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ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:
POLITICS OF THE M IDDLE EAST

Volume 17

THE POLITICS OF ARAB

INTEGRATION
Page Intentionally Left Blank
 THE POLITICS OF ARAB
INTEGRATION

Edited by
GIACOMO LUCIANI AND GHASSAN SALAME

13 Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

LO N D O N A N D NEW YORK
First published in 1988 by Croom Helm Ltd
This edition first published in 2016
by Routledge
2 Park Square, M ilton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, N Y 10017
Routledge is an imprint o f the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 1988 Istituto Affari Internazionali
All rights reserved. N o part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or
hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, w ithout permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be tradem arks or registered
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation w ithout intent to
infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-138-83939-7 (Set)

ISBN: 978-1-315-68049-1 (Set) (ebk)
ISBN: 978-1-138-92249-5 (Volume 17) (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-68511-3 (Volume 17) (ebk)

Publisher’s Note
The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but
points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent.
Disclaimer
The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome
correspondence from those they have been unable to trace.
 Volume IV

The
Politics of
Arab
Integration
Edited by
Giacomo Luciani
and Ghassan Salame

CROOM HELM
London • New York • Sydney
© 1988 Istituto Affari Intemazionali
Croom Helm Ltd, Provident House,
Burrell Row, Beckenham, Kent BR3 1AT
Croom Helm Australia, 44-50 Waterloo Road,
North Ryde, 2113, New South Wales
Published in the USA by
Croom Helm
in association with Methuen, Inc.
29 West 35th Street,
New York, NY 10001
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
The politics of Arab integration.
1. Arab countries — Politics and
government — 1945-
I. Luciani, Giacomo n. Salami, Ghassan
320.917'4927 JQ1850.A2
ISBN 0-7099-4148-X

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Politics of Arab integration / edited by Giacomo Luciani and
Ghassan Salame.
p. cm. — (Nation, state, and integration in the Arab world :
v. 4)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-7099-4148-X
1. Panarabism. 2. Arab countries — Politics and government — 1945-
I. Luciani, Giacomo, 1948- . II. Salamah, Ghassan. III. Series.
DS39.N34 vol. 4
[DS63.6]
956 - dc 19 87-30368

Filmset by Mayhew Typesetting, Bristol, England

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Mackays of Chatham Ltd, Kent
 Contents

Foreword
Introduction — Giacomo Luciani and Ghassan Salome 1

Part One The Cultural Dimension

1. Speech Diversity and Language Unity: Arabic as an
Integrating Factor
Zakaria Abuhamdia 33
2. The Media and Arab Integration
Hamdi Kandil 54
3. The Role of Education in Domestic and Inter-Arab
Integration
Michael Suleiman 73
4. Attitudes to the Nation and the State in Arab Public
Opinion Polls
Tawfic Farah 94

Part Two The Economic and Social Dimension

5. Economic Interdependence and National Sovereignty
Samir Makdisi 111
6. Migration as a Factor Conditioning State Economic
Control and Financial Policy Options
Ibrahim Saad Eddine Abdallah 141
7. Immigrants in the Arab Gulf Countries: ‘Sojourners’ or
‘Setders’?
Georges Sabagh 159
8. Migration and Political Integration in the Arab World
Sharon Stanton Russell 183

Part Three The Political and Institutional Dimensions

9. The Impact of Palestine on Arab Politics
Walid Kazziha 213
10. Israeli Interference in Internal Arab Politics: The Case
of Lebanon
Avi Shlaim 232
CONTENTS

11. Integration in the Arab World: The Institutional

Framework·
Ghassan Salame 256

References 280

Index 307
Combined Index 315
 Foreword

The Arab State is a series of four collective volumes exploring the

origins, foundations, impact and stability of Arab states. This
volume is the fourth in the series; it is devoted to a discussion of the
politics of Arab integration. The question of integration is seen in
its two interrelated aspects, as referring on the one hand to domestic
affairs within each Arab state and on the other to relations between
the Arab states in connection with the broader conception of an Arab
nation. In previous volumes it has been argued that Arab states must
face the challenge of particularisms and universalisms at the same
time: this volume attempts to evaluate the importance of these
tensions and proposes an original analysis of the real content of Arab
nationalist conceptions.
The series is the result of a collective research effort organised
by the Istituto Affari Intemazionali over a period of three years,
under the general title of Nation, State and Integration in the Arab
World. This undertaking was made possible by a generous main
grant from the Ford Foundation, and an equally generous additional
grant from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
of Canada. The latter was specifically devoted to support the work
of Arab scholars writing on economic issues. Further financial
support was received from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and from the Commission for Cultural Exchanges between Italy and
the United States.
The Istituto Affari Intemazionali worked in co-operation with the
Panteios School of Political Science in Athens, which was respons-
ible for the organisation of two international gatherings, allowing
authors of different chapters to come together and discuss their ideas
in depth. As a result, while these are collective volumes, we believe
that they have reached a degree of homogeneity which is not
normally found in these undertakings. The Panteios School also
supported one of the meetings with its own funds, decisively
contributing to the success of the project.
Help was also received from the Gustav E. von Grunebaum
Centre for Near Eastern Studies at the University of California Los
Angeles, which hosted me in February and March 1984 and again
in the fall of 1986.
The project was directed by an international steering committee
in which the following participated:
FOREWORD

Roberto Aliboni, Director, Istituto Affari Intemazionali

Hazem Beblawi, Chairman, Egyptian Export Development Bank
Ursula Braun, Consultant, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Marwan Buheiry, Director, Centre for Lebanese Studies
Alexander Cudsi, Professor, Panteios School of Political Science
Adeed Dawisha, Professor, George Mason University
Omaymah Dahhan, Professor, University of Jordan
Georges Sabagh, Director, The Gustav E. von Grunebaum Center
for Near Eastern Studies, UCLA
Ghassan Salami, Professor, American University of Beirut
I. William Zartman, Director, Africa Program, SAIS, Johns
Hopkins University

The committee played a major role, and, as director of the project,

I am very substantially indebted to its members for their advice in
planning the research effort and selecting contributors. Some of the
members also served as editors for a volume, thus exercising closer
responsibility on the material included in it: this fourth volume was
edited by myself and Ghassan Salame.
I received substantial help and advice also from other friends. Ali
Hillal Dessouki was expected to be on the committee, but a variety
of circumstances prevented him from participating in its delibera-
tions. I did, nevertheless, greatly benefit from his generous advice
and detailed comments during numerous interviews in Cairo. My
debt to him is indeed very substantial. I also greatly benefitted from
the friendly advice that I received from Judy Barsalou of the Ford
Foundation in Cairo, Ann Lesch of American Field Staff in Cairo,
Andrew Watson of IDRC in Cairo, and Gary Sick of the Ford
Foundation in New York.
My personal thanks also to the staff of the LAI that contributed
with sympathy and dedication to the complex organisation of this
undertaking.

The shape of this project was deeply influenced by the advice of two
friends who unfortunately did not live to see its conclusion: to their
memory the steering committee decided to dedicate the four
volumes.
I had met Malcolm Kerr in Los Angeles when the project was still
in its planning stage, and he gave me valuable advice at that time.
I asked him to be a member of the committee, but he was then
expecting to be appointed President of the American University of
Beirut. He insisted, however, that he wanted to be associated with
 FOREWORD

the project, so much so that the first meeting of the steering commit-
tee was hosted by him at Marquand House in June 1983. He
participated in our deliberations then, and contributed to the basic
decisions which shaped the project. His assassination was a tragedy
for us personally and professionally, and has marked a disastrous
turning point in West Beirut’s struggle to remain one of the intellec-
tual centres of the world.
The same negative turn of events finally drove Marwan Buheiry
out of Beirut. Marwan was, personally and intellectually, a living
example of West Beirut’s intellectual curiosity and non-sectarian
spirit. He participated enthusiastically in the work of the steering
committee and in the meetings connected with this project, until
death struck unexpectedly, in exile.
It has been an honour and a very educational experience for me
to serve as the director of this project, and I wish to thank all
contributors for the very many things I learned. I hope that the
reader will find these volumes as instructive as preparing them was
for me. Any shortcoming, as usual, should be ascribed to my
responsibility only.

Giacomo Luciani
Director of Studies
Istituto Affari Intemazionali
Page Intentionally Left Blank
 Introduction

In the previous three volumes in this series the foundations and

stability of the Arab states were explored. The prevailing message
has been that Arab states as ‘sovereign’, internationally recognised
entities, contrary to the hopes of many, appear to be more resilient
than they have often been portrayed to be in the literature. The
analysis of the historical foundations, of the economic bases and of
the interplay between state and society lead to arf overall impression
of progressive consolidation of the state structures that formed at
various points in time during the first half of this century.
The most common image of the Arab states in the media and in
most of the literature is, on the contrary, one of weak states
precariously ruling over highly segmented societies. The emphasis
is laid on the multiple lines of division honeycombing Arab politics
along ethnic, religious and linguistic grounds. The ‘mosaic’
framework is easily accepted and often aggravated by those political
forces that have among their objectives that of showing the Arab
governments as ‘unreliable’ or ‘shaky’. Lebanon is viewed as the
forerunner of the inevitable disaggregation of all Arab states.
At the same time, the demise of pan-Arabism is recorded time
and again, as if some found pleasure in constantly writing its
obituary. Yet somehow the ideal and call of the Arab nation refuses
to die. The reality of Arab politics is there for everybody to see, and
it is a different reality from the politics of each individual Arab
country. While obituaries are being written, new, intense forms of
Arab interaction are emerging.
Thus, our inquiry into the Arab state could not possibly avoid a
discussion of the politics of integration. We will discuss integration
both at the domestic (state) level and at the regional (pan-Arab)
level; the first aspect has already been dealt with in several chapters
in the first three volumes in this series, and this last volume
concentrates on the regional dimension of integration.

Integration — from the Latin integer, which remains unchanged in

English — is the process whereby differences are gradually over-
come and homogeneity is created. It is convenient to differentiate
between integration and unification; the former refers to economic,
cultural or societal processes, the latter has a predominantly institu-
tional content. A country may be politically unified and still be

1
INTRODUCTION

socially or economically disintegrated; a nation or a group of nations

can be highly integrated while not politically unified. Integration is
a multidimensional process and need not happen in parallel at all
levels: economic integration is largely independent of linguistic or
cultural or religious or social integration.
At the same time, integration is more than the mere existence of
some common ground (similarities) or linkage (interaction) between
different actors. The latter may be sufficient to establish a relation-
ship of interdependence between the actors sharing common traits;
but interdependence may be a conflictual as well as a co-operative
relationship. It is only in the latter case, that of co-operative
interdependence, that we should speak of integration. Thus, several
countries have in common the fact that they possess nuclear
weapons, but in most cases this creates mere interdependence, not
integration. Even an intense trade relationship can sometimes lead
to conflictual interdependence, rather than integration — as in the
case of trade between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. But
when the sharing of a common interest is accompanied by co-
operative behaviour (a regime) then it leads to integration, as in the
case of trade between countries which are members of the European
Community. Integration is thus the result of a component of volun-
tarism rather than simply of facts of geography, culture etc.
Also, integration is always relative to some specific interest, and
as we shift analysis from one interest or set of interests to another
the geometry of integration changes: countries that are integrated
with respect to trade may not be integrated in matters of defence or
language or religion. Thus, while members of the EC are integrated
in matters of trade, agriculture etc., in matters of defence some, but
not all, of them are integrated in NATO; the latter comprises also
countries that are not members of the Community. With respect to
international monetary affairs the relevant integrative scheme
(admittedly a weak one) is the Group of 7, in which Japan partici-
pates as well. If language is chosen as a variable, then Europe is
disintegrated, while France promotes schemes to achieve co-
operation among the French-speaking countries. In matters
concerned with the international forwarding of mail, a large number
of countries are integrated in the World Postal Union. In short: the
geometry of integration/interdependence between states varies with
the specific interest or set of interests under consideration. While
some interests may be perceived as more important than others,
there is little reason to argue that one integrative project relative to
one interest should not coexist with a different integrative project for

2
 INTRODUCTION

a different interest. Neither is there evidence to prove that integra-

tion relative to one interest will tend to encourage integration
relative to other interests, eventually leading to the emergence of one
pre-eminent integrative project spanning a broad range of interests
simultaneously: this may occur, but it is certainly not a necessary
outcome.
Supposedly, a nation is integrated, and it is the fact of integration
that distinguishes one nation from the other. This postulates that
there is one overriding character, or a set of common interests that
is shared by all individuals belonging to this nation, and not by
others. Integration should thus define the boundary of any nation.
This is particularly evident in the German tradition (Fichte), accord-
ing to which a nation is the result of an integrated people; the French
tradition (vouloir vivre en commuri) views the nation as the vehicle
for integration, rather than the result of it, but nevertheless in both
traditions a strong association is posited between nation and integra-
tion. However, because commonly the geometry of integration
varies with the character that is posited as definitional, and several
characters may be equally important in shaping political life, nations
seldom are defined in an empirically measurable way, as entities
which are integrated with respect to one or another well defined and
quantifiable character. Nations are myths that politicians manipulate
to achieve their political goals: while there must be something in
common that helps define a nation, very profound segmentation is
frequent. In historical experience, nations are more often than not
integrated ex post, by the conscious effort of the political structure
that was created in their name.
Ethnic and cultural factors, more rarely religious or economic
ones, are commonly invoked to define a nation. But in no case in
the real world are boundaries so neat as to identify clearly a set of
contiguous groups: overlaps and ambiguity prevail, and not only in
the newly independent states, but in old Europe as well. While there
may be some core group which is indeed strongly integrated with
respect to several characteristics, as we move towards the edges of
this group the coherence of the integrative pattern will gradually
fade away, and commonality will become dubious, or the pattern of
integration according to one characteristic will conflict with those
based on different characteristics. Very often a single core group
cannot even be clearly identified. Yet, nationalistic discourse
dominates contemporary international relations, and the very usage
of the adjective international, where inter-statal would certainly be
more accurate, is a manifestation of such domination.

