Defence and Peace Economics

ISSN: 1024-2694 (Print) 1476-8267 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gdpe20

TIRED TITANIUM: A FATIGUE‐BASED APPROACH

TO AIRCRAFT INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AND
ACQUISITION PLANNING

Chad D. Meyerhoefer & Robert P. Trost

To cite this article: Chad D. Meyerhoefer & Robert P. Trost (2006) TIRED TITANIUM: A
FATIGUE‐BASED APPROACH TO AIRCRAFT INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AND ACQUISITION
PLANNING, Defence and Peace Economics, 17:1, 1-21, DOI: 10.1080/10242690500369298

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Defence and Peace Economics, 2006,
Vol. 17(1), February, pp. 1–21

TIRED TITANIUM: A FATIGUE-BASED APPROACH TO

AIRCRAFT INVENTORY MANAGEMENT AND
ACQUISITION PLANNING
CHAD D. MEYERHOEFERa,1 and ROBERT P. TROSTb,†
a
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, CFACT/DSER, 540 Gaither Road, Rockville, MD 20850,
USA; bGeorge Washington University, Department of Economics, 1922 F St., NW, Old Main, Room
208, Washington, DC 20052, USA

(Received in final form 17 August 2005)

GDPE_A_136912.sgm
Taylor and Francis Ltd

Airframe fatigue has emerged as a primary determinant of tactical aircraft service life. To investigate the impact of
Defence
10.1080/10242690500369298
1024-2694
Original
0Taylor
00
[email protected]
RobertTrost
2005
000
00 &andArticle
Francis
(print)/1476-8267
Peace Economics(online)

various operational scenarios on airframe fatigue and aircraft stocks, we develop an econometric model of fatigue and
arrest landing accumulation for US Naval aircraft. Model forecasts suggest that fatigue-related attrition threatens to
reduce inventories below the level needed to meet operational commitments before planned replacements are avail-
able. Changes to training regimes could mitigate the shortfall, but it is likely that acquisition schedules will have to
be accelerated, or current service life extension programs expanded to maintain inventories in the future.

Keywords: Airframe fatigue; Aircraft procurement; Acquisition planning

INTRODUCTION

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) is currently in the midst of one of the most
significant military aircraft planning and acquisition phases in recent years. Many of the
systems acquired during the post-Vietnam period are reaching the end of their service lives,
leaving DoD with the task of replacing or refurbishing a large and diverse set of aircraft oper-
ated by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. As a result, the literature on the economics of
aircraft replacement has seen an increasing number of contributions over the past several
years. For example, Jondrow et al. (2002) analyze the trade-off between new procurements
and refurbishing older aircraft through a service life extension program (SLEP). They find that
SLEPs are cost-effective provided that they result in moderately lower operating and support
costs. Greenfield and Persselin (2003) develop a dynamic programming model to determine
the optimal replacement period for an aging fleet by comparing acquisition to operating and
support costs. After extending the model to account for aircraft availability, Keating and

1
This research was conducted while Chad Meyerhoefer was an economist at The CNA Corporation and Robert
Trost was at The CNA Corporation while on Summer Break from The George Washington University (GWU). No
official endorsement by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality or the Department of Health and Human
Services, by The CNA Corporation, or by GWU is intended or should be inferred. Programming assistance by Kletus
Lawler and Geoffrey Shaw is greatly appreciated.
†Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]

ISSN 1024-2694 print: ISSN 1476-8267 online © 2006 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/10242690500369298
2 C. D. MEYERHOEFER AND R. P. TROST

Dixon (2004) demonstrate its use in forecasting the cost-minimizing replacement period for
the KC-135 refueling tanker.
However, this dynamic programming model is only strictly appropriate for cargo and re-
fueling aircraft, which can be kept in flying condition over long periods without the imminent
threat of airframe fatigue or technological obsolescence. In the case of tactical aircraft, these
factors may limit aircraft service life long before the ratio of operating and support costs to
acquisition costs suggests an optimal economic replacement time. Indeed, during the post-Cold
War era of continued air supremacy and high operational tempo, all branches of the armed forces
have seen airframe fatigue, or the fatigue life expended (FLE) on critical airframe components
become the single most important determinant of tactical aircraft service life (Wu et al., 1995).2
The US Department of Navy (DoN) has developed the most sophisticated and comprehen-
sive airframe fatigue tracking system of any service branch. Under the Navy program the deci-
sion to replace an aircraft or initiate a SLEP is based on the computation of an aircraft-specific
fatigue measurement, the FLE index, which ranges between 0 and 100% fatigue. This index
is based on known engineering relationships that map information on each aircraft’s flight
profile and G-exceedence levels into a cumulative measure of fatigue for a measured location.
When tactical aircraft conduct training or operational flights, the specific maneuvers pilots
execute subject the airframe to stress, or G-forces, that cause metal deformation.3 Over long
periods of time, this process can result in the initiation and growth of airframe cracks that
threaten structural failures. By monitoring airframe metal fatigue using the FLE index, the
Navy is able to greatly reduce the threat of structural failures. Although this index has been
used to calculate FLE rates and make short-term projections based on historical aggregate flight
hour distributions, it has never been correlated to day-to-day operational data. Consequently,
little is known about how flying different mission profiles impacts airframe fatigue.
In this paper we develop a statistical model that relates the FLE indexes of the F/A-18
Hornet, EA-6B Prowler, and S-3B Viking to their operational determinants, which include the
composition of mission profiles flown by the aircraft, ownership unit, and aircraft character-
istics. The roles of these three aircraft vary greatly, necessitating that separate models are
estimated for each. The F/A-18 is the Navy’s primary fighter/attack aircraft and is used for a
wide variety of potentially stressful missions, from air-to-air combat to ground attack and
combat air patrols. The EA-6B is an electronic counter-measures aircraft that typically accom-
panies other tactical aircraft during ground attack missions to seek out and destroy enemy
radar and air defense installations. As a result, it is often subjected to high-speed maneuvers
at low altitude. In contrast, the S-3B is used primarily for low-stress aerial re-fueling and
surveillance missions, although it does still perform some of the anti-submarine and anti-ship
attack training consistent with its earlier Cold War role.
The three aircraft also have varying procurement costs, operating and support costs and
service lives, which are summarized in Table I. Due to budget constraints delaying the timely
acquisition of replacement aircraft, the Navy’s tactical aircraft are remaining in service longer
than their original design lives, making fatigue monitoring and SLEP scheduling critical to
operational readiness. Our model uses data from several Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) databases, including information on planned SLEPs, to make long-term forecasts
of aircraft service through the transition to a fleet that is composed of newly procured F/A-18
Super Hornets and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

2
Within US Naval aviation FLE is known as “fatigue life expenditure”; however we use the term “expended” to
avoid confusion with money metric expenditure.
3
G-force is a measure of the stress of vertical acceleration on the airframe, where 1G equals the acceleration due
to gravity at sea level. See Wu et al. (1995) and the SAE Fatigue Design Handbook (1997) for a discussion of the
engineering relationships relating G-force to fatigue levels.
 TIRED TITANIUM 3

