Constitutional Transition in Museveni's Uganda: New Horizons or Another False Start?

Author(s): J. Oloka-Onyango
Source: Journal of African Law , 1995, Vol. 39, No. 2 (1995), pp. 156-172
Published by: School of Oriental and African Studies

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 CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION IN MUSEVENI'S
UGANDA: NEW HORIZONS OR ANOTHER FALSE
START?*

J. OLOKA-ONYANGO**

"First of all, the idea of multi-parties is not a new one in Africa. Here in Uganda
we had multi-parties between 1962 and 1966. The generals took over power al
over Africa because the multi-parties had failed: this is a historical fact. The
failure was, however, not surprising because we are talking about systems fro
completely different societies. In Africa, we still have pre-industrial societies without
any significant level of social stratification [and] therefore, we are still dealin
mainly with tribal groups. Political pluralism will come to Africa, no doubt, bu
not at a forced pace."
(Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda)

INTRODUCTION

Uganda's Yoweri Museveni currently enjoys the limelight as one of Africa'

new breed of leaders, the contradictory beloved figure of liberal Africanists
radical Africans and the World Bank. He is perhaps the only leader who can
hob-nob with both Baroness Chalker, British Minister for Overseas Developmen
and Libya's Muammar el Quadaffi and get away with it. He is certainly t
only African incumbent who has successfully withstood Western pressure f
"multi-partyism"-pressure that hastened the eventual collapse of the Kamuz
Banda gerontocracy in Malawi and political transition in a host of other stat
around the continent.' In the country of his birth, Museveni either evok
uncritical loyalty and absolute devotion, or scathing, uncompromising, even
pathological distaste.2 At this point in the evolution and tenure of the Nation
Resistance Movement (NRM), Museveni has much to smile about, havin
brought Uganda out of the doldrums, to the point where members of t
National Resistance Army (NRA) can be invited to form part of the African
contingent keeping the peace in Liberia. Even his worst critics will acknowled
(in a moment of unguarded, objective reflection) that there has been positiv
change over the NRM's eight-year stay in office.
The concern of this article is not to add to the accolades heaped on this ne
African "revolutionary". Rather, it is to step back and critically examine the
process of transition to a new constitutional order on which Museveni has stak
much of his claim to being a new and genuinely different kind of African lead
In particular, it focuses on the "no-party" philosophy by which recent Uganda
politics has been guided. To do this, the article takes the legal framework with

* An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1st Conference on Law, Politics a
Multipartyism in East Africa, 17-21 October, 1993, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. I am grateful
Sylvia Tamale for her ever critical comments, but remain responsible for any errors.
** Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda and Visitin
Professor, University of Minnesota Law School/Institute of International Studies: Minneapo
U.S.A. (1994-95).
i M. Chege, "Remembering Africa", (1992) 71 Foreign Afairs 146; G. M. Carew, "Developmen
theory and the promise of democracy: the future of post-colonial African states", (1993) 40, 4 Afr
Today 31.
2 B. Berkeley, "Uganda: an African success story?", Atlantic Monthly (September 1994) 24.

156

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Vol. 39, No. 2 Constitutional transition in Museveni's Uganda 157

which the struggle for democratic change is taking place, flavoured with a critical
analysis of its historical and socio-political context. Hence, the concern is not
merely the major legal instruments that are central to the transition, but also
the events that preceded the completion of the draft Constitution which, at the
time of revising this article, is the subject of scrutiny, debate and amendment
by the delegates to the Constituent Assembly (CA).3 It also gauges the sustainability
of the process of democratic change in Uganda, observed against the backdrop
of political consolidation and manoeuvring that has characterized the interim
period of NRM governance. A comparison is made with previous attempts at
democratic reform in the country in a bid to answer the question: is this a new
horizon, or yet another false Ugandan start?
The article is divided into four sections. The first provides a historical backdrop
to constitutional transition in Uganda, thereby establishing the basis for a critical
consideration of the dynamics of the transition process initiated under the
NRM-the subject of the second part of the paper. The next part examines the
main features of the draft Constitution as well as the Constituent Assembly
Statute, and the article concludes with a consideration of the prospects for the
future of the country.

The independence honeymoon: an historical reprise

Uganda's first post-colonial constitutional instrument was the 1962 Constitution
that was promulgated following negotiations between Britain as the departing
colonial power and the nationalist politicians of the day. Despite the current
belief, promoted by NRM politicians as part of the justification for a new
Constitution, the 1962 Constitution was indeed predated by a Constituent
Assembly of sorts, and was not entirely the product of a closed, non-participatory
debate.4 Following extensive recommendations for reform by a 1959 Con-
stitutional Committee drawn from the members of the Legislative Council
(LEGCO), the then Secretary of State for the Colonies made a number of
proposals. The first was that direct elections should be held throughout the
protectorate in early 1960. The second resulted in the establishment of a
Relationships Commission to ". . . make a careful study of the form of government
which would be appropriate for a self-governing Uganda". This led to the
establishment of the Munster Commission to make proposals on the form of
government that should be adopted in independent Uganda. According to Ovonji
the proposals of the Commission were a mass of contradictions, since they
counselled that:

"... Uganda be made a single, democratic state with a strong, central government
and that the Buganda Kingdom be granted federal status with more powers than
it had hitherto, and that the other Kingdoms be semi-federal states. At a time
when the protectorate was moving towards independence, the protectorate ad-
ministration was raising issues directed towards creating disunity."5

3 Elections to the Constituent Assembly (CA) were held at the beginning of 1994. Actual debate
and deliberations in the Assembly commenced in April of the same year. While the election and
the debate are both interesting issues for examination, this article is concerned mainly with the
process preceding these events. Although not specifically referenced, extensive reliance is placed on
the Ugandan media output, which is prolific and fairly independent. This covers the period 1993
to 1994. The newspapers heavily relied upon include: The New Vision, The Monitor, Weekly Topic, Uganda
Confidential, and Star.
4 H. F. Morris andJ. S. Read, Uganda: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, London, 1972.
5 I. Ovonji, "Constitutional government and human rights in Uganda", in N. Rembe and E.
Kalula (eds.), Constitutional Government and Human Rights in Africa, Roma, 1991, 217.

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158 Constitutional transition in Museveni' Uganda [1995] J.A.L.

