Received: 30 November 2023

| Revised: 28 December 2023

| Accepted: 8 January 2024

DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.13334

SPECIAL SECTION

Peace as a hypothetical imperative: Brazil's foreign policy

standpoint on the war in Ukraine

Dawisson Belém Lopes1 | Karin Costa Vázquez2

1
The Federal University of Minas Gerais, Abstract
Belo Horizonte, Brazil
2
The text traces Brazil's pacifist stance back to the early 20th century, rooted
O.P. Jindal University, Sonipat, India
in a pragmatic approach to conserve resources and foster economic growth.
Correspondence It discusses the role of public opinion in shaping Brazil's response to the con-
Dawisson Belém Lopes, The Federal flict, highlighting a pro-neutrality tendency within the populace. The article also
University of Minas Gerais, Belo
Horizonte, Brazil.
analyses the continuity of Brazil's stance under two different presidents, empha-
Email: [email protected] sising that despite a change in leadership, there has been no structural shift in
foreign policy concerning this matter. We then reflect on Brazil's evolving role
on the global stage, considering its historical alignment with the West and the
changing dynamics driven by factors such as China's rising influence and the
BRICS grouping. The continuing conflict in Ukraine is portrayed as an illustra-
tive case, providing insights on the prospective foreign policy conduct of Global
South actors.

1 | I N TROD UC T I O N development—three major foreign policy vectors for

any Global Southerner—will flourish again.1
Unlike the ethical categorical imperative, Immanuel Developing nations often entertain this idea of
Kant's hypothetical imperative does not stem exclu- transforming foreign policy into an instrument for the
sively from morality. Instead, it is the outcome of cal- pursuit of social welfare. For Latin American policy-
culations in which one subject, usually a grown-up makers, maybe even more than for the rest of the
person, who aims at achieving a particular goal, not world, geopolitical factors can be taken as minor driv-
necessarily in connection with moral values, will em- ers, and be relegated to the backstage. Somewhat
brace whichever means fit for purpose at their disposal along the lines of Carlos Escudé's ‘peripheral realism’
(Kant, 1952). But this reasoning seems instrumental (Escudé, 2014), it is as if statesmen from this region
to account for the realm of nation states as well. If a believed they literally cannot afford the price of bel-
country's foreign policy that is fully determined by moral ligerence, as their countries face internal hardships
concerns does not even exist, modern states can still such as massive hunger and poverty, so instead they
weaponise values in order to facilitate their access to must devote every budgetary resource to leverage
national objectives abroad (Koivisto, 2012). economic growth. 2 In the end, it is mostly about ra-
As we intend to show along this piece, this strate- tionalism applied to foreign policymaking (Schmidt &
gic behaviour relates to a broad class of Global South Wight, 2023).
actors that adopted neutrality as an official position for Over the next four sections, this article will ten-
the current war in Ukraine. Lest they incur unbearable tatively cover different topics. First, we recall Brazil's
costs for their own societies, countries like Brazil have 200-year-old diplomatic tradition, pinpointing those
advocated for peace as a shortcut to the world resto- historical principles that lie behind the Brazilian stance
ration. In fact, even if individuals find one or another towards the Russian–Ukrainian ongoing confronta-
party to be rightful in the context of war, only an im- tion. Then, we show how the governmental strategy
mediate cessation of hostilities can bring about those for the war has slightly shifted in the beginning, partly
conditions upon which trade, investment and social due to the influence of Brazil's public opinion. Third,

© 2024 Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Global Policy. 2024;00:1–5. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/gpol | 1