TABLE I Operating and Procurement Costs per Aircraft (1991–2002)*

F/A-18 EA-6B S-3B

Operating Costs (per yr) 1.3 1.5 1.6

Fuel 0.4 0.4 0.2
Consumables 0.3 0.4 0.3
Aviation Depot-Level Repairables 0.6 0.7 1.0
Total Operating Costs for Design Life 23 33 53
End-of-Run Unit Procurement Cost 29 52 27
Average Flight Hours (per yr) 332 337 392
Original Flight Hour Design Life 6,000 7,500 13,000

Source: US Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Cost (VAMOSC) database (operating costs) and US Navy
Fact File (procurement costs), 2005
*In millions of FY 2005 US dollars

The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data sample used to estimate
the model and provides some descriptive measures of FLE and the flight hour distributions for
each type-model-series (TMS). This is followed by a formal presentation of the empirical model
and forecasting methodology. The third section gives the estimation results and categorizes the
impact of different mission assignments and other operational factors on FLE and arrested land-
ing accumulation. The results of the statistical model are then used in the fourth section to make
inventory projections under different operational scenarios. These are compared to procure-
ment schedules for replacement aircraft and planned SLEPs to determine whether shortfalls in
aircraft stocks are likely to occur. The final section of the paper concludes with a review of
fatigue mitigation strategies and the implications for acquisition planning.

DESCRIPTION OF DATA

Fatigue Data
The Structural Appraisal of Fatigue Effects (SAFE) program at NAVAIR collects cumulative
airframe fatigue information and computes the FLE index used in our empirical model. The
FLE index is critical to projecting aircraft service life. When it reaches 100% the aircraft is
typically either retired or overhauled, unless the index corresponds to a part of the airframe
that can be easily monitored for crack initiation through regular inspections (such as the
vertical tail of an F/A-18).4 The F/A-18 has ten monitored locations on its airframe, but we
concentrate on the wing root (WR) and vertical tail (VT) fatigue measurements because these
areas accumulate FLE the quickest. In addition, the wing root is the primary measure of fatigue
for the overall airframe. When WR FLE reaches 100% the aircraft must be retired or undergo
a substantial overhaul, whereas tail components are more easily replaced after reaching struc-
tural limits. Both the EA-6B and S-3B have only one fatigue index, which is the wing center
panel (WCP) for the former and (usually) the rear spar area for the latter.
In addition to data on FLE indexes, the SAFE reports also contain information on cumula-
tive flight hours, arrested landings and catapults. There is a limit on the number of arrested
landings and catapults any aircraft can sustain, much like the FLE index limit of 100%.
Together, the FLE and arrested landings/catapults limits define an aircraft’s most important

4
The Navy uses a safe-life requirement when designing aircraft, based on both crack initiation and crack growth
thresholds, to ensure that the probability a structural crack occurs during an aircraft’s service life is acceptably low.
For example, aircraft are designed so that a 0.01-inch crack will not rupture within one service life.
4 C. D. MEYERHOEFER AND R. P. TROST

structural life limits (SLL), or the usage range determining its service life. Because cumulative
arrested landings and catapults track each other closely, we only consider the former measure
in the empirical model and service life projections. In order to make this service life measure
comparable to the fatigue indexes, the cumulative number of arrested landings, or the arrested
landings expended (ALE), is expressed as an index ranging between 0 and 100% of allowable
arrests and treated as another FLE index.

FLE and ALE Distributions

The distribution of WR FLE for F/A-18 aircraft contained in the last year of our data sample
(from the 3rd quarter of 2001 to the 3rd quarter of 2002) is given in Figure 1. The distribution
is centered at 35% of expended airframe fatigue, indicating that the majority of aircraft have
not reached the point where measures must be taken to mitigate high fatigue levels. However,
the distribution has a long right tail and there are several aircraft that have WR FLE levels
above 80 and even 100%. These aircraft are either scheduled for, or are in the process of
receiving fuselage center barrel replacements (denoted CBR+), a SLEP that mitigates both
WR fatigue and ALE.
In general, aircraft of different series are concentrated at different parts of the distribution.
FIGURE 1 Cumulative F/A-18 WR FLE (as of Q3 2002).

F/A-18D aircraft are typically land-based – an environment characterized by higher WR

fatigue than deployments aboard aircraft carriers. Therefore, they are concentrated in the right
tail of the distribution, as are the older F/A-18A and F/A-18B flown in training squadrons. The
left-hand side of the distribution is accordingly composed primarily of C series aircraft found
in most deployable squadrons.
In comparison to cumulative WR fatigue levels, VT FLE is significantly higher. Nevertheless,
the replacement cost of a vertical tail is minor in comparison to the $2 million price tag on a
CBR+, so VT FLE is rarely a determining factor in the decision to retire an aircraft. For this
reason, we base inventory projections only on WR FLE and ALE. Cumulative levels of the

FIGURE 1 Cumulative F/A-18 WR FLE (as of Q3 2002).

 TIRED TITANIUM 5

latter index vary greatly by aircraft series, with a high number of arrests on the F/A-18C due
to consistent deployment, and lower ALE for those aircraft typically operating from land bases,
such as the F/A-18A/B/D. The population of F/A-18C aircraft shown in Figure 2 has an ALE
distribution that is fairly symmetric and centered at 65% (excluding the spike at 5% associated
with aircraft in non-deployable squadrons). When this distribution in compared to WR FLE
levels in Figure 1, it is clear that many F/A-18C will reach their ALE limit first, necessitating
measures such as the fuselage center barrel replacement or accelerated acquisition be taken to
mitigate ALE.
In contrast to series C aircraft, the distribution of expended arrested landings for F/A-18 A/
FIGURE 2 Cumulative F/A-18C ALE (as of Q3 2002).

B/D in Figure 3 is concentrated between 0 and 25%, with a long right tail composed almost
exclusively of series A aircraft that still deploy with frequency. Although many F/A-18A/B/
D have low ALE, they tend to be the aircraft with the highest wing root FLE, and are not neces-
sarily expected to last much longer than the F/A-18C under current operating conditions.
The EA-6B Prowler data sample is slightly more recent than the F/A-18, reaching through
FIGURE 3 Cumulative F/A-18A/B/D ALE (as of Q3 2002).

the fourth quarter of 2002, but contains a much smaller number of aircraft. The distribution
of wing center panel (WCP) FLE is bi-modal, with a cluster of low fatigue aircraft centered
around 15–20% fatigue, and a separate group of high fatigue aircraft centered at 80% FLE.
Many of the aircraft at lower fatigue levels have undergone a SLEP to replace their original
WCPs with newer 7050 aluminum wings, while those with high fatigue levels exceeding the
structural life limit are currently being “re-winged”. These SLEPs cost approximately
$5 million per aircraft and must continue through 2008 in order to maintain inventories. The
distribution of ALE for the EA-6B indicates the majority of aircraft have significantly
lower ALE than WCP FLE levels, suggesting the latter is the greatest threat to inventory
sustainability. The S-3B FLE distribution is more or less symmetric around 40% of
expended fatigue, while the ALE distribution is far to the right and centered around 80%.
Therefore, arrested landing accumulation is currently a more pressing fatigue problem than
FLE for the S-3B.

FIGURE 2 Cumulative F/A-18C ALE (as of Q3 2002).

