...

•
F

437 MILITARY AIRLIFT WING

Charleston A.F.B., S.C.
RESTRICTION REMOVED BY AFHRA ~ ·~
SAFE PAPER . EXTKKl O}\)L~ P'f'Vv\J
DATE : \ l)}\\))()2

HISTORY
1 January - 31 March 1984
Vol. 2 Supporting Documents
P'! .,, ·- ". . .. "!

f,~ - ··:.<: .~ -s

MICIOfiLMED IY 'TIM
 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
H EADQUARTE R S MILITARY AIRLIFT C OMMAND
S C OTT AIR FO RC E BASE . ILLINOIS 62225

l~f ~ ~ "' ~0
,,., ,, ,)< DOOAS (Capt Raney, 4127)

s u s J £ CT Exercise AU'I'UMN FORGE 83--Final After Action Report

~ ~; See Distribution

1. The subject exercise report has been reviewed by the appro-

priate MAC staff functional areas. The final report includes the
problems, discussions, and recommendations contained in the COMALF
and 21 AF/DO reports with a Headquarters MAC action/position and
status on each.

2. As we strive to improve the MAC system, we appreciate the

efforts of all who assist in the planning, execution, and
follow-up on each exercise.

1 Atch
AUTUMN FORGE 83--After Action
) Report, Items 01-13

cc: CINCMAC/HO
HQ AFISC/DAP
HQ MAC/AOS/EDC (5)
HQ MAC/DEHS/DCOO/DOC/
DOOMA/DOOX/DPX/LGX/TRX

DISTRIBUTION

21 AF/DO 435 TAW/DOX 314 TAW/DOX

22 AF/DO 436 MAW/DOX 463 TAW/DOX
23 AF/DO _!37 MA~l!.Cll 317 TAW/CV
322 ALD/DOX 437 MAW/DOX 374 TAW/DOX
834 ALD/DOX 62 MAW/DOX 616 MAG/DOX
USAFALCENT/CV 62 MAW/SEF Det 1 I 1701 MOBSS/CC
438 MAW/DOX 60 HAW/DOX Det 1 I 1702 MOBSS/CC
317 TAW/DOX 63 MAW/DOX

GLOBAL IN MISS ION - PROFESSION AL IN A CT ION

 AUTUMN FORGE 83--AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPR: HQ MAC/OOOXE
30 JAN 84
 iii

TrTLES
AtPHABETICAL LISTING BY OPR
AUTTH1N FORGE 8 3 AFTER ACTION i;

AU'rm1N FORGE 83 WAS AN UMBRELLA TITLE THAT INCLUDED EXERCISES

REFORGER, COLD FIRE, CRESTED CAP, DISPLAY DETERMINATION, AND
OKSBOEL. THE DEPLOYr1ENT PHASE TOOK PLACE BETWEEN 9 AUG AND
27 SEP 83. DEPLOYMENT REQUIRED ONE C-130, ONE C-5, 25 COMMERCIAL,
AND 156 C-141 MISSIONS, INCLUDING A FIVE-SHIP INTERCONTINENTAL
C-141 AIRDROP ON 19 SEP. REDEPLOYMENT (16 SEP-15 NOV) REQUIRED
ONE C-130, ONE C-5, 33 COMMERCIAL, AND 135 C-141 MISSIONS.
 iv

EXP LANA TION OF TERMS --AFTER AC Tl ON REPORT

1. After a~tion reports have been automated to expedite handling and
follow-up action. The report consists of a sequenced listing of
titles by OPR (OCR's are only listed in the report itself), other
convenient title listings and after action report items.
2. The following codes apply to title 1i s't i ng s:
a. HQ MAC OPR for response/corrective action/follow-up.
b. After action item number.
c. After action item title.
d. Classification of item.
e. Status of corrective action--open ("0"- will be followed in
MAC R.emedial Action Program) or closed ("C"- item completed or ·
inappropriate for HQ MAC action; wi 11 not be followed in MAC RAP).
f. Whether the corrective action is internal to MAC(I) or
requires external action or assistance (E)·.

l3. The format for each item is consistent. iJ.bbreviations indicate

paragraph content of Title (T), Problem (P), Discussion (0),
Recommendation (R), '-lction (A), Status (S), and action OPR (0).
Subsequent entries on the OPR 1ine are OCR's.
ATTTutlN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION v

OEH 001 SUPPLEMENTS TO MEALS TASKING MESSAGE u c I

000 002 MISSION ALLOCATION BETWEEN MAC AFS u c I
000 003 JCS tHLESTONES u c I
000 004 SILENT ATC PROCEDURES u 0 I
000 005 PPRS FOR JCS EXERCISES u c I
000 006 IDENTIFICATION OF UNITS PLANNED TO MOVE ON EACH MISSION u c I
DOO 009 COMMAND AND CONTROL OF C-130 ASSETS INBOUND TO THE THEATER u c I
DOO 010 STRATEGIC AIRFLOW DISSEMINATION u c I
OOX 007 AUGMENTATION MANNING u 0 I
DOX 008 AUGMENTATION PERSONNEL u c I

DPX 012 RECEPTION PLANNING u c I

DPX 013 AUm1ENTATION MANNING u c I

TRX 011 ALOC PROCEDURES u 0 I
 \1TtJrlN FORGE 8 3 AFTER ACTION 1

001 T
SUPPLEMENTS TO MEALS TASKING MESSAGE

001 p
INFLIGIIT HEAL SUPPLEMENTS WERE NOT PUBLISHED BY HQ MAC/DEHS.

001 D
INITIAL HEALS DEPLOYMENT TASKING MESSAGE WAS PUBLISHED ON
8 JUL 83 BASED ON A DRAFT FLOW PLAN THAT HAD rNCOMPLETE AND
INACCURATE PASSENGER INFORMATION. FINAL DEPLOYMENT MEALS
TASKING WAS PUBLISHED BY HAC/DEH ON 9 AUG 83. NUMEROUS PASSENGER
CHANGES WERE SUBSEQUENTLY HADE BY III CORPS. HQ 21AF/DOX SPENT
SEVERA!, WORK HOURS PUBLISHING REVISED MEALS TASKING VIA SUPPLE-

001 D
HENT HESSAGE. TELEPHONIC COORDINATION WITH HQ r.1AC/DEHS INDICATED
THEIR PREFERENCE FOR US TO HANDLE CHANGE NOTIFICATION ON MEALS.
REDEPLOYMENT MEALS TASKING WAS PUBLISHED ON 7 SEP 83 AND NO
REVISIONS WERE SENT OUT. . MOST REDEPLOYMENT M-ISSIONS WERE OPERATED
FROM FORMAL MAC AERIAL PORTS. SINCE MEALS WERE READILY AVAILABLE,
THERE WAS ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY TO ,MEET CHANGES AT THE AERIAL PORT
LEVEL.

