Colour codes
⌂ ---- Question from corresponding paragraph
⌂ ---- Analysis for prelims and mains point of view
⌂ ---- Detailed explanation for prelims and mains point of view
⌂ ---- Overall brief about the article
Why are people fleeing Myanmar
for Mizoram?
What’s happening in the border States of the northeast because of the civil
war in the neighbouring country? How have ethnic organisations
responded to the junta crackdown? How has China reacted to the
hostilities?
The Brotherhood Alliance’s attack on the junta since late October has
changed the equations, increasing the number of battlefields for the junta
and stretching it thin
GS 2: India and its Neighbourhood
The story so far:
In a spillover of the civil war in Myanmar, more than 1,500 nationals of India’s neighbouring
country, took refuge in Mizoram’s Champhai district early this Monday following a gunfight
between the Myanmar Army, and pro-democracy militias in the country’s western Chin State
abutting Mizoram. Reports indicate that the attacks on the ruling military junta (or the
Tatmadaw) involving the Chin National Army (CNA) and the Chin Defense Force among others
led to the capture of two bases — the Khawmawi and Rihkhawdar military camps — by the
rebels.
What is the situation in Myanmar?
The attacks in Chin State coincidentally followed a major coordinated attack on regime forces by
three ethnic armed groups — the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA),
Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA) in Myanmar’s north Shan
State abutting China. The coordinated attacks, termed “Operation 1027” on October 27, by the
Three Brotherhood Alliance as the three groups called their collective, led to serious setbacks
for the junta’s forces in Shan State and brought about a sequence of other rebel attacks —
including those in the Chin State. Scores of military outposts and bases were either abandoned
by the junta forces or were captured by the rebels, with the UN stating that 60,000 people in
Shan State and 2,00,000 overall in the country have been displaced following the current
hostilities taking the total number of civilian displacements to more than two million since the
coup. -----→ The coordinated attacks by ethnic armed groups in Myanmar's Shan State, known
as "Operation 1027," inflicted significant setbacks on the junta's forces, resulting in the
abandonment or capture of military outposts and bases. This has contributed to a worsening
humanitarian situation, displacing over 2 million civilians since the military coup.
What led to the current civil war?
In February 2021, a new junta, the State Administration Council (SAC) dominated by the
Myanmar armed forces, organised a military coup that ousted the civilian National League for
Democracy-government and detained its leader Aung San Suu Kyi among many other legislators
and party officials. The junta said it captured power because of irregularities in the November
2020 elections, even though international observers called the elections fair. The coup led to the
collapse of the democratic phase that opened up after the 2008 Constitution. This Constitution
allowed for reserving 25% of the Parliament of Myanmar for serving military officers, and
control over home, border affairs and defence by the military, thereby limiting civilian powers. --
---→ The junta's coup in Myanmar, citing electoral irregularities, obscured its intent to maintain
military control, undermining the democratic progress initiated after the 2008 Constitution,
which already granted significant power to the military.
After the February 2021 coup, there were nationwide protests and civil disobedience
campaigns, leading to what was called the “Spring Revolution”. Members of the deposed NLD
and other elected ethnic lawmakers formed a new political body called the Committee
Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (or National Parliament in Burmese), which along with other
civil society actors, ethnic party representatives and others later formed the National Unity
Consultative Council (NUCC) — a dialogue platform seeking to unite pro-democratic forces. The
NUCC agreed upon a “federal democratic charter” (FDC) that sought to come up with a future
constitution, and a political roadmap to a “federal democratic” country to be led by a National
Unity Government (NUG) that was announced in April 2021. A final publication of the FDC
happened in March 2022, after incorporating ethnic demands of recognition and equality for
non-Bamar minority identities. The United States Institute of Peace argues that the resistance is
now “led by the most inclusive political coalition in Myanmar’s history”. ---→ How did the
nationwide protests and formation of the NUCC contribute to the "Spring Revolution," and what
role did the Federal Democratic Charter play in shaping Myanmar's resistance against the
military junta?
The junta responded by violently cracking down on the largely peaceful movement leading to
the NUG announcing the creation of People’s Defense Forces (PDF), and in September 2021,
explicitly gave the call for the PDF and other rebels to attack the junta, launching a civil war.
What has been the ethnic organisations’ response to the coup?
