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 SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP ON
U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND,
SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE

Committee on U.S. Natural Gas Demand and Supply Projections:

A Workshop

Committee on Earth Resources

Board on Earth Sciences and Resources

Division on Earth and Life Studies

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS

Washington, D.C.
www.nap.edu
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20001

NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board
of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medi-
cine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special
competences and with regard for appropriate balance.

This study was supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Minerals Management Ser-
vice, and the U.S. Geological Survey. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommenda-
tions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project.

International Standard Book Number 0-309-08964-6 (Book)

International Standard Book Number 0-309-5264-0 (PDF)

Additional copies of this report are available from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth
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Copyright 2003 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America

The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of dis-
tinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the further-
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quires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M.
Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences.

The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the
National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is au-
tonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The Na-
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The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916
to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes
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tute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. Wm. A. Wulf are chairman and vice chair-
man, respectively, of the National Research Council.

www.national-academies.org

iii
 COMMITTEE ON U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND AND
SUPPLY PROJECTIONS: A WORKSHOP
SCOTT W. TINKER, Chair, The University of Texas at Austin
JOHN B. CURTIS, Colorado School of Mines, Golden
JAMES J. EMME, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, The Woodlands,
Texas
VELLO A. KUUSKRAA, Advanced Resources International, Arlington,
Virginia
DIANNE R. NIELSON, Utah Department of Environmental Quality,
Salt Lake City

National Research Council Staff

TAMARA L. DICKINSON, Study Director

MONICA R. LIPSCOMB, Research Assistant
KAREN L. IMHOF, Senior Project Assistant

iv
 COMMITTEE ON EARTH RESOURCES
SUSAN M. LANDON, Chair, Thomasson Partner Associates, Denver,
Colorado
JAMES C. COBB, University of Kentucky, Lexington
VICKI COWART, Consulting Geologist, Denver, Colorado
PATRICK CUMMINS, Western Governors’ Association, Denver,
Colorado
THOMAS V. FALKIE, Berwind Natural Resources Corporation,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
MURRAY W. HITZMAN, Colorado School of Mines, Golden
MICHAEL L. MENGE, U.S. Senate Committee for Energy and Natural
Resources (retired), Dover, Arkansas
JOHN N. MURPHY, University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
DONALD L. PAUL, ChevronTexaco Corporation, San Ramon,
California
MARK C. ROBERTS, Michigan Technological University, Houghton,
Michigan
JOAQUIN RUIZ, University of Arizona, Tucson
RUSSELL E. STANDS-OVER-BULL, Arrow Creek Resources, Inc.,
Pryor, Montana
R. BRUCE TIPPIN, North Carolina State University, Asheville
LAWRENCE P. WILDING, Texas A&M University, College Station
P. MICHAEL WRIGHT, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory, Idaho Falls

National Research Council Staff

TAMARA L. DICKINSON, Senior Program Officer

MONICA R. LIPSCOMB, Research Assistant
KAREN L. IMHOF, Senior Project Assistant

v
 BOARD ON EARTH SCIENCES AND RESOURCES
GEORGE M. HORNBERGER, Chair, University of Virginia,
Charlottesville
JILL BANFIELD, University of California, Berkeley
STEVEN R. BOHLEN, Joint Oceanographic Institutions, Washington,
D.C.
VICKI COWART, Consulting Geologist, Denver, Colorado
DAVID L. DILCHER, University of Florida, Gainesville
ADAM M. DZIEWONSKI, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
WILLIAM L. GRAF, University of South Carolina, Columbia
RHEA GRAHAM, New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission,
Albuquerque
V. RAMA MURTHY, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis
DIANNE R. NIELSON, Utah Department of Environmental Quality,
Salt Lake City
RAYMOND A. PRICE, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
MARK SCHAEFER, NatureServe, Arlington, Virginia
BILLIE L. TURNER II, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts
THOMAS J. WILBANKS, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge,
Tennessee

