01) which stated that there was no statistically significant relationship between
board accountability and non-performing loans of commercial banks was rejected.
The perceived understanding of Board Accountability and Non-performing Loans of Commercial Banks
This section presents the interviewees’ perceived understanding of board accountability and non-performing loans
of commercial banks. To obtain a clearer picture, the interviewees were asked to answer each of the following
questions.
1. In your opinion, to what extent does the board interfere or help the bank to solve the problem of non-performing
2. How would banks manage non-performing loans?
3. How often does the board sit to discuss issues related to non-performing loans?
The themes and sub-themes generated were presented in the figure below

1st order Codes 2nd Order Themes Aggregated Dimension

• Board participation in loan

decision-making.
• Board impact on loan management
that is favorable or unfavorable. Board Intervention
• Board micromanagement affects in Loan
NPL Procedures

Board Influence
over NPL
The board intentional efforts to Management
reduce NPLs.
credit department improve debt
collection efforts.
The board implemented rules and Board's Role in
structures to reduce the number of Resolving NPL
non-performing loans. Issues

Figure 1: Reality Radial Diagram on Board Accountability and Non-performing Loans

Board Influence on NPL Management
The results reveal that, generally, interviewees perceived board accountability and non-performing loans of
commercial banks as board influence on non-performing loan management. On analyzing the transcripts from qualitative
interviews, it was established that two major sub-themes emerged to mean board influence which are the extent of
Board Interference in Loan Processes and Board’s Role in Solving NPL Issues.
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Board Intervention in Loan Procedures
One of the main themes that emerged was the extent of board interference in loan processes, with interviewees
stating that in most cases, members of the board want to intervene in the loan-giving process by influencing who
should get the loans, particularly to favor themselves, their friends, and relatives, which has had an impact on the
level of non-performing loans. Interviewees also stated that there is a need to evaluate the nature and frequency of
board engagement in loan decision-making, situations of positive vs. negative board influence on loan management,
and ways to reduce the impact of board micromanagement on NPL ratios. Page | 48
Board’s Role in Solving NPL Issues
After analyzing the transcripts, it was determined that the board's involvement in solving NPL concerns as a sub-
theme may be brought about by strategic interventions by the board to minimize NPLs. Support for the credit
department in enhancing loan recovery operations, as well as the board's implementation of policies and frameworks
to reduce NPL growth, which improves commercial banks' performance in battling non-performing loans.
Interviewees said that it is vital to establish the responsibilities and tasks of the board in commercial banks'
operations, especially when dealing with loan issues, in order to minimize conflict between the board members and
management.
DISCUSSION
The empirical findings about board accountability and non-performing loans were taken to be positive since the null
hypothesis which stated that there is no statistically significant relationship was rejected and alternative accepted
meaning that there is a positive significant relationship between board accountability and non-performing loans of
commercial banks, implying that when the board members are subject to annual election by all shareholders,
ensuring that non-executive board members have a formal session without executives once a year, putting in place
mechanisms of disclosing a code of ethics for senior executives and corporate governance policies and guidelines,
the board being responsible for CEO succession planning, adopting the recommendations of a shareholder proposal,
ensuring that all executive and non-executive board members hold their own shares after excluding options and
separating chairman and CEO all these will reduce the non-performing loans of commercial banks and the reverse
is true.
These empirical findings are in agreement with [11] who evaluated the influence of non-performing loans on
corporate governance and observed that corporate governance had a considerable influence on NPLs in all
categories. Among corporate governance factors, board size is positively related to non-performing loans, whereas
board independence, ownership concentration, and government form are adversely associated. [21], emphasized
that there are conflicting effects of corporate governance factors on the loan loss provision and concluded from their
investigation that regulation and board member attendance at meetings had a favorable and significant influence on
the loan loss provisions of Indian banks.
The findings are also consistent with the findings of [13] who investigated the influence of corporate governance
on non-performing loans of listed banks in Sri Lanka from 2013 to 2017 and the results demonstrate that whereas
other corporate governance factors like board size, board independence, and CEO duality have no significant impact
on non-performing loans, board actions have a substantial impact on non-performing loans of listed banks in Sri
Lanka. The findings were not far from the findings of [14] who investigated how well banks' corporate governance
can cut down on non-performing loans and the main finding of this study was that small banks tend to have a weak
and unstable corporate governance framework, which negatively affects the quality of their loans. A strong corporate
governance structure concerning midsize banks was established. Regarding huge banks, it should be noted that their
corporate governance mechanism has been neutralized and due to the high amount of liquidity, huge banks engage
in excessive lending practices without considering the resulting unjustified losses.
CONCLUSION
They conclude that having in place a well-established board of directors who are responsible and accountable to
their duties and responsibilities is key in fighting non-performing loans of commercial banks. Internation of board
members in the loan-giving process by influencing who should get the loans, particularly to favor themselves, their
friends, and relatives, which has had an impact on the level of non-performing loans and the nature and frequency
of board engagement in loan decision-making had positive and negative board influence on loan management and
ways to reduce the impact of board micromanagement on NPL ratios.
The also concludes that enabling the board to perform their loans by providing support to the credit department in
enhancing loan recovery operations, as well as the board's implementation of policies and frameworks to reduce
NPL growth, which improves commercial banks' performance in battling non-performing loans and it is vital to
establish the responsibilities and tasks of the board in commercial banks' operations, especially when dealing with
loan issues, to minimize conflict between the board members and management.
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Recommendation
Evidence is now available that board accountability affects non-performing loans, there the study recommends that
commercial banks should be very sensitive when instituting boards by selecting board members who can perform
their duties with high level of integrity. This will reduce the level of board members involved and influence the loan
processes by favouring themselves and their close friends and relatives which at times brings non-performing loans.
The study also recommends that all commercial banks and their regulators like the Bank of Uganda should continue
creating a conducive environment that enables the board to perform their loans by providing support to the credit Page | 49
department in enhancing loan recovery operations, as well as the board's implementation of policies and frameworks
to reduce NPL growth, which improves commercial banks' performance in battling non-performing loans and it is
vital to establish the responsibilities and tasks of the board in commercial banks' operations, especially when dealing
with loan issues, to minimize conflict between the board members and management.
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CITE AS: Sewanyina Muniru, Nyambane David, Ongesa Tom and

Manyange Michael (2025). Does Board Accountability Influence non- Page | 50
performing loans of commercial banks? Empirical Evidence from
Commercial Banks in Western Uganda. NEWPORT INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF CURRENT RESEARCH IN HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL
SCIENCES 5(1): 43-50.
https://doi.org/10.59298/NIJCRHSS/2025/5.1.435000