3
INTRODUCTION

Shying away from the issue of definition, the discourse on

nationalism and the nation often personalises the latter. Nations, or
countries, are assumed to be living entities that one can readily
recognise; to have a soul, a conscience, a will, a personal history
of maturing and becoming more sensible. They are assumed to have
a character to which they may be true or unfaithful (as in the Ba‘th
slogan ‘One single Arab nation with an eternal mission’): hence the
debate on authenticity, which is so overwhelmingly important in the
Arab countries today.
This personalised approach is common both in the nationalist
literature (Bensaid in Salame, 1987: vol. I in this series) and in the
‘scholarly’ literature on Arab nationalism (such as in The Arab
Predicament). Within this line of thinking, we may include all those
who maintain that the distinction between East and West has signifi-
cant scientific value left to it (including most of the orientalists and
all kinds of salafi nationalists or religious writers in the Arab world),
and that humankind is not singular, but plural.
Contrary to this approach, the editors of this volume are inclined
to confess their unabashed illuministic belief that men are primarily
just that, and groupings of men are a matter of convenience and
adherence to observable facts, and, to a large extent, the result of
accidents of history and geography. Thus in discussing a highly
emotional topic such as the definition and future of the Arab nation,
this volume tries to adhere as much as possible to reality and
measurable facts and concentrates on the non-ideological aspect of
the problem, i.e. integration.

Any society, large or small, has divisive and integrating factors, and
integration is a political problem at any level of political action.
Politics of integration exist even within the family, although admit-
tedly the concrete meaning of integration vs. disintegrative
behaviour changes with the dimensions and nature of the group it
refers to.
Political life takes place at various levels: the common distinction
between local (municipal), national and international political affairs
— which is reflected in the layout of many a morning paper — is
as good as any other. In fact, we know that there are many more than
three levels: but for the sake of clarity let us stick to these three.
Integration is a problem at all levels, and there is normally a
trade-off between integration/disintegration at each of them.
Because integration is achieved not only by reducing differences
within, but also underlining differences with the rest of the universe,

4
 INTRODUCTION

the dictates of integration at any one level contrast with the same at
levels above or below. This is the essential reason why the issue of
integration should be simultaneously considered with reference to
the various levels. Integration within the existing Arab states is
logically and politically connected to integration between these same
states, and very frequently policies that are adopted with a view to
promoting integration at one level are opposed as jeopardising
integration at other levels. Thus, for example, to insist on a
‘Lebanese’ identity serves the purpose of integrating the various
confessions within Lebanon and isolating the country from the
environment, while insisting on the Arab and Islamic dimension of
the Sudan has disintegrative consequences on relations between the
north and south of the country. This is a common problem in any
subregional system, as well as globally and within each state (when
the dialectical relationship between central and local government is
considered).
Arab societies are divided: this point has been extensively dealt
with in the literature. In most cases the divisions that are described
and analysed with greatest accuracy are those that are the closest to
heart and mind of the orientalist tradition and of its local followers:
the communal and religious differences. Thus considerable attention
is paid to the differences between Sunnis and Shi‘is, Druzes and
‘Alawis, Maronites and Greek Orthodox, Copts and Protestants, and
so on; or to communal identities such as Kurds, Berbers, southern
Sudanese. The various identifications combine to form multiple
groupings, and the image projected is of a regional political system
of baffling complexity, that only devotees of an esoteric science can
understand. The insistence on complexity implies that the region is
a natural ground for foreign intervention.
This line of analysis is often elegant and may make fascinating
reading. Of course, no one would ever deny that these factors play
an important role in Arab politics, and yes: the Middle East is an
anthropologist’s paradise. However, that Arab societies are in any
significant and measurable sense more divided than societies in other
parts of the world is questionable. Religious or communal
differences exist in all countries, and are the rule rather than the
exception. Examples in the Third World are extremely abundant,
but one should not forget the tendency for ethnicity to push aside the
old melting pot, while segmentation persists in centuries old Euro-
pean states. A Scot is not the same thing as a Welshman, a Lutheran
Hamburger is not the same as a Catholic Miinchener, and a Sicilian
is not to be confused with a Milanese. It is hard to argue that

5
INTRODUCTION

European politics is in any meaningful sense less complex and

involute that Arab politics: American political scientists sometimes
lose the perception of this fact, because of the widespread lack of
interest in European affairs and the well-known American
impatience with anything complex. But they only have to consider
their own country: in the US citizens are on many occasions
requested to state whether they are white or black, Asian or latino,
while ethnic lobbies are increasingly influential in culture and
politics.
That existing societal divisions have a greater impact on Arab
politics than on politics in non-Arab countries is again questionable.
One need only recall that in Belgium parties are differentiated along
linguistic as well as ideological lines, that regionally defined parties
exist in West Germany and Italy, and communal irredentism fuels
intense terrorist activity in the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland),
Spain (the Basques) and France (Corsica). In the United States, the
influence of ethnically or religiously defined lobbies has gradually
overshadowed the more traditional, economically defined groupings
(labour vs. capital, industry vs. agriculture or finance, small
business vs. big business etc.). Indeed, while in Europe ideology
still plays an important role in politics, in the United States ethnic
and religious factors have, for all practical purposes, made ideology
irrelevant to political life. Finally, examples of the political impact
of societal segmentation in non-Arab developing countries are so
numerous that we do not need to elaborate. How can one seriously
argue that the Arab case is quantitatively or qualitatively different?
The need to integrate, i.e. to establish a common basis of
allegiance to the state and the political process is common to any
country. The way this need is addressed, however, is different. In
particular, integration through the acceptance of a constitutional pact
may be considered a superior and more stable solution to the
problem. Indeed, while disintegrative movements may surface in
any country, they may be expected to have less of a conflictual
character if the latter enjoys well-established democratic institutions.
Yet it is a fact that even the United Kingdom, the land of the Magna
Carta, still faces rebellion in Northern Ireland. Furthermore,
whenever the authoritarian nature of the regime creates conditions
that are more conducive to disintegration, the blame should logically
be laid on the character of the regime, not on some supposedly extra-
ordinary degree of segmentation.
Although the acceptance of a national myth is certainly more
widespread in certain countries than it is in others (les Frangais sont

6
 INTRODUCTION

chauvins!), no national myth is able to monopolise the hearts and

minds of the people. It is inevitable that individuals realise that they
sometimes have differences with their fellow countrymen, while at
the same time sharing interests with individuals or groups elsewhere
in the world. But if individuals have multiple identifications,and
they all do, the ranking of the latter and the attempt to find one that
may be said to be predominant is largely arbitrary. Such rankings
only acquire a meaning when identifications become mutually
exclusive and people are requested to choose. But this is a rare
occurrence, although it may help explain why so many Egyptian
intellectuals have been obsessed by the need to return to the Arab
fold following Camp David, while most intellectuals outside of
Egypt derive very little satisfaction from being in the same Arab
fold, and even wonder what the Arab fold is anyhow. In any case,
the vast majority of the people probably never felt this contradiction,
simply because they quite naturally identify as both Egyptian and
Arab, independently of what their government or the Arab League
may say in this respect in their official declarations.
Thus it is not surprising that citizens of the Arab countries
typically identify with subnational groups defined along ethnic,
religious, linguistic or cultural lines; while at the same time they also
identify with their country of birth as well as with an Arab dimen-
sion, or nation. If it is acceptable to be bruxellois-wallon-belge-
catholique-europeen-occidental, why should there be a problem in
being a Damascene-Greek Orthodox-Syrian-Arab? Such multiple
identifications would hardly be as controversial as they are if the
Arab states were ruled by legitimate, democratic governments. But
because this is commonly not the case, particularism and/or Arab
nationalism have at times become vehicles of opposition, threatening
governments in power.
It is entirely predictable that whenever political discourse per se
is suppressed, individuals will attribute political functions to
aggregations that would normally perform altogether different roles.
Social, cultural, communal and religious groups will be used as
covers or alternative avenues for political action. This surrogate role
may lead to the impression that segmentation thus defined plays a
fundamental role, but it is only after freedom of political discourse
is restored that one can pass judgement. Admittedly, this freedom
may never be restored, and the political role of non-political agents
may become entrenched; but surprising changes in the perceived
structure of the political system are common whenever countries
return to democracy. Thus, it was commonly believed in the last

7
INTRODUCTION

years of Franco’s rule that the Catholic church would play a crucial
role in post-Francoist Spain: yet we witness an entirely different
reality, one which was unpredictable as long as authoritarian rule
suppressed political discourse.
The same Catholic church that provided technocratic expertise
through the Opus Dei in Spain, has often been a vehicle of opposi-
tion to authoritarian rule in Latin America. However when democracy
was reinstated, e.g. in Brazil, entirely secular political parties came
to dominate the political debate, and the role of the church was
redefined. In the Arab region it is Islam that has sometimes played
a prominent role as the language of opposition (while generally being
used to support and legitimise authoritarian governments). Not surpris-
ingly, governments in power have tended to portray this opposition
as being a threat to the state, and this view has often found its way
in to the literature. In fact, there is little evidence that this opposition
is aimed at the state rather than at the regime or government. Thus,
it is not clear that the prominence of particularism or universalism
is a manifestation of state weakness, while it may be a manifestation
of the weakness of the government and institutions (more on this in
Hermassi, in Salami, 1987: 75-85, vol. I in this series).
Opposition to established rule has always been coloured by local,
religious or ethnic considerations in the region. In many cases it is
difficult and arbitrary to dissociate opposition (i.e. the wish to see
an alternative to the present use of power) from separatism (the wish
to subtract oneself from submission to that power). Most opposition
movements, being unable to achieve results qua opposition have
reverted or contented themselves with separatism.
From a theoretical point of view, a segmented polity may provide
an authoritarian government the opportunity to consolidate its
position through divide et impera. However, it would obviously be
preposterous to derive the conclusion that authoritarian governments
are better equipped to address the problem of segmentation: they
may deliberately maintain it rather than promoting integration. This
is not reflected, however, in their official rhetoric nor, in most
cases, in their deeds: most authoritarian governments are inclined to
deny the existence and legitimacy of communal identifications,
while at the same time trying to manipulate universalistic ones. Thus
in most Arab countries the existence of politically or sociologically
defined minorities is ignored, and the power of the central state is
affirmed over regional or municipal autonomy. At the same time,
almost all governments resort to pan-Arab or pan-Islamic rhetoric to
support their dubious legitimacy.

