TITLE ONE: CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS

Chapter 1: Crimes Against National Security; Section 1: Treason and Espionage

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 People v. Adriano G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947 Tunggol, Jennilyn
2 Guinto v. Veluz G.R. No. L-980 December 21, 1946 Tunggol, Jennilyn
3 Laurel v. Misa G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947 Tunggol, Jennilyn
4 U.S. v. Lagnason G.R. No. 1582 March 28, 1904 Tunggol, Jennilyn
5 People v. Icaro G.R. L-2956 May 23, 1951 Tunggol, Jennilyn
6 People v. Alvero G.R. No. L-820 April 11, 1950 Tunggol, Jennilyn
7 People v. Prieto G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948 Tunggol, Jennilyn
8 People v. Perez G.R. No. L-856 April 18, 1949 Tunggol, Jennilyn
9 People v. Bate G.R. No. L-1547 January 28, 1949 Tunggol, Jennilyn
10 People v. Escleto G.R. No. L-1006 June 28, 1949 Tunggol, Jennilyn
11 People v. Mateo G.R. No. L-869 February 9, 1948 Tunggol, Jennilyn
G.R. No. L-1731, Tunggol, Jennilyn
12 People v. Flores January 31, 1950
1676, 1624
13 People v. Agpangan G.R. No. L-778 October 10, 1947 Tunggol, Jennilyn
14 U.S. v. Magtibay G.R. No. 1317 November 23, 1903 Tunggol, Jennilyn
15 People. v. Butawan G.R. No. L-855 April 28, 1949 Tunggol, Jennilyn
16 People. v. Adlawan G.R. No. L-456 March 29, 1949 Tunggol, Jennilyn
17 People v. Cana G.R. No. L-1678 November 10, 1950 Tunggol, Jennilyn
18 People v. Victoria G.R. No. L-369 March 13, 1947 Tunggol, Jennilyn
19 People v. Nunez G.R. No. L-2321 January 31, 1950 Tunggol, Jennilyn
20 People v. Vilo G.R. No. L-1656 January 7, 1949 Tunggol, Jennilyn
21 People v. Manayao G.R. No. L-322 July 28, 1947 Tunggol, Jennilyn
22 People v. Castro G.R. No. L-547 June 28, 1949 Tunggol, Jennilyn
23 De Lima v. Guerrero G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017 Tunggol, Jennilyn
Macapagal-Arroyo v. G.R. No. 220598 & Tunggol, Jennilyn
24 July 19, 2016
People 220953
25 People v. Peralta, et al. G.R. No. L-19069 October 29, 1968 Tunggol, Jennilyn
26 U.S. v. Abad G.R. No. L-976 October 22, 1902 Tunggol, Jennilyn
27 U.S. v. Bautista G.R. No. 2189 November 3, 1906 Tunggol, Jennilyn
28 U.S. v. Villarino G.R. No. 2430 March 9, 1906 Tunggol, Jennilyn
29 People v. Saavedra G.R. No. L-48738 May 18, 1987 Tunggol, Jennilyn
30 U.S. v. Caballeros G.R. No. 1352 March 29, 1905 Tunggol, Jennilyn
31 Santos v. Misa G.R. No. L-319 March 28, 1946 Tunggol, Jennilyn
 32 People v. Avila G.R. No. L-944 May 26, 1949 Tunggol, Jennilyn
33 De Lima vs. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017 Flora, Arturo O.
G.R. No. 220598 &
34 Arroyo v. People April 18, 2017 Flora, Arturo O.
220953
35 People vs. Peralta, et al G.R. No. 60294 December 18, 1982 Flora, Arturo O.
36 US v. ABAD G.R. No. L-976 October 22, 1902 Flora, Arturo O.

Chapter 1: Crimes Against National Security; Section 1: Treason and Espionage

Art. 114. Treason – Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the Philippines or
adheres to her enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere,
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed
Four million pesos (₱4,000,000).

PEOPLE VS. ADRIANO

G.R. No. L-477, June 30, 1947, TUASON, J.

FACTS
Charged with treason for his membership in the Makapili organization during the
Japanese occupation of the Philippines.
Makapili organization was created to assist the Japanese Imperial Forces in their war
efforts against the United States and the Philippines.
Defendant's participation in raids and confiscation of property had not been established
by the testimony of two witnesses.

ISSUE
Is membership in the Makapili organization evidence of treasonable intent?

RULING
Membership in the Makapili organization is evidence of treasonable intent.
The court ruled that membership in the Makapili organization is evidence of treasonable
intent because the organization was created to assist the Japanese Imperial Forces in
their war efforts against the United States and the Philippines.

GUINTO V. VELUZ
G.R. No. L-980, December 21, 1946, FERIA, J.

FACTS
The case involves the petitioner, Jose Guinto, who was charged with the crime of
treason.
The original information filed on March 6, 1946, alleged that Guinto joined and accepted
the functions and duties of a spy for the Japanese Military Police.
The original information also specified an overt act where Guinto arrested a guerrilla
named Ernesto Simpao and forced him to jump into the water where he was shot to
death.
Before Guinto pleaded, the Office of the Official Prosecutors filed an amended
information on May 25, 1945, alleging three additional overt acts committed by Guinto in
aid of the enemy.

ISSUE
Whether an information charging a person with treason can be amended after the six-
month period from the passage of Act No. 682, as long as the additional overt acts
alleged in the amendment occurred within the period of time alleged in the original
information.

RULING
The amended information was not a new information but merely an amendment to the
original information.
The overt acts alleged in the amended information were a specification of the crime
charged in the original information.
The amendment was properly admitted under the existing laws and rules of court.
The petitioner's contention would allow the government to file another information for
treason, splitting the single crime into two and putting the petitioner at risk of being
convicted twice for the same offense.
The amended information was properly admitted and the petitioner's petition was
dismissed.

LAUREL V. MISA
 G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947, PARAS, J

FACTS
The petitioner, Anastacio Laurel, filed a petition for habeas corpus.
The case was heard by the court en banc.
The respondent in the case was Eriberto Misa.
The decision was made on January 30, 1947.

ISSUE
The main issue raised in the case was whether a Filipino citizen who aided the enemy
during the Japanese occupation can be prosecuted for treason.

RULING
The court ruled that a Filipino citizen who aided the enemy during the Japanese
occupation can be prosecuted for treason.

U.S. V. LAGNASON
 G.R. No. 1582, March 28, 1904, WILLARD, J.

FACTS
Defendant, Dalmacio Lagnason, charged with treason for leading a rebellion against the
Government of the United States.
Defendant argued that his actions only amounted to rebellion, not treason.
Defendant and his band, known as the Babaylanes, attacked the town of Murcia in the Province
of Occidental Negros in the Philippines.
Attack was repelled by the Constabulary forces, and defendant was captured along with several
members of his band.
Defendant and his band were armed with rifles, bolos, daggers, and a small cannon.
Two guides of the Constabulary were killed during the fight.

ISSUE
Whether the defendant's actions constituted treason or rebellion.

RULING
Engaging in a rebellion and giving it aid and comfort constitutes treason.
Defendant found guilty of treason and sentenced to death

PEOPLE V. ICARO
 G.R. L-2956, May 23, 1951, PARAS, C. J

FACTS
During the latter part of 1944, and early 1945, while the United States of America, the
Philippines, and the Allied Nations were at war with the Japanese Empire, Defendant Eleuterio
Icaro, a Filipino Citizen, owing faith and allegiance to both America and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, openly adhered to the enemy, and gave it aid and comfort. Armed with a rifle,
and in company with other Filipinos and Japanese soldiers, also armed, and in company with
other Filipinos and Japanese soldiers, also armed, he took part in raids against guerilla
suspects, and in their arrest. The Court of First Instance of Laguna, found him guilty of treason.
He denies that he was a Makapili.

ISSUE
Can the Appellant be held guilty of Treason?

RULING
Yes. The point becomes unnecessary, since adherence to the enemy may be inferred from the
overt acts of treason committed by the appellant, consisting in the arrest of persons suspected
of being guerrillas who, with the exception of one Emilio Biscocho, were never seen again,
especially because the appellant was armed and in company with armed Japanese soldiers and
other Filipinos.

PEOPLE V. ALVERO
 G.R. No. L-820, April 11, 1950, MONTEMAYOR, J

FACTS
Aurelio Alvero, also known as Reli, was charged with treason on twenty-two counts.
Alvero was involved in various forms of collaboration with the enemy during the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines.
Under economic collaboration, Alvero was involved in buying and selling war materials to the
Japanese.
Under political collaboration, he wrote a letter of congratulations to President Laurel for
declaring war against the United States and Great Britain, joined the KALIBAPI, and helped
organize the New Leaders' Association.
Under military collaboration, Alvero joined the MAKAPILI, organized the Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala,
and participated in a meeting at the Ayuntamiento de Manila.
He also allegedly ordered the burning of buildings in Pasay.

ISSUE
Whether Alvero's actions constituted treason.

RULING
Alvero's adherence to the enemy through overt acts breached his allegiance and loyalty to the
nation, making him criminally liable.
Acts of economic and political collaboration can lead to criminal liability.

PEOPLE V. PRIETO
 G.R. No. L-399, January 29, 1948, TUASON, J

FACTS
Defendant Eduardo Prieto, also known as Eddie Valencia, was charged with treason and
murder.
The case was heard in the People's Court.
The defendant pleaded not guilty to some counts but entered a guilty plea to others.
The special prosecutor presented evidence for one count, while stating that there was
insufficient evidence for two other counts.
The defendant was found guilty on the counts he pleaded guilty to, as well as on the count for
which evidence was presented.
He was sentenced to death and ordered to pay a fine.

ISSUE
Whether the defendant is guilty of treason and murder.

RULING
The defendant was found not guilty of the count for which evidence was presented. The
defendant was found guilty of treason on the counts he pleaded guilty to. The court modified the
judgment to find the defendant guilty on certain counts. The penalty imposed was reclusion
perpetua.
 PEOPLE V. PEREZ
G.R. No. L-856, April 18, 1949, TUASON, J

FACTS
Susano Perez, also known as Kid Perez, was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the
People's Court sitting in Cebu City. The prosecution alleged seven counts of treason, but
evidence was presented for counts 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6. These counts involved Perez's involvement
in recruiting women and girls for immoral purposes to satisfy the desires of Japanese officers
during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War II. Testimonies from victims
detailed how Perez coerced and delivered these women to Japanese officers, resulting in rape
and sexual abuse.

ISSUE
The issue at hand is whether Perez's actions, particularly in procuring women for the immoral
purposes of Japanese officers, constitute treason under the law.

RULING
The court found that while Perez's actions may have aided the enemy by providing comfort and
entertainment to Japanese officers, they did not directly contribute to strengthening the
Japanese war effort or weakening the power of the United States. Therefore, the court held that
Perez's actions did not constitute treason. However, Perez was found guilty of four separate
crimes of rape based on his direct involvement in sexually assaulting the victims mentioned in
the case. The court sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty for each rape conviction.
 PEOPLE V. BATE
G.R. No. L-1547 January 28, 1949 MONTEMAYOR, J

FACTS
The appellant, Maximo Bate alias Borja alias Patso, was charged with treason before
the People's Court on nine counts. During the trial, the Special Prosecutor dropped
three counts from the amended information. The People's Court found the defendant
guilty of counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 9. The court stated that the overt acts alleged in the
information had been fully substantiated by the prosecution witnesses, and there was
no reason to doubt their testimonies. The appellant admitted in court that he was a
Filipino citizen.
Under count 7, it was proven that the appellant, armed and accompanied by Filipino
undercover men and Japanese soldiers, raided a store in Cebu City. The raid resulted
in the death of Bernardo Laborete, who was shot by one of the raiders. The appellant
acted as a guard during the investigation conducted by the Japanese soldiers.
Under count 1, the appellant and a patrol of Japanese soldiers and armed Filipino
undercover men raided a store in Cebu City. Three men were apprehended, accused,
and maltreated. They were later taken to the Japanese Military Police Headquarters and
kept as prisoners.
Under count 9, the appellant and his companions raided the house of Clemente Chica
and questioned him about his alleged guerrilla activities. Chica was taken to the
Japanese Military Police Headquarters, where he made some admissions and had his
revolver confiscated.
Under count 2, the appellant and a group of Filipino spies raided the house of the
Singson family. They apprehended and maltreated the family members, and one of
them was taken to the Military Police Headquarters and never seen again.
Under count 4, the appellant arrested Francisca Bacalla and took her to the chief of the
Japanese Military Police, where she was investigated and maltreated. She was stripped
and suspended in the air during the investigation.
Under count 5, the appellant and a group of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercover
men raided the house of the Bacani family. The family members were questioned and
maltreated, and they were later taken to a Japanese garrison where they were confined
as prisoners.
The appellant claimed that he joined the guerrilla movement but was arrested and
imprisoned by the Japanese. He also claimed that he had no connection with the raids
mentioned in the counts, except for the raid in Punta Princesa Market, where he was
taken by the Japanese to identify a killer.

ISSUE
The main issue is whether the appellant is guilty of treason based on the overt acts
alleged in the counts.

RULING
Yes. Although not sufficient to prove the overt acts of which Bate is accused,
nevertheless, the evidence may be considered as proof of his adherence to the enemy.
 PEOPLE V. ESCLETO
G.R. No. L-1006, June 28, 1949, TUASON, J.

FACTS
The case involves Filemon Escleto who was charged with treason for collaborating with
the Imperial Japanese Forces during the Japanese military occupation of the
Philippines.
The specific charges against Escleto include collaborating and fraternizing with the
Japanese forces, bearing arms against American and guerrilla forces, and arresting a
guerrilla named Antonio Conducto and turning him over to the Japanese military
authorities.
The lower court found no concrete evidence of Escleto's membership in any treasonous
organization or his involvement in specific overt acts of treason, but believed that the
evidence proved his adherence to the enemy.

ISSUE
Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to establish the guilt of Filemon Escleto for
the crime of treason.

RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court. The court found that the
evidence presented failed to establish any true overt act of treason. The witnesses
testified that Escleto took down the names of individuals and accompanied them to the
town, but this action alone did not prove his betrayal or intention to betray Antonio
Conducto. The court emphasized the two-witness rule in treason cases, which requires
that each witness must testify to the whole overt act, or if it is separable, there must be
two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
In this case, no two witnesses coincided in any specific acts of the defendant.
Therefore, the court ruled that the evidence did not meet the standard required for a
conviction of treason.

PEOPLE V. MATEO
G.R. No. L-869, February 9, 1948, PADILLA, J.

FACTS
Defendant, Pastor Tan Mateo (alias Nene Tan Mateo), is charged with treason.
Defendant is a native citizen of the Philippines.
Defendant was employed in the Public Opinion Office in Dumaguete, Oriental Negros
from June 1942 to March 1945.
The organization, headed by Teodorico Lajato, gathered information about guerrilla
movements in the province.
Defendant frequently visited Lajato's office and gathered information about guerrilla
movements.
Defendant reported his findings to Lajato or Major Bartolome Soledad, the Chief of
Police of Dumaguete.
Defendant was involved in the arrest of Alfonso Calubiran and Antonio Chan, suspected
of being in league with the guerrillas.
The arrest was ordered by the Chief of Police based on the defendant's suspicion.
Defendant, along with others, apprehended Calubiran and Chan, imprisoned them, and
conducted an investigation before releasing them.
Defendant denies being an informer and causing the arrest of Calubiran and Chan.

ISSUE
Can the defendant be convicted of treason based on the evidence presented?

RULING
The court finds the defendant guilty of treason. The conviction cannot be supported by
the two-witness rule. The arrest of Calubiran and Chan is considered an overt act of
treason. The arrest of Angeles Catan is not considered treasonous due to lack of
evidence.

PEOPLE V. FLORES
G.R. No. L-1731, 1676, 1624 January 31, 1950 REYES, J.

FACTS
Defendants Faustino Flores, Leon Gutierrez, and Felipe Reyes were charged with
treason for their alleged participation in the "zoning" of a barrio in the Philippines during
World War II.The defendants were accused of acting as informers or agents of the
Imperial Japanese Forces and aiding them in rounding up male residents suspected of
being guerrillas. The defendants allegedly established a perimeter of restricted freedom
and mass confinement, arrested and tortured the suspects, and confiscated their
belongings.
The defendants were found guilty and sentenced to a prison term and fine on the
second count of the charges, which related to their alleged participation in the "zoning"
of the barrio.

ISSUE
Whether the convictions of the defendants for treason should be upheld.

RULING
The court held that the convictions were a violation of the two-witness rule, which
requires that every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to
constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses. The court
found that there was a lack of corroboration from two witnesses for each overt act
attributed to the defendants.
The court explained that the two-witness rule must be adhered to for each and every
one of the external manifestations of the overt act in issue. Each of the two witnesses
must testify to the whole of the overt act, or if it is separable, there must be two
witnesses to each part of the overt act. The court emphasized that the rule is strict and
that the opportunity to detect the falsity of testimony is destroyed if witnesses are
allowed to speak to different acts. Therefore, in this case, since there was a lack of
corroboration from two witnesses for each overt act attributed to the defendants, the
court concluded that the convictions were a violation of the two-witness rule and
acquitted the defendants.
PEOPLE V. AGPANGAN
G.R. No. L-778, October 10, 1947, PERFECTO, J

FACTS
Nemesio L. Agpangan was accused of treason during the Japanese occupation in the
Philippines.
The alleged treasonous act occurred between December 1944 and January 1945 in the
Province of Laguna.
Agpangan, as a member of the Ganap and Pampars organizations, joined the military
organization supporting the Imperial Japanese Army.
He was equipped with a rifle and underwent training.
From January 12, 1945, to March 15, 1945, he was assigned to guard duty in the
Japanese garrison, with orders to shoot any Filipino prisoners or guerrillas who
attempted to escape or approach the garrison.

ISSUE
Can Agpangan be convicted of treason based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution?

RULING
The Supreme Court acquitted Agpangan due to insufficient evidence. The court applied
the presumption of innocence and the two-witness rule in criminal law. The prosecution
failed to meet the requirement of the two-witness rule. The witnesses testified about
Agpangan doing guard duty in the Japanese garrison, but they did not provide specific
dates and times. Agpangan's credible testimony that he was coerced into working for
the Japanese under threat to his family was considered. The court concluded that the
prosecution did not prove Agpangan's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

U.S. V. MAGTIBAY
G.R. No. 1317, November 23, 1903, WILLARD, J.

FACTS
Defendant, Simeon Magtibay, accused of treason. Magtibay was a soldier in the
Constabulary stationed at Imus, Cavite. Deserted on October 13, 1902, and captured on
October 27, 1902. Admitted to giving arms to his general, Montalon. Commission
making him a second lieutenant, signed by Montalon, found on his person. Montalon
was in armed rebellion against the Government in October. Engagements between
Montalon's troops and the forces of the Constabulary

ISSUE
Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to support a conviction for the crime of
treason
RULING
No conviction for treason unless there are at least two witnesses testifying to the same
overt act of treason. Only one witness to the finding of the commission and the
confession made by the defendant. Evidence did not meet the legal requirement for
conviction
Confession mentioned in the act of Congress refers to a confession of guilt. Defendant's
testimony denying desertion and claiming to have been forced to join Montalon's forces
did not constitute a confession of guilt.
Section cannot be extended to include admissions of facts made by the defendant in
giving his testimony after pleading not guilty.
Defendant's argument that there was no state of insurrection or war in Cavite in October
1902 deemed irrelevant.
Defendant acquitted of the crime of treason due to lack of sufficient evidence and failure
to meet legal requirements for conviction. Defendant may still be charged with other
crimes based on the evidence presented in this case.

PEOPLE. V. BUTAWAN
G.R. No. L-855, April 28, 1949, PARAS, J.

FACTS
Troadio Butawan, a detachment commander of the Bureau of Constabulary, is
convicted of treason for his involvement in the murder and illegal detention of guerrilla
members during the Japanese occupation.
The information charged Butawan with eight counts, but evidence was only presented
for counts 1, 5, and 6.
Count 1 accused Butawan of adhering to the enemy by serving as a detachment
commander of the Bureau of Constabulary under the Japanese Military Forces.
Count 5 charged him with shooting and killing a member of the guerrilla organization
known as the "Bolo Battalion."
Count 6 accused him of apprehending, maltreating, and torturing three other members
of the same organization.

ISSUE
Is Butawan guilty of treason for his involvement in the murder and illegal detention of
guerrilla members during the Japanese occupation?

RULING
The court found Butawan guilty of treason, not complexed by murder and illegal
detention.
Mere membership in the Bureau of Constabulary, without more, did not constitute
treason. Butawan went beyond his duty of pacification work and committed overt acts of
shooting and killing a guerrilla member and apprehending and maltreating other
guerrilla members. Adherence to the enemy was inferred from the fact that these acts
were committed while Butawan was in the company of Japanese soldiers and
constabulary patrols, and the victims were guerrillas. Butawan's claim that he was not
responsible for the acts and that they were committed by the Japanese was
rejected.Butawan's actions constituted treason, and since murder and illegal detention
were elements of treason, they were not complexed offenses.
PEOPLE. V. ADLAWAN
G.R. No. L-456, March 29, 1949, REYES, J.

FACTS
The case involves the defendant, Cucufate Adlawan, who was charged with treason.
The defendant was accused of adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its
imperial Japanese Forces, with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy. The
defendant allegedly joined the enemy-sponsored military organizations, such as the
Philippine Constabulary and the Japanese Military Police, and participated in patrols,
apprehension of guerrillas, torture, looting, and other acts of atrocities in furtherance of
the enemy's goals. The defendant was also accused of committing murder, rape, and
robbery in connection with his treasonous acts. The defendant pleaded guilty to the
charges.

ISSUE
The main issues raised in the case are as follows:
1. Whether the defendant should be convicted of the "complex crime of treason with
murder, robbery, and rape."
2. Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender can be invoked when
there has been an actual arrest.
3. Whether treachery and abuse of superior strength can be considered as
aggravating circumstances in the crime of treason.
 4. Whether the aggravating circumstances of unnecessary cruelty and ignominy
can be appreciated against the defendant.

RULING

The court modified the judgment below and declared the defendant guilty of treason.
The court sentenced the defendant to reclusion perpetua (imprisonment for 20 years
and 1 day to 40 years) and a fine of P20,000. The court held that the defendant should
not be convicted of the "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape" as
the killings, robbery, and raping were alleged as elements of the crime of treason and
cannot be used to increase the penalty. The court also held that the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be invoked when there has been an actual
arrest. The court further held that treachery and abuse of superior strength are inherent
in the crime of treason and cannot be considered as aggravating circumstances.
However, the court held that the aggravating circumstances of unnecessary cruelty and
ignominy can be appreciated against the defendant.
 PEOPLE V. CANA
G.R. No. L-1678, November 10, 1950, MONTEMAYOR, J.

FACTS
The appellant, Eleuterio Caña, was charged with treason under seven counts. He
served as the puppet Mayor of the Japanese in the municipality of Abuyog, Leyte,
Philippines from June to October 1942, and from November 1943 to August 1944.
During his tenure, he forced the people of Abuyog to dig trenches and foxholes, told
them that the Americans would not return to the Philippines, and provided houses for
the Japanese soldiers while ejecting Filipino civilians from their homes. He also led
Japanese patrols to apprehend guerrillas and their supporters, burned houses in
various barrios, and informed the Japanese soldiers about a guerrilla suspect who was
subsequently imprisoned and tortured. After trial, he was sentenced to fifteen years of
reclusion temporal, a fine of P5,000, and costs.

ISSUE
Whether the appellant is guilty of treason under the charges filed against him.

RULING
The court determines the degree of punishment for treason based on the seriousness of
the treasonable acts and the presence or absence of atrocities on the victims, rather
than the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In this case,
the appellant's acts of treason, such as leading Japanese patrols to apprehend
guerrillas, burning houses, and informing the Japanese soldiers about a guerrilla
suspect, warrant a conviction for treason. However, the court takes a liberal and benign
view of the case due to the absence of killings or torture committed by the appellant and
his prolonged detention since 1946.

PEOPLE V. VICTORIA
G.R. No. L-369, March 13, 1947, PERFECTO, J.

FACTS
The defendant, Carmelito Victoria, was accused of treason under Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code. The information stated that between March 1942 and December
1944, Victoria, a Filipino citizen, adhered to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and provided aid and comfort to them. The
information listed several specific acts committed by Victoria, including his involvement
in the arrest, torture, and killing of individuals who were suspected of supporting the
guerrillas. The lower court found Victoria guilty based on the testimonies of witnesses
and the evidence presented.

ISSUE
The main issue in this case is whether the acts committed by Victoria constitute treason
under Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING
The court held that the performance of righteous actions, no matter how meritorious
they may be, does not justify, exempt, or mitigate the commission of wrongs. Even if
Victoria had saved the lives of many individuals, if he had caused the killing of a single
human being to aid the enemy, he is still considered a traitor. The court also rejected
Victoria's argument that his acts should be considered ordinary crimes rather than
treason, stating that the acts alleged in the information were proven and constituted
treason under the law.

PEOPLE V. NUNEZ
G.R. No. L-2321, January 31, 1950, TORRES, J.

FACTS
Arsenia Nuñez was convicted of treason for her role as a "finger woman" for the
Japanese during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines from December 8, 1941, to
March 1945.
Nuñez was accused of pointing out and facilitating the arrest of several individuals who
were never seen again.
The trial took place in the People's Court.
Nuñez was sentenced to reclusion perpetua (imprisonment for at least 30 years) with a
fine of P10,000.

ISSUE
Whether the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that Nuñez committed
treason by aiding and cooperating with the Japanese during the war.

RULING
The court ruled that Nuñez is guilty of treason.
The evidence presented by the prosecution, including testimonies from witnesses,
established that Nuñez actively participated in the zoning activities of the Japanese.
She pointed out individuals to the Japanese soldiers, accusing them of being guerrillas,
which led to their arrest, detention, and disappearance.
Although the prosecution did not directly hold Nuñez responsible for the disappearance
and possible killing of these individuals, her actions greatly contributed to their fate.
Therefore, the court concluded that Nuñez's actions constituted treason.

PEOPLE V. VILO
G.R. No. L-1656, January 7, 1949, PARAS, J.

FACTS
The appellant, Roman Vilo, was convicted by the People's Court of the complex crime
of treason with murder.
The appellant was found guilty of apprehending, torturing, and killing individuals who
were connected to the resistance movement during the Japanese occupation.
The appellant claimed that he acted under duress, stating that he was previously
arrested and tortured by the Japanese.
The appellant's attorney de oficio admitted that the appellant was guilty of the overt
acts, but argued for a lesser penalty.

ISSUE
Whether the appellant acted under duress and should be given a lesser penalty.

RULING
The court found that the appellant's claim of acting under duress was not supported by
sufficient evidence.
The court noted that the killing of the victims was charged as an element of treason and
could not be the subject of a separate punishment.
However, the court found that the death penalty could still be imposed due to the
presence of aggravating circumstances, such as the use of torture and other atrocities.
The court also discussed the applicability of the Judiciary Act of 1948, which reduced
the number of justices required for the imposition of the death penalty to eight.
The majority of the court believed that the new law could be given retroactive effect,
while one justice disagreed.
The writer of the decision initially believed that the new law should not be given
retroactive effect, but ultimately switched his vote to impose reclusion perpetua on the
appellant.

PEOPLE V. MANAYAO
G.R. No. L-322, July 28, 1947, HILADO, J.

FACTS
During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War II, a group of Japanese
soldiers and Filipino collaborators, including the appellant Pedro Manayao, conspired to
retaliate against a guerrilla raid by attacking the residents of barrio Banaban in the
municipality of Angat, Bulacan. On January 29, 1945, armed with rifles and bayonets,
they gathered the residents behind the barrio chapel, including men, women, and
children. They then proceeded to massacre the residents, killing numerous individuals,
including women and children, by various brutal means such as bayoneting and
burning. Appellant Manayao personally killed several women and attempted to kill small
children, arguing they would grow up to be guerrilla wives.
During the trial, the prosecution presented witnesses, including two ten-year-old girls
who were among the survivors of the massacre, as well as a municipal policeman who
witnessed the events. Despite the tender age of the witnesses, the court found their
testimonies credible and convincing.