National Research Council Staff

ANTHONY R. DE SOUZA, Director

PAUL M. CUTLER, Senior Program Officer
TAMARA L. DICKINSON, Senior Program Officer
DAVID A. FEARY, Senior Program Officer
ANNE M. LINN, Senior Program Officer
KRISTEN L. KRAPF, Program Officer
LISA M. VANDEMARK, Program Officer
RONALD F. ABLER, Senior Scholar
YVONNE P. FORSBERGH, Research Assistant
MONICA R. LIPSCOMB, Research Assistant
VERNA J. BOWEN, Administrative Associate
JENNIFER T. ESTEP, Administrative Associate
RADHIKA S. CHARI, Senior Project Assistant
KAREN L. IMHOF, Senior Project Assistant
TERESIA K. WILMORE, Project Assistant
WINFIELD SWANSON, Editor

vi
 Acknowledgments

T
his workshop summary has been reviewed by individuals chosen
for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise in accordance
with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s
(NRC) Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent re-
view is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the au-
thors and the NRC in making their published summary as sound as pos-
sible and to ensure that the summary meets institutional standards for
objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The con-
tent of the review comments and the draft manuscript remain confiden-
tial to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank
the following individuals for their participation in the review of this
summary:

Tom Bates, Lime Rock Partners

James T. Jensen, Jensen Associates
Richard Nehring, NRG Associates
Greg Stringham, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
Robert J. Weimer, Colorado School of Mines (emeritus)

Although the individuals listed above provided many constructive

comments and suggestions, they did not see the final summary before its
release. The review of this summary was overseen by David L. Bodde,
Henry W. Block School of Business, University of Missouri. Appointed by
the NRC, he was responsible for making certain that an independent ex-

vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

amination of this summary was carried out in accordance with institu-

tional procedures and that all review comments were carefully consid-
ered. Responsibility for the final content of the summary rests entirely
with the authoring committee and the NRC.
 Preface

C
ommittee members John Curtis, James Emme, Vello Kuuskraa,
and Dianne Nielson and National Research Council staff mem-
bers Tammy Dickinson, Monica Lipscomb, and Karen Imhof were
fundamental in developing the workshop agenda, identifying speakers,
running the workshop, and writing this report. It was a great team effort.
My thanks to each of them.
For 150 years, U.S. energy consumption trends have led global energy
consumption trends. Those trends indicate that the future of energy is
most likely a hydrogen and solar future utilizing technology that today
may not even exist. As we transition toward the future, a mix of known
energy sources—coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, hydro, and other
renewables—will be required over the next 100 years to meet global en-
ergy demands. Certainly there is a global supply of coal for the next cen-
tury that can be burned for electricity and gasified for transportation fuel
if policy so directs. Similarly, there is a global supply of cleaner and more
efficient natural gas for the next 100 years, which in addition to being
burned as a direct energy source could provide feedstock for hydrogen if
policy so supports.
Recognizing that fossil fuels supply 85 percent of the world’s energy
needs today, that the world has been steadily progressing away from solid
and liquid forms of fossil energy toward natural gas, nuclear, and renew-
able energy, and that all fossil fuels are only an energy bridge to the next
century, it is important to determine the best mix of fossil energy sources
for the economy, health, and well-being of our planet during the present

ix
x PREFACE

century. In that context, energy and the environment should be conjunc-

tive terms, and reasonable compromises—guided by good science and
good application of technology—should be made to transition sensibly
toward the 22nd century.

Scott W. Tinker, Chair

 Contents

SUMMARY 1

1 INTRODUCTION 6
Study and Report, 10

2 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND 13

Projecting Natural Gas Demand, 15
Outlook for U.S. Natural Gas Demand, 17
Outlook for Canadian and Mexican Natural Gas Demand, 24
Sensitivity Analyses, 26
Summary, 33

3 NORTH AMERICAN NATURAL GAS SUPPLY 34

Gas Resource Estimates, 35
North American Supply Going Forward, 47

4 MEETING U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND 49

U.S. Production and Storage Trends, 49
U.S. Sources of Natural Gas, 53
External Sources of Natural Gas, 65
Summary Observations and Issues, 75

