Explore the full ebook collection and download it now at textbookfull.

com

Business, Government and Economic Institutions in

China 1st Edition Xiaoke Zhang

https://textbookfull.com/product/business-government-and-
economic-institutions-in-china-1st-edition-xiaoke-zhang/

OR CLICK HERE

DOWLOAD EBOOK

Browse and Get More Ebook Downloads Instantly at https://textbookfull.com

Click here to visit textbookfull.com and download textbook now
 Your digital treasures (PDF, ePub, MOBI) await
Download instantly and pick your perfect format...

Read anywhere, anytime, on any device!

Governing Corporate Tax Management: The Role of State

Ownership, Institutions and Markets in China Chen Zhang

https://textbookfull.com/product/governing-corporate-tax-management-
the-role-of-state-ownership-institutions-and-markets-in-china-chen-
zhang/
textbookfull.com

Biota Grow 2C gather 2C cook Loucas

https://textbookfull.com/product/biota-grow-2c-gather-2c-cook-loucas/

textbookfull.com

American government : institutions and policies Sixteenth

Edition Bose

https://textbookfull.com/product/american-government-institutions-and-
policies-sixteenth-edition-bose/

textbookfull.com

Unpacking EU Policy-Making towards China: How Member

States, Bureaucracies, and Institutions Shape its China
Economic Policy Bas Hooijmaaijers
https://textbookfull.com/product/unpacking-eu-policy-making-towards-
china-how-member-states-bureaucracies-and-institutions-shape-its-
china-economic-policy-bas-hooijmaaijers/
textbookfull.com
Environmental Management in China Policies and
Institutions Jing Wu

https://textbookfull.com/product/environmental-management-in-china-
policies-and-institutions-jing-wu/

textbookfull.com

American Government: Institutions and Policies James Q

Wilson Et Al.

https://textbookfull.com/product/american-government-institutions-and-
policies-james-q-wilson-et-al/

textbookfull.com

Culture and Institutions in the Economic Growth of Japan

Juro Teranishi

https://textbookfull.com/product/culture-and-institutions-in-the-
economic-growth-of-japan-juro-teranishi/

textbookfull.com

Investing in China and Chinese Investment Abroad Xiuping

Zhang

https://textbookfull.com/product/investing-in-china-and-chinese-
investment-abroad-xiuping-zhang/

textbookfull.com

Green Finance in China: Policies, Experiences and

Challenges Wenting Zhang

https://textbookfull.com/product/green-finance-in-china-policies-
experiences-and-challenges-wenting-zhang/

textbookfull.com
International Political Economy Series

Business, Government and

Economic Institutions in China

Edited by
Xiaoke Zhang and Tianbiao Zhu
International Political Economy Series

Series editor

Timothy M. Shaw
Visiting Professor
University of Massachusetts Boston, USA

Emeritus Professor
University of London, UK
The global political economy is in flux as a series of cumulative crises
impacts its organization and governance. The IPE series has tracked its
development in both analysis and structure over the last three decades. It
has always had a concentration on the global South. Now the South
increasingly challenges the North as the centre of development, also
reflected in a growing number of submissions and publications on indebted
Eurozone economies in Southern Europe. An indispensable resource for
scholars and researchers, the series examines a variety of capitalisms and
connections by focusing on emerging economies, companies and sectors,
debates and policies. It informs diverse policy communities as the estab-
lished trans-Atlantic North declines and ‘the rest’, especially the BRICS,
rise.

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/series/13996
 Xiaoke Zhang • Tianbiao Zhu
Editors

Business, Government
and Economic
Institutions in China
Editors
Xiaoke Zhang Tianbiao Zhu
Alliance Manchester Business School Institute for Advanced Study in
University of Manchester Humanities and Social Sciences
Manchester, UK Zhejiang University
Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China

International Political Economy Series

ISBN 978-3-319-64485-1    ISBN 978-3-319-64486-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64486-8

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017959575

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub-
lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institu-
tional affiliations.

Cover image © Rob Friedman/iStockphoto.com

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Acknowledgements

As editors, we wish to thank all the authors for their willingness to respond
to our editorial suggestions and their valuable contribution to the book.
We also extend our appreciation to Wyn Grant, Gregory Noble, Richard
Whitley, Yongping Wu and the anonymous reviewer for their comments,
criticisms and support. While organizing the international symposium in
August 2014 and the publication workshop in January 2016 from which
this book was born, we received and gratefully acknowledge financial sup-
port from China’s National Social Science Fund (project number:
13BJL027) and the Zhejiang University Research Fund (project number:
188020-193810401/054). Finally, we are grateful to Timothy Shaw, the
series editor, and Christina Brian, editorial director for politics and inter-
national studies at Palgrave Macmillan, for encouraging the project.

Xiaoke Zhang
Tianbiao Zhu

v
 Contents

Part I Introduction   1

1 Understanding Business–Government Relations in China:

Changes, Causes and Consequences   3
Xiaoke Zhang and Tianbiao Zhu

2 State–Business Relations in China’s Changing

Economic Order  47
Tak-Wing Ngo

Part II Changes and Variations in Business–Government

Relations  79

3 The Evolution of Government–MNC Relations in China:

The Case of the Automotive Sector  81
Gregory T. Chin

4 Regional Business Associations in China: Changes

and Continuities 105
Juanfeng Liu and Jianjun Zhang

vii
viii CONTENTS

5 Trapped into Collusion: The Under-­Institutionalized

Taxation System and Local Business–State Relations
in China 139
Changdong Zhang

6 Chinese Private Entrepreneurs’ Formal Political

Connections: Industrial and Geographical Distribution 165
Jiangnan Zhu and Yiping Wu

7 International Context and China’s Business–Government

Relations 195
Tianbiao Zhu

Part III Institutional Consequences of Changing

Business–Government Relations 223

8 Business–Government Relations and Corporate

Governance Reforms 225
Richard W. Carney

9 The Changing Business–State Relations in China:

The View from Socialist Corporatism 255
Yukyung Yeo

10 State Structures, Business–State Relations,

and Multinational Corporate Behaviours: A Case
Study of Chinese Multinational Oil Companies 281
Jin Zhang

11 Business–State Interactions and Technology Development

Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Two Metropolises 313
Xiaoke Zhang

12 Conclusions and Reflections 341

Tianbiao Zhu and Xiaoke Zhang

Index 345
 Notes on Contributors

Richard W. Carney is Fellow at the College of Asia and the Pacific,

Australian National University.
Gregory Chin is Associate Professor at the Department of Political
Science, York University, Canada.
Juanfeng Liu is Assistant Professor at the School of International
Relations, University of International Business and Economics, China.
Tak-Wing Ngo is Professor at the Department of Government and
Public Administration, University of Macau.
Yiping Wu is Associate Professor at the School of Public Economics and
Administration, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.
Yukyung Yeo is Associate Professor at the College of International
Studies, Kyung Hee University, South Korea.
Changdong Zhang is Associate Professor at the School of Government,
Peking University.
Jianjun Zhang is Professor at the Guanghua School of Management,
Peking University.
Jin Zhang is Senior Research Fellow at the Cambridge China
Development Trust and university lecturer at Judge Business School,
University of Cambridge.

ix
x Notes on Contributors

Xiaoke Zhang is Professor at Alliance Manchester Business School,

University of Manchester.
Jiangnan Zhu is Associate Professor at the Department of Politics and
Public Administration, University of Hong Kong.
Tianbiao Zhu is Executive Dean and Professor at the Institute for
Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Zhejiang University.
 List of Figures

Fig. 6.1 The distribution of LPC across provinces 181

Fig. 6.2 The distribution of CPPCC across provinces 182
Fig. 8.1 The contribution of SOEs and private firms to the industrial
output of Shanghai and Guangdong, 2005–2011  235
Fig. 9.1 Profits and numbers of central state firms, 2003–2014 264
Fig. 9.2 Five hard years 265
Fig. 9.3 China’s anti-monopoly regime 272
Fig. 10.1 Governance structure of the Chinese oil industry  293

xi
 List of Tables

Table 1.1 Four ideal types of business–government relations 11

Table 1.2 State and market influences on the four varieties of
business–government relations 30
Table 2.1 Expectations of government–business relations under
different frameworks 50
Table 2.2 China in comparison with dominant models of state–business
relations52
Table 5.1 Typologies of state-business relationships 142
Table 5.2 Basic facts of seven counties 145
Table 5.3 Entrepreneurs with different levels of political connection
and their enterprise sizes 153
Table 6.1 Number of firms classified by industries in the sample 173
Table 6.2 Number of firms classified by provinces in the sample 174
Table 6.3 Average level of political connections across sectors 175
Table 6.4 Average level of political connections across provinces 179
Table 6.5 Overall LPC distribution across sectors 184
Table 6.6 Overall CPPCC distribution across sectors 185
Table 6.7 Overall LPC distribution across provinces 186
Table 6.8 Overall CPPCC distribution across provinces 188
Table 8.1 Business–government relations and their corporate
governance implications 234
Table 9.1 Return on assets of central SOEs 266
Table 9.2 SOE financial performance 266
Table 9.3 NDRC’s approval of investment projects, 2005–2013
(Yeo 2012) 269

xiii
xiv LIST OF TABLES

Table 10.1 Corporate governance and overseas investment of the

Chinese multinational oil companies 283
Table 10.2 State structure and state-business relations 284
Table 10.3 Co-evolution of state structure, industry structure, and
corporate governance in the Chinese oil industry 285
Table 10.4 Multinational corporate behaviour and state-business
relations287
Table 11.1 Divergent technology development regimes 318
Table 11.2 Business–state interactions and technology development
regimes330
Table 11.3 Business–state interactions, technology development
regimes, and innovation outcomes (2013) 337
 PART I

Introduction
 CHAPTER 1

Understanding Business–Government
Relations in China: Changes, Causes
and Consequences