8
 INTRODUCTION

At the same time, it must be recognised that the formal existence

of democratic institutions in no way guarantees per se that a
segmented society will be able to maintain political unity and evolve
towards integration. The case of Lebanon is an obvious example of
this, and certain of its peculiarities need to be underlined at this
point. While the Lebanese regime was a democratic one, it was
based on the official recognition of sectarian cleavages, and tended
to consolidate them. In fact, sectarianism was a political objective
sought by the ruling elite (basically Maronite). At the same time,
the constitution strongly centralised power in the hands of the presi-
dent, naturally concentrating attention and controversy on presiden-
tial politics. Indeed, because the lack of integration was officially
recognised in the National Covenant, attempts to make up for it
through constitutional centralisation (the powers of the President
reflecting the privileged position of his sect) were made. The
alternative approach — a deliberate attempt to play down the
political significance of sectarian connotations coupled with a fairer
institutional power-sharing formula — was systematically blocked
by the ruling elite. Partly because of the strongly centralised
definition of the state, the role of the latter in the economy and
society tended to be limited. Had the state attempted to permeate
society and perform all the crucial roles (education, information,
allocation of resources) that it plays in most Arab countries,
the concentration of power in the hands of a Maronite president
would probably have become unacceptable to the other sectarian
groups. Hence the state was centralised but confined, and con-
sequently the dependence of the individual on the state was also
limited.
It is interesting to underline, at this point, the current paradox
of the Lebanese civil war: none of the major factions proposes
liquidation of the Lebanese state nor partition, nor absorption by
neighbouring Syria. True, Lebanese militias that confront each
other in the civil war do not normally engage in issue politics: yet
the absence of a real debate on the redefinition of the Lebanese state
is significant. The idea that a territorial redefinition of the Lebanese
state is possible, whereby Tripoli and the Beqa‘ would be annexed
by Syria, and the remaining territory would have a clear Maronite
majority, is found in the writings of Israeli scholars, but is not
publicly entertained by any of the Lebanese forces nor does it seem
to appeal to Damascus; this creates a paradox which has left an
important mark in the domestic debate in Israel (as documented in
Shlaim, Chapter 9 in this volume).

9
INTRODUCTION

The experience of all other Arab states is entirely different.

Centralisation has been coupled with the official downplaying of
sectarian identifications and with a tremendous growth in the role of
the state, that has greatly increased citizens’ dependence on it. While
sects have certainly not disappeared, their influence must be
weighed against dependence on the state, and the expectation that
Arab states will blow apart has not been supported by facts. Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that in Iraq the Shi‘a do not participate in
power — while being the majority — has not led to opposition and
massive desertions, as the Iranian Islamic government had hoped. In
the early stages of war, the speculative expectation that the Arab
population in southern Iran might come to support the Iraqi invasion
was proven equally unfounded.
The next candidate for disintegration along sectarian lines is
Syria. Indeed, the authoritarian nature of the Syrian regime, coupled
with its own sectarian dimension, abundantly justifies the continuing
importance of sectarian identifications as an expression of opposi-
tion. Yet, one should not forget that the Syrian state has come to be
something much more complex than simply the regime of Hafez al-
Asad, and that this same regime relies on numerous support struc-
tures, not just the ‘Alawi ‘asabiyya (see on this Hinnebush, in
Dawisha and Zartman, 1987: vol. HI in this series). The expectation
that Syria will disintegrate whenever the current regime comes to an
end may therefore be unfounded. Authoritarian governments create
conditions that do not allow measurement of the transformations that
occur in societies and individual perceptions; but transformations do
occur.
In the case of the Sudan, the attempt on the part of the
authoritarian government of Ga‘far an-Nimeiry to play the game of
divide and rule has gradually brought it to isolation and downfall.
The armed revolt in the south has played an essential role in bringing
about this result. Restoration of democratic government has not led
to an end of the civil war, partly because of the fact that the Islamic
legislation approved in 1983 has not yet been repealed (An-Naim,
1987).
The Sudan is a graphic example of the contradiction between
domestic and regional integration. The proposition of wider
integrative projects — be they Nilotic co-operation with Egypt, pan-
Arab sympathy or adoption of the shari ‘ah — has a disintegrative
impact on the domestic polity. The Ba‘th pan-Arab vocabulary is no
more adequate in Iraq: indeed examples can be given for almost any
Arab state. Faced with the need to achieve greater domestic

10
 INTRODUCTION

integration, a majority of the Arab states have paid little more than
lip service to the goal of Arab integration. Yet some pan-Arab
integration nevertheless exists, at least enough of it to keep the Arab
national dream alive. The next question is to see what is the
concrete, measurable content of Arab integration.

Who is an Arab? Clearly the shortest acceptable definition is: any

individual whose native language is Arabic. Thus, the Arabic
language must be the backbone of any attempt to define an Arab
nation, and is anyway the common point of departure for most
Arabists.
In recent times, as noted, Islam has played an increasing role as
an universalistic language of opposition, eroding the impact of Arab
nationalism. However, although some speak of an Islamic nation, on
the basis of a misleading if possibly unavoidable translation of
umma, it is obviously inaccurate to speak of Islamic nationalism.
Islam, thus, may be a language of opposition, but it is not a language
of integration, in the sense that it does not per se define a credible
dimension for intense co-operation between states. The tendency to
create Islamic institutions is not to be denied, but is a qualitatively
different phenomenon from the growth of pan-Arab institutions.
While for the Arabs the ideal is that of one nation one state, for the
other Islamic states such an ideal is marginal, or a mere sanctified
utopia.
For this reason, we felt it was necessary to start from Arabic. If
Arabic is the backbone of the attempt to define the Arab nation, then
the question must be asked: is there one Arabic language? Zakaria
Abuhamdia feels strongly that indeed Arabic provides language
unity, notwithstanding the regional and social variations that are
common in any language. He notes the opinion of those who believe
that Arabic as a unified language is dead or doomed and sees a lack
of supporting evidence and a political intention in them.
The fact that Arabic in its standard form has become the prevail-
ing political language in the Arab countries, and that Arabisation
programmes explicitly exist in many of them, although implementa-
tion is far from uniform, will probably tend to consolidate the unity
of Arabic and its integrating role. At the same time, does this fact
per se carry political consequences? Arabic certainly is not the only
language utilised in more than one country: English, Spanish,
Portuguese, German and French are all examples of languages
similarly conserving unity across political boundaries. With the
possible exception of German, such commonality of language

11
INTRODUCTION

justifies limited common undertakings and co-operation, but does

not impinge upon the definition(s) of nation and the strictly political
realm. (Even in the case of German, World War Two killed pan-
Germanism in its broader definition, and what is left of it is only the
aspiration to eventual reunification of the FRG and GDR in a very
distant future). On the other hand, we have examples of countries
in which multiple languages are officially spoken, and even of
countries in which an altogether foreign language is the common
vehicle for political life. In what sense can the use of English in India
be portrayed as a limitation of sovereignty or a factor negatively
affecting the stability of the Indian state? Finally, the most successful
experience of regional integration to this date (notwithstanding its
failures and limitations), i.e. the European Community, is not based
on a commonality of language. Many Arab nationalists try hard to
show that the case of the Arabic language is different, primarily
because of its association with Islam. Arabic, in this view, is not like
any other language, and acquires greater importance for the Arabs
as an integrating factor. The latter remains a respectable subjective
opinion, but we see little empirical evidence to support it
objectively.
Thus, international evidence points to a separation of language
and politics: commonality of language can help consolidate a
political entity which historical and political forces create and
sustain, but is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for its
birth and viability.
Surely there is more to it than pure language. Language unity
permits the circulation of information and cultural inputs, which
would be obviously hindered by language barriers. Thus the
question of the impact of language unity is raised in the two chapters
that follow, with reference, respectively, to the circulation of the
media and to the education system.
Hamdi Kandil’s assessment of media circulation among the Arab
countries is extremely pessimistic. Arab governments closely
control the media within their borders, use them to interfere in each
other’s political life, view media production from other Arab
countries as a threat and try to prevent it from reaching their
citizens. Thus the Arab media do not circulate, not because the
conditions for regional circulation are (potentially) not there, but
because governments make sure that it does not take place. This
being the case, what is the real impact of language unity? Some of
the very same data which Abuhamdia uses to demonstrate that
standard Arabic is alive and well, are taken by Kandil to underline

12
 INTRODUCTION

the limitations in the freedom of expression and circulation of ideas

in the Arab countries.
One is tempted to say that this is a case in which domestic integra-
tion contradicts regional integration: the state controls the media in
order to foster domestic integration. But in fact this is not so: the
roots of state control of the media lie in the lack of legitimacy of the
regimes in power. The media are not used to cultivate a country-
specific national myth: quite to the contrary they are open to univer-
salistic discourse, especially under the form of Islam, as well as to
unabashed foreign influence, ranging from American soap opera to
Japanese cartoons. What matters is that critical* or dangerous infor-
mation does not seep through. Information relating to domestic
political affairs is suppressed even more carefully than information
relating to the rest of the world.
In this respect, there is a difference between control of the media
and the way primary and secondary education is utilised. Suleiman’s
chapter demonstrates that schooling is utilised to accredit a country-
specific national myth and to maximise the legitimacy of the existing
regime. At the same time, the wider Arab dimension is not
contradicted. Thus, it is appropriate to say that states use their
educational systems to consolidate their domestic integration,
relatively downplaying universalistic discourse. Beyond the contents
of textbooks, which are Suleiman’s main source, one should note
that education has also been a primary instrument of domestic
integration through its spread and increased reach, including the
effort to provide better education for women. While the quality of
public education is far from being satisfactory or uniform, and a
large number of young Arabs still are out of school, the effort cannot
be denied, and has an unmistakable effect on domestic integration.
(More generally, this effect is connected with bureaucratic expan-
sion and the provision of a growing number of services: see Dawisha
and Zartman, 1987.)
Yet one may argue that what is important about education and
language unity is not just the kind of national myth which textbooks
propose, but more generally the knowledge of the Arab culture in
its historical dimension. The continuity of Arab culture and its
commonality as the source of contemporary cultural life in all Arab
countries is an important integrating factor. At the same time, the
European experience once again shows that commonality of
language is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
commonality of culture. Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Goethe
belong to a same cultural tradition independently of the fact that they

13
INTRODUCTION

use different languages. Europe has had an integrated culture for a

very long time, indeed centuries, and her contemporary process of
integration is nevertheless progressing at a snail’s pace, and no
common language is involved.
Furthermore, and notwithstanding the progress of education, how
many Arabs are aware of past and present Arab culture? In addition,
if we shift our attention from culture in the sense of learned intellec-
tual life, to culture in the anthropological sense of daily values,
interests and behavioural codes, is it not the case that Arabs, as
indeed the citizens of almost any country except possibly Albania,
are increasingly participating into an international culture, promoted
by media and advertising agencies? A culture made of jeans, soft
drinks, diapers and aspirin: possibly uninspiring, but for those who
can afford it, marking a very substantial increase in the standard of
living by any reasonable objective measure.
Common, or popular, culture is thus internationalised, and so too
is learned intellectual life. While there is no doubt a domain in which
a specifically Arab culture can flourish, knowledge is universal and
the international circulation of it, as well as of intellectuals, is
continuously increasing. In fact, it is a common experience that
Arab intellectuals have easier access to non-Arab sources, and can
more easily travel to non-Arab countries than within the Arab region
itself. The influence of the French and Anglo-American cultures
created a cleavage which the explicit will to Arabise and increase
communication among Arabs has not yet erased.
In fact, even Salafi Islamist writers participate in this accultura-
tion. Some of them discuss Marx as if he were their neighbour and
Newton as the neighbourhood shopkeeper. The real problem with
Islamist writers (and some Arabist writers as well) is that their
knowledge of the ‘West’ they curse daily is ashamedly nil, or in any
case much more superficial and equally if not more biased than the
way the ‘Orient’ is presented in the orientalist literature.
Increasingly, Arab intellectuals meet, communicate and interact;
but this is so only because some among them are explicitly engaged
in a longstanding effort to bring about this result — and it is an uphill
battle to this day. Thus there is no easy answer to the question: does
an active Arab conscience exist in the Arab countries? In his chapter,
Tawfic Farah reviews the results of various attitudinal samples that
have tried to address this question, and finds mixed evidence. With
all the caveats that he formulates, at least one conclusion is
legitimate: that the identification with the Arab nation is not an over-
whelming factor which pushes aside competitive identifications;

14
 INTRODUCTION

quite the contrary, it must coexist with such competitive identifica-

tions. At the same time, neither is the Arab identification purely
artificial or illusory.
At the cultural level, the Arab identification is thus strong enough
to deny credibility to alternative universalist doctrines, and even acts
as a limiting factor on the impact of Islam. At the same time, it is
not powerful enough to overcome the obstacles that illegitimate
governments (not states) raise to prevent it from becoming an instru-
ment of the opposition. One gets the impression that the potential for
a rebirth of Arab nationalism is there, but political conditions are not
ripe for it. What is becoming clear at last, two decades after the 1967
defeat — the greatest blow to Arab nationalism — is that the ‘Arab
idea’ is not the creation of any individual political party or leader,
such as the Ba‘th or Nasser or al-Husri. Following the reaction to
one form of Arabism, a reaction well illustrated in Ajami (1981), a
time for the reappearance of other forms, other expressions of the
idea, has come.