6 C. D. MEYERHOEFER AND R. P. TROST

FIGURE 3 Cumulative F/A-18A/B/D ALE (as of Q3 2002).

Operational and Logistical Data

In order to explain changes in FLE and ALE indexes we compiled data on the operational,
logistical, and engineering determinants of airframe fatigue and arrested landing accumula-
tion. Occasional performance upgrades meant to adapt aircraft to evolving threats are one
example of an engineering change impacting fatigue. While minor upgrades may not substan-
tially alter airframe life, major upgrades to engines, avionics, or weapons systems can have a
significant effect on both the types of missions the aircraft is selected to perform, and their
associated stress levels. Because initial service life projections do not take these upgrades into
account, manufacturer estimates of aircraft design life can be overly optimistic. Therefore, our
models include indicator variables for the F/A-18C/D Enhanced Performance Engine (EPE)
Upgrade and the F/A-18A avionics upgrade. We also obtained data on the age of each aircraft
in order to proxy for a variety of factors related to repetitive metal deformation and corrosion,
which influence the level of airframe fatigue expended over time.
The bulk of the operational data used to estimate the model was obtained from the Naval
Aviation Maintenance and Material Management (AV-3M) System. This database contains
extensive operational data on individual aircraft, including daily flight records, squadron
information and landing records. We merged the AV-3M data with information on reported
fatigue levels from the SAFE database in order to estimate the empirical model. Table II lists
the characteristics of the joint AV-3M/SAFE database. The record of historical SAFE data
collected under a consistent methodology limits the length of each sample. This length is
smaller for the EA-6B than the other two TMS.
Nearly all operational aircraft in the DoN inventory over the respective data collection peri-
ods are included in the sample, though they may not necessarily have reported data every
month or quarter due to lapses associated with depot maintenance or certain deployments. In
order to investigate the impact of different operational scenarios on airframe fatigue, historical
flight records contained in the AV-3M data must be aggregated into categories representing
 TIRED TITANIUM 7

TABLE II AV-3M / SAFE Data Sample

F/A-18 EA-6B S-3B

Custody
Navy – Active Duty 347 61 94
Navy – Reserve 88 4 –
Marine – Active Duty 204 28 –
Marine – Reserve 71 – –
Training Squadron 228 36 22
Blue Angels 28 – –

Type-Model Series (Average Age in 2002 in Parenthesis)

F/A-18A (17.0 yrs) 313 – –
F/A-18B (18.1 yrs) 37 – –
F/A-18C (11.2 yrs) 451 – –
F/A-18D (10.5 yrs) 160 – –
EA-6B (20.8 yrs) – 129 –
S-3B (27.2 yrs) – – 116
Total in Sample 961 129 116
Average No. Reporting per Year 715 89 77

Total Flight Hour Proportions

Training 0.81 0.76 0.62
Support 0.12 0.10 0.30
Operations 0.01 0.01 0.05
Contigency 0.02 0.02 0.00
Combat 0.04 0.12 0.03
Data Range 1/91–9/02 5/97–12/02 1/93–9/02

different types of operational missions. In general, there are five major categories of flying
denoted by the first digit of the total mission requirement (TMR) code. These are: training,
support and logistics flights, operations flights conducted in support of tasking not designated
as contingency operations, contingency flights, and combat.
The proportion of flight hours in each general mission category by TMS is also reported in
Table II. Clearly, training missions make up the majority of flight hours, although there is
some variation in the levels across platforms. The S-3B carries out proportionally fewer train-
ing flights and logs nearly three times as many support flights as the other TMS, primarily due
to its aerial refueling role. The EA-6B Prowler has more associated combat hours, reflecting
its status as the only electronic attack aircraft available to all branches of the armed forces. As
a result, the demand for Prowlers in combat situations is higher than the F/A-18 and S-3B.
The 1991–2002 sample period encompasses two large combat operations as well as a
variety of smaller conflicts. The number of combat flight hours can be associated with each
operation through launch dates from flight records. For the F/A-18, approximately 21,981
combat hours were flown during Operation Desert Storm (First Gulf War), 38,842 hours were
flown during Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), and 48,309 combat hours corre-
spond to smaller conflicts. Flight hours logged during smaller conflicts appear to reflect Iraq
no-fly zone patrols, and operations in Kosovo, Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti.5 Although breaking
total flight hours into the five categories shown in Table II provides a useful snapshot of histor-
ical operational activity, there exists much heterogeneity within these categories with regard

5
Note that nearly all flights associated with combat operations are given the combat distinction, not just flights
where the pilot directly participates in a combat action.
8 C. D. MEYERHOEFER AND R. P. TROST

to the level of stress placed on the airframe and measured by the FLE index for any given
flight. In order to account for this heterogeneity in the statistical model, we further disaggre-
gate total flight hours into between 13 (for the S-3B) and 18 (for the F/A-18) different mission
categories having similar stress profiles using the TMR codes.
The AV-3M/SAFE database also contains information on landing records for all types of
landings, including arrested landings, airfield landings, and various types of “touch and go”
practice landings. Aside from capturing the stress of landings on the airframe, the inclusion of
cumulative landing counts is perhaps most important as a proxy for operational environment,
and in particular, whether the aircraft was sea-based or shore-based during a respective period.
Furthermore, counts of different landing categories can be used to account for variation in the
fatigue characteristics of missions flown from ships as opposed to land bases that are not
captured by TMR classifications.

STATISTICAL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION

Our statistical model of airframe life is specified as a recursive system of two equations, in
which the arrested landing index and critical fatigue index of each TMS is related to the oper-
ational determinants described above. The recursive specification arises because the change in
the FLE index is also a function of the number of accumulated arrested landings, or equiva-
lently, the change in the ALE index over the same period.6
The two-equation system is defined as:

∆FLEit = µ i + κ t + ρ ′Dit + β ′Xit + θ∆ALEit + δ ′Lit + γ ′Ait + ε it (1)

∆ALEit = α i + λ t + ζ ′Dit + π ′Xit + uit (2)

for time periods t = 2,…, T and aircraft i = 1,…, N. The dependent variable in each equation
represents the change in the respective index over a given time period, such that in equation
(1) ∆FLEit = FLEit − FLEit−1 and in equation (2) ∆ALEit = ALEit − ALEit−1. The vector Xit =
[X1,it,…, XK,it]′ represents observable flight hour levels corresponding to K different mission
classifications for aircraft i flown between time periods t − 1 and t, and has associated param-
eter vector β′ = [βi,…, βK]. Likewise, Lit is a vector of landing variables containing the total
number of landings of different types accumulated between periods t − 1 and t, Ait is a vector
containing the age and (sometimes) age squared of each aircraft in the respective period, and
Dit is a vector of operational control variables, including branch of service, squadron group
indicators such as Atlantic and Pacific Fleet, Navy and Marine Corps, performance upgrade
indicators, and in the case of the EA-6B a variable denoting whether the aircraft was subject
to a 3-G maneuver limitation.
Each of the equations in the system contains two intercept terms, one that varies over
aircraft and is constant over time (µi or αi), and another varying over time but not aircraft
(κt or λt). This two-way fixed effects specification (Greene, 2000) allows us to control for
unobservable aircraft-specific effects, such as configurational differences or reliability
attributes that impact FLE and ALE, as well as unobservable time specific effects, such as
minor changes in FLE measurement that are constant across aircraft. Finally, the error terms