5 SUMMARY AND OVERARCHING ISSUES 77

Demand, 78
Supply, 78

xi
xii CONTENTS

Meeting U.S. Demand, 79

Overarching Issues, 81
A Look Ahead, 82

REFERENCES 83

APPENDIXES

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 89

B WORKSHOP AGENDA 93
 Summary

N
obel laureate and workshop keynote speaker Richard Smalley
believes that energy leads the list of humanity’s most important
issues, which include water, food, the environment, poverty, ter-
rorism and war, disease, education, democracy, and population (Richard
Smalley, Rice University, personal communication, 2003). And although
there is a very predictable and long-term decarbonization of the world’s
energy sources—from coal, to oil, to natural gas, and eventually to hydro-
gen—the United States today, and for the foreseeable future, will remain
dependent on fossil fuels to satisfy on the order of 85 percent of its energy
demand (EIA, 2001a). Because natural gas represents a growing propor-
tion of the global fossil energy mix, accurately projecting natural gas sup-
ply and demand is critical. In this context, according to some workshop
participants, key efforts in achieving the most efficient use of natural gas
resources are (1) creating the proper mix of access and incentives to en-
courage efficient and environmentally sound exploration and production
activities, (2) designing a strategic private-public partnership to foster the
innovative research and technology development that are fundamental to
meet long-term U.S. energy demand, and (3) encouraging the infrastruc-
ture development to create a global natural gas transportation network
that will be required for increased use of natural gas.
The National Research Council, under the auspices of the Committee
on Earth Resources of the Board on Earth Sciences and Resources, was
requested by the U.S. Department of Energy, the Minerals Management
Service, and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to host a workshop to
address projections for the supply of and demand for natural gas over the

1
2 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

next 10 to 20 years and methods of increasing reserves and production.

The workshop, held on April 21, 2003, in Washington, D.C., addressed
three questions: (1) What projections have been made by government
agencies for the U.S. supply of and demand for natural gas over the next
10 to 20 years? (2) Where are the current natural gas reserves and re-
sources? (3) By what means and by how much can future reserves, re-
sources, and production be increased? The workshop included partici-
pants from academia, industry, federal and state government agencies,
and non-profit organizations.
This workshop summary is not a comprehensive report on natural
gas but rather a synopsis of the presentations and discussions at the work-
shop. There are many important and timely topics related to natural gas
supply and demand that were not discussed at the workshop. These in-
clude but are not limited to (1) factors that influence private-sector invest-
ment in natural gas, (2) natural gas transportation infrastructure and pipe-
line capacity, (3) natural gas storage, (4) significant environmental benefits
of natural gas over other fossil fuel energy sources, (5) the impact of U.S.
policy on perturbing the global trends of decarbonization of energy
sources, (6) the impact on the U.S. and global economies of a transition to
a natural gas economy, (7) carbon sequestration, (8) the national security
effects of a U.S. transition to natural gas, and (9) a review of the EIA mod-
els. This summary does not contain any conclusions and recommenda-
tions.
By design the workshop focused on natural gas demand and factors
that cause uncertainty in demand, North American supply estimates and
variability in those estimates, natural gas resource and reserves, and ways
to meet future U.S. natural gas demand—especially through technology
and liquefied natural gas (LNG) transportation. Several additional issues
were brought forward during the workshop, including (1) the impact of
tax incentives and royalties on the natural gas supply, (2) the growing
need for research and technology as the natural gas resource base becomes
increasingly unconventional, (3) the significant decrease in private-sector
research and development funding, (4) the need for new federal-private
research and technology models, and (5) the significant decline in the
number of graduate students enrolled in geosciences and petroleum engi-
neering who will be available to replace retiring workers over the next
decade as the oil and gas industry faces the loss of well over half its tech-
nical workforce.
In terms of U.S. natural gas consumption, some workshop partici-
pants projected an overall increase in the next 5 years, owing largely to an
anticipated rebound in industrial production and continued growth in
new natural gas-fired electric power plants. They also discussed the
longer-term outlook for natural gas, which will depend on its affordability
SUMMARY 3

by the industrial sector, its competitive position for new power facilities,
the energy conservation and efficiency response to higher gas prices, price
volatility, and the creation of a global transportation and storage network.
In addition, proposed and pending energy policies, such as the Bush
Administration’s Clear Skies Initiative, and international pressures for
addressing carbon emissions and global climate change will further influ-
ence the demand for and price of natural gas. Consumption of natural gas
is projected by the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2003a) to
grow from 22.4 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in 2002 to 27.1 Tcf in 2010 and to
34.9 Tcf in 2025. This rate equates to an average annual increase in natural
gas consumption of 2 percent per year and is faster than the expected
growth in overall primary energy consumption. The bulk of the increase
is from electricity generation as the share of natural gas in this market,
assuming natural gas is available at moderate prices, is expected to in-
crease from 17 percent in 2001 to 29 percent in 2025 (EIA, 2003a).
Committee members and participants noted that workshop assess-
ments of the future supply of natural gas in North America sent some-
what mixed signals. Some workshop participants believe (1) that the
United States will continue to require increasing amounts of imported
natural gas to meet projected demand; (2) that Canada will increase its
domestic consumption, with little excess export capacity beyond that of
the present day; and (3) that Mexico will most likely remain a net im-
porter of natural gas. LNG imports—and perhaps natural gas hydrates in
the longer term—will most likely be required to augment the North
American natural gas supply. Participants also thought the accuracy of
the supply assessment is limited by (1) perception and understanding of
the origin and occurrence of the resource, (2) the quality and distribution
of available data with which to conduct the estimates, and (3) the meth-
ods used in the assessment. Owing to these variables, a range of assess-
ment values as opposed to a single number could be expected.
Total assessed gas resources for the United States have been increas-
ing over the past 20 years owing to (1) an improved understanding of the
phenomenon of reserve appreciation or reserve growth whereby gas (and
oil) fields ultimately produce three to nine times the amounts initially
estimated by standard engineering techniques; (2) an understanding of
the potential for new “plays”* ; and (3) an evaluation of the role of current
and advanced technologies in gas exploration and production (Thomas
Ahlbrandt, USGS, personal communication, 2003). A total of 1,289 Tcf of