001 R
HQ MAC/DEHS IMMEDIATELY PUBLISH SUPPLEl1ENTS TO THE MEALS TASKING
~1F.SSAGE WHEN HQ ffl\C/DOOX VALIDATES CHANGES TO THE ORIGINAL FLOVl
PLAN.

001 A
!fQ MAC/DEIIS IS AT THE DISPOSAL OF HQ HAC/DOOX TO PROVIDE ANY
JuPPORT ·NECESSARY. WHEN AND IF A VALIDATED CHANGE TO THE ORIGINAL
FT.mv PLAN IS PROVIDED, JlfAC/DEHS WOULD I!IMEDIATELY PfJBLISH
SUPP~EMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL MEAL TASKING MESSAGE.

001 s
CLOSED •.

001 0
OPR: HQ MACiDEHE:

002 T
i1ISSION ALLOCATION BE'fl·lEEN MAC AFS

002 p
l\IRCRAF'T/AIRCREW ALLOCATIONS BETHEEN MAC AFS l'lERE NOT PRO.TECTED
r,CCURATELY.

002 D
THE FLYING HOURS WF.RE ESSENTIALLY BALANCF.D RETNEEN MAC AFS \vHEN
211\F /DOX RECEIVED THE AIRLIFT FL0\'7 FROM HQ ~L-\C/DOOX. AFTER
RECEIVING gEVERAL HIGH-PRIORITY SAAMS, 21AF /DOm1A NOTI-fiED
21AF/DOXC THAT THE FIRST 7 DAYS OF OCT REDEPLOYMENT WERE
UNMANAGEABLE DUB TO LACK OF AIRCRAFT AND CREHS. THE LAST-
t1INUTR RECOVERY EFFORTS CAUSED TU}:tBULENCE THROUGHOUT THE MAC ,
SYSTEJI.!.

002 R
HO H.M' IDOO FORECAST REALISTIC REQUTREHENTS EARLY AND DURING
HEAVY COH!UTMENT ASSIGN MISSIONS TO THE MAC AFS BASED ON SORTIE
';;ENF.RATION WORKLOAD VICE FLYING HOUR BALANCE.
AUTUIIN FORGE 8 3 AFTER ACTION 2

002 A
1. DURING THE FIRST ~'lEEK OF OCT, 21AF WAS TASKED AND
ACTUAT,LY FLEW A SMALLER PERCENT OF THEIR POSSESSED AIRCRAFT
THAN 22AF. WHILE 21AF ACTUALLY FLE\'1 8% tJ!ORE OF THEIR POSSESSED
AIRCRAFT THAN PLANNED, 22AF OPERATED 11% GREATER THAN PLANNED.
THE EXERCISE STAGE CREW TASKING IS COORDINATED BETWEEN THE CON-
TROLLING AF EXERCISE DIRECTOR AND THE TWO NAF AIRLIFT DIRECTORS

002 A
TO THEIR SATISFACTION.
2. THE TURBULENCE CAUSED THROUGHOUT THE MAC SYSTEM THE FIRST WEEK
OF OCT WAS CAUSED BY SHORT-NOTICE, HIGH-PRIORITY CONTINGENCY
SAAMS.
3. HQ MAC/DOOM WILL CONTINUE TO DISTRIBUTE THE AIRCRAFT/AIRCREW
WORKLOAD AS EQUITABLY AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE NAFS.

002 s
CLOSED.

002 0
OPR: HQ 1''11\C /DOOMA
OCR: HQ MAC/DOOX

003 T
JCS MILESTONES

003 p
JCS MILESTONE DEADLINES WERE NOT REALISTICALLY ESTABLISHED.

003 D
'l'HE ~HLESTONES FOR AUTUm; FORGE 8 3 \'JERE BASED ON THE START OF
OKSBOEL DEPLOYMENT IN AUG, WHILE THE MAIN REFORGER DEPLOY~-lENT
WAS SCHEDULED FOR SEP. AS A RESULT, tJ!UCH OF THE INFORMATION
FOR REFORGER REQTJIRED TO MEET 'rl!E HILESTONES WAS NOT AVAILABLE.

003 R
llQ MAC PUBLISH ~HLESTONES FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL EXERCISE IN A
SERIES OF COMBINED EXERCISES.

003 A
AUTUt1N FORGE 8 3 HAS COMPOSED OF REFORGER, CRESTED CAP, COLD
FIRE, DISPT.AY DETERMINATION, AND OKSBOEL EXERCISES. MAC
tELESTONES \>JEHE RASED ON THE MILESTONES DEVELOPED BY THE SPON-
SORING CO~L'1AND, USEIJCOM, FOR REFORGER (THE LARGEST OF THS AUTm1N
F'O~GE EXERCISES) AND APPROVED BY THE PARTICIPATI:~G COPu'-tANDS,
INCLUDING tmC. THE 1 AUG MILESTONE REFERENCE D~TE (THE FIRST

003 A
DAY OF THE MONTH TN WHICR DEPLOYMENT BEGAN) ESTABLISHED BY USEUCOM
\•lAS USED BY ~lAC FOR ALL OF THE AUTUHN FORGE EXERCISES SINCE ONLY
ONE OPERAT"J;ON ORDER AND ONE AIRFLOV~ HAS PUBLISHED. ALJ. MILESTONES
\'IERE REVIEWED TO INSURE THEY COULD BE REALISTICALLY ACCOMPLISHED.
ALL USEUCOH AND HQ MAC !HLESTONES WERE MET EXCEPT FOR COLD FIRE
AIRLIFT REQUESTS, AND THE INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE FOR 21AF'

003 A
UNITS TO HEET 'rHEIR MILESTONES. TilE HQ MAC/DOO CONCEPT/TASKING
11F.SSAGE FOR AUTUMN FORGE TASKED THE CONTROLLING ~11\C AF, 21AF,
TO MEET HILESTONES FOR ALCC AND ALCE MANPOWER/MATERIEL PACKAGES,
SITE SURVEYS AND AIRLIFT REQUESTS FOR MISSION SUPPORT AND AUGl·1EN-
TATION HISSIONS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP ONE AIRFLOW AND ONE
OPORD FOR AUTUMN FORGE IN ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE/REDUCE AIRCRAFT AND

003 A
AIRCREW Cm1MITHENTS. MILESTONES WILL BE ESTABLISHE.D IN A LOGICAL
l\ND REALISTIC TIHE FRAME TO ALLOW THE EXERCISE PLANNING TO PROCEED
IN A TH1ELY MANNER.
 'AUTmm
I
FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION 3
003 s
CLOSED.

003 0
OPR: HQ J11AC/DOOX

004 ...
m

SILENT ATC PROCEDURES

004 p
SILENT CROSSING PROCEDURES IN CANADIAN AIRSPACE.