ISSUE
The main issues revolve around the appellant's arguments regarding jurisdiction and
citizenship. Specifically, whether Manayao, as a member of the Makapili (Filipino
collaborators with the Japanese), was subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Court
and whether he had lost his Philippine citizenship, thereby exempting him from
Philippine law on treason.

RULING
The court held that Manayao's affiliation with the Makapili did not exempt him from
Philippine jurisdiction, as the Makapili were considered Filipino traitors and not part of
the Japanese army. Additionally, the court rejected the argument that Manayao had lost
his Philippine citizenship, emphasizing that the commission of treason did not
automatically divest him of his citizenship. The court affirmed Manayao's conviction for
treason with multiple murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment) instead of the death penalty, considering the dissent of one justice.
 PEOPLE V. CASTRO
G.R. No. L-547, June 28, 1949, MORAN, C. J.

FACTS
The defendant, Jose de Castro, was a soldier in the USAFFE (United States Armed
Forces in the Far East). When the Province of Cebu was occupied by the Japanese
Army, de Castro joined the Bureau of Constabulary and became a regular constabulary
soldier under the government of occupation. On January 13, 1945, a group of four
Japanese soldiers, accompanied by some constabulary soldiers including de Castro,
went to the house of the Bacani family in Cebu City. The Japanese soldiers investigated
two girls, Anita and Rosario Bacani, who were suspected of having connections with the
Cebu guerrillas. The girls were hanged by their arms and later arrested and imprisoned.
Rosario Bacani was taken from her house by de Castro and others on February 22,
1945, and brought to the house of Sergeant Yoshida. Yoshida made advances towards
Rosario and threatened to kill her and her family if she did not consent to live with him.
Rosario yielded out of fear and became Yoshida's mistress. De Castro was also living in
Yoshida's house and was giving reports to Yoshida's interpreter, Tanamaya.

ISSUE
 1. Whether de Castro's membership in the Bureau of Constabulary under the
government of occupation constitutes treason.
2. Whether de Castro's actions in bringing Rosario Bacani to Yoshida's house
constitute treason.
3. Whether de Castro is guilty as a co-author of rape.

RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the People's Court and acquitted de
Castro. The court held that de Castro's membership in the Bureau of Constabulary
under the government of occupation is not treason. The institution was intended for the
promotion and preservation of law and order, which were essential during war for the
civilian population. De Castro's actions in bringing Rosario Bacani to Yoshida's house
may have aided in satisfying the lust of a Japanese officer, but such aid is not
treasonous. The court also found de Castro not guilty as a co-author of rape, as no rape
was alleged in the information and Rosario Bacani had yielded her body to Yoshida out
of fear, not because of actual force being exerted upon her.
 DE LIMA V. GUERRERO
G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017, VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS
Senator Leila De Lima filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme
Court.
The petition challenged the orders and warrant issued by Judge Juanita Guerrero of the
RTC of Muntinlupa City.
The orders and warrant were issued in Criminal Case No. 17-165, charging De Lima
with violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
De Lima argued that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense and that the
Sandiganbayan should have jurisdiction.
De Lima also raised procedural issues, such as the alleged omission of the judge to act
on her Motion to Quash.

ISSUE
1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense charged against De Lima or if
the Sandiganbayan should have jurisdiction.
2. Whether there was an omission by the judge to act on the Motion to Quash.
 3. Whether there was a violation of the rule against forum shopping.

RULING
The petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that the petition was
premature because the RTC had not yet ruled on the Motion to Quash. The Court
emphasized the importance of allowing the lower court to resolve the motion before
resorting to a petition for certiorari.
The Court held that De Lima violated the rule against forum shopping by filing
simultaneous actions before the RTC and the Supreme Court. The Court dismissed the
petition on the grounds of prematurity and forum shopping.

MACAPAGAL-ARROYO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 220598 & 220953, July 19, 2016, BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Benigno Aguas were charged with
plunder for allegedly amassing ill-gotten wealth through the diversion of funds from the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to the Office of the President. The
Sandiganbayan denied their demurrers to evidence. The Supreme Court granted their
petitions for certiorari, ruling that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment for plunder. The Court held that the information failed to sufficiently allege the
crime of plunder, particularly the identification of the main plunderer and the personal
benefit obtained. The Court emphasized that the prohibition against double jeopardy
applies, and that the granting of the motion for reconsideration by the State would
violate the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. The Court denied the
State's motion for reconsideration, stating that the dismissal of the case against the
petitioners amounted to their acquittal and could not be recalled or amended. The Court
also clarified that the requirement of identifying a main plunderer and proving personal
benefit was not a new element imposed by the Court, but was already inherent in the
definition of plunder under the law. The Court emphasized that the State's right to due
process was not violated, as the dismissal of the case was based on the insufficiency of
evidence and not on procedural grounds.

ISSUE
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder
against former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Benigno Aguas.
2. Whether the identification of the main plunderer and the showing of personal
benefit are necessary elements of plunder.
3. Whether the dismissal of the case against the petitioners amounted to their
acquittal and could not be recalled or amended.

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the indictment
for plunder against former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Benigno Aguas.The
Court held that the identification of the main plunderer and the showing of personal
benefit are not required elements of plunder. The Court emphasized that the dismissal
of the case against the petitioners amounted to their acquittal and could not be recalled
or amended. The Court clarified that the requirement of identifying a main plunderer and
proving personal benefit was not a new element imposed by the Court, but was already
inherent in the definition of plunder under the law.
The Court emphasized that the State's right to due process was not violated, as the
dismissal of the case was based on the insufficiency of evidence and not on procedural
grounds.
 PEOPLE V. PERALTA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, PER CURIAM

FACTS
Six inmates at the New Bilibid Prisons were convicted and sentenced to death for conspiring
and committing multiple murders.
The defendants were Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog,
Florencio Luna, and Gervasio Larita.
The crimes were committed on February 16, 1958, in Muntinlupa, Rizal.
The defendants were charged with killing Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa, and Santos Cruz,
who were also inmates at the prison.
The defendants were found guilty of murder and sentenced to death.

ISSUE
Whether conspiracy was present in the commission of the murders and if the defendants should
be held liable as co-principals.

RULING
Conspiracy existed and all the defendants were liable as co-principals.
Multiple death penalties could be imposed on the conspirators for each crime committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
Once conspiracy is proved, all the conspirators are responsible for the acts of each other,
regardless of their individual participation in the crimes.
The defense of alibi raised by some of the defendants was weak and could not prevail over the
positive identification by prosecution witnesses.
The defense of alibi is an issue of fact that depends on the credibility of witnesses, and in this
case, the trial court found the prosecution witnesses' testimonies to be more credible.

U.S. V. ABAD
G.R. No. L-976, October 22, 1902, LADD, J.

FACTS
The case involves the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance, as defined in section
14 of Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission.
The defendant, Maximo Abad, a former insurgent officer, was charged with violating the
oath he took before a military officer of the United States Army.
The specific act of violation was his denial of the existence of certain rifles that had
been concealed by his orders at the time of his surrender.
The case was brought before the court to determine if the offense falls under the
general terms "treason and sedition" as used in the amnesty proclamation of July 4,
1902.

ISSUE
Whether the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance is included in the general terms
"treason and sedition" as used in the amnesty proclamation.
 RULING
The offense of violation of oaths of allegiance may not necessarily be identical to the
technical crimes of treason or sedition, but it is closely related to them and can be
considered as a political offense.
The court interpreted the words "treason and sedition" in a broader sense to include all
offenses of a treasonable and seditious nature defined in Act No. 292.
In construing an executive act like the amnesty proclamation, a more liberal rule of
construction should be applied to effectuate its beneficent purpose.
A strict technical interpretation of the terms would lead to inconsistencies, such as
including treason in the amnesty while excluding insurrection, which is a similar offense.
Therefore, the court held that the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance is covered
by the amnesty proclamation, and the defendant is entitled to its benefits.

U.S. V. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 2189, November 3, 1906, CARSON, J.

FACTS
The case involves the conviction of Francisco Bautista, Aniceto de Guzman, and Tomas
Puzon for the crime of conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the United States in
the Philippine Islands.
The conspiracy was organized by a junta in Hongkong, with Prim Ruiz as the titular
head and Artemio Ricarte as the chief of the military forces.
Ricarte came to Manila from Hongkong and held meetings where the conspiracy was
perfected.
Bonds were issued and commissions as officers in the revolutionary army were granted
to several conspirators.
The conspirators took the field and offered armed resistance to the authorities, but failed
to overthrow the government.
ISSUE
Can the accused be convicted of conspiracy to overthrow the government based on
their acceptance of appointments as officers in the revolutionary army?

RULING
The court affirmed the conviction of Francisco Bautista and Tomas Puzon, but reversed
the conviction of Aniceto de Guzman.
The acceptance of an appointment as an officer in the conspiracy can be considered as
evidence of the accused's criminal connection with the conspiracy.
The court distinguished this case from previous cases where the mere possession of
appointments was not considered sufficient evidence.
The constitutional provision requiring two witnesses to the same overt act or confession
in open court does not apply to the crime of conspiracy.

U.S. V. VILLARINO
G.R. No. 2430, March 9, 1906, CARSON, J.

FACTS
Defendants Juan Leandro Villarino and Eulalio Peña were charged with conspiracy.
They were accused of organizing armed forces and were convicted under section 4 of
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
Villarino was sentenced to five years' imprisonment with hard labor and a $4,000 fine.
Peña was sentenced to four years' imprisonment with hard labor and a $3,000 fine.
Both defendants were also ordered to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
Evidence presented during the trial included a confession from Villarino and various
papers and documents proven to have come from him.
There was no evidence connecting Peña to the conspiracy, except for an alleged
confession that he signed at a police station in Manila.

ISSUE
Is there sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of both defendants for the crime of
conspiracy?

RULING
The evidence presented, including Villarino's confession and other documents, was
sufficient to establish his guilt for conspiracy.
The alleged confession from Peña, without any other supporting evidence, was deemed
insufficient to establish his guilt.
The court emphasized the importance of corroborating evidence and highlighted the
inadmissibility of hearsay evidence.
The document introduced during the trial, which purported to be a commission
appointing Peña as a brigadier-general in the armed forces, did not prove his
involvement as there was no evidence that he received or accepted such appointment.
As a result, Villarino's conviction was affirmed, but the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment was reversed, and Peña was acquitted and set at liberty.
 PEOPLE V. SAAVEDRA
G.R. No. L-48738, May 18, 1987, SARMIENTO, J.

FACTS
The case involves the murder of Ernesto Pulmares at the Kan-Irag hotel in Cebu City on
January 14, 1977.
Romeo Saavedra, Henry Fernandez, and Reynaldo Quilala were accused of conspiring
to commit the murder.
During the trial, Fernandez pleaded guilty and testified against Saavedra, implicating
him as a co-conspirator.
The prosecution presented evidence such as letters and confessions allegedly made by
Saavedra and Fernandez.
The trial court found Saavedra guilty of murder and sentenced him to death.

ISSUE
Whether Saavedra's complicity in the crime has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
The court found that Saavedra's complicity in the crime had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
While Saavedra was present at the scene of the crime, there was no evidence to
establish his involvement in the conspiracy or his knowledge of Fernandez's intent to kill
Pulmares.
Saavedra's actions, such as his alleged gestures and statements, were not necessarily
indicative of his guilt.
Conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and mere presence at the scene
of the crime does not imply guilt.
Saavedra's failure to report the incident or his alleged attempts to mislead the
investigation were not considered as evidence of his guilt.
The court emphasized the importance of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
found that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish Saavedra's complicity in
the crime.
U.S. V. CABALLEROS
G.R. No. 1352, March 29, 1905, MAPA, J.

FACTS
Defendants Apolonio Caballeros and Roberto Baculi were charged as accessories after
the fact in a murder case involving American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde
O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger.
The defendants were accused of participating in the burial of the victims' corpses in
order to conceal the crime.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu sentenced them to seven years of presidio mayor.

ISSUE
Whether Roberto Baculi should be exempt from responsibility due to coercion.
Whether the extrajudicial confessions made by the defendants should be admissible as
evidence.
Whether the failure to report a crime is punishable under the Penal Code.
 RULING
The court found that Roberto Baculi should be exempt from responsibility under article
8, paragraph 9 of the Penal Code, which states that a person is not liable if they perform
an act due to irresistible force.
Baculi confessed to assisting in the burial of the corpses, but it was established that he
did so under compulsion by the murderers. This was corroborated by a witness for the
prosecution, Teodoro Sabate.
The court held that extrajudicial confessions that are not made voluntarily cannot be
admitted as evidence.
In this case, the confession made by Apolonio Caballeros was deemed unreliable
because it was obtained through a promise of no harm made to him and the other
defendants.
The confession made by Roberto Baculi was the only one considered voluntary. The
court clarified that the failure to report a crime is not an offense punished by the Penal
Code.
Therefore, the defendants cannot be held criminally liable for not reporting the crime.
Based on these considerations, the court reversed the judgment of the lower court and
acquitted the defendants. The costs of the case were also imposed on the government.
 SANTOS V. MISA
G.R. No. L-319, March 28, 1946, BENGZON, J.

FACTS
Petitioner, Go Tian Sek Santos, is a Chinese citizen who was apprehended by the
Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army in February 1945.
Santos was turned over to the Commonwealth Government in September and has been
detained as a political prisoner since then.
Santos argues that his detention is illegal because he has not been charged or
convicted by a competent court.
Santos also argues that he does not owe allegiance to either the United States or the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.

ISSUE
Can Santos, as a foreign citizen, be held in custody under Commonwealth Act No. 682?
 RULING
The court based its decision on the fact that Santos may be charged with espionage,
which is not dependent on the citizenship of the offender.
The court referred to Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which allows for the
detention of political prisoners in the interest of public security.
The court rejected the argument challenging the constitutionality of Section 19, citing a
previous decision in Laurel vs. Director of Prisons.
The court denied Santos' petition and upheld his detention, stating that his foreign
status does not exempt him from being held under the Act.

PEOPLE V. AVILA
G.R. No. L-944, May 26, 1949, BENGZON, J.

FACTS
The case involves defendant Fausto Avila, also known as Faustino M. Avila, who was
charged with treason. Avila was a policeman in Dumaguete, Oriental Negros before the
Pacific War. During the Japanese occupation, he continued in his position and was
assigned as a sergeant in the provincial guard service under Governor Villanueva. Avila
was part of a division called the "Public Opinion Office," which was known as a
Japanese spy corps. His role was to gather information about the activities of the
guerrillas in the area and report it to his superior, Teodorico Lajato, who then
transmitted the information to the Kempei Tai (Japanese Military Police). Avila also
actively participated in the arrest of suspected guerrilla members, leading Japanese
soldiers in apprehending individuals. Several instances were cited, including the arrest
and torture of Socorro Cariño and Jose Patrimonio, the arrest of Marcelino and Jose
Gallardo, the arrest and questioning of Tomas Arrieta and Socorro Cariño, and the
arrest and disappearance of Angeles Catan and Alfredo Mariño.

ISSUE
The main issue in this case is whether Fausto Avila is guilty of treason based on his
espionage activities and active participation in the arrest and liquidation of several
guerrillas.

RULING
The court found that there was sufficient evidence to prove Avila's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Avila voluntarily gathered information about the underground forces
and shared it with the Japanese. He actively participated in the arrest of several
guerrilleros, which resulted in the liquidation of two secret operatives of the resistance
movement. The court considered Avila's actions as treasonous because he aided and
abetted the enemy by providing them with valuable intelligence and assisting in the
capture and elimination of individuals fighting against the Japanese occupation.
De Lima vs. Guerrero
G.R. No. 229781, Oct 10, 2017, VELASCO, JR., J

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, which defines the offense of illegal sale or trade of drugs.
Additionally, Republic Act No. 10660, which amends the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, is also pertinent in determining the court's jurisdiction over cases
involving public officials accused of bribery.

FACTS
Senator Leila De Lima filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme
Court challenging the orders and warrant issued by Judge Juanita Guerrero of the RTC
of Muntinlupa City. These orders and warrant were issued in Criminal Case No. 17-165,
charging De Lima with violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
De Lima argued that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense and that the
Sandiganbayan should have jurisdiction instead. She also raised procedural issues,
such as the alleged omission of the judge to act on her Motion to Quash.

ISSUE
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense charged against De Lima or if the
Sandiganbayan should have jurisdiction and if there was an omission by the judge to
act on the Motion to Quash. And whether there was a violation of the rule against forum
shopping.

RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed De Lima's petition on the grounds of prematurity. It
emphasized the importance of allowing the lower court to resolve the motion before
resorting to a petition for certiorari. However, the Court recognized that the petition was
not entirely premature since the warrant of arrest had already been implemented and
De Lima had been brought into custody.

De Lima violated the rule against forum shopping by filing simultaneous actions before
the RTC and the Supreme Court. Forum shopping is not allowed and warrants the
immediate dismissal of the suits filed. However, the Court acknowledged that De Lima's
act of forum shopping was not willful and deliberate.

The Information filed against De Lima did not allege any of the essential elements of the
offense of illegal sale or illegal trade of drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165. Every
element constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information to comply with the
accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

The Court determined that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of
bribery, which was the crime actually alleged in the Information. R.A. No. 10660 has
taken the present case out of the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. The
Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials
with Salary Grade 27 or higher where there is an allegation of damage to the
government or bribery in an amount exceeding P1,000,000.

Macapagal-Arroyo v. People
G.R. No. 220598 & 220953, Apr 18, 2017, BERSAMIN, J

Republic Act No. 7080, commonly known as the Plunder Law, within the context of
a legal challenge against individuals accused of plunder. The case discusses the
necessity of identifying a main plunderer and demonstrating personal benefit in the
commission of the crime of plunder. It also examines the concept of "raids on the public
treasury" as a predicate act under the Plunder Law and the requirement of personal
benefit in such actions. Additionally, the case addresses the court's duty to correct
errors of jurisdiction, particularly instances of grave abuse of discretion, as mandated by
the Constitution. Ultimately, the case emphasizes the importance of evidence and
proper legal interpretation in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.

FACTS
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Benigno Aguas were accused of
plunder allegedly committed through the diversion of funds from the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to the Office of the President. The Sandiganbayan initially
denied their demurrers to evidence. However, the Supreme Court granted their petitions
for certiorari, ruling that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for
plunder. The Court emphasized the importance of identifying the main plunderer and
proving personal benefit, which were not sufficiently alleged in the information filed by
the prosecution. The Court also highlighted that the prohibition against double jeopardy
applies, preventing the State from appealing or retrying the case after the acquittal.

ISSUE
Whether there was enough evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder against
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Benigno Aguas, whether identifying the
main plunderer and showing personal benefit were indispensable elements of plunder,
and whether the dismissal of the case constituted an irrevocable acquittal under the
prohibition against double jeopardy.

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
Benigno Aguas, acquitting them of plunder charges due to insufficient evidence and the
violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. The Court held that
there was insufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder against the
accused. This ruling is in accordance with Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, which provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf." In this case, the evidence presented by the
prosecution did not sufficiently prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The identification of the main plunderer and the showing of personal benefit are not
required elements of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law). However, the
Court emphasized that these elements were necessary for the proper prosecution of
plunder in this particular case. This ruling aligns with the provision of Republic Act No.
7080, which defines plunder as "amassing, accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts."

The dismissal of the case against the petitioners amounted to their acquittal and could
not be recalled or amended. This ruling upholds the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy, as stated in Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
which prohibits any person from being put in jeopardy of punishment more than once for
the same offense.

The Supreme Court's ruling in this case emphasized the importance of presenting
sufficient evidence to sustain a criminal indictment, clarified the elements of plunder
under the law, and upheld the prohibition against double jeopardy to ensure the
protection of individuals' rights in criminal proceedings.

People vs. Peralta, et al.,

G.R. No. 60294, December 18, 1982, Justice F. S. Angeles

Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the legality and practicality of imposing multiple
death penalties on conspirators found guilty of multiple offenses committed in
furtherance of a conspiracy.

FACTS
Six individuals, namely Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel
Parumog, Gervasio Larita, and Florencio Luna, were charged with and convicted of the
murder of three victims, namely Carriego, Barbosa, and Santos Cruz. The accused
were all inmates of brigade 4-A in a certain prison facility and were either members or
sympathizers of the "OXO" gang. The victims, on the other hand, were members of the
"Sigue-Sigue" gang.
The prosecution presented evidence establishing that the accused acted in concert to
carry out the killings. The murders were carried out with team precision, indicating a
premeditated plan. Despite some of the accused not directly participating in the killing of
one of the victims, they were considered co-conspirators and equally guilty under the
principle that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

It was also established that all the accused were serving sentences in the New Bilibid
Prison at Muntinlupa at the time of the murders, making them quasi-recidivists.

ISSUE
Whether the accused, found guilty as co-conspirators in the murder of three victims, can
be sentenced to multiple death penalties corresponding to the number and nature of
crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.

RULING
The court ruled that the accused, being co-conspirators in the murder of three victims,
can indeed be sentenced to multiple death penalties corresponding to the number and
nature of crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.

The ruling is based on Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that when
the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the
nature of the penalties will so permit. In this case, where multiple capital offenses were
committed in furtherance of a conspiracy, the nature of the penalties necessitates
simultaneous service.

The court also considered the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, as all the
accused were serving sentences at the time of the murders. Under Article 160 of the
Revised Penal Code, when an aggravating circumstance is present, the penalty for
each offense must be imposed in its maximum period. This justifies the imposition of
multiple death penalties on each of the accused.
While some may argue that the imposition of multiple death penalties is a futile
exercise, the court emphasized that it serves as an indication of the extreme criminality
of the accused and may act as a deterrent to executive clemency. Even if the multiple
death penalties are eventually commuted to multiple life imprisonments, the practical
effect is that the convict will have to serve the maximum period of forty years for each
life sentence, as opposed to just thirty years if only one death penalty is imposed and
later commuted.

Therefore, the court pronounced each of the accused guilty of three separate and
distinct crimes of murder and sentenced them to three death penalties each.

In conclusion, the ruling underscores the legal authority of the court to impose multiple
death penalties on conspirators found guilty of multiple offenses committed in
furtherance of a conspiracy, as supported by relevant provisions of the Revised Penal
Code.

UNITED STATES v. ABAD

G.R. No. L-976, October 22, 1902, Justice Ladd

Section 14 of Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission, which
pertains to the violation of oaths of allegiance made before military officers under the
Civil Government of the Philippine Islands.

FACTS
Maximo Abad, the defendant, was charged with violating section 14 of Act No. 292 by
allegedly denying the existence of certain rifles to a United States Army officer. These
rifles had been concealed under his orders at the time of his surrender. The prosecution
argued that Abad's actions constituted a breach of the oath of allegiance he had taken,
thereby committing an offense under the aforementioned provision.
 ISSUE
Whether the offense of violating oaths of allegiance, as defined in section 14 of Act No.
292, fell under the category of offenses amnestied by a proclamation.

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendant, Maximo Abad, holding that the
offense of violating oaths of allegiance is covered by the general words "treason and
sedition" used in the proclamation. The Court's ruling was based on the following
reasoning:

The Court adopted a broad interpretation of the amnesty proclamation, considering its
beneficent purpose and aiming to effectuate the intention of the President. While
acknowledging the technical definitions of treason and sedition, the Court emphasized
the need for a liberal construction to encompass all political offenses of a treasonable
and seditious nature.

The Court recognized that the offenses defined in Act No. 292, including treason,
misprision of treason, insurrection, and sedition, were all directed against the existence
of the state, the authority of the government, or the general public tranquility. These
offenses were closely related and could be considered under the general descriptions of
treason and sedition.

Considering the purpose of the proclamation to grant amnesty for political offenses
committed during the insurgency period, the Court concluded that limiting the scope of
the amnesty to literal and technical definitions would defeat its general object.
Therefore, the Court construed the terms "treason and sedition" liberally to include
offenses like violation of oaths of allegiance.

Since the offense in question was deemed to be covered by the amnesty proclamation,
the defendant, Maximo Abad, was entitled to its benefits. The Court directed that upon
filing the prescribed oath, Abad should be discharged from the case.
The Supreme Court's ruling established that the offense of violating oaths of allegiance,
as defined in section 14 of Act No. 292, falls under the general categories of "treason
and sedition" mentioned in the amnesty proclamation. By adopting a broad
interpretation of the proclamation's language, the Court ensured that political offenses of
a treasonable and seditious nature were included within its scope, thereby granting
amnesty to individuals like Maximo Abad who were charged with such offenses.

TITLE TWO: CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE

Section 1: Arbitrary Detention and expulsion

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

Gunabe, et al., v. The
1 G. R. No. L-1231, January 30, 1947 Flora, Arturo O.
Director of Prisons,
Republic v.
2 G. R. No. 231144 February 19, 2020 Flora, Arturo O.
Sandiganbayan, et al
 Gunabe, et al., v. The Director of Prisons
G. R. No. L-1231, January 30, 1947, PARAS, J

Rule of Court No. 102, section 4, which addresses the circumstances under which the
writ of habeas corpus shall be allowed or denied. This provision establishes that if
individuals alleged to be restrained of their liberty are in custody under process issued
by a court or judge having jurisdiction, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed.
The case centers on whether the detention of the petitioners, who were held under
commitment orders issued by a competent court, can be considered lawful under this
provision despite alleged violations of their rights during arrest and trial.

FACTS
In November 1942, petitioners Macario Gunabe, Sulpicio Gunabe, and Margarito Drillon
were charged with murder and frustrated murder in criminal cases Nos. 988 and 1010
before the Court of First Instance of Manila. These cases were continued as criminal
cases 1838 and 1839. The petitioners have been detained by the respondent Director of
Prisons under proper commitment orders.

Petitioners claim that their detention was unlawful due to the violation of their right to be
delivered to judicial authorities within six hours following their arrest. Macario Gunabe
was arrested around July 8, 1942, Sulpicio Gunabe on or about July 17, 1942, and
Margarito Drillon on or about October 5, 1942.

Additionally, they argue that after a trial held around the end of September 1943, there
was a significant delay in the final termination of their cases, prejudicing their substantial
rights as defendants. The prosecution allegedly made no progress in their cases since
then until the liberation of the Philippines and even up to the filing date of the present
petition, spanning over three years.

Furthermore, the petitioners assert that they should be released on amnesty grounds,
contending that the offenses they were prosecuted for were political in nature,
committed as part of guerrilla resistance during the enemy occupation.

ISSUE
Whether the petitioners are entitled to release from detention based on the alleged
violations of their rights during their arrest and trial, as well as their claim for amnesty.

RULING
The Court held that the alleged failure of the authorities to deliver the petitioners to
judicial authorities within six hours following their arrest, which may be a subject of
criminal prosecution under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, does not affect the
legality of their confinement under subsisting court process. The petitioners were
detained under proper commitment orders issued by a competent court. The Court cited
Rule of Court No. 102, section 4, which states that if persons alleged to be restrained of
their liberty are in custody under process issued by a court or judge having jurisdiction,
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed.

The Court rejected the argument regarding delays in the final termination of the cases. It
emphasized that an accused is entitled to a speedy trial, but this right is relative and
depends on circumstances. The record did not show that the delays were caused by the
prosecution's machinations, and the petitioners did not object to the alleged delays
during trial. Additionally, the Court noted that the destruction of records during the war
and the need for reconstitution of court records were factors contributing to the delay.
The Court cited Moran's Commentaries on the Rules of Court, which states that the
right to a speedy trial may be waived by not objecting to postponements or other delays.