*A play is a group of prospects and any related fields having common oil or gas sources,
migration relationships, reservoir formations, seals, and trap types. The prospects thus share
any common elements of geological risks (White, 1992).
4 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

technically recoverable resources has been reported for the United States
by the Energy Information Administration, using predominantly USGS
and Minerals Management Service data, with proven reserves accounting
for 14 percent of the remaining U.S. resource (Mary Hutzler, EIA, per-
sonal communication, 2003). Unconventional natural gas—comprising
tight (low-permeability) sands and carbonates, fractured shale gas, and
coalbed gas—accounts for 34 percent of remaining U.S. resources (Mary
Hutzler, EIA, personal communication, 2003). Controversy exists, how-
ever, as to the size and geological nature of the tight sands gas resource in
the U.S. Rocky Mountains region, where the bulk of the assessed uncon-
ventional gas is thought to reside (Ben Law, Pangea Hydrocarbon Explo-
ration, personal communication, 2003; Keith Shanley, Stone Energy, per-
sonal communication, 2003). The remaining potential global supply of
natural gas is more than 13,000 Tcf according to USGS (2000) assessments.
Undiscovered natural gas is concentrated in the former Soviet Union, the
Middle East, and North Africa. Known reserves account for 35 percent of
the remaining potential supply.
Workshop discussion focused on ways to meet projected demands
and to counter natural gas price increases and volatility in the United
States, including the need for an educated and trained workforce; access
to off-limits lands; increased natural gas storage capacity; a global trans-
portation infrastructure, especially for offshore production and imports;
more efficient and competitive fiscal and regulatory regimes; and rapid
technological improvements—with emphasis on the development of un-
conventional reservoirs and conventional deepwater and frontier re-
sources. Rapid technological improvements—which in the past two de-
cades have served to create unconventional gas reserves such as tight gas,
shale gas, and coalbed gas—have historically relied on large private-sec-
tor investment. In terms of future unconventional natural gas resources,
workshop participants also discussed the need for investment in research
and development, including a greater proportion of federal investment
than in the past.
Until pipeline and LNG transportation projects are put in place and
natural gas storage solutions are found, the interplay between factors such
as wellhead price, weather, imports, domestic gas rig activity, deliver-
ability of new wells, and availability and cost of external supplies (i.e.,
pipelines) will continue to result in price and storage volume volatility.
New sources of natural gas from Canada via pipelines and globally via
LNG appear to be competitive in a sustained $3.25 per thousand cubic
feet (Mcf) or greater price environment.
The workshop was designed to address projections for the supply of
and demand for natural gas over the next 10 to 20 years and methods of
increasing reserves and production. As noted at the workshop, it seems
SUMMARY 5

relevant to recognize that in order to meet global demand all sources of

energy will be critical over the next 50 to 100 years as the world transi-
tions out of a fossil fuel energy-dominated economy, including continued
(1) production and consumption of coal with positive impacts from ad-
vances in “clean coal” technology, (2) renewable and nuclear energy pro-
duction and associated research, (3) oil consumption and enhanced oil
recovery research, and (4) natural gas consumption and associated re-
search and technology development across the upstream-to-downstream
natural gas spectrum. According to some workshop participants, because
long-term global trends are toward a natural gas economy and away from
coal and oil, the issue of meeting natural gas technology needs in the face
of decreased private and federal spending on oil and gas research and
technology, decreased geoscience and engineering enrollments in gradu-
ate schools, and an aging energy company workforce provides a frame-
work for future U.S. policy directions.
 1