In the post-World War II era the importance of cultural factors in

the conduct of international affairs, and as a determinant of
integrative processes, has often been downplayed to the benefit of
economic factors. While nationalism based on ethnicity or cultural
heritage led to the worst conflicts in the history of humankind, trade
and investment were expected to cause reciprocal interest and
dependence, mutual knowledge, respect and confidence. On the
basis of this belief, an international economic order was put in place
which explicitly aimed at increasing economic intercourse to rein-
force stability and peaceful co-operation. It is clear that this system
did, in fact, succeed in increasing interdependence among industrial
countries; in Europe, in particular, the economy has provided a
convenient base to launch and sustain an important experiment in
regional integration, i.e. the European Community. At the same
time, other countries of the world have remained largely at the
periphery of this process.
The increase in international economic intercourse is a fact, but
it is not at all clear that the resulting interdependence necessarily
leads to integration: countries may fail to agree on a regime, may
fail to develop the co-operative and institutionalised environment
that distinguishes integration from mere interdependence. Indeed, as
we look at the evolution of economic relations since 1971, the year
the Bretton Woods system collapsed, we see at one and the same
time continued growth of interdependence and economic conflicts

15
INTRODUCTION

among the major players. If anything, the international economy has

witnessed a decrease of integration, in the sense of coherent and
possibly institutionalised conduct of economic policies, and a sharp
increase in conflictual behaviour. That this has not led to a collapse
of the international economy is proof of the fact that countries are
indeed interdependent, and could no longer isolate themselves from
international economic relations. Still, the fact remains that increas-
ing interdependence does not necessarily lead to integration.
The European Community, in partial contrast, constitutes an
attempt at integration inasmuch as it established common institutions
and policies. That this integration is less than perfect is abundantly
clear, as conflicts are the daily experience of the Community. It
remains to be explained, nevertheless, why the members of the
Community insist in being engaged in this integrative process, while
conflict and disintegration prevail at the international level. Mere
analysis of economic data does not provide an answer, as
Community members are not significantly more interdependent than
they are individually with the rest of the world. Countries that have
just as important ties with EC members, such as Switzerland and
Norway, stay out of the Community. Any Community member
could leave the Community at very little economist cost, as it would
still maintain the possibility of engaging in economic intercourse
with the rest of Europe to the extent it wished. Thus, pure economic
interdependence does not suffice to explain economic integration.
The position of the Arab countries in the context of the politics
of global interdependence is analysed in the chapter written by Samir
Makdisi. The data provided in that chapter document a well-known
fact: the Arab countries are strongly interconnected with the inter-
national economy, but both trade and financial linkages between
Arab countries are not important. Thus, from the point of view of
trade and financial flows, the Arab world appears to be fragmented,
as each Arab country is individually tied to the industrial countries
but Arab countries are not tied to one another. This weakens the
position of the Arab countries in the game of international inter-
dependence, and stresses the unbalanced nature of the relationship,
i.e. Arab dependence. This, however, is not a necessary result: quite
to the contrary, Makdisi strongly argues that the position of the Arab
countries would be greatly enhanced collectively through a process
of regional integration, allowing them to participate in conflictual
interdependence as a group rather than as individual countries. Thus
the potential interest for increased regional integration is clearly
established: it is connected with the will to escape from a position

16
 INTRODUCTION

of subordination in international economic relations, and vanishes

if subordination is accepted or even welcomed by the existing
regimes.
However, this is not the whole story. When discussing the
credibility of Arab economic integration, attention is often focused
on trade and financial flows only, and one loses sight of the most
important factor of economic interdependence between Arab
countries, i.e. migration. This is partly a consequence of the impact
of the European precedent, in which trade was the driving force; and
in part as well a consequence of the fact that migration has attracted
little interest on the part of the economic profession, and is viewed
with considerable uneasiness in the political circles of both the
countries of origin and the countries of destination. Yet the fact is,
as the chapters by I.S.E. Abdallah, Georges Sabagh and Sharon
Stanton-Russell illustrate, that migration is a massive phenomenon
and a powerful factor of interdependence.
While the literature on inter-Arab migration has tended to stress
the potential negative effects of this phenomenon, and has in some
cases listed as negative certain consequences that from any
reasonable point of view should be called positive (here a point of
difference exists between the editors and I.S.E. Abdallah, as we are
inclined to list the increase in wages in agriculture in Egypt as one
of the positive, not the negative effects of migration; and possibly
the same might apply to the purported breakdown in work ethic and
discipline, if this means that the fellahin now understand that their
life does not need to be as miserable as they were previously
resigned to) it is clear that migration is having a major and
unmistakable impact on the economies of both the countries of origin
and the countries of destination.
Countries of destination have been able to build up rapidly from
scratch an administrative and services sector, and engage in massive
infrastructural and residential construction, that has literally
changed the structure of the countries themselves. Their dependence
on the inflow of migrant workers is massive, as foreign workers
constitute 90.3 per cent of the work force in the UAE, 84.5 per cent
in Qatar, 78.6 per cent in Kuwait, 58.6 per cent in Bahrain, 48.7
per cent in Oman and 46.6 per cent in Saudi Arabia.
It has often been maintained by Gulf leaders that such immigra-
tion is a temporary and disposable phenomenon. Available data for
the 1980s show, quite to the contrary, that migrants are displaying
a tendency to stabilise, extend their period of residence, establish
independent businesses and become self-employed in increasing

17
INTRODUCTION

numbers. Thus, the predicted massive outflow of migrants, who,

some feared would be pushed back to their countries of origin, has
not materialised, as the net flow remains positive in the direction of
the major oil-exporters, albeit, not surprisingly, at a much reduced
level relative to the previous decade. Much has also been made of
the recent tendency of some of the Gulf countries to hire an increas-
ing proportion of Asian immigrant workers, thus reducing their
relative dependence on other Arab countries; this tendency is there,
but it must be seen in the context of the extreme dependence of some
of these countries on foreign labour. If 90 per cent of the labour
force is foreign, and 40 per cent of immigrants are Asians, one is
still left with a proportion of Arabs from other countries which is
higher than 50 per cent of the labour force. Furthermore, it is the
Arabs that tend to renew and extend their work permits, while the
Asian immigrants exhibit a higher turnover.
In the face of these data, it is difficult to discard migration as just
a passing phenomenon, that does not establish any long-term ties
between the Arab countries.
As far as the effect on the countries of origin is concerned, atten-
tion has often focused on the balance of payments, and less so on
the allocation of savings of the migrants. To the limited extent that
they are available, empirical data on the utilisation of remittances
underline the importance of expenditure on improving one’s basic
life conditions, especially on housing, and on investment goods.
Such data probably underestimate the investment content of
migrants’ remittances, as expenditure that may appear to be for
consumption is in fact a form of investment, such as may be the case
when offspring or relatives are allowed to continue in school for
more years than they would have otherwise. When all direct and
indirect effects are considered, the effect of migration on economic
and social mobility in the countries of origin will be shown to be
very substantial indeed.
At the same time, the need to attract migrants’ remittances has
contributed to a very important realignment of Arab economic
policies. This point is discussed again in the chapter of I.S.E.
Abdallah, as he shows that in some of the countries of origin
previous dirigiste tendencies were shed in favour of an increased
role for the private sector and for market mechanisms of allocation.
In this respect, while the importance of the state sector and of
administrative allocation policies may be justifiable in the light of the
historical conditions of development faced by the Arab countries in
the 1950s and 1960s, it is nevertheless a fact that economic

18
 INTRODUCTION

integration becomes more difficult whenever the state plays a major

role in the conduct of economic affairs.
It is typically the private sector that leads economic integration
across borders. It often does so to escape the control of the state in
the country of origin, besides reaping the higher profits generally
associated with international expansion. The state sector naturally
thinks in terms of self-sufficiency, and national administrative
controls seldom are mutually consistent. The experience of the
European Community and of international trade negotiations proves
that while it is relatively easy to reduce tariffs and other barriers to
trade, it is extremely difficult to agree on common standards for
national regulations and administrative systems, and the latter have
by now become very important obstacles to a further deepening of
economic interdependence. The recent history of the Arab countries
is dotted with attempts at co-ordination and integration in situations
in which states are the most important actors, and it is often the case
that the original goodwill, which may in some cases be quite
substantial, is rapidly eroded and the agreements collapse as each
partner becomes intolerant of limitations on his sovereignty. But
where the role of the state is more limited and the market is the
primary mechanism for allocation, the opportunity for successful
integration is increased.
Of course, one should beware of the mystique of the private
sector, a category that includes several sharply different types of
actors. We do not expect too much of the wealthy financiers and
speculators who accumulated large fortunes in the years of the oil
boom: Khashoggi’s involvement in the Sudan is not our model of
Arab integration. We believe in the potential of the millions who
work and toil, who migrated and were able to accumulate a small
capital and become aware of new opportunities, out of which a new
entrepreneurial class with a strong interest in the regional dimension
may emerge.
In one of the previous volumes in this series, it was argued that
the different economic bases of the Arab states act as important
obstacles on the path to Arab integration. According to the concep-
tualisation proposed there, allocation and production states have
different and conflicting interests with respect to integration, and
progress would inevitably require a progressive transformation of
the allocation states into production states. Current trends, with
respect to both the effort for industrialisation and diversification on
one hand, and the tendency to a stabilisation of the immigrant labour
force, point to such a progressive transformation.

19
INTRODUCTION

At the same time, it seems likely that, if these trends are

consolidated, political problems will arise that may cause a crisis.
In particular, none of the countries of destination offers immigrants
a fully predictable way to acquire citizenship and political rights. As
long as these states remain independent of domestic taxation, while
providing a profitable business environment, it is possible that even
long term residents might accept such political marginalisation. As
Sharon Stanton Russell underlines, ‘The fact that acquisition of
citizenship has been limited in the major receiving states of the Gulf,
or has not resulted in full political participation where it occurred,
does not mean, however, that political integration of migrants has
not taken place . . . in view of the authoritarian nature of the Gulf
regimes, a more important mechanism for integration of migrants
has been their participation in host countries institutions that . . .
serve to build consensus’. However the writing is on the wall and
the day will come when the state will need to appeal to the support
of the established foreign resident community, and the latter will
inevitably demand political rights as a result. Indeed, in some cases,
e.g. in Bahrain, this support has been sought and obtained on a
limited scale. The very lack of any discussion of the possibility of
changing the rules for acquiring local citizenship in those countries,
such as Kuwait, where there is already a long established immigrant
community (mostly Palestinians) is proof of the uneasiness which
this problem arouses. It is not by chance that the Kuwaiti political
elite maintains a close relationship with the PLO, and tries to accom-
modate the latter’s wishes on matters of interest to the Palestinian
community.
That allocation states will in fact evolve to become production
states is thus not clear. If current regimes start feeling threatened by
this evolution, then they may cut down on industrialisation, diver-
sification and immigration, and concentrate on oil revenues and
financial investment on the capital markets of the industrial coun-
tries. This would be a setback for the cause of Arab integration. But
if current trends are allowed to continue, then it is likely that the
migrant community will gradually establish a network of regional
ties that will involve trade and financial flows as well as movements
of labour.
Thus the importance of migration as a link establishing inter-
dependence between the Arab countries deserves to be stressed, and
certainly adds to the credibility of regional economic integration.
Though our knowledge of the field remains largely impressionistic,
George Sabagh (Chaper 7, this volume) distinguishes between