Xiaoke Zhang and Tianbiao Zhu

Introduction
This book brings together conceptual and empirical analyses of the causes
and consequences of changing business–government relations in China
since the 1990s, against the backdrop of the country’s increased integra-
tion with the global political economy. More specifically, it provides an
interdisciplinary account of how the dominant pattern of interactions
between state actors, firms and business organizations has changed differ-
ently across regions and industries and how the changing varieties of these
interactions have causally interacted with the evolution of key economic

X. Zhang (*)
Alliance Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
T. Zhu
Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Zhejiang
University, Hangzhou, China

© The Author(s) 2018 3

X. Zhang, T. Zhu (eds.), Business, Government and Economic
Institutions in China, International Political Economy Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64486-8_1
4 X. ZHANG AND T. ZHU

institutions in China. The basic theoretical premise of the book is that

business–government relations comprise a key linchpin that defines the
Chinese political economy and calibrates the character of its constitutive
institutional arrangements.
In line with this analytical focus, the book has three different yet inter-
related objectives. In the first place, building on the recent comparative
political economy literature (Crouch et al. 2009; Hancke et al. 2007;
Zhang and Whitley 2013), it develops a typological framework for identi-
fying key dimensions to be included in cross-regional and cross-sectoral
comparisons and for establishing the guiding principles for elucidating the
diversity of business–government relations in China. Furthermore, the
book advances novel theoretical propositions concerning the primary
causes of changes and variations in the organization of state and business
actors and in the configuration of power relations and interactions between
them. Finally, it explores the causal pathways through which business–
government relations, as a key set of sociopolitical structures and pro-
cesses, have shaped emergent systems of economic control and coordination
across the regional and sectoral levels of analysis.
This introductory chapter sets the general backdrop against which the
central analytical objectives of the book are defined and its major contribu-
tions to theoretical and policy debates specified. It introduces a typology
of business–government relations, advances the main causal propositions
of changes and variations in business–state interactions, and explores the
impact of such interactions on the emergence of new market institutions.
It does so by drawing on, but not confining itself to, empirical evidence
presented in individual contributions to the book. The chapter concludes
by discussing the organization of the volume.

Key Contributions
By focusing on the above-mentioned three analytical objectives, the book
is intended to make a number of contributions to current theoretical and
policy debates on the changing nature of business–government relations
and its impact on newly emerging economic institutions in China.
To begin with, existing studies of business–government relations in
China have tended to be narrow in theoretical focus and fragmented in
analytical perspectives. Some have shown political actors in the state domain
as the causal agents of changes in business–government interactions and
 UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN CHINA… 5

portrayed business actors and their organizations largely as passive and sub-
ordinate objects of control and co-optation through state corporatist
mechanisms (Alpermann 2006; Dickson 2003, 2008; Foster 2008; Ong
2012; Unger 2008a; Walder 1995, 2003). Others have granted analytical
primacy to the growing role of economic actors and firms in structuring
relations with the state and emphasized horizontal interactions mediated
through market institutions, business associations and social networks as an
important defining feature of state–firm relations (Nee 1992; Nee and
Opper 2012; Peng 2004; Sun, Wright and Mellahi 2010; Tjosvold et al.
2008; Xin and Pearce 1996). Still others have sought to advance a micro-
theory of business and politics that explains the motivation of individual
firms to develop connections with various party and governmental entities,
the choices they make on tactics and strategies, and the impact of political
ties on their performance (Du and Girma 2010; Guo et al. 2014; Li et al.
2006; Park and Luo 2001; Peng and Luo 2000).
While these approaches shed important light on the manifestations and
consequences of changing business–government relations in China, they
do not exhaust the categories of potential patterns of such relations. They
have mainly concentrated on one set of analytical dimensions, largely to
the exclusion of others that are constitutive of interactions between the
state and businesses. As a result, they have precluded the theoretical pos-
sibility of more than one pattern of state–business ties existing in the
Chinese political economy. The typological framework to be developed in
this book, which focuses on both the authoritative governance of the
economy and the market coordination of socioeconomic activities, pro-
vides a more encompassing analytical tool for developing a holistic under-
standing of changing and divergent forms of state–business relations, as
will be shown below. This is particularly relevant, given that the ultimate
objective of the book is to illustrate how the interrelationship between
state agencies, firms and business organizations has varied across different
regions and industries and explain how these regional and sectoral varia-
tions have shaped the pattern and trajectory of economic institutional
changes in China.
Furthermore, the emphasis of many extant studies has tended to be
more on understanding how business–government relations in China have
been changing over time, particularly against the backdrop of the coun-
try’s increased integration with the global economy and continuous mar-
ket reforms, than on examining how and why such relations have changed
6 X. ZHANG AND T. ZHU

differently at the regional or sectoral levels of analysis. To the extent that

some studies have explored cross-regional or cross-sectoral variations in
state–business interactions (see Ernst and Naughton 2008; Huchet and
Richet 2002; McNally 2011; Segal 2003; Thun 2006), they have failed to
provide a systematic explanation of the sources of these variations (the few
exceptions include Kennedy 2005 and Tsai 2007). There has yet to be any
satisfying account of why economic agents have been more powerful in
shaping socioeconomic relations, business associations more autonomous,
or state–firm relations more cooperative and development-oriented in
some regions or industries than in others.
As indicated above, the typological framework that focuses on how
authoritative governance and market coordination interact to generate
different forms and patterns of state–business relations facilitates a com-
parative analysis of why such relations vary across divergent regional or
sectoral sociopolitical environments. In advancing their respective causal
propositions, individual contributions to the book explore how the impact
of global and market forces on changes in the structure and practice of
business–government ties have been mediated through the region-specific
or sector-specific characteristics of ideological orientations, state institu-
tions and market structures. By examining the causes and consequences of
changing business–government relations within a cross-regional and
cross-sectoral framework, this book introduces a more dynamic perspec-
tive into the study of the Chinese political economy and thus fills an
important analytical lacuna in the literature.
Finally, the literatures on business–government relations in China and
on economic institutions and institutional change have, until recently,
developed largely in isolation from each other. While there have been
scholarly efforts to integrate the analysis of state–firm interactions and
industrial transformations (Breznitz and Murphee 2011; Kennedy 2005;
McNally 2008; Segal 2003; Thun 2006), empirical studies on the impact
of changing interactions between state and business actors on the emer-
gence of new market institutions have been rare; cross-regional or cross-­
sectoral analyses of the causal linkage between different forms of
business–government ties and divergent patterns of economic institutional
reforms have been even rarer. This book aims to bring together both the
temporal and spatial comparisons of how the structure of business–gov-
ernment relations has varied and of how these variations have exerted
shaping influence on the process of institutional changes in China.
 UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN CHINA… 7

A Typology of Business–Government Relations

This section delineates the defining features of key analytical dimensions
that underpin business–government relations, develops some guiding
principles for categorizing and comparing the organization of these
dimensions that generates the varied contours of interactions between
state and business actors, and describes the different configurations of
such interactions across regions and industries in China.

Key Analytical Dimensions

Developing a typology of business–government relations, in such a vast
and diverse country as China, that is both conceptually parsimonious and
empirically encompassing is difficult. The difficulty mainly rests with the
lack of commonly accepted conceptual criteria for identifying key analyti-
cal dimensions that characterize business–government relations and for
ascertaining the number of distinct types of state–firm interactions,
although the regional and sectoral diversity of such interactions is widely
recognized (Breslin 2012; Kennedy 2005; Ngo this volume; Unger
2008b). However, there appears to be general agreement in the emerging
literature on the constitutive institutions of Chinese capitalism that the
authoritative governance of the economy and the market coordination of
socioeconomic activities are crucial components of interrelationships
between state actors, firms and business organizations (Fligstein and
Zhang 2010; Redding and Witt 2007; Zhang and Peck 2016).
The authoritative governance of the economy concerns the extent to
which the state structures its relationships with the business sector through
industrial targeting and intervention, market regulations and controls over
associational arrangements among various economic agents. Despite the
continuous process of market-oriented reforms, both central and local
governments in China have remained involved in steering and organizing
economic activities and outcomes, though the nature and levels of such
involvement have varied significantly across regions and industries (Huang
2008; McNally 2008; Naughton and Tsai 2015). On the other hand,
socioeconomic producer groups, particularly business, are also crucial
agents that coordinate economic action and structure market transactions
(Nee and Opper 2012; Redding and Witt 2007). Thus, to understand the
organizational diversity of business–government relations in China, the
authoritative governance of the economy needs to be viewed in close
8 X. ZHANG AND T. ZHU

interaction with the market coordination of socioeconomic activities that

pertains to the ability of business actors to organize themselves for collec-
tive action purposes. Such an ability is embodied in the degree of interfirm
collaborations, the development of business associations and the density of
interlinkages between firms and such third-party entities as financial and
research institutions.
In the first place, the state structures its relationship with business
actors through its efforts to protect or promote specific firms, sectors or
industries. These efforts affect the development of new technologies, the
restructuring of ailing industrial sectors and the performance and fortunes
of various enterprises. Here, we are concerned with how the state manage-
ment of industrial development shapes state–firm relations. In the less
state-led form of intervention, the state facilitates industrial development
and adjustment by organizing its strategies around public–private partner-
ships and even private initiatives and providing policy and institutional
support; it often does not target specific sectors or firms for special promo-
tion and discriminate against private domestic or foreign firms. In the
more dirigiste form, the state deploys a wide array of elaborate policy
instruments to manage resource allocation, production activities and
investment flows directly, with the view to aligning the behaviour and
incentives of market players with its industrial policy goals and socioeco-
nomic development imperatives.
The extent to which state actors are actively involved in governing the
economy through industrial targeting and intervention both derives from
and influences their approaches towards managing and regulating the
development of product, labour or financial markets. Such approaches
vary, for instance, between the more market-oriented modes of regulation
and the more state-controlled pattern of market development. These dif-
ferences that have prevailed across regions and industrial sectors in China
exert differential shaping influence over both state–firm relations and
interactions among various socioeconomic actors. They are particularly
manifest in the extent to which: state actors orchestrate the distribution of
financial resources between economic agents through ownership means
and administrative decrees; bureaucratic procedures favour some firms
over others by restraining entry and reducing competition; and regula-
tions influence relations between business and labour and their respective
ties with state actors.
A final attribute of authoritative governance concerns the extent to which
the state sets the rules and conventions that structure interlinkages between
 UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN CHINA… 9

various economic agents and shape associational arrangements among them.