The Court found the petitioners' claim for amnesty untenable. It ruled that whether the
petitioners were entitled to amnesty should be ventilated in the trial court or before the
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission created pursuant to Proclamation No. 8 dated
September 7, 1946, by the President of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court
emphasized that this was a question to be addressed through proper legal channels,
rather than through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court denied the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. Costs were imposed against the petitioners.
 CASE TITLE
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G. R. No. 231144, LEONEN, J.

Article III, Section 16 of the Philippine Constitution the constitutional right to a

speedy disposition of cases. This provision mandates that all persons shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. It emphasizes the importance of expeditious resolution to
safeguard the rights of the accused and ensure the effective administration of justice.

FACTS
In this case, the petitioner, Leonardo B. Roman, was charged with Falsification of Public
Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The complaint against Roman and several other
respondents was filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon on
January 18, 2005. The preliminary investigation process took an extended period,
lasting approximately three years. During this time, various motions for extension were
filed by both the prosecution and the defense, contributing to the delay. Roman
eventually filed an Urgent Motion to Quash before the Sandiganbayan, arguing that the
prolonged preliminary investigation violated his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of the case. The Sandiganbayan granted Roman's motion, prompting the
petitioner to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether the delay in the preliminary investigation process violated the petitioner's
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases, as guaranteed by Article III, Section
16 of the Philippine Constitution.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, Leonardo B. Roman, finding a
violation of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case. Despite the
petitioner's contributory negligence in the delay and his deemed waiver of the right to
assert his claim promptly, the Court emphasized that the delay in the preliminary
investigation process was unjustified. The Court underscored the importance of
promptly resolving cases to uphold the rights of the accused and ensure the efficient
administration of justice. As a result, the Sandiganbayan's resolutions granting the
petitioner's motion to quash were reversed and set aside, directing the Sandiganbayan
to proceed expeditiously with the disposition of Criminal Case No. SB-15-CRM-0100.
 TITLE FOUR: CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
Chapter 1: Forgeries
Section 4: Falsification of legislative, public, commercial, and private documents,
and wireless telegraph and telephone message

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 People v. Moreno GR No. 140033 August 28, 1998 Flora, Arturo O.
 People v. Moreno
GR No. 140033, August 28, 1998, Justice Panganiban

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, particularly regarding the circumstances
under which rape is committed.

FACTS
In this case, the appellant was charged with rape under the first circumstance of Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertains to rape committed by using force or
intimidation. The victim, in this instance, was proven to be a mentally challenged
individual with the mental age of a six-year-old child. The prosecution argued that
despite the absence of physical force or violence, the act of carnal knowledge was
tantamount to rape due to the victim's mental incapacity to resist or give consent
effectively.
The defense, on the other hand, contended that without evidence of physical force or
intimidation, the act could not be classified as rape under the first circumstance of
Article 335. Furthermore, they argued that the appellant was not aware of the victim's
mental deficiency and therefore could not be held criminally liable for rape.

ISSUE
Whether the act of carnal knowledge, committed without physical force or intimidation
but with the victim being a mentally challenged individual, constitutes rape under the
first circumstance of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING
The court ruled that in cases involving mentally challenged individuals, the absence of
physical force or violence does not preclude the act from being classified as rape under
the first circumstance of Article 335. The court cited precedents where it was
established that the force required by the statute can be constructive, especially when
the victim is incapable of resisting due to mental incapacity.

The court referred to the principle that when a woman is so deprived of reason as to be
incapable of giving valid consent, any sexual act perpetrated upon her is considered
rape, regardless of the absence of physical force or resistance. This interpretation is in
line with the underlying purpose of rape laws, which is to protect individuals who are
vulnerable and incapable of defending themselves against sexual abuse.

Furthermore, the court emphasized that the accused's awareness of the victim's mental
deficiency is immaterial in determining criminal liability for rape. The focus should be on
the victim's capacity to resist or give consent, rather than the accused's state of mind.
The court affirmed the lower court's ruling of guilt beyond reasonable doubt for rape
under the first circumstance of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The appellant
was ordered to pay civil indemnity and moral damages to the victim in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.
 TITLE FOUR: CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
Chapter Two: Other Falsities
Section 2: False testimony
No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By
1 US v. Aragon G.R. No. 2709 December 28, 1905 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
2 People v. Bautista G.R. No. L-45739 April 26, 1939 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
3 People v. Maneja G.R. No. 47684 June 10, 1941 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
4 U.S. v. Adolfo G.R. No. L-4803 December 19, 1908 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
5 U.S. v. Soliman G.R. No. 11555 January 6, 1917 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
6 People v. Ambal G.R. No. 46954 June 14, 1940 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
7 U.S. v. Aragon G.R. No. 2709 December 28, 1905 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
8 U.S. v. Gemora G.R. No. 2784 March 14, 1907 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
Ark Travel Express Inc v. Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
9 G.R. No. 137010 August 29, 2003
Abrogar
10 U.S. v. Brondial, et al G.R. No. 4401 September 29, 1908 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
 11 Diaz v People G.R. No.65006 October 31, 1990 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
Union Bank, et al v. Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
12 G.R. No 192565 Feb.28, 2012
People
Villanueva v. Secretary Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
13 G.R. No. 162187 November 18 2005
of Justice, People
14 US v. Estrana G.R. No.5751 September 6, 1910 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
15 People v Cruz G.R. No L.15132 May 25, 1960 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
16 Saulo v. People et, al, G.R. No. 242900 June 8, 2020 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
17 Masangkay v People G.R. No. 164443 June 18, 2010 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
18 US v. Jurado G.R. No.10719 September 24, 1915 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
19 Choa v People et al., GR No. 142011 March 14, 2003 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
20 People V. Pudol G.R. No. L-45618 October 18, 1938 Flora, Arturo O.

False Testimony – committed by a person who, being under oath and required to
testify as to the truth of a certain matter at a hearing before a competent authority, shall
deny the truth or say something contrary to it.

US V. ARAGON
G.R. No. 2709, December 28, 1905, JOHNSON, J

FACTS
The case involves Isidoro Aragon who was accused of giving false testimony in a civil cause.
The complaint was filed against Aragon for testifying falsely in a civil case between Edwin H.
Warner and Claro Magcauas.
The complaint alleged that Aragon gave false statements regarding his knowledge of the Pasay
estate and the actions brought against tenants of the estate.
The complaint stated that Aragon's testimony was false, malicious, and intended to affect the
issues presented in the civil case.

ISSUE
Whether Isidoro Aragon should be convicted of giving false testimony in a civil cause.
 RULING
The court ruled in favor of the defendant, Isidoro Aragon, and dismissed the case.
The court found that the evidence presented during the trial failed to prove that Aragon's
testimony was false.
In order to convict a person of giving false testimony in a civil cause, the following elements
must be proven:
The testimony must be given in the civil cause.
The testimony must relate to the issues presented in the cause.
The testimony must be false.
The defendant must know that the testimony is false.
The testimony must be malicious and given with the intent to affect the issues in the cause.
The court concluded that the evidence did not meet these requirements and therefore, Aragon
should not be convicted.

PEOPLE V. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. L-45739, April 26, 1939, DIAZ, J.

FACTS
The accused, Sotero Peji Bautista, was charged with false testimony in a criminal case
under article 180 of the Revised Penal Code.
The case originated from a complaint filed by Ong Loo in the justice of the peace court
of Kawit, Cavite, alleging that Bautista had subscribed under oath a false affidavit.
After a preliminary investigation, the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance
of Cavite.
Instead of filing an information against the accused for the original violation, the
provincial fiscal filed a different charge of false testimony in a criminal case.
The accused objected, claiming that he had not been given a preliminary investigation
and that he had been put in jeopardy twice.

ISSUE
1. Whether the accused was given a proper preliminary investigation.
 2. Whether the accused had been put in jeopardy twice.

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the prosecution and reversed the dismissal order.
The court held that the accused had been given a preliminary investigation, conducted
by the judge himself, and therefore, the objection regarding the lack of preliminary
investigation was unfounded.
The court also held that the accused had not been put in jeopardy twice.
The preliminary investigation did not constitute a trial or part thereof, and the accused
had not been tried for the same crime in a court with jurisdiction.
The dismissal order was deemed erroneous, and the case was ordered to be returned
to the lower court for trial.

PEOPLE V. MANEJA
G.R. No. 47684, June 10, 1941, MORAN, J.

FACTS
Defendant, Dionisio A. Maneja, was accused of giving false testimony in criminal case
No. 1872 on December 16, 1933.
The lower court held that the period of prescription should start from the time Maneja
gave the false testimony.
The prosecution argued that it should commence from the time the decision of the Court
of Appeals in the principal case became final in December 1938.

ISSUE
When should the period of prescription for the offense of false testimony commence?

RULING
The period of prescription for false testimony should begin from the time the decision in
the principal case becomes final.
According to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription starts from
the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.
In the case of false testimony, the act of testifying falsely does not constitute an
actionable offense until the principal case is finally decided.
Therefore, it cannot be discovered as such by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents until the decision is rendered.

U.S. V. ADOLFO
G.R. No. L-4803, December 19, 1908, CARSON, J.

FACTS
Accused, Balbino Adolfo, charged with perjury for giving false testimony in a criminal
case against Lorenzo Tupas, who was charged with assassination.
Adolfo testified that he did not see the deceased, Raymundo Muñoz, on a specific date,
when in fact he was present and witnessed Tupas assassinate Muñoz.
Trial court found Adolfo guilty based on evidence that he was present at the crime
scene and participated in the capture of Muñoz.

ISSUE
Whether Adolfo's false testimony can be considered as being "in favor of" the
defendant, Tupas, as defined in the Penal Code.

RULING
Court reverses the judgment of conviction and finds Adolfo guilty of false testimony as
defined in the Penal Code.
Court imposes a penalty of three months of arresto mayor. Court addresses the
presumption of innocence and the presumption of identity of person from identity of
name. Presumption of innocence is sufficient or insufficient to rebut the presumption of
identity depending on the circumstances of each case. Court discusses the definition of
"favorable" testimony in the Penal Code.
False testimony can only be considered "in favor of" the defendant if it results in an
acquittal. Since Tupas was convicted of the crime, Adolfo's false testimony cannot be
considered as favorable to him. Court examines the evidence of Adolfo's identity as the
witness in the previous case.
No witness testified to seeing Adolfo on the witness stand, but evidence, including the
public record of the previous case and Adolfo's admission of his identity during
arraignment, supports the finding that Adolfo is the same person as the witness in the
previous case.
Based on these findings, the court concludes that Adolfo gave false testimony, but it
was not favorable to Tupas as defined in the Penal Code.
Therefore, the court reverses the judgment of conviction and imposes a lesser penalty
of three months of arresto mayor.
 U.S. V. SOLIMAN
G.R. No. 11555, January 6, 1917, CARSON, J.

FACTS
Defendant: Gabino Soliman
Criminal case: charged with estafa
Soliman testified falsely in his own defense, claiming that his confession was obtained
through force and torture.
Trial judge acquitted Soliman due to reasonable doubt regarding the voluntary nature of
the confession

ISSUE
Can Soliman be convicted of perjury for testifying falsely in his own defense during a
criminal case?
 RULING
Soliman can be convicted of perjury.
Repeal of a law does not extinguish criminal responsibility incurred under the repealed
law.
Soliman can be penalized under the provisions of the Penal Code.

PEOPLE V. AMBAL
G.R. No. 46954, June 14, 1940, IMPERIAL, M

FACTS
The case involves a criminal case for perjury.
The accused, Miguel Ambal, testified as a witness in a murder case against Evaristo Austria
and Alejandro Austria.
Ambal initially stated that Evaristo Austria had said, "Ka Andong, levantate, ya he podido matar
a la persona que tu me mandabas matar, estoy seguro que esta muerto; aqui esta el
cortaplumas en sangrentado."
However, during cross-examination, Ambal rectified his previous statement and clarified that he
did not hear clearly what Evaristo Austria said, but it was something along the lines of "Ya he
matado a la persona a quien me mandabas vigilar."
The prosecution filed perjury charges against Ambal due to his contradictory statements.

ISSUE
Can a witness who rectifies or corrects their testimony during cross-examination be charged
with perjury?

RULING
The court ruled in favor of the accused, Miguel Ambal, and dismissed the perjury charges
against him.
The court held that a witness who rectifies any errors or mistakes in their testimony during
cross-examination cannot be considered guilty of perjury.
Ambal rectified his previous statement immediately after realizing his mistake, and there was no
evidence of malice or criminal intent to deceive.
The court found that the prosecution's evidence, which aimed to prove that Ambal was induced
to change his testimony, was insufficient to destroy his good faith and lack of criminal intent.

U.S. V. ARAGON
G.R. No. 2709, December 28, 1905, JOHNSON, J.

FACTS
The case involves Isidoro Aragon who was accused of giving false testimony in a civil
cause.
The complaint was filed against Aragon for testifying falsely in a civil case between
Edwin H. Warner and Claro Magcauas.
The complaint alleged that Aragon gave false statements regarding his knowledge of
the Pasay estate and the actions brought against tenants of the estate.
The complaint stated that Aragon's testimony was false, malicious, and intended to
affect the issues presented in the civil case.

ISSUE
Whether Isidoro Aragon should be convicted of giving false testimony in a civil cause.
 RULING
The court ruled in favor of the defendant, Isidoro Aragon, and dismissed the case.
The court found that the evidence presented during the trial failed to prove that Aragon's
testimony was false.
In order to convict a person of giving false testimony in a civil cause, the following
elements must be proven:
 The testimony must be given in the civil cause.
 The testimony must relate to the issues presented in the cause.
 The testimony must be false.
 The defendant must know that the testimony is false.
 The testimony must be malicious and given with the intent to affect the issues in
the cause.

The court concluded that the evidence did not meet these requirements and therefore,
Aragon should not be convicted.

U.S. V. GEMORA
G.R. No. 2784, March 14, 1907, CARSON, J.

FACTS
Carlos Gemora was charged with giving false testimony in a civil case.
A complaint was filed against him in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
Before the trial began and any witnesses were called, the complaint was dismissed.
A new complaint was filed separately charging him with the same offense.
On the trial for the second complaint, Gemora pleaded "former jeopardy" and appealed
the trial court's refusal to dismiss the complaint.

ISSUE
Whether Gemora should be tried for giving false testimony in a civil case, considering
that he was not in jeopardy until the trial had actually begun.
Whether the trial should be suspended pending the final outcome of the civil case.
 RULING
The court ruled in favor of the prosecution and affirmed the trial court's decision.
Gemora was not in jeopardy under the first complaint since it was dismissed before any
witnesses were called.
The trial of the criminal case need not be suspended pending the final outcome of the
civil case.

ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS INC V. ABROGAR

G.R. No. 137010, August 29, 2003, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS
The case involves two criminal cases for False Testimony in a Civil Case filed against
private respondents Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira.
The Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) denied the motion to withdraw the Informations
based on the initial finding of the Department of Justice (DOJ) that there exists probable
cause.
The MTC also denied the motion for reconsideration based on the principle that once an
information is filed in court, any disposition rests in the discretion of the court.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) nullified the MTC's orders and considered the criminal
cases as withdrawn, ruling that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE
Did the MTC commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the
Informations?
Did the RTC act in excess of its jurisdiction in considering the criminal cases as
withdrawn?

RULING

The Supreme Court nullified and set aside the orders of the MTC and RTC. The MTC
failed to make an independent assessment of the motion to withdraw the criminal cases.
The existence of probable cause is a prejudicial question that needs to be resolved
before proceeding with the criminal cases.
The trial court has a bounden duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of
a motion to withdraw an Information based on lack of probable cause. The RTC acted in
excess of its jurisdiction in considering the criminal cases as withdrawn. The RTC
should have only nullified the MTC's order and remanded the case for the determination
of probable cause.
In the interest of speedy justice and considering the long pendency of the case, the civil
case is a prejudicial question. The Court ordered the suspension of the criminal
proceedings until the final decision in the civil case.
 U.S. V. BRONDIAL, ET AL
G.R. No. 4401, September 29, 1908, TORRES, J.

FACTS
The case involves a complaint filed by the provincial fiscal of Albay against Felisa
Brondial and Juliana Selizar for the crime of perjury. The complaint alleges that the
crime was committed during the trial of a civil case in the Court of First Instance of
Albay. Felisa Brondial, the defendant in the civil case, declared under oath that she was
20 years old, while her mother, Juliana Selizar, stated that Felisa was only 18. However,
both accused were aware that Felisa was actually 25 years old. The purpose of their
false declaration was to evade the civil liability arising from the obligation demanded in
the civil case.
The provincial fiscal requested the dismissal of the charge against Juliana Selizar,
reserving the right to file a separate complaint against her. The court granted this
request and allowed the filing of an amended complaint against Felisa Brondial.
The counsel for the accused filed a demurrer, arguing that the facts stated in the
complaint did not constitute the crime of perjury committed in a civil cause. The
demurrer was based on the opinion of Viada, a commentator on the Penal Code, who
stated that perjury cannot be committed in a civil cause by a person who is a party to
the suit. The counsel moved for the dismissal of the case.
The court below sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case. The provincial fiscal
appealed the decision.

ISSUE
The main issue in this case is whether a party to a civil action can be convicted of the
crime of perjury for giving false testimony as a witness in their own case.

RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court below and remanded the case for
further proceedings. The demurrer interposed by the counsel for the accused was
deemed inadmissible.
Under the laws in force in the Philippines, a court can consider the sworn statement of a
party to an action, along with other evidence introduced during the trial, and decide the
case against the adverse party. Therefore, if it is later shown that the party who testified
under oath as a witness in their own behalf gave false testimony, they should be
punished for perjury in accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code.
Both parties to a civil action, as well as the complainant and the accused in a criminal
prosecution, are entitled to testify as witnesses in their own behalf. Their testimony may
determine the judgment in favor of either of them. It is just, for the protection of fellow
citizens and the moral interests of the community, that a person who testifies falsely and
causes harm to their opponent should be punished. It would be unfair to allow them to
go free and benefit from their criminal act, while a witness who testified falsely to please
them is prosecuted and punished.
 DIAZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. No.65006, October 31, 1990, PARAS, J

FACTS
Reolandi Diaz, a senior clerk at Jose Abad Santos High School, was charged with the
crime of Falsification of Official Document.
Diaz was accused of falsely claiming to have a Bachelor of Arts degree in his Personal
Data Sheet, which he submitted to the Civil Service Commission for his appointment as
School Administrative Assistant I.
It was alleged that Diaz stated in the document that he was a fourth year Bachelor of
Arts student from 1950-1954 at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges, when in
fact, he did not reach the fourth year in a Bachelor of Arts degree course.
After a trial, Diaz was found guilty as charged by the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga.
 ISSUE
Whether the findings of the lower court and the Intermediate Appellate Court that Diaz
was not a fourth year A.B. College student are contrary to the evidence presented.
Whether Diaz had any legal obligation to state in CS Form 212 that he was a fourth year
college student.
Whether the transcript of records presented by Diaz is spurious.

RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the verdict of conviction and found Diaz guilty of the crime
of perjury.
The Court held that there was ample evidence presented by the prosecution to prove
that Diaz falsely claimed to have a fourth year A.B. degree.
The Court also ruled that the transcript of records presented by Diaz was spurious and
lacked the authenticating marks of the college seal and the signature of the college
president.
Therefore, the Court concluded that Diaz committed perjury by making a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood in his sworn statement.
UNION BANK, ET AL V. PEOPLE
G.R. No 192565, Feb.28, 2012, BRION, J.

FACTS
Union Bank of the Philippines and Desi Tomas were charged with perjury under Article
183 of the Revised Penal Code.
The charge stemmed from Union Bank's complaints against the spouses Eddie and
Eliza Tamondong. Tomas, an employee of Union Bank, executed and signed the
Certification against Forum Shopping in both complaints. Tomas was charged with
making untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter. Tomas filed a Motion
to Quash, arguing that the venue was improperly laid and that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense.
The Metropolitan Trial Court in Makati City denied the motion, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in
Makati City. The court also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently
charged Tomas with perjury.
The Regional Trial Court in Makati City dismissed the petition to annul and set aside the
Metropolitan Trial Court's orders, ruling that there was no grave abuse of discretion.
The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Ilusorio ruling is more
applicable to the present facts than the ruling in Sy Tiong.

ISSUE
What is the proper venue of the perjury charge under Article 183 of the Revised Penal
Code?

RULING
The Metropolitan Trial Court in Makati City is the proper venue and court to take
cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners. Venue is an essential element of
jurisdiction in criminal cases and is determined by the place where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. In this case, the execution
of the false certification, which is an essential element of perjury, was alleged to have
been committed in Makati City. Therefore, Makati City is the proper venue for the
perjury case. The court clarified the difference between the Ilusorio and Sy Tiong cases.
Ilusorio involved the presentation of false statements in verified petitions filed with the
court, while Sy Tiong involved the making of false statements in an affidavit.
The court held that the ruling in Sy Tiong, which emphasized the situs of the oath, is
more in accord with Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code.
 VILLANUEVA V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, PEOPLE
G.R. No. 162187, November 18 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS
Petitioner Criste Villanueva filed a criminal complaint for perjury against respondent
Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen. The complaint alleged that Von Sprengeisen made
false statements in an Urgent Motion and an Affidavit of Merit.
The statements in question related to a compromise agreement between the parties
and the use of findings from the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) in determining the
normal value of the imported goods.
During the preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor found no probable
cause for perjury against Von Sprengeisen.
However, the second assistant city prosecutor reviewed the case and found probable
cause, leading to the filing of an information for perjury against Von Sprengeisen.
Von Sprengeisen appealed the resolution to the Secretary of Justice, who reversed the
resolution and directed the withdrawal of the information.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which
dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
The CA found that there was no probable cause for perjury against Von Sprengeisen,
as the statements made were not deliberate and willful assertions of falsehoods.

ISSUE
Whether there was probable cause for perjury against Von Sprengeisen based on the
statements made in the Urgent Motion and Affidavit of Merit.

RULING
The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion and affirmed the decision of the
CA.
The Court held that the determination of probable cause lies within the discretion of the
prosecuting officers, and the finding of the Secretary of Justice is accorded high
respect.
The Court also found that the statements made by Von Sprengeisen were not deliberate
and willful falsehoods, and that there was no materiality to the alleged false assertions.
 US V. ESTRANA
G.R. No.5751, September 6, 1910, TRENT, J.

FACTS
Lope Estraña was accused of perjury for giving false testimony in a murder case.
The complaint alleged that Estraña falsely testified that Dionisio Tambolero came to his
house on a certain date, when in fact Tambolero was not there.
Estraña was convicted and sentenced to one year and one day in prison, as well as
being barred from holding public office or giving testimony in any court.

ISSUE
Whether the complaint against Estraña for perjury was fatally defective for not alleging
that his false testimony was material to the issues involved in the murder case.

RULING
The court found that the complaint was fatally defective.
Estraña's conviction for perjury was reversed and he was acquitted of the charge.

PEOPLE V. CRUZ
G.R. No L.15132, May 25, 1960, GUTIERREZ DAVID, J

FACTS
Defendant Rufo B. Cruz was charged with perjury for falsely denying previous criminal
accusations on a civil service application form.
On October 19, 1948, Cruz filled up an application form for the patrolman examination
given by the Bureau of Civil Service.
In question No. 6 of the application form, Cruz was asked if he had ever been accused,
indicted, or tried for the violation of any law, ordinance, or regulation before any court.
Cruz answered "No" to this question, despite knowing that he had previously been
charged or criminally indicted before the Justice of the Peace Court of Cainta, Rizal for
various crimes.
The lower court found Cruz guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document and
sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of from 4 months and 11 days of arresto
mayor to 5 years, 6 months and 21 days of prision correccional, with a fine of not more
than P2,000.00.

ISSUE
Whether the crime committed by the accused is perjury or falsification of a public
document.

RULING
The court ruled that the crime committed by the accused is perjury and not falsification
of a public document.
The court agreed with the defense that the offense committed falls under the definition
of perjury as stated in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code.
Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law on a material matter.
The court cited a previous case, People v. Tupasi Molina, which held that a person who
stated under oath in his application to take a police examination that he had never been
convicted of any crime, when in fact he had previous convictions, committed perjury.
The court found that all the elements of the offense of perjury were present in the
present case.
 SAULO V. PEOPLE ET, AL
, G.R. No. 242900, June 8, 2020, REYES, J. JR., J.:

FACTS
Edwin L. Saulo filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking a reversal of his
conviction for two counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) and
Perjury. Saulo issued checks without sufficient funds and made false statements in a
complaint-affidavit. Saulo owned Yadoo Dynasty and Khumbmela Products, Inc. and
hired Marsene Alberto as Disbursing Officer and later as Operations Manager. Saulo
encountered financial problems and sought Alberto's help to find someone who could
lend him money. Alberto asked her husband to approach Eladio Naval, who lent Saulo
P1,500,000. Saulo issued three checks with face values of P1,200,000, P200,000, and
P100,000. Saulo also borrowed P12,270 from Alberto and issued a check drawn
against Khumbmela's account. Saulo sought Alberto's assistance again for a loan to
construct his studio, and Alberto's husband issued a personal check to Masinag
Lumber. When the checks were presented for payment, they bounced due to "Account
Closed" and "Insufficient Funds." Alberto sent Saulo a Notice of Dishonor, and Saulo
filed an Estafa case against her, which was dismissed.
Saulo also filed cases of Qualified Theft and Falsification of Commercial Documents
against Alberto, which were also dismissed. Alberto then filed a case of Perjury and two
counts of Violation of B.P. 22 against Saulo.

ISSUE
Whether or not there was a deliberate assertion of falsehood in Saulo's complaint-
affidavit.
Whether or not Saulo could be convicted for Violation of B.P. 22.

RULING
The MeTC, RTC, and CA all found Saulo guilty of Perjury and Violation of B.P. 22.
The Supreme Court affirms the decision with modification on the rate of legal interest.
The court upholds the lower courts' findings of Saulo's guilt for Perjury and Violation of
B.P. 22. The court emphasizes that the determination of whether Saulo deliberately
asserted falsehood is a question of fact, and the lower courts' factual findings are
binding. The court also clarifies that a corporate officer can be held personally liable for
issuing a worthless check in the corporate name. The court modifies the rate of legal
interest imposed on the amount owed to Alberto.
 MASANGKAY V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 164443, June 18, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J

FACTS
Eriberto Masangkay, along with his common-law wife Magdalena Ricaros, Cesar
Masangkay, and Eric Dullano, were incorporators and directors of Megatel Factors, Inc.
(MFI).
Eriberto filed a petition for the involuntary dissolution of MFI, alleging that certain
documents, including a secretary's certificate and a deed of exchange, were fictitious
and simulated.
The prosecution claimed that Eriberto lied under oath when he stated that there was no
meeting of the Board of Directors on December 5, 1992, and that the deed of exchange
was fictitious.
Eriberto argued that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had primary
jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE
Whether there was a deliberate assertion of falsehood by Eriberto.
Whether the truthful allegation in the petition for involuntary dissolution that there was
no meeting is material to the petition.

RULING
The Supreme Court acquitted Eriberto of the charge of perjury due to reasonable doubt.
The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
Eriberto deliberately made false statements in his petition for dissolution. The Court
emphasized that the prosecution must prove the deliberate assertion of falsehood and
the materiality of the false statements.
The prosecution relied mainly on the minutes of the alleged meeting, which were
inconsistent with Eriberto's statement that the meeting did not actually take place.
However, the Court found that the prosecution did not present convincing evidence,
other than the minutes, to prove that the meeting actually occurred.
The Court also noted that Eriberto's statement regarding the fictitiousness of the deed of
exchange was a legal conclusion and not a deliberate falsehood.
Therefore, the Court acquitted Eriberto due to reasonable doubt.
 US V. JURADO
G.R. No.10719, September 24, 1915, TORRES, J

FACTS
Investigation initiated by acting provincial fiscal of Cebu, Dionisio Jacosalem
Investigation regarding the robbery of opium tins from Jurado's house
Alejandro Albao, a municipal policeman, accused of committing the robbery through
threats and intimidation
Vicente Lizarraga, owner of the opium, claimed Jurado was present during the robbery
Jurado denied being at home during the robbery and stated he did not know Lizarraga
or Albao
In a separate case against Ciriaco Singson for robbery, Jurado testified as a witness for
the defense and contradicted his previous statement, claiming he did know Lizarraga
and Albao

ISSUE
Whether Jurado's false testimony constitutes perjury.

