Republic of the Philippines

Court of Appeals
Cagayan de Oro City

TWENTY-THIRD DIVISION

JEMMOR MACASARTE YBAÑEZ, CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227

Petitioner-Appellee,
Members:
- versus -
LLOREN , J., Ch.,
SANTOS, &
MAYOR NELIETA Q. NOVAL, VICE ROXAS, JJ.
MAYOR EDWARD O. PIDO,
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS
DANNY G. YANOC, JR., CLIFFORD Promulgated:
JUMALON, LORIANO S. JUMARITO, JULY 21, 2016
ROGELIO T. MANOOP, ALFREDO S.
MANOSA, JR., VIRGILIA A.
SAMANIEGO, NELLY M. PEPITO,
AND RICHARD M. PALOMARES,
CHIEF OF POLICE DENNIS PENAS
TANO, AND MCTC JUDGE ROSITE
PAPANDAYAN-MACARAYA, ALL OF
TUBOD, LANAO DEL NORTE,
Respondents-Appellants,

and

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Oppositor-Appellant.

DECISION

LLOREN, J.:

This is a petition for Certiorari and prohibition on appeal which seeks

the reversal of the Resolution1 dated October 23, 2015 and the Order 2 dated
December 28, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, Branch
7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte (court a quo), prohibiting the implementation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 67, as amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 233-
2014, and declaring the same null and void.
1
Records, pp. 109-120
2
Records, pp. 133-136
CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227 Page 2 of 14
Decision

On February 10, 2014, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubod, Lanao del

Norte issued Resolution No. 29, s. 20143 which enacted Municipal
Ordinance No. 233-2014 entitled “AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY
PROHIBITING ANY PERSON OR GROUP OF PERSONS TO LOITER
OR ROAM AROUND ANY PLACE WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION OF TUBOD, LANAO DEL NORTE AND AS WELL AS
PROHIBITING THE USE OF ANY VEHICLE ON ALL KINDS OF
ROADS LOCATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF TUBOD, LANAO DEL
NORTE FROM TEN (10) O'CLOCK IN THE EVENING TO FOUR (4)
O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING EXCEPT ON REASONABLE
GROUNDS/CERTAIN CONDITIONS PROVIDED FOR AND
PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREOF.” The Ordinance is
amendatory to Municipal Ordinance No. 67 s. 1984.

At around 12:30 in the morning of April 23, 2015, police officers of

Tubod, Lanao del Norte flagged down and apprehended Jemmor Macasarte
Ybañez (petitioner-appellee), who was riding a motorcycle, for violation of
the curfew ordinance. Upon inspection, the police officers found a knife in
the box of the motorcycle. Accordingly, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an
Information4 for violation of the curfew Ordinance and another Information 5
for violation of illegal possession of a bladed weapon before the 6 th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubod, Lanao del Norte (MCTC).

On June 16, 2015, petitioner-appellee filed a Petition 6 for Certiorari

and prohibition before the court a quo questioning the validity of the curfew
ordinance and praying that the municipal mayor, vice mayor and
sangguniang bayan members (municipal officials), including the chief of
police and the MCTC judge, all of Tubod, Lanao del Norte (collectively,
respondents-appellants) be enjoined from enforcing the curfew ordinance.
On July 10, 2015, he filed an Amended Petition.7

Meanwhile, on July 2, 2015, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)

deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Lanao del Norte to appear in the
case.8 The OSG filed a Notice of Appearance 9 before the court a quo and
informed it of the authority of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear. After the
parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the court a quo issued the
assailed Resolution with the following dispositive portion:
3
Records, pp. 17-22
4
Records, p. 26
5
Records, p. 25
6
Records, pp. 1-14
7
Records, p. 62-75
8
Records, p. 87-88
9
Records, p. 85-86
CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227 Page 3 of 14
Decision

WITH THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered

ordering respondents to desist from further proceedings in
implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 67, as amended by
Municipal Ordinance No. 233-2014 which is hereby declared
NULL and VOID for having been issued for lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

The court a quo stated in the assailed Resolution that there was no
showing of an emergency or an extraordinary reason to justify the curfew. It
found that the ordinance was an invalid exercise of the police power as it
violated the right of an individual to move without fear of being arrested.
Also it ruled that the ordinance, which enumerated several persons exempted
from its application, violated the equal protection clause as the distinctions
between those exempted and the rest are not substantial. Likewise, it held
that there is nothing in the Local Government Code which authorizes local
government units (LGUs) to enact a curfew ordinance.