Introduction

E
nergy leads the list of humanity’s top 10 problems of the next 50
years. Recognized as an important component of the standard of
living, energy is required in order to meet other important chal-
lenges: water, food, environment, poverty, terrorism and war, disease,
education, democracy, and population (Richard Smalley, Rice University,
personal communication, 2003).
Fossil fuels account for 84 percent of global and U.S. energy consump-
tion (EIA, 2001a). According to EIA (2001b), the past 20 years have seen a
steady and predictable decrease in the percentage of global energy con-
sumption satisfied by oil (from 46 percent to 40 percent) and coal (from 26
percent to 22 percent), and an associated increase in the percentage of
global energy consumption satisfied by a combination of natural gas,
nuclear, and other renewables (from 28 percent to 38 percent) (see Figure
1.1). During the same period, total global energy consumption increased
by nearly 35 percent (from 282 quadrillion British thermal units [Btu]
[quads] to 379 quads), and U.S. total energy consumption increased 23
percent (from 78 to 97 quads); (EIA, 2001b). In contrast to global consump-
tion, which shows a trend away from coal and oil to more efficient, abun-
dant, and environmentally sound natural gas, nuclear, and renewables,
the U.S. energy consumption mix has remained unchanged for two de-
cades and is at a point today where it is nearly identical to the global
energy mix (coal, 22 percent; oil, 39 percent; natural gas, 23 percent [EIA,
2000a]).
Accurately projecting natural gas supply and demand is important
for the United States. Historically, world energy consumption has re-

6
INTRODUCTION 7

50%

45%
Energy Consumption

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%
1980 1985 1990 1995

Year

U.S. Coal U.S. Gas, Nuclear, Hydro,

Renewables
World Coal World Gas, Nuclear, Hydro,
U.S. Oil Renewables
World Oil

FIGURE 1.1 U.S. and world energy consumption by fuel type. SOURCE: Scott
Tinker, University of Texas at Austin, personal communication, 2003. Data are
from EIA (2000a, 2001b).

flected a series of carbon-based resource periods, with the predominance

of coal and oil in the 20th century evolving to a projected dominance of
natural gas in the 21st century (see Figure 1.2). Most workshop partici-
pants believe that the longer-term global trend to natural gas is real, al-
though actual U.S. energy consumption data for the mid-1970s to the
present show a flattening in coal, oil, and natural gas compared to the
curves fit in these 1994 projections. The progression in technology to a
methane economy (Fisher, 2002) will result in a cleaner-burning, lower-
carbon-emitting (see Figure 1.3), more efficient energy source. However,
this will increase demand and put pressure on existing reserves and ex-
ploration and production technology.
8 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

100
Percentage of Total Market

80
Solids

60
Liquids

40
Natural Gas
20 Nuclear &
Renewables

0
1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100
Year
FIGURE 1.2 World primary energy substitution showing evolving resource pe-
riods. Dashed lines represent forecast concept of Marchetti and Nakicenovic
(1974). Solid lines represent smoothed curves fit to actual data from EIA (2001b).
SOURCE: Scott Tinker, University of Texas at Austin, personal communication,
2003. Data are from Marchetti and Nakicenovic (1974).

With a growing population, increased demand for electricity, and

improved cost and efficiency of advanced gas combined-cycle generation,
the consumption of natural gas by electric generators is expected to more
than double over the next two decades (EIA, 2003a). Electricity generation
fueled by natural gas and coal is projected to increase through 2020 to
meet growing demands for electricity and to offset the projected retire-
ment of existing nuclear units (Ausubel, 1996). The demand for electricity
generation is expected to triple between 1999 and 2020. As a result, the
overall demand for natural gas in the United States is projected to grow
by an average 1.8 percent per year from 22.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in
2001 to 34.9 Tcf in 2025. While these consumption levels are expected to
materialize only if prices do not rise appreciably, concerns have been
raised about the ability of the industry to supply the necessary gas at
moderate prices.
Annually, U.S. natural gas consumption has exceeded domestic pro-
duction since the mid-1980s, and by 2025 the differential is anticipated to
be 8 Tcf, roughly 23 percent of total demand (Mary Hutzler, EIA, personal
communication, 2003). According to the EIA (2001b), in order to meet pro-
jected demands and to counter price increases and volatility for natural
gas, the United States will need technological advances, increased explo-
ration and developmental drilling, increased capacity for natural gas im-
ports, and conservation. Projections through 2025 consistently predict suf-
ficient supply to meet U.S. demand, but delivering on a reserve estimate
INTRODUCTION 9