004 D
THE 21AF WAS REQUIRED TO PUBLISH THE PROCEDURE AND EXECUTE
THE "SILENT CROSSING" DURING AUTUMN FORGE 83 DEPLOYMENT;
HOWEVER, 21AF WAS NOT INVITED TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
COORDINATION CONFERENCES. THE PROCEDURES PUBLISHED BY 21AF/DOXC
REFLECTED THE CONCEPTS THEY UNDERSTOOD HAD BEEN AGREED TO BY
ALL CONCERNED CONTROLLING AGENCIES. IN FACT, ONLY THE EUROPEAN

004 D
AGENCIES HAD FULLY AGREED TO THE PROCEDURES, WHILE THE CANADIAN
AGENCIES WERE EXPECTING ENCODED POSITION REPORTS. THIS RESULTED
(AFTER STARTEX) IN COORDINATING AND PUBLISHING AN ALTITUDE
RESERVATION (ALTRV) WITH A 1-HOUR APPROVAL IS VOID FOR AIRCRAFT
NOT AIRBORNE (AVANA) TIME. THIS COMPLICATED THE SILENT CROSSING
PROCEDURE AND REDUCED THE TRAINING VALUE TO THE MAC SYSTEM.

004 R
)THE 21AF REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE INVITED TO ALL CONFERENCES
THAT DEAL tHTH PROCEDURES 21AF MUST PLAN AND EXECUTE.

004 A
1. THE SILENT CROSSING PROCEDURES USED DURING AUTUMN FORGE 83 WERE
BASED ON PROCEDURES DEVELOPED DURING REFORGERS 78, 79, AND 81.
THESE PROCEDURES IVERE COORDINATED WITH THE AIR RESERVATION UNIT
(ARU) IN CANADA, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL AIR RESERVATION FACILITY
(EUCARF) AT RHEIN-MAIN AB, AND 21AF/DOX. THE 21AF/DOX WAS
REQUESTED TO COMMENT ON THE INITIAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS;

004 A
HOWEVER, NO INPUT vJAS RECEIVED.
2. NO PLANNING CONFERENCES WERE HELD FOR THE SILENT ROUTING.
COORDINATION WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY MESSAGE TRAFFIC. THE 21AF/DOX
WAS TASKED WITH DEVELOPING THE SPECIFIC PROCEDURES BASED ON THE
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS PROVIDED BY HQ MAC. HQ MAC WAS NOT APPRISED
OF THE COORDINATION PROBLEMS AT GOOSE BAY AND CONSEQUENTLY COULD NOT

004 A
PROVIDE A RESOLUTION. PROCEDURES DEVELOPED BY 21AF AND THE GOOSE
BAY ALCE DID NOT PROVIDE OPTIMUM TRAINING FOR AIRCREvlS, ALCE
PERSONNEL OR ATC AGENCIES FOR SILENT CROSSING OB.JECTIVES.
3. HQ MAC IS PLANNING TO EXERCISE THE SILENT ROUTING PROCEDURES
DURING AUTW1N FORGE 84 AND REFORGER 85. GENERAL PROCEDURES
HAVE BEEN APPROVED FOR INCORPORATION INTO MACRS 55-2, 55-130,

004 A
55-141, AND 55-3, VOL I. COORDINATION WILL BEGIN IN JAN
WITH ARU AND EUCARF FOR AUTUMN FORGE 84. INITIAL PLANNING
WILL INCLUDE A MEETING AT EUCARF IN LATE APR TO CLARIFY
)EUROPEAN PROCEDURES. MEETING WITH CANADIAN AGENCIES, IF REQUIRED,
WILL BE SCHEDULED FOLLOWING THE EUCARF MEETING.

004 s
OPEN.
AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION 4

004 0
OPR: HQ MAC/DOOX
OCR: HQ MAC/DCOO

005 T
PPRS FOR JCS EXERCISES
005 p
EXCESSIVF. TIME CONSUMED IN OBTAINING PPRS.

005 D
THE PPR SYSTEM ALLOWS LOCAL BASE OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO CONTROL
AND HAVE INFORMATION ON FLIGHTS TRANSITING THEIR BASE. FOR UP
TO A HANDFUL OF MISSIONS, THIS IS NOT A GREAT TASK FOR SCHEDULERS
TO COORDINATE; HOWEVER, WHEN SEVERAL MISSIONS ARE SCHEDULED FOR A
LARGE-SCALE JCS EXERCISE, THE TASK OF OBTAINING A PPR NUMBER FOR
EACH MISSION REQUIRES 2 TO 3 WORKDAYS.

005 R
HQ MAC SHOULD TAKE ACTION TO GET MAC MISSIONS SUPPORTING JCS
EXERCISES EXEMPTED FROM NORMAL OPERATING HOUR PPR REQUIREMENTS.

005 A
USE OF AIR BASES FOR AN EXERCISE IS COORDINATED BY THE HQ MAC/DOOX
EXERCISE DIRECTOR EARLY IN THE AIRFLOW PLANNING. OPERATING
HOUR RESTRICTIONS, MAXIMUM ON GROUND (MOG), FUEL AVAILABILITY
AND PPR REQUIREMENTS ARE DISCUSSED AND APPROVAL TO OPERATE INTO
THE BASE IS OBTAINED. WAIVERS TO PPR REQUIREMENTS ARE ALSO
REQUESTED; HOWEVER, THE BASE MAY STILL WANT TO ISSUE PPR NUMBERS

005 A
ONCE THE SPECIFIC FLOW PLAN IS DEVELOPED. SINCE APPROVAL TO OPERATE
INTO THE BASE HAS ALREADY BEEN OBTAINED, GETTING THE SPECIFIC PPR
NUMBER SHOULD REQUIRE A SINGLE TELEPHONE CALL. HQ MAC EXERCISE
DIRECTORS WILL CONTINUE TO REQUEST WAIVERS TO THE PPR REQUIREMENTS
OR A BLANKET PPR FOR THE EXERCISE DURING THE COORDINATION WITH THE
AIRFIELD MANAGER; HOWEVER, THE CONTROLLING MAC AF WILL REMAIN
RESPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING THE FINAL CLEARANCE NUMBER, IF REQUIRED.

005 s
CLOSED.

005 0
OPR: HQ MAC/DOOX

006 T
IDENTIFICATION OF UNITS PLANNED TO MOVE ON EACH MISSION

006 p
DIFFICULTY ASSOCIATING UNITS WITH MISSIONS.