The ethnic armed actors, despite coming under severe attack over the years from the
Tatmadaw, have managed to establish autonomous enclaves in their areas. With the Tatmadaw
unable to defeat them entirely, it signed ceasefires with groups that allowed them to retain
arms and some autonomy in minority areas, a situation that persists even today. The ethnic
armed groups’ responses to the insurrection call by the NUG have been varied. A paper by Paul
Vrieze in the Asian Survey journal last year pointed to three divergent responses. Groups such as
the Karen (Karen National Union), Kachin (Kachin Independence Organization), Chin (Chin
National Front) and Karenni (Karenni National Progressive Party) rebels support the NUG,
fighting the army and helping forming anti-coup militias. They do so while rejecting a NUG
proposal for a single “Federal Army’’ under unified NUG command. ---→ The diverse responses
of ethnic armed groups, including support for the NUG and formation of anti-coup militias while
resisting a unified "Federal Army," highlight the complexity of alliances and challenges in
Myanmar's resistance against the military junta.
What happened after Chin was targeted?
The junta’s first punitive action against ethnic armed organisations was targeted at those in
Chin State in October 2021, an initiative that failed but resulted in several refugees fleeing to
Mizoram and Manipur in India. While New Delhi passed strictures not to open camps or provide
assistance, the Mizoram government defied the Union government’s order to deport the
refugees and allowed them to take shelter. The Mizo people regard those from the Chin
community as ethnic brethren. The influx of refugees in Manipur has heightened the ethnic
conflict between the Kuki-Zo community and the majority Meiteis in the State.
Eight groups including the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), New Mon State Party
(NMSP), Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) initially joined the NUCC dialogue, but
after the junta’s crackdown, decided to retain their ceasefire status with the junta. The TNLA,
the Kokang-based MNDAA, and other northern groups in Shan State, besides the Rakhine state
based AA used the post-coup situation to strengthen themselves without provoking the junta.
However, the Brotherhood Alliance between the MNDAA, AA and the TNLA and its attack on the
junta forces since late October has changed equations suddenly, increasing the number of
battlefields for the junta and stretching it thin. ----→ The evolving dynamics among ethnic
armed groups, especially the formation of the Brotherhood Alliance and their recent attacks,
have significantly altered the strategic landscape, challenging the junta on multiple fronts and
increasing pressure on its military capabilities.
How has China reacted?
Myanmar’s closest ally, China, has leverage over some of the northern ethnic armed forces that
are now engaged against the junta. While Beijing has publicly called for a cessation in hostilities,
experts aver that the Chinese are willing to tolerate the actions as the rebels have evinced
interest in reining in illicit activities such as “telecom scam centres” in the Kokang zone. The
MNDAA announced that it is planning to attack the Laukkai township in Kokang which is
controlled by junta-affiliated militias and is also host to many cybercrime compounds. These
illicit centres have trapped thousands of Chinese nationals besides many from Southeast Asia,
forcing them to carry out internet fraud, theft and cybercrime activities targeting Chinese
citizens and others.
Brief about the article:
The civil war in Myanmar, stemming from the 2021 military coup, has led to a spillover into
India's Mizoram, with over 1,500 refugees fleeing recent clashes in Myanmar's Chin State. The
conflict involves ethnic armed groups, including the Chin National Army, and has resulted in
significant setbacks for the junta's forces. The diverse responses of ethnic armed organizations
to the coup, support for the National Unity Government, and recent attacks on the junta have
added complexity to the situation. China, Myanmar's ally, is urged for a ceasefire, while experts
suggest it may tolerate actions against the junta due to rebels' interest in curbing illicit activities.
Why has the China-Pakistan
corridor stalled?
What has led to an impasse in the development of the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor?
The main project, under the CPEC, was to establish a corridor connecting
Pakistan’s Gwadar port in Balochistan to China’s Kashgar in the Xinjiang
region
GS 2: India and its Neighbourhood
The story so far:
Seeking funds to the tune of $65 billion via infrastructure investment, Pakistan’s caretaker
Prime Minister Anwaarul Haq Kakar, on October 20, completed a five-day trip to Beijing. He was
also attempting to allay China’s demands regarding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC), the infrastructure project spearheaded by Beijing from 2015 that had reached an
impasse due to disagreements over the Gwadar port in Balochistan.
What is the CPEC?
The CPEC — one of the One Belt, One Road’s (OBOR) largest investments — was formally
launched in 2015 during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s two-day state visit to Pakistan. Signing
over 50 projects worth $45 billion, China set up the ‘Silk Road Fund’ to invest in CPEC projects
planned till 2030. The main project was to establish a corridor connecting Pakistan’s Gwadar
port in Balochistan to China’s Kashgar in the south-western Xinjiang region. The Silk Road Fund,
which manages the investment, is being financed by a consortium of Chinese banks. The
projects themselves are undertaken by various Chinese firms in collaboration with Pakistani
companies. Apart from this corridor, a number of power projects and several special economic
zones are to be developed under the CPEC. ----→ The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
launched in 2015, is a flagship project of the One Belt, One Road initiative, involving over 50
projects and a $45 billion investment aimed at creating an economic corridor connecting
Gwadar port in Balochistan, Pakistan, to Kashgar in Xinjiang, China, fostering collaboration on
power projects and special economic zones.