6
The reverse, however, is not true since there is little reason to believe that FLE accumulation in the current
period affects ALE, especially if the indexes are measured monthly or quarterly.
 TIRED TITANIUM 9

represent unobservable random shocks to the system and are assumed to be distributed as
follows: µ it ~ IN (0, σ µ ) and ε it ~ IN (0, σ ε ).
2 2

While the process generating changes in the FLE index is based on the relationship between
flight hours and metal deformation of the airframe, the process generating changes in ALE is
based on the operational environment and launch and recovery schedules associated with
different types of flying. Therefore, we can reasonably assume uit and εit are uncorrelated and
consistently estimate equations (1) and (2) separately using ordinary least squares. The FLE
equation is estimated on the entire sample of aircraft in all time periods, but the ALE equation
is only applicable while aircraft are deployed aboard ships. Hence, it is estimated on a reduced
sample of ship-based aircraft, determined by taking the ratio of arrested landings, ship touch-
and-gos and bolters to field landings and field touch-and-gos in each time period. If this ratio
exceeds 25% the aircraft are included in the ship-based sample.
The estimation procedure outlined above is adapted slightly in order to model FLE associ-
ated with the F/A-18’s vertical tail. Although there are five separate fatigue indexes corre-
sponding to different zones on the vertical tail, we wish to determine the impact of missions
on overall tail fatigue. This is done by jointly estimating five VT FLE equations, each speci-
fied as in equation (1), while imposing the restriction that the parameters of all five equations
are the same. Allowing the errors terms to be correlated across equations, the five-equation
system is estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions.

Forecasting Procedure
Equations (1) and (2) can be used to project future FLE and ALE levels and to simulate the
impact of changing operational requirements on aircraft inventories. By replacing the popula-
tion parameters in each equation with their consistently estimated counterparts, the following
forecasting equations are defined:

ˆ ˆ
it +1 = FLEit + µ i + ρ ′Dit +1 + β ′Xit +1 + θ∆ALEit +1 + δ ′Lit +1 + γ ′Ait +1
ˆ
FLE ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (3)

ˆ
it +1 = ALEit + α i + ζ ′Dit +1 + π ′Xit +1
ˆ
ALE ˆ ˆ ( 4)

where ∆ALE ˆ 7
i ,t +1 is predicted from equation (4). If future mission assignments and deploy-
ment schedules are assumed to follow historical patterns, the form of the forecasting equations
can be modified to reflect this assumption. Let PX1 ,K, PX K denote the average proportion of
flight hours in each mission category, and PL1 ,K, PLH denote average proportion of non-
arrested landings in each category. If XTOT,t and LTOT,t are the total number of flight hours and
non-arrested landings in a given time period then equations (3) and (4) can be equivalently
written as:

ˆ ˆ
it +1 = FLEit + µ i + ρ ′Dit +1 + ( β1 PX1 + K + β K PX K ) XTOT ,t +1 + θ∆ALEit +1 +
ˆ
FLE ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ

(δˆ1 PL1 + K + δˆ H PLH ) LTOT ,t +1 + γˆAit +1 (3b)

ˆ
it +1 = ALEi ,t + 5 (α i + ζ ′Dit +1 + (π 1 PX1 + K + π K PX K ) XTOT ,t +1)
ˆ
ALE 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ( 4 b)

7
Note that the time specific controls κt and λt are omitted from the forecasting equations. Since these terms are
measured relative to the last quarter (or year) of the sample, they effectively normalize past fatigue and arrested land-
ing measurements to present values.
10 C. D. MEYERHOEFER AND R. P. TROST

The right hand side of equation (4b) must be scaled down by two fifths in comparison to
equation (4) to reflect the average amount of time aircraft spend deployed and training aboard
ships.8 When the total flight hours and non-arrested landing levels that the aircraft are
expected to log in the future are be inserted into equations (3b) and (4b), the model predicts
FLE and ALE given historical mission emphasis, squadron assignments, and associated
aircraft age growth. If one expects the mission mix to change in the future, the proportion vari-
ables can be changed accordingly so the forecast will reflect the new operational situation.
In the case of the F/A-18, the forecasting methodology described above requires additional
refinement to capture the broad operational environment and specific fleet management tech-
niques unique to this platform. Otherwise, the model may underestimate actual operational
lives. In general, the F/A-18 fleet is composed of mostly A, B and D aircraft that are used
almost exclusively for training or expeditionary operations and rarely deploy aboard carriers,
and series C aircraft that deploy with frequency. While high levels of FLE and very low ALE
characterize the former land-based training environment, the opposite is true of shipboard
operations. Therefore, it is not uncommon to find F/A-18A aircraft that are near their FLE
limit, but far from their ALE limit, while F/A-18C are close to reaching 100% ALE, but have
much lower FLE levels.
In addition to the general categorization of land-based and ship-based aircraft, there is also
a distinction between Navy and Marine Corps aircraft.9 While Marine Corps squadrons that
deploy with the Navy operate much like other deployable aircraft, land-based Marine Corps
aircraft fly a very different mix of missions than the land-based training aircraft used by the
Navy. In particular, they are frequently engaged in expeditionary operational and combat
missions, a mission mix that also leads to fatigue indexes.
Maximizing the operating life of each aircraft requires that it reach its FLE and ALE SLL
at roughly the same time. In order to mitigate the current misalignment of SLLs for most F/A-
18s and extend the life of the fleet, NAVAIR is instituting squadron rotations for some aircraft.
F/A-18As currently operating from land bases, which have low ALE levels, are given a weapons
system and avionics upgrade and sent to deployable squadrons to replace F/A-18Cs with high
ALE levels, but relatively low WR FLE. The F/A-18Cs are then assigned to land-based squad-
rons where they can continue to expend WR fatigue without reaching the arrested landing SLL.
The basic forecasting equations in (3b) and (4b) can be modified as follows to capture the
above characteristics of F/A-18 fleet operations and management:

USN / MC
FLEdeployable = 2 5 F( Xtraining , Xsupport , Xops / combat , Pship
USN / MC
, ALE;⋅)
+ 3 5 F( Xtraining , Xsupport , Pland
USN / MC
, ALE;⋅) (5)

USN / MC
ALEdeployable = G( Xtraining , Xsupport , Xops / combat , Pship
USN / MC
;⋅) (6)

USN
FLEland = F( Xtraining , Xsupport , Pland
USN
;⋅) (7)

USMC
FLEland = F( Xtraining , Xsupport , Xops / combat , Pland
USMC
;⋅) (8)

8
This includes regular and surge deployments, composite unit training exercises (COMPUTEX), joint task force
exercises (JTFEX), carrier qualifications, and small land-based arrestment periods. Since equation (4) is estimated
using only the sample of deployed aircraft, equation (4b) must be scaled by the proportion of time aircraft are
deployed when it is re-formulated using total flight hours.
9
Although the Marines also fly the EA-6B, they operate only about 20 aircraft and mission profiles are more simi-
lar to Navy aircraft than for the F/A-18.
 TIRED TITANIUM 11