Business–government relations are likely to be developed in a hierarchical,
top-down and often narrow manner, where the state plays a dominant role
in defining the nature of linkage relationships between market players and is
reluctant to encourage the growth of business associations. By contrast,
state actors are likely to be connected to business actors and organizations
through broad, multiple and horizontally oriented mechanisms, where the
state gives private players considerable latitude in developing their collab-
orative interactions, provides them with incentives to organize themselves
and enlists the support of business associations in the formulation of strate-
gies for strengthening networks of market governance.
The configuration of business–government relations is also contingent
on how business actors coordinate within and between industries to
resolve collective action problems (Evans 1995; Maxfield and Schneider
1997). As suggested above, the ability of business actors to organize
themselves to interact with state actors is constitutive of interfirm collabo-
rations and alliances. Firms that develop and maintain dense and durable
inter-corporate networks and share managerial, informational and techno-
logical resources across an array of activities are more capable of deploying
organizational and associational mechanisms to shape their relations with
political actors. Strong interfirm collaborations enable business actors to
effectively coordinate their decisions and actions and render them well
organized and cohesive in a robust negotiating relationship with the state.
By contrast, where firms share resources across a narrow range of activities
and for limited purposes and interfirm relationships are conducted on an
arm’s-length, ad hoc and low-commitment basis, the private sector is
likely to be fragmented and weakly organized. This not only undermines
collective business efforts to interact with government officials but also
makes it difficult for state agencies to elicit cooperation from the private
sector and stimulate business participation in policy-making processes.
Not only do firms coordinate their decisions and actions through inter-
firm linkages, they may also develop collaborative ties with such third-­
party entities as financial institutions, research organizations or legal and
consultancy services. Extensive and long-term networks with these enti-
ties, which can help firms build, integrate and reconfigure their internal
and external competences, are likely to enable them to respond to rapidly
changing business environments and tackle market and technological
challenges in the process of organizing economic and innovation activities.
Equally important, these networks may also broaden business actors’
10 X. ZHANG AND T. ZHU

access to extramural resources, sharpen their mobilizational skills to pur-

sue shared goals, and enable them to take independent action to initiate or
strengthen public–private partnerships. It can be argued that business
actors immersed in dense firm–third party linkages are well equipped to
coordinate socioeconomic activities through network arrangements rather
than seeking aid and guidance directly from the state.
Finally, interfirm coordination and firm–third party linkages also reflect
the organizational structure and strength of business associations. Apart
from their crucial roles in strengthening the functioning of markets by
supporting the provision of such public goods as property rights and pub-
lic administration, business associations also act as an interfirm forum to
pursue collective interests and as a key network governance arrangement
that links state actors to the business sector (Bell and Hindmore 2009;
Doner and Schneider 2000). While the roles of business associations are
crucial, the ways in which they organize themselves internally and exter-
nally to fulfil these roles differ considerably across industries and regions in
China (Kennedy 2005; Unger 2008b). They are likely to be strong and
effective, if they can aggregate and articulate interests coherently, disci-
pline the behaviour of members, and develop institutionalized and stable
linkages to state agencies. How regions or industrial sectors differ in these
dimensions is an empirical issue and will be illustrated in the following
analysis of the changing variety of state–firm interactions in China.

Four Ideal Types of Business–Government Relations

While these two constitutive dimensions of business–government relations
are conceptually distinct, they are correlated because shifts in the authori-
tative governance of the economy may reflect the changing ability of busi-
ness actors to coordinate economic action and develop collaborative links
with other sociopolitical groups. The two dimensions can thus interact to
generate different configurations of connections between state actors,
firms and business organizations. Conceptualized more broadly than
extant approaches that tend to focus relatively narrowly on state structures
or policy networks as the fulcrum of business–government relations in
emerging markets (Cali and Sen 2011; Cammett 2007; Weiss 1994), this
framework is better able to capture the multiplicity and heterogeneity of
interactions between the state and businesses in China.
Table 1.1 characterizes heuristically the different ways in which authori-
tative governance and market coordination interact with each other and
 UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN CHINA… 11

Table 1.1 Four ideal types of business–government relations

Authoritative governance of the economy

Strong Weak

Market coordination of Extensive I II

socioeconomic activities Interdependent Networked
Limited III IV
Statist Atomistic

the resultant configuration of business–government relations. When

strong authoritative governance exists alongside robust market coordina-
tion (cell I), the state is connected to business actors through mutually
dependent or interdependent relations. State agencies may possess rich
and elaborate policy and administrative resources to shape and nurture the
growth of new industries and promote technology development. They
often do so by extracting vital information from firms, stimulating busi-
ness participation in key policy areas and eliciting cooperation from a well-­
organized business sector. By the same token, firms rely on the state for
developing governance structures that restrain the play of particularistic
interests, coordinate competing claims and organize collective action
among various socioeconomic interests. On the other hand, the ability of
state actors to mobilize industry collaboration in advancing industrializa-
tion strategies and enhance the effectiveness of their economic policies is
contingent on the contribution of firms and associations to policy devel-
opment and implementation. This reflects, among other things, the rela-
tively robust ownership integration of production chains or different
markets, extensive inter-corporate collaborations or strong firm–third
party linkages. In an interdependent mode of business–government rela-
tions, while the state establishes and monitors a broad set of sociopolitical
objectives, these are often pursued through negotiations and cooperative
relationships with business actors.
Where authoritative governance is relatively modest or limited but the
role of key socioeconomic producer groups in coordinating market activi-
ties is crucial (cell II), the state is likely to develop close, cross-cutting and
highly structured ties with the business community. While state actors may
have considerable policy-making capabilities, they organize industrializa-
tion processes not so much through direct and dirigiste resource alloca-
tions and market regulations as through multifaceted, broadly based and
12 X. ZHANG AND T. ZHU

sometimes horizontally oriented networks with various market players.

The economic governance roles of both state and business actors derive
from such networks that are shaped as much by informal norms of nego-
tiating relationships as by institutionalized practices of public–private part-
nerships. Both as a cause and a consequence of this networked mode of
firm–state interactions, business actors generally develop more collabora-
tive relations through extensive intra- or inter-sector alliances and through
the comparatively strong coordinating roles of collective interest-­
representing organizations. Among these organizations, business associa-
tions not only play a key role in organizing collective action among firms
but also provide a strong basis for long-term and multi-level exchange
relationships between state agencies, firms and sectors.
State–firm relations are likely to be organized in a top-down and verti-
cally structured manner, in the case of strong authoritative governance
coexisting with limited market coordination of socioeconomic activities
(cell III). In this statist mode of business–government interactions, the
development of policy-making rules, market institutions and innovation
strategies is structured around state interests and actions, with firms and
associations connected hierarchically to each other through the suborna-
tion of economic governance to state authorities. While state actors may
solicit cooperation from the private sector and encourage business partici-
pation in policy processes, socioeconomic producer groups are more an
instrument of development strategies than an equal and negotiating part-
ner. This derives from the predominant role of a powerful and interven-
tionist state in directing industrial development, allocating financial
resources, orchestrating market regulations and controlling intermediary
organizations. Equally important, state dominance weakens the develop-
ment of independent and robust business associations and stifle private
initiatives to promote collective action through close and long-term inter-
firm or inter-sector networks. Large firms that operate in oligopolistic sec-
tors or business groups, both state-controlled and family-owned, that
coordinate economic activities between firms within groups may have
direct entrée to the state and employ various means of securing influence.
However, the business community as a whole that has limited associa-
tional resources to draw on to develop horizontal linkages and
­collaborations is likely to be too weakly organized and fragmented to
shape relations with the state in line with its policy interests.
Finally, where the authoritative governance of the economy is weak and
the ability of socioeconomic groups to coordinate market activities is
 UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN CHINA… 13

l­ imited (cell IV), the organization of state–firm relations tends to be atom-

istic. While state agencies may be directly involved in investment and pro-
duction activities, their ability to promote industrial development, regulate
product and labour markets and organize technological innovation pro-
cesses is likely to be poorly developed. Likewise, business actors are
unlikely to play an effective role in the coordination of economic and
innovation activities in an institutional setting in which industrial struc-
tures are decentralized, interfirm relations fluid, firm-third party linkages
ad hoc and difficult to sustain or business associations incohesive. Atomistic
business–government relations often arise in regional political economies
or industrial sectors where state officials demonstrate limited ideological
and organizational coherence and have few stable and broadly based links
to the business sector. To the extent that they are connected to major
economic interests, these connections tend to be narrow and particularis-
tic and are unlikely to centre on impersonal and institutionalized proce-
dures. This makes it difficult for state actors to draw business into
cooperative relationships and mobilize broad industry participation in for-
mulating and pursing regional or sectoral development objectives.