Respondents-appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 which

the court a quo denied in the assailed Order.

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), as self-styled oppositor-

appellant, through the OSG, now comes before this Court alleging that:

I.
THE RTC DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER
THE PERSONS OF THE RESPONDENTS BECAUSE IT
DID NOT ISSUE SUMMONSES TO THE
RESPONDENTS. THUS, THE PROCEEDINGS HAD
BEFORE THE RTC AND ALL THE ORDERS AND
RESOLUTIONS IT ISSUED, INCLUDING THE
ASSAILED RESOLUTION AND ORDER, ARE NULL
AND VOID.

II.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF TUBOD, LANAO DEL NORTE
IS EMPOWERED TO ENACT AND IMPLEMENT A
CURFEW ORDINANCE AS A POLICE POWER
MEASURE. THUS, MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO. 67,
AS AMENDED BY MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO. 233-
2014, IS VALID.11
10
Records, p. 121-128
11
Rollo, pp. 12-13
CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227 Page 4 of 14
Decision

The issues, as raised by the OSG, are: (1) whether the court a quo has
jurisdiction over the persons of respondents-appellants, and (2) whether the
curfew ordinance is valid.12

Jurisdiction over the persons of respondents-appellants

The OSG points out that the court a quo did not issue summonses to
respondents-appellants. It thus claims that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons. Also, it points out that the OSG is not the
legal counsel of LGUs and their officials. Hence, it claims that the
Provincial Prosecutor it deputized to appear in the case could not represent
respondents-appellants.

The claims are unmeritorious. “In civil cases, the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of summons
or by the latter's voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the
former.”13 In the present case, the municipal officials voluntarily appeared as
stated in the Order14 dated July 3, 2015. They even personally filed a Notice
of Appeal15 aside from the one filed by the OSG.

The OSG is estopped from questioning its authority or that of the

Provincial Prosecutor it deputized to represent respondents-appellants. By
virtue of estoppel, a representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied as against the person relying thereon.16

Besides, there is no showing that respondents-appellants were

prejudiced by the representation of the OSG through the Provincial
Prosecutor, nor is there showing that respondents-appellants repudiated such
representation.

It is a waste of time for this case to go back to the court a quo because
of the issue of representation. Instead, the Memorandum on appeal filed by
the OSG in the name of the Republic shall be considered as the
Memorandum of respondents-appellants considering that the OSG, through
the Provincial Prosecutor, represented them before the court a quo.

12
Rollo, pp. 12-13
13
Palma v. Galvez, G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010
14
Records, pp. 46-47
15
Records, 143-144
16
Panay Electric Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 81939, June 29, 1989
CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227 Page 5 of 14
Decision

Validity of the Curfew Ordinance

The Local Government Code expressly vests LGUs with police power
under the General Welfare Clause contained in Section 16 which reads:

Sec. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit

shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate,
or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other
things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

The police power under the General Welfare Clause “authorizes the
municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the
health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of
their property.”17 Relatedly, Section 447 provides:

Sec. 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. -

(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the
municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in
the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the
municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code,
and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for

an efficient and effective municipal government, and in
this connection shall:

xxx

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress

and impose appropriate penalties for habitual
17
Rural Bank of Makati, Inc. v. Municipality of Makati, G.R. No. 150763, July 2, 2004
CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227 Page 6 of 14
Decision

drunkenness in public places, vagrancy,

mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and
maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and
other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent
devices and ways to obtain money or property,
drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug
pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing,
distribution or exhibition of obscene or
pornographic materials or publications, and such
other activities inimical to the welfare and morals
of the inhabitants of the municipality;

Invoking the foregoing, the OSG contends that the curfew ordinance
is a valid exercise of the police power.

The contention is untenable.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.18 reiterated that an

ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements to be
valid:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

On the first requirement, the curfew ordinance fails. It runs counter to

the constitutional precept that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.” The due process clause has been
expounded as follows:

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate

limits on government, usually called "procedural due process"
and "substantive due process."

18
G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994
CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227 Page 7 of 14
Decision

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to

the procedures that the government must follow before it de-
prives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural
due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and
what form of hearing the government must provide when it
takes a particular action.