006 D
USER IDENTIFICATION IS NORMALLY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION; THERE-
FORE, HQ HAC USES LUMP NUMBERS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH MISSION.
EACH LUMP NUHBER TS ALSO ASSOCIATED WITH ONE OR MORE FORCE
RF.QUIRE!1ENT NUMBERS (F'RN) . THE FRN IS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH
UNIT ON A CLASSIFIED PRINTOUT THAT IS ONLY AVAII~BLE AT THE
FINAL TRANSPORTATION CONFERENCE. THEREFORE, THREE SEPARATE

006 D
DOCUMENTS MUST BE CONSULTED TO BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE UNIT
ON A SPECIFIC MISSION. IF USER PROBLEMS ARISE, ALCES AND AERIAL
PORTS NEED TO QUICKLY FIND OUT WHAT UNIT IS RESPONSIBLE. THIS
INABILITY TO EASILY IDENTIFY USERS IMPEDES MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.
 ,UTUMN FORGE 8 3 AFTER ACTION 5

006 R
HQ t1AC SHOULD PUBLISH UNIT IDENTIFICATION LISTED AGAINST EACH
MISSION NUMBER.

006 A
1. LUMP NUMBERS ALLOW THE SCHEDULING OF FRNS THAT DO NOT
MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A FULL AIRCRAFT LOAD BY COMBINING FRNS
WITH LIKE APODS/APOES AND AVAILABLE/LATEST ARRIVAL DATES. HQ MAC
PROVIDED A LUMP REPORT TO 21AF WITH THE FRNS IN EACH LUMP; IN
ADDITION, THE TIMED PHASED FORCE DEPLOYMENT PLANN.ING DOCUMENT
USED TO BUILD THE AIRFLOW WAS AVAILABLE TO 21AF. AS TELEPHONE

006 A
NUMBERS FOR THE USERS' POINTS OF CONTACT BECAME AVAILABLE,
THEY WERE PROVIDED TO 21AF BY HQ MAC, THE ARRED PLANNING AGENT
AT FT HOOD, AND FROM FORSCOM.
2. ON FUTURE AUTUMN FORGE EXERCISES, THE LUMPING PROCESS WILL
BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE JOINT DEPLOYMENT AGENCY. SPECIFIC UNITS
IN EACH LUMP WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE JDA DATA BASE. THE ARRED

006 A
PLANNING AGENT WILL PROVIDE POINTS OF CONTACT FOR THE DEPLOYING
UNITS AND THE ARMY AIRFIELD DEPARTURE/ARRIVAL GROUP (ADAG)
AS SOON AS THEY ARE KNOWN.

006 s
CLOSED.

006 0
QPR: HQ MAC/DOOX

007 T
AUGMENTATION MANNING
007 p
OSC ENTRY CONTROL.

007 D
ENTRY TO THE OSC IS LIMITED TO THOSE PERSONNEL WITH RAMSTEIN
LINE BADGES AND APPROPRIATE OPEN NUHBERS; PERSONNEL WITH HOME
STATION BADGES, A TOP SECRET CLEARANCE, AND LISTING ON A
322ALD-CERTIFIED ENTRY ROSTER; OR B.Y ESCORT BY A CERTIFIED
ESCORT OFFICER. THE TDY PERSONNEL HAD NUMEROUS PROBLEMS
COJI1PLYING ~VITH THESE PROCEDURES, INCLUDING A HAJOR LOG-JA11

007 D
AT SHIFT CHANGE, A FEELI:'\G OF CONFINEJ11ENT DUE TO 100 PERCENT
ESCORT, AND FRUSTRATION WITH "THE SYSTEM."

007 R
TAKE STEPS, TO INSURE ALL PERSONNEL SCHEDULED TO AUGMENT THE
COMALF HAVE TOP SECRET CLEARANCES. ADDITIONALLY, FOR
EXERCISES, INSURE ALL AUGMENTEES ARE PREBRIEFED ON ENTRY CONTROL
PROCEDURES AND INFORM 322ALD AS ~ARLY AS POSSIBLE SO THAT ENTRY
ROSTERS CAN BE DEVELOPED PRIOR TO PERSONNEL ARRIVAL.

007 A
1. THE AUGMENTATION FOR THE COMALF AND ALCC STAFFS FOR AUTUHN
FORGE IS BASED ON A DEPLOYMENT t1ANNING DOCUMENT ·(DMD) DEVELOPED
BY 21AF AND THE 322ALD AND VALIDATED BY HQ ~~C. THE DMD CONTAINS
/AFSC AND SECURITY CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS. MAC UNITS .1\RE THEN
LEVIED TO FILL THE DMD BY SPECIFIC LINE NUMBER. HQ MAC DID NOT
RECEIVE THE PROPOSED DMD FROM 21AF UNTIL 24 AUG, 9 WEEKS
AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER. ACTION 6

007 A
AFTER THE 13 JUN SUSPENSE TASKED IN THE HQ MAC/DOO CONCEPT/TASKING
MESSAGE PUBLISHED ON 12 MAY. CONSEQUENTLY, THE IDENTIFICATION
OF INDIVIDUALS TO FILL THE LINE NUMBERS WAS ALSO DELAYED.
LEVIED UNITS WERE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE 21AF AND THE 322ALD THE
AUGMENTEES' NAMES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER THAT ENTRY ROSTERS
CQQLD BE DEVELOPED.

007 A
2. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE NAMES OF PARTICIPATING AUGMENTEES
TO THE 322ALD FOR CONTROL ROSTERS, THE DMD MUST BE RECEIVED AT
HQ MAC IN A TIMELY MANNER.
3. THE 322ALD SHOULD PROVIDE AN IN-BRIEFING TO ALL AUGMENTEES
ON THEIR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO INCLUDE ENTRY CONTROL
PROCEDURES.

007 s
OPl:;N.

007 0
OPR: 21AF/DOX
OCR: HQ NAC/DOOX

008 T
AUGMENTATION PERSONNEL

008 p
PERSONNEL ~.ANAGEHENT.

008 D
NUHEROUS INDIVIDUALS COHMENTED ON SEVERAL ASPECTS OF PERSONNEL
t1ANAGEHENT. THESE RANGED FR0!1 LACK OF A FIRST SERGEANT, TO
SHORT NOTIFICATION, TO INCORRECT/HISSING REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS,
TO LACK OF A MANPOWER DOCUMENT WITH LINE NUHBERS r'OR ACCOUNTING
PURPOSES. THESE PROBLEMS WERE NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEGRADE THE
OVERALL OPERATION, BUT WERE IRRITATING ENOUGH SO THAT SEVERAL
COr'LMENTS CONCLUDED tt1ITH "NEVER AGAIN."

008 R
REVIEW MANPm•1ER PROPOSALS FOR ADEQUATE "PEOPLE" STAFFING.
PUBLISH A FULL 01-10 WITH NN1ES, LINE NUMBERS, AND POSITIONS,
AND ATTEMPT TO FORECAST REQUIREHENTS SO THAT MINIMUM SHORT-
NOTICE TASKING IS INVOLVED. PROVIDE UPDATE INFOR...'1ATION
INCLUDING TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS FOR MID-TOUR SWAPS.