The 1961 London Constitutional Conference was chaired by the then Secretary
of State for the Colonies, Iain Macleod, and was attended by a motley collection
of colonists and colonized. The 1962 Constitution that resulted from this
conference continued in the same contradictory spirit as that of the Munster
Commission recommendations. Its major problem was that it was based on
compromise, manifestly opportunistic alliances and the demands of the aristocracy
in Buganda, the largest and economically most dominant of the regions in
Uganda. As a consequence, it left many issues unresolved. Those issues that
were addressed were settled badly. Buganda was granted a superior status, while
the remaining kingdom areas enjoyed a semi-federal status within the whole.
The lines between the rights of the states and the power and authority of the
central government were ill-defined, culminating in a variety of conflicts and
struggles between the two entities over such matters as the Land Question and
the distribution of finances.6 Simultaneously, the powers of the main government
officials-the supposedly ceremonial President (Sir Edward Mutesa) and the
executive Prime Minister (Apollo Milton Obote)-were vague and fraught with
potential conflict. This is precisely what happened in 1966. Following the growing
rift between the two, coupled with the rupture of the alliance between their
respective political parties, Kabaka Yekka (KY) and the Uganda People's Congress
(UPC), Obote overthrew the 1962 Constitution and declared the kingdoms
abolished. Troops of the Uganda Army surrounded the King's palace and
Mutesa was hounded into exile.7 The rest, as the saying goes, is history.

Obote and beyond: shattered dreams, extended nightmares

Uganda's 1966 Constitution was constructed in the teeth of what became
known as the Buganda Crisis. The National Assembly was convened and its
members were informed that they had been constituted into a Constituent
Assembly, representing the people of Uganda and brought together to draft a
new Constitution. Obote outlined the main features that differentiated the
proposed document (which members found in their pigeon-holes) from the
Independence Constitution, and read out the motion for adoption. The opposition
members of Parliament walked out of the Assembly along with four members
of the Government side, and the speaker immediately called a vote on the
motion. There was no debate and, not surprisingly, the motion adopting the
1966 Constitution was passed by a vote of 55 to 4. The 1966 Constitution was
thus promulgated with neither debate nor discussion, hence the apt description
adopted for it-"Pigeon-Hole" Constitution. The new Constitution created an
executive presidency, vesting the office with fairly extensive powers of government.
The old federated structures remained in place, but basically as an interim
measure designed to pave the way for the introduction of a new Constitution
(see Article 145, 1966 Uganda Constitution).
With the Buganda Crisis behind him and aided by the declaration of a state
of emergency, Obote felt confident enough to precede the 1967 Constitution
with significantly more debate, as well as the creation of a Constituent Assembly.8
Act No. 12 of 1967 made provision for the establishment of such a body-at
least in name. The intention of the law, however, was clearly not to create a

6 J. J. Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modem History, London, 1981.

7 E. F. Mutesa, The Desecration of My Kingdom, London, 1967; N. Akena-Adoko, Uganda Crisis,
Kampala, 1968.
8 A. W. Bradley, "Constitution-making in Uganda", (1967) 7, 1 Transition 25 at 26.

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Vol. 39, No. 2 Constitutional transition in Museveni' Uganda 159

body different from the Parliament that had been in place since independence,
and which now had a clear UPC majority.9 The document that Parliament
subsequently debated and approved ostensibly sounded the death-knell for
federalism and monarchy in Uganda, as evidenced by Articles 118 and 8(3) of
the 1967 Constitution. The latter stipulated that no citizen of Uganda shall enjoy
"... any special privilege, status or title ... by virtue of his birth, descent or
heredity". The law that made provision for the payment of pensions to the
former traditional rulers, mentioned both the wife, the former Nabagereka (Lady
Damali Kisosonkole Mutesa), and the 11 children of the exiled Kabaka, in
addition to all the other former kingdom rulers. To add insult to injury, however,
no mention whatsoever was made of Sir Edward-a clear expression of Obote's
personal umbrage towards his erstwhile political ally.
Since 1967, the Constitution has undergone several amendments, the most
fundamental of which have been the various Legal Notices promulgated after
the violent transitions from one regime to the next, and essentially intended to
validate the extra-constitutional usurpation of power by the new regime. Idi
Amin set the stage with Legal Notice No. 1 of 1971 which suspended Articles
1, 3 and 63 of the 1967 Constitution, thereby installing Amin as supreme ruler
of Uganda with the power to rule by decree.?1 Other regimes followed suit,
taking what they felt was beneficial to their extra-constitutional usurpation and
exercise of power, and suspending or simply ignoring what they felt was a
hindrance." Needless to say, despite lip-service respect for the 1967 Constitution,
neither the practice nor the law that was promulgated under it actually paid
any homage to accepted notions of constitutionalism or democratic rule. The
Constitution was at best an expeditious instrument for the consolidation of
personal power and at worst was simply ignored. The rise to power of the NRM
in the mid- 1 980s witnessed a marked shift in rhetoric, culminating in the process
of transition currently under way in Uganda. It is to a critical consideration of
this process that we can now turn.

THE NRM AND CONSUTTUTIONAL TRANSITION

Upon assuming power in 1986, the NRM proclaimed an era of "fundamental

change" based on its "Ten-Point Programme".'2 It ushered in novel institutions
of governance, both at the local level, such as resistance committees and councils
(RCs) and at the higher levels, with the establishment of an Ombudsman in the
form of the Inspector-General of Government (IGG), the creation of a Human
Rights Commission, and, in 1988, the Constitutional Commission.13 Much
however remained the same, while some things even became worse. Political
party activity was severely constrained, a civil war festered in the north of the
country, and a massive backlog of "lodgers" accumulated in military detention

9 S. 1 of Act No. 12 stated: "The National Assembly may from time to time resolve itself into a
Constituent Assembly with full power to enact such provisions for or in connection with the
establishment of a new Constitution as it thinks fit".
10 Art. 1 refers to the supremacy of the Constitution, Art. 3 to its alteration, and Art. 63 to the
power to make law.
1" C. Gertzel, "Uganda after Amin: the continuing search for leadership and control", (1980) 37
African Affairs 461-489.
12 National Resistance Movement, The Ten-Point Programme of the National Resistance Movement,
Kampala, 1986.
13 S. Salyaga, "RCs: a path for democracy?" (1987) 9, 2 Forward 9; E. Ddungu, E. and A.
Wabwire, Electoral Mechanisms and the Democratic Process, CBR Working Paper No. 9, 1990; A. Kiapi,

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160 Constitutional transition in Museveni' Uganda [1995] J.A.L.