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks

whether the government has an adequate reason for taking
away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, sub-
stantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient jus-
tification for the government's action. Case law in the United
States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification
depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. For exam-
ple, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is
applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it
is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting
fundamental rights, then the government will meet substan-
tive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary
to achieve a compelling government purpose.19

On the other hand, Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,20 clarifies

the scope of liberty, as guaranteed by the fundamental law:

Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of

freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community,
consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in
others. The right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
includes the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed
by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary
for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of
authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, liberty includes the right of the citizen
to be free to use his faculties in lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to
pursue any avocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his
carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The
chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the

19
City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
20
G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919
CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227 Page 8 of 14
Decision

right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the

right of locomotion.

In Chicago v. Morales,21 the United States Supreme Court

acknowledges freedom of movement as an attribute of personal liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause, thus:

On the other hand, as the United States recognizes, the

freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the “liberty”
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. We have expressly identified this “right to re-
move from one place to another according to inclination” as
“an attribute of personal liberty” protected by the Constitu-
tion. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); see also
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972). In-
deed, it is apparent that an individual’s decision to remain in a
public place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as
the freedom of movement inside frontiers that is “a part of our
heritage” Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958), or the
right to move “to whatsoever place one’s own inclination may
direct” identified in Blackstone’s Commentaries. 1 W. Black-
stone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 130 (1765).

Also, in the recent case of Kerry v. Din,22 the United States Supreme
Court clarified the scope of the interests that could not be deprived without
due process:

Edward Coke, whose Institutes “were read in the Ameri-

can Colonies by virtually every student of law,” Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213, 225 (1967), thoroughly de-
scribed the scope of the interests that could be deprived only
pursuant to “the law of the land.” Magna Carta, he wrote, en-
sured that, without due process, “no man [may] be taken or
imprisoned”; “disseised of his lands, or tenements, or dispos-
sessed of his goods, or chattels”; “put from his livelihood
without answer”; “barred to have the benefit of the law”; de-
nied “the franchises, and priviledges, which the subjects have
of the gift of the king”; “exiled”; or “forejudged of life, or
limbe, disherited, or put to torture, or death.” 1 Coke, supra,
at 46–48. Blackstone’s description of the rights protected by
Magna Carta is similar, although he discusses them in terms
much closer to the “life, liberty, or property” terminology
used in the Fifth Amendment. He described first an interest in
“personal security,” “consist[ing] in a person’s legal and un-
21
527 U.S. 41 (1999)
22
576 U.S. __ (2015)
CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227 Page 9 of 14
Decision

interrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his

health, and his reputation.” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
on the Laws of England 125 (1769). Second, the “personal
liberty of individuals” “consist[ed] in the power of locomo-
tion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to what-
soever place one’s own inclination may direct; without im-
prisonment or restraint.” Id., at 130. And finally, a person’s
right to property included “the free use, enjoyment, and dis-
posal of all his acquisitions.” Id., at 134.

As stated above, the fundamental right of liberty, which includes the

freedom of movement, means without imprisonment or restraint. In other
words, deprivation of personal liberty occurs when there is imprisonment or
restraint. A similar situation obtains in a curfew which Black's Law
Dictionary23 defines as “(a) regulation that forbids people from being
outdoors or in vehicles during specified hours.” Of course, the deprivation
resulting from a curfew is mild and temporary compared to that caused by
detention or imprisonment.

Aside from restraining the freedom of movement, a curfew also

burdens other fundamental rights. Notably, the freedom of speech, the right
to assemble, the right to travel and the free exercise of religion are affected.
These fundamental rights are enshrined in Article III, Bill of Rights of the
1987 Constitution:

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of

speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.

Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment

of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same

within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.

Broad as it is, the police power of an LGU may cover the enactment
of a curfew ordinance. However, the infringement upon fundamental rights
23
Eight Edition (2004), p. 410
CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227 Page 10 of 14
Decision

must satisfy the due process clause. Specifically, there must be a sufficient
justification for the infringement as required by substantive due process.

The curfew Ordinance contains the following justifications:

WHEREAS, the present Sangguniang Bayan Members of

Tubod, Lanao del Norte admires the wisdom of the past
administration in the passage of the said ordinance
considering that it protects the inteterest of the community
and as well as promotes the peace and order condition, as a
catalyst in building a dynamic and progressive municipality;

WHEREAS, although Ordinance No. 67 regulates the

right of mobility/liberty of the people, territorially and
geographically residing in Tubod, Lanao del Norte, from
10:00PM to 4:00AM, the said measure helps to stop or if not
minimize the commission of the crimes involving the use/sell
of prohibited drugs, crimes against public morals, crimes
against public order, crimes against personal liberty and
security, crimes against chastity, crimes against persons or
property, punishable under the Revised Penal Code or Special
laws;