20
 INTRODUCTION

integration between Arab countries and integration within Arab

countries, and between integration and interdependence. The latter
is, of course, strengthened by the tendency of many ‘guest-workers’
to setde in the Gulf. It is plainly a fact that ‘the degree of day-to-day
interaction among Arabs of different origins has never been greater.
The numbers bom and growing up outside their home countries are
increasing’ (Russell, Chapter 8 in this volume, page 207).
Increased regional interdependence may as a consequence occur
largely independently of state will and international agreement. This
is in fact what has occurred with migration: attempts at regulating
this essentially private phenomenon through international agreement
have almost consistently failed. Under what conditions is the poten-
tially growing regional interdependence going to stimulate a
conscious effort at integration?
Makdisi’s answer to this question is essentially linked to the
politics of interdependence. He believes that regional integration
will result from the realisation on the part of the Arab states that
their individual weight is not sufficient to defend their economic
sovereignty while pursuing their development goals. Only a regional
dimension can provide an adequate base for the implementation of
the optimal balance of inward looking and outward looking policies,
striking a compromise between sovereignty and growth.
Indeed, the European experience seems to support this view.
Progress is made on the lengthy and at times byzantine path to a
united Europe only when the international environment evolves in
such a way that the leading countries feel the need for support on
the part of the other Community members in order to resist
unwanted outside influences. The European Monetary System
provides an excellent example in this respect, as it was brought
about by the German determination to resist what were viewed as
disastrous American pressures to reflate under the Carter admini-
stration. Generally, once some progress is made the Community
then tends to defend it even under changed, frequently adverse,
circumstances. Thus, the EMS survived the second oil shock,
although the original project was realised only in part. Indeed, the
tendency to defend the aequis communautaire under all circum-
stances has become one of the basic rules of Community life and a
powerful obstacle to reform even for blatantly irrational common
policies, such as the agricultural policy.
Can similar circumstances and processes arise in the Arab
context? It is clear that the reduction in the price of oil may turn out
to be a blessing for the cause of Arab integration. During the oil

21
INTRODUCTION

boom, the extraordinary complementarity of the Arab countries was

repeatedly underlined (some countries offering agricultural poten-
tial, others a favourable environment for industrial development;
some financial capital and others an abundant labour supply; some
needing export markets and others reliable sources of supply); but
this very same complementarity made a political approach to
integration more difficult, as the issue of division of benefits was
necessarily quite controversial, and the balance of inter-Arab power
was tilting too heavily to the benefit of the oil countries.
The end of the oil boom creates conditions in which the
emphasis is shifted from profit maximisation to damage limitation.
The Arab countries presently face, individually and collectively,
the spectre of disaster, and should be willing to pay a price to avoid
it. The major oil exporters need the support and discipline of even
the smaller and more densely populated exporters such as Tunisia
or Egypt to effectively bargain in their difficult position within
Opec. The currencies of all the Arab countries will manifest a
tendency to depreciate in dollar terms, and consequently even more
so relative to the Yen or the European currencies. This will act as
a powerful incentive to increased regional trade. The oil exporters
will look more carefully into the opportunities for cheaper imports
from neighbouring Arab countries, and the latter need markets
desperately, and may be willing to shed some of the administrative
regulations that still hinder the establishment of export-oriented
industries. As official surpluses shrink, emphasis will shift from the
macro-recycling of officially-held funds to the micro-recycling of
private savings, belonging to migrants or to the national
bourgeoisie. These may be more easily attracted into regional
investment if the appropriate conditions are offered. Thus trade
liberalisation between Arab countries, formal or informal co-
ordination of oil and exchange rate policies, and guarantees on the
transferability of funds may all be much more attractive proposi-
tions today than they were some years back.
These are not impressive steps. It is not clear, however, that
more impressive steps are needed. And neither is it clear that
political conditions exist for more ambitious attempts at regional
integration. Indeed, we noted before that the European Community
cannot be understood as merely economically motivated, although
the dismantling of trade barriers is at the heart of it. The existence
of the Community can only be explained in the light of two major
political circumstances:

22
 INTRODUCTION

(a) the institutional homogeneity of the original members, all of

which are parliamentary democracies (with the three major original
members, Italy, Germany and France, being republics); and
(b) the presence of a powerful external threat, and the traumatic
division of Europe in two opposed groups, with contrasting
ideologies, and the iron curtain in between.

The failure of most regional groupings in the Third World may

be at least in part attributed to the absence of similarly compelling
political considerations. It is not by chance that ASEAN, presently
another success story, also displays similar features, and in
particular the perception of a powerful threat following the US
defeat in Vietnam and the latter’s invasion of Cambodia. ASEAN
however does not display homogeneous democratic governments, or
at least not yet.
The importance of institutional homogeneity has been highlighted
in the successive enlargements of the Community’s membership.
Indeed, in the last two enlargements — Greece and then Spain and
Portugal — the basic criterion for acceptance as a member has been
the establishment of democratic regimes after periods of
authoritarian rule. In the case of Spain, the economic incentive of
becoming a member was minimal, and the interest both on the side
of the Community and on the side of Spain lay primarily in the
consolidation of Spanish democratic institutions after forty years of
Francoist rule. In current discussions about the status of relations
between the Community and Turkey the question of Turkish
democratisation and respect for individual political rights plays a
crucial role.
What is the situation in the Arab region with respect to institu-
tional homogeneity? The answer is very obviously that there is very
little of it: most Arab countries are not democracies, the ideologies
of the regimes in power are often mutually exclusive, and a number
of them are ruled by monarchs or tribal clans, some of whom do not
even feel the need for a constitution. That this lack of political
homogeneity at the superstructure level is a practically unsurmoun-
table obstacle to regional integration hardly needs to be stressed. A
proof per absurdum comes from the relative success of the Gulf
Cooperation Council, whose membership is clearly defined as a
function of institutional homogeneity (a club of wealthy rulers, be
they kings, sultans or amirs).
This point is so obvious that it does not require further analysis
in this volume. The same cannot be said with respect to the role of

23
INTRODUCTION

an external threat. In the last forty years the Arab world has been
subjected to a multiplicity of external threats, and it is interesting to
see how their impact on Arab integration evolved.
Initially the main external threat was represented by genuine
colonial domination. The idea of an Arab state that would include
at least all of the eastern Arab region, was coincidental with the
Hijazi-based ‘Arab revolt’ and the wish to detach the Arabs from
Ottoman rule. When that disappeared, resistance to European
colonial power and schemes came to the fore, and the Maghreb and
Mashreq found themselves involved in the same struggle. The
period of anticolonial struggle, culminating with the Algerian war,
was one in which on the one hand the present system of states was
confirmed, while on the other the Arabs were drawn significantly
together. However, Algerian independence coincided with the
breakdown of the UAR (1961), the beginning of Egyptian-Saudi
confrontation in the Yemen (1962), the collapse of the tripartite
unity talks (1963): the agenda of inter-Arab politics was substan-
tially modified.
As all Arab states gradually achieved independence, Israel was
left as the only immediate external threat confronting the region.
The continuity between the anticolonial struggle and the struggle
against Israel has often been underlined, and the Middle East
conflict is in a sense the struggle for independence of the Palestin-
ians. Indeed, some would propose that the creation of the Israeli
state and the subsequent Arab-Israeli conflict has been by far the
most important external threat confronting the region. The creation
of Israel evidenced the weakness and precipitated the downfall of the
‘traditional’ regimes in Egypt and the Crescent (Kazziha, in this
volume page 213-18). Subsequently, the Israeli state has been
assimilated to a beachhead of Western, or specifically American,
penetration in the Arab world, aiming at regional dominance. Israel
has been equated to the Crusaders’ state. The return of Palestine to
Arab rule has been portrayed as the most important objective of
Arab nationalism and co-operation among Arab countries, hence the
famous slogan ‘Unity is the road to Palestine’, later turned by PLO
publicists into ‘Palestine is the road to Unity’.
Might Israel have played the same role in precipitating Arab
integration as the iron curtain played in the establishment of the
European Community? There is obviously a scale factor to be
considered here, as the magnitude of the two threats is simply not
comparable, and merely proposing the parallel constitutes a wild
exaggeration of Israel’s position in the region. However, it is a fact

24
 INTRODUCTION

that many Arabs tend to portray Israel as the overriding preoccupa-

tion of all sincere Arab patriots; thus it seems logical to ask whether
the presence and posture of the Israeli state has played an integrative
role: the chapters by Avi Shlaim on Israeli intervention in Arab
politics, and Walid Kazziha on the impact of Palestine and the
Palestinians address this question.
Kazziha offers a critical and balanced view of the impact of
Palestine and the Palestinians on Arab politics. While rejecting
sweeping generalisations that exaggerate the impact of Palestine’s
vicissitudes, he notes that the Palestine question has had a tremen-
dous impact on three major areas in Arab politics: firstly in the
1950s it precipitated the substitution of several monarchies with
military regimes; secondly Palestine acted as a rallying point for
internal solidarity in many Arab societies, and thus in a sense
contributed to domestic integration; finally, ‘the Palestine issue has
been instrumental in the process of achieving a certain measure of
political and military co-operation among the Arab countries’. The
latter statement, though, requires qualification: Kazziha stresses the
importance of 1967 as a turning point in the relationship between
Palestine and Arab politics. Because 1967 was such a crushing
defeat, and nothing is more disintegrative than defeat, Palestine
started having a disintegrative effect. The development of a national
Palestinian consciousness, separate from the pan-Arab conscious-
ness, changed the relationship between the Palestinian struggle and
Arab unity. Palestinians began attributing priority to Palestine,
rather than to Arab unity; the growth of an independent military
force had a disintegrative impact on both Jordan and Lebanon, albeit
with different outcomes. While on the one hand the ‘Palestinisation’
of the conflict on the part of the PLO mainstream helped consolidate
the now-relieved Arab regimes, differences between Arab states on
how the Palestinian issue should be addressed deepened, and became
a major bone of contention. Thus the Palestine issue, on the whole,
has probably had a disintegrative effect since 1967, notwithstanding
the ceremonial reiteration of solidarity on the part of the Arab states,
and its exploitation to enhance consensus around vacillating
domestic regimes.
Shlaim analyses Israeli involvement in Lebanon to seek the roots
of the fundamental Israeli decision that it was in the best interest of
Israel to pursue disintegration rather than integration in the Arab
camp. The basic dilemma that this strategic decision poses for the
future of Israel — i.e. the absence of a credible counterpart with
which peace may be negotiated, and consequently the creation of a

25
INTRODUCTION

situation in which war is the only alternative — was understood in

the early days of the Israeli state. However, the temptation to
manipulate the politics of integration in its Arab neighbours to its
immediate advantage gradually prevailed, and Israel succumbed to
the delusion of being able to control disintegration. In a not unusual
repeat of Vapprenti sorcier, Israel proceeded to find that it could not
reach the objective that it had imagined, because the latter contrasted
with the evolution of structural factors. In the case of Lebanon,
structural factors have irreversibly eroded Maronite control over the
state. In the case of Palestine, the structural factor that no extent of
manipulation will ever succeed in erasing is the existence of the
Palestinian people, to whom a political identity must be offered.
Israeli interference proved successful in exploiting cleavages and
contradictions in the Arab camp, but offers no solution to the need
of guaranteeing the security of the state of Israel, unless a state of
permanent war is considered acceptable. In fact, if the 1982 invasion
of Lebanon was meant to destroy the West Bank attachment to the
PLO, it was probably counter-productive.
With hindsight, it should be clear that, contrary to rhetorical
utterances, Israel was never perceived as a threat equally by all Arab
countries, and the call for co-ordinated Arab action has consistently
been stuffed with explicit or implicit reservations. The Arab regimes
became trapped in their own rhetoric and to this day have been
unable to admit to their genuine interests and seek a compromise
accordingly. Similarly, the Arab countries have become victims of
the initial decision not to assimilate the Palestinian refugees, creating
a factor of disintegration that has destroyed Labanon and threatens
Kuwait. (Not so Jordan, because the Palestinians are Jordanian
citizens; the threat to Jordanian integrity is a consequence of
competition for Palestinian allegiance between the PLO and the
Hashemite monarchy.) Because of their marginalisation, and despite
their role in pan-Arab politics, the Palestinians failed to become a
factor of Arab integration, and became instead a source of conflict.
The isolation of Egypt following the Camp David agreements
underlines the connection between Arab integration and peace with
Israel. If, as Shlaim would argue, Arab integration is to some extent
a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for peace between
Israel and the Arab states, today the reverse is also true, and peace
has become a prerequisite of integration. No attempt at Arab integra-
tion is credible if Egypt, by far the largest Arab country, is not a
party to it. Egypt does not need to be the leader of Arab integration,
but certainly cannot be left aside. Thus, the agenda for integration

26
 INTRODUCTION

is indefinitely postponed until some kind of agreement is fashioned

with Israel that is acceptable to all Arab sides.
One can speculate on the shape of such an agreement, but no
agreement can solve the Palestinian problem in a simple way. What-
ever the territorial solution for Palestine, and though the existence
of a Palestinian political entity is an unavoidable component of any
peace, a Palestinian diaspora will continue, and a solution to it, i.e.
assimilation of a number of Palestinians in some of their countries
of residence, is necessary if the Palestinians are to play a more
integrative role in Arab politics.