camps.4 Coupled with all this, the regime's commitment to genuine con-
stitutionalism was suspect, if not downright hostile. In part, such hostility was
generated by the "no-party" or movement philosophy by which the NRM has
been guided.
The no-party ideology asserts that because of the low ("classless") level of
social and economic development in Africa, political parties will invariably
degenerate into ethnic or religious factions, with the attendant social strife that
usually accompanies such factionalism. Echoes of this argument can be found
in the single-party ideology of the early- 1960s. Speaking soon after independence,
Tanzania's Julius Nyerere stated:
"With rare exceptions the idea of class is something entirely foreign to Africa.
Here, in this continent, the Nationalist Movements are fighting a battle for freedom
from foreign domination not from domination by any ruling class of our own. To
us 'the other party' is the colonial power. In many parts of Africa this struggle has
been won: in others it is still going on. But everywhere the people who fight the
battle are not the former overlords wanting to re-establish a lost authority; they
are not a rich mercantile class whose freedom to exploit the masses is being limited
by the colonial powers, they are the common people of Africa."'5

The no-party philosophy is of questionable veracity but has proven a powerful

tool of mobilization given the historical performance of political parties in
Uganda, and thus finds many adherents. But this is only part of the story. In
order to comprehend fully the nature and content of the constitutional transition
that is taking place in Uganda today, and most importantly to gauge its long-
term sustainability, it is imperative to examine the broad context. From a legal
perspective, this entails an examination of the record of the NRM on the issue
of constitutionalism and its response to critical constitutional issues that have
arisen in its "interim" period of governance. This is important for two reasons:
the NRM is acting as both mother and mid-wife in the transition process, which
requires a consideration of NRM rule over the past eight years; and the NRM
(or at a minimum Museveni) sees itself as a critical component of the post-
"interim" period.

The NRM response to constitutional challenges

During the course of the NRM administration, there have been several
instances in which the regime's commitment to genuine constitutionalism has
been put to the test and found wanting. An early example came by way of a
challenge to the constitutional regime that the NRM itself had introduced. This

"The Inspector General of Government: Uganda's ombudsman of all trades", (1990) 9 The
Ombudsman Journal 91; J. Oloka-Onyango, "The dynamics of corruption control and human
rights enforcement in Uganda", (1993) 1, 1 East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights 23;
E. A. Brett, "Rebuilding organization capacity in Uganda under the NRM", (1994) 32 Journal
of Modern African Studies 53. The major constitutional instrument of the NRM regime is Legal
Notice No. 1 of 1986 (LN1/86), which formed the basis for the legitimization and subsequent
exercise of state power by the government. Like its predecessors, LN1/86 suspended Art. 3
(alteration of the Constitution); Chapter IV (the Executive), save Arts. 24, 28, 34, 35 and 36;
Chapter V (on Parliament) and Art. 63 (on the power to make laws for Uganda), of the 1967
Constitution. LN1/86 introduced several new concepts into the mode of governance such as
the vetting of Presidential appointees (paras. 8 and 9), although in substance the exercise of
this power has rarely been witnessed in Parliament.
14 Amnesty International, Uganda: The Human Rights Record, London, 1989.
15 J. Nyerere, "One party government", (1961) 1, 2 Transition 9.

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Vol. 39, No. 2 Constitutional transition in Museveni's Uganda 161

was in the unreported case of Ssempebwa v. Attorney General. This tested the
constitutionality of an amendment to Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986 (LN1/86), the
instrument that legitimized and established the structural framework for the
NRM's governance. The case originated in a claim against the previous Obote
Government for wrongful arrest and imprisonment, search and humiliation, as
well as claims for lost and damaged property. After the plaintiff obtained
judgment in his favour and made several requests for payment, nothing was
forthcoming. This was in violation of the legal principle on the inheritance of
debts between successor governments. The plaintiff then applied for a writ of
mandamus against the NRM Government which would have compelled payment
in satisfaction of the judgment.
The judge in the lower court refused to grant Ssempebwa leave to apply for
the order on the grounds that LN1/86 had been nullified by Legal Notice No. 6
of 1986 (LN6/86) which prohibited actions against the NRM and the NRA
resulting from activities that had led to their assumption of power. LN6/86 also
extended the prohibition to cover all actions brought against the Government in
relation to acts committed by previous governments between 1 November, 1978
and 26 January, 1986. The Notice consequently nullified any action, suit or
proceedings that had been brought in the courts against the Government before
23 August, 1986. On appeal the most essential argument was that LN6/86 had
not been made in accordance with the Constitution (as amended by LN1/86).
The leading judgment marked a significant departure from the mode in which
the Ugandanjudiciary had traditionally responded to constitutional cases. Declaring
that the NRM was bound by the terms of the constitutional regime it had itself
introduced, the Court declared: "... even the NRC as the sovereign power who
made the Proclamation LN1/86 is bound to work within the new Constitution.
The NRC having by LN 1/86 set itself the legislative framework, [it] is bound to
work within that framework. It cannot therefore validly legislate outside that
framework" (at 30-31). In a mockery of the Court's judgment, the government
simply drafted a verbatim re-enactment of LN6/86, that complied with the court's
demand to "... work within the new Constitution", but was still of retrospective
application. In effect, this deprived Ssempebwa of any real remedy.
Such chicanery has not been confined to state-court relations, but has also
found expression in several other facets of the operation of the regime, extending
from constitutional amendments to the massive show of military force when
challenged over the proscription of political party activity and the right of
assembly. It has also found expression in the attitude of the government to the
presumption of innocence, the right to remain silent and the right to bail in
criminal trials.16 Enactments of questionable constitutional content have been
commandeered through the interim legislature, the National Resistance Council
(NRC), largely on account of the procedure adopted for the running of the
Council. Of particular concern has been "closed sessions" of the body, which
are chaired by the President and have produced dramatic overnight changes on
seemingly decided positions adopted only the day before. This happened, for
example, in the case of legislation retroactively approving IMF and World Bank
loans, and other issues critical of economic policy, such as the return of the
property of Ugandan Asians expelled in 1972 by Idi Amin.17

16 Association of the Bar of New York City, Uganda at the Crossroads: A Report on Current Human
Rights Conditions, New York, 1991.
17 J. Kakooza, "Some reflections on the repossession of the expropriated properties", (1992) 1
Uganda Law Sociey Review 45.

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162 Constitutional transition in Museveni's Uganda [1995] J.A.L.

In such an atmosphere, it was not surprising that on the eve of the termination
of its self-proclaimed interim period of governance in 1989, the NRC was
convened in close session to discuss and proclaim a five-year unilateral extension
of that period. One of the several reasons given for the extension was that the
Constitutional Commission had yet to complete its work. To hold elections
before they had completed their work, according to this argument, would lead
to an abortion of the process of consolidating peace and unity in the country.
Given the importance attached to this institution as well as the central place
which constitutionalism occupies in the NRM transition arrangement, it is
necessary to turn to a more extensive consideration of its work.