This system is written in more general notation, with differences in flight hour categories and
flight hour and landing proportions noted. In equations (5)–(8) the population of F/A-18s is
divided into two groups, the first being deployable aircraft and the second land-based training
aircraft. During the forecasting simulation, those in the former group cycle through equations
(5) and (6) until their ALE reaches 95%, at which point they are switched with training aircraft
in the latter group having relatively low ALE in comparison to FLE. Aircraft are swapped in
this manner until the entire population of training aircraft is exhausted, and then remain in their
current groups until either WR FLE or ALE index reaches 100%.10

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Parameter estimates from the statistical model defined by equations (1) and (2) provide a
means of comparing the relative stress of each mission assignment in terms of FLE and ALE,
net of other operational measures, operator, and aircraft characteristics. Table III contains the
coefficient estimates for each flight hour category from the F/A-18 FLE and ALE equations,
re-scaled so they represent the percentage change in the index per 1000 mission-specific
flight hours. For example, an additional 1000 flight hours of air-to-air combat training causes

TABLE III F/A-18 Fatigue Indexes and Flight Hour Proportions*

Flight Hour Category WR FLE VT FLE Total FH ALE On-Ship FH

Training Flights
Fundamentals, Instrument 6.4 3.7 16.3 −13.9 7.7
Field-Carrier Landing Practice 4.9 6.3 4.2 −5.3 5.6
Carrier Qualification 8.9 7.1 2.5 63.9 5.6
Air-to-Air 8.5 7.4 35.6 26.5 33.1
Attack (Air-to-Ground) 6.2 6.0 22.4 19.0 25.4
Other, Special Equipment 2.3ns 9.1 0.5 32.8 0.6

Operational/Contingency and Combat Flights

Attack (Target Pre-assigned) 7.7 7.4 1.2 16.7 3.3
Attack (CAS, Armed Recon.) 4.6 3.2 2.1 14.9 4.5
Attack (SAM / Flak Suppr.) 10.9 10.6 0.5 54.1 1.1
Escort 2.1 1.2ns 0.4 22.2 1.0
CAP, Anti-Air, Recon. 6.3 5.8 2.1 22.7 5.3
Intercept 23.4 36.2 0.0 −1.6 0.0

Support Flights
Ferry Flights 6.8 6.7 1.6 −18.9 0.8
Simulated Bogey 7.9 4.8 5.1 24.8 2.1
Check Flts, Experimental, Eval 5.6 4.5 4.0 20.6 3.0
Administrative Support 9.0 8.7 0.4 −5.4ns 0.1
Non-combat Patrol, SAR 10.0 1.2ns 0.6 34.3 0.4
Air Shows 13.9 6.2 0.2 — —
Model Adj. R-square 0.32 0.33** — 0.62 —

*Change in fatigue indexes per 1000 flight hours is reported with % of total or on-ship flight hours in each TMR category.
**Average over five VT FLE equations.
ns
Not statistically significant at either the 5% or 1% level (all other effects are significant).

10
Per NAVAIR planning, only F/A-18A/C aircraft are swapped across the two operational environments, while F/
A-18B/D remain in the land-based group throughout the simulation.
12 C. D. MEYERHOEFER AND R. P. TROST

the F/A-18 wing root (WR) index to increase by 8.5 percentage points, the vertical tail (VT)
index to increase by 7.4 percentage points, and the arrested landings fatigue index (ALE) to
increase by 26.5 percent, other things being equal. These estimates are of great use to aircraft
managers in that they convey the fatigue cost of planned training flights and expected opera-
tional commitments.
The percentage of total and shipboard flight hours attributable to each mission category is
also reported to provide an indication of the relative importance of WR and VT FLE and
ALE effects for policy and planning. Certain mission categories may be associated with very
high levels of FLE or ALE, but represent only a small proportion of total flight hours, making
them relatively unimportant from a fatigue management standpoint. However, if a mission
category has a large fatigue impact and accounts for a substantial share of flight hours,
planners may want to consider whether the fatigue costs of these missions are justified by
their benefits.
Since nearly all of the fatigue effects are significant at the 1% level, we note with a (ns)
cases of statistically insignificant estimates.11 Among training flights, some of the most
damaging types of flying for the WR and VT are associated with very small flight hour cate-
gories, such as carrier qualification and other/special equipment. However, the largest training
category accounting for 35% of the total flight hours, air-to-air combat, is also associated with
high levels of WR and VT FLE. Given the importance of the former as a SLL, there is an
implied trade-off between maintenance of air-to-air readiness and dogfighting skills and other
types of F/A-18 mission training. For example, attack, the second largest training category,
has an associated WR FLE that is over two percentage points lower than air-to-air training.
From an operational standpoint, attack missions accounted for approximately 58% of combat
flight hours between 1991 and 2002, whereas air-to-air engagements represented less than 1%
of total combat hours. Despite the fact that some skills are transferable across a variety of
mission profiles, this suggests current training and readiness requirements are designed to
provide high levels of readiness against low probability, but potentially catastrophic, airborne
attacks, and place less emphasis on developing skills for more typical air-to-ground combat
operations.
The estimates reveal the training mission associated with by far the highest level of ALE is
carrier qualification, followed by other training.12 On-ship flight hours allocated to this type
of training are relatively small, but the impact of carrier qualification on ALE is large enough
to have a significant effect on aircraft service life. Although the gap between shipboard flight
hours in attack and air-to-air training is smaller than for land-based training, air-to-air still
accounts for the greatest proportion of on-ship hours. In addition, air-to-air training missions
appear to be shorter and more frequent, suggesting a shift in training hours away from air-to-
air would reduce both WR FLE and ALE, resulting in longer aircraft service lives.
Converting the parameter estimates in Table III to elasticities helps provide an indication
of how much longer aircraft could remain in service if, for example, air-to-air training hours
were reduced by 50% and redistributed to attack training, holding total training flight hours
constant. The parameter estimates imply a WR FLE elasticity with respect to air-to-air and
attack training of 0.37 and 0.17, respectively. Therefore, the aforementioned policy change
results in an increase in wing root life (reduction in WR FLE) of approximately 5%.
Assuming that the typical aircraft service life is 20 years and aircraft attrition is due solely

11
The full set of regression results is available from the authors upon request. In theory none of the parameter
estimates should be negative, although we do get a few statistically significant negative effects in the ALE equation.
This may result from our limited ability to determine precisely when aircraft are at sea.
12
The high ALE levels attributable to other/special equipment training suggest a large proportion of flight hours
in this nondescript category go to practicing carrier landings.
 TIRED TITANIUM 13