2 | BELÉM LOPES and VÁZQUEZ

we suggest that even with the arrival of Lula da Silva Organization (NATO) countries. Thus, Brazil's position
to the country's presidency, not much has changed about the war in Ukraine might well account for ‘varied
with regard to Ukraine. We finally conclude with some consequentialism’ as a foreign policy ideal type.4
thought-provoking remarks on the future of world order It is important to recall the constitutional backdrop
and global affairs. against which Brazil's contemporary foreign policy
comes to life. Since the year 1988, two foreign policy
tenets have been explicitly enshrined in the Brazilian
2 | BR A Z I L' S D I PLO MAT I C federal constitution—one is the defense of peace;
H I STORY AN D FORE I G N another is the peaceful settlement of conflicts. In asso-
POLI CY TE N E T S ciation with non-intervention, self-determination of the
peoples and national independence, these principles
Brazil has not always been a pacifist nation in inter- add up to Brazil's reluctance to adopt any war-like dis-
national affairs. Back in the early 19th century—the course since the beginning of the 20th century. Even if
moment it gained its political independence from they have been included to Brazil's constitutional sys-
Portugal—there was deep concern amid the Brazilian tem only in the late 20th century, diplomatic practices
elite on the maintenance of the country's territorial in- already embodied this ‘pacifism as pragmatism’ under-
tegrity. Interstate wars were fought during that period, standing for a while.
particularly in the La Plata Basin region, in order to se-
cure control over mineral resources, navigable waters,
land and the people who were settled in. Bitter rivalries 3 | T H E ROLE OF PUBLI C OPI N I O N
were cultivated with Argentina and Paraguay, not to I N S HAPI N G FORE I G N POLI CY
mention not so amicable relationships with Chile, Peru
and Bolivia (Bethell, 2019; Ricupero, 2017). When Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022,
As Brazil was still organising its armed forces by the Brazil was positioned in a rather delicate way. On 15
early 1900s, whereas other armies and naval forces February 2022, just a few days before the war of ag-
from neighbouring countries already enjoyed some de- gression was launched, then-president Jair Bolsonaro
gree of consistency, any conflict that could erupt would had visited Moscow and declared Brazil to be in full
have meant massive destruction for those parties in- solidarity with the Russian people. As the prospects
volved in it. Deriving from this assessment, the Baron for war were already tangible, that candid alignment to
of Rio Branco—Brazil's foreign minister from 1902 until Putin was perceived as unnecessarily risky and utterly
1912, and an all-time national hero—decided that the incompatible with the South American nation's diplo-
largest and most populous South American nation matic tradition. As war eventually came out, Bolsonaro
would do better to refrain from confrontational attitudes, has contradicted himself quite a few times before Brazil
and to embrace from that moment a peace-oriented could find its way back (Belém Lopes et al., 2022).
stance (Alsina Jr, 2014). All at once, this radical depar- It is arguable that pollsters might have played a
ture from the 19th-century bellicose posture earned role for course correction. In early March 2022, three
Brazil a brand-new diplomatic reputation, while sparing national polls were released including questions on
scarce governmental resources, and ensuring better Brazil's position on the war. The one conducted by Ideia
conditions for the developing nation to grow richer and (from 8 March 2022) found that 65% of the Brazilian
stronger. population approved neutrality as a diplomatic prin-
Brazilian pacifism, thus, is the historical byproduct ciple, even if 62% believed Ukraine to be right in its
of a very acute sense of diplomatic pragmatism. These claims. By the same token, 65% reasoned that the war
efforts to avoid the dissipation of human and economic would end up bringing harm to Brazil's economic situa-
resources are key for one to grasp Brazil's position tion. Two other polls released in the following week (by
about the war in Ukraine even today—like it or not. It is Ipespe and Quaest) also reached similar numbers with
driven by such practicality—the need to live up to local regard to the population's backing of neutrality (62%
populations' needs and emergencies—that Brazilian of- and 71%, respectively). Still according to Ipespe, some
ficials have formulated this current nonaligned stance.3 56% of Brazilians saw Ukraine as the rightful side in
It is essentially different from Brazil's diplomatic han- this war, against 8% who would favour Russia.
dling back in the 1950s and 1960s, as the country now This broad societal pro-neutrality inclination led
proactively bids for a global rearrangement. Still, for Brazilian authorities to seek a balanced position, even
being a historical champion of rules-based multilateral- if sometimes a deliberately ambiguous one, in order to
ism, and for treasuring its long-cultivated relations with accommodate all strands of opinion. At the level of the
the Western world, Brasília does not engage in major United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Brazil pub-
confrontation. Given all that would be at stake, it seems licly condemned the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 2
not to fall within Brazil's best interest the idea to cut March 2022 in voting for a resolution that expressly de-
ties with either Russia or Ukraine/North Atlantic Treaty manded the withdrawal of troops from Ukrainian territory
BRAZIL'S PACIFISM AS PRAGMATISM | 3