Regional and Sectoral Variations in Business–Government

Interactions
Contributors to the book apply and interrogate this typological frame-
work in view of variations and changes in business–state interactions and
the institutional consequences of such interactions in China. The objective
is to develop an analytical approach that can distinguish different and
changing forms of authoritative governance and market coordination in a
clear and accurate manner. While the four ideal types of business–govern-
ment relations delineated in the foregoing subsection may not be found
pristine in the real sociopolitical world, they help establish a theoretically
appropriate point of departure for understanding the varied patterns of
interrelationships between political actors and economic agents in China.
A key question being considered here is not so much whether state–busi-
ness ties have changed over the past decades as how these changes have
varied across regions and industries.
These four ideal types are empirically illustrated in the comparative
analysis of regional and sectoral changes and variations in business–gov-
ernment relations in this volume and elsewhere. In the first place, state–
firm interactions in the oil industry have shared many characteristics of the
14 X. ZHANG AND T. ZHU

interdependent type. In her chapter, Jin Zhang argues that while the
strong guiding hand of the planning agency, the National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC), tight party controls over the careers of
corporate elites and extensive state ownership have underpinned the state
steering of the oil industry, state planners have depended on lead petro-
leum firms for organizing technological and market developments, not
only because of the latter’s substantial financial and human resources but
also because of their strong inter-corporate collaborations, increasing
transnational networks and symbiotic ties with key line economic minis-
tries. By the same token, ties between the central and local governments
and leading multinational automakers have represented an interdependent
variety of state–business interactions, as made clear in Gregory Chin’s
chapter. Such ties that were mainly structured around negotiations over
market access, ownership levels and investment treatment in early years of
the reform era have shifted towards a mutually dependent relationship
that has hinged on the coordinating capability of state officials, MNCs’
financial and technological contributions, and personal and institutional-
ized linkages between them. Likewise, other empirical studies (Luo 2001;
Sun, Mellahi and Thun 2010) have also highlighted an increasingly inter-
dependent relationship between government agencies and multinationals
across various industries in China.
The interdependent genre of business–government relations also mani-
fests itself in the regional pattern of industrial transformation. In Shenzhen,
for instance, the municipal government has displayed a robust authorita-
tive capacity to mobilize financial resources, foster collaborations between
high-tech firms and academic institutions, and strengthen public–private
policy linkages in its effort to direct the high-tech industrialization pro-
cess. The effective state direction has co-exited with the strong business
coordination of economic and innovation activities that has organization-
ally correlated with the governing role of large firms, dense interfirm net-
works and well-structured business associations. Shenzhen has thus
cultivated a co-governed regime of technology development in which
state and business actors have coordinated efforts to promote the growth
of high-tech industries (Breznitz and Murphee 2011; Xiaoke Zhang this
volume). In Beijing, Guangzhou, and Kunshan, state–firm interactions
have also featured an interdependent structure that has combined authori-
tative governance with extensive business coordination to shape the trans-
formation of the ICT and other sectors (Keng 2010; So 2004).
 UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN CHINA… 15

Business–government relations take on networked properties when the

state organization of the economy is limited relative to the business coor-
dination of socioeconomic activities. Nowhere are these properties more
salient than perhaps in the evolution of interlinkages between local gov-
ernment officials and private market plyers in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province.
In their comparative analysis of associational underpinnings for business–
government ties in this volume, Juanfeng Liu and Jianjun Zhang suggest
that the limited ability of sub-state actors to steer local socioeconomic
development in Wenzhou has been more than compensated for by their
close, cross-cutting and multifaceted connections with a well-organized
local business community. Such connections have both derived from and
reinforced the roles of dense interfirm networks and business associations
in coordinating local industrialization processes, shaping corporate financ-
ing patterns and promoting foreign trade activities. Similarly, Richard
Carney’s study in this volume also portrays state–firm interactions in the
automobile industry of Guangdong as displaying many characteristics of
this networked type. Local industrial planners have promoted public–pri-
vate partnerships, inter-corporate linkages and major business associations
as important institutional vehicles for reforming corporate governance
practices and organizing the upgrading of production technologies in the
industry.
It should be noted that the networked type of business–government
relations has been a prevalent sociopolitical characteristic, particularly in
the Pearl River and Yangzi River delta regions. While networked ties may
vary in the density of public–private policy linkages, the tenacity of inter-
firm collaborations and the cohesion of business associations, they have
converged on the combination of the facilitating role of sub-state agencies
and actors with the dominant role of private market players in coordinat-
ing local industrial development. As meticulously documented in many
region-specific studies (see Nee and Opper 2012; Wei et al. 2007; Yang
2014; Zeng 2010; Zhang and Liu 2013), private entrepreneurs, moti-
vated by a perennial search for new business opportunities in decentralized
economic systems and emboldened by local government efforts to foster
associational arrangements among various socioeconomic actors, have
developed both formal institutions and informal practices of commitments
and collaborations along the same production value chains and across
industrial boundaries. These institutions and practices have enabled pri-
vate firms to share information about each other’s business plans, mitigate
opportunist behaviours, reduce uncertainties surrounding investment
16 X. ZHANG AND T. ZHU

activities and develop competitive advantages in government-facilitated

and self-organized industrial clusters.
The flipside of networked ties is the statist type of business–government
nexuses. Such state-centred nexuses have manifested themselves in the
dominance of state actors over giant telecommunications companies in
policy and regulatory processes, as made clear by Yukyung Yeo in her con-
tribution to the volume. The other sectors of strategic importance, includ-
ing defence industries, finance and energy, have also had a top-down
governance structure in which large firms organize and coordinate eco-
nomic activities through their subordination to centralized regulatory and
planning authorities (Hsueh 2016; Naughton and Tsai 2015), with the
partial exception of the oil industry that features more interdependent
state–firm relations, as noted above. This structure has weakened the abil-
ity of large firms in these sectors to shape their relations with state and
other sociopolitical actors in line with their commercial and strategic inter-
ests, despite their increased lobbying power and operational autonomy
from government agencies and despite the reliance of economic officials
on them for information collection, policy implementation or technology
development (Brodsgaard 2012; Deng and Kennedy 2010).
The regional variety of statist business–government relations is particu-
larly salient in Shanghai. Contributions to this book (Carney; Xiaoke
Zhang) and other key empirical analyses (see Chen 2009; Huang 2008;
Thun 2006; Zhang 2015; Zhang 2016) have emphasized strong state
direction and weak business coordination as the dominant sociopolitical
structure of industrial governance across an array of high-tech and
medium-tech sectors. The heavy dirigisme of industrial governance has
been derivative from and concomitant with significant government con-
trols over financial and product markets and elaborate and systemic policy
interventions to target and promote specific sectors and firms. In stark
contrast to the forceful state steering of industrial development processes,
the business organization of economic activities through collaborative and
associational arrangements has been weak in Shanghai. This weakness has
been reflected in the segmentation of firms of various ownership types into
mutually isolated groupings, organizationally incohesive and politically
subordinate industrial associations, and fragmented linkages between
business, financial and research entities. Business–government relations in
other places, such as Chongqing, Jiangsu, Liaoning and Shandong, that
have exhibited statist tendencies at various administrative levels have borne
 UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN CHINA… 17