to WR FLE, this translates into an additional year of life for each aircraft. Thus, 665 aircraft
could provide as much service life under the new training regime with less air-to-air training
as the current stock of 700 aircraft under the old training regime, saving at least $1 billion in
procurement costs and $805 million in operating and support costs over the design life of
the aircraft.
In contrast to the high flight hour levels of training missions, operational/contingency, and
combat flight hours represent only 6.3% of total flight hours, so their fatigue impact is compar-
atively less important. The WR FLE impact of attack flights varies depending on the particular
mission profile with an overall weighted average impact of 6.4%, which is slightly higher than
the 6.2% level associated with attack training. This similarity in mission stress between
combat and training, however, does not hold for air-to-air category, with combat intercepts
proving to be much more stressful than air-to-air training. Surface-to-air missile (SAM) and
flak suppression missions result in high levels of ALE, but historically account for only 1% of
on-ship flight hours. Nonetheless, ALE from these missions could become significant under
sustained combat operations.
The analysis of fatigue effects associated with F/A-18 support flights leads to some inter-
esting findings. Even after controlling for the effect of squadron assignment to the Blue
Angels, the Navy’s flight demonstration team, participation in air shows leads to high FLE.
Based on AV-3M data, we find that the average yearly cost per aircraft (b/w 1992 and 2002)
of depot-level repairs for an F/A-18A assigned to the Blue Angels is $198,000, which is 58%
less than the comparable cost for an active duty F/A-18A. Both the large fatigue impact of air
shows and relatively low depot support cost of the Blue Angels suggests that the Navy may
want to re-consider the inclusion of active duty aircraft in air shows in addition to the Angels.
Although the high fatigue effects from air shows are not particularly surprising, administrative
support and ferry flights seems to be associated with higher fatigue levels than one might
anticipate a priori, considering their primary purpose is to move people or aircraft from one
location to another. In fact, administrative support flights are comparable in airframe stress to
air-to-air training, while ferry flights are slightly more damaging than fundamentals and
instrument training.
Predicting the impact of different types of flying on airframe fatigue indexes is particularly
important for the EA-6B community, which has experienced persistent fatigue problems. EA-
6B airframes are older than typical F/A-18s and earlier aircraft were manufactured with 7079
type aluminum, which demonstrated poor stress corrosion characteristics. As a result, a fatigue
management program has been in place since the late 1990s whereby all aircraft are issued a
quota of 4G “equivalent” hits13 to be expended on an annual basis, while high wing center
panel (WCP) FLE aircraft are subject to a 3G operational restriction. Although it took several
years for pilots to adjust to the new restrictions and incorporate them into their flying behavior,
there are signs the fatigue management program is successfully extending the life of Prowler
airframes.
Because the EA-6B’s mission is more narrowly defined than that of the F/A-18, fewer
mission categories are included in the model results presented in Table IV. In addition, we
found large statistical differences in the fatigue impacts of some training missions in the 1997
to 2001 period when compared with 2002, so the percentage change in WCP FLE per 1000
flight hours is reported separately for the latter year. The time period differences are rather
dramatic, with fatigue impacts dropping to less that half their earlier levels in 2002. For
example, 1000 flight hours of carrier qualification training in the earlier period lead to an
increase in WCP fatigue of 32 percentage points, whereas the fatigue impact was only

13
Higher-level G hits can be converted to 4G equivalents.
14 C. D. MEYERHOEFER AND R. P. TROST

TABLE IV EA-6B Fatigue Indexes and Flight Hour Proportions*

Flight Hour Category WR FLE** Total FH ALE On-Ship FH

Training Flights
Fundamentals, Instrument 7.0 49.5 2.0 41.4
Carrier Qualification 31.5 / 9.0 2.6 0.6 5.0
Air-to-Air 56.7 / 21.0 1.4 7.4 1.7
ECM Equipment 10.0 / 4.4 11.0 2.5 18.9
Other (Attack, FCLP) 0.0 5.4 0.2 6.7

Operational, Contingency, and Combat Flights

Attack (Target Pre-assigned) 0.8 0.2 — —
Attack (SAM / Flak Suppr.) 2.8 10.7 1.3 13.0
Attack (ECM Support) 2.6 7.8 2.3 4.5
ECM / Photo Recon. 14.5 0.9 2.6 0.7

Support Flights
All Support 4.3 10.3 1.6 7.5
Model Adj. R-square 0.43 — 0.45 —

*Change in fatigue indexes per 1000 flight hours is reported with % of total or on-ship flight hours in each TMR category.
**Left index change is for the 1997–2001 period, while right change is for 2002.

9 percentage points in 2002. This clearly demonstrates the greater awareness by pilots of the
necessity to mitigate WCP FLE and reduce in-mission stress in order to preserve aircraft
stocks.
In addition to reductions in fatigue within particular mission categories, we also found
statistically significant decreases in WCP FLE for aircraft subject to 3G restrictions. These
aircraft accumulated 0.11 percentage points less WCP FLE per quarter than aircraft not 3G
limited. Because this effect has been netted out in the above results, the fatigue estimates imply
that changes in pilot behavior have lead to both lower baseline WCP FLE for 3G limited
aircraft and recent reductions in mission stress for all aircraft.
The empirical distributions of FLE and ALE for the S-3B suggest arrested landing accumu-
lation is a far greater threat to inventory sustainability than FLE. Therefore, our empirical
analysis concentrates on modeling the dynamics underlying ALE and assumes FLE
constraints are unlikely to bind before the S-3B squadrons are replaced. Aerial refueling has
become the S-3B’s primary mission over the past 12 years and the results in Table V bear this
out. Non-combat and operational/combat refueling accounts for the largest share of non-train-
ing flight hours by a heavy margin and leads to high levels of ALE. Because there must be an
S-3B in the air at all times when aircraft are recovering, aerial re-fueling missions are frequent
but not necessarily long in duration.
The high level of ALE exhibited by the S-3B for aerial re-fueling has important implications
for future acquisition planning and fleet management. Rather than replacing the S-3B with a
dedicated tanking asset, the DoN plans to add the refueling mission to F/A-18’s portfolio and
have it performed by newly acquired F/A-18 Super Hornets. Our results suggest that doing so
will lead to large increases in ALE for these aircraft and exacerbate the problem of dispropor-
tionately high levels of ALE for frequently deployed aircraft. Therefore, in the future, care
must be taken to ensure that F/A-18s performing the tanking mission are rotated out to land-
based squadrons so they do not accumulate ALE too quickly and risk reaching their SLL
prematurely. Since the F/A-18Es used for tanking will have the same performance and design
characteristics as other series E aircraft, the logistical cost of rotating them is negligible, while
the saving in airframe fatigue could be substantial.
 TIRED TITANIUM 15

TABLE V S-3B Fatigue Index and Flight Hour Proportions*

Flight Hour Category ALE On-Ship FH

Training Flights
Fundamentals, Instrument, FCLP 0.0 26.1
Carrier Qualification 47.8 4.6
Air-to-Air 22.6 0.6
Attack (Air-to-Ground) 9.4 11.4
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 5.8 9.2
Other, Special Equipment 13.0 1.1

Operational, Contingency, and Combat Flights

Attack (CAS, Armed Recon, Other) 20.3 2.0
Aerial Refueling 18.3 4.0
Escort, ASW, CAS, Anti-Air 9.4 0.5
Reconnaisance 11.7 3.9

Support Flights
Non-combat Aerial Refueling 20.8 24.4
Non-combat Patrol, SAR 8.2 3.4
Model Adj. R-square 0.63 —

*Change in ALE index per 1000 flight hours is reported with % of on-ship flight hours in each TMR category.