Work of the Uganda Constitutional Commission: a critical review

The establishment of the Uganda Constitutional Commission (UCC) to
consider the question of the promulgation of a new Constitution for Uganda
captures the dual-faceted nature of the Museveni government. On the one hand,
there was little doubt about the need for constitutional reformulation. On the
other, the dynamics of the process of such reform raise serious questions about
the commitment of the regime to genuine democratic transition. This point is
illustrated by several aspects of the process. In the first instance, the Chairman
and the members of the Commission were appointed by the President, without
any openly democratic process of consultation. While over time this criticism
lost much of its force, it is nevertheless a critical consideration especially in light
of the results of the UCC's investigation. The Commission Chairman, Justice
Benjamin Odoki, has argued that such a criticism:
"... was based on the mistaken understanding of the role of the Commission as a
technical committee of experts and specialists charged with the task of collecting
the views of the people, analysing them and drawing up proposals for the new
Constitution. Although the Commission will prepare a Draft Constitution, it will
merely be a proposal to government and the country. It is the people themselves
who will write the final version of the constitution."'

However, the UCC was extremely sensitive to media and intellectual criticism
about their methodology and to any unsanctioned attempts to gather views
about and debate constitutional issues. This was underscored by the government
response to a survey carried out by the independent Centre for Basic Research
(CBR) that came to conclusions that were in direct contrast to the findings of
the Commission.19 The UCC also operated in a period that coincided with
intense military activity in the northern and north-eastern parts of the country,
in which there existed de facto states of emergency, and where access to non-
military personnel was strictly prohibited.20 Although the UCC eventually reached
almost all parts of the country, in many there was still the unresolved issue of
reconciliation, which to date has never been satisfactorily accomplished. Finally,
the influence of external forces on the whole process and the extensive reliance

18 B.J. Odoki, "Writing a democratic constitution", (1993) 1 East African Journal of Peace & Human
Rights 195, at 242-43.
19 Centre for Basic Research Working Paper 10, Constitutionalism in Uganda: Report of a Survey and
Workshop of Organized Groups, Kampala, 1990.
20 Justice Odoki responded by asserting that the UCC had visited and carried out seminars at
the sub-county and district levels in all the disturbed areas. Furthermore, the areas which were
excluded from the more extensive canvassing by the Commission would be represented in the
Constituent Assembly at which time they would get the opportunity to fully air their views on the
Constitution.

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Vol. 39, No. 2 Constitutional transition in Museveni's Uganda 163

placed on foreign material and financial resources to support the Commission

raises questions about the loss of autonomy even to determine the pace and the
content of attempts to engender indigenous and autochthonous instruments of
governance.2' Nevertheless, there were several positive aspects to the operation
of the Commission. It sought, both through its seminars and in calling for public
memoranda, to involve as wide an ambit of the population as was possible.22
Indeed, it is in part on account of its methodology that so much interest and
controversy was generated about the enterprise.
Before turning to a consideration of the main product of the Commission,
the draft Constitution, it is necessary to consider the ramifications of a major
event that occurred before the debate over the draft was fully joined-the issue
of the restoration of Uganda's traditional kingdoms.

The restoration of traditional rulers and the debate over

"Ebyaffe"23
The place and position of Buganda in Ugandan politics has been a conten
issue almost since the establishment of the Uganda protectorate by the Br
colonialists at the turn of the century.24 Buganda was also the staging poin
Museveni's guerrilla war.25 It is thus of little surprise that in the transit
process Buganda returned to the central point in the debate and the jostling
political advantage. The issue that gained most prominence was the fashio
which the government introduced an amendment to the Constitution to ef
the restoration of monarchies and traditional leaders. This was compound
the fact that the amendment completely ignored that the issue of these institu
had been included in the draft Constitution. The whole process of restori
ebyaffe was plagued by contradictions and conflicts.26 The first emerged w
the Attorney-General announced that there were no legal prohibitions to
coronation of the King. This was challenged by an attorney who began prep
a civil suit asserting that the proposed coronation in fact violated the 1967
Constitution. Museveni then stepped in and, arguing that it was impermissible
to retain a constitutional provision that denied people their cultural rights,
declared that the provision would be amended by the NRC. True to its writ,

21 The issue of financial dependence on external funding surfaced in bold relief when a major
financier of the Commission withheld further assistance on account of improprieties alleged to have
taken place in the UCC's parent Ministry. See "DANIDA stops constitution aid", New Vision, 9
January, 1993, 1.
22 The UCC focused on Resistance Councils and Committees (RCs), the NRM's grassroots
structures that commence at the village level and extend upwards through to the county and district
levels. The total number of memoranda received amounted to 15,693, broken down into the
following categories: RCI 9,525, RCII 2,170, RCIII 575, RCIV 13, RCV 36, Individuals 2,539,
and Groups 835 (Uganda Constitutional Commission).
23 Translated literally from the Luganda, ebyaffe connotes "our things". It refers to the overall
cultural and material assets appropriated or abolished by the first Obote Government in the 1966
putsch against the monarchies.
24 A. A. Mazrui, "Privilege and protest as integrative factors: the case of Buganda's status in
Uganda", in A. A. Mazrui and R. I. Rotberg, Protest and Power in Black Africa, New York/Oxford,
1970.
25 K. Ingham, Obote: A Political Biography, London, 1994, 214.
26 Indeed, on more than one occasion, the principal architects of the restoration of the Kingdom
asserted that they had no intention of crowning the King. Thus, for example, Africa Now (April 1986,
6) reported that Abu Mayanja, later to become the co-chairman of the Kabaka's coronation, told a
gathering that those pushing for the restoration of the Kabakaship were members of FOBA (Force
Obote Back Again). See further, "Mutebi already Kabaka", New Vision, 2 April, 1993, in which the
Bataka (Baganda Clan Heads) denied that Mutebi would be enthroned as Kabaka.