discernible resemblance to the sociopolitical attributes of state and busi-

ness organization in Shanghai (Liu 2008; Liu and Zhang this volume;
Mulvad 2015).
Business–government relations may become atomistic and individual-
ized, when state actors have a limited authoritative capacity to direct the
economy and weakly organized socioeconomic groups play an ineffective
role in market processes. Recent studies on the changing roles of local gov-
ernments in socioeconomic transformation (Chen 2016; Ong 2012; Zhou
2010) have contended that the ability of sub-state actors to align business
interests with collective policy objectives has been significantly weakened
against the backdrop of continuous market liberalization. This has gener-
ated an increasingly particularistic state–firm relationship and made it diffi-
cult for local governments to mobilize broad private-sector collaboration in
advancing development strategies. These studies, while shedding light on
the dynamics of business–government relations at the local level, have
focused on the causal importance of sub-state institutions and actions,
largely to the exclusion of that of business organization. In his comparative
analysis of changing state–business ties across seven counties in Chongqing,
Hunan, Shanxi and Zhejiang, Changdong Zhang (this volume) argues that
collusive interactions between officials and businessmen have prevailed in
many of these counties, not only because the governance capacity of local
governments has been weak or weakened but also because the business sec-
tor has remained organizationally fragmented, and, equally important, pub-
lic–private linkages have been narrowly based, exclusive and unstable. Due
to the lack of steering and coordinating capabilities on the part of both state
agencies and socioeconomic groups, political and economic elites have col-
luded to control the commanding heights of the local economy, giving rise
to the personalized character of business–government relations.
There have been heated debates on the changing nature of personal-
ized or guanxi connections in the process of China’s transition towards a
market economy. While some observers have contended that the signifi-
cance of particularistic ties between officials and businessmen has declined,
against the backdrop of continuously strengthened formal institutions
(Guthrie 1999; 2002), others have emphasized the prevalence of such ties,
despite institutional changes and improvements (Wank 1999, 2002; Yang
2002). Scholarly efforts to reconcile these opposing views have focused on
the exploration of the process through which personalized ties have grad-
ually taken on organizational properties (Wank 2002) or the co-evolution
between guanxi practices and the peculiar socioeconomic institutions of
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
broadside mount. Having in view the fact that all war-ships heretofore built,
particularly steam-ships, exceeded their calculated draught, I determined to
avoid a similar error in this ship. I provided against it in my calculations of
displacement by allowing a foot for a margin. The draught was not to exceed
fifteen feet; I allowed for fourteen feet. The minimum height of the port-sills
above water at load draught, to insure sea-worthiness and ability to fight the
guns in sea-way, should have been seven feet, according to our instructions.
But in getting up the plans I arranged that the port-sills with the 8-inch
battery would be eight feet above water. My calculations having been
correctly made, I had a foot to spare.
“About three months after we began work, and when the frames were up
and the beams in, the Department decided to arm the ship with fourteen 11-
inch Dahlgrens in broadside and two 200-pounders (8-inch Parrotts). They
were all muzzle loaders. This, together with the increased weight of
ammunition for the larger guns, exactly consumed my foot of margin and
brought the port-sills down to the normal height of seven feet above water,
and the draught of ship there was not over fifteen feet, the original design.
“It may not be improper to say that I received much credit and
congratulation from the Board and others for my foresight in allowing the
margin as I did, and for the correctness of my calculations. But for that the
modified battery would have brought the port-sills down to six feet or less,
which would have rendered it dangerous to open the main-deck ports in much
of a sea.
“During the earlier stages of the construction of this ship but little attention
was paid to it by the people of the country; the exciting conditions of the war
on land; battles won and lost; the movement of troops, etc., occupied the
entire attention of the people; so that while the yard was left open and no
fence around it there were no visitors.
“When the battle between the ‘Monitor’ and ‘Merrimac’ took place a short
time before launching the ‘New Ironsides,’ the whole world was aroused, and
their attention was called to the fact that there were such things as armor-
clad ships.
“When the number of visitors who applied for admission was so great that
we had to build a high fence around the shipyard, and only admitted those
who secured tickets issued by us, and when the launch took place, it was
under conditions of great excitement and enthusiasm. The completion of the
ship was accomplished in a very short time, and her first scene of operations
was before Fort Sumter, which she bombarded eleven months and two days
after the contract was signed.
“At this point the history of the contracts may be stated:
 “When the appropriation was made by Congress for the purpose of
constructing iron-clads, the Secretary of the Navy, as has been remarked,
created a board on armored ships, consisting of Commodores Paulding,
Smith, and Davis, who were fully authorized to carry out the provisions of the
law and make contracts, keeping in view what had been done by England and
France in the way of iron-plated floating batteries. These gentlemen
advertised for plans and specifications accompanied by proposals for
accomplishing the purpose of the act of Congress. There were twenty-five or
thirty proposals, embracing a great diversity of projects, the principal features
of most of which were lack of well-defined plan, type, and character.
“After considerable investigation, the board decided to accept three plans
and award the contracts. They were the ‘New Ironsides,’ the original ‘Monitor,’
and the ‘Galena.’ Those three vessels exhibited a vast diversity in form,
construction, and outfit.
“A number of fables have originated and have come to be believed as truths
about many of the circumstances attending the selection of plans. Among
others, it was said that Mr. Lincoln himself, being impressed with the claims of
Mr. Ericsson, had to interfere, and ordered the board to select the ‘Monitor.’
This is entirely false, for no such demonstration was ever made by Mr. Lincoln,
and the board was not influenced at all by any considerations of that or any
other kind except their own judgment.
“The contract for the ‘New Ironsides’ was awarded to Merrick & Sons; the
design, plans, and specifications of hull complete had been made by me in
connection with Mr. B. H. Bartol, who conceived the project and had charge of
the proposal to the government,—Mr. B. H. Bartol was Superintendent of
Merrick & Sons at that time. When the contract was awarded to Merrick &
Sons, they sub-let the hull together with the fittings to our firm, in accordance
with a previous agreement with Mr. Bartol. The contract price was about
$848,000. Merrick & Sons furnished the engines and armor plate. The engines
were designed by I. Vaughan Merrick, and were duplicates of those which
they had completed for a sloop-of-war, and were for a single screw. The
speed was about seven knots. She was bark-rigged with bowsprit.
“After completing the ‘New Ironsides,’ I proposed to build two more of
similar type with certain modifications and improvements, that is, sea-going
iron-clads, with twin screws instead of a single one, and in increasing the
speed and the efficiency of the armor. But at that time what was known as
the ‘Monitor craze’ was in full blast, and, notwithstanding the excellent all-
around performance of the ‘New Ironsides,’ she remained the only sea-going
broadside iron-clad in the navy, and was the first to fire a gun at an enemy,
and fought more battles than all other sea-going battleships past and present
put together.
 “The armor plate of the ‘New Ironsides’ was made partly at Pittsburg and
partly at Bristol, Pennsylvania, and was of hammered scrap iron. It was four
inches thick, and the plates, which could now be rolled in many mills and be
considered light work, were then looked upon as marvels of heavy forging.
“When the contract was made for the ship, wages for shipwrights were
$1.75 per day, and in less than two months they rose to $3 per day. We
contracted for all the copper sheathing and bolts the day after signing the
contract at twenty-nine cents per pound; in four months it was sixty cents per
pound. Materials in general went up from 50 to 100 per cent. before we
finished the ship.
“Great and radical changes have since occurred, but, primitive as the ‘New
Ironsides’ seems in comparison with modern battleships, it is doubtful if any
one now existing will ever see as much fighting or make so much history as
she did. Last July, in an address read before the Naval War College at
Newport, I said:
“‘I cannot better illustrate my point than by comparing the first and the last
sea-going battleships built and delivered to the government by Cramp. The
first was the ‘New Ironsides,’ built in 1862. The last is the ‘Iowa,’ completed in
1897. Each represented or represents the maximum development of its day.
“‘The ‘New Ironsides’ had one machine, her main engine, involving two
steam-cylinders. The ‘Iowa’ has seventy-one machines, involving one hundred
and thirty-seven steam-cylinders.
“‘The guns of the ‘New Ironsides’ were worked, the ammunition hoisted,
the ship steered, the engine started and reversed, her boats handled, in
short, all functions of fighting and manœuvring, by hand. The ship was
lighted by oil lamps and ventilated, when at all, by natural air currents.
Though, as I said, the most advanced type of her day, she differed from her
greater battleship predecessor, the old three-decker ‘Pennsylvania,’ only in
four inches of iron side armor and auxiliary steam propulsion. She carried
fewer guns on fewer decks than the ‘Pennsylvania,’ but her battery was
nevertheless of much greater ballistic power.
“‘In the ‘Iowa’ it may almost be said that nothing is done by hand except
the opening and closing of throttles and pressing of electric buttons. Her guns
are loaded, trained, and fired, her ammunition hoisted, her turrets turned, her
torpedoes, mechanisms in themselves, are tubed and ejected, the ship
steered, her boats hoisted out and in, and the interior lighted and ventilated,
the great search-light operated, and even orders transmitted from bridge or
conning-tower to all parts by mechanical appliances.
“‘Surely no more striking view than this of the development of thirty-five
years could be afforded.’
 “The battery of the ‘New Ironsides’ was mounted in broadside, and she had
eight ports of a side, out of which she fought seven 11-inch Dahlgrens and
one 200-pounder Parrott, the maximum train or arc of fire being about 45
degrees.
“The ‘Iowa’s’ four 12-inch guns are mounted in pairs in two turrets, and
train through arcs of about 260 degrees forward and aft respectively. Her
eight 8-inch guns are mounted in pairs in four turrets, and each pair trains
through an effective arc of about 180 degrees.
“The ‘New Ironsides’ had no direct bow or stern fire.
“The ‘Iowa’ fires two 12-inch and four 8-inch guns straight ahead and
straight astern.
“The maximum shell-range of the heaviest guns of the ‘Ironsides’ was
about a mile and a quarter, that of the ‘Iowa’s’ heaviest guns is about eight
miles. The muzzle energy of the ‘Ironsides’’ 11-inch smooth bores was to that
of the ‘Iowa’s’ 12-inch rifles about as 1 to 26.
“The fate of the ‘New Ironsides’ is well known: she was destroyed by fire at
League Island in 1866, about a year after her last action.”

Judged by modern standards of construction, the time expended

in building the “New Ironsides” was marvellously brief, six months,
because, as Mr. Cramp said, she was in action against Fort Sumter
within eleven months from signing of the contract.
Of course, there can be no comparison between the methods of
her construction or the nature of her appliances and those of a
modern battleship, yet in her time and for her day she was the most
formidable and powerful sea-going battleship afloat.
Mr. Cramp, notwithstanding that he was entering upon a new and
untried field without any prior guidance of observation or
experience, undertook the design and construction of this
remarkable vessel with all the confidence that a sense of
professional mastery never fails to inspire; and so confident was he
that the “New Ironsides” would prove a success that, while she was
building, he proceeded to design two other vessels of the same type,
but embodying numerous improvements which his experience in
construction of the “Ironsides” from day to day suggested to him,
and when these designs were completed he offered them to the
Department.
He then discovered that the Navy Department had become
entirely under the influence of what might be called the “Monitor
craze,” which absolutely dominated the councils of the Department
and of Congress in respect to armor-clad vessels.
A combination, or “ring,” was formed, with head-quarters in New
York, to prevent the construction of any type of iron-clad vessel
except monitors, and it had sufficient power to carry its
determination into effect.