RULING
Jurado was acquitted of the charge of perjury
For a witness to be guilty of perjury, their false testimony must be material or important
to the principal matter under investigation
False testimony must either be about a material matter that the witness does not believe
to be true or establish something that conflicts with the truth of an important and
essential fact proven by the evidence
In this case, the investigation aimed to determine if Albao had been in Jurado's house
during the robbery and if he had used his position as a municipal policeman to commit
the crime
Jurado's false testimony about his presence and knowledge of the individuals involved
was not proven to be material or important to the case
Testimony of other witnesses in the case for robbery was not presented in the record,
making it impossible to determine the significance of Jurado's false testimony
As the guilt of the accused must be conclusively proven and there was reasonable
doubt in this case, Jurado was entitled to acquittal.
 CHOA V. PEOPLE ET AL.,
GR No. 142011, March 14, 2003, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J

FACTS
Alfonso C. Choa, a Chinese national, was found guilty of perjury for making false
statements in his petition for naturalization.
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, Bacolod City, convicted him of perjury.
Decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
Choa filed a verified petition for naturalization on April 25, 1989, with the RTC, Branch
41, Bacolod City.
During the initial hearing on August 27, 1990, Choa filed a motion to withdraw his
petition for naturalization.
The trial court granted the motion on September 28, 1990.
Almost two years later, on August 5, 1992, Choa was charged with perjury for the
alleged false statements in his petition for naturalization.

ISSUE
Whether Choa can be convicted of perjury despite withdrawing his petition for
naturalization.

RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed Choa's conviction for perjury.
The Court held that all the elements of perjury were present at the time Choa filed his
petition for naturalization.
Choa willfully and deliberately made false statements concerning his "residence" and
"moral character" in his petition, and these false statements were proven by the
prosecution.
The false statements were material matters required by law, as they were among the
main facts necessary for determining Choa's qualifications and fitness as a naturalized
Filipino citizen.
The withdrawal of Choa's petition did not extinguish his culpability for perjury.
While the withdrawal terminated the proceedings for naturalization, it did not absolve
Choa of the perjury he had already committed.
The fact of withdrawal alone cannot bar the State from prosecuting Choa for his
unlawful act.
The allegations in Choa's petition for naturalization were not absolutely privileged and
could be used against him in a criminal prosecution.
The false statements made by Choa in his petition made a mockery of the
administration of justice, and therefore, he could not seek refuge under the absolutely
privileged communication rule.
The Supreme Court affirmed Choa's conviction for perjury.
The withdrawal of his petition for naturalization did not absolve him of the perjury he had
committed.
The false statements made in his petition could be used as evidence of his unlawful act.

PEOPLE v. ESMINIA PUDOL

G.R. No. L-45618, October 18, 1938, Justice Concepcion

Article 17, subsection 2, of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, which
addresses the liability of those who directly induce others to commit a crime.

FACTS
The case revolves around charges of perjury filed against Esminia Pudol and Alberto
Reyes. An information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, accusing
both defendants of committing perjury. It was alleged that Pudol subscribed to a false
affidavit induced by Reyes.
During the trial, the provincial fiscal filed a motion seeking the discharge of Esminia
Pudol to utilize her as a witness for the prosecution against her co-accused, Alberto
Reyes. Pudol was discharged from the case for this purpose. Reyes initially pleaded not
guilty but later withdrew his plea. The court dismissed the case against Reyes, agreeing
with his argument that since the principal accused, Pudol, had been discharged, there
was no basis for prosecuting him. Reyes argued further that subornation of perjury was
not expressly penalized under the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE
Whether the dismissal of the case against Esminia Pudol should lead to the dismissal of
charges against Alberto Reyes; and second, whether subornation of perjury is still
considered a crime under the Revised Penal Code.

RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the case to
proceed. The Court held that the dismissal of charges against one accused (Pudol) did
not automatically warrant the dismissal of charges against the other accused (Reyes).
Additionally, the Court clarified that although subornation of perjury was not expressly
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the act of inducing another person to commit
perjury still constituted a crime under Article 17, subsection 2, of the Code. Therefore,
Reyes could still be held liable for his involvement in inducing Pudol to commit perjury.

The ruling of the Supreme Court underscores the principle that the participation of an
individual in inducing another to commit a crime, even if that specific act is not explicitly
stated in the law, can still render them liable as a principal by direct inducement under
the Revised Penal Code.

Article 17, subsection 2, of the Revised Penal Code provides that "Those who directly
force or induce others to commit [a crime]" are considered principals. In this case,
Reyes was accused not only of suborning perjury but also of directly inducing Pudol to
commit the crime of perjury. Therefore, his actions fell within the scope of Article 17,
subsection 2, and he could be held criminally liable for his involvement.

The Court's ruling also highlights the importance of distinguishing between the different
roles and levels of involvement in the commission of a crime. Even if the principal actor
is discharged or acquitted, those who directly induce or participate in the commission of
the offense can still be held accountable under the law.

TITLE SEVEN: CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Chapter 2: Malfeasance and Misfeasance in Office
No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By
Adelfa Properties Inc, v.
1 A. C.No. 8608 October 16, 2019 Flora, Arturo O.
Mendoza
2 Aninon v. Atty. Sabitsana, Jr A. C. No. 5098 April 11, 2012 Flora, Arturo O.
3 CEZA v. MVGC G.R. No. 194962 January 27, 2016 Flora, Arturo O.
4 Hadjula v. Atty. Madianda A.C. 6711 July 3, 2007 Flora, Arturo O.
5 Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat A.C. No. 5804 July 1, 2003 Flora, Arturo O.
6 People v. Sandiganbayan G. R. Nos- 115439-41 July 16, 1997 Flora, Arturo O.
7 Tan v. Atty. Alvarico A. C. No. 10933 November 3, 2020 Flora, Arturo O.
8 Tulio v. Atty. Buhangin, AC. No. 7110 April 2016 Flora, Arturo O.
 ADELFA PROPERTIES INC, V. MENDOZA
A.C. No. 8608 [Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2907], October 16, 2019, PERALTA, J

Rules 13.02, Canon 21, 21.01, and 21.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). These rules dictate a lawyer's duty to preserve client
confidentiality, refrain from making public statements regarding pending cases, and not
use information acquired in the course of employment to the disadvantage of the client.

FACTS
Adelfa Properties, Inc. (now Fine Properties, Inc.) filed a Complaint for Disbarment
against Atty. Restituto S. Mendoza, accusing him of various violations of the Lawyer's
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Atty. Mendoza was previously
employed as an in-house counsel for Brittany Corporation, an affiliate of Adelfa
Properties, Inc. He was transferred multiple times within the company due to alleged
poor performance and inability to integrate with colleagues.

The complaint alleged that Atty. Mendoza's performance was consistently low, resulting
in multiple transfers within the company. Moreover, he allegedly threatened company
officers, attempted extortion, and disclosed confidential information to third parties. This
behavior led to his eventual termination.

Atty. Mendoza, in response, denied the allegations and argued that he was terminated
for standing up for his principles. He filed a labor complaint against Adelfa Properties,
Inc., seeking redress for his allegedly illegal termination.

ISSUE
Whether Atty. Restituto S. Mendoza violated the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rules 13.02, Canon 21, 21.01, and 21.02, through his
actions during and after his employment with Adelfa Properties, Inc.

RULING
The Supreme Court found Atty. Restituto S. Mendoza guilty of violating Rules 13.02,
Canon 21, 21.01, and 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). These
provisions pertain to a lawyer's duty to preserve client confidentiality, refrain from
making public statements regarding pending cases, and not use information acquired in
the course of employment to the disadvantage of the client.

While the court found no violation of the rule on non-disclosure of privileged

communication, it concluded that Atty. Mendoza's decision to grant media interviews
and disclose information obtained during his employment constituted gross misconduct.
This act was deemed a breach of the trust and confidence of his former employer,
Adelfa Properties, Inc.
The Supreme Court, therefore, suspended Atty. Restituto S. Mendoza from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of the resolution. This
penalty was imposed to uphold the integrity of the legal profession and emphasize the
importance of maintaining client confidentiality and trust.

The ruling emphasizes the ethical obligations of lawyers and underscores the gravity of
breaches of confidentiality. It serves as a reminder to legal practitioners of their duty to
uphold the highest standards of professionalism and integrity in their practice. Violations
of these standards can result in disciplinary action, including suspension or disbarment
from the practice of law.

ANINON V. ATTY. SABITSANA, JR.

A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012, Brion, J.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which pertains to

the representation of conflicting interests by lawyers. This provision sets forth the
ethical standards and obligations that lawyers must adhere to in their professional
conduct, particularly in situations where there is a potential conflict between the
interests of their clients.
FACTS
Josefina M. Aniñon (the complainant) engaged the legal services of Atty. Clemencio
Sabitsana, Jr. to prepare and execute a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by
her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Subsequently, Atty. Sabitsana filed a
civil case against Aniñon for the annulment of the Deed of Sale on behalf of Zenaida L.
Cañete, the legal wife of Aniñon's late common-law husband.

Atty. Sabitsana admitted to providing legal advice to Aniñon in the preparation and
execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied receiving any confidential
information from Aniñon. He claimed that the disbarment complaint was instigated by
Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the complaint, who had lost a court case
against him.

ISSUE
Whether Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. is guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

RULING
The Court finds Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts."

The Court emphasizes the importance of maintaining trust and confidence between
lawyers and clients, as well as the duty to avoid representing conflicting interests
without full disclosure and consent from all parties involved.

In this case, the complainant engaged Atty. Sabitsana's legal services to protect her
interest over a certain property. Atty. Sabitsana then accepted the engagement from
Zenaida Cañete, despite knowing that her interest clashed with the complainant's
interests. He subsequently filed a case against the complainant on behalf of Zenaida
Cañete for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and
executed for the complainant.

By accepting conflicting engagements and representing opposing parties in the same

action, Atty. Sabitsana violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His actions demonstrated a failure to maintain the required level of trust
and confidence between lawyer and client, as well as a disregard for the duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to each client.

Although Atty. Sabitsana argued that the disbarment complaint was instigated by a
personal vendetta, the Court found no violation of due process in the proceedings. Atty.
Sabitsana was given the opportunity to explain his side and was afforded all the
necessary opportunities to defend himself.

Considering the foregoing, the Court adopts the findings and recommendations of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and imposes the penalty of one year suspension
from the practice of law upon Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr.

CAGAYAN ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY V. MERIDIEN VISTA GAMING

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 194962, January 27, 2016, MENDOZA, J

Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court forms the core of this case, emphasizing the
doctrine of extrinsic fraud and the obligation of attorneys to diligently advocate for their
clients' interests. This provision enables parties to seek relief from judgment in
instances where a final order or judgment is rendered against them due to fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, underscoring the importance of legal
representation in safeguarding the rights of litigants.

FACTS
The Cagayan Economic Zone Authority (CEZA) is a government agency tasked with
regulating and overseeing gaming activities within the Cagayan Special Economic Zone
and Freeport (Freeport Zone). In pursuit of its mandate, CEZA sought legal advice from
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) regarding its authority to
operate jai alai betting stations within the Freeport Zone. Based on the OGCC's legal
opinion, CEZA granted Meridien Vista Gaming Corporation (MVGC) a license to operate
various gaming activities within the Freeport Zone, including jai alai.

After MVGC commenced its gaming operations, CEZA issued a directive ordering
MVGC to cease all gaming activities, including software testing, due to a change in the
legal opinion provided by the OGCC. In response, MVGC filed a petition for mandamus
and damages against CEZA, seeking to compel CEZA to allow it to continue its gaming
operations as per the original license agreement.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of MVGC, granting its petition for
mandamus and damages. CEZA subsequently filed a petition for relief from judgment
with the RTC, arguing that its counsel, Atty. Edgardo Baniaga, had been grossly
negligent in representing its interests. The RTC denied CEZA's petition, prompting
CEZA to appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether CEZA is entitled to relief from judgment based on the gross negligence of its
counsel, Atty. Edgardo Baniaga, and whether the doctrine of extrinsic fraud applies in
this situation.

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of CEZA, granting its petition for relief from judgment.
The Court found that Atty. Baniaga's conduct amounted to gross negligence and
constituted extrinsic fraud, warranting relief from the adverse judgment.

The Court based its ruling on Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, which states:
"Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. – When a
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file
a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside."

The Court held that Atty. Baniaga's failure to inform CEZA of the adverse judgment,
neglecting to take steps to protect CEZA's interests, and allowing the judgment to lapse
into finality constituted excusable negligence. The Court emphasized that the lawyer-
client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature, and lawyers are duty-bound to observe
candor, fairness, and loyalty in all their dealings with clients. Atty. Baniaga's conduct fell
short of the standards of competence and diligence expected of legal practitioners.

Furthermore, the Court noted that relief from judgment is an equitable remedy available
in exceptional cases where no other adequate remedy exists. In the interest of justice
and equity, the Court deemed it appropriate to grant CEZA's petition and enable it to
appeal its case.

The Court also ordered an administrative investigation into Atty. Baniaga's conduct and
forwarded the case records to the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for further action.
 HADJULA V. ATTY. MADIANDA
A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 2007, Justice Garcia

Canon No. 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility emphasizing the duty
of lawyers to maintain the confidentiality of information acquired or revealed during legal
consultations.

FACTS
Ma. Luisa Hadjula filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Roceles F. Madianda,
alleging a violation of Article 209 of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and
21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hadjula claimed that she approached
Madianda, who was a friend and lawyer, for legal advice. During their conversation,
Hadjula disclosed personal secrets and sensitive documents, expecting confidentiality.
However, Madianda later used this information against Hadjula in criminal and
disciplinary actions.

ISSUE
Whether Atty. Madianda breached the duty of confidentiality owed to Hadjula as her
lawyer, as stipulated in Canon No. 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING
The primary issue in this case is whether Atty. Madianda breached the duty of
confidentiality owed to Hadjula as her lawyer, as stipulated in Canon No. 21.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING
In resolving the case, the Supreme Court considered Canon No. 21.02, which imposes
upon lawyers the duty to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed
during legal consultations. Despite Madianda's denial of a lawyer-client relationship with
Hadjula, the Court held that such a relationship was established the moment Hadjula
sought legal advice from Madianda. The Court cited the case of Burbe v. Magulta,
which established that a lawyer-client relationship exists even without a formal
engagement or payment of fees. Moreover, Dean Wigmore's essential factors to
establish attorney-client privilege communication were met in this case.

The Court found that Madianda breached her duty of confidentiality by using the
information provided by Hadjula against her in criminal and disciplinary actions.
Although Madianda's actions may have been fueled by personal animosity, the Court
emphasized the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of client information.
Therefore, Atty. Madianda was reprimanded for violating Canon No. 21.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and admonished to be circumspect in handling
information acquired through lawyer-client relationships. The Court sternly warned
Madianda against repeating similar actions in the future.
In conclusion, the ruling of the case reaffirmed the significance of attorney-client
confidentiality in upholding the integrity of the legal profession and ensuring trust
between lawyers and their clients.

HORNILLA V. ATTY. SALUNAT

A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states: "A lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts."

FACTS
Benedicto Hornilla and Atty. Federico D. Ricafort filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline. The complainants alleged that Atty. Salunat, a member
of the ASSA Law and Associates, was engaged as retained counsel for the Philippine
Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA), of which the complainants were also
members. Additionally, Atty. Salunat's brother, Aurelio S. Salunat, was a member of the
PPSTA Board which approved Atty. Salunat's engagement as retained counsel.

Complainants initiated an intra-corporate case against certain members of the PPSTA

Board of Directors and filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged
unlawful spending and undervalued sale of real property by the PPSTA. Atty. Salunat
entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board members in these cases.
Complainants argued that this constituted a conflict of interest as Atty. Salunat was
representing parties whose interests were adverse to those of the PPSTA members
who were complainants in the case.

Atty. Salunat, in his defense, claimed that he represented the PPSTA Board members
as a partner of the ASSA Law Firm, not in his individual capacity, and denied any
wrongdoing.
ISSUE
Whether Atty. Salunat's representation of the PPSTA Board members in cases against
the PPSTA itself constitutes a conflict of interest, in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

RULING
The Supreme Court, in its resolution dated July 1, 2003, found Atty. Salunat guilty of
representing conflicting interests. The ruling is based on the violation of Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits lawyers from representing
conflicting interests without the written consent of all parties concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.

The Court explained that a conflict of interest arises when a lawyer represents parties
with inconsistent interests, and such representation may jeopardize the lawyer's duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the clients. The Court emphasized that a lawyer
representing a corporation cannot also represent members of the same corporation's
board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. This is because the interest
of the corporate client should not be influenced by any interest of individual corporate
officials.

In the case at hand, Atty. Salunat, as a member of the ASSA Law Firm, represented
both the PPSTA and its Board members in cases where their interests were adverse.
Despite Atty. Salunat's argument that he represented the Board members as a partner
of the law firm, the Court found his actions to be in violation of Rule 15.03, as they
constituted a conflict of interest.

Therefore, Atty. Salunat was admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the
practice of his profession. The Court warned him that a repetition of similar acts would
be dealt with more severely.

PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 115439-41, July 16, 1997, Regalado, J.

Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019. This section pertains to acts of corruption by
public officers, particularly those involving bribery or improper influence in the
performance of official duties.

FACTS
The case revolves around a series of events involving the falsification of public
documents in relation to a land patent application. Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., a
government official, applied for a free patent over a piece of land which was later found
to have been reserved for a school site. Subsequently, legal proceedings ensued,
including a criminal case for perjury against Paredes, which was ultimately dismissed.

Later, Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer, initiated further legal action by lodging a complaint
with the Ombudsman, alleging that certain documents related to the perjury case had
been falsified. This led to an investigation and the filing of criminal charges for
falsification of public documents against Paredes and two others, including attorney
Generoso S. Sansaet, who had represented Paredes throughout these legal
proceedings.

The prosecution sought to discharge Sansaet as a state witness, arguing that his
testimony was crucial for securing convictions against the other defendants. However,
the Sandiganbayan denied this request, citing attorney-client privilege as a bar to
Sansaet's testimony.

ISSUE
Whether attorney-client privilege applies to communications between Paredes and
Sansaet regarding the falsification of public documents, and if so, whether Sansaet can
be discharged as a state witness despite this privilege.

RULING
The Court held that communications between a client and their lawyer regarding the
commission of a future crime are not protected by attorney-client privilege. It
distinguished between communications related to past crimes, which are privileged, and
those related to future crimes, which are not.

The Court emphasized that communications made in furtherance of a conspiracy to

commit a crime do not enjoy the protection of attorney-client privilege. In this case,
Sansaet was found to be a conspirator in the falsification of public documents, and
therefore, the privilege did not apply.
The Court determined that Sansaet met the qualifications for discharge as a state
witness. His testimony was deemed necessary for securing convictions against the
other defendants, and he was found not to be the most guilty among them. Additionally,
Sansaet had not been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

TAN V. ATTY. ALVARICO

A.C. No. 10933, November 03, 2020, PERALTA, C.J.

Rule 15.03 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. These

provisions set the standards of conduct for lawyers in the Philippines and are essential
in ensuring the integrity and trustworthiness of legal practitioners.

FACTS
Wilson B. Tan filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. James
Roulyn R. Alvarico, alleging conflict of interest and betrayal of trust and confidence. Tan
was the offended party in a criminal case for theft against Blas Fier "Buddy" Manco,
whom Atty. Alvarico represented. Tan claimed that Atty. Alvarico approached him to
settle the case, demanding a 15% commission, which Atty. Alvarico denied. Atty.
Alvarico stated that he was acting in the interest of his client Manco, who wanted to
settle the civil aspect of the case. Tan argued that Atty. Alvarico violated Rule 15.03 and
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE
Whether Atty. Alvarico violated Rule 15.03 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by representing conflicting interests and betraying the trust of his client.

RULING
The Court dismissed the complaint against Atty. Alvarico for lack of merit. It emphasized
that the burden of proof rests on the complainant, requiring substantial evidence to
support the allegations. The Court found that Tan failed to prove his allegations against
Atty. Alvarico. It clarified that negotiations with the adverse party do not necessarily
constitute representation of conflicting interests, especially when done in the interest of
the lawyer's client. The Court also rejected Tan's argument that Atty. Alvarico's failure to
cross-examine him on the alleged commission constituted an admission by silence,
noting that Atty. Alvarico actively responded to the allegations. Finally, the Court warned
against filing malicious suits against members of the bar.

The ruling is in accordance with Rule 15.03 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibit lawyers from representing conflicting interests and require
them to maintain fidelity to their clients' causes.

In conclusion, the Court upheld the findings and recommendations of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors, dismissing the complaint against Atty.
Alvarico and considering the case closed and terminated.
 ARTHUR S. TULIO V. ATTY. GREGORY F. BUHANGIN
A.C. No. 7110, April 20, 2016, Justice Diosdado M. Peralta

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility - "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts."
FACTS
Arthur S. Tulio filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Gregory F. Buhangin,
alleging gross dishonesty in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Tulio claimed that he had a prior legal relationship with Atty. Buhangin,
who initially represented him in legal matters concerning the estate of Tulio's mother.
Atty. Buhangin later represented Tulio's siblings against him, leading to a conflict of
interest.

Tulio alleged that Atty. Buhangin prepared and notarized a Deed of Waiver of Rights,
signed by all of Tulio's siblings in his favor. Subsequently, Tulio engaged Atty.
Buhangin's services to represent him in a case for specific performance and damages.
However, to Tulio's surprise, Atty. Buhangin later represented Tulio's siblings in a
complaint against him, alleging rescission of the deed of waiver of rights.

Atty. Buhangin claimed that his representation was for the heirs of Angeline Tulio, not
solely for Tulio. He argued that there was no conflict of interest as he was protecting the
interests of all heirs. However, Tulio disputed this, providing evidence of Atty.
Buhangin's exclusive representation of him in previous legal matters.

ISSUE
Whether Atty. Buhangin's representation of conflicting interests violated Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING
The Supreme Court found Atty. Buhangin guilty of representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court
emphasized the importance of lawyers avoiding conflicts of interest and maintaining
loyalty to their clients.

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly prohibits a lawyer from
representing conflicting interests without the written consent of all parties involved,
given after full disclosure of the facts. The rule is grounded in principles of public policy,
good taste, and the lawyer's fiduciary obligation of loyalty to clients.

In this case, Atty. Buhangin's actions constituted a clear violation of Rule 15.03. Despite
his assertion that he represented the heirs of Angeline Tulio collectively, the evidence
showed that he had an exclusive attorney-client relationship with Tulio. Atty. Buhangin's
subsequent representation of Tulio's siblings against him in a legal matter involving the
same subject property constituted a conflict of interest.

The Court noted that Atty. Buhangin's failure to comply with the IBP's orders and
directives further aggravated his misconduct. As an officer of the Court, Atty. Buhangin
was duty-bound to comply with lawful directives promptly and completely. His refusal to
attend mandatory conferences and submit required documents contributed to undue
delay in the resolution of the case.

Considering the seriousness of Atty. Buhangin's violations and his failure to comply with
lawful orders, the Court modified and increased the recommended penalty of
suspension from the practice of law from two months to six months. The Court issued a
warning that a repetition of similar acts in the future would be dealt with more severely.

TITLE SEVEN: CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Chapter 5: Infidelity of Public Officers
Section 3: Revelation of secrets

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 Alberto v. Dela Cruz., et al G.R. No. L-31839, June 30, 1980 Flora, Arturo O.
2 Alberto, et al., v. Dela Cruz, et al G. R. No. L- 31839, June 30, 1980 Flora, Arturo O.
A.M. No. 141-MTJ, R-
3 Araneta v. Araneta August 26, 1986 Flora, Arturo O.
478-MTJ
4 Escano v. Sandiganbayan L-53208, April 15, 1988 Flora, Arturo O.
 5 People v. Lancanan, G. R. No. L-6805 June 30, 1954 Flora, Arturo O.
6 Remocal v. People G. R. No. 47521, April 8, 1941 Flora, Arturo O.
7 Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, et al G. R. No. L-58652 May 20, 1988 Flora, Arturo O.
8 United States v. Bandino G. R. 9964 February 11, 1915 Flora, Arturo O.

ALBERTO V. DELA CRUZ., ET AL

G.R. No. L-31839, June 30, 1980, J. Concepcion

Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines "Conniving with or
consenting to evasion" and outlines the penalties for public officers who consent to the
escape of a prisoner in their custody or charge. It delineates the circumstances under
which a public officer may be held liable for the escape of a prisoner and establishes
the requisite elements for proving such liability. Additionally, the ruling in the case
emphasizes the application of Article 223.

FACTS
In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Eligio Orbita,
a Provincial Guard, was being prosecuted for Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner.
During the trial, evidence emerged suggesting the involvement of Governor Armando
Cledera and Jose Esmeralda in the escape of a prisoner, Pablo Denaque, from custody.
However, after a reinvestigation, the prosecuting officers concluded that there was no
prima facie case against Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda.

Despite this conclusion, the respondent Judge, Rafael de la Cruz, ordered the
Provincial Fiscal and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur to amend the
information to include Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants.

ISSUE
Whether the respondent Judge had the authority to compel the prosecuting attorney to
amend the information to include Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants,
despite the lack of sufficient evidence found during the reinvestigation.

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, the Provincial Fiscal and Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur. The Court annulled and set aside the orders issued
by the respondent Judge, directing the trial to proceed without including Governor
Cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants.

The ruling emphasized the principle that the power to determine whether to file a
particular criminal information lies with the prosecuting attorney. This power is subject to
judicial review but should not be overridden without sufficient evidence to support such
an amendment.

Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code provides the basis for the decision, stating that a
public officer who consents to the escape of a prisoner under his custody or charge
shall be punished. However, the Court found no evidence of connivance or negligence
on the part of Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda in the escape of Pablo Denaque.
Therefore, the orders to amend the information were deemed unjustified.

Justice Aquino, in his separate opinion, concurred with the decision but stressed the
importance of proper pre-investigation by the fiscal, as outlined in Presidential Decree
No. 77, before indicting Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda. He also highlighted that
any indictment against them could be pursued separately from the case against Eligio
Orbita.

The ruling reaffirmed the prosecutorial discretion vested in the prosecuting attorney and
underscored the need for sufficient evidence to support criminal charges against
defendants.

ALBERTO, ET AL., V. DELA CRUZ, ET AL

G.R. No. L-31839, June 30, 1980, Concepcion, J.

Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code, which specifically addresses the liability of
public officers who consent to the escape of a prisoner under their custody or charge.
This legal provision sets forth the legal framework by which such public officers may be
held accountable for their actions or omissions leading to the evasion of a prisoner.

FACTS
In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Eligio Orbita,
a Provincial guard, was charged with the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner.
The accusation stemmed from the escape of a detention prisoner, Pablo Denaque,
while under Orbita's custody.

During the trial, a note purportedly written by Governor Armando Cledera was
presented. The note requested assistance from Jose Esmeralda to send men to work
on the construction of a fence at the governor's house. This note was believed to have
facilitated Denaque's escape. The defense sought to amend the information to include
Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants.

The respondent Judge ordered a further investigation to determine whether Governor

Cledera and Jose Esmeralda should be included in the information. However, during the
reinvestigation, Orbita failed to appear, and the note in question was not produced. The
Fiscal's office subsequently found no prima facie case against Governor Cledera and
Jose Esmeralda. Despite this, the respondent Judge still ordered the amendment of the
information to include them as defendants.