008 A
1. THE 11ANPOWER PROPOSALS FOR THE CO~·:ALF ALCC AND ALDS I-JERE
DEVELOPED BY 21AF/DOX AS WERE THE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR
EACH LOCATION. AS CONTROLLING AIR FORCE, THEY WERE TASKED TO
SUBr-1IT THESE REQUIREt1ENTS BY 1 JUL 83. REQUIREMENTS WERE
FOR~lARDED B,Y 21AF/DOXL ON 24 AUG 83 (241800Z AUG 83). ,OTHER
IN-THEATER AUGMENTATION FORCES WERE DEVELOPED AND SOURCED THROUGH

008 A
USAFE/DOX AND THE 322ALD. SUBSEQUENTLY, USAFE/DPXX BUILT THE
IN-THEATER AUGMENTATION INTO THEIR DMD. THE LACK OF MANPOWER
DOCUMENTATION IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE LATE/INCOMPLETE SUB-
MISSION FRDr-1 21AF/DOXL.
2. THE RECOMMENDATION TO PUBLISH A FULL mm WITH NAMES, LINE
NUMBERS, AND POSITIONS IS NOT PRACTICAL. CHANGES ARE TOO NUMEROUS

008 A
TO MAKE PUBLICATION OF AN ACCURATE DOCUMENT FEASIBLE, THE PRO-
CEDURES IN r1ACR 28-2 ARE SUFFICIENT TO INSURE THE TIHELY NOTIFI-
CATION TO ALL PARTICIPANTS. RECOMMEND COHALF/DP BE ADDED TO THE
STAFF.
 AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION 7

008 s
CLOSED.

008 0
OPR: 21AF/DOX
OCR: HQ MAC/DPX

009 T
COt~ND AND CONTROL OF C-130 ASSETS INBOUND TO THE THEATER

009 p
C-130S EN ROUTE TO THE THEATER FROM OUTSIDE (LPLA AND CYYR)
WOULD NOT SHOW UP IN THE TIMS DATA BASE, COMPLICATING FLIGHT
FOLLOWING.

009 D
ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, C-130S DEPARTED LPLA OR CYYR FOR EUROPEAN
BASES. IN MOST CASES, A DEPARTURE MESSAGE WOULD BE RECEIVED
BY 322ALD AND RELAYED TO CALD (SOMETIMES VERY LATE, 6 HOURS)
WITH NEXT DESTINATION, ETC. CALD WOULD HAVE NO INFORMATION ON
THESE MISSIONS (ITINERARY, AUTH GND TIMES, ETC.). THIS CAUSED
GYRATIONS THRU COMALF TO 21AF FOR INFO. POSITIVE TRANSFER OF

009 D
COt~ND AND CONTROL FROM 21AF TO THE CALD WAS LACKING. BEFORE
CALD CAN EFFECTIVELY PERFORM COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS,
IT MUST KNOW MSN ITINERARY, ETC.

009 R
CALD ASSUME COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS FOR INBOUND C-130S
BEGINNING AT lOW, AS IS CURRENTLY DONE BY 322ALD; THAT CALD BE
FURNISHED COMPLETE SETUP INFORMATION BY COMALF/21AF ON ALL
C-130S INBOUND FROM OUTSIDE THE THEATER BEFORE THEY DEPART THE
I~ST STATION PRIOR TO ENTERING THE THEATER. THESE MISSIONS
SHOULD BE ENTERED INTO TIMS, JUST LIKE THE OTHERS. CALD SHOULD

009 R
BE GIVEN COMPLETE DIVERSION AND REROUTE AUTHORITY OVER THESE
AIRCRAFT JUST AS IT HAS ON THE INTRATHEATER RESOURCES.

009 A
1. THE PROBLEMS ADDRESSED HERE RESULT FROM INCOMPLETE
DISTRIBUTION OF SCHEDULING INFORMATION. THE NEEDS THAT ARE
IDENTIFIED WILL BE MET IF THE SCHEDULING ACTIVITY PROVIDES
COMPLETE SCHEDULE INFORMATION (AIMS, FRAGORD, ETC.) TO ALL
COMMAND AND CONTROL AGENCIES THAT WILL BE INVOLVED IN THE
EXECUTION OF THAT SCHEDULE.

009 A
2. CONCERNING THE SUGGESTION THAT CALD BE GIVEN COMPLETE
DIVERSION AND REROUTE AUTHORITY OVER AIRCRAFT, THIS AUTHORITY
RESTS SOLELY WITH THE AGENCY EXERCISING OPERATIONAL CONTROL
OVER THE AIRCRAFT IN QUESTION AS SPECIFIED IN THE APPROPRIATE
OPORD.

009 s
CLOSED.

009 0
. OPR: HQ MAC/DOOX
OCR: HQ MAC/DOC

010 T
STRATEGIC AIRFLOW DISSEMINATION

<:'1] I -1
AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION 8

010 p
ALLIED NATIONS HAD TOO MANY CHANGES.

010 D
CONFUSION DEVELOPED AT SOME ALLIED AIRPORTS WHEN CONFRONTED
WITH NUMEROUS VERSIONS AT THE AIRFLOW FROM MANY DIFFERENT
SOURCES, E.G., FLOGEN, 21AF, THE OPERATING WING FOR SAAMS.

010 R
ATTEMPT TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF VERSIONS OF THE AIRFLOW AND,
IF FEASIBLE, DESIGNATE ONE AGENCY TO PROVIDE DATA TO THE HOST
NATIONS.

010 A
THE DEPI,OYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT AIRFLOWS FOR JCS EXERCISES ARE
PUBLISHED BY HQ MAC/DOOX THROUGH THE FLOGEN COMPUTER AUTODIN
INTERFACE. ONCE THE AIRFLOW IS TURNED OVER TO THE CONTROLLING
MAC AF FOR EXECUTION, SUPPORT MISSIONS AND ANY CHANGES TO THE FLOW
ARE PUBLISHED BY A ~~C AF SUPPLEMENT TO THE FLOGEN MESSAGE.
EVERY ATTEMPT IS MADE TO KEEP CHANGES TO A MINIMUM. IF THE NUMBER

010 A
OF CHANGES BECOMES TOO LARGE, A NEW MASTER AIRFLOW IS PUBLISHED
THROUGH THE FLOGEN COMPUTER. HQ MAC WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH
OUR USERS TO KEEP LAST-MINUTE CHANGES TO A MINIMUM.

010 s
CLOSED.

010 0
OPR: HQ MAC/DOOX

011 T
ALOC PROCEDURES
011 p
THERE IS NO PROCEDURE TO MOVE ALOC CARGO FROM A STRATEGIC APOD
TO THE REQUESTING CORPS BY AIR.