CRUISER NEWARK

A sudden halt was made in the development of the armored sea-

going type which originated during the Crimean War. France had
finished the construction of “La Courunne,” “La Gloire,” and several
others, one of which had made a voyage to Vera Cruz before our
Civil War, and certain lessons derived from that ship during the
voyage were utilized in the construction of the “New Ironsides.” Both
England and France were proceeding slowly in the development of
the very complete type of battleship of the present day. While they
built several vessels of an improved monitor type and adopted the
turret on a roller base, in many cases they adhered to the course
first laid out. The late British battleships have fixed barbettes and
shields for their heavy guns.
The old Timby turret is practically a revolving barbette extending
above the guns, which had to be loaded at the muzzle and the
rammer being jointed, eleven minutes being occupied in loading and
firing.
In the operations before Charleston, the Confederates would leave
their bomb proofs after a shot was fired, and prepare for the next
one during the eleven minutes and retire unharmed, ready to renew
the contest. Under these conditions, the defence became a system
of guns in a casemate connecting with a bomb proof.
The old-fashioned monitor, viewed simply as a floating battery for
use in smooth water, was serviceable. It was not in any sense a sea-
going vessel, and it was always in danger of foundering as it crept
along the coast from harbor to harbor. Besides this, it was almost
intolerable to its officers and men in the living sense. In fact, service
in the monitors developed a new and distinct disease known in the
war-time pathology as the “monitor fever.” Whenever one was
torpedoed, as for example the “Tecumseh” in Mobile Bay, she sank
immediately; so quickly, in fact, that her crew below deck were
unable to escape. The torpedo which the “New Ironsides” resisted
practically without injury would have instantly sunk any monitor then
existing. The “Ironsides,” on the contrary, was a sea-going vessel of
the best and stanchest type, capable of any length of voyage with
comfort and perfect safety to her officers and crew.
A wise administration of the Navy Department, or one not affected
by the influence of cranks and combinations, would have built at
least half a dozen vessels of that type as soon as they could be
constructed.
Mr. Cramp, realizing and appreciating the value of the type, and
knowing that the influences which prevented its multiplication in the
navy were unworthy, keenly felt the sting of his repulses. However,
he proceeded to build such ships as the Department required,
including a monitor, and from that time to the end of the war gave
the navy the full benefit of his experience and skill in all directions,
both in new construction and repair.
Partly through the natural unthinking enthusiasm of the people in
times of great excitement and partly through a carefully planned
campaign of sentiment adroitly managed by the ring, the monitor
became almost the symbol of patriotism.
After the repulse of the “Merrimac” in Hampton Roads, Ericsson
was almost deified, particularly by that class of people who consider
rant synonymous with eloquence. Yet such sentiments were actually
cherished at the time by a great many people who knew nothing
whatever about the actual merits of different types of vessels. But
their fanaticism made the operations of the monitor ring easy, and at
the same time made it impossible to introduce or carry forward any
other type of armored vessel during the whole Civil War, no matter
how efficient or how desirable it might be.
Captain Ericsson is popularly credited, and doubtless will be in
history, with the complete invention of the monitor. So far as the
form and structure of the hull, which was simply “scow bottom,” and
the fantastic type of its propelling engine and the Ericsson screw
were concerned, this is probably true, at least so far as known; but
the main distinguishing feature of the monitor was not its model of
hull nor its propelling engine, but its revolving turret; and this device
had been invented and patented by Mr. John R. R. Timby several
years before the outbreak of the Civil War. Timby had proposed to
use the revolving turret system for sea-coast defence, as a primary
proposition. However, in his description, upon which his letters-
patent were issued, he suggested that it might also be applied to
floating structures or batteries. All that Ericsson did in the application
of the turret system to his monitor was to appropriate Timby’s
invention and act upon his suggestion; a fact which was abundantly
demonstrated afterward when Mr. Timby received compensation for
the infringement.
But all these facts probably went for little or nothing. It seemed
that the people had determined to make a demigod of Ericsson, and
there was no gainsaying them. They would have it so, and so it is.
Mr. Cramp, in a hitherto unpublished paper, deals with the history
and operations of the monitor ring with regard to its personnel and
the details of its origin and methods, the origin of the “fast cruisers
of the navy,” and the “state of marine engineering of this country as
it existed at that time.” In this paper, as will be seen, he hews to the
line.
 THE “MONITOR.”

“The coming out of the ‘Merrimac’ for the last time, and her successful
repulse by the ‘Monitor’ having driven her back into Norfolk, gave a boom to
the monitor system, the extent of which had never been witnessed in this
country before.
“The enthusiasm that always greets successful combats in war-time was on
this occasion of an extraordinary character, and the whole country was
aroused to the highest pitch of excitement.
“The designer of the ship, John Ericsson, already well known as one of the
principal promoters and successful advocates of screw propulsion, and Alban
C. Stimers, who was engineer during the fight, and some of the officers, were
the recipients of the most extravagant and hysterical demonstrations in the
way of hero worship.
“An illustration of the effect that this battle had on the popular mind at that
time may be found in an address of Bishop Simpson at the Academy of Music
in Philadelphia.
“During the war, frequent addresses were made throughout the country by
well-known orators, states-men, and ministers of the gospel, intended to
promote a patriotic spirit and encourage the doubtful.
“I was present at the Academy of Music shortly after the ‘Monitor’ had been
made famous by repulsing the ‘Merrimac,’ when, in referring to Mr. Ericsson,
the Bishop stated that ‘the Almighty had directly interposed in the contest
between Captain Ericsson and Robert Stephenson in England,’ both of whom
had responded to the offer of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway Company
of a premium of £500 sterling for the most improved locomotive engine. This
was at the very beginning of the introduction of railways in Great Britain, and
the following engine entered for the prize:
“The ‘Novelty,’ by Ericsson and Braithwait; the ‘Rocket,’ by Robert
Stephenson; the ‘Sans Pareil,’ by Timothy Hackworth, the ‘Perseverance,’ by
Mr. Burstall.
“Mr. Joseph Harrison states in his book, the ‘Locomotive Engine,’ that ‘the
prize was easily won by the “Rocket,” built by George and Robert Stephenson,
having fulfilled, in some respects, more than all of the requirements of the
trial.’
 “Bishop Simpson, in referring to this incident, said that ‘the Almighty had
interposed to prevent Captain Ericsson from succeeding there, so that he
might become disgusted with England and shake the dust of that country
from his feet and depart for America, in order that he might be here ready to
save the country.’
“In using the words ‘in saving the country,’ Bishop Simpson looked on the
fight between the ‘Monitor’ and the ‘Merrimac’ as a great many other people
did; that is to say, if the ‘Merrimac’ had escaped, she would have bombarded
Philadelphia and New York and other cities of the North, thereby compelling
the government to submit to the South. But the ‘Monitor’ having destroyed
her before she got out, John Ericsson was therefore entitled to all the credit
due to a person who had been specially delegated by the Almighty for saving
the country. John Ericsson had already become famous on account of
conspicuous efforts in promoting screw propulsion in the United States
generally, and particularly with reference to the use in war-ship construction.
In view of his unceasing labors in this direction his name had become
inseparably associated with the screw propeller. This added much to the
enthusiasm that prevailed at that time, and all minor considerations being
overlooked. It was discovered a very short time after the war was ended that,
even if the ‘Merrimac’ could have escaped at that time from her encounters
with the ‘Cumberland,’ ‘Congress,’ and ‘Monitor,’ it would have been impossible
for her to go as far north as Philadelphia or New York. It was found that she
was in a very badly crippled state as a result of her ramming the ‘Cumberland’
and ‘Congress;’ and the statement was made by those who temporarily
repaired her in Norfolk that her bow was split to a great distance below the
water.
“To use the words of one of the workmen, he had ‘put more than a bale of
oakum in the opening.’
“The construction of the ‘New Ironsides,’ ‘Monitor,’ and ‘Galena’ had already
been practically taken out of the hands of the Construction Department of the
Navy by the Secretary of the Navy, who became a convert to the monitor
craze after the battle with the ‘Merrimac.’ The ‘Monitor’ had become the ideal
type of armored war-ship, and a sort of sub-department of the navy was
created and located at New York for the sole purpose of building and fitting
out monitors.
“This establishment in New York was placed under the immediate
supervision of Admiral Gregory, the active head being Chief Engineer A. G.
Stimers, who had been the chief engineer of the ‘Monitor’ during her
engagement with the ‘Merrimac.’ He had associated with him Isaac Newton
and Theodore Allen, the nephew of Mr. Allen of the Novelty Works in New
York. This board was in direct communication with the Secretary of the Navy.
 “The monitor party, which may be described as the executive of the ring or
the New York section of the Navy Department, soon assumed a position of
great power and responsibility; the balance of the Department amounting to
practically mere nothing in the way of new construction.
“Mr. Stimers and Mr. Allen were autocrats. They spent money lavishly,
ordered vessels, designed them, made contracts, sub-contracts, made
purchases, and carried everything with a high hand.
“Mr. Lenthall, the Chief Constructor of the Navy, and Mr. Isherwood, who
was on his staff as engineer, were entirely set aside, and practically
disappeared from the scene as far as new constructions were concerned.
“A large number of monitors were built, slightly improved in structural detail
over the original, and were engaged as soon as finished in the operations
before Charleston.
“The head-quarters in New York was often called the ‘draughtsmen’s
paradise,’ on account of the great number of draughtsmen employed there,
and who were getting twenty dollars a day. The most extraordinary displays
of drawings were issued to the various machine-shops which were building
monitors at that time. They were particularly noticeable on account of the
extravagant character of the shading of the circular form of the turrets,
smoke-stacks, conning-towers, etc.
“The inspectors of construction that were employed by the New York party
emulated their superiors in carrying things with a high hand at the various
concerns where they inspected the vessels.
“Up to that time our concern had not built any monitors. We were not in
what was called the ‘Monitor Ring,’ not having indorsed the type nor manner
of construction, besides being the authors of the ‘New Ironsides’ type, which
the ring had determined to suppress.
“Immediately after the ‘New Ironsides’ had been engaged in a small way in
the first fight at Charleston, we recommended that the government should
build other vessels like her, but with twin screws and with other
improvements.
“By request of Assistant Secretary Fox, we prepared plans of the proposed
ships, some all iron, and others of iron and wood in the construction of the
hull; but the Department in Washington refused to listen to or recommend
anything. The New York section continued to be paramount, and we were
ruled out of naval construction for a time.”
 LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS.