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, and at least

until the 1960s, the need to strengthen the stability of the inter-
national system through regional integrative schemes that would
encompass the ‘new’ states which the process of decolonisation was
bringing to independence, was commonly recognised and found
expression in a multiplicity of institutions and agreements. Most of
these attempts have not bom the fruits that were expected of them.
Indeed, most collapsed or lost effectiveness because states system-
atically privileged the demands of domestic integration over those of
regional integration. Considerable disillusionment has thus arisen
over the potential for regional integration: at the same time the need
for it stands unaffected.
The fact that regional integration may be necessary to strengthen
individual states in the face of superpower rivalries and broader
international conflicts does not necessarily mean that it will take
place. The functionalist fallacy is to believe that because an institu-
tion is necessary, it will develop. Rationality does not always belong
to this world, and it is entirely possible that states will continue to
engage in conflictual relations with each other. After all, European
states engaged in many a long war before resigning themselves to
co-operation; and to this date, it is not clear that this decision cannot
be reversed.
At the same time, it should not be surprising that fresh attempts
are periodically made to get regional integration off the ground. This
is true of all regions, not just of the Arab countries: in south and
southeast Asia, in Latin America and to some extent in Africa as
well, new attempts at regional integration have been proposed, with
mixed results, in the last 15 years. In this respect, the Arab countries
are no different: what makes the politics of integration different in
the Arab region is the nationalist undertone that is an ineliminable
component of it. Elsewhere in the world, the politics of integration

27
INTRODUCTION

generally do not speak the nationalist language, but rather de facto

contradict it.
It is the nationalist component that makes it so difficult to attempt
a fresh start. What is peculiar about Arab integration is that, while
little effective progress has been made, an array of institutions has
been put in place, mostly under the general umbrella of the Arab
League — an aspect which is explored in the concluding chapter of
this book. While these institutions are mostly ineffective, they have
served the existing state system well because they have provided
international legitimation to the plurality of sovereign Arab states.
At the same time, these institutions enjoy an undeserved legitimacy
in terms of the nationalist discourse, leading to a situation whereby
progress within the existing setup is precluded by sclerosis, while
progress with some alternative setup is immediately perceived as
being contradictory to the cause of building an Arab nation. At best,
subregional schemes can be launched, such as the Gulf Cooperation
Council, but their consistency with the objective of Arab integration
is still questioned. Clearly, participation on the part of Arab states
in integrative schemes that are openly at odds with the Arab idea is
anathema.
Thus, while these institutions are likely to continue a subsistence
life, they certainly cannot be expected to take the lead in future
efforts to promote Arab integration. At the same time, new
developments are occurring in the region which may establish a new
basis for the process.
At the superstructural level, Arab nationalism now appears to
have entered a third phase in its evolution. The first phase had been
characterised by the affirmation of the existence and unity of the
Arab nation as a theological statement. Total dedication was
requested to the ideal of reuniting the Arab nation, and this was an
objective more important than any other and one that encompassed
all others. No problem could be solved unless the Arab nation was
restored to unity and glory, and all problems would be easy to solve
once this task had been accomplished. As reality did not support this
vision, a second phase was ushered in, during which isolationist
policies prevailed, states gave priority to their domestic integration
rather than to inter-Arab integration, and disillusionment ensued.
Intellectuals started to question the validity of the pan-Arab ideal,
and proclaimed the end of pan-Arabism. The third phase, that we
now witness, is marked by a revived and more serene assessment of
the Arab idea: an idea which is seen as useful and realistic, but strip-
ped of the theological tones that abound in the writings of Husri or

28
 INTRODUCTION

‘Aflaq. This phase is marked by several concurrent phenomena.

There is a new wave of writings on Arabism, which, however, are
not related to political agendas and programmes. There is a fresh
interest in the Arab idea outside the tense ideological climate of the
Crescent, notably in the Maghreb and in the Gulf: writers from the
‘wings’ of the Arab world sometimes pretend to offer their view of
Arabism, as opposed to the Syrian traditional school, but do not
refute the idea itself. In parallel, Western-educated technocrats,
bankers and businessmen have taken up the idea outside the
ideological milieu in which it had been cultivated, and repropose it
with new, more immediate, if more limited, contents. Finally, there
is the growing perception of Iran as a strongly nationalist state, that
constitutes a threat behind the veil of Islamism, and stimulates a
growing support of the potential victims of Iranian expansionism.
Other factors are at work at the structural level. In the second
volume in this series (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987) it was proposed
that a link exists between the fiscal basis of the state and the potential
evolution towards democratisation. It was stated there that the
collapse in oil prices constitutes a new challenge for some of the
Arab states, a challenge that may impose either an intensification of
repression or an institutionalisation of legitimacy through the
adoption of democratic institutions and rules of conduct. The odds
that the latter may prevail are strengthened by the importance of
migration, an essentially private phenomenon, that has shifted the
balance of power between state and citizen to the benefit of the latter
(as illustrated by his ability to transfer money through unofficial
channels). The progressive strengthening of existing Arab states,
explored in the third volume (Dawisha and Zartman, 1987), points
to the fact that states may possibly be less obsessed by the need to
control centrifugal tendencies, and more open to a redefinition of the
relative role of state and society.
These structural tendencies are important because integration is
very closely connected with democratisation. One may propose
examples of forms of integration that have developed between states
that are not democratic, and indeed the GCC is an example of this.
However, there is always necessarily a limit to such integrative
processes since eventually the evolution towards unity would entail
a loss of power for all except whoever would rule the unified entity.
The difficulties of the federal government in the UAE are a clear
proof of this. It is only if the participants share democratic institu-
tions that a process of integration may eventually — and if a strong
political will prevails — lead to political unification. Inevitably, the

29
INTRODUCTION

objective of political unification will arouse as much resistance as it

receives support, and it is only the support of a strong popular will
that may possibly lead to a prevalence of the Unitarian ideal.
If the Arabs, rather than the Arab states, become the protagonists
of the drive towards integration, then the latter stands a chance of
making real progress. It is unlikely that all Arab countries will
experience similar political evolutions, although the tendency to a
paring down of the states’ ambitions seems to be quite widespread.
To the extent that only some of the Arab states will evolve towards
democratisation and abandon the attempt to contol every aspect of
society, integration will take place among a subset of the Arab coun-
tries. In many respects, it is the African Arab countries — with the
possible exception of Libya — that are more likely to evolve in the
direction that we are suggesting. In the Arab east, the negative
impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the likelihood that the Gulf states
will continue to be based essentially on oil rent and to be ruled by
authoritarian governments, and the authoritarian character of the
regimes in Syria and Iraq, all converge to make a society-based
integrative process more difficult. Yet even there things are happen-
ing, changes are taking place, and surprises are not to be ruled out.
Society-based integrative processes do not need to endanger the
independent existence of present-day Arab states, and may even find
accommodation and political co-optation in the context of existing
inter-Arab institutions. Yet this requires that the evolution be fairly
generalised. If, on the other hand, Arab states experience divergent
political evolutions, some possibly falling prey to Islamic funda-
mentalism, others continuing under authoritarian rule, and only a
few evolving towards democratisation, then the Arab dimension will
eventually lose its appeal, and attempts at regional co-operation that
would explicitly contradict the Arab conception (i.e. that would tie
some Arab states to other non-Arab states, in a co-operation
motivated by homogeneity of domestic regimes rather than by the
nationalist ideology), and that would aggravate the east/west
polarisation in the region, might well emerge.

30
 Part One
The Cultural Dimension
Page Intentionally Left Blank
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
The side walls, which are very substantial, are still 8 ft. high. The
entrance from this passage into Enclosure F is formed by two large
rounded buttresses with portcullis grooves.
Enclosure C.—This enclosure is on the west side of the ruins, and
is on the south side of the main and north-west entrance to these
ruins, and north of Enclosure A, and is on the inner side of the west
portion of the main wall. Its length from north to south is 43 ft., and
its width from east to west 17 ft. The western length of banquette
wall forms its west side, and the face of this wall is poorly built. The
south wall must be considered as badly built. On its south and
south-east sides is the “conglomeration of buttresses,” the character
of which can better be seen by glancing at the accompanying plan.
The buttresses are almost circular, and have their centres filled with
stones, thrown in most promiscuously. The east wall is well built; still
it is inferior to any of the main walls of the Elliptical Temple. Through
this wall is an aperture 2 ft. wide and with side walls 3 ft. high. The
floor of this enclosure has been cleared away in places, showing the
foundations of the walls.
Enclosure D.—This enclosure is on the inner side of the north
portion of the main wall, and east of the north-west entrance to
these ruins and of the Entrance Enclosure.
The area of this enclosure is 41 ft. from north to south, and 45 ft.
from east to west. It is bounded on the north, west, and south sides
by the banquette and main walls for 23 ft., on the west by the
Entrance Enclosure for 5 ft., and by Enclosure EE for 18 ft., on the
south by a wall dividing it from Enclosure E for 10 ft., but the rest of
the southern boundary wall for 12 ft. is now only débris, and in
places can barely be traced. On the east side is a wall 15 ft. long, 4
ft. high, 2 ft. 10 in. wide on present summit, which separates this
enclosure from Enclosure H; the rest of the eastern boundary is lost
in débris.
From the north inner side of the main wall at 20 ft. from the
north-west corner of this enclosure there is a wall 4 ft. high
projecting southwards into the enclosure for 5 ft., and this has an
angular end.
A wall 6 ft. long, forming part of the passage from the north-west
entrance, projects into this enclosure. Judging by the arrangement
of débris in the space between this wall and the main wall, it is very
probable that there were steps here leading up to the summit of the
banquette wall.
At the eastern corner of this enclosure is the north entrance to
these ruins. This has already been described.
Enclosure EE.—This enclosure is bounded on the north by
Enclosure D, on the north-west by Entrance Enclosure, on the west
by Enclosure C, and on the south by Enclosure E. Its area is 26 ft.
from north to south, and 27 ft. from east to west.
The floor of the south-west corner was once at a higher level than
that of the rest of the enclosure, and to this originally raised portion
there are remains of a narrow-rounded entrance on the south side,
now filled up with débris, from Enclosure E. There are traces of
steps up to this raised entrance. The floor of the aperture in the wall
on the east side of Enclosure C appears to have been on the level of
this raised floor.
Enclosure E.—This lies directly to the south of Enclosure EE. Its
area is 49 ft. from north to south, and 48 ft. from east to west. It is
bounded on the west for 49 ft. by a wall and the “conglomeration of
buttresses” already mentioned, which respectively separates it from
Enclosures A and C; on the south for 45 ft. by Enclosures B and the
passage which connects Enclosures B and F; on the east for 36 ft. by
a wall and a large rounded buttress, which is one of the prominent
features of these ruins; the rest of the east boundary cannot be
traced, owing to débris piles; lastly, on the north by Enclosures EE
and D.
There are still two entrances remaining—one from Enclosure A
and the other from Enclosure C. Both are approached from the
enclosure by steps, now ruined but traceable, leading up either side
of the central buttress of the “conglomeration of buttresses.”
The large buttress on the east side is semi-circular, the centre of
its face is towards the west. It is 6 ft. high, 30 ft. round its face, and
is fairly well built, it being a wall with its internal portion
promiscuously thrown in till its summit was levelled throughout.
On the south-west are two rounded buttresses with their faces
towards the east and west respectively.
The enclosure contains piles of excavators’ soil débris of some
age.
Enclosure F.—This is situated on the east side of Enclosure E, and
lies between that enclosure and Enclosure G. Its area is roughly
circular, it being 37 ft. from north to south, and 42 ft. from east to
west. Its southern boundary is formed for 37 ft. by the outer south
wall of these ruins, which wall is 5 ft. high and 4 ft. wide on its
present very reduced summit. There is a gap of 12 ft. on its north-
west side, where there are now only traces of a wall.
The enclosure has two entrances now remaining—the entrance
from the passage leading from Enclosure B, which has already been
described, and an entrance through the outer south wall. This
entrance which is rounded is 2 ft. 6 in. wide, the side walls are 3 ft.
high, and there are portcullis grooves on either hand, and these
have been deliberately built up. This enclosure resembles the other
portions of these ruins with regard to large piles of soil débris on its
area.
Enclosure G.—This is the most easterly enclosure in these ruins. It
is bounded on the south by Enclosure F, on the west by Enclosure H,
and on the north and east by the outer east wall of the ruins, which
wall is 8 ft. high and 3 ft. 6 in. wide on its present summit. Its area
is 35 ft. from east to west, and 47 ft. from north to south. It
possessed three entrances, and these were on its west, north, and
east sides. The west entrance is barely distinguishable, but has
traces of its having been angular. The north entrance has rounded
sides, and leads from Enclosure H, a wall 22 ft. long and 5 ft. high
forming a division between the two enclosures. The enclosure has
been filled in with débris up to the level of this wall and overlooks
the east end of Enclosure H, which here is very much lower. The
east entrance through the outer wall is rounded on its south side,
but the north side has disappeared.
Enclosure H.—This lies on the inner side of the north and north-
east portions of the main wall, which here is considerably broken. It
is bounded on the west by Enclosure D, on the south by Enclosures
E and F, and on the east by Enclosure G. Most probably there was an
entrance between the main wall on the east side and Enclosure G,
and this led to the network of ruins which are built up against this
side of No. 1 Ruins and extend for some 300 yds. towards the east.
The area of this enclosure is 53 ft. from east to west, and 31 ft. from
north to south. The western end of this enclosure is considerably
higher than the eastern end.
Outer enclosures.—Four enclosures lie to the west of the south-
west extremity of the main wall, and are separated from it by the
passage which leads to the west entrance of these ruins, and
connects these enclosures with Enclosure A.
These enclosures adjoin one another in a single line broadways
from south to north, there being a common wall for all of them on
their west sides. These enclosures are lettered W to Z, commencing
at the south end.
Their areas are as follows:—
W 25 ft. N. to S., and 20 ft. E. to W.
X 15 ft. 〃 26 ft. 〃
Y 12 ft. 〃 22 ft. 〃
Z 16 ft. 〃 19 ft. 〃
RIDGE RUINS