011 D
CURRENT PROCEDURES FOR ALOC HAVE CARGO SHIPPED TO EITHER OF
TWO APODS WHERE IT IS PROCESSED THROUGH THE PORT FOR FINAL MOVEMENT
TO THE CORPS BY SURFACE. WHAT IS NF.EDED IS A PROCEDURE TO KEEP
THE CARGO IN THE AIRLIFT SYSTEM UNTIL DELIVERED TO THE CORPS
REAR BY C-130. THIS BECOMES VITAL IF THE CARGO IS STOPPED SHORT
OF ITS ORIGINAL APOD, I.E., AT MILDENHALL INSTEAD OF RAMSTEIN.

011 R
MAC AND 322ALD COORDINATE WITH ARMY SHIPPERS AND RECEIVERS
BOTH IN EUROPE AND CONUS TO DEVELOP PROCEDURES TO INSURE
TIMELY DELIVERY OF ALOC CARGO.

011 A
PROBLEM HAS BEEN REFERRED TO 21AF/TRKO FOR ACTION. STILL PENDING
RESOLUTION.
011 s
OPEN.

011 0
OPR: HQ MAC/TRX
OCR: HQ MAC/LGX

012 T
RECEPTION PLANNING
 AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION 9

012 p
LACK OF DETAILED INFORMATION FROM CONUS PRECLUDED RESPONSIVE
RECEPTION ACTIVITIES.

012 D
ALTHOUGH MANPOWER PLANNING WAS INITIATED IN LATE MAY BY 322ALD,
WE WERE NOT PROVIDED RELIABLE PERSONNEL DATA AS LATE AS THE DAY
OF DEPARTURE FROM CONUS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT
80 PEOPLE ON THE EXERCISE MISSION AND ONLY RECEIVED ABOUT 40
PEOPLE. THIS THREW OUR RECEPTION PROGRAM INTO COMPLETE TURMOIL.
AS NOTED IN EARLIER ITEMS, TIMELY, RELIABLE, COMPLETE INFORMATION
IS NEEDED TO MANAGE AN AUGMENTATION PROGRAM.

012 R
INVOLVE THE PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AT ALL LEVELS IN THE DEVELOPMENT,
SOURCING, AND MANAGEMENT OF AN AUGMENTATION PACKAGE. PROVIDE
DATA TO THE RECEIVING STATION(S) NLT 45 DAYS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL
SO ADEQUATE COORDINATION CAN BE PERFORMED IN AREAS OF TRANSPOR-
TATION, BILLETING, TRAINING, AND RECEPTION.

012 A
PERSONNEL IS INVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT, SOURCING, AND MANAGEMENT
OF AUGMENTATION PACKAGES AND DESIGNATES THE DATE THAT EACH INDIVI-
DUAL MUST REPORT TO THE EMPLOYMENT SITE. THIS INFORMATION IS
PROVIDED IN THE DMD AND TPFD. TRANSPORTATION ARRANGES AIRLIFT
BASED UPON KNOWN AIRCRAFT SCHEDULES. PERSONNEL HAS NO CONTROL
OVER AIRFLOW CHANGES, AIRCRAFT DELAYS, OR SEAT AVAILABILITY.
012 s
CLOSED.

012 0
OPR: HQ MAC/DPX

013 T
AUGMENTATION MANNING

013 p
AUGMENTEES IN SOME CASES WERE UNQUALIFIED FOR THE POSITION TO
WHICH THEY WERE ASSIGNED.

013 D
A LACK OF QUALITY CONTROL IN THE SELECTION OF AUGMENTEES ALLOWED
POSITIONS TO BE FILLED BY UNQUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS. A CASE IN
POINT WAS THE INDIVIDUAL SELECTED AS COMALF/ADO, HE WAS A LINE
NAVIGATOR WITH NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN A DO MANAGEMENT POSITION.
THE SELECTION OF SQUADRON CREW MEMBERS FOR STAFF TACTICS AND
PLANS ROLES ALSO LED TO PROBLEMS IN TIMELY PROCESSING AND COORDI-
NATION OF PLANNING ITEMS FROM DEPLOYED UNITS TO THE 435TAW FOR
MISSION SETUPS.

013 R
DEVELOP BETTER DEFINITION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND DUTIES BY POSITION
NUMBER/AFSC, DEVELOP A MEANS OF RELAYING THIS DATA IN THE
PERSONNEL TASKING SYSTEM, AND INSURE QUALITY CONTROL IS APPLIED
AT THE UNIT LEVEL WHERE INDIVIDUALS ARE SELECTED TO FILL POSITIONS.

013 A
DEFINITION OF REQUIREMENTS IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFICE
,WHICH CREATES THE COMALF STRUCTURE. SINCE MACR 28-2 ALLOWS FOR
1SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN AFSCS 1425 AND 2245, 21AF/DOXL SHOULD HAVE
BEEN MORE SPECIFIC IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMALF REQUIREMENTS.
THE REQUIREMENTS SUBMITTED IN THEIR 24 AUG 83 MESSAGE CONTAINED
NO SPECIAL EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ADO. THEIR MANPOWER
AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTI;;R ACTION 10

013 A
MESSAGE ON 31 AUG 83 DID NOT EVEN CONTAIN THAT POSITION AT ALL.
IN ADDITION, 21AF/DOX SOURCED THIS POSITION TO THE RESERVES
911 TAW). THIS IS A 21AF INTERNAL ACTION I'rEM.

013 s
CLOSED.

013 0
OPR: HQ MAC/DPX
OCR: HQ MAC/DOOX
 .._ .......... Command units, the annual Reforger exercise mean$ .. . ·.

' FtPt John Brett braced against the

'-· .. d and the morning rain as he left
his dry bunker. A relentless North
Sea wind sliced across the openness
of Gilze-Rijen , a Dutch fighter base
in the southern part of the Nether-
lands, near the Belgian border.
Capt. Brett, the commander of the
airlift control element-"ALCE "-
for Military Airlift Command (MAC ),
headed for the German C-160 Tran-
sa/1 that had just landed . It would
take on a load of U.S. Army jeeps and
their drivers.
Reforger '83 was on the upswing
as NATO alli es mounted a counter
attack against a mock invasion of tary members and tons of equipment. shut down on the C-160-similar to a
Western Europe. Reforger- return of Keeping men and machines moving two-engine version of the C-130
U.S. forces to Germany-was really was MAC's responsibility, and people Hercules-and Army troopers in pon-
many exercises and was. in turn , part like Capt Brett were in Europe to chos awaited their load ing calls .
of the Autumn Forge war games in help keep the massive airlift on Two Dutch anti-aircraft weapons were
Europe. schedule. dug in about 300 yards away, next
The forces were divided into a Capt Brett had established his to a cornfield . Their presence lent
defending army and an aggressor headquarters in a bunker map room reality to the warlike atmosphere .
force. Overhead, U.S. Air Force F-4s at Gilze-Rijen . Rain had fallen for "The rain makes it tough for every-
that had been ferried across the eight straight days. And more was one," Capt Brett said , "but this is
Atlantic behind air refuelers, were predicted . The woods around the really the kind of stuff we 'd have to
providing friendly air cover as part of bunker smelled dank, and he was fight in , anyway, if war broke out.
exercise Crested Cap. surprised he hadn 't come down with I think the generals and field com-
The massive, annual exercise a cold. manders actually prefer this kind
i· 'ved 40,000 American , Dutch , By the time Capt. Brett reached the of weather; it lends more realism to
L nan, British, and Canadian mili- parking apron, the props had been the exercise."