It bears stressing that when a law burdens a fundamental right, as in

the case of the curfew Ordinance, it must be necessary to achieve a
compelling government purpose and that there are no other less restrictive
means of achieving that purpose. This refers to the strict scrutiny standard
which has been clarified as follows:

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict

scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and
the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used
today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of
speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.
The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of
strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,
judicial access and interstate travel.24

On the other hand, Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.25

expounds on the concept of compelling state interest, thus:
24
White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009
25
G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009
CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227 Page 11 of 14
Decision

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by

the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and
calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of
the state for which some individual liberties must give way,
such as the public interest in safeguarding health or
maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining access to
information on matters of public concern.

Undoubtedly, the objective of the curfew ordinance is to prevent

crimes. However, general crime prevention does not constitute a compelling
state interest since it is not “akin to the paramount interest of the state for
which some individual liberties must give way.” Despite the laudable
objective, there is no sufficient justification for the infringement upon
fundamental rights. Of course, the situation is different when the curfew is
enacted during emergencies. In those times, the exigencies generally justify
the infringement.

Moreover, the curfew ordinance does not meet the requisites for the
valid exercise of police power as laid down in City of Manila v. Laguio,
Jr.:26

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as

the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it
from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must
it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must
be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of
the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police

measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights – a violation of the due process clause.

The prevention of crimes can be done in ways which do no involve

curtailment of fundamental rights. While a curfew may prevent crimes, the
26
Supra note 19
CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227 Page 12 of 14
Decision

enactment of the curfew Ordinance without a justifying emergency becomes

unreasonable. Besides, the curfew Ordinance is oppressive as it prohibits the
affected inhabitants from doing innocent activities, such as walking,
strolling, loafing and wandering, which have been considered as part of the
common comforts of life:

The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities

which, by modern standards, are normally innocent. "Night-
walking" is one. Florida construes the ordinance not to make
criminal one night's wandering, Johnson v. State, 202 So.2d at
855, only the "habitual" wanderer or, as the ordinance de-
scribes it, "common night walkers." We know, however, from
experience that sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps
hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result.

Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico,

commented once that "loafing" was a national virtue in his
Commonwealth, and that it should be encouraged. It is, how-
ever, a crime in Jacksonville.

xxx

Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have

been extolled by Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay. The
qualification "without any lawful purpose or object" may be a
trap for innocent acts. Persons "neglecting all lawful business
and habitually spending their time by frequenting . . . places
where alcoholic beverages are sold or served" would literally
embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs.

Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or

coming from a burglary. Loafers or loiterers may be "casing"
a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife support him is an in-
tra-family matter, and normally of no concern to the police.
Yet it may, of course, be the setting for numerous crimes.

The difficulty is that these activities are historically part

of the amenities of life as we have known them. They are not
mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These
unwritten amenities have been, in part, responsible for giving
our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence,
the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified the
right of dissent, and have honored the right to be noncon-
formists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have en-
couraged lives of high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating
silence.27
27
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) mentioned in People v. Siton, G.R. No. 169364,
September 18, 2009
CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227 Page 13 of 14
Decision

In fine, the curfew Ordinance, aside from being oppressive and

unreasonable, contravenes the due process clause of the constitution. Hence,
it is invalid.

Lest it be misunderstood, this Court is aware that the constitutional

rights of minors, due to their peculiar vulnerability, immaturity and need for
parental guidance, may not be as encompassing as adults. 28 Accordingly, a
curfew ordinance intended for minors even in the absence of an emergency
is generally valid. In the present case, however, the curfew Ordinance was
intended for all inhabitants regardless of age. Understandably, it did not
contain exceptions, such as, when a minor is accompanied by an adult.
Hence, the curfew Ordinance is invalid even when applied to minors.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Resolution dated

October 23, 2015 and the Order dated December 28, 2015 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte insofar as they prohibited the
implementation of Municipal Ordinance No. 67, as amended by Municipal
Ordinance No. 233-2014, and declared the same null and void, are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

EDGARDO T. LLOREN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RAFAEL ANTONIO M. SANTOS RUBEN REYNALDO G. ROXAS

Associate Justice Associate Justice

28
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)
CA-G.R. SP NO. 07227 Page 14 of 14
Decision

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.

EDGARDO T. LLOREN
Associate Justice
Chairperson,Twenty-Third Division