These ruins are situated on the highest point of the bare granite
ridge which extends from the north-west of the Elliptical Temple
towards the north-west, and curves towards the north, where it
terminates at Havilah Camp.
The southern extremity of these ruins is 140 yds. from the north-
west side of the Elliptical Temple and 100 yds. west of No. 1 Ruins.
The path from the outspan and camp to the water springs and the
Elliptical Temple passes close to its west side, while another path to
the Temple passes close to its east side. The Outer Defence Wall,
which runs from the west side of the Temple round towards the
west, north-west, and north of the Acropolis Hill, runs parallel to the
west side of these ruins at a distance of 96 ft. A number of
euphorbia trees and aloes line its walls, which are now
comparatively low, the highest parts being about 9 ft.
The whale-back granite glacis on which these ruins are built dips
sharply from immediately outside the walls all round these ruins,
except at the south-east end, which is here only slightly higher than
the present ground level outside the Elliptical Temple. Except for
vegetable mould at a few points, the whole of the floors of these
ruins are formed by the formation rock.
The plan of these ruins shows an oval area, with a long and wide
outer passage running along its east side for 246 ft. from the north
to the south of the oval enclosure, this passage having its southern
extremity well protected by traverses and buttressed entrances.
These ruins, though built of irregularly sized stones, have the
faces of the walls which still remain remarkably true and even, so
much so that experienced builders after examining the walls state
that with such irregularly sized stones it would be most difficult to
erect walls with faces as true as those of these ruins. There appears
to be no similarity whatever between the second-period architecture
and construction and these ruins, except that the filling-in of the
walls between their faces is more promiscuous than is the case with
walls of first-period architecture and construction. Its entrances and
buttresses are all rounded, and the walls have a fair batter-back,
there being no plumb wall present.
 Sketch Plan
RIDGE RUINS
Zimbabwe.

It would be difficult to state the purpose these ruins were

intended to serve, but seeing they occupy the most westerly position
of the main ruins’ area, and that they are built on a commanding
and strategetic position, it might be inferred, if their claim to any
great antiquity were established, that their purpose was that of a
fort, defending not only the westerly side of the main ruins’ area, but
also part of a main line of communication, of which the Parallel
Passage formed a section, between the Elliptical Temple and the
west end of the Acropolis Hill. This suggestion is, in fact, apparently
supported by the numerous traverses in the passage, traces of which
can still be noticed, and by the fact that the oval enclosure overlooks
the passage throughout its length. But, as stated before, these ruins
cannot at present be classed as ancient, though they are
undoubtedly of great age.
 Oval Enclosure.—The area of the oval enclosure is 170 ft. from
north to south, and 86 ft. from east to west. These are its longest
and its widest points. The floor is formed by comparatively level
surfaces of granite rock. There is very little soil within the enclosure,
and this consists of black mould, decomposed cement, and native
clay. The walls still standing average some 4 ft. to 7 ft. in height,
and are about 3 ft. 6 in. wide on their present reduced summits, and
are battered-back. Plumb and angular walls are absent. The east
wall is at one point carried over a large boulder 8 ft. high, and a few
courses of blocks on the summit still remain. The north wall is
considerably dilapidated, and the débris of this portion lies on the
face of the declivity. The external faces of the walls are in a much
better condition than the inner faces, for trees and shrubs which
could not grow on the outer granite slopes manage to thrive in the
very scanty soil of the interior. This enclosure has been used by the
natives as a cattle kraal. Though cattle could not climb into the
enclosure from outside, they no doubt damaged the inside faces of
the walls by attempting to get outside from over the walls. The
material for the stone foundations of circular huts of no very great
age, which are to be seen in the enclosure, was very probably taken
from the inside faces of the walls.
These Makalanga stone foundations, which are identical with
those found in old Makalanga kraals, occupy the following positions.
At 60 ft. from the south end and 12 ft. from the west side,
foundations of stone blocks 19 ft. in diameter. At 110 ft. from south
end and almost facing the west entrance, stone foundations of hut
22 ft. in diameter. At 8 ft. from north end foundation blocks
disarranged and exact measurement impossible. At 60 ft. from south
end and 10 ft. from east side is another foundation, but here again
the blocks have become considerably disturbed.
This enclosure has two entrances, and these are on the south and
west sides respectively. The south entrance is comparatively intact,
but the west entrance is buried in wall débris and can only be traced
on one side. Both are rounded. The south entrance walls are 3 ft. 6
in. high, the passage is 2 ft. wide and 7 ft. long, and there are
portcullis grooves. The north side of the west entrance is formed by
a large boulder 6 ft. high.
There is no trace of ornamentation on the walls, but if it ever
existed, the walls having become so reduced, it must have
disappeared. No article was found for which the slightest antiquity
could be claimed, all the finds being obviously of native make,
though somewhat superior to their make of to-day.
Parallel Passage.—Roughly speaking, the passage throughout its
length of 246 ft. from north to south runs parallel with the east wall
of the oval enclosure and follows it round in its curves, but
narrowing towards its southern extremity. There is no entrance from
the passage to the oval enclosure except at the south end. At the
north end the passage is 47 ft. wide, and the formation rock forms
the floor; at 40 ft. further south the passage is 36 ft. wide; at 80 ft.
from the north end 22 ft. wide; at 160 ft., 19 ft. wide; at 190 ft., 13
ft. wide, which width is maintained as far as the southern extremity.
The heights of the outer wall vary from 5 ft. to 7 ft., the best-
preserved lengths being near the southern end, where a pair of
traverses with rounded ends stand at a few feet north of the south
entrance to the passage. This entrance has rounded sides.
A passage crosses from east to west at the southern extremity,
and in it are three entrances with rounded sides. Opposite the south
face of the southern extremity of the passage, and at 6 ft. distance
is an independent screen wall, 16 ft. long and 5 ft. high, covering
the approach to the entrance from the south. At several points in the
parallel passage there are distinct traces of traverses.
The new path from Havilah Camp to the Elliptical Temple now runs
through the parallel passage of these ruins.
CAMP RUINS NO. 1

Camp Ruins Nos. 1 and 2 lie north and south respectively of the
Shangani Grave, which separates them, the huts of the camp being
built on the north and wrest sides and within a few feet of the
remains of Camp Ruins No. 1, which is Sir John Willoughby’s No. 3
Ruins in his Further Excavations at Zimbabye, 1892.
Sir John describes this ruin as follows:—
“Previous to my arrival, the only trace of ruins here was one small stone
buttress on the eastern side. My original intention was to find any wall
foundations that might exist, and then to cross-cut right through the
mound at their level from east to west, and from north to south. But I was
deterred from carrying this out, because as the work proceeded, traces of
cement floors at different levels were discovered. By starting low down
the mound, I came upon a wall, varying in height from 4 ft. to 6 ft., which
encircled it. The original height of this wall can only be estimated by
comparing the existing structure with the fallen débris which was buried
by an accumulation of soil. At the foot of this wall, and on the outside, I
found many specimens of arrow-heads, Kafir pottery, bracelets, and
necklaces of iron and copper. I also found something which may perhaps
prove to be an object of special interest. This was a piece of copper about
6 in. in length and a quarter of an inch thick, covered with a green
substance (whether enamel, paint, or lacquer, I am unable to determine),
and inlaid with one of the triangular Zimbabwe designs. It was buried 5 ft.
below the surface, almost in contact with the east side of the wall itself.
 CAMP RUINS No. 1.
Zimbabwe

“I also discovered a small cave under a big rock that culminates in the
highest point of the mound, but the only object of interest here found,
besides bits of coarse pottery, was a piece of crystal or glass. On driving
into the mound through a somewhat broken entrance in the inside wall of
the west side, I was much puzzled by striking a level cement floor some 4
ft. above the wall foundations, and on following this level I came upon a
second floor about 2 ft. above the first. It would therefore seem that
originally there were a series of cement terraces, one above the other,
culminating in a point of observation on the south side on the summit of a
large rock, or that different occupants at varying dates had made new
floors. It was near this rock that I came upon one of the few pieces of
masonry inside the other wall, and that only very fragmentary in
character. In following the outside wall on its inner face, I found it varied
in width between 2 ft. 6 in. and 4 ft., and that its foundations also varied
much in depth. In the cutting thus made I came upon three small furnace
holes close together on a level with the top of the wall as it now stands,
the foundations of which increased in depth as I proceeded, and disclosed
here and there what appeared to be an extensive layer of ashes with the
bones and teeth of animals. A notable peculiarity in this mound is the
variety of stratified soil with folding concave towards the centre. The
 surface soil is more or less black; then comes a bright red clay divided by
a broad yellow streak, and below this a dash of yellow, with here and
there a vein of decomposed sandstone or other rocky substance. During
this excavation I was not very successful in finds, which were only
represented by three pieces of sea-green china, one of which was lying in
the solid red clay below the surface, and 8 ft. to 10 ft. into the side of the
mound, and two dull green porcelain beads, found 7 ft. deep and near its
centre. Taking into consideration the ash beds and furnace holes already
referred to, I feel justified in suggesting that once a workshop was here
the scene of useful activity, and at that time surrounded by an irregular
wall for protective purposes, with a point of outlook to guard against
surprise, such as the big rock with the summit would represent.”