March 1984 29
 The ca pta1n wa s involved in the
1982 Reforger , also. He is ass ig ned
to th e 435th Tacti cal Airl ift Wi ng
at Rhei n-Mam AB , near Fra nkfurt
" Exerc ise veterans like me are refin -
ing what we 've done before- going
th rough proc edures we' d have to
fol low if thi s were for real. "
The C-160 was loaded and tax iing
A Ca nadian Ai r Force C-1 30 had
dropped beneath the overcast and
wa s battling wind s as it lined up
on th e Gilze-Ri jen runway About 30
m1nu te s beh ind , a North Ca ro li na
Air National Guard C- 130 was also
on its way. A plane would come and
go every 30 minutes all day long,
and their schedules wou ld be d utiful-
ly repo rted by Capt. Brett ove r a
cryp to sc ramb ler in his bunker office.
"People who haven 't taken part in
Reforger before are here to learn .
That's how a corpo rate memory is
deve loped," he said. When he had
left Frankfurt two weeks earli er for the
start of Reforger, the September
days had been warm and mild . Since
then, all of Europe, it seemed , had
become a bog . He wriggled inside
his camouf lage fie ld jacket. " I'd
rather have the sun shine," he said .
Reforger had begun as a strategic
ai rlift. In eight days of radio-silent
flying across the Atlant ic , Military Air-
lift Command planes had de live red
17,000 U.S. Army troops from US.
bases to airfields in the Netherlan ds
and Germany. The forc es swelled
batta lions permanently garrisoned in
Europe.
The war games were the biggest
North Atlantic Treaty Alliance show of
force of the year-a test of military
re ad iness in the context of NATO's

CLOCKWISE (from top): An A-10 Thun-

derbolt II waits to taxi as another pre-
pares to land. "first there" is the
promise of a combat control team
member. The international honor guard
presents the colors during ceremonies.
OPPOSITE PAGE: Ground crews race
toward an A-10 to prepare it for an-
other sortie. A C-1418 from the 63rd
MAW at Norton AFB , Calif. , taxis at
Luxembourg Airport.

30 AIRMAN
.. ..
deterrent m1 ss ion. More tha n 250 of The a1rcraft co mm and er. Capt As he ta lked. Autu mn Forge had
the U.S. reinforcements parachuted D.W Eva ns of the 86th Mil itary Airl ift reach ed the German border. All ied
from air-refueled C-141 B's th at Squadron. wa s she lteri ng beneath troops were prep aring to throw a
•rned to the Un ited States without the wing of his C-1 41 B as troop s file d po ntoon bnd ge ac ross the Maa s Riv-
Jing . Other Army mem bers were out the rear ca rgo doo r and head ed er. Armor was mass ing on the auto-
tran sported to Europe on comme rc ial for th e Mercedes buses. The under- ba hns . Refo rger had becom e tact ica l.
airlin ers. si de of th e Starlifter wm g was gl azed an d Capt Brett was abo ut to move
Capt Brett was one of a half-dozen with frost from the 5 '/2-hou r cros sing inland .
ALCE members who had prepa red from Goose Bay, Labrador. For the fi rst time. th e Du sse ldorf
the way fo r thei r arrival. He had ''We've bee n out fo r two week s. Airport was re ce ivm g troop planes.
start ed at Schipho l Airpo rt . outs ide fl ying a variety of miss ions ." he sa id. Capt. Billy W Wren , anothe r 435th
Amsterdam. where c ivil secu ri ty had zipp ing hi s jacket highe r aga in st TAW ALC E commande r. wa s on
been tig hter than usual because of the col d. A coupl e of crewm embers the JO b there . The Refo rger planes
anti-mili ta ry demonstrations. joined hi m under th e w1ng . They had , had parked away fro m the mai n
From the fogged win dow of hi s he sa id. bee n flyin g one mission passenge r terminal in order to pre-
terminal building head q uarters at after another. " We've flow n support serve a military " low prof ile. " Most
Schiphol he had watched Army driv- fo r [exercise] Br1ght Star in Egypt. travelers, he was sure, were not even
ers dep lane for a bus rid e to Rotter- To night we'/! be in Mild en hall [E ng - awa re of troop act ivity at the ai rport.
dam to meet heavy equi pm ent land] , and that' s where we'll learn Just to make certain everytll ing
arriving from th e United States by what our next mis sion 1s . We won 't be went without a hitch. German Army
ship. home for anothe r wee k, at least. " rese rvist Capt. Wilfri ed Hau sman- a
federal justic e of the High Court of
Dusseldorf-was helping Capt. Wren
as interprete r and ombudsman . Th e
US. troops had been moved quickly
off th e airport- with in minutes , real-
ly- to bivouacs near Monch en glad-
bach , Herongen, Coesteld, and
Rhei neberg.
Further to the east. Wiesbaden AB
had been rea ctivated for Reforger,
and Ai r National Guard and Air Force
Reserv e C-130s we re usi ng it s run-
wa ys as springboard s to land ing
strips near where the Army readied
tor mock battle . A-1 0 tank-busters of
the U.S. Air Forces in Europe and
Tactical Air Command also were
nested at Wiesbaden . They were get-
ting plenty of practice in mock
attacks against the 3,500 tanks and
armored vehicles involved in Autum n
Forge .
Ram stein AB , near Kaiserslautern ,
was the main arrival point for most
of the statesid e troops . The first
simulated casualties were being sent
back to the area. Air Force C-130s
ru shed them to Upper Heyto rd , Eng-
land, and C-141 B's then took the
"wounded" back to military hospitals
in the United States.
Everywhere in Europe the flying
workload had ballooned . Maj. Ronald
T. Kadish 's 37th Tactical Airlift
Squadro n at Rhein-Main could attest
to that. Aircrews had been flyi ng
into some pretty rough places tor the
Army. Maj. Kadish, the unit's opera-
tions officer and a pil ot with 2,400
hou.rs, said . "Th e workload is a lot
higher now than it normally is , and
that puts a strain on people . We're a
24 -hour a day operation . The Reforger
missions are scattered throughout
the day, so we need more crews . The