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164 Constitutional transition in Musevenis Uganda [1995] J.A.L.

and following a "closed" session with the President in the chair, the NRC passed
the amendments. This was done over further protests from the Uganda Law
Society about the impropriety of such a measure.
Two constitutional enactments which were introduced to achieve the res-
toration of kingdoms raised numerous constitutional issues despite the gov-
ernment's attempt to down-play them as unrelated to the constitution-makin
exercise and thus uncontroversial. The Constitution (Amendment) Statute (No.
7 of 1993) and the Traditional Rulers (Restitution of Assets and Propertie
Statute (No. 8 of 1993) were both assented to on 23 July, 1993, only one week
before the proposed coronation. The first instrument amended the Constitution
to allow for the freedom of all persons to adhere to "... the culture and cultura
institutions of the community to which he belongs or a community of his choice".
It further provided for the repeal and replacement of Article 118 of the 1967
Constitution that had abolished monarchy in Uganda. The new Article 118(2)(a
stipulated that the traditional ruler shall not take part in partisan politics, nor
shall he/she exercise any administrative, legislative, executive or judicial power
of central or local government (Article 118(2)(b)). The main objective of the
second instrument was to restore the property of those monarchs that had bee
confiscated by the first Obote regime.
The general atmosphere in which the debate was carried out paralleled Milton
Obote's arbitrary destruction of the kingdoms in 1966, absent the overt show o
military might. Any opposition-particularly that from within Buganda-was
dismissed as the ravings of fringe and lunatic groups, or was allegedly instigated
by opposition political operatives, desirous of depriving Buganda of its rightful
"things". There were also charges of attempts to create instability and disharmony.
The threat of coercive force against those who might attempt to prevent the
coronation from taking place at all times lay in the background. The fact tha
the NRM had all along adamantly refused to lift the administrative ban o
political party activity, on the grounds that it was an issue for deliberation by
the Constituent Assembly, clearly manifests the double standards in operation.
The chicanery is heightened by the fact that the issue of traditional leaders wa
similarly to be a subject of debate by the same body. The ongoing harassment
of multi-party advocates, who even in the face of open intimidation failed to
find relief in the courts of law, compounded the injury. This was especially s
in the light of existing constitutional provisions guaranteeing free assembly an
expression.
At the same time, the restoration of the kingdom in Buganda produced a
bogey-man for the NRM. This came in the shape of Crown PrinceJohn Barigye's
demand for the restoration of the Obugabe (Kingship) in the former Ankole
kingdom. Here there was both prevarication and chicanery, not only because
Ankole is Museveni's home area and a traditional political strong-hold for the
NRM, but unlike Buganda the monarchy in Ankole lacked the popular appeal
among the majority of the Banyankole people. In addition, because Museveni
was himself from the former ruling sub-group-the Bahima-any official support
for the restoration would have had extremely negative political repercussions.
Consequently, whereas section 3(4) of the Restitution Statute categorically
stipulated that "... all regalia where they exist shall vest in the Traditional Ruler
in accordance with subsection (1) of this section, without the needfor negotiation"
(my emphasis) the Ankole Crown Prince was prevented from repossessing his
regalia, on orders from the President. To date, the restoration of the Ankole
kingdom has been held in abeyance. It has become clear that the primary

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Vol. 39, No. 2 Constitutional transition in MuseveniS Uganda 165

intention of the restoration of the Kabakaship had been to appease the Baganda
elite and thereby to ensure their allegiance in capturing the substantial Buganda
vote in the approaching elections for the CA.

THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY STATUTE

Four years of discussion, deliberation and consultation produced three large

volumes from the Constitutional Commission, the most important of which is
the draft Constitution. The draft runs to some 314 articles, and over 140 pages,
placing it among the longest constitutional instruments in the world.27 Indeed,
it is intended to cover virtually every conceivable issue and there lies both its
strength and weakness as an instrument designed to establish the framework for
the future exercise and control of political power in Uganda. A number of the
draft proposals simply incorporate various positive aspects of the mode of
governance introduced under the NRM. Some of the novel provisions in the
draft present the potential for a dynamic evolution of more sustainable forms of
government. Yet in other cases, the extent of executive power remains intact,
as do the various bodies empowered to oversee it. What are the specific provisions
of the draft and how do they relate to the overall politics of the transition process
in Uganda?

Highlights of the draft Constitution

The main novelties of the draft Constitution comprise, inter alia, its proposals
for the political system; the establishment of a National Council of State (NCS);
the recognition of women's rights as requiring specific attention; the inclusion
of socio-economic rights and the right to development; the inclusion of the rights
of traditionally marginalized groups such as the disabled and the aged; an
independent Human Rights Commission; the right of recall of parliamentary
representatives and the participation of the people in the administration of
justice. An extended discussion of each of these areas is impossible in this article,
but it is essential to focus on the most prominent and to gauge the manner in
which the draft deals with them.
Many of the provisions of the new Constitution are simply statements of
aspiration, without any accompanying mechanisms of enforcement. As such,
they are superfluous and simply add to the general verbiage of the document.
Article 2 declares the Constitution to be the supreme law of the land, and
declares void both laws and customs inconsistent with it. Although the general
thrust of the draft on women's rights is positive, there is a marked paternalism
in the fashion in which these rights are articulated and the continuous use of
the words "he" and "him" rather than the maintenance of a strict neutrality in
the form of gender address.28 Although the issue of violence against women has
assumed critical dimensions, the Constitution is silent on the issue, relegating it

27 The three volumes of the final report comprise the Analysis and Recommendations of the
various memoranda and seminars conducted, the Index of Sources of People's Views, and the draft
Constitution.
28 S. R. Tamale, "Law reform and women's rights in Uganda", (1993) 1, 2 East African Journal of
Peace & Human Rights 164; C. Harries, "Daughters of our peoples: international feminism meets
Ugandan law and custom", (1994) 25 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 493. See also draft Art. 14,
which refers to the "unique status and natural maternal functions": both of which continue to reflect
the dominant perception of women as objects to be "protected" by their menfolk and emphasizing
their traditional role as child-bearers and nurturers.

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166 Constitutional transition in Musevenis Uganda [1995] J.A.L.