(UN, 2022). Notwithstanding, Brazilian Ambassador to increased by 34% in 2022. Brazilian imports from the
the UN, Mr. Ronaldo Mota Filho, affirmed on the oc- Russian Federation have reached an all-time peak,
casion that Brazil would oppose both the imposition of and amounted to USD 7.853 billion in 2022, as Russia
sanctions on Russia and the shipping of weapons and became Brazil's sixth most salient provider of goods
ammunition, as they would only help to prolong the war and services—fertilisers accounting for 71% of total
(Zarur et al., 2022). Brazilian imports from Russia in 2022.5
From this watershed moment on, Bolsonaro's As a final move, since his inauguration as presi-
Brazil started abstaining from most resolutions pass- dent, Lula da Silva has defended the ‘peace club’, a
ing judgments and/or imposing sanctions on Russia, diplomatic arrangement conceived to bring Russia
be they discussed at the United Nations (UN) or the and Ukraine to the negotiating table. According to his
Organization of American States. An important land- master plan, only countries with no direct involvement
mark was the UNGA resolution approved on 7 April in the war—such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia,
2022, suspending Russia from the Geneva- based Mexico and Argentina—would be entitled to success-
UN Council on Human Rights. The Brazilian Foreign fully broker and lead the peace process. If this plan
Ministry justified the country's abstention vote on dip- has not been properly welcomed by Moscow and Kiev
lomatic grounds, arguing that ‘polarisation and politi- yet, it has allegedly kickstarted conversations and trig-
cisation of the issue’ could be detrimental to the plan gered proposals coming from Beijing, Paris, Pretoria,
of conducting peace dialogues between the warring Copenhagen, Jakarta, the Vatican, New York and
parties (Brazilian Foreign Ministry, 2022). others.

4 | TR AN S I T I O N I N LE AD ERS H I P, 5 | T H E DAW N OF A N E W ER A
ACCO M PAN I ED BY N UAN CED FOR BR A Z I L
S H I F T S I N POLI CY
Brazil's self-perception revolves around being a large
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's arrival to the presidential nation constantly striving for socioeconomic develop-
office on 1 January 2023 did not signify a profound ment and diplomatic redemption. Throughout much
rupture with foreign policy contents as previously of the 20th century, Brazil actively pursued develop-
put forth. Brazil's Ukraine war stance under Lula re- mental agendas within international organisations like
mained very much in alignment with old diplomatic the UN, the G77 and the UN Conference on Trade
orientations. If anything, Brazil's new engagement and Development while advocating for unity among
with global affairs has prompted the new president the poor through regional bodies such as the Latin
to the forefront, so much so that opinions uttered by American Free Trade Organisation, the Latin American
Lula and his aides started resonating further and— Integration Association, and Mercosur (Southern
sometimes—generating heated repercussion, home Common Market). With the old geopolitical order in flux,
and abroad. though, the country might have found new avenues for
The most resounding case involved Lula's interview manoeuvring that were previously blocked.
to Time magazine in 2022—one in which he claimed Whereas Brazil's international identity is clearly
that the ongoing war was Russia's as well as Ukraine's defined in terms of the rich-poor divide, challenges
fault. This line of reasoning was repeated in 2023, arise when framing the horizontal axis—‘the West
when the Brazilian president took an official trip to the and the rest,’ as Samuel Huntington once put it
United Arab Emirates. On an improvised speech, Lula (Huntington, 1997). Despite being colonised by
said again both parties were to be apportioned blame Europeans, Brazil's full incorporation into the Western
for the conflict not coming to a close. He actually went league has always been tenuous. Albeit adopting
as far as to affirm that Washington and Brussels were values such as Christianity, a Neo-Latin language,
‘feeding the war’, as they kept sending money and arms Romano- Germanic legal institutions, market economy
to Kiev along the way. and representative democracy, Brazil remains distinct,
Truth be told, however, nothing structural has often viewed as an ‘other West’—a poorer, more enig-
changed about the Brazilian position since February matic and different civilisation (Merquior, 1990). In less
2022. From a practical standpoint, the bilateral com- flattering portrayals, Brazil is seen as an exotic soci-
merce not only continued but rather improved be- ety, quite distinct from the European/Western norm
tween Brazil and Russia. Brazil's politically influential (Huntington, 1993).
‘farm caucus’ pressurised Bolsonaro first, and Lula Despite engaging in debates like the one surround-
now, so the country did not stop importing fertilisers ing the New International Economic Order, Brazil has
from Russia, given Brazil's dependence to sustain its never strayed far from the Western sphere. The na-
year-long crops and commodity exports. In compari- tion never really connected itself with the Non-Aligned
son with 2021, total trade between the two countries Movement, which emerged from the 1955 Bandung
4 | BELÉM LOPES and VÁZQUEZ