“The next development of the craze was that of the so-called ‘Light-draught
Monitors.’ These were intended to operate in Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds
and various other shallow waters in the South. Twenty of them were
authorized, and we responded to the advertisement of them by bidding for
one or more.
“It was found that, with the exception of Harlan & Hollingsworth, we were
the lowest bidders. We were a little higher than Harlan & Hollingsworth, but
the time in which we offered to build them was shorter than theirs.
“The government promptly gave us one and the Harlan yard one, and
notified eighteen other bidders that they could have one each at the same
price as ours, which amounted, as near as I can remember, to $350,000.
“Some of the bids ran as high as $750,000, and these bidders had some
delicacy in accepting prices at one-half, because, to accept the contract at
one-half, it would be an acknowledgment that they did not know what they
were about, or that they were trying to rob the government.
“The fact is, that none of the bidders except Harlan & Hollingsworth and
ourselves were ship-builders. They were in other lines of mechanical
construction, and of course they did not have the slightest idea of what was
to be done or what it would cost.
“The drawings on which the vessels were to be built were of the crudest
character; only a midship section and one or two vague longitudinal sketches
being furnished as a guide or basis of construction.
“Notwithstanding, as I said before, we were the lowest bidder, thereby
saving millions of dollars to the government, only one was awarded to us. The
balance was offered to the other bidders at our price, and the offer was
accepted by most of them.
“Having received our contract, we promptly visited New York to get the
details of construction and engines in order to begin work and procure
materials. The demand for materials was greater than the supply, and all were
in a feverish state of excitement. To get our orders out quickly, I immediately
made application to Mr. Stimers for plans, and had a long and detailed
conversation with him and Theodore Allen over what plans they had
developed, and numerous alterations were made to the plans as drawn.
 “Their first plan permitted the boilers to come within three and one-half
inches of the bottom plating of the ship, practically landing the boilers on the
three and one-half inch angle-bars, which had at that time no floors.
“I suggested in a rather strong way that this would not do, and after
considerable discussion they concluded to make the vessels a little deeper,
give the deck more spring, and put shallow floors in. Other important
alterations were made as the work progressed.
“We would have had our vessel overboard first, but the northward march of
General Lee previous to the battle of Antietem interfered with the furnishing
of materials, and also with our own working force in the shipyard.
“Our employees, with those of the rolling-mills supplying materials near
Philadelphia, organized themselves into military companies for the purpose of
defence. Two companies were formed in our establishment.
“While these delays affected us, they did not interfere with the progress of
the monitor which was building in Boston; but when this vessel was launched,
she sank to the bottom from lack of buoyancy, and a halt was called on the
nineteen other vessels.
“These vessels had been constructed on very vague plans and conditions.
Mistakes were made in the original design, and weights added without
investigating the correctness of the original sketch, which, with the so-called
‘calculations,’ were furnished by Mr. Ericsson; at least they had been
examined, approved, and signed by him. They were not furnished to bidders.
“The day after this launch, the ‘Monitor Ring’ was in a state of collapse! Mr.
Lenthall and Mr. Isherwood now reasserted their proper authority. They
ordered Mr. Stimers and Mr. Allen to reduce the weights in the turrets, and
wherever else it was possible to do so sufficiently to make the vessels float.
“These reductions in equipment, outfit, etc., were communicated to the
builders at Chester, before they launched the ‘Tunxis’; but these vessels, by
the reductions, were rendered entirely useless for their designed service, or
any other.
“Finding that the Boston vessel and the ‘Tunxis,’ built at Chester,
notwithstanding the alterations, lacked efficiency to a serious degree, they
decided to rebuild most of the others by deepening them, and the whole
matter was placed in my hands by Chief Engineer King, who with some others
were designated by the Secretary of the Navy to investigate and prepare
plans for the deepening, and to ascertain the cost of the alterations.
“After a careful investigation, I found it would be necessary to increase the
depth of the hulls about thirty-three inches, involving the necessity of raising
the solid oak decks to that extent with the hull proper, and the armor backing
and armor which had to be taken off and replaced.
“A so-called expert was detailed to assist me in my calculations, but, having
no use for him, I did not avail myself of his services.

CRUISERS PENNSYLVANIA AND COLORADO

“When I sent my plans and our price for the deepening of the vessel to the
Secretary, he immediately awarded us the contract for deepening ours (the
‘Yazoo’), and accepted our price, and notified the eighteen other people that
he would give them the same price for deepening theirs. The other
contractors would not accept my price, and they denounced me for not
having put a ‘higher price on the job,’ when I had the opportunity to do so. I
told them that I had estimated that we would make 30 per cent. profit, and I
contended that that was enough, notwithstanding we were under the
influence of war prices, and that I had been delegated to do what I
considered was right. In other words, I held that the Secretary had placed me
upon honor.
“These eighteen other builders ultimately got higher prices than we did.
They made all sorts of claims to the government through their
representatives, and made life a burden to the Secretary by showing, or
endeavoring to show, him that wages were higher everywhere else in the
localities where these vessels were built than they were in Philadelphia.
“In fact, every one of the other builders ultimately received higher prices
than we did, and later on some were awarded additional sums by act of
Congress, notwithstanding that the drawings, specifications, plans, and
designs for the alterations were made by me without pay! without even
thanks!
“Subsequently the Department decided not to alter all alike, and about one-
half of them were finished without the turrets, and the big guns were taken
out, thereby relieving their builders of the necessity of making them deeper.
The decks were finished, and they were designated as a sort of torpedo boat
for harbor defence. These vessels, as altered according to my
recommendations, would have been efficient factors in the operations in the
southern waters if the war had not ended before they were finished.
“The ‘Sub-Department’ in New York, with all its investitures and
appointments, was abandoned, and the Navy Department took up the
monitor matter from that time onward. But the mischief had been done. The
service had been debauched and the Treasury robbed of millions, which an
intelligent policy from the start might have saved.
“During the alterations on the ‘Yazoo,’ the Chester light-draught monitor
was sent to our place to be altered. Notwithstanding she had been finished
with the reduced weights recommended by Mr. Stimers, she still continued
defective, and was sent to our yard to be altered according to my new plan.
“As it was necessary to raise the turret in order to raise the deck, and as we
were compelled to haul the vessel out of the water, we took the guns out of
the turret and proceeded to remove it also. Hoisting out the guns was an easy
accomplishment, but the removal of the turret was a difficult problem.
“At first sight, cutting out the rivets and bolts, taking apart and rebuilding it,
appeared the most feasible. This, however, was an expensive transaction.
After careful investigation, we concluded that it could be hauled off the ship
on to the dock on sliding-ways if the work was done with the greatest rapidity
with the best men at it. The removal of guns and turret to the dock was
successfully accomplished.
“On account of the great cost due to occupying a dry-dock long enough to
make the change, it was determined to haul her out on sliding-ways,
reversing the process of launching, and that without using a coffer-dam for
laying the ground-ways.
“The vessel was hauled out by the use of six 12-inch falls, two of which
were attached to end of upper ways, two to a chain that passed around the
stem extending to amidships, the ends lashed to the ship just above high-
water mark, and the other two to holes in the bow made for the purpose.
“When the six large ‘crabs’ were started with all of the men that could be
put on them, they never stopped until the vessel was entirely out of the
water, taking a day and a night for the operation.
“This was by all odds the heaviest vessel ever hauled out on ways in this
country, and, in view of the simplicity of its preparations and the limited cost,
was one of the great achievements of the time occupied by the Civil War. But
little or no notice was taken of it by the papers, as battles lost and won were
the sensation of the day.
“While the craze for constructing monitors had possession of the country,
the government built nothing else in the way of armored vessels.
“Mr. Lenthall and Mr. Isherwood, who was on Mr. Lenthall’s staff at that
time, had no power to antagonize the monitor craze successfully, and a large
one of wood was ordered to be built in each navy-yard, to be designed by the
constructor of that particular yard as far as the hulls were concerned. But little
money of the vast expenditures of the navy during the war was devoted to
other iron-clad constructions than that of the monitor class.
“The ‘Miantonomah,’ which was one of these vessels built in one of the
navy-yards and designed by the constructor at the navy-yard in which she
was built, was sent to Russia under command of Commodore John Rodgers
with Assistant Secretary Fox, as Special Envoy to convey to the Emperor
certain congratulations. The idea was that the government of Russia would
construct a number of large monitors. The trip, so far as that was concerned,
was a failure. Commodore Rodgers, who went in command, was formerly in
command of one of the original monitors which had been engaged in the
contests before Charleston, and also in the Savannah sounds in the Civil War,
and he was one of the strongest of the captains in favor of that type. As a
rule, the captains and other officers were all adverse to them.
“While the Navy Department and Naval Committee of Congress were
favorable to the monitor type, Messrs. Lenthall and Isherwood were against
it; but they were very backward in doing or in recommending anything else,
and permitted themselves to be overlooked. In view of this negligence on
their part, it was argued that it was better to try to do something, even if it
turned out wrong, than to do nothing at all.”
 ORIGIN OF FAST CRUISERS.