As the author resided actually within Camp Ruins for fully two
years (1902–4), very frequent opportunities of thoroughly examining
the walls have presented themselves, the result being that it is now
ascertained that these ruins as seen to-day can be shown to be not
ancient but of a some very old Makalanga period. The furnace holes
alluded to have been used for iron-smelting, and to the depth of 11
ft. no single article approaching an antique or even mediæval
character has been found within or near its walls. The brass wire
bangles found at depth still have their grass, hair, or fibre intact.
Garden hoes, assegai heads, and coarse pottery of ordinary Kafir
make are here found in abundance. The green pottery beads are
found in almost every ruin at Zimbabwe, and never at lower depth
than the yellow soil which lies immediately under the black vegetable
mould on the floors of all the ruins. Certainly, the present natives do
not know this class of beads. That this building, as suggested by Sir
John Willoughby, was once a workshop is obvious from the
quantities of iron slag and ashes and burnt clay floors and iron
furnaces found in the vicinity. The bones of animals are mainly those
of buck of all kinds. The construction of the walls precludes any
suggestion that they could have been standing very many centuries,
certainly not extending back to any period which could, even by long
inference, be considered “ancient.” The workmanship is decidedly
poorer than that shown in modern Kafir buildings in the district.
But while this ruin, as seen to-day, may not itself be ancient, there
is some evidence that the ancients must have fortified this knoll; and
when we consider its strategetic position on the granite ridge,
extending from the south-west foot of the Acropolis Hill and the
Elliptical Temple, it becomes highly probable that later people have
utilised the material of some older buildings once occupying this
position in the erection of their poorer structures. Foundations of
walls surround the knoll at distances of some fifty and one hundred
yards from these ruins, and these show a fair claim to be recognised
as ancient, or, at any rate, as older than the walls on the summit.
The “cement” mentioned by Sir John is common soil daga (clay),
similar to that found in old Makalanga huts and floors.
The ruin crowning the knoll is roughly circular, with a diameter of
about 100 ft., with walls varying in height from 4 ft. to 6 ft. The
accompanying plan, with explanatory notes, kindly lent to the author
by Sir John Willoughby, shows the character of this ruin. The “finds”
made here in 1902–3 are identical with those discovered by Sir John
Willoughby.
CAMP RUIN NO. 2

This ruin lies 50 ft. south of Camp Ruins No. 1, and is on the same
knoll, the two being separated from each other by the Shangani
graveyard.
 CAMP RUINS No. 2
Zimbabwe

Sir John Willoughby writes:—

“I carefully attacked Ruin No. 2, but with a disappointing result. It
merely appears to be an enclosure formed by an irregular outside wall,
varying in thickness and in the depth of its foundations. In tracing this
wall, the bed-rock was occasionally exposed at a depth of 3 ft. The only
‘finds’ here were two small pieces of sea-green china, one small piece of
white china, a few Kafir arrow-heads, whorls of poor make, two fragments
of pottery having a kind of basket design, and a copper or brass clasp or
fastening, which probably formed part of a box of modern date.”

This ruin has recently been re-examined with similarly

disappointing result, and the remarks made with regard to No. 1
Ruin apply equally to this ruin. Clay foundations and floors of old
Kafir huts fill the interior at different levels. Probably in the most
ancient period, long before the present structures were erected, one
large ruin occupied the site of both Nos. 1 and 2 Ruins, and
encircled and crowned the knoll, for judging from very old
foundations, walls surrounded the knoll. At least there were two
such walls, one being within and higher than the other.
 CHAPTER XXI

RUINS NEAR ZIMBABWE

East Ruins—Other Ruins within the Zimbabwe Ruins’ Area.

EAST RUINS

T HESE ruins lie 20 yds. to the south of the Motelekwe Road at

550 yds. east of Havilah Camp, and face the east end of the
Acropolis Hill at a distance of 300 yds. south.
They occupy a rise overlooking the Valley of Ruins, and are built
upon an open granite glacis which originally formed its floor. Their
elevated and strategetic position at once claim the attention of
visitors. These ruins have always been written and spoken of as
being a fort for the defence of the east side of the Valley of Ruins,
and, in fact, for all the ruins of the lower Zimbabwe group, including
the Elliptical Temple, and especially for the eastern end of the South-
East Ancient Ascent to the Acropolis. Judging from the contour of
the country round about, the only possible line the ancient road from
the east and the coast could have taken must have passed within a
few yards of this ruin.
The view from East Ruins towards the east is most extensive and
picturesque, for the land slopes on that side for over two miles
towards the Beroma Range and the valley of the Motelekwe, while in
the hollow are the Chipo-popo and Mapudzi rivers. Opposite are the
peculiar and romantic columns of granite near Chenga’s kraal.
For the purposes of defence these ruins are ideally situated. On
the south side they are protected by a steep declivity of some 40 ft.
into the valley, and down this the original builders and later
occupiers have shot their débris in great quantities. The space
between the ruin and the declivity, some 25 yds. in width and 100 ft.
in length, is covered with short lengths of walls and wall débris.
 Sketch Plan
EAST RUINS
Motelekwe Road
Great Zimbabwe

The area covered by these ruins is 140 ft. from north to south,
and 93 ft. from east to west. It is most probable that on the south
and east sides there were other enclosures.
The walls on the north, west, and south are fairly well built and
massive, and are still some 8 ft. to 10 ft. in height, and average 3 ft.
6 in. to 4 ft. width of summit at those heights. The walls on the
south-east and east average a height of from 4 ft. to 7 ft., while the
divisional walls which remain have a reduced height of 4 ft. and 5 ft.,
and these latter are also substantially constructed.
There are four well-defined enclosures, the two on the west side
being the most perfect. The northern enclosure had once been
subdivided into at least six separate compartments.
Both in plan and construction these ruins excel most of the minor
ruins, including No. 1 Ruins, and many walls on the Acropolis. The
curved lines of the walls on the northern and southern sides are bold
and striking, and well and exactly carried out. Their solidity is very
noticeable, especially on both outer and inner faces. Not only are the
courses in these walls fairly even, but the blocks are well-sized and
are of a good quality of granite. In some portions of the walls the
workmanship is of an inferior character.
But, whatever the style of construction may be, the faces of the
walls are beautifully even from base to summit and also lengthways,
for placing one’s eye close up against the wall and glancing along an
area of wall-face, there is hardly to be seen half an inch of front of
block protruding in front of its neighbours. This, of course, does not
apply to the batter-back, which is only that of an average wall at
Zimbabwe. The impression gained on viewing these massive walls,
which occupy such an excellently strategetic position, is that the
original builders intended the building to be used for some important
purpose.
The northern enclosure is 60 ft. from north to south, and 67 ft.
from east to west. The south-west enclosure is 61 ft. from north to
south, and 51 ft. from east to west. The eastern enclosure is 55 ft.
from north to south, and 22 ft. from east to west. The south-eastern
enclosure, which is rather rudely constructed, and the walls of which
are very considerably dilapidated, is 20 ft. from north to south, and
80 ft. from east to west.
There are three entrances through the outer walls, and these are
on the west, south, and east, and all are rounded; two have
buttresses, one has portcullis grooves, and the foundation forms the
passage floor in each case. Two divisional entrances now only
remain, and these are also rounded.
Immediately inside the west entrance and on the north side is
what appears to have been a raised platform, facing west, about 4
ft. above the original floor. This may have an area of 15 ft. from
north to south by 12 ft. from east to west, but the artificial filling-in
of the ruin with soil has raised the interior surface to the level of this
platform. Probably, as at other ruins at Zimbabwe with identical
platforms in corresponding positions, this afforded a look-out
overlooking the entrance. On the eastern side of these ruins there is
a similar but smaller structure which may have answered the same
purpose.
In the eastern enclosure and on the east face of the west wall is a
recess starting upwards from the ground. This is 3 ft. high, 1 ft. 10
in. wide, and the blocks on each side respectively are flush-edged
with each other. The recess goes back about the length of two
blocks (see Architecture—Blind Recesses).
These ruins have been artificially filled in with soil to a depth of 3
ft. to 5 ft. by native occupiers of a comparatively late date, for the
soil on the surface and downwards to the bottom of the filling-in is
thick with old native pottery and the broken-up remains of Kafir
huts.
Although almost every relic-hunter seems to have paid attention
to these ruins, nothing of any antique value has been found here.
Probably when the original occupiers left the granite floors were still
exposed, and any objects found there may have been removed long
before the filling-in took place. So far, there is no evidence that any
industry—whether of ancient, mediæval, or modern occupiers—has
ever been carried on in this building.
OTHER RUINS WITHIN THE ZIMBABWE RUINS’ AREA

Bentberg (Matusu).—This kopje, which is 240 ft. above the

threshold of the West Entrance to the Elliptical Temple, lies
immediately south and south-west of the temple. Only 200 yds.
separate the building from the foot of the hill. Here are many signs
of very old occupations in the form of ruined terrace walls apparently
of the Zimbabwe style, but of a very late period. The local
Makalanga state that though their predecessors of the same race
have had kraals on this hill, the terrace walls are not of any
Makalanga construction; and this appears to be obvious. Further,
though Makalanga pottery is abundant, yet there can be found both
pottery and cement of a very superior quality and make; and such
are repudiated by the natives as having been made by Amangwa,
Makalanga, or Barotse. Great quantities of quartz broken into very
small splinters are to be found in large areas on the hill. The nearest
quartz reefs are six miles west of Zimbabwe. The older remains of
terraces—many buried in silted soil—are to be found on the north
side of the hill, but traces of walls can be met with extending almost
to the summit and round the western flank. It is impossible to
imagine that the ancients did not in some manner occupy the hill, as
otherwise the Elliptical Temple would have been exposed on its
south side without any defences. The old Barotse had a kraal at the
foot of the north side of the hill just above the spot where are still
the traces of Bent’s camp.
Rusivanga Kopje.—This hill (190 ft.) rises from the Zimbabwe
Valley at some 300 yds. west of Havilah Camp. It is directly on the
right of the road from Victoria to Zimbabwe at about a third of a mile
from the main ruins, the road passing between it and Makuma Kopje
on which is Mogabe’s kraal. The northern and eastern faces of this
hill show in places from base to summit abundant evidence of
occupations by ancients and also by very old Makalanga and
Barotse. The remains of walls are in most instances of inferior
construction, though at some points the courses of excellently built
wall can be traced. There are also rudely built ramparts and
enclosure walls of some later period. On the summit of the hill was
once a fort. Fragments of soapstone, slate, quartz, and ironstone are
to be found, also large stone-crushers, some excellent pottery, and
cement work of superior quality. At one point is a cement wall
carried across the top of a boulder. There are stone foundations of
Makalanga huts which are circular and lined with cement, and
winnowing floors with raised edges. On the eastern side of the hill
two sets of isafuba game-holes have been cut into the surface of the
granite rock. Each of these has thirty-six holes. On the west side and
near the summit there are at least thirty different sets of game-holes
cut into the granite, the holes of the sets varying in size. On the
open granite areas on the hill are several places where deep
depressions have been worn into the rock, evidently by the
sharpening of tools or by grinding stones.
Ruin on Bingura’s Path.—This is located on the left-hand side of
the path leading to Bingura’s kraal at about half a mile from the
camp. Only its south-east wall is now standing, but its outlines can
be traced by piles of blocks on all other sides. The area covered is
about half an acre. The wall is well and substantially built, and is still
6 ft. high. This appears to be of very old construction. There have
been no important “finds” made here, the ruin not having yet been
examined. It occupies a strategetic position on slightly raised ground
in the valley between the Bentberg and Rusivanga.
RUIN NEAR CHENGA’S KRAAL

This is situated one mile and a quarter east of Havilah Camp, and
is the most easterly ruin of the Zimbabwe group. It stands upon a
low ledge on the west side of the Beroma Range, and is a quarter of
a mile west of Chenga’s kraal, and directly overlooks the Mapudzi
stream, which flows at about 60 ft. immediately below the west face
of the ruin. The position is strategetic and affords a view over
several valleys. The area covered by walls and stone débris is fully
an acre and a half, but the actual walls now standing in any
recognisable form of plan only cover 100 ft. by 80 ft.
A cluster of large boulders has been utilised, and over these and
between them the walls have been erected, the interior being filled
up with earth almost up to the summits of the walls by some later
occupiers. On clearing this foreign soil from the interior faces of the
walls, two buried entrances, both rounded, were discovered, and it
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