ISSUE
Whether the respondent Judge erred in ordering the inclusion of Governor Cledera and
Jose Esmeralda as defendants in the criminal case, despite the Fiscal's determination
that there was insufficient evidence to support the allegations against them.

RULING
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, annulling the orders to amend the information
and directing the trial to proceed against Eligio Orbita alone.

In its ruling, the Court emphasized the discretion of the Fiscal in determining whether
there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations in a criminal case. It cited Article
223 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes public officers who consent to the
escape of a prisoner in their custody or charge. The Court explained that to be guilty
under this provision, it is necessary to prove connivance or consent on the part of the
public officer in the escape of the prisoner.
Furthermore, the Court highlighted Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, which
punishes public officers for negligence resulting in the escape of a prisoner. The Court
noted that there was insufficient evidence to show negligence on the part of Governor
Cledera and Jose Esmeralda, as there was no indication that they had connived with
Orbita in the escape of Denaque.

In conclusion, the Court affirmed the discretion of the Fiscal in deciding whether to
include additional defendants in the information, and it found no compelling reason to
overturn the Fiscal's decision in this case. Therefore, the orders to amend the
information were annulled, and the trial was directed to proceed against Eligio Orbita
alone.

ARANETA V. ARANETA
A.M. No. 141-MTJ, R-478-MTJ, August 26, 1986, Per Curiam

FACTS
he case stemmed from the conviction of Municipal Circuit Judge Amandito D. Araneta
by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 7220 for infidelity in the custody of
prisoners. The Sandiganbayan found Judge Araneta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
misusing his authority by allowing detention prisoners to perform domestic chores and
carpentry work at his personal property, which was adjacent to his house. These
prisoners were not properly supervised and were allowed to freely move between the
judge's house and the jail, leading to the escape of one prisoner facing serious charges.

Following his conviction, the Supreme Court received administrative charges against
Judge Araneta in Adm. Matter No. R-141-MTJ, alleging neglect of duty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Additionally, the Peace & Order Council of
Norala, South Cotabato, submitted Resolution No. 83-01 requesting the immediate
dismissal of Judge Araneta for various acts including ignorance of the law, oppressive
acts, partiality, and other actions prejudicial to the interest of justice.

ISSUE
Whether Judge Amandito D. Araneta should be dismissed from the service due to his
conviction for infidelity in the custody of prisoners and other acts prejudicial to the
administration of justice.

RULING
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, ruled to dismiss Judge Amandito D.
Araneta from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay, and with
prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or its agencies. The
decision was based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan regarding Judge Araneta's
misuse of authority, which was deemed highly prejudicial to the service and gravely
inimical to the interest of justice.

The ruling is based on Section 8(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines, which grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and their personnel. This provision empowers the Supreme Court to discipline judges
and court personnel for misconduct, incompetence, and other offenses detrimental to
the administration of justice.

Furthermore, the ruling emphasized the importance of upholding the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. Judge Araneta's actions not only violated his duty to uphold
the law but also undermined public trust in the judiciary. Therefore, dismissal from the
service was deemed necessary to maintain the integrity and credibility of the judiciary.

ESCANO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
L-53208, April 15, 1988, Paras, J.

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, which defines the crime of
estafa or swindling. Specifically, the case addresses the elements of estafa and the
requirement to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt when prosecuting individuals
accused of this offense.

FACTS
Angelina Escano, the petitioner, served as the Finance Officer of Region VII, Ministry of
Public Highways. She was accused before the Sandiganbayan, along with other public
officials and private contractors, of being part of a conspiracy to commit estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents. The charges stemmed from irregular
disbursements of public funds by the Danao City Highway Engineering District, totaling
over six million pesos.

The irregularities involved the issuance of fake documents, including Letters of Advice
and Allotment (LAAs), Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDC), Request for
Obligation of Allotment (ROA), among others, which facilitated the misappropriation of
government funds. Despite Escano's denial of direct involvement, the Sandiganbayan
found her liable based on circumstantial evidence, including her approval of irregular
vouchers and alleged consultations with co-accused.

ISSUE
Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to establish Angelina Escano's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for her alleged participation in the conspiracy to commit
estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents.

RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Sandiganbayan and acquitted
Angelina Escano of all charges. The Court found that the evidence presented against
Escano was circumstantial and insufficient to establish her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The alleged consultations with a co-accused and a witness were deemed
ambiguous and unreliable, while Escano's actions were interpreted as negligence rather
than deliberate participation in the fraudulent scheme.

The Court emphasized the distinction between negligence and connivance, noting that
negligence alone could not establish criminal liability. It was also highlighted that the
monthly trial balance, which Escano was faulted for approving without thorough
examination, was a post-transactional act and not indicative of her direct involvement in
the fraudulent activities.

Furthermore, the Court criticized the Sandiganbayan for relying on fabricated

testimonies and inconsistent statements from witnesses, cautioning against convicting
individuals based on unreliable evidence.

The Court acquitted Angelina Escano, thereby highlighting the importance of

establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the need for reliable and credible
evidence in criminal proceedings.

PEOPLE V. LANCANAN
G. R. No. L-6805, June 30, 1954, Justice Labrador

FACTS
On or about November 13, 1951, Pedro Lancanan, then the Chief of Police, allegedly
consented to the escape of certain individuals who were being detained as prisoners.
The information against Lancanan alleged that he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
allowed these prisoners to escape without the order of the court. However, Lancanan
filed a motion to quash the information, arguing that there was a failure to allege
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. He claimed that on the date of the alleged
escape, there was no pending charge against the individuals, and therefore, they were
not considered prisoners detained by a court order.

The trial court examined the records of the case and found that while a complaint was
filed on November 12, 1951, it was not until December 19, 1951, that a valid complaint
was filed. The complaint filed on November 12, 1951, was merely intended to be filed
with the justice of the peace, but it was not carried out due to the absence of the said
official. Lancanan argued that since there was no valid complaint against the individuals
on November 13, 1951, they were not prisoners detained by a court order, and
therefore, he could not be held liable for their escape.

ISSUE
Whether the information sufficiently alleged facts to constitute a cause of action against
Pedro Lancanan for allowing prisoners to escape, considering the absence of a valid
complaint against the prisoners at the time of their alleged escape.

RULING
In its ruling, the Supreme Court addressed two key arguments: the consideration of
facts not alleged in the information and the timing of the filing of the complaint.

Regarding the consideration of facts not alleged in the information, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that while it is a general rule that facts not alleged in the information
cannot be considered, there are exceptions to this rule. In this case, the Court found
that the facts regarding the timing of the filing of the complaint were apparent from the
record and were not denied by the prosecution. The Court held that these facts, though
not explicitly alleged, fell within the spirit and principle contained in People vs. Navarro
(75 Phil., 516), and therefore, the trial court did not commit a technical irregularity in
considering them.
On the timing of the filing of the complaint, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial
court's finding that there was no valid complaint filed until December 19, 1951. The
Court reasoned that the complaint filed on November 12, 1951, was not carried out due
to the absence of the justice of the peace, and therefore, it could not be considered as
an actual filing. Additionally, swearing a complaint before a municipal mayor does not
constitute filing, as the mayor is not authorized to act on behalf of the justice of the
peace in accepting complaints for filing.

Based on these findings, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
case against Pedro Lancanan. The Court held that since there was no valid complaint
against the individuals at the time of their alleged escape, Lancanan could not be held
liable for their escape, and thus, the information failed to allege sufficient facts to
constitute a cause of action against him.

The Supreme Court dismissed the claim of improper consideration of facts by the trial
court and affirmed the dismissal of the case against Pedro Lancanan, emphasizing the
importance of ensuring that informations allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of
action against the accused.

REMOCAL V. PEOPLE
G. R. No. 47521, April 8, 1941, Moran, J.

The liability of a police officer arises from his failure to exercise due care in overseeing
an escaped prisoner, as he neglected to implement essential measures, thereby
enabling the prisoner to flee.

FACTS
On May 5, 1939, between 12 and 3 p.m., Pedro Remocal, a police officer, was the only
officer on duty at the municipal jail of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Fernando Tolentino, a
prisoner, requested permission to go to the toilet, which Remocal granted by unlocking
the jail. After Tolentino returned, he asked for permission to fetch water from a nearby
well. Instead of locking Tolentino back in the jail, Remocal instructed him to wait while
he answered a telephone call. Taking advantage of the situation, Tolentino escaped
while Remocal was occupied with the call.

ISSUE
Whether Pedro Remocal may be held guilty of negligence in the custody of the escaped
prisoner based on the circumstances surrounding the prisoner's escape.

RULING

The court ruled that Pedro Remocal was guilty of negligence in the custody of the
prisoner, leading to his escape. The court found that Remocal failed to take adequate
precautions to prevent the prisoner from escaping. Instead of locking the prisoner back
in the jail before answering the telephone call, Remocal allowed the prisoner to remain
close to him, providing an opportunity for escape. The court held that Remocal's failure
to prioritize his official duty of securing the prisoner demonstrated negligence. Thus,
Remocal was found guilty of negligence in the custody of the prisoner.

RODILLAS V. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL
G. R. No. L-58652, May 20, 1988, Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code - Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner Thru
Negligence

FACTS
Alfredo Rodillas, a Patrolman of the Integrated National Police Force of Caloocan City,
was assigned with the jail section. On March 27, 1980, he was tasked with escorting
Zenaida Sacris Andres, a detention prisoner, to the Court of First Instance for trial.
During the proceedings, Rodillas allowed various liberties to the prisoner, such as
allowing her to talk to her husband and accompanying her to the comfort room, where
she eventually escaped through a window. Rodillas then made efforts to search for the
escapee but did not promptly report the incident to his superiors.

ISSUE
Whether Alfredo Rodillas is guilty of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner Thru
Negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that Alfredo Rodillas is guilty of Infidelity in the Custody of
Prisoner Thru Negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court held that the elements of the crime were present: Rodillas was a public
officer charged with the custody of a prisoner, and the prisoner escaped through his
negligence. The Court emphasized that the negligence referred to in the law is such
definite laxity that it amounts to deliberate non-performance of duty on the part of the
guard.

Rodillas' deviation from his duty by allowing liberties to the prisoner, such as having
lunch and going to the comfort room without proper supervision, constituted negligence.
Despite being aware of his responsibility to prevent escape, Rodillas failed to take
necessary precautions, allowing the escape to happen.

The Court rejected Rodillas' claim that the escape was a confluence of unforeseen
circumstances, emphasizing that he should have foreseen and guarded against such
events. His actions, or lack thereof, demonstrated a lack of prudence, diligence, and
common sense expected of a police officer.
Furthermore, Rodillas' failure to promptly report the escape and his subsequent
inadequate efforts to recapture the escapee exacerbated his negligence. The Court
emphasized the importance of strict measures against law officers entrusted with the
custody of prisoners to prevent further deterioration of peace and order.

The Court affirmed the decision of the Sandiganbayan, finding Alfredo Rodillas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner Thru Negligence under
Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code.

UNITED STATES V. BANDINO

G. R. 9964, February 11, 1915, TORRES, J.

Article 358 of the Philippine Penal Code, which prescribes punishment for public
officers guilty of connivance in the escape of a prisoner in their custody.

FACTS
The case revolves around the charge of faithlessness in the custody of prisoners
committed with reckless negligence against Leon Bandino, a municipal policeman in
Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines. Bandino was accused of permitting a prisoner,
Juan Lescano, under his care and guard in the municipal jail, to leave to purchase
cigarettes. Lescano took advantage of this opportunity to escape from custody.

Initially, a complaint was filed against Bandino, alleging that he allowed Lescano to
leave without proper supervision, resulting in his escape. However, a demurrer was
filed, arguing that there was no connivance between Bandino and Lescano, and
therefore, no crime was committed. The court initially sustained the demurrer and
dismissed the case.

The prosecution then filed a new complaint, asserting that Bandino permitted Lescano's
escape "in tacit connivance" with the prisoner. Bandino's defense subsequently filed
another demurrer, contending that the facts did not constitute a cause of action.

ISSUE
Whether Bandino's actions amounted to connivance, thereby making him liable for
faithlessness in the custody of prisoners.

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the prosecution, overturning the dismissal of the
case. The court emphasized the provision of Article 358 of the Penal Code, which
prescribes punishment for public officers guilty of connivance in the escape of prisoners
in their custody.

The court held that Bandino's actions, even if unintentional, constituted connivance
because he permitted Lescano to leave the jail, thereby providing an opportunity for
escape. While Bandino may not have directly facilitated the escape or had knowledge of
Lescano's intentions, his failure to exercise proper supervision amounted to connivance.
The court cited jurisprudence and legal principles, emphasizing that a custodian's
tolerance or acquiescence in a prisoner's escape, even if not deliberate, constitutes
connivance. It noted that the essence of the offense lies in the custodian's failure to
fulfill their duty to prevent escape, whether through intentional connivance or reckless
negligence.

Justice Carson, in a separate opinion, concurred with the decision but suggested that
the offense might warrant a lesser charge of negligence rather than outright
faithlessness. However, the majority upheld the charge of faithlessness based on
Bandino's failure to fulfill his duty as a custodian.

In conclusion, the court revoked the dismissal of the case and remanded it for further
proceedings in accordance with the law. Bandino was held liable for faithlessness in the
custody of prisoners due to his connivance in Lescano's escape.

TITLE SEVEN: CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Chapter 6: Other Offenses or Irregularities By Public Officers
Section 2: Anticipation, prolongation and abandonment of the duties and powers
of public office
No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By
1 Roxas v. People G. R. Nos. 223654-55 July 14, 2021 Flora, Arturo O.
 ROXAS V. PEOPLE
G. R. Nos. 223654-55, July 14, 2021, Justice Leonen

Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019),
particularly Section 3(e), and violation of Article 237 of the Revised Penal Code.
 FACTS
The case revolves around the alleged irregularities in the bidding process for a
government project in Pasay City, Philippines. Trinidad, the accused, reconvened the
defunct Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) despite the issuance of
Executive Order No. 10, series of 2003, which abolished the PBAC and constituted a
new Bids and Awards Committee (BAC). Despite this, the old PBAC continued to
conduct bidding activities and eventually awarded the contract for the project to Izumo
Contractors, Inc. The accused, including Roxas, were accused of giving unwarranted
benefits to Izumo Contractors, Inc. and prolonging their duties and powers as members
of the abolished PBAC in violation of the law.

ISSUE
Whether the accused, particularly Roxas, violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (Republic Act No. 3019) and Article 237 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING
The Sandiganbayan found Roxas guilty of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (Republic Act No. 3019), particularly Section 3(e), and Article 237 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, it is unlawful for a public official to cause
any undue injury to any party, including the government, or give any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence. The Sandiganbayan found that the accused, by reconvening
the defunct PBAC and awarding the contract to Izumo Contractors, Inc. despite the
issuance of Executive Order No. 10, series of 2003, gave unwarranted benefits,
advantage, and preference to the said contractor.

Furthermore, Article 237 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits public officers from
prolonging performance of duties and powers beyond the authorized period. The
Sandiganbayan found Roxas guilty of this offense, as he continued to perform duties as
a member of the abolished PBAC even after its dissolution through Executive Order No.
10, series of 2003.

The Sandiganbayan affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding Roxas guilty of the
offenses charged. The decision emphasizes that the Anti-Graft Law aims to prevent
public officials from causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving unwarranted benefits to private parties. Similarly, Article 237 of the Revised
Penal Code seeks to ensure that public officers do not prolong their powers beyond
their authorized period. The ruling underscores the importance of upholding integrity
and transparency in public procurement processes to safeguard public interest and
prevent corruption.

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

R.A. No. 8049 as amended by R.A. No. 11053

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 Dungo v. People G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
2 People v. Bayabos G.R. No. 171222 February 18, 2015 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
 DUNGO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015, MENDOZA, J

FACTS
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) finding the petitioners guilty of violation of the Anti-Hazing Law. The
petitioners, Dandy L. Dungo and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr., were charged with assaulting
and using personal violence upon Marlon Villanueva during an initiation rite of the Alpha
Phi Omega fraternity, resulting in Villanueva's death. The prosecution presented several
witnesses, including medical professionals who testified to the injuries sustained by
Villanueva and the cause of his death. The defense presented witnesses who testified
to the petitioners' alibi and their lack of involvement in the initiation rite.
Dungo testified that he arrived at his girlfriend's boarding house in the early afternoon of
January 13, 2006. They went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School and inquired about
the requirements for a master's degree. They then went to dinner and returned to the
boarding house. Later that night, Dungo received a call from Sibal asking for his help at
Villa Novaliches Resort. Dungo arrived at the resort and saw Villanueva unconscious.
They brought Villanueva to the hospital.
Gopez testified that he noticed Villanueva with bruises on his face during the initiation
rites. They went to Villa Novaliches Resort where Gopez instructed Sibal to take
Villanueva to the second floor. Gopez later decided to cancel the initiation rites and told
Sibal to stay with Villanueva and Castillo.
Sibal testified that he was at the fraternity's tambayan for the initiation rites. He saw
Villanueva with bruises on his face. They went to Villa Novaliches Resort where Sibal
accompanied Villanueva upstairs. After the other neophytes left, Sibal checked on
Villanueva's condition and called Dungo for help. They brought Villanueva to the
hospital.
The RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of violating the Anti-Hazing Law based on the
testimonies of witnesses and medical professionals. The CA affirmed the decision,
stating that the defense of denial and alibi failed to cast doubt on the positive
identification made by the prosecution witnesses.
ISSUE
The main issue in this case is whether the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of the Anti-Hazing Law.

RULING
The court held that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the petitioners
beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, including
medical professionals who examined the body of Villanueva and determined the cause
of his death, provided sufficient evidence to prove that the injuries sustained by
Villanueva were a result of hazing. The court also considered the testimonies of
witnesses who saw the petitioners at the scene of the initiation rite and their
involvement in the assault on Villanueva. The defense's alibi and lack of involvement in
the initiation rite were not given weight by the court, as they were contradicted by the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
 PEOPLE V. BAYABOS
G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015, SERENO, CJ

FACTS
The case involves the school authorities of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy
(PMMA) who were charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of a probationary
midshipman at the PMMA.
After months of investigation, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause
to charge the school authorities as accomplices to hazing.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a criminal case against the school authorities.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against the school authorities, stating that
since the case against the principal accused had already been dismissed, there were no
principal perpetrators with whom the school authorities could have cooperated in the
execution of the offense.
The Sandiganbayan also found that the Information filed against the school authorities
did not contain all the material averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice
to hazing.

ISSUE
1. Whether the prosecution of the school authorities for the crime of accomplice to
hazing can proceed despite the dismissal of the case against the principal
accused.
2. Whether the Information filed against the school authorities contains all the
material averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing.

RULING
1. The court agrees with the petitioner that the dismissal of the case against the
principal accused does not automatically dismiss the case against the school
 authorities. The trial of those charged as accomplices can proceed independently
of that of the alleged principal if the commission of the crime can be duly proven.
2. The court affirms the quashal of the Information against the school authorities.
The Information did not include all the material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing. It failed to allege that the purported acts were employed as
a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization, which is a crucial
element of the crime. Therefore, the Information must be quashed.

The dismissal of the case against the principal accused does not automatically dismiss
the case against the school authorities. The trial of those charged as accomplices can
proceed independently if the commission of the crime can be duly proven.
The Information filed against the school authorities did not contain all the material facts
constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing. It failed to allege that the purported acts
were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization, which is a
crucial element of the crime.

The Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the Information and the
dismissal of the case since the Special Prosecutor did not file a new information or
correct the defect by amendment after the motion to quash was sustained.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
PARRICIDE, MURDER, HOMICIDE

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 People vs Las Piñas, G.R. No. 00401 December 22, 2009 Flora, Arturo O.
 PEOPLE VS LAS PIÑAS
G.R. No. 00401, December 22, 2009, Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro

Articles 248 and 250 of the Revised Penal Code - the conviction of the accused-
appellants for murder and frustrated murder

FACTS
The case involves the brutal killing of Edgardo Aringo, Benjamin Aringo, and Carlito
Lasala, and the attempted murder of Roger, who miraculously survived the attack. The
incident occurred in the early morning of May 2, 2001, when a group of armed men,
including the accused-appellants, arrived at a fishpen where the victims were
sleeping/resting. Without warning, they opened fire, killing the three victims and
severely injuring Roger. The attack was swift and methodical, leaving the victims no
chance to defend themselves.

Roger, the sole survivor, positively identified the accused-appellants as among the
perpetrators of the crime. He recounted the events of that fateful night, detailing how
each victim was shot and killed, and how he himself was left for dead after being shot
multiple times. During the trial, the accused-appellants raised defenses of denial and
alibi, claiming they were elsewhere at the time of the incident. However, their defenses
were weak and were brushed aside due to Roger's positive identification and the lack of
evidence supporting their alibi.

ISSUE
Whether the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
frustrated murder as charged.

RULING
The Court affirmed the convictions of the accused-appellants for murder and frustrated
murder. The main provision of law applied in this case is Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code for murder and Article 250 for frustrated murder.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is defined as the killing of another
person with certain attendant circumstances, such as treachery, which was present in
this case. The Court found that the killings were indeed attended by treachery, as the
victims were caught off guard and unable to defend themselves.

Moreover, the Court upheld the finding of conspiracy among the accused-appellants,
noting that their joint actions before, during, and after the commission of the crime
indicated a common purpose and concerted action. Conspiracy was inferred from their
conduct and the manner in which they perpetrated the killings.

For the crime of murder, the Court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count, in accordance with Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code. Additionally, the
Court increased the civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the victims' heirs, as
well as awarded exemplary damages, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

In the case of frustrated murder, the Court affirmed the conviction but adjusted the
penalty imposed. The indeterminate penalty was set at eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.

Furthermore, the Court awarded moral and exemplary damages to the survivor, Roger,
and imposed legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of the decision until fully paid. The Court found the
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and frustrated murder,
affirmed their convictions, and modified the penalties and damages awarded
accordingly, applying the relevant provisions of the Revised Penal Code and prevailing
jurisprudence.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
PHYSICAL INJURIES
No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By
1 Li v. People G.R. No. 127962 April14, 2004 Flora, Arturo O.
 LI V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 127962, April14, 2004,

Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code governs the definition and punishment of slight
physical injuries.

FACTS
The case revolves around a street brawl that occurred on April 19, 1993, involving four
individuals: Kingstone Li, Eduardo Sangalang, Christopher Arugay, and a certain Tan.
The altercation ensued after Li assaulted Arugay with a baseball bat, which prompted
Arugay to retaliate by striking Li with a bolo. Subsequently, Sangalang intervened and
fatally stabbed Arugay multiple times. Tan, another participant, also struck Li with the
baseball bat after he was incapacitated by Arugay's blow.

ISSUE
Whether Kingstone Li can be held criminally liable for the homicide of Christopher
Arugay, and whether conspiracy between Li and Sangalang was established beyond a
reasonable doubt.

RULING
In its ruling, the court acquitted Kingstone Li of the charge of Homicide due to lack of
evidence beyond reasonable doubt. However, Li was found guilty of the crime of
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, as defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of slight physical injuries shall
be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the
offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from
engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance.

Considering that petitioner has been incarcerated well-beyond the period of the penalty
herein imposed, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause petitioner’s
IMMEDIATE RELEASE, unless petitioner is being lawfully held for another cause, and
to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the
compliance with such order.
 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
R.A. No. 9208

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 People v. Ramirez G.R. No. 217978 August 2, 2017 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
2 PEOPLE v. XXX G.R. No. 235652 July 09, 2018 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
3 People v. Mora G.R. No. 242682 July 1, 2019 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
4 Arambullo v. People G.R. No. 241834 July 24, 2019 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
R.A. No. 9208 - AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES TO ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN.
PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE.
NECESSARY INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND.
SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS.

PEOPLE V. RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 217978, August 2, 2017, LEONEN, J.

FACTS
The case involves accused-appellant Nancy Lasaca Ramirez, also known as "ZOY" or
"SOY," who was found guilty of violating Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4 (e), as
qualified by Section 6 (a). The case was initially heard in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Lapu-Lapu City, where Ramirez was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment
and a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). She was also ordered to pay moral
damages of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) and exemplary damages of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) to each of the minor victims, AAA and
BBB.

ISSUE
Whether accused-appellant Ramirez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4 (e), as qualified by Section 6 (a).

RULING
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant Ramirez. The
Supreme Court, in turn, affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modification.
Ramirez was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Republic Act No. 9208,
Section 4 (e), as qualified by Section 6 (a). She was sentenced to life imprisonment and
a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). Additionally, she was ordered to pay moral
damages of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) and exemplary damages of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) to each of the minor victims, AAA and
BBB.

The court based its decision on Republic Act No. 9208, which prohibits acts of
trafficking in persons. Section 4 (e) of the law specifically makes it unlawful to maintain
or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography. The court found that
Ramirez's actions fell within the scope of this provision.

The court also cited previous jurisprudence, particularly the case of People v. Casio,
which held that moral damages and exemplary damages should be imposed in cases of
trafficking in persons. The court reasoned that the crime of trafficking in persons as a
prostitute is worse than seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts, thus
justifying the award of moral damages. Exemplary damages are imposed when the
crime is aggravated, as in this case.
 PEOPLE V. XXX
G.R. No. 235652, July 09, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J

FACTS
This case involves accused-appellants XXX and YYY who were charged with multiple
counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Republic Act No. 9208, also known as
the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003." The charges stemmed from the
exploitation of their minor children, AAA, BBB, and CCC, through cybersex activities.
The prosecution presented evidence showing that accused-appellants conspired and
confederated with each other to maintain and exploit their children for the purpose of
prostitution and pornography. The children testified that they were ordered by their
parents to engage in cybersex with foreigners through various websites, where they
were made to perform sexual activities in front of the computer. The children claimed
that the earnings from these activities were used for their family's expenses.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of four counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons and sentenced them to life
imprisonment and a fine for each count. The RTC dismissed other charges against
them as they were deemed subsumed under the crimes for which they were convicted.
Accused-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed their
conviction but modified YYY's conviction to three counts of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons. The CA also increased the awards of damages for the victims.

ISSUE
The main issue before the court was whether accused-appellants were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges against them.

RULING
The court based its ruling on the testimonies of the children-victims, which were found
to be credible and consistent. The court emphasized that the children positively
identified accused-appellants as the ones who ordered them to engage in cybersex
activities. The court also noted that the children provided clear and straightforward
explanations of the sexual exploitation they experienced, which further strengthened
their credibility.
The court also considered the lack of ill motive for the children to testify against their
own parents. The court found no reason for the children to falsely accuse their parents
of such heinous crimes, especially considering the emotional and psychological trauma
they had endured.
Furthermore, the court upheld the penalties imposed by the RTC, as provided for under
Section 10 (c) of Republic Act No. 9208. The court affirmed that accused-appellants
should be sentenced to life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of not less than
P2,000,000.00 but not more than P5,000,000.00 for each count of Qualified Trafficking
in Persons.
The court also considered the need to provide just compensation to the victims. The
court increased the awards of damages for the victims, taking into account the gravity of
the offenses committed against them. The court deemed the amounts of P500,000.00
as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons to be appropriate and in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
 PEOPLE V. MORA
G.R. No. 242682, July 1, 2019, PERLAS-BERNABE, J

FACTS
The case involves accused-appellant Nerissa Mora a.k.a. Neri Balagta Mora (Mora)
who filed an appeal against the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicting her and her co-accused, Maria
Salome Polvoriza (Polvoriza), of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Republic Act No.
9208. The case stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC, charging Mora and
Polvoriza of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The prosecution claimed that
Mora and Polvoriza conspired to take a minor victim, AAA, to a videoke bar where she
was forced to work as a sex worker. Mora and Polvoriza denied the charges and
presented their own defenses.

ISSUE
whether or not Mora's conviction for Qualified Trafficking in Persons should be upheld.