to the domain of the private rather than the public sphere in which it correctly
belongs.
The phraseology of the draft on human rights is disappointing, because in
substance it makes no fundamental departure from the 1967 Constitution which
allowed for the emergence of a regime of laws that was wholly oppressive and
antithetical to the rights of individuals, and permitted the enactment of legislation
such as the Public Order and Security Act of 1967. This comes by way of the
liberal use of the phrases "in the public interest" "in a just and democratic
society", "reasonably justifiable", and "subject to laws made by Parliament".
Although these phrases (known colloquially as "claw-back clauses") are tra-
ditionally used in many constitutions the world over, the Ugandan experience
demonstrated that it was the exceptions rather than the rule which prevailed.
History thus demanded a strengthening of the rule on exceptions. The problem
was compounded by the generally lacklustre performance on human rights issues
of the Ugandan judiciary which has historically been constrained by the doctrine
of judicial restraint rather than judicial activism.29
The draft attempts to provide some relief as it clearly stipulates the right of
redress in court for human rights violations and establishes a Human Rights
Commission with fairly extensive powers of review.30 However, this facility is
minimized by the provisions of Article 168 which resurrects an issue that has
previously bedeviled the hearing of constitutional questions, namely the question
of locus standi and the speedy hearing of constitutional matters. Moreover, in the
absence of an affirmative right to legal aid such a provision may be of little
impact. The provision is not only a duplication of Article 87 of the 1967
Constitution, it is also unduly convoluted. To free it of restrictions and delays,
it should be replaced with a provision that allows for a constitutional question
to be determined (in the first instance) by a single judge, without the complicated
process of invoking a three-person bench.
There are several other omissions in the draft relating to the rights and
freedoms of the individual. Although Article 53 changes the phraseology employed
in Article 10(3) of the 1967 Constitution concerning the production of a detainee
in court from "without reasonable delay" to "not later than 72 hours", this
period is too long and is thus susceptible to abuse. Article 58 allows for the
exclusion of the press or public from all or any court proceedings for reasons of
"... morality, public order or national security, as is necessary in a free and
democratic society"-an unjustifiably broad and open-ended abridgement of the
public's right to know. The draft also contains no affirmative assertion of the
right to information-a particularly acute problem in the Ugandan context that
has found expression in questions such as the release of the reports of Commissions
of Inquiry as well as general matters of public interest which have been concealed
by the authorities. The provisions on the operation of Parliament represent an
attempt to distance the institution from the influence of the Executive. However,
in so doing the Commission omitted to insert a prohibition against the holding
of the so-called "closed" sessions of the body, a problem that has bedeviled the

29 For an examination of the evolution and operation of judicial power in Uganda, see J. Oloka-
Onyango, Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda, CBR Working Paper No. 30, Kampala, 1993.
3 Only injured individuals can move the Commission. Whilst Art. 77 of the draft provides for
the Human Rights Commission to initiate investigations on its own motion, a much stronger
provision would be necessary to give it the power of review of constitutionally offensive legislation
upon enactment-a power that is not given to the judiciary (cf. draft Art. 156 on the power of the
judiciary).

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Vol. 39, No. 2 Constitutional transition in Musevenis Uganda 167

operation of the current legislature and undermined its independence from the
Executive.
Perhaps the most innovative of the provisions of the draft relate to the proposals
concerning the establishment of a National Council of State (NCS). The NCS
is designed, among other things, to act as a liaison between Parliament and the
Executive; counsel the President on the exercise of executive power; and perform
any functions relating to the appointment to or removal from any office of any
public officer, as provided under the Constitution. In short, for the first time
there is an attempt to mediate constitutionally the exercise of executive power,
hitherto unbridled. Thus several of the offices established by the Constitution
(ranging from the ChiefJustice to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to
the Army Commander and the Inspector-General of Police), can only be
appointed or removed on the advice, with the approval or upon the re-
commendation of the NCS. While this is a useful and extremely important
device, it is undercut by a number of factors, in particular the fact that the NCS
is chaired by the President and also consists of the Vice-President and ten
members of cabinet appointed by the President. Although the overwhelming
majority of persons is elected (and presumably independent) it is questionable
about the kind of impact they will actually have on the issues they have been
mandated to consider. This leads to the conclusion that the NCS is little more
than a toothless dog.
It is most appropriate to conclude this analysis of the draft Constitution with
what is perhaps its most controversial proposal, the question of political systems.
The basic recommendation of the draft is for the continuation of the "Movement"
system existing immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution,
that is the NRM system. In the first instance Article 94(2) stipulates that every
Ugandan shall be entitled to participate in public affairs, but only through the
Movement. This provision effectively outlaws the right to opposition, despite the
attendant stipulation that no Ugandan shall be expelled from the Movement.
Furthermore, instead of precisely demarcating the parameters within which the
Movement shall operate, the draft is content to leave this to broad generalities,
and to other "parliamentarily-enacted" laws that may be consistent with the
Constitution.
Article 96 effectively proscribes the operation of political parties, even though
the draft of Article 97 purports in almost the same breath to allow for their
operation. The same Article proceeds to make extensive proposals for the internal
composition of such parties-precisely the thing that it fails to do for the
Movement.31 Finally, Article 98 stipulates that a referendum will be held every
five years after the assumption of office of the first President elected under the
new Constitution, and thereafter every five years until such a time as political
parties are restored.
The above provisions are fraught with potential calamity. First, the draft fails
to recognize that the Movement has over the years become much more like a
political party requiring scrutiny of its operations and structures and more
effective mechanisms of accountability. Secondly, and most importantly, the
provision fails to recognize and foster the possibility of the development of
alternative forms of political organization, alternatives to either the Movement

31 Indeed, Art. 97 is striking for its comprehensiveness, extending to the issue of the declaration
of public assets and accountability, when there is only silence on the same issues in relation to the
Movement.

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168 Constitutional transition in Musevenis Uganda [1995] J.A.L.

or to the traditional political parties. The proposal effectively stunts the growth
and development of politics in Uganda and sets the stage for the concretization
of single-party domination of the political scene for as long as the Movement
pleases.32 The above formulations of the most crucial articles in the draft illustrate
that the Commission was influenced by an unspoken but nevertheless abundantly
clear premise: how to retain the Movement system in power for as long as
possible. To the UCC, the risk posed by allowing for the revival of political
party activity was too daunting to take. All these factors are abundantly clear in
the report and the draft Constitution.

The Constituent Assembly Statute

As important as the contents of a constitutional document defining and
outlining the nature and parameters of the exercise of governmental power is
the process by which that instrument is promulgated and eventually legitimized.
Initially, the NRM sought the easy expedient of having the Constitution pro-
mulgated by the NRC and the National Resistance Army Council (NRAC). In
the face of an onslaught against the unrepresentative nature of the former and
the lingering associations with military coercion and domination elicited by the
latter, the Government was forced to abandon this idea.33 It was replaced by
the Constituent Assembly Statute (No. 6 of 1993) (CA Statute), a statute that is
perhaps one of the most unfortunate of the promulgations of the NRC to date
in terms of both its drafting and its content.
According to its preamble, the CA Statute was designed for the purpose of
"... considering and enacting a new national Constitution ...". Section 4
stipulates that the delegates to the CA shall comprise three categories: (i) directly
elected, from each electoral area, in accordance with the rules specified in the
Statute; (ii) elected by specified bodies, including 1 woman per district, 10
members of the National Resistance Army (NRA), 2 members from the National
Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU), 2 members from each of the four
recognized political parties, 4 delegates from the National Youth Council, and
1 delegate elected by the National Union of Disabled People of Uganda
(NUDIPU); and, (iii) not more than 10 people appointed by the President on
the advice of the Cabinet.
The above composition is problematic. The most controversial issues are the
NRA delegates and the ten presidential appointees, as well as the reservation of
seats for political parties. In the first instance, the justification for the inclusion
of the NRA is dubious, to say the least. Rather than incorporating the army in
the positive governance of the country by subordinating them to civil authority,
the law sought to perpetuate the army to the civilian elements in the political
process. The justification for the presidential nominees is even less convincing,
especially since the law was unclear on what basis such persons were to be
selected and what interest group (other than the Presidency) they would represent:
a classic case of stacking! Finally, the number of political parties named in the
statute (namely those which participated in the 1980 election) reflects NRM