Inventory Forecasts
In addition to determining the impact of mission-specific flight hours and other exogenous
factors on FLE and ALE, the statistical model can be used to forecast future levels of these
fatigue indexes for individual aircraft. The model is able to predict when an aircraft will reach
its SLL and which SLL (100% FLE or 100% ALE) will be the binding determinant of the
aircraft’s service life. Using this information, we are able to construct overall inventory
profiles resulting from different assumptions about future operational requirements.14
In most cases, the Navy and Marine Corps cannot maintain current aircraft stocks with-
out prolonging the life of the fleet through service life extension programs (SLEPs), such
as the $2 million per aircraft fuselage center barrel replacement program (CBR+), and other
fatigue mitigation strategies. Our projections can be used to determine whether these strate-
gies are sufficient to sustain aircraft stocks if future operational tempo (optempo) matches
historical levels. Since maintaining inventories is even more difficult under higher
optempo, the impact of prolonged future combat operations on F/A-18 stocks is also
investigated.
Figure 4 shows the F/A-18 inventory projection resulting from equations (5)–(8) based
on historical flight patterns without any intervention by aircraft managers to mitigate
airframe fatigue or extend aircraft service lives. Beginning in 2007, the total inventory level
falls short of the required number of approximately 722 aircraft denoted by the dotted hori-
zontal line.15 Clearly, the rate of F/A-18E/F and JSF acquisitions is too slow to keep pace
with the fatigue-induced retirement of existing aircraft. Aircraft in deployable squadrons are

14
Although only F/A-18 and EA-6B projections are reported below, S-3B forecasts are available from the
authors. They show that inventories are more than sufficient to last through squadron de-commissioning and the
transfer of the aerial refueling mission to the F/A-18E.
15
This number is based on the somewhat smaller final inventory level that is achieved after all newly acquired
Super Hornets and JSF are brought into service. Since the newer aircraft are more productive, the same operational
commitments can be fulfilled with a smaller overall inventory.
16 C. D. MEYERHOEFER AND R. P. TROST

FIGURE 4 F/A-18 inventory projection based on historical usage patterns.

retired from service based on either ALE or WR FLE (FLE Ship), while those in land-based
squadrons necessarily reach their WR FLE limit (FLE Land) and must be grounded.
Attrition in deployable squadrons is due exclusively to ALE until 2007, and it is not until
FIGURE 4 F/A-18 inventory projection based on historical usage patterns.

2010 that FLE begins to surpass ALE as the leading cause of deployable aircraft retirement.
Land-based squadrons maintain the majority of their inventories until 2007, after which inven-
tories begin to decline quickly, causing a substantial drop in available aircraft between 2008
and 2010. Although F/A-18E/F acquisitions begin to accumulate immediately, a large propor-
tion of total procurements must be used for the aerial refueling mission and to replace F-14
squadrons, leading to a significant shortfall of aircraft until JSF acquisitions begin to re-build
inventories. Without any intervention by NAVAIR, the inventory deficit exceeds 400 aircraft
in 2014 if aircraft are flown in a manner consistent with historical mission assignments.
Due to the large and somewhat anticipated shortfall of aircraft between 2008 and 2023, the
DoN has funded a substantial number of F/A-18 fuselage center barrel replacements (CBR+)
to extend the life of the current fleet. In particular, 192 CBR+ have been funded through 2009
at a total cost of $384 million, and another 158 have been planned between 2010 and 2013 at
an approximate cost of $316 million. The CBR+ service life extension program gives an
aircraft 22% more WR FLE and 35% additional ALE before structural limits are reached.16
Figure 5 shows inventory projections after accounting for scheduled and planned CBR+.
Although the current fleet lasts much longer than before, a large shortage of aircraft remains
between 2008 and 2023. For example, the deficit in 2011 drops from approximately 273 in
Figure 5 to 109 aircraft after accounting for CBR+. The maximum shortfall occurs in the last
quarter of 2015, but is nearly as critical as before at 364 total aircraft.
Whereas 67 deployable aircraft attrite from ALE in Figure 5, only 21 reach the ALE struc-
FIGURE 5 F/A-18 inventory projection based on historical usage patterns with CBR+.

tural life limit (SLL) in Figure 6. Many of the aircraft closest to their SLL at the beginning on
the projection are F/A-18C with high ALE indexes. These are among the majority of F/A-18

16
Only series C and D aircraft are eligible for this SLEP.
 TIRED TITANIUM 17

FIGURE 5 F/A-18 inventory projection based on historical usage patterns with CBR+.

to receive the CBR+, and since the SLEP gives aircraft proportionally more ALE than FLE, a
large percentage subsequently retire from WR FLE, but at a much later date than previously.
The CBR+ also extends the life of land-based F/A-18D, leading to higher land-based invento-
ries between 2008 and 2012. Nonetheless, our forecasts predict the number of scheduled
CBR+ is not sufficient to sustain inventory levels through the Super Hornet/JSF transition.
However, NAVAIR plans to swap high WR FLE and low ALE aircraft from a land-based

FIGURE 6 F/A-18 inventory projection based on historical usage patterns with CBR+ and squadron rotation.
18 C. D. MEYERHOEFER AND R. P. TROST

squadron with high ALE but low WR FLE aircraft in deployable squadrons in order to
maximize their total fatigue expended before retirement or overhaul.
This squadron rotation strategy has the potential to increase service life, but it is not costless.
FIGURE 6 F/A-18 inventory projection based on historical usage patterns with CBR+ and squadron rotation.

The reason why many series A and older series C aircraft are land-based is because they lack
the “smart-bomb” capabilities and more advanced avionics characteristic of F/A-18C in
deployable squadrons. In order to make them deployable, they must undergo costly upgrades
to their avionics and weapons systems.17 After the upgrades have taken place, deployable
aircraft can be swapped with land-based aircraft, producing the inventory profile in Figure 6.
Since most of the aircraft with high initial ALE receive the CBR+, only 21 F/A-18C are left
that retire from ALE. These aircraft can be rotated into land-based squadrons and 21 relatively
low WR FLE land-based F/A-18A/C placed in deployable squadrons. However, the overall
effect on inventories is minimal, although squadron rotations do eliminate the ALE SLL as a
service life constraint and extend the life of a few aircraft. Nonetheless, after the CBR+ has
been taken into account, the number of available aircraft to rotate is too small to have any
significant impact on attrition rates.18
Over the past decade there has been an increasing trend in the number and duration of
combat operations involving Naval aircraft. Such mission assignments generally result in an
increase in flying hours and airframe stress levels that clearly divert from typical peacetime
operations. Increased combat operations can have a significant impact on airframe life and
must be taken into account by managers to avoid future inventory shortfalls. In order to predict
the effect of sustained combat on inventories we use actual operational data from Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF, Second Gulf War) to determine the effect of engaging the fleet in a
different number of conflict years.19
The effect on F/A-18 inventories of 2, 4 and 6 years of sustained combat is reported in
Figure 7. Clearly, the higher optempo and stressful missions associated with combat opera-
tions lead to shortened aircraft service lives, although inventory depletions appear to be rela-
tively minor under shorter conflict periods. For example, the impact of an additional 2 conflict
years on inventories in 2012 is only 20 fewer aircraft, with the shortfall increasing to 44 aircraft
under 4 conflict years and 72 aircraft under 6 years of sustained combat.20 Therefore, the inven-
tory impacts of larger conflicts can be significant and lead to large shortfalls, but shorter
operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OIF do not pose a significant
threat to inventory sustainability, provided they do not occur with great frequency.
The statistical model of WCP FLE and ALE defined by equations (3b) and (4b) is used to
FIGURE 7 F/A-18 inventories in a high-conflict environment

make inventory forecasts for the EA-6B similar to those presented above for the F/A-18. The
model simulations reveal that all aircraft eventually retire from WCP FLE, implying the ALE
SLL is essentially a non-binding constraint for the EA-6B. The projections are based on a
starting inventory of 110 aircraft, of which 90 are allocated to the Navy and 20 to the Marine