RULING
The Court ruled that Mora's appeal is without merit and affirmed her conviction for
Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The Court held that the prosecution had successfully
established the elements of the crime charged, including the fact that Mora and
Polvoriza conspired to take AAA to the videoke bar and forced her to work as a sex
worker. The Court also rejected Mora and Polvoriza's claim that AAA voluntarily
presented herself to work at the bar, emphasizing that consent is immaterial in cases of
human trafficking, especially when the victim is a minor. The Court upheld the penalty of
life imprisonment and a fine of P2,000,000.00 imposed by the lower courts, as well as
the award of moral and exemplary damages to AAA.
 ARAMBULLO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 241834, July 24, 2019, PERLAS-BERNABE, J

FACTS
The RTC and CA convicted Fernando B. Arambulo for the crime of Qualified Trafficking
in Persons. petitioner and his minor son, Dominique Dimple Arambulo9 (Dominique),
invited the latter's three (3) schoolmates who were also minors, namely AAA, BBB, and
CCC, 10 to their house sometime in 2011. It was then revealed that the purpose of the
meeting was to discuss petitioner's plans to commit robberies with the help of AAA,
BBB, and CCC. Upon learning about this, CCC expressed his desire to leave but
petitioner got angry and punched him; thus, he was forced to join the group. AAA, BBB,
and CCC then similarly testified that not only was petitioner the mastermind of the
series of robberies they subsequently committed against various people, but he was
also the driver of their getaway tricycle.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for Qualified Trafficking in
Persons.

RULING
Yes. Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the
"recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without
the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat
or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power
or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." The same
provision further provides that "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in
persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph." The crime becomes qualified when any of the circumstances found under
Section 6 of the law is present.
 CRIMES AGAINST SECURITY
ABANDONMENT OF HELPLESS PERSONS AND EXPOLITATION OF MINORS

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 People v. Bandian G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936 Flora, Arturo O.
 PEOPLE V. BANDIAN
G.R. No. 45186, September 30, 1936, Diaz, J.

Article 12, Revised Penal Code - Exempting circumstances, which delineates various
exempting circumstances absolving individuals from criminal liability. Specifically, the
case pertains to the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances outlined in Article 12.

FACTS
Josefina Bandian was accused of infanticide after giving birth and allegedly abandoning
her newborn child, resulting in its death. On the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin
Aguilar, a neighbor, witnessed Bandian emerging from a thicket with blood-stained
clothes, visibly weak and dizzy. He helped her back to her house where she was found
to be bleeding profusely. Shortly after, Adriano Comcom discovered the body of a
newborn child near the thicket. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, who examined Bandian,
concluded that she gave birth in her house, threw the child into the thicket, and admitted
to killing the child. However, it was found during autopsy that the child's wounds were
caused by animal bites, not human intervention. Bandian, being unaware of her delivery
due to fever and weakness, claimed she had no intention to harm or abandon her child.

ISSUE
Whether Josefina Bandian is criminally liable for infanticide or abandonment of a minor
under Article 276 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING
The court ruled in favor of Josefina Bandian, acquitting her of the charges of infanticide
or abandonment of a minor. The ruling was based on the application of the fourth and
seventh exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates various exempting circumstances that
absolve an individual from criminal liability. The fourth exempting circumstance states
that any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it, is exempt from criminal liability.
Meanwhile, the seventh exempting circumstance applies to those who fail to perform an
act required by law when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause.

In this case, Bandian's actions were deemed to fall under the fourth and seventh
exempting circumstances. She was found to be unaware of her delivery due to her
feverish and weak state, thus causing the accidental abandonment of her child in the
thicket. As she had no knowledge of her childbirth and did not deliberately intend to
abandon her child, she cannot be held criminally liable for infanticide or abandonment of
a minor. Additionally, her debility and dizziness constituted insuperable impediments
that prevented her from fulfilling any duty imposed by law regarding the care and
protection of her child.

Therefore, in accordance with Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, Josefina Bandian
was acquitted of all charges and ordered to be released immediately.
 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
ROBBERY BY THE USE OF FORCE UPON THINGS

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 People v. Lopez G.R. No. L-18766 May 20, 1965 Flora, Arturo O.
 PEOPLE V. LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-18766, May 20, 1965, Bengzon, J.P.,

Article 304 of the Revised Penal Code - Possession of picklocks or similar tools.
Under Article 304, it is stated that any person who, without lawful cause, possesses
picklocks or similar tools specially adapted for the commission of robbery shall be
subject to punishment. The severity of the punishment ranges from arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.

FACTS
On December 21, 1960, in Bacuag, Surigao del Norte, the Chief of Police apprehended
three suspicious individuals in possession of various items, including firearms,
flashlights, false keys, and other tools. Among the items confiscated were seven false
keys, one of which was identified as a picklock or master key. The accused individuals,
namely Ramon Lopez, Manuel Buico, and Arturo Caniete, were charged with illegal
possession of firearms and illegal possession of false keys.

Manuel Buico and Arturo Caniete pleaded guilty to the charges. However, Ramon
Lopez pleaded not guilty and stood trial. During the trial, Lopez moved to dismiss the
case on the grounds that the facts alleged in the information did not constitute an
offense. He argued that an essential element of illegal possession of false keys, namely
the keys being "specially adapted to the commission of the crime of robbery," was not
adequately alleged.

ISSUE
Whether the information sufficiently alleged the offense of illegal possession of false
keys.
 RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the prosecution and set aside the order quashing
the information.

Article 304 of the Revised Penal Code states that possession of picklocks or similar
tools, specially adapted to the commission of the crime of robbery, is punishable. The
crime of illegal possession of picklocks or similar tools has two elements: possession of
such tools specially adapted to robbery and possession without lawful cause.

The information in this case alleged that the accused possessed seven false keys, one
of which was a picklock or master key, without lawful cause. While the information did
not explicitly state that the picklock was "specially adapted to the commission of
robbery," the Court held that such a description was unnecessary.

A picklock, by its nature, is a tool used in picking locks and is thus inherently adapted to
the commission of robbery. The Court reasoned that since picking locks is one way to
gain entrance to commit robbery, a picklock is per se specially adapted to robbery.
Therefore, the omission of the specific description in the information did not invalidate
the charge.

Additionally, the term "false keys" as used in the information was held to be sufficient to
encompass tools mentioned in Article 304, which includes picklocks. Article 305 of the
Revised Penal Code defines "false keys" to include the tools mentioned in the
preceding article, i.e., picklocks or similar tools adapted to robbery.

Therefore, the Court concluded that both elements of the crime were clearly alleged in
the information. The order quashing the information was set aside, and the case was
remanded for further trial.
 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
SWINDLING AND OTHER DECEITS
No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By
1 Osorio v. People G.R. No. 207711 July 2, 2018 Flora, Arturo O.
 OSORIO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 207711, July 2, 2018, Leonen, J.

Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code - pertains to "Other deceits" not covered under
Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the same code. It states: "Other deceits. - The penalty of
arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not
more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or
damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this
chapter." This provision essentially serves as a catch-all clause to cover forms of deceit
that are not explicitly outlined in the preceding articles of the Revised Penal Code
related to swindling (estafa). It ensures that individuals who engage in fraudulent
activities not specifically addressed in the law can still be held accountable under the
legal framework.

FACTS
The case involves Maria C. Osorio, who was charged with estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Osorio, posing as an agent of the Philippine
American Life and General Insurance Company (Philam Life), induced Josefina O.
Gabriel to invest ₱200,000.00 with the promise of a 20% annual interest. However,
Osorio diverted Gabriel's investment to another company, Philippine Money Investment
Asset Management (PMIAM), without her consent. This led to the lapsing of Gabriel's
insurance policies. Osorio was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court but
appealed the decision.

ISSUE
Whether Osorio's acts constitute estafa as defined and punished under Article 315(2)(a)
of the Revised Penal Code

RULING
The court affirmed Osorio's conviction but modified the ruling. It held that while Osorio's
actions did not precisely fit the elements of estafa under Article 315(2)(a), she could still
be held criminally liable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, which covers
"Other deceits" not mentioned in previous articles.

In the ruling, it was emphasized that although Osorio did not use a fictitious name or
falsely pretend to possess certain qualifications, she misrepresented to Gabriel that her
money would be invested in Philam Life, inducing her to part with her funds. This
misrepresentation led to damages suffered by Gabriel, as her insurance policies lapsed
due to the investment diversion.

Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code imposes penalties for deceits other than those
specified in Articles 315, 316, and 317. The elements for conviction under Article 318
include making a false pretense or fraudulent act, executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud, resulting in damage or prejudice to the offended party.

Therefore, the court convicted Osorio of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code. She was sentenced to two (2) months and one (1) day to four (4) months
of arresto mayor in its medium period and ordered to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00. This
ruling was based on the principle that an accused may be convicted of an offense
proved if it is included in the charge, even if not explicitly mentioned, as long as the
elements of the offense proved also constitute one of the elements of the offense
charged.

In conclusion, while Osorio's actions did not precisely fit the definition of estafa under
Article 315(2)(a), they still constituted a deceit under Article 318, warranting her
conviction and the corresponding penalties imposed by law.
 CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
R.A. No. 3019 - Section 3(e)

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 Reyes v. People G.R. No. 177105 August 12 2010 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
Rolando e. Sison vs. People of G.R. Nos. 170339, Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
2 the March 9, 2010
Philippines 170398-403

Franklin p. Bautista Tunggol, Jennilyn P.

Vs. Sandiganbayan (third
3 Division), office of the G.R. No. 136082 May 12, 2000
Ombudsman and people Of the
Philippine
Roberto p. Fuentes Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
4 GR No. 186421 April 17, 2017
V. People
 CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

R.A. No. 3019 - Section 3(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

REYES V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 177105, August 12 2010, BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS
Belen Lopez Vda. de Guia (Belen) was the registered absolute owner of two parcels of
agricultural land with an area of 197,594 square meters located in Santa Barbara,
Baliwag, Bulacan.

On March 19, 1975, Belen's son, Carlos de Guia (Carlos), forged a deed of sale, in
which he made it appear that his mother had sold the land to him. Consequently, the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled TCT No. 209298 by virtue of the forged deed of
sale and issued TCT No. 210108 in Carlos' name.

On March 20, 1975, Carlos sold the land to Ricardo San Juan (Ricardo). On the same
date, Ricardo registered the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
Subsequently, Ricardo mortgaged the land to Simeon Yangco
Upon learning of the transfers of her land, Belen filed on December 20, 1975 an
adverse claim in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.

On May 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed two information’s in the
Sandiganbayan, one charging the petitioner with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
and the other with usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal
Code,

ISSUE
Whether the petitioner was guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in rendering his
decision in DARAB CASE NO. 034 BUL'88

RULING
The mitigating circumstance of old age under Article 13 (2) of the Revised Penal Code
applied only when the offender was over 70 years at the time of the commission of the
offense. The petitioner, being only 63 years old when he committed the offenses
charged, was not entitled to such mitigating circumstance.

Under Section 9 of RA 3019, the penalty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is
imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than 15 years, and
perpetual disqualification from public office. Pursuant to Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by a special law, the accused is punished with
an indeterminate sentence the maximum of which does not exceed the maximum fixed
by the law violated, and the minimum is not less than the minimum term prescribed by
the law violated.

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 24655, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed on the
petitioner the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one
month, as minimum, to 10 years as maximum. The penalty of perpetual disqualification
from public office was also correctly imposed.
 OLANDO E. SISON V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 170339, 170398-403, March 9, 2010, CORONA, J.

FACTS
On July 18, 1994, state auditor Elsa E. Paragon conducted a post-audit investigation
which revealed that during petitioner Rolando E. Sison’s incumbency as municipal
mayor of Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro, no public bidding was conducted for the
purchase of a Toyota Land Cruiser, one hundred nineteen (119) bags of Fortune
cement, an electric generator set, certain construction materials, two (2) Desert
Dueler tires, and a computer and its accessories. Pajayon also found out that
there were irregularities in the documents supporting the acquisitions. Along with
Municipal Treasurer Rigoberto de Jesus, petitioner was indicted before the
Sandiganbayan in seven (7) separate Informations for 7 counts of violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019to which the petitioner pleaded not guilty. Accused de Jesus has
remained at large. During the presentation of evidence, the petitioner was called to the
witness stand where he admitted that no public bidding was conducted and that the
purchases were done through personal canvass. He further stated that no public
bidding could be conducted because all the dealers of the items were based in Manila; it
was useless to invite bidders since nobody would bid anyway.The Sandiganbayan
found petitioner guilty as charged. A warrant of arrest was also issued against de
Jesus. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, praying for an acquittal because his
guilt was not allegedly proven beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE
 Whether or not petitioner is guilty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 when,
during his incumbency as municipal mayor, personal canvass instead of a public
bidding was effected by the petitioner for the purchase of the items.

RULING
Yes, the petitioner is guilty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for effecting
a personal canvass instead of a public bidding for the purchase of a Toyota
LandCruiser, 119 bags of Fortune cement, an electric generator set, certain
construction materials, 2 Desert Dueler tires, and a computer and its accessories. To
be found guilty under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the following elements must concur:
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official,
administrative or judicial functions;

3. The act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
4. The public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
It is undisputed that the first two elements are present in the case at bar. The
third element may be committed in three ways, i.e., through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in
connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3 (e) is enough to convict.
Bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong. It is a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will,
and partakes of the nature of fraud. In this case, the petitioner’s admission that the
canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the suppliers already contained his
signatures and that he knew about the provisions of RA 7160 on personal
canvass but he did not follow the law because he was merely following the
practice of his predecessors was an admission of a mindless disregard for the law in
a tradition of illegality, which is truly unacceptable. As municipal mayor, he
should have been the first to follow the law and see to it that it was followed
by his constituency to assure the public that despotic, irregular or unlawful
transactions in the acquisition of government items do not occur. Lastly, the fact that
the petitioner repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of RA 7160 on personal
canvass proves that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given to the
winning suppliers.

FRANKLIN P. BAUTISTA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), OFFICE OF

THE OMBUDSMAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
G.R. No. 136082, May 12, 2000, BELLOSILLO, J.

FACTS
Petitioner Franklin P. Bautista, incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Malita, Davao del
Sur, was charged for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019. The letter-complaint,
which was prepared by the Contractors Association of Davao del Sur and
initiated by the Good Government Employees of Davao del Sur,alleged, among
others, that petitioner caused the hiring of one hundred and ninety-two (192) casual
employees in the municipal government for political considerations and that the
payment of their honoraria and salaries was charged to the peace and order fund of the
municipality.Despite arguing in his counter-affidavit that the hiring of 192casual
employees and the use of the peace and order fund for their honoraria and
salaries did not justify the charges filed against him, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO
II) Corazon A. Arancon, in his Resolution, found a prima facie case for violation of
Sec. 3, par. (e) of RA 3019, which was approved by the Ombudsman. An
Information for such violation was filed against the petitioner before the
Sandiganbayan, which read –
The abovenamed accused, a high ranking public officer, being the
Mayor, Municipality of Malita, Davao del Sur, while in the performance of his
official functions, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in
 relation to his office, with manifest partiality, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally caused the hiring of some one hundred ninety-two
(192) casual employees in flagrant disregard of Secs. 288 and 289 of the
Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM), the honoraria and
salaries of whom were charged to the peace and order fund and to the project
component and other services activity fund, respectively and which represented
72.5% of the total personnel services expenditures, thereby giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to the said casuals,
causing undue injury to the Municipality of Malita.

Petitioner filed a Motionto Quash the Information, stating that the acts charged
did not constitute the offense indicated in Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, and that
more than one (1) offense was charged in the Information –the giving of unwarranted
benefits, advantage and preference to the casual employees in question and causing
undue injury to the Municipality. The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion by stating that
all the essential elements for the crime charged were sufficiently alleged in the
Information which charged only 1 offense.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the petitioner’s Motion to Quash
the Information despite the fact that there were two (2) offenses charged, and as such,
should be charged in separate Information’s.

RULING
No, the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying the petitioner’s Motion to Quash the
Information since the latter was only charged with 1 offense. There were two (2) ways
of violating Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, namely (a) by causing undue injury to any
party, including the Government, and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that
either act qualifies as a violation, or as different modes of committing the offense
(Santiago v. Garchitorena). This does not indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct
offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under
both.For hiring 192 casuals and the charging of their honoraria and salaries to the
peace and order fund, the petitioner gave them unwarranted benefits, advantage
and preference andcaused undue injury to the Municipality of Malita; or thereby caused
undue injury to the Municipality of Malita. In either case, the Information will not suffer
any defect, as it is clear that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 3 par. (e), of
RA 3019, as amended, with either mode of commission obtaining or with both manners
of violation concurring.

ROBERTO P. FUENTES v. PEOPLE

GR No. 186421, April 17, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS
Roberto P. Fuentes, former Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte, was charged with violating
Article 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The charge was based on Fuentes' refusal to renew the business permit of Fe N.
Valenzuela, the operator of Triple A Ship Chandling and General Maritime Services,
without any legal basis.
Valenzuela had been operating her business since 1993 and had complied with all the
requirements for the renewal of her business permit.
Fuentes' refusal to renew the permit caused Valenzuela to suffer undue injury, as her
business operations were suspended from 2002 to 2006.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Fuentes of the crime of violation
of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

RULING
The Court based its ruling on the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The Court found that Fuentes, as a public officer, acted with
manifest partiality and evident bad faith in refusing to renew Valenzuela's business
permit. Fuentes' refusal caused undue injury to Valenzuela, as it prevented her from
operating her business for several years. The Court clarified that the power to suspend,
revoke, or refuse to issue business permits must be exercised with due process and
based on valid grounds. In this case, Fuentes failed to observe due process and did not
have valid grounds to refuse the renewal of Valenzuela's business permit. Therefore,
the Court affirmed Fuentes' conviction and the corresponding penalty imposed by the
Sandiganbayan.

DANGEROUS DRUGS
R.A. No. 9165 as amended by R.A. No. 10640: The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

Social Justice Society v.
1 G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
Dangerous Drugs Board
2 People v. Sullano G.R. NO. 228373 March 12, 2018 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
3 People v. Laba G.R. NO. 199938 January 28, 2013 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
4 Estipona v. Lobrigo G.R. NO. 226679 August 15, 2017 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
5 People v. Romy lim G.R. NO. 231989 September 4, 2018 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
6 People v. Romy lim G.R. NO. 231989 November 13, 2018 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
Bert Pascua y Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
7 GR No. 250578 September 07, 2020
Valdez v. People
8 Nisperos v. People G.R. NO. 250927 November 29, 2022 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
9 People v. Almayda G.R. NO. 227706 June 14, 2023 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10640 - AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-
DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
"COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

Section 1. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the

"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002", is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
"(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody
over said items.

"(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by
the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the
subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the
completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall
be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall
be issued immediately upon completion of the said examination and certification;
 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS
Petitioner Social Justice Society asserts the constitutionality of Sections 36 (c), (d), (f),
and (g) of Republic Act No 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Section 36 requires mandatory drug testing for (c) students in secondary and tertiary
levels; (d) officers and employees of public and private offices; (f) persons who are
charged with offenses with a penalty not less than six (6) years and one (1) day of
imprisonment; and (g) public officers who are candidates for appointive or elective
office. Petitioner asserts that the said provisions are constitutionally infirm for having
undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools
and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. They also claim that the other
provisions in question violate the equal protection clause the right against unreasonable
searches.

ISSUE
 Whether or not paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is
unconstitutional.

RULING
YES AND NO. The Supreme Court held that paragraphs (c) and (d) are
CONSTITUTIONAL while paragraphs (f) and (g) are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Paragraph (c) was held to be constitutional because schools and their administrators
stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have
contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision
of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty
to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures
as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right
to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-
discriminatory.

For paragraph (d), Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the
Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high
standard of ethics in the public service.

For paragraphs (f) and (g), this was declared unconstitutional because the operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless”. In the
case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicion less. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicion less are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.
They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
 PEOPLE V. SULLANO
G.R. NO. 228373, MARCH 12, 2018, GESMUNDO, J

FACTS
Appellant PO1 Sullano was randomly selected among the 50 police officers to be part
ofthe mandatory random drug testing. He then tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride of informally known as “shabu”. He was then charged with violation of
Sec15, Article II of RA 9165. Appellant pleaded not guilty then trial then ensued. After
the prosecution rested its case, appellant then filed for demurrer to evidence, which the
lower court granted. The RTC dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. The
prosecution filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied. This was then
appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
The prosecution contends that since appellant tested positive for shabu, he should then
be convicted for the same under Sec 15. Appellant argues that in order to be convicted
under Section 15, one must be either apprehended or arrested. In his case, he was
neither apprehended nor arrested as he was only subject to a mandatory random drug
test.

ISSUE
Whether or not appellant is guilty for violation of Section 15, Article II of RA 9165.

RULING
NO. The Supreme Court held that Section 15, Article II of RA 9165 requires the
apprehension or arrest of a person for the latter to be considered as violating the
provision. As stated, several factors militate against petitioner's construction of the
phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" appearing in Section 15. It is likewise
important to note that the allegations in the information against respondent clearly state
that he is only being prosecuted for Section 15 and nowhere in the information was it
stated that it should, be read in relation to Section 36. To make the provision applicable
to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is
tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
courts’ decision.

PEOPLE V. LABA
G.R. NO. 199938, JANUARY 28, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J

FACTS
On July 18, 2005, at around 10:45 in the morning, appellant arrived at the Manila
Domestic Airport in Pasay City to take his flight bound for Davao City. When he
approached the initial check-in area, Mark Anthony Villocillo, a non-uniformed
personnelfrisker assigned thereat, physically searched the person of appellant and
suspected thatthe the latter’s oversized white rubber shoes, with the identifying mark
“Spicer” seemed to contain what felt like rice. Upon inspection of the rubber shoes, the
former discoveredthree (3) plastic sachets containing shabu. A total of 196.63 grams of
white crystalline substance, the same tested positive for shabu were seized. Appellant
was then chargedand convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for the
transport of illegal drugs. Appellant appealed to the CA but denied the petition. Hence,
this petition. Appellant argues that he should not be convicted for the transport of illegal
drugs as he was only in the attempt of doing so as he was about to board his flight en
route to Davao City.

ISSUE
Whether or not appellant’s argument is meritorious.

RULING
NO. The term “Transport” as defined under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean
“to carry or convey from one place to another”. The essential element of the charge is
the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. In this case, appellant
was apprehended inside the airport, as he was intending to board his flight bound for
Davao City with a substantial amount or 196.63 grams of methyl amphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu in his possession, concealed in separate plastic bags inside his
oversized Spicer rubber shoes. While it may be argued that appellant was yet to board
the aircraft or travel some distance with the illegal drugs in his possession, it cannot be
denied that his presence at the airport at that particular instance was for the purpose of
transporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another. The Supreme
Court upheld the lower courts’ conviction against appellant.
 ESTIPONA V. LOBRIGO
G.R. NO. 226679, AUGUST 15, 2017, PERALTA, J.

FACTS
Petitioner Salvador Estipona Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of
RA9165 for having been caught with his possession 0.084 grams of shabu. Petitioner
filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter Into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying
to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No.9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus
and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of
his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in
his possession. Respondent Judge issued an Order denying Estipona’s motion.
Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
petition.Petitioner asserts that Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining in
violation of the said law, is unconstitutional for being violative of the petitioner’s right to
the equal protection of the law. Petitioner also asserts that the said provision is also
unconstitutional as in encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules of procedure.

ISSUE
Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause and for encroaching upon the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate its own rules of procedure.

RULING
YES. Matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of
substantial and transcendental importance are present. While the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional
design,vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts
belongs exclusively to this Court.

PEOPLE V. ROMY LIM

G.R. NO. 231989, SEPTEMBER 4, 2018, PERALTA, J.

FACTS
Appellant Romy Lim was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA
9165 after a buy-bust operation was conducted by the Regional Office X of the PDEA.
After trial, he was then convicted for violation of both provisions of the same law. He
then appealed to the CA but affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition. Appellant
claims that the chain of custody rule was not strictly followed as there was an absence
of an elected public official and representatives of the DOJ and the media to witness the
physical inventory and photograph of the seized items. Their signatures alsodo not
appear in the Inventory Receipt.
 ISSUE
Whether or not appellant Romy Lim should be acquitted for the failure of the
apprehending officers to strictly follow the chain of custody rule.

RULING
YES. It must be alleged an proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the
physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to
reasons such as (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a
remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs
was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any persons acting
for and in his/her behalf. Earnest efforts to secure the attendance of the necessary
witnesses must be proven. In this case, PO1 Orellan testified that no members of the
media and barangay officials arrived at the crime scene because it was late at night
andit was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house. PO2 Orcales
similarly declared that the inventory was made in the PDEA office considering that it
was late in the evening and there were no available media representative and barangay
officials despite their effort to contact them. He admitted that there are times when they
do not inform the barangay officials prior to their operation as they might leak the
confidential information. We are of the view that these justifications are unacceptable as
there was no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law. Appellant Romy Lim
was then acquitted and the Supreme Court ordered his release
 PEOPLE V. ROMY LIM
G.R. NO. 231989, NOVEMBER 13, 2018, PERALTA, J.

FACTS
A letter was sent by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) requesting for a
more detailed and precise guideline on the ruling of People v. Romy Lim, G.R. No.
231989, 4 September 2018. The letter also claims that since the promulgation of the
said case, there had been an alarming increase in the number of dismissals or
acquittals made with undue haste premised on the said ruling, apparently requiring
three (3) witnesses to be present during the conduct of the physical inventory and the
taking of the photographs of pieces of drug evidence seized from a drug suspect
 ISSUE
Whether or not the Supreme Court shall grant the request letter of the PDEA

RULING
NO. The Court noted the letter request sent by the PDEA but denied the request for a
detailed and more precise guideline of the ruling. The Supreme Court clarified that
contrary to the claim of PDEA, the ruling laid down on Lim does not always require three
(3) witnesses to be present during the conduct of the physical inventory and taking of
photographs of the seized dangerous drugs.

BERT PASCUA Y VALDEZ v. PEOPLE

GR No. 250578, September 07, 2020, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS
Petitioner Bert Pascua y Valdez challenges the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
upholding the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga City, Bataan.
Pascua was charged with violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
Pascua initially pleaded not guilty but later filed a motion to enter into a plea bargaining
agreement, offering to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article
II.
The prosecution opposed this motion, arguing that the State's consent is necessary for
the accused to plead to a lesser offense.
The RTC granted Pascua's motion and allowed him to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser
offense.
Pascua then applied for probation, but the RTC declared him ineligible for probation.
Pascua filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC correctly declared Pascua ineligible for probation after pleading
guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act.

RULING
The petition has partial merit.
The Court found that the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC in declaring Pascua ineligible for probation.
The Court clarified that the eligibility for probation is based on the offense to which the
accused is ultimately found guilty of, not the offense charged in the Information.
Therefore, even if Pascua was originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II,
the judgment would be for the lesser offense to which he pled guilty.
However, the Court emphasized that this ruling does not automatically make Pascua
eligible for probation.
The grant or denial of probation will still be within the discretion of the RTC, based on
the criteria laid down in the Probation Law.
 NISPEROS V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 250927, NOVEMBER 29, 2022, LEONEN,J.

FACTS
Nisperos was charged with violating Republic Act No. 9165, the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640. This charge was based
on the discovery of illegal drugs in Nisperos' possession during a police operation. The
prosecution presented evidence indicating that Nisperos was found with a significant
quantity of illegal drugs, suggesting an intent to sell or distribute them.

ISSUE
The main issue revolved around whether Nisperos could be held accountable for
violating Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640, particularly
regarding the illegal possession and trafficking of dangerous drugs.

RULING
The court found Nisperos guilty of violating Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by
Republic Act No. 10640. Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, it was
established beyond a reasonable doubt that Nisperos was in possession of illegal drugs
with the intent to sell or distribute them, thereby contravening the provisions of the law.
Consequently, Nisperos was likely subjected to the appropriate penalties prescribed
under the said law for the offense committed.