32 M. Mamdani, Pluralism and the Right ofAssociation, CBR Working Paper No. 29, Kampala, 1993.
33 This was not without considerable opposition from among members of the NRC comprising
a rear-guard action led by former Attorney General George Kanyeihamba to abort the process (see,
"Constitutional assembly bill blasted", New Vision, 23 November, 1992, and "NRC can work as C.
Assembly-Babu", Weekly Topic, 15 January, 1993). The Bill was eventually passed after one of
Museveni's closed session addresses to the NRC.

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Vol. 39, No. 2 Constitutional transition in Museveni' Uganda 169

antipathy towards new forms of political organization, and an implicit addiction

to and patronizing of the old.
Section 6 of the statute disqualifies persons under a sentence of death, without
qualification. One of the offences that carries a death sentence in Uganda is
treason, a political offence. Even though there is a practical question of whether
or not a person sentenced to death would actually be able to assume their seat
in the Assembly, such a person could be elected as an expression of protest, or
as a political statement. Indeed, several of the NRM's political opponents were
facing death having been convicted of treason. Section 6 was riddled with further
contradictions. Sub-sections 3 and 4 refer to a public officer requesting a leave
of absence at least 30 days before nominations for the elections were to be made.
Such a person had to relinquish any vehicle or equipment belonging to his
employer. This provision was ostensibly designed to prevent the use of public
vehicles and equipment for election campaigning, and must thus be read together
with the provisions of the Constituent Assembly Election Rules, made under
section 4(2)(a) and contained in the 3rd Schedule of the statute.
Rule 11(1) of the Election Rules stipulated that the elections were to be
non-partisan and based on the "personal merit" of each candidate, a hangover
from the 1989 elections and the continuing assault against the operation of
the two major political parties, the DP and the UPC. Rule 11(2) made it an
offence subject to disqualification for a person to use any political party,
tribal or religious affiliation or any other sectarian ground as a basis for his
candidature. There was no definition of the phrase "other sectarian" ground.
Rule 12 stipulated that the Returning Officer shall prepare and conduct a
programme known as "Candidates' Meetings", so that there shall be one
such meeting per parish. The purpose of these meetings was for candidates
to meet collectively, address voters and answer their questions (Rule 12(2)).
Each of the candidates was to be individually introduced, and allowed a
"reasonable time", but in any case not less than 20 minutes, to address the
meeting (Rule 12(6)). Clearly, the framework for debate and deliberation on
serious issues was thus minimized.
Returning to the provisions of the CA Statute dealing with the process of
actual debate in the Assembly, several additional problems are manifest and
likely to affect the eventual outcome of the deliberations of the body. The
chair and deputy of the Assembly were to be elected from a list of not more
than five Presidential nominees to be presented to the Assembly at its first
sitting (Section 9). The problems involved with this provision are obvious
Section 17 resurrects consensus voting in terms that are vague and allow for
a manipulation of the vote, particularly since the Chair reserves the right to
make a ruling on whether to put the issue to a vote. Moreover, there is no
provision by which to challenge such a ruling. Lastly, the most powerful
organ in the Assembly next to the Chair is that of the Commissioner, who
is, once again, a Presidential appointee. Although Museveni's choice appears
not to have raised the usual dust over such appointments,34 the search for a
candidate was not linked to a wider process of consultation. The lack of
consultation over such a sensitive position may become an issue of controversy

34 It is nevertheless clear that the appointment was intended to act as a sop to the numerically
significant Iteso, who had also suffered a long and debilitating period of military suppression under
the NRA.

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170 Constitutional transition in MuseveniS Uganda [1995] J.A.L.

in future, particularly in light of the experience of 1980, and the extensive

powers vested in the office by the law.35
Perhaps the most controversial of the provisions of the CA Statute relate to
matters of a "contentious" nature,36 and the calling of a referendum to determine
such matter, if, in the opinion of the Chairman, it is of a "national character". The
provision is all the more contentious in that it further stipulates that the President
may, at any time before, during or after the deliberations of the Assembly, direct
that any issue or specified issues be resolved by a referendum, and that the
outcome of such referendum will be "final and conclusive". This is compounded
by a further stipulation that matters of a "local character" are not to be the
subject of a referendum. Instead, all such matters are to be settled through
negotiation and consultation between the concerned region, district or community
and the government. The problem with these provisions lies in the absence (in
the definition section or elsewhere) of any precise definition of the terms "national"
or "local" character. The concern over this issue was heightened by the passing
of a Referendum Statute which conferred powers on the Minister to direct that
a referendum be held "... if the Minister is satisfied ... that it will be in the
public interest necessary so to do ...".
The Referendum law compounded the problems already elicited by the CA
Statute, not least because of its timing, but additionally on account of the wholly
subjective nature of the provision triggering the process. Subjecting the activation
of a referendum to the "public interest" was problematic because of its nebulous
and subjective nature. Furthermore, the notion of public interest has been the
source of much executive abuse in the past. In addition, the underlying motive
for the law was to prepare the ground for holding a referendum on political
parties in the event of there being a stalemate in the Assembly on the issue. A
referendum (however slight the majority) would provide the necessary mandate
for the continuation of the Movement system, in the event that it failed to pass
through the CA.
While the Rules and the Statute raised serious questions about freedom of
expression and assembly, they were not only idealistic in the extreme but were
quickly overtaken by the momentum engendered by election fever. The official
date for the declaration of candidacies was simply ignored, and canvassing of
the countryside began immediately upon the announcement of the election. The
campaign was characterized by the illegal (but uncontested) use of public vehicles
and other equipment. This was of course of disproportionate advantage to
those-such as Government Ministers-who could use the guise of performing
public duties to tour the country and conduct their campaigns. Attendant to this
was the use of Government instruments such as the media and local administration
officials to transmit the message of particular "chosen" candidates. In addition,
media reports soon surfaced about the intimidation of candidates and the
employment of unfair tactics in election campaigns, including the use of money
and other incentives such as feasts and ceremonies. At one point, the Government

35 The pre-election report of the African-American Institute stated that, for the very reason of
the appointment, the Commissioner was under a special duty to be as objective as possible and open
to public scrutiny (African-American Institute, below n. 37, 55). However, the new Commissioner
soon ran into problems with journalists over what was perceived to be a lack of forthrightness and
a tendency to patronize rather than listen.
36 A "contentious matter" arises under the statute if the motion is supported by the votes of the
majority of delegates voting, but does not obtain the support of two-thirds of the delegates voting
(s. 17(3)(f)).