17
Although we were unable to obtain comprehensive cost estimates of the full package of necessary upgrades, a
good proxy is the $1.7 million per aircraft cost of the US-Israeli Litening-Advanced Targeting (AT) system, recently
endorsed by USMC for their F/A-18s. Therefore, rotating 21 aircraft would cost $35.7 million in necessary
upgrades.
18
We test the sensitivity of these forecasts to variation in the scaling factor of 2/5 used in equation (5), denoting
the amount of time aircraft spend aboard ships. If this factor is an underestimate then our results will minimize the
beneficial effects of squadron rotations. However, increasing the factor to 3/5 does not significantly influence the
results. In addition, the 18 year service life projection for the F/A-18 (with scheduled CBR+) generated by our model
corresponds to forecasts in Wu et al. (1995).
19
A conflict year is defined as one year of sustained combat under the mission assignments and average levels of
aggregate flight hours and non-arrested landings observed during OIF. Since historical flight patterns include the
average level of combat operations occurring during the past 12 years, a conflict year should be interpreted as addi-
tional tasking beyond historical averages, as would occur during a sustained conflict.
20
Since combat operations tend to be highly ship-based, higher levels of conflict will also change the number of
aircraft that retire from ALE as opposed to FLE in favor of the former.
 TIRED TITANIUM 19

FIGURE 7 F/A-18 inventories in a high-conflict environment.

Corps. Since the Marines have made no plans to procure a replacement for their aircraft, we
assume they will retain the 20 longest living EA-6Bs, with the other 90 aircraft slated for
replacement by the EA-18G.
Our simulation predicts that without any intervention by NAVAIR nearly the entire stock
of EA-6B aircraft will reach their WCP FLE SLL before replacement EA-18G acquisitions
enter service in 2006. Of course, airframe fatigue is a well-known problem in the EA-6B
community and in addition to previously mentioned fatigue mitigation strategies, the DoN has
funded 90 WCP replacements valued at approximately $450 million, which effectively set the
FLE index on this critical component back to zero. The additional service life gained by “re-
winging” 90 aircraft successfully extends the life of the fleet and avoids a significant inventory
shortfall. However, our forecasts still indicate a small drop in EA-6B stocks below 90 aircraft
at several points during the EA-18G transition. In order to avoid these shortfalls, eight
additional re-wings are necessary, four of which must occur during 2004, followed by three in
2005 and one in 2006. The total cost of the additional re-wings is approximately $40 million.
Re-winging also extends the life of the 20 longest living aircraft, so the Marine Corps should
be able to keep their EA-6B fleet operational for an additional two years, before aircraft start
retiring in 2011.21

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this study, a statistical model of airframe life is developed and estimated using several
operational databases maintained by NAVAIR on F/A-18, EA-6B, and S-3B aircraft. Model

21
Note that the EA-6B projections presented are based on historical data. However, recent airframe inspections
by NAVAIR have revealed a larger number of cracks than expected. If the WCP FLE SLL is revised downward as a
result, then additional re-wings will be necessary beyond the eight we recommend.
20 C. D. MEYERHOEFER AND R. P. TROST

estimates are used to derive the impact on both FLE and ALE of flight hours in a variety of
mission areas; encompassing training, support flights, and combat operations. Results for the
F/A-18 suggest an increase in attack training at the expense of air-to-air training, if operation-
ally feasible, would reduce the rate of aircraft fatigue as measured by both indexes. Over the
long run, this would allow the DoN to procure fewer aircraft while meeting the same opera-
tional needs, provided that alternatives to in-flight air-to-air training could be found so as to
maintain current levels of proficiency. Possible training alternatives include the judicious use
of simulators to make time spent in the cockpit more productive, or the specialization of pilots
in different mission areas.
The EA-6B community has undergone a similar re-evaluation of training requirements in
recent years in order to extend the life of their airframes to the point when a new EA-18G
electronic attack aircraft is brought online. In addition to educating pilots about the damaging
effects of high G maneuvers, managers have also allocated a limited number of 4+ G-hits to
each aircraft on an annual basis. Our EA-6B WCP FLE model reveals that the community’s
fatigue mitigation policies have been effective in recent years, with the fatigue impact of
training flights decreasing significantly in 2002 in comparison to the 1997–2001 period.
In addition to quantifying the impact of different mission assignments and other factors on
FLE and ALE, the statistical models are used to make forecasts of future aircraft inventory levels
to determine whether stocks can be maintained through Naval Aviation’s transition to the Super
Hornet and JSF. Inventory projections for the F/A-18 fleet suggest action must be taken to avoid
a significant shortfall in inventories between 2010 and 2022. The DoN has already funded fuse-
lage center barrel replacements (CBR+) to give aircraft additional FLE and ALE, but these
appear to be insufficient to maintain F/A-18 stocks. The forecasts also show that planned squad-
ron rotations have only a marginal effect on service life after CBR+ is taken into account.
Another factor with the potential to accelerate airframe fatigue is higher operational tempo
and involvement in future conflicts. We use data from Operation Iraqi Freedom to simulate
the impact of sustained future combat operations on F/A-18 inventories. It is found that short
and infrequent conflicts do not lead to large inventory rundowns in future years, but the fatigue
impact of long sustained conflicts is significant. Furthermore, participation in combat opera-
tions changes the distribution of aircraft that retire from WR FLE and ALE in favor of the
latter. In light of the impending inventory shortfalls and continued increase in the proportion
of flight hours in combat operations, our findings suggest that either the CBR+ SLEP must be
expanded, or acquisition schedules accelerated in order to maintain the current stock of oper-
ations F/A-18 aircraft.
Inventory sustainability does not appear to be as large a problem for the EA-6B as the F/A-
18, provided the planned SLEP is fully implemented. We find that some additional WCP
replacements are necessary to sustain Navy and Marine Corps inventories at desired levels,
but by and large, the SLEP is sufficient to maintain inventories through the EA-18G transition.
However, if the WCP FLE SLL is revised downward due to recent findings of high crack initi-
ation levels in current aircraft, then additional WCP replacements will need to be budgeted to
maintain inventories. Indeed, of the three platforms we include in the analysis only the S-3B
is found to have sufficient fatigue life to meet its planned retirement from service without
intervention by DoN acquisition planners.
Overall, the results show the value of a fatigue-based approach to acquisition planning and
the evaluation of current operational policies. For tactical aircraft, airframe fatigue is proving
to be a larger constraint on aircraft service life than previously thought. Although more
research is needed to link fatigue forecasts to the age-related growth in operating and support
costs, these forecasts provide policy makers with important information that can be used to
foresee large budgetary commitments, allowing them to modify acquisition schedules or seek
additional sources of funding in order to avoid inventory shortfalls.
 TIRED TITANIUM 21

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