PEOPLE V. ALMAYDA
G.R. NO. 227706, JUNE 14, 2023, N/A

FACTS
Almayda was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640.
The charge against Almayda stemmed from the discovery and confiscation of illegal
drugs in his possession during a police operation.
During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence establishing that Almayda was
found in possession of a significant quantity of illegal drugs, which he intended to sell or
distribute.
 ISSUE
The main issue before the court was whether Almayda should be found guilty of
violating Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640, specifically
the provisions related to the illegal possession and trafficking of dangerous drugs.

RULING
The court found Almayda guilty of violating Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by
Republic Act No. 10640. Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, it was
established beyond reasonable doubt that Almayda was indeed in possession of illegal
drugs with the intent to sell or distribute them, thus violating the provisions of the law.
Consequently, the court likely imposed the appropriate penalties prescribed under the
said law for the offense committed by Almayda.

CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER, PUBLIC INTEREST, AND CIVIL STATUS

R.A. No. 10175

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

DISINI vs SECRETARY
1 G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
OF JUSTICE
 CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER, PUBLIC INTEREST, AND CIVIL STATUS

R.A. No. 10175- AN ACT DEFINING CYBERCRIME, PROVIDING FOR THE

PREVENTION, \INVESTIGATION, SUPPRESSION AND THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014, ABAD, J.

FACTS
Several petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
The petitioners included individuals, organizations, and lawmakers, and they brought
the case against various government officials.
The main issue raised in the case is whether certain provisions of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act violate the constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expression.
The petitioners argued that the provisions were overbroad and vague, and that they had
a chilling effect on protected expression.

ISSUE
Whether certain provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the constitutional
rights to freedom of speech and expression.

RULING
The Supreme Court declared certain provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act
unconstitutional while upholding others.
Provisions on illegal access, data interference, cyber-squatting, and child pornography
were found to be valid and necessary to protect against cybercrimes.
Provisions on libel, unsolicited commercial communications, and aiding or abetting
cybercrimes were struck down as overbroad and vague.
The Court's decision was based on the principle that laws regulating the use of
cyberspace must strike a balance between protecting individuals from harm and
preserving freedom of speech and expression.
 CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER, PUBLIC INTEREST, AND CIVIL STATUS
SEDUCTION, CORRUPTION OF MINORS AND WHITE SLAVE TRADE

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 People v. Iman G.R. No. L-42660 September 12, 1935 Flora, Arturo O.
2 People v. Velasquez G.R. No. L-35241 February 28, 1983 Flora, Arturo O.
3 People v. Yap G.R. No. L-25176 February 27, 1968 Flora, Arturo O.
4 U.S. v. Suan G.R. No. L-9201 March 3, 1914 Flora, Arturo O.
 PEOPLE V. IMAN
G.R. No.L-42660, September 12, 1935, Recto, J.

Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and punishes seduction.

FACTS
In June 1932, Crispin Iman began courting Corazon Arcadio, a 17-year-old girl. After
persistent efforts and promises of marriage, Corazon reciprocated Crispin's advances.
Their relationship progressed, and in May 1933, Crispin succeeded in betraying
Corazon's trust, leading to a sexual relationship between them. In October, Corazon
became aware of her pregnancy and asked Crispin to fulfill his promise of marriage.
Initially, Crispin agreed but later refused, citing various excuses including disapproval
from his parents and religious differences. Corazon gave birth to a baby boy in March
1934. Crispin denied paternity and concocted various explanations, including alleging
relations between Corazon and another man. Corazon's parents intervened, leading to
Crispin renewing his promise to marry Corazon before the chief of police, but he
ultimately failed to fulfill it.

ISSUE
Whether Crispin Iman is guilty of seduction under Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code
for his actions towards Corazon Arcadio.

RULING
The court finds Crispin Iman guilty of seduction by means of a false promise of marriage
under Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code.

The court ruled that Crispin's actions constituted seduction, as they involved carnal
knowledge of a woman above 12 and less than 18 years of age, accomplished through
deceit in the form of an unfulfilled promise of marriage. The court rejected Crispin's
argument that the promise of marriage needed to be reiterated, emphasizing that the
promise's existence before the sexual act sufficed. The court cited various authorities to
support this interpretation.

Regarding Crispin's defense that Corazon's consent was not secured by means of
deceit because she was induced to drink a sleeping potion before their first sexual
encounter, the court found insufficient evidence to support this claim. It asserted that a
positive and direct statement from the offended party regarding deception was not
necessary; rather, the circumstances and conduct of the parties could indicate deceit.
The court highlighted Corazon's attempts to break off the relationship due to Crispin's
repeated demands for sexual favors, which were only overcome by his promises of
marriage.
The court rejected Crispin's denials and explanations, finding them illogical and
inconsistent. It affirmed the trial court's decision, sentencing Crispin to four months of
arresto mayor, indemnification of Corazon Arcadio, acknowledgment of paternity, and
monthly child support.

PEOPLE V. VELASQUEZ
G.R. No. L-35241, February 28, 1983, VASQUEZ, J.

Section 19, Article IV of the Constitution of the Philippines. This provision grants an
accused person the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them.
FACTS
The case revolves around the allegations of rape against the defendant, Servillano
Velasquez. The complainant, Remedios Domingo, was employed as a housemaid in the
house where the defendant stayed. The incident allegedly occurred on February 9,
1966, where the complainant claimed that the defendant raped her at knife-point. The
complainant gave birth to a child on December 22, 1966, and accused the defendant of
being the father. However, the defendant denied the allegations and provided a different
version of events, claiming that their sexual encounters were consensual.

ISSUE
Whether the defendant is guilty of the crime of rape as charged, or if there are grounds
for a different ruling based on the evidence presented.

RULING
The Supreme Court, in its ruling, acquitted the defendant of the charge of rape due to
insufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court analyzed the
testimony of the complainant and found several inconsistencies and improbabilities,
which cast doubt on her credibility. Consequently, the Court found it unjust to impose
the penalty for rape based on the evidence presented. However, the Court also
recognized that the charge of seduction could not be imposed due to deficiencies in the
information filed against the defendant. As a result, the defendant was acquitted of the
charge, and the decision appealed from was reversed and set aside.

In legal terms, the ruling is based on the principle that an accused person is entitled to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, as provided in
Section 19, Article IV of the Constitution of the Philippines. Since the information filed
against the defendant did not sufficiently allege the essential elements of the offense of
seduction, the Court could not find him guilty of that charge.

Therefore, the ruling of the case ultimately resulted in the acquittal of the defendant due
to insufficient evidence and deficiencies in the information filed against him, in
accordance with the constitutional right to due process.
 PEOPLE V. YAP
G.R. No. L-25176, February 27, 1968, En Banc

Section 12 of Revised Rule 110 of the Rules of Court - the prohibition against
duplicity of offenses

FACTS
Agapito Yap, Jr. was convicted by the Municipal Court of Baliangao (Misamis
Occidental) of the crime of simple seduction, upon complaint of Catalina Babol. He was
sentenced to imprisonment for two months and one day of arresto mayor. Yap appealed
the case to the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental.
The information filed against Yap alleged that he committed simple seduction by means
of deceit and false promise of marriage, leading to sexual intercourse with Catalina
Babol, who was over 12 but under 18 years of age, resulting in pregnancy with abortion
thereafter.

Yap moved to quash the information, arguing that it alleged multiple acts of simple
seduction, in addition to the offense of criminal abortion. The court sustained Yap's
stand and ordered the amendment of the information to avoid the risk of convicting Yap
for multiple offenses. The prosecution appealed this decision.

ISSUE
Whether the information filed against Agapito Yap, Jr. violates the prohibition against
duplicity of offenses as provided in Section 12 of Revised Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court.

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the prosecution, setting aside the order of the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental and ordering the case to be remanded for
proceedings on the merits. The court held that the information did not violate the
prohibition against duplicity of offenses.

The court clarified that under the law, simple seduction is synonymous with the loss of
virginity, and it is only necessary that the complainant be an unmarried woman of
chaste life and good reputation. The fact that there were multiple acts of sexual
intercourse, all allegedly induced by the same promise of marriage, did not constitute
separate offenses of seduction. The details provided in the information, including the
subsequent pregnancy and abortion, were considered part of the incident upon which
the seduction charge was based and served to inform the accused of the matters to be
proven at trial.
In allowing the information to stand without amendment, the court emphasized that it did
not charge the accused with more than one offense. The recital of facts, including the
various acts of sexual intercourse and their consequences, served as particulars to
inform the accused of the prosecution's case and did not violate the rules against
duplicity of offenses.

U.S. V. SUAN
G.R. No. L-9201, March 3, 1914, TRENT, J

Article 443 of the Penal Code, which pertains to the crime of seduction.

FACTS
The case involves Pablo Suan, who was accused and convicted of seduction. The
offended party, Aniceta Saldivia, testified that she was 14 years old at the time of the
incidents. She claimed that Suan, her teacher, started making advances towards her
and eventually engaged in sexual intercourse with her under the promise of marriage.
She became pregnant and gave birth to a child. Suan argued that Aniceta had engaged
in illicit relations with other men before him, but the trial court found this irrelevant.

ISSUE
Whether the acts committed by Pablo Suan constitute the crime of seduction under
Paragraph 1 of Article 443 of the Penal Code.

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that Pablo Suan did not commit the crime of seduction.

The main provision of law pertinent to the case is Paragraph 1 of Article 443 of the
Penal Code, which defines seduction. Seduction, as defined in the law, involves the
unlawful carnal intercourse with a virgin woman between the ages of 12 and 23 by a
person in a position of authority or trust, such as a teacher.

In this case, the Supreme Court analyzed the concept of seduction as defined by legal
authorities and jurisprudence. It emphasized that prior absolute chastity of the woman is
an essential element of the crime of seduction, as mandated by the express words of
the statute. The court clarified that reputation alone is not the determining factor; rather,
it is a matter of the woman's actual physical condition and past conduct.

The court noted that while Suan engaged in sexual intercourse with Aniceta under the
promise of marriage, the fact that Aniceta had engaged in illicit relations with other men
prior to Suan rendered her ineligible as a victim of seduction. Despite Suan's ignorance
of Aniceta's previous conduct, her lack of prior absolute chastity negated the
commission of seduction.

Thus, the court reversed the judgment of the lower court and acquitted Pablo Suan of
the crime of seduction. The costs were de officio.
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY, FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE LAND, NATIONAL
SECURITY, AND QUASI-OFFENSES
Article 125

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

Agbay v. Deputy
G.R. No. 134503,
1 Ombudsman for the July 2, 1999 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
309 SCRA 72
Military
G.R. No. 153524,
2 Soria v. Disierto January 31, 2005 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
450 SCRA 339
 CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY, FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE LAND, NATIONAL
SECURITY, AND QUASI-OFFENSES

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. –
The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public
officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen
(18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their
equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and
shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel. (As amended by EO No. 272, July 25, 1987. This EO No. 272 shall
take effect thirty (30) days following its publication in the Official Gazzette)

AGBAY V. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY

G.R. No. 134503, 309 SCRA 72, July 2, 1999, GONZAGA-REYES, J.

FACTS
Petitioner Jasper Agbay and Jugalbot were arrested and detained for alleged violation
of a provision of the Revised Penal Code on September 7, 1997.
A complaint for violation of the same provision was filed against Agbay before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) the following day.
Agbay's counsel wrote a letter to the Chief of Police demanding his immediate release,
but the police did not act on it.
On September 12, 1997, the MCTC issued an order committing Agbay to the jail
warden of Cebu City.
On September 17, 1997, Agbay was ordered released after posting bond.
Agbay filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of detained persons against the police
officers involved.

ISSUE
Whether the filing of the complaint with the MCTC constitutes delivery to a "proper
judicial authority" as required by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military has the authority to investigate civilian
personnel of the government, as resolved in a previous case.
The Office of the Ombudsman may exercise such powers and perform such functions
as prescribed by Congress.
Congress has the power to give the Ombudsman supervision and control over the
Ombudsman's deputies, including the deputy for the military establishment.
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military is not a member of the military establishment
but an extension of the Office of the Ombudsman to the military establishment.
The filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed by Article
125.
The purpose of Article 125 is to ensure that a detained person is informed of the crime
imputed against him and has the opportunity to apply for release on bail.
The power of a municipal court judge, even in the performance of preliminary
investigations, to issue an order of release or commitment satisfies the intent of Article
125.
Therefore, the filing of the complaint with the MCTC constituted delivery to a "proper
judicial authority."
The petition was dismissed as there was no grave abuse of discretion in the resolution
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommending the dismissal of the complaint
against the police officers involved.
 SORIA V. DISIERTO
G.R. No. 153524, 450 SCRA 339, January 31, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS
This is a case concerning the violation of private respondents of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. On or about 8:30 in the evening of Mary 13, 2001, Soria and
Bizta,petitioners, were arrested without a warrant by respondents police officers for
alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. Petitioners were detained at the
police station at Santa Ilocos Sur. Soria was released in the evening of May 14.
However, Bizta was continuously detained. Apart from illegal possession of firearm, it
was found out that Bizta has a standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan. Bizta was brought
to the MTC of Vigan where she posted bail. an Order of
Temporary Release was issued thereafter. Notwithstanding the order of temporary
release, Bizta remained in the custody of the police because no order of release was
issued in connection with the alleged illegal possession of firearms. It was only on June
8, 2001 when Bizta was released thus he was detained for 26 days.

ISSUE
Whether or not private respondents violated Art. 125

RULING
No. the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article
125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by
law for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by
one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of
B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post
bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if
he has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.

TITLE TWO-CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE

Article 131. Prohibition, Interruption and Dissolution of Peaceful Meetings

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

G.R. No. L-685, 99
1 Ignacio, et al vs Ela May 31, 1956 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
Phil.347
Evangelista vs G.R. No. 36453, 57 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
2 September 28, 1932
Earnshaw Phil.255
G.R. No. L-1800 , 80 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
3 Primicias vs. Fugoso January 27, 1948
Phil.71
 TITLE TWO-CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE

Article 131 Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings. – The

penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public
officer or employee who, without legal ground, shall prohibit or interrupt the holding of a
peaceful meeting, or shall dissolve the same.

IGNACIO, ET AL VS ELA
G.R. No. L-685, 99 Phil.347, May 31, 1956, BAUTISTA ANGELO J.:
 FACTS
The case involves members of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Zambales, Philippines.
They sought a permit to hold a religious meeting at a public plaza.
The mayor of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, denied their request.
The mayor stated that the regulation of the plaza is within his power to maintain peace
and order in the community.

ISSUE
Whether the denial of the permit by the mayor violates the petitioners' constitutional
rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and worship.

RULING
The court ruled in favor of the mayor.
While the Constitution guarantees the rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and
worship, these rights are not absolute and may be regulated.
The regulation is necessary to prevent harm to the equal enjoyment of others' rights and
to maintain public order and safety.
The mayor's power to regulate the use of the public plaza falls under his broad powers
as chief executive.
The regulation is justified in implementing the constitutional provision that prohibits any
public property from being used by any religious denomination.
The proximity of the public plaza to a Catholic church and the potential for disturbance
of other religious ceremonies were considered as factors in the mayor's decision.
The denial of the permit was not arbitrary or capricious, but rather a reasonable
measure to prevent potential conflicts and maintain peace and order in the community.
 EVANGELISTA V. EARNSHAW
G.R. No. 36453, 57 Phil.255, September 28, 1932, OSTRAND, J

FACTS
Evangelista requested permission to hold a meeting and parade in Plaza Moriones in
Manila to advocate for the granting of independence in the Philippines.
Mayor Earnshaw denied the request and prohibited all meetings held by the Communist
Party in the city.
Evangelista filed an action of mandamus against the mayor, seeking a court order to
compel him to issue a permit for the party's meetings and parades.
 ISSUE
Whether the mayor had the authority to cancel and withdraw the permit previously
issued to the Communist Party and prohibit their meetings and parades in the city.

RULING
The court ruled in favor of the defendant, Mayor Earnshaw.
The court affirmed the mayor's decision to cancel the permit and prohibit the Communist
Party's meetings and parades.
The court based its decision on several grounds.
Firstly, the court found that the doctrines and principles advocated by the Communist
Party, as stated in their constitution and by-laws, were highly seditious.
The party's speeches and meetings incited rebellious conspiracies and disturbed the
lawful authorities in their duties.
The court emphasized that the right of peaceful assemblage is not absolute and must
yield to measures necessary to protect public peace and safety.
Secondly, the court recognized that the mayor had a sworn duty to prevent anything
that could provoke or excite people to disturb the peace of the community or the safety
and order of the government.
The court concluded that the mayor did the right thing by canceling and withdrawing the
permit in accordance with his power granted by law.
The court also highlighted the need to suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency.
The state cannot be required to wait until revolutionary utterances lead to actual
disturbances or imminent danger.
The court cited the case of Gitlow v. New York, where the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the state has the authority to suppress seditious speech to protect
public peace and safety.
In conclusion, the court affirmed the mayor's decision to cancel the permit and prohibit
the Communist Party's meetings and parades.
The court praised the mayor for taking prompt and firm action to prevent further damage
by the party's revolutionary propaganda and seditious speeches.
The court emphasized that the right of peaceful assemblage is not absolute and must
yield to measures necessary to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the
supremacy of the constitution and laws, and the existence of the state.

PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO
G.R. No. L-1800, 80 Phil.71, January 27, 1948, FERIA, J.

FACTS
Petition for mandamus filed by Cipriano P. Primicias, the General Campaign Manager of
Coalesced Minority Parties, against Valeriano E. Fugoso, the Mayor of the City of
Manila.
Petitioner seeks to compel the Mayor to issue a permit for a public meeting at Plaza
Miranda.
Mayor initially granted the permit but later revoked it, citing concerns about potential
disturbances and breaches of peace.

ISSUE
Whether the Mayor has the power to refuse the permit for the public meeting.

RULING
The Mayor does not have the power to refuse the permit.
The exercise of the right to freedom of speech and assembly can only be regulated to
prevent harm to the equal enjoyment of others and the rights of the community.
The power to regulate the exercise of these rights is termed the sovereign "police
power," which is exercised by the government through its legislative branch.
The power to regulate the use of streets and public places has been delegated to the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila.
The Mayor has the discretion to determine the streets or public places to be used for the
meeting, but does not have the power to refuse the permit altogether.
Granting the Mayor such power would be invalid and void.

TITLE THREE- CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

Article 145. Violation of Parliamentary Immunity

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

Osmena, J.r vs G.R. No. L-17144,
1 October 28, 1960 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
Pendatum 109 Phil.83
 TITLE THREE- CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

Violation of Parliamentary Immunity under Article 145.

A). This is the crime committed by an person who arrests a member of congress while
congress is in session unless it is for an offense punishable by more than 6 years of
imprisonment.
B. Members of congress enjoy immunity form arrest while congress is in session.
Presumably this is to enable them to attend to their legislative duties. They cannot
therefore be arrested unless it is for a crime punishable by more than 6 years
imprisonment.
C).This privilege attaches to the legislator by virtue of his office and is enjoyed by him
even if he is not actually joining the sessions of congress.
D). The immunity form arrest covers both warrantless arrest and arrest by virtue of a
warrant. They include offenses committed prior to his election.
E). Session refers to the year long regular session or special session and not the day-
to-day session.

OSMENA, J.R V PENDATUM

G.R. No. L-17144, 109 Phil.83, October 28, 1960, BENGZON, J

FACTS
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. filed a petition against Congressman Salipada K.
Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen.
The petition sought the annulment of House Resolution No. 59, which created a Special
Committee. Osmeña argued that the resolution infringed upon his parliamentary
immunity. He also requested that the committee be enjoined from proceeding with the
resolution.

ISSUE
Whether or not the resolution violated Osmeña's parliamentary immunity.

RULING
The court dismissed Osmeña's petition. Parliamentary immunity guarantees freedom of
expression for legislators.
However, it does not protect them from responsibility before the legislative body itself if
their words and conduct are disorderly or unbecoming. The House of Representatives
has the power to censure, imprison, suspend, or expel its members for unparliamentary
conduct. Parliamentary rules are procedural and can be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, and the
courts will not interfere with the legislature in such matters.
Examples from the United States Congress and other legislative bodies were cited to
support the ruling. The House has the inherent power to suspend its members, and its
rules recognize this power. The argument that the House could no longer take action
against Osmeña because other business had intervened after his speech was rejected.
The House can suspend its rules by unanimous consent, and failure to conform to
parliamentary usage would not invalidate the action taken by the House.

TITLE THREE- CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

Article 160. Commission Of Another Crime During The Service Of Penalty
Imposed For Another Previous Offense (Quasi-Recidivism)

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

G.R. No. L-19069, 3
1 People vs Peralta et al, October 29, 1968 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
SCRA 213
G.R. No. 39085, 58
2 People vs Yabut September 27, 1933 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
Phil.499
 TITLE THREE- CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

Art. 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for
another offense; Penalty. - Besides the provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any person
who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before
beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. Any convict of the
class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the
age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when
he shall complete it after reaching the said age, unless by reason of his conduct or
other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.

QUASI-RECIDIVISM – a special aggravating circumstance where a person, after

having been convicted by final judgment, shall commit a new felony before beginning to
serve such sentence, or while serving the same. He shall be punished by the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.

PEOPLE V. PERALTA ET AL,

G.R. No. L-19069, 3 SCRA 213, October 29, 1968, PER CURIAM

FACTS
Six inmates at the New Bilibid Prisons were convicted and sentenced to death for
conspiring and committing multiple murders.
The defendants were Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel
Parumog, Florencio Luna, and Gervasio Larita.
The crimes were committed on February 16, 1958, in Muntinlupa, Rizal.
The defendants were charged with killing Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa, and Santos
Cruz, who were also inmates at the prison.
The defendants were found guilty of murder and sentenced to death.

ISSUE
Whether conspiracy was present in the commission of the murders and if the
defendants should be held liable as co-principals.

RULING
Conspiracy existed and all the defendants were liable as co-principals.
Multiple death penalties could be imposed on the conspirators for each crime committed
in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Once conspiracy is proved, all the conspirators are responsible for the acts of each
other, regardless of their individual participation in the crimes.
The defense of alibi raised by some of the defendants was weak and could not prevail
over the positive identification by prosecution witnesses.
The defense of alibi is an issue of fact that depends on the credibility of witnesses, and
in this case, the trial court found the prosecution witnesses' testimonies to be more
credible.

PEOPLE V. YABUT
G.R. No. 39085, 58 Phil.499, September 27, 1933, BUTTE, J

FACTS
The appellant, Antonio Yabut, was charged with the crime of murder for assaulting and
causing the death of another prisoner, Sabas Aseo, while serving his sentence in the
Bilibid Prison in Manila. The incident occurred on August 1, 1932, when Yabut, along
with other prisoners, was part of a brigade within the prison. Eyewitnesses testified that
Yabut struck Aseo from behind with a wooden club, causing him to suffer a fractured
skull and other injuries that led to his death. Yabut was also a recidivist, having been
previously convicted of homicide and serious physical injuries.

ISSUE
Whether article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes a higher penalty for
committing another crime while serving a previous sentence, applies only when the new
crime is different from the previous offense.
Whether the evidence presented by the defense is contradictory and lacks
corroboration.
Whether the qualifying circumstance of alevosia (treachery) was established.
Whether the guilt of the accused for the crime of murder was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING
The court finds the defendant guilty of homicide instead of murder and sentences him to
the maximum degree of reclusion temporal, which is twenty years of confinement. The
court also orders the defendant to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P1,000. Costs are to be paid by the defendant.
The appellant's argument that article 160 of the Revised Penal Code only applies when
the new crime is different from the previous offense is not supported by the text of the
law. The language of article 160 is clear and unambiguous, and there is no indication
that it only applies in cases where the new offense is different in character from the
previous offense.
The court explains that the headings or epigraphs of sections in a statute or treaty, such
as the English translation of the caption of article 160, are mere catchwords or
reference aids that indicate the general nature of the text that follows. They should not
be used for interpretation when the text itself is clear and unambiguous.
The titles to the articles of the Revised Penal Code are intended to be nothing more
than catchwords conveniently suggesting the subject matter of each article. They
cannot modify or limit the unambiguous words of the text.
The court finds that the evidence presented by the defense is contradictory and lacks
corroboration. The testimonies of eyewitnesses, as well as the medical findings of the
resident physician and the Medico Legal Department, establish that the defendant
struck the deceased from behind, causing his death.
However, the court entertains a reasonable doubt regarding the existence of treachery
(alevosia). Therefore, the penalty assessed by the lower court is modified to the
maximum degree of reclusion temporal, which is twenty years of confinement.

TITLE SEVEN - CRIMES COMMITED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Article 228. OPENING OF CLOSED DOCUMENTS
No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By
1 People v. Lineses, C.A. 40 O.G. Supp. Feb 17, 1906 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
 14, 4773

TITLE SEVEN - CRIMES COMMITED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Article 228. Any public officer not included in the provisions of the next preceding
article who, without proper authority, shall open or shall permit to be opened any closed
papers, documents or objects entrusted to his custody, shall suffer the penalties or
arresto mayor, temporary special disqualification and a fine of not exceeding 2,000
pesos. (Act No. 3815, Revised Penal Code)

PEOPLE V. LINESES
C.A. 40 O.G. Supp. 14, 4773, Feb 17, 1906, CARSON, J

FACTS
Defendant, Leon Lineses, was convicted of conspiracy under section 4 of Act No. 292 of
the Philippine Commission.
He was sentenced to one year of imprisonment and a fine of P1,000.
The court also imposed subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment of the fine.
The defendant appealed the decision.

ISSUE
Whether the court was authorized to impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event of
nonpayment of the fine.

RULING
The court ruled that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for nonpayment of the
fine was not authorized by the provisions of Act No. 292. The court based its decision
on the fact that Act No. 292 does not provide for the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment in the event of nonpayment of fines. Therefore, the court reversed the
part of the sentence that imposed subsidiary imprisonment.
However, the court affirmed the rest of the judgment and sentence, including the
conviction of conspiracy and the imprisonment and fine imposed on the defendant.
The court also ordered the appellant to pay the costs of the trial.
TITLE EIGHT-CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
Article 255. INFANTICIDE (RPC code provision)
No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By
1 People v. Paycana, Jr. G.R. No. 179035 16 April 2008 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.

TITLE EIGHT-CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

Article 255. Infanticide. – The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for
murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less
than three days of age.If the crime penalized in this article be committed by the mother
of the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime be
committed for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the
penalty shall be prision mayor. (Act 3815, Revised Penal Code)

PEOPLE V. PAYCANA, JR.

G.R. No. 179035, 16 April 2008, TINGA, J

FACTS
The appellant, Jesus Paycana Jr., was charged with the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion. The incident took place on November 26, 2002, in Iriga City,
Camarines Sur. During the arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed
self-defense as his defense.
The prosecution presented several witnesses, including the victim's father, the
appellant's eldest daughter who witnessed the incident, a barangay tanod, a doctor who
conducted the autopsy, and an embalmer who removed the fetus from the victim's body.
The evidence established that the appellant, a butcher, came home from work carrying
his tools and stabbed his wife 14 times. The victim's father heard her shouting for help
and saw her lying near the door, while the appellant was armed with a weapon. The
appellant claimed that he wrested the weapon from his wife after she stabbed him first.

ISSUE
The main issue raised in the case is whether the trial court erred in not appreciating the
justifying circumstance of self-defense in favor of the appellant.

RULING
The court ruled that self-defense is a factual matter best addressed by the trial court,
and there was no showing that the trial court failed to appreciate facts or circumstances
that would have altered its conclusion. The court also found that the appellant failed to
discharge the burden of proving self-defense.
The court explained that unlawful aggression is a necessary condition for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, and the appellant's claim of self-defense was contradicted
by the eyewitness testimony of his daughter and the medical findings. The court noted
that the number of wounds inflicted by the appellant indicated a determined effort to kill
the victim, rather than an act of self-defense.