“On account of the heavy loss of our ships captured by the Confederate
cruisers, and our failures to capture any of them with the exception of the
‘Alabama,’ which was accidentally discovered and destroyed by the
‘Kearsarge,’ our Navy Department conceived it necessary to have constructed
a number of very fast cruisers, faster than any known afloat.
“The Department delegated Messrs. Stimers and Allen, when in the height
of their power in their ‘Sub-Department’ in New York, to design and have
them constructed.
“Not being naval architects, and not having any naval architect of
competent knowledge in connection with their ‘Sub-Department,’ but having
an exalted idea of their own abilities not only as naval architects and
engineers, and everything else in that direction, they designed some ships of
a peculiarly fantastic model, and engines of equally fanciful character which
they called, for short, the ‘grasshopper engine.’
“Having the power to design these vessels and contract for them, they
invited me to inspect the plans and build two of them.
“On looking over these designs, I began to criticise them, and
recommended modifications.
“I was wound up suddenly by the observation that, as they intended to give
us two ships and give us what they considered a fair price for them, we must
build them exactly as they were designed.
“As the price they offered was high, and feeling that we would practically
have our own way with them, provided we adhered to the general type of
design, and having no responsibility, we thought that we had better take
them and make a handsome sum out of them than to stand out on trifles and
fight for glory alone.
“I had commenced at the beginning of the war with criticising the monitors,
and our concern got nothing, and the grass might have been growing in our
yard if we adhered to that course. So the price was fixed for these ships, and
we were about going on, when the fatal contretemps of the launching of the
Boston light-draught monitor occurred. The ‘fast cruiser’ contracts of Stimers
and Allen were set aside, and a large sum of money saved to the
government. The ring was broken. They who had had unlimited power
heretofore suddenly found themselves without the power to contract for a
dingy.
“This was really a great disappointment to us and several other contractors,
because the price they fixed for the cruisers was liberal, and, as they would
not listen to suggestions, they were naturally expected to take the
responsibility.
“After the matter of the fast cruisers was taken out of the hands of the
‘Sub-Department of the navy’ after the sinking of the Boston monitor, the
Navy Department ordered each of the four navy-yards to design one on a
scheme of general dimensions, and giving the engines out by contract to the
various engine-builders, the engines, with two exceptions, being designed by
Mr. Isherwood. The machinery for the ‘Madawaska’ was designed by Ericsson!
“At the same time, to encourage private enterprise, one was given to us,
hull and machinery of our own design. We awarded the engines to Merrick &
Sons, who built them on their own designs. All of these vessels were
constructed of wood. Our ship was called the ‘Chattanooga,’ and that built at
the Philadelphia Navy-Yard was called the ‘Neshaminy.’
“The engines designed by Mr. Isherwood were geared, the propellers
making two and one-half revolutions to the engine’s one. When these engines
were designed, gearing was supposed to be an indispensable necessity in
screw-engine practice.
“The engines designed for the ‘Madawaska’ by Ericsson were of the same
design as that of the ‘Dictator,’ and would be considered of fantastic character
at the present time; that, however, might be said of most marine engines of
that period.
“Much was expected of the ‘Madawaska’s’ engines by Mr. Ericsson’s friends,
but after a trial of twenty minutes it was stopped, as the crank-pin and main-
bearing brasses ran out into the crank-pit before they had attained their
required performance.
“The engines were subsequently taken out and compound engines of poor
design were put in by parties who had never built a compound engine before.
The performance of these engines was but little better than that of the
original.
“Having been eminently successful in the introduction of compound engines
in this country, by the construction of four compound engines for the
American Line and one set for the ‘George W. Clyde’ of our own design, we
made application to the government to substitute the design of compound
engines in place of the first set of ‘Madawaska,’ but our offer was not
accepted, unfortunately for the government.
 “All of these vessels were of good model, and all built according to the
latest improvements of the great ship-builders and contractors, and the
devices in the way of rigging, spars, and other outfit, besides the model and
general arrangements were from the stand-point and designs of the naval
constructor and ship-builder at the yard where they were built. No ships in
modern times have been superior to them in design, construction, and ship-
building technique. The engines, however, were not up to the standard, and,
no matter what else may be said of them, they were much too small.
“Some time after these vessels were laid up, an effort was made by private
parties in New York to utilize them in a trans-Atlantic line to carry the mail,
and a proposition was made to the government covering certain conditions
under which they could be operated. The proposition meeting a favorable
consideration, an exhaustive examination of the engines was made by Mr.
Norman Wheeler, of New York. He found that the gearing of the driving-
wheels and pinion had been worn down five-eighths of an inch during their
trials; the project was abandoned, and the ships gradually disappeared.
“It has been stated that the ‘Wampanoag’ made her designed speed from
New York to Charleston in one trial.
“The British government was very much interested in this scheme of
building fast cruisers for our navy. Captain Bye-the-sea, who was Naval
Attaché of Great Britain, was ordered to investigate the matter here. He
decided to obtain the plans and drawings of the ‘Chattanooga,’ and applied to
the Secretary of the Navy for his approval. The Secretary sent a letter to us
stating that, so far as he was concerned, he had no objection. So we
furnished Captain Bye-the-sea with the drawings of the ‘Chattanooga’ in
return for some valuable information that he had, which we expected to
utilize in some construction of our Navy Department. We did not, however,
realize anything in that direction.
“The ‘Inconstant,’ built by the British government, was practically the same
model as that of the ‘Chattanooga,’ but with another deck added to her, which
gave her an entirely different appearance, and which made her look a good
deal heavier above the water than the ‘Chattanooga’ did, particularly as far as
the stern was concerned.
“The ‘Wampanoag,’ one of the ships built at one of the navy-yards, made
what was designated as one quick trip from New York to Charleston; but in
doing so the teeth of the gearing were worn to the extent of five-eighths of
an inch, practically ruining her usefulness for any future service. The vessel
was laid up and never sent to sea again.
“The ‘Chattanooga’ did not make a successful trial. The engines were too
small, and a long contest between the engine-builders and Mr. Isherwood
occurred over the construction of the machinery, ending in the engine-
builders making modifications, and the vessel was laid up.
“As these ships were considered at that time too expensive to equip for sea
service in time of peace, they were laid up; being wooden and very much
neglected, they rotted at their wharves.
“The failure of these vessels to demonstrate the propriety of building fast
cruisers was due altogether to defective machinery and to defective marine
engineering as it generally existed at that date in this country, and to the
material of their construction being of wood.”
 EVOLUTION OF MODERN MARINE ENGINE.

“At that time a large majority of the marine engineers of the United States
were adherents of the paddle-wheel, walking-beam type of engine, and
nothing would do but that type of engine. That was particularly the case in
the city of New York.
“Philadelphia, at a very early period in the history of steam propulsion,
advocated the propeller engine, and as far as the working of propeller engine
was concerned, the degree of workmanship and skill in its design attained
there was never excelled in Europe or America. These engines were generally
small in power, and the prejudices of the people were against them,
particularly as all New York ship-builders and marine engineers spoke of
propeller engines with the most profound contempt.
“Now and then some one in New York would build a propeller engine of
poor design which would prove disastrous, so in large enterprises the walking-
beam, side-wheel type of engine prevailed and was the fashion.
“This was done to such a great extent that when the first line of steamships
was established between Philadelphia and Charleston, side-wheel engines
were put in them by parties who had a great deal of interest with the
management of the steamship company.
“In fact, it was this craze for the walking-beam engine and side-wheels in
New York which ruined us as a steamship building country, and was one of
the many causes for the supremacy in ocean commerce that Great Britain
ultimately attained.
“After the government had stopped the subsidy, the Collins Line, which was
run at an enormous expense, was withdrawn. We were completely out of the
business. The influence of Philadelphia, as we had no large ships or large
steamship companies, was not listened to.
“Rather than adopt the propeller and go to Philadelphia to have the engines
built, steamship owners in New York permitted the whole steamship business,
together with all the foreign trade, to go to foreign countries. The British
began early to establish large machine shops and to perfect the propeller
engine. Though slow, they were sure.
“There was not a time in the history of steam navigation that we did not
feel that we could equal or even excel the English builders of propeller
 steamships that were coming to this country. But, as I said before, we could
not induce the New York merchants to embark in the enterprise.
“I am sure that if we had abandoned the side-wheel and commenced with
the propeller at the time the British did and continued with steadfastness, we
never would have lost it.
“The ships of this country were right, of the best form and model, and they
were in advance of anything in Great Britain, as far as hull construction and
design were concerned; but, while the ship-builders in New York were among
the greatest in the world, the builders of marine engines there were the
poorest in the world.
“When it was discovered that the propeller steamship was in every respect
the best and had come to stay, it was too late to try to recover our trade.
“The construction of monitors and machinery during the latter end of the
war was very demoralizing, and had its effect upon naval constructions long
after the war was over.
“The Construction Department, which had not shown much enterprise
during the war, had become very much deteriorated, and the system was
inaugurated, principally by Mr. Isherwood, which exists at the present day, of
dividing the executive department into many bureaus; and, to strengthen
their heads and give them power, it was also provided that the appointment
of these heads of bureaus should be made by the President and confirmed by
the Senate, thus making the Senate a coördinate factor in their existence, and
the heads of bureaus independent of the Secretary of the Navy.
“This was started, as I said before, by Mr. Isherwood, who was on Mr.
Lenthall’s staff. He organized the Bureau of Steam Engineering as an
independent bureau, not subordinate to the Secretary, and having its head
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Of course he was
made its Engineer-in-Chief.”

That being started, other bureaus as they practically exist at

present, the heads of which are independent of the Secretary, were
established the same way. A great deal of friction occurred between
the various branches of the Navy Department at that time, the
effects of which continued for a good while. Nothing was built by the
government, although the Secretary of the Navy had full power to
do practically as he pleased with the appropriations. The
appropriations in Congress at that time were made in bulk, and the
Secretary could give vessels out by private contract or build them in
the navy-yards.
Some few vessels involving antique ideas were started in the
navy-yards and were principally of wood. The engines were
contracted for by the various engine-builders of the United States.
They were constructed practically on one general design.
On account of some irregularities and misunderstandings in the
way of giving out contracts and certain favoritisms, together with the
jealousies and bickerings of the various heads of the Departments
and officers of the Navy, Congress became more and more exacting
in their appropriations, until at last nothing was done in the Navy
Department without a special appropriation for the particular
purpose.
At the end of the Civil War in 1865, a large number of United
States vessels under contract were uncompleted. In some cases,
notably of the monitor type, work was immediately suspended upon
them, and settlements were made after long and tedious delays. The
Cramp concern, as already mentioned, had one vessel in hand under
these conditions, the first-class fast cruiser “Chattanooga;” but the
government provided for her completion, which was carried out, and
her delivery concluded the relations of Mr. Cramp to the navy of the
Civil War.
CRUISER COLUMBIA
Welcome to our website – the ideal destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. With a mission to inspire endlessly, we offer a
vast collection of books, ranging from classic literary works to
specialized publications, self-development books, and children's
literature. Each book is a new journey of discovery, expanding
knowledge and enriching the soul of the reade

Our website is not just a platform for buying books, but a bridge
connecting readers to the timeless values of culture and wisdom. With
an elegant, user-friendly interface and an intelligent search system,
we are committed to providing a quick and convenient shopping
experience. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery
services ensure that you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading.

Let us accompany you on the journey of exploring knowledge and

personal growth!

textbookfull.com