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Vol. 39, No. 2 Constitutional transition in Musevenis Uganda 171

banned public advertisements in the private press and crowned this action with
the arrest on sedition charges of two local newspaper editors. These actions
raised significant questions about the fairness of the election, despite the general
observation that they were perhaps the fairest ever witnessed in independent
Uganda.37
Essential to the constitutional transition and debate, as well as Museveni's
political philosophy, has been the issue of non-partisanship described earlier.
Despite the administrative ban on political party activity, the old parties have
in fact remained very much alive (although underground) as a continuing threat
to NRM political control. This meant that given the nature of the stakes involved,
the run-up to the election became much more than a struggle over the issues in
the draft Constitution alone and became instead the battleground for the first
bids for the capture of state power. This explains the nature of the issues that
were the predominant focus of the campaigns: promises of grand hospitals,
refurbished roads and new schools. In sum, nobody really cared about the
contents of the draft Constitution-it was a straight battle between the idea of
"no-partyism" represented by Museveni and his adherents and "multi-partyism"
as transmitted by the various political parties. Unfortunately, this scenario
prevented the emergence of any alternative force to either the NRM or the
traditional parties. It also blocked serious consideration and discussion of the
critical and far-reaching constitutional issues that were supposed to be at the
foundation of the election.
All of the above must be analysed together with the restrictions on public
campaigning, and on access to the media, the sensitization of the population
and the very real imperatives of national reconciliation. It is of little surprise,
therefore, that the no-party advocates emerged victorious over the proponents
of multi-partyism, who were identified as members of the traditional parties.38
Against such a background, serious questions arise about the fairness of the CA
election, as well as about the long-term sustainability of any product of the
Assembly that would emerge.

THE WAY AHEAD: SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Constituent Assembly debate which commenced in April 1994 was

characterized by a jostling for advantage between the three main tendencies that
emerged in the run-up to the election, that is the Movement supporters, the
proponents of multi-partyism and the traditionalists. The process of debate and
the outcome of the Assembly must be the subject of an altogether separate
analysis. The main point of this article has been to scrutinize the run-up to the
debate, and to assess its implications in terms of the sustainability of the outcome.
Several points, both conceptual and practical, emerge from a consideration of
the context of the process of constitutional transition and fundamental change
in Uganda, and its relationship to Yoweri Museveni's "no-party" philosophy.
In the first instance, the process of collection, dissemination and debate over
constitutional issues and the dynamics that produced a Constituent Assembly
give some confidence that traditional perceptions of power and its control in
Uganda have undergone a measure of transformation. However, despite attempts
to decentralize power and control the executive, the draft Constitution still

37 African-American Institute, Uganda: Pre-Election Assessment, Washington D.C., 1993.

38 C. Watson, "Uganda: no to multiparty", (1994) Africa Report 24 at 25; "Uganda: no party for
Museveni", (1994) 35, 8 Africa Confidential 3.

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172 Constitutional transition in Musevenis Uganda [1995] J.A.L.

manifests the executive-centred and autocratic philosophy that underpinned

earlier constitutional enactments. Such conceptual loopholes paved the way for
the dictatorship and the eventual complete abandonment of the notion of
constitutionalism in Uganda. More troubling, however, is the near-sycophantic
attempt to do "his master's bidding", manifest in the provisions of the draft on
the political system. There is little doubt that these enshrine Museveni's "no-
party" philosophy without temperance or modification. Neither is there any
doubt that a mechanism that seeks to provide for the consolidation of what was
only intended as a transitory mechanism cannot be a recipe for enduring stability.
Thus the political ghosts of old have been resurrected, throwing considerable
doubt on the viability of a system that depends to such an extensive degree on
the strengths of a single individual and, moreover, which has failed to create a
broader framework for participation and empowerment.
It is also clear that under the NRM tenure many of the tactics of its predecessors
have been employed to circumvent and even undermine respect for the con-
stitutional mediation of power, even in the midst of initiating reforms that would
alter the prevailing perception that a constitution is not worth the paper on
which it is printed. This attitude emerged clearly in the double standards
attending the restoration of traditional leaders in the election to the CA. It was
also manifest in the rules of the election, which were weighted to give a clear
advantage to the no-party advocates. Such actions papered over the fundamental
issues of free expression and assembly involved in the recent contest for state
power in Uganda. Furthermore, it brought to the fore and in a most undemocratic
fashion the issue of Buganda and the rest of the country, eliminating the discussion
of the issue from a democratic and non-conflictual resolution. Indeed, in terms
of the tensions of the nationality and ethnicity questions which have long plagued
Ugandan politics, the manner in which the restoration of the kingdoms was
handled can only further complicate the matter. Finally, the draft raises serious
questions about the potential for the Movement evolving into a monolithic,
insulated and rigid structure-in short, a single party in all but name. All these
factors portend major points of conflict in the future.
At the centre of all these machinations, and underscoring the fragility of the
transition to democratic rule in Uganda, is Yoweri Museveni. His larger-than-
life persona is both a boon and a bane to Uganda. Museveni today is reminiscent
of the "founding Fathers" of independent Africa in the 1960s. Those leaders
(among them Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Leopold Senghor and even
Julius Nyerere) sought to utilize (indeed one could say exploit) the legitimacy
and mythology of their roles in the liberation struggle as a life-time endorsement
of personal rule. Unfortunately, that mode of governance eventually disintegrated
into dictatorship. What is clear is that without Museveni's drive and determination,
Uganda would still be the "sick man" of Africa. However, there is little doubt
that the single-minded pursuit of the no-party philosophy, and the lack of
opportunities for the development of alternative structures of political organization
and democratic participation, can only bode ill for the success of constitutional
transition in Uganda. Ultimately, the continuing reliance on overt and latent
military force, coupled with a growing personality cult which considers Museveni
indispensable, can only result in the reversal of the significant gains made by
the NRM since its assumption of power in 1986. In this way, Uganda will be
consciously (and tragically) proving the old adage: history repeats itself.

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