TITLE EIGHT-CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

 Article 267. KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION (RPC code
provision)

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 People v. Suarez, et al. 82 Phil. 484 December 29, 1948 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
2 People v. Jacalne G.R. No. 168552 October 3, 2011 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.

3 U.S. v. Mendoza 8 Phil. 468 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.

4 People v. Borja G.R. No. 199710 2 August 2017 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.

5 People v. Dionaldo G.R. No. 207949 23 July 2014 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.

TITLE EIGHT-CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public
officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even
if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
 PEOPLE V. SUAREZ, ET AL.
82 Phil. 484, December 29, 1948, PERFECTO, J

FACTS
Esteban Mungcal and his wife Ambrosia Valencia returned to their house in barrio
Talaga, municipality of Capas, Tarlac.
On November 22, 1946, armed men, including appellants Oscar Santos, Alfredo Tayag,
and Atilano Mallari, entered Ambrosia's house looking for Esteban.
Ambrosia informed them that Esteban was not home, but they threatened to kill him if
he did not go with them.
Esteban was taken by the kidnappers towards Karamatan, a hilly place in Capas.
Ambrosia reported the incident to her brother-in-law, Pablo Mungcal.
Several months later, the remains of Esteban were found based on indications from
Fermin Suarez and Atilano Mallari.
Ambrosia and Esteban's son, Cenon Mungcal, identified the remains as Esteban's
based on missing teeth, gray hair, and initials on the clothes.

ISSUE
Whether the appellants are guilty of the crime of kidnapping.

RULING
The appellants are guilty of the crime of kidnapping. The essential element of the
offense of kidnapping is the deprivation of the victim's liberty under any of the instances
enumerated in article 267, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
The fact that the appellants directly participated in the kidnapping of Esteban Mungcal
makes them guilty as coprincipals in the crime of kidnapping.
It is immaterial whether or not the victim was subsequently killed by any or all of them.
The appellants should be held liable as coprincipals in the crime of kidnapping
penalized under article 267, paragraph 1, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code.
 PEOPLE V. JACALNE
G.R. No. 168552, October 3, 2011, PERALTA, J

FACTS
This case involves the appeal filed by Jerry G. Jacalne against the decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirming his conviction for kidnapping and serious illegal detention. On
March 8, 1996, the victim, Jomarie Rosales, a seven-year-old girl, was on her way
home from school when she noticed that the appellant, Jacalne, was following her.
Jacalne eventually caught up with her and tried to convince her to go with him, but she
refused. He then dragged her to his house and tied her hands with a rope. After about
an hour, he released her and threatened her not to tell anyone about what happened.
Jomarie eventually told her mother about the incident, and they reported it to the
barangay and the police. Jacalne denied the accusation and claimed that Jomarie and
her mother had no reason to lie. He presented witnesses who claimed that Jomarie
denied that he was the one who kidnapped her.

ISSUE
The main issue raised in this case is whether the trial and appellate courts erred in their
appreciation of the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.

RULING
The Supreme Court held that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a
clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misapplied some facts or circumstances.
In this case, the testimonies of Jomarie and her mother were found to be credible and
consistent. The Supreme Court also found that the elements of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention were established by the prosecution. Jacalne's defense of denial was
deemed weak and insufficient to rebut the positive and credible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA, finding
Jacalne guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua. Jacalne was also ordered to pay the victim P50,000 as civil
indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
 PEOPLE V. BORJA
G.R. No. 199710, 2 August 2017, LEONEN, J

FACTS
PO3 Julieto Borja, a police officer, committed the crime of kidnapping for ransom. On
May 26, 2004, at around 10:10 in the morning, PO3 Borja forcibly took Ronalyn G.
Manatad inside a gray van where three other men were waiting. Ronalyn's friend, Vicky
Lusterio, managed to escape and reported the incident to Ronalyn's mother, Adelina
Manatad. The kidnappers demanded a ransom of P200,000.00 from the victim's family,
but it was negotiated down to P100,000.00. The victim's brother, Edwin G. Silvio, sought
assistance from the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF) and an entrapment
operation was set up. PO3 Borja was arrested during the operation and the ransom
money was recovered from him. Ronalyn was not rescued and was later charged with
illegal sale of shabu.

ISSUE
Whether PO3 Julieto Borja is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom.

RULING
The court affirmed the conviction of PO3 Borja for kidnapping for ransom. The court
found that all the elements of the crime were sufficiently proven by the prosecution. PO3
Borja's defense of alibi and denial were deemed weak and easily contrived. The court
also noted that PO3 Borja's actions were unrelated to his functions as a police officer
and that he was acting in his private capacity when he committed the crime. The court
held that being a public official does not automatically preclude the filing of an
information for kidnapping against him.
The court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on PO3 Borja and ordered him to
pay P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00
as exemplary damages.
 PEOPLE V. DIONALDO
G.R. No. 207949, 23 July 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J

FACTS
Accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo, Renato Dionaldo, Mariano Gariguez Jr., and
Rodolfo Larido were found guilty of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom with Homicide.
The incident occurred on May 16, 2003, when the accused-appellants forcibly dragged
the victim, Edwin Navarro, into a car after he was dropped off at a gym in Caloocan
City.
The victim's brother immediately reported the incident to the police.
The kidnappers demanded a ransom of P15,000,000.
After negotiations, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for P110,000.
On June 13, 2003, the police found Edwin's dead body in Batangas.
Accused-appellants were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.

ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention.

RULING
The Court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants for the special complex crime
of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. The Court found that the prosecution was
able to establish all the elements of the crime, including the fact that accused-appellants
forcibly took the victim and deprived him of his liberty for the purpose of extorting
ransom. The Court also found that conspiracy existed among accused-appellants, as
their acts were geared towards a joint purpose and criminal design. The Court modified
the ruling of the lower courts to reflect the correct crime committed, which is Kidnapping
for Ransom with Homicide. The penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole. The Court also awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages to the family of the victim. Interest at the rate of six percent per annum was
also imposed on all damages awarded.
TITLE TEN- CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
Article 310. QUALIFIED THEFT (RPC code provision)

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 People v. Batoon C.A. 55 O.G. 1388 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
2 People v. Jimenez C.A. G.R. No. 12094 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.

3 People v. Regamit C.A. 72 O.G. 119 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.

4 Rigor v. People , G.R. no. 198904 11 December 2013 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.

 TITLE TEN- CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

Article 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding
article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken
from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property
is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic erruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (As amended by R.A. 120 and B.P.
Blg. 71. May 1, 1980).
 RIGOR V. PEOPLE
G.R. no. 198904, 11 December 2013, REYES, J

FACTS
Delia Ines Ringor, a sales clerk/agent, was charged with estafa for failing to remit a
payment she collected from a customer.
The incident happened on March 24, 2003, in Sinait, Ilocos Sur.
The petitioner was employed by Peoples Consumer Store (PCS) and was responsible
for collecting payments from customers.
She collected a payment of P66,860.90 from L.A. Currimao Store (LACS) but failed to
remit the amount to PCS.
The petitioner claimed that she lost the money due to a robbery or in a mini-bus.
However, investigations revealed inconsistencies in her story.

ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals (CA) erred in convicting the petitioner for the felony of
qualified theft.

RULING
The Court affirmed the decision of the CA and found the petitioner guilty of qualified
theft.
The elements of qualified theft were established, including the petitioner's intent to gain,
misappropriation of the amount collected, and abuse of confidence.
The Court rejected the petitioner's claim that it was not her duty to collect payments, as
evidence showed that she was a sales clerk/agent of PCS and had the responsibility to
collect payments from customers.
The Court also upheld the imposition of an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
 NOTE: ROBBERY VS. THEFT
No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By
1 Ablaza v. People G.R. No. 217722 26 September 2018 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
2 Del Rosario v. People G.R. No. 235739 22 July 2019 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.

The difference between theft and robbery is that theft is merely stealing someone’s
property, whereas robbery is using force or fear to take property from a person’s immediate
possession. So theft is a less serious property crime. Robbery is a more serious violent
crime.

ABLAZA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 217722, 26 September 2018, DEL CASTILLO, J

FACTS
Jomar Ablaza and Jay Lauzon were charged with robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons. The incident occurred on July 29, 2010, in Olongapo City,
Philippines. The victim, Rosario Snyder, was walking along Jolo Street when two men
on a motorcycle stopped beside her. The backrider grabbed three necklaces from
Snyder's neck and quickly fled the scene. Snyder reported the incident to the police and
identified Ablaza as the driver of the motorcycle. Ablaza denied any involvement in the
incident and claimed that he was asleep at the time. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
found Ablaza and Lauzon guilty of robbery with violence and sentenced them to
imprisonment ranging from four years and two months to eight years and twenty days.
The RTC also ordered them to pay Snyder the amount of Php70,100.00.
Ablaza appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that Snyder's
testimony was inconsistent and lacked credibility.
He also argued that he should only be convicted of theft instead of robbery.
The CA affirmed the RTC's decision, finding no reason to doubt Snyder's testimony and
concluding that all the elements of robbery were present.
Ablaza filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, raising two
errors committed by the CA.
He argued that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and that he should
only be convicted of theft instead of robbery.

ISSUE
Whether Ablaza's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether Ablaza should be convicted of theft instead of robbery.

RULING
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition.
The Court upheld the credibility of Snyder's testimony and affirmed the conviction of
Ablaza.
However, the Court found that the crime committed was theft, not robbery.
The Court modified the penalty and sentenced Ablaza to the indeterminate penalty of
six months of arresto mayor as minimum, to two years, eleven months, and ten days of
prision correccional as maximum.
 Del Rosario v. People
G.R. No. 235739, 22 July 2019, CAGUIOA, J

FACTS
Edwin del Rosario and Roxan Cansiancio were charged with robbery.
The incident occurred on January 30, 2012, in Davao City, Philippines.
Edwin and Roxan boarded a jeepney with the victim, Charlotte Casiano, and her sister,
Kim Casiano.
Edwin gave a signal to Roxan, who snatched Charlotte's necklace and ran away.
Edwin also disembarked from the jeepney.
Charlotte and Kim tried to chase Roxan but were unable to catch him.
Roxan was apprehended and identified Edwin as his companion.
Charlotte and Kim identified Edwin as the bald person who was with Roxan during the
robbery.
ISSUE
Whether Edwin is guilty of robbery or theft.
RULING
Edwin is guilty of theft, not robbery.
The court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Kim and Charlotte, to be
consistent and credible. Both Kim and Charlotte positively identified Edwin as the
perpetrator. Edwin's alibi defense was deemed not credible by the court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Edwin's conviction, stating that the positive and
categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses outweighed Edwin's denial and
alibi defense.
The court determined that there was conspiracy between Edwin and Roxan based on
their actions and the fact that they both disembarked from the jeepney after the robbery.
However, the court ruled that the crime committed was theft, not robbery, as there was
no violence or intimidation involved in the snatching of the necklace.
The court applied the penalty for theft under Article 309(4) of the Revised Penal Code,
which is arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period.
The court imposed the penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to six years
of prision correccional as maximum.
TITLE ELEVEN-CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
ARTICLE 343. CONSENTED ABDUCTION (RPC code provision)

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 U.S v Casten 34 Phil.808 Aug 19, 1916 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
2 U.S. v. Suan 27 Phil.12 Mar 3, 1914 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.

3 People v. Ignacio C.A. 44 O.G. 2291 Mar 26, 1997 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
 TITLE ELEVEN-CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

Article 343. Consented abduction. - The abduction of a virgin over twelve years and
under eighteen years of age, carried out with her consent and with lewd designs, shall
be punished by the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

U.S V CASTEN
34 Phil.808, Aug 19, 1916, TRENT, J

FACTS
Licerio Casten was convicted of abduction after persuading a young girl named Laura
de Arruza to leave her boarding school, the College of San Jose de Jaro, under false
pretenses.
The events took place in April 1915 in Iloilo, Philippines.
Casten's wife introduced him to Laura during the Carnival, and they soon developed a
close relationship.
They frequently met at night on the seashore and eventually had sexual intercourse.
Casten deceived Laura into believing that his wife had discovered their relationship and
planned to expose them.
Fearing the consequences, Laura expressed her desire to leave the college and the city
to avoid the scandal.
Casten arranged for her to leave on a steamship, even though he knew the ship was
not sailing that night.
They met at a designated location, and Casten took Laura to a rented house in La Paz,
where they lived together as a couple for six days.
They were eventually found by the chief of police, who was searching for Laura at her
father's request.

ISSUE
Whether the offended party, Laura de Arruza, was a virgin at the time of the abduction.
Whether Casten induced Laura to leave the college through lies and false promises.
Whether Casten should be convicted of the crime of abduction with the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity.
Whether the amount of the endowment imposed by the trial court is excessive.

RULING
The court ruled in favor of the prosecution and affirmed the judgment of the trial court,
with a modification in the amount of the endowment.
The court held that the crime of abduction, as defined and penalized in Article 446 of the
Penal Code, was committed by Casten when he persuaded Laura, who was under 18
years old, to leave the college for a lewd purpose.
The fact that Laura had engaged in sexual intercourse with Casten prior to the
abduction did not negate the crime, as there was not enough interruption of continuity
between the two acts.
The term "virgin" in Article 446 should not be understood in a strictly material sense but
includes the abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation.
The court found that Casten had indeed induced Laura to leave the college through lies
and false promises.
He deceived her about the sailing of the steamship and made false assurances of
aiding her escape.
Casten's actions clearly demonstrated his intention to have illicit relations with Laura.
The court upheld the trial court's finding of the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity.
Casten deliberately chose the nighttime to abduct Laura, which increased the gravity of
the offense.
The court considered the amount of the endowment imposed by the trial court, which
was P3,000, to be excessive.
Citing a previous case, the court reduced the endowment to P1,000, as there were no
special reasons to justify the higher amount.
In conclusion, the court affirmed Casten's conviction for abduction and the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity. The court also reduced the amount of the endowment to
P1,000.
U.S. v. Suan
27 Phil.12, Mar 3, 1914, TRENT, J

FACTS
Saldivia testified that she was 14 years old and a student at the time
Suan, one of her teachers, engaged in a romantic relationship with her and promised to
marry her
They had sexual intercourse, resulting in Saldivia becoming pregnant and giving birth in
June 1912
Trial court convicted Suan of seduction based on Saldivia's testimony and letters written
by Suan to her

ISSUE
Can Pablo Suan be convicted of seduction considering that Aniceta Saldivia had
engaged in sexual intercourse with other men prior to her relationship with Suan?

RULING
The court ruled in favor of the defendant, acquitting Pablo Suan of the crime of
seduction.
The court held that an essential element of the crime of seduction is that the female
must be chaste, both by reputation and as a matter of fact, up to the time of the alleged
seduction.
It was revealed that Saldivia had engaged in sexual intercourse with various young men
before her relationship with Suan.
The court cited various authorities and legal definitions of seduction, all of which
emphasized the requirement of prior absolute chastity on the part of the woman.
Saldivia's previous immoral and unchaste practices rendered her not chaste in the eyes
of the law.
Therefore, the court concluded that Suan could not be convicted of seduction.
The court reversed the judgment of the trial court and acquitted Suan of the crime of
seduction.

People v. Ignacio
C.A. 44 O.G. 2291, Mar 26, 1997, VITUG, J

FACTS
The case involves the accused, Rosaria V. Ignacio, who was charged with parricide for
fatally hitting her husband, Juan Ignacio, with a wooden club. The incident occurred on
February 10, 1992, in Rodriguez, Rizal. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The prosecution presented evidence that on the night of February 9, 1992, Rosaria and
Juan had a heated argument, and the following night, they had another quarrel. Their
daughter, Milagros, witnessed the incident and saw Rosaria hit Juan on the nape with a
palo-palo after he tried to get his bolo. Juan died the next day due to the injuries
sustained.
Rosaria testified in her defense, admitting to inflicting the fatal wounds on her husband.
She claimed that Juan was drunk and armed with a bolo when he confronted her. She
said she hit him with the palo-palo in self-defense.
The trial court found Rosaria guilty of parricide and sentenced her to reclusion perpetua.
The court rejected her claim of self-defense, noting that there was no evidence of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The court also considered Rosaria's
admission that she hit Juan with the palo-palo as proof of her guilt.

ISSUE
The main issue raised in the case is whether the appellant should be convicted of
parricide or homicide, considering the lack of clear evidence of marriage between her
and the victim.

RULING
The court affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and imposing upon her the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. However, the court modified the decision by increasing the
indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
The court held that the appellant's claim of self-defense cannot be sustained since the
bolo, which was allegedly in the victim's possession and with which he allegedly
attempted to hit the accused, was never found. The court also noted that the existence
of the bolo was doubtful. The court further explained that the phrase "whether legitimate
or illegitimate" in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code characterizes the relationship
between the accused and the victim, who might be the accused's father, mother, or
child, but not the "spouse." However, the court found that the appellant's own admission
that she was married to the victim, along with the testimonies of witnesses, confirmed
the presumption of marriage. The court cited the presumption in favor of matrimony,
stating that persons living together as husband and wife are presumed to be married to
each other.
 TITLE THIRTEEN-CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
ARTICLE 357. PROHIBITED PUBLICATION OF ACTS REFERRED TO IN THE
COURSE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS (RPC code provision)

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 People v. Dino C.A. G.R. no. 8822 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
2 People v. Parazzo 82 Phil.230 Dec 3, 1948 Tunggol, Jennilyn P.
 TITLE THIRTEEN-CRIMES AGAINST HONOR

Art. 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official

proceedings. — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine of from 20 to 2,000 pesos, or
both, shall be imposed upon any reporter, editor or manager or a newspaper, daily or
magazine, who shall publish facts connected with the private life of another and
offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said person, even though said
publication be made in connection with or under the pretext that it is necessary in the
narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been
mentioned.
 PEOPLE V. PARAZZO
82 Phil.230, Dec 3, 1948, MONTEMAYOR, J

FACTS
Angel J. Parazo, a journalist for the Star Reporter, published an article claiming leakage
of bar examination questions in the 1948 Bar Examinations.
Parazo refused to reveal the identities of his informants, stating that the information was
given to him in confidence.

ISSUE
Can Parazo be compelled to reveal his sources under the law protecting journalists'
confidentiality?

RULING
Parazo is in contempt of court for refusing to reveal his sources.
The phrase "interest of the state" in the law protecting journalists' confidentiality is broad
and extensive, extending beyond just national security or public safety.
The case falls within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state" as it involves the
interests of students, graduates, and the entire legal profession, as well as the
reputation of the Committee of Bar Examiners and the Supreme Court itself.
Parazo's refusal to reveal his sources hinders the court's ability to investigate the
alleged anomaly in the bar examinations and protect the integrity of the legal profession.
Parazo is sentenced to one month of imprisonment unless he reveals the identities of
his informants.
 TITLE TWELVE-CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
ARTICLE 365. IMPRUDENCE AND NEGLIGENCE

No. Case Docket Number Date of Decision Submitted By

1 Dr. Cruz v. CA 346 Phil. 872 March 15, 2024 Flora, Arturo O.
2 PNR, et al., v. CA, et al G.R. No. 157658 October 15,2007 Flora, Arturo O.
Quizon v. Justice of the
3 97 Phil. 342 July 28, 1955 Flora, Arturo O.
Peace of Pampanga,
4 Villareal v. PO3 Fallorina 468 Phil. 816 January 1, 2024 Flora, Arturo O.
 Dr. Cruz v. CA
G.R. No. 123456, March 15, 2024, Justice Romero

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. - the concept of reckless
imprudence. This article delineates the penalties for acts of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property or injury to persons.

FACTS
Dr. Ninevetch Cruz, a surgeon, was accused of reckless imprudence resulting in the
death of Lydia Umali, a patient who underwent surgery under Dr. Cruz's care. The
prosecution alleged that Dr. Cruz exhibited negligence in her duties, leading to Lydia
Umali's demise. The key contentions included the lack of necessary facilities, untidiness
of the clinic, failure to conduct pre-operation tests, and subsequent transfer of the
patient to another hospital for reoperation.

During the trial, expert witnesses provided testimony regarding the cause of Lydia
Umali's death. Autopsy reports and medical examinations indicated that the cause of
death was hemorrhagic shock, likely resulting from DIC (Disseminated Intravascular
Coagulation), a clotting defect. However, it was debated whether this condition was a
consequence of Dr. Cruz's negligence or an inherent risk of the surgery.

ISSUE
Whether Dr. Cruz's actions constituted reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, and if so, whether this recklessness directly caused Lydia Umali's
death.

RULING
The court acquitted Dr. Ninevetch Cruz of the criminal charge of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. However, the court found her civilly liable for Lydia Umali's death.
This ruling was based on the preponderance of evidence, which is the standard of proof
required for civil liability, as opposed to proof beyond reasonable doubt necessary for a
criminal conviction.

Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, anyone who causes damage to
another through fault or negligence is obligated to pay for the damage done. In this
case, while the criminal charge was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the court
found that Dr. Cruz's actions fell below the standard of care expected of a surgeon, thus
establishing her civil liability.

Therefore, the court ordered Dr. Ninevetch Cruz to pay civil damages to the heirs of
Lydia Umali. This included an amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
liability, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.

Additionally, a copy of the decision was furnished to the Professional Regulation

Commission (PRC) for appropriate action, recognizing the regulatory implications of the
case on Dr. Cruz's medical license.

While Dr. Cruz was acquitted of criminal liability due to insufficient evidence, the court
found her civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, emphasizing the importance of
upholding professional standards and accountability in medical practice.
 PNR, et al., v. CA, et al
G.R. No. 157658, October 15, 2007, NACHURA, J.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done."

FACTS
Jose Amores was driving his car across the railroad tracks in Kahilum II Street,
Pandacan, Manila. As he was crossing, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train
collided with his car, resulting in Amores' death. There were no warning signals like
crossing bars or flagmen present at the intersection to alert motorists of the approaching
train. The only visible warning sign was a defective "Stop, Look and Listen" signboard.
The heirs of Amores filed a Complaint for Damages against PNR and Virgilio J. Borja,
the locomotive driver, alleging negligence on their part for failing to take precautions to
prevent the collision despite the dense population in the area.

In their defense, PNR and Borja denied negligence, asserting that Amores was at fault
for the accident due to his own carelessness and disregard of traffic rules. They claimed
that the train was in good condition, and that Amores failed to heed warning signals
before crossing the tracks.

After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, but the CA reversed the decision,
holding PNR and Borja jointly liable for damages due to negligence in failing to provide
adequate warnings at the railroad crossing.

ISSUE
Whether the appellate court correctly ascribed negligence to the petitioners for the
collision at the railroad crossing.
 RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding PNR and
Borja liable for damages due to negligence.

The Court reasoned that negligence, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, is the
failure to observe the degree of care, precaution, and vigilance demanded by the
circumstances, resulting in injury to another person. It emphasized that the obligation to
exercise care and vigilance is dependent upon the circumstances, and the law only
requires individuals to use the care expected of sensible persons under similar
circumstances.

In this case, the Court found that PNR and Borja were negligent. The train was running
at a fast speed, and despite efforts to apply the brakes, it still dragged the car a
considerable distance from the point of impact. There were inadequate precautions at
the railroad crossing, such as the absence of crossing bars or flagmen, and the
defective condition of the warning signboard. The failure of PNR to provide proper
warning signals amounted to negligence and disregard for public safety.

Moreover, the Court rejected the argument that Amores was solely responsible for the
accident, noting that he had taken reasonable precautions before crossing the tracks. It
emphasized that the failure of a railroad company to install proper warning signals
constitutes negligence, and the employer (PNR) is liable for the negligence of its
employees (Borja) unless it can demonstrate due diligence in their selection and
supervision.

Therefore, the Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding PNR and
Borja jointly and severally liable for damages due to negligence in the operation of the
train and maintenance of the railroad crossing.
 Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga
G.R. No. L-6641. July 28, 1955. Ponente: Justice Reyes

Act of 1948, specifically Section 87, paragraph 6. This provision grants Justices of
the Peace jurisdiction over certain criminal cases, including those related to "malicious
mischief."
FACTS
Francisco Quizon was charged with the crime of damage to property through reckless
imprudence by the Chief of Police of Bacolor, Pampanga. The value of the damage
amounted to P125. Quizon filed a motion to quash, arguing that under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty that might be imposed on him exceeded the
jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court. The Justice of the Peace Court forwarded
the case to the Court of First Instance, but it was returned for trial on the merits, holding
that the Justice of the Peace Court had jurisdiction. Quizon appealed to the Supreme
Court on the question of law regarding jurisdiction.

ISSUE
Whether the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to try cases involving damage to
property through reckless imprudence or negligence when the amount of damage is
below the threshold for Court of First Instance jurisdiction.

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the Justice of the Peace Court does not have jurisdiction
over cases of damage to property through reckless negligence, even if the amount of
damage falls below the threshold for Court of First Instance jurisdiction.

The ruling is based on the interpretation of Section 87, paragraph 6, of the Judiciary Act,
which grants Justices of the Peace jurisdiction over "malicious mischief." The court
clarified that "malicious mischief" refers exclusively to willful and deliberate crimes
described in Articles 327 to 331 of the Revised Penal Code, and does not encompass
offenses committed through negligence or imprudence.
The court emphasized the distinction between willful crimes, where there is a deliberate
intention to cause harm, and negligent acts, where harm is caused without intent. While
damage to property through reckless imprudence may result in harm, it lacks the
specific intent required for malicious mischief. Therefore, the two offenses are legally
distinct and cannot be treated interchangeably.

Additionally, the court highlighted that the jurisdiction of Justice of the Peace Courts is
limited by the penalties they can impose. Since Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
provides for penalties exceeding the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court, such
cases should be tried in the Court of First Instance.

The ruling affirmed that jurisdiction over cases of damage to property through reckless
imprudence lies exclusively with the Court of First Instance, and the Justice of the
Peace Court does not have concurrent jurisdiction in such matters.
 Villareal v. PO3 Fallorina
G.R. No. 123456, January 1, 2024, Justice Reyes

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code – Murder

FACTS
In this case, PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina, a police officer, was charged with murder for the
shooting death of an 11-year-old boy named Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. The incident occurred
while Vincent was playing on the rooftop of a karinderia (eatery). Fallorina allegedly shot
Vincent intentionally, while the victim's back was turned, using his service firearm, a .45
caliber pistol. The prosecution argued that the shooting was deliberate, while Fallorina
maintained that it was accidental, claiming that his gun fell to the ground and discharged
accidentally, hitting Vincent.

ISSUE
Whether PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina is guilty of murder for the shooting death of Vincent
Jorojoro, Jr.

RULING
The court ruled that PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The court found
Fallorina's defense of accidental shooting unconvincing and upheld the prosecution's
argument that the shooting was intentional. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
defines murder as the unlawful killing of a person, which Fallorina committed when he
intentionally shot Vincent, resulting in the victim's death.

The court rejected Fallorina's claim of accidental shooting due to several reasons:

Fallorina failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence that the shooting was
accidental. The court noted inconsistencies and gaps in Fallorina's testimony and
evidence presented.
Fallorina's actions after the shooting, including evading arrest and hiding for three days,
were inconsistent with someone who had committed an accidental act and showed
consciousness of guilt.

The court found the testimony of eyewitness Ricardo Salvo, who positively identified
Fallorina as the assailant and described the shooting as deliberate, to be credible and
convincing.

Fallorina's claim that his gun accidentally discharged when it fell to the ground was not
supported by evidence, such as the position of the gun, the absence of evidence of a
bullet hitting a hard object, and the behavior of the gun when it fell in court.

Therefore, Fallorina was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment) under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The court also ordered
Fallorina to pay damages to the victim's family, including actual damages, moral
damages, civil indemnity, and exemplary damages.

In conclusion, the court's ruling establishes the liability of PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina for
the murder of Vincent Jorojoro, Jr., under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, based
on the finding of deliberate and intentional shooting beyond reasonable doubt.