31
 .
schedul e and workload under these
condition s is more diffic ult eve n if the
number of missi ons neve r cha nged
But," he added, " that's the way we
would do it in warti me, to su ppl y the
uni ts in the field ."
As the subo rdin ate uni t of the 435th
TAW , the 37th TAS wa s providing
advanced element controll ers. It is
al so a perma nent duty unit in Europe .
"And being permanent , we do this
Reforg er thing all the time. on a daily
basis," MaJ. Kad ish said . " Once
the C-14 1s from the States de liver
peop le, we follow them in and do our
type of ai rdrop. We do late-n ight
drops- whatever it takes to suppo rt
the Arm y.
"The C-141 s go back to the States,
sometimes without stopp ing in Ger-
many. The concept is that strategic
airlift brin gs in the peop le, and we
supply them in an ai r-to-air interfac e.
We do it on short notice , re supplying
the troops with food, ammo- whatev-
er. We get our task ing orders from
the 322nd Airlift Division [MAC] and
we launch within three to four hours
after notification. "
The Air Force in Europe had been
ordered to 12-hour shifts. At Ram-
stein, headquarters fo r the 322nd Air-
lift Divis ion, so many transpo rts had

CLOCKWISE (from above): The wel-

come sign was out for Reforger partici·
pants. One of those participants uses
his signalling mirror. Troops prepare to
board an aircraft. Tanks move across a
bridge during war games.

32
 arrived du ri ng one peri od of Reforger being close to the work makes prob- adversar ies ali ke tha t we can rap 1dly
that park ing space shrank to ze ro . lems seem larger than life. Maj. and strategically deploy U.S. force s
'' "'intenance people scam pered Gen. Overa cker was watch ing how 1n Eu rope . The se ri es of exerc ises are
;eep up. h1s people so lved those pro blems. A watched very carefull y by the Ea ste rn
" We ha d ramp satu ration at tim es. comp uter for the first time was plot- Bloc nat ions, JUSt as we try to watch
with every spot taken, inc ludin g ti ng airc raft operations . Late r. th e the ir exerc ises as c lose ly as we
alternate spots out back and the hot compute r would ki ck out a c hrono- can , to learn tact ics and procedures .
ca rg o pit, " sai d Capt David B. Nobel, logical history that th e gene ral and " Peop le tend to think of Reforg er
608th Airlift Support Group. " As of h1s staff wo uld use to evaluate the ir as the 'ret urn of for ces to Germany. '
today, 20 days into the month, we 're part in Reforger. But afte r it's all over, they all have
already 40 planes over our normal Jet sounds filtered into his offi ce as to go home, so it 's not just the return
monthly load of 200 planes . We 've he provid ed a perspective that tran- of forces. but the re-return of fo rces
done five engine changes' " scended the gra ss-roots expe rien ce back to the Unite d States after th e
Two blocks away, in a pl ain, small at Gilze-Rijen , Dusse ldorf. and all the exerc ise is over."
office in a Ram ste in rece iving ware- other places where Reforger was Maj . Gen. Overa c ker said he con-
house, Ma j. Gen. Will1am E. Overac k- happening . If Reforger wa s reduced to side rs Reforger a test of com mand-
er was in contact with his staff on its common denominator, he said, " It level planning " not to exceed the
Reforger progress . As the 322nd is a transportation problem of moving ca pability of the bases we are us ing.
commander, he is MAC 's top general people from one place to another- " But when it comes to execution ,"
in Europe. He expected complaints returning peop le and equipment he said candidly, "things can happen
about the increa sed workload , which to Europe. we can 't plan for. Instead of one
was an object ive of Reforger Plan- "These forces, once they are here , mission, we may need two . Instead of
ners needed to learn , he expla in ed , participate in a host of exercises a plane Sitti ng on the ground fo r
how their subordinates would react to sponsored by the armed services . two hours, we may find it will be on
the additional stress of a big exer- MAC also helps in the deployment of the grou nd eig ht hours because
cise . fighters used in Crested Cap [the of conside rati ons we couldn 't fore-
" We work our people harder and movement of U.S.-based fighter cast.
longer," he asserted. " Most of them units ], and it bring s the Army over for " So, we try to build into the plans
enough flexibility so we can, in the
execution stage, take care of those
kinds of things. It's a test of the
planner's abilities. In Reforger, we
haven 't exceeded our capab ilities
anywhere. "
Maj Robert C. St John , the gener-
al 's chief of Central Region Planning ,
said the challenge is "trying to work
around so as not to interfere with
other things while we are doing
Reforger.
"We actually knew a year ago we
would need additional airlift capabil-
ity. We knew the number of available
C-130s in Europe would not be
enough to support the fall exercises ,
so we coordinated with Headquarters
MAC to get help from the Guard
and the Reserve. They 're planned for
as part of the exercise force pack-
age "
are work ing seven days a week A C-130 lands during the exercise. The Air Force, he said , plans with
during this period. The key word is the Army to determine when and
'surge.' We are able to surge our the field exercises. Reforg er is just where airlift is needed . "We're keep-
folks and produce good results at a one small aspect of the Autumn ing our aircrews busy , that 's for
highly increased rate of activity. Forge exerc ise, but it 's a vi tal part. " sure ," he said.
Because of augmentation [from U.S Defining Reforger further , he said , Back at Gilze-Rijen, the conti nual
units] and the increased hours, we "It is both politi cal and mili tary. In the radio chatter was proof the flying
are able to do our regular mission mi litary sense, it allows us to practice units-both the permanent party and
and Reforger equally well. what we might one day have to do the augmentees on temporary duty
"We find the exercise lets us try for real. It allows the Army to come to
inexpe rien ced people in surge oper- the theater where its forces would
ations and to hone experienced be deployed , and to the places
people to a fine edge ," the general where they might have to fight a war."
c<"ried . In addition , Maj. Gen. Overacker
Gilze-Rije n, Dusseldorf, and on said , "Reforger demonstrates to
the Ramstein maintenance ramps , our friends and to our potential

March 1984 33
 from the United States- were getting
a workout. Capt. Brett had returned
to the bunker. The Canadian C-130
had come and gone and another
German C-160 with orange markings
over green-g ray camouflage paint
wa s loading . The air inside the
bunker was stale with cigarette
smoke. Capt. Brett strolled past an
Army soldier squatting in a corner
and probing the cold contents of a
can of C-rations.
Gilze-Rijen was important for the
moment, a place from which to move
the pawns of war. It had seen use
before in Wo rld War II. Capt. Brett
and the aircrews who flew out of
it during Reforger were demonstrating
it was ready for allied use again . e(.'F3

CLOCKWISE (from bottom) : A soldier

takes a short rest break. A tank and ar-
mored personnel carrier move through
a small village. Armored personnel car-
riers share the roadways with automo-
biles in Stockhusen, Germany. Some
3,500 tanks and armored vehicles were
used in the Autumn Forge exercise.

34 AIRMAN