When did trouble start?
The CPEC had teething troubles in 2016 as several projects ground to a halt over confusion on
funding, contractor selection, delay in bidding process, differences over tax exemption, and
obtaining of no-objection certificates. For example, the Gwadar port faced multiple issues,
starting with water supply. The 11.2 billion rupees project to supply, treat and distribute water
to the port by connecting the Swad and Shadikaur dams was delayed as the port authorities
were unclear if the project’s funding was via a grant, an interest-free loan or a commercial loan
from China. Other projects like the 600 MW Gwadar coal-fired power plant and the Gwadar
Smart Port City Master Plan too ran into issues over uncertainty about funding. ----→ The CPEC
faced critical challenges in 2016, including project halts and funding uncertainties, particularly
exemplified by issues in the Gwadar port project, highlighting the complexity and obstacles
within the initiative.
These projects are financed by commercial Chinese loans and are insured by the China Export
and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure) against non-payment, guaranteed by the Pakistan
government. Sinosure levies a 7% debt servicing fee, a yearly varying interest, and financing fee,
making the entire project a huge economic burden on the debt-ridden nation. Several experts
have argued that the high costs incurred in construction will diminish any gains from the
increased power production.
How have locals reacted to the project?
The biggest thorn in CPEC’s side is the intense protest by locals in Balochistan against the
Gwadar port city project. Fearing loss of local livelihoods such as fishing, and resisting the use of
unskilled Chinese labour instead of Pakistani locals, Baloch residents have refused to sell land to
the Chinese for building the port. Moreover, the Gwadar port has been leased to the China
Overseas Ports Holding Company which means that Beijing reaps 91% of the profits while
Islamabad gains only 9%. This has led to a rise in anti-China sentiments among Baloch locals.
↑
How have local protests in Balochistan, fueled by concerns over livelihoods, employment, and
the unequal profit-sharing arrangement in the Gwadar port project, impacted sentiments
toward China among Baloch residents?
Complicating issues further, the Pakistani government has resorted to grabbing lands from
locals, forcing them to resettle elsewhere. This has led to a rise in insurgency in Balochistan.
These militant groups have carried out several attacks on Pakistani Army officials providing
protection to Chinese workers.
What is the rift between China and Pakistan?
China stopped funding three road projects — the 210-km Dera Ismail Khan-Zhob Road worth 81
billion rupees, the 110-km Khuzdar-Basima Road worth 19.7 billion rupees, and the 136-km
Karakoram Highway worth 8.5 billion rupees — over suspicions of corruption. China also
complicated the Gwadar port issue by insisting on Yuan as a legal tender in the region. In a
retaliatory move, in May 2018, the Pakistan National Assembly’s Standing Committee ordered
an inquiry into the China Overseas Ports Holding Company (Pakistan) claiming that it had been
operating without valid security clearance. The port construction, already slow due to local
resistance, virtually stalled. In 2022, China refused to further expand cooperation with Pakistan
in the areas of energy, water management, and climate change under CPEC. ---→ China's
suspension of funding for key road projects, insistence on the use of Yuan as legal tender, and a
subsequent decline in cooperation signal significant challenges and strains in the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC), impacting infrastructure development and diplomatic ties between
the two nations.
What next?
With the recent visit to Beijing, Islamabad is attempting to restart funding for its key projects.
While Mr. Kakar and Chinese President Xi Jinping reviewed the progress of other projects, the
development of the Gwadar port itself remains unresolved.
Brief about the article:
Pakistan's caretaker Prime Minister's visit to Beijing sought $65 billion for infrastructure
investment, aiming to address challenges in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
particularly related to the Gwadar port in Balochistan. The CPEC, launched in 2015, faced
hurdles due to funding, contractor selection, and local resistance, especially in Balochistan.
Locals in Balochistan have protested against the Gwadar port project, fearing loss of livelihood
and exploitation of unskilled Chinese labour. China's funding suspension for three road projects
and insistence on using Yuan added to the rift between China and Pakistan. Despite the recent
visit, the fate of the Gwadar port development remains unresolved.