Conference. In critical historical junctures—such as AC K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

the World Wars, the Cold War, and 9/11—Brazil's We sincerely thank the special section editors and
diplomatic and military stance tilted towards the reviewers for their invaluable feedback on earlier ver-
West. Major trading partners—Portugal, followed by sions of this article.
England, and then the United States—have histori-
cally exerted significant influence over Brazil. Until re- C O N F L I C T O F I N T E R E S T S TAT E M E N T
cently, Brazil's alignment with the North Atlantic was Authors declare none.
an implicit given of its foreign policy. Diplomats and
local political elites often upheld a form of ‘de facto DATA AVA I L A B I L I T Y S TAT E M E N T
Westernism,’ even when Brazil was denied the official Data sharing not applicable to this article as no data-
status of a Western/NATO ally (Belém Lopes, 2020). sets were generated or analysed during the current
However, the landscape has drastically shifted, pri- study.
marily due to the rapid rise of China. By 2009, China
had become Brazil's leading trading partner, signifying ORCID
a pivotal moment in their bilateral ties. This shift paral- Dawisson Belém Lopes https://orcid.
lels the transformation observed in early 20th-century org/0000-0002-1949-1001
relations between the United States and Brazil. This
substantial change in Brazil's economic foundations E N D N OT E S
is anticipated to resonate across various spheres, 1
There is also the reverse argument—which ends up leading to the
encompassing politics and security matters. The ex- same corollary: Development is a precondition to maintain peace.
The idea of there being a ‘development imperative’ upon which
panded BRICS grouping is just another manifestation
the global order should be based is crucial for one to understand
of this evolving global order, where the ongoing conflict the Brazilian position over time. For more on this topic, please see
in Ukraine serves as both a contemporary illustration Atwood, 2002. One can also refer to this document on peacebuild-
and a predictive glimpse into the future of Global South ing by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, available at https://www.gov.
actors' foreign policy behaviour. br/ mre/ en/ subje cts/ inter natio nal- peace - and- secur ity/ maintenanc
e-and-consolidation-of-peace/brazil-and-peacebuilding on 13 No-
vember 2023.
2
The notion of ‘peace dividend’ has also been defended by leaders
6 | CO N CLUS I O N from the Global North, including US president George H.W. Bush
and UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher, to refer to the potential
The article explores Brazil's foreign policy perspective social benefits stemming from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as
on the ongoing war in Ukraine, examining it through countries would then be in a position to commit less of their national
the lens of Immanuel Kant's hypothetical imperative budgets with military goals.
3
and historical diplomatic traditions. Unlike the ethical The Brazilian position on this war is well captured by the ‘Active Non-
Alignment’ concept. Please see Carlos Fortín et al. (2023).
categorical imperative, Brazil's foreign policy is not ex-
4
clusively determined by morality but involves cost and As the editors of this special section have well defined it, ‘varied con-
sequentialism’ consists of a Global Southern nation's concentration
benefit calculations and strategic considerations—thus on the diverse tangible effects of war—ranging from food price infla-
corresponding to the varied consequentialist foreign tion to potentially losing access to much-needed fertilisers.
policy ideal type. 5
Official data from the Brazilian government on foreign trade can be
The text traces Brazil's pacifist stance back to the openly accessed on this online database: http://comexstat.mdic.gov.
early 20th century, rooted in a pragmatic approach to br/pt/comex-vis.
conserve resources and foster economic growth. It
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