102
H
H/C
H+C
Hyd ro gen
Eco nomy

101 0.90
Nonfossil
Hydrogen
Methane: H/C = 4
0.80
Methane Economy
Oil: H/C = 2
0.67
Coal: H/C = 1
100 0.50
1935 (midpoint of process)

∆t = 300 years (length of process)

Wood: H/C = 0.1

10-1 0.09

10-2
1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100
Year

FIGURE 1.3 Decarbonization of primary energy. World primary energy sources

have collectively declined in carbon intensity since coal began to compete with
wood and hay about 200 years ago. The evolution is seen in the ratio of hydrogen
to carbon in the world fuel mix, graphed on a logarithmic scale, analyzed as a
logistic growth process, and plotted in the linear transform of the logistic (S) curve.
Progression of the ratio above natural gas (methane) requires production of large
amounts of hydrogen fuel with nonfossil energy. SOURCE: Ausubel (1996). Illus-
tration by Aaron Cox, American Scientist. Reprinted by permission of American
Scientist, magazine of Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society.

is dependent on more than future markets. Key assumptions include tech-

nology to improve exploration and production success, an educated and
trained workforce, access, and infrastructure, especially for offshore pro-
duction and imports (Mary Hutzler, EIA, personal communication, 2003).
The committee and workshop participants discussed how current
trends appear to challenge these assumptions. While liquefied natural gas
(LNG) transport and conversion facilities are common internationally,
domestic facilities essential for offshore imports are limited (Colleen Sen,
Gas Technology Institute, personal communication, 2003). Furthermore,
pipelines for both imports and interstate transport are yet to be built. Al-
though industry research facilities formed the core of oil and gas technol-
ogy development in the past, private-sector research and development
funding plummeted in the 1990s. Within the U.S. Department of Energy,
10 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

Note Scale Difference

5

DOE Oil and Gas Funding

120
Private Sector Funding
(Billion Dollars)

(Million Dollars)
100
4 80
Fuel Cells and Gas 60
Turbines Removed from
3
1996-1999 for 40
Comparison
20
2
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year

FIGURE 1.4 U.S. natural gas production from unconventional sources, includ-
ing coalbed methane, shale gas, and tight gas—and results from new exploration
concepts and new technology. Significantly decreased private and federal fund-
ing for oil and natural gas research could negatively impact the future supply of
natural gas, particularly unconventionals. SOURCE: Scott Tinker, University of
Texas at Austin, personal communication, 2003. Private-sector data are from Ross
and Trewhella (2001).

the $40 million proposed for oil and gas research marks a sharp decline in
federal funding (see Figure 1.4). University enrollments for geoscience
graduates and petroleum engineers—the future educated workforce—
have declined by more than 50 percent since 1985, with steeper declines
for engineers (see Figure 1.5). Some workshop participants expressed con-
cern about meeting the demand for natural gas and other fossil fuels given
decreasing graduate student enrollments. Committee members and work-
shop participants discussed ways to meet increasing demand for natural
gas and technological requirements at a time when oil and gas research
and development funding, university science and petroleum engineering
enrollments, and industry employment are all declining.

STUDY AND REPORT

The National Research Council, under the auspices of the Committee
on Earth Resources of the Board on Earth Sciences and Resources, was
requested by the U.S. Department of Energy, the Minerals Management
Service, and the U.S. Geological Survey to host a workshop to address
projections for the supply of and demand for natural gas over the next 10
to 20 years and methods of increasing reserves and production. The work-
shop and resulting summary, without conclusions and recommendations,
were specifically focused on addressing the following questions:
INTRODUCTION 11

20,000
Number of Students

Geoscience Graduate Enrollments

10,000

0
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year

FIGURE 1.5 University geoscience enrollments for the period 1955 to 2000. Pe-
troleum engineering enrollments show similar trends. SOURCE: AGI (2001).

1. What projections have been made by government agencies for the

U.S. supply of and demand for natural gas over the next 10 to 20 years?
• What methods were used?
• On what assumptions are the projections based?
• What external factors could impact the projections?
2. Where are the current natural gas reserves and resources?
• How much is technically available?
• How much is economically available?
• How much is in conventional versus nonconventional supplies?
• How much is offshore?
• How much is in Canada and Mexico?
3. By what means and by how much can future reserves, resources,
and production be increased?
• Technology
• Imports (from Canada and Mexico)
• Tax incentives/royalties
• Access
• Demand

To address this charge the National Research Council established the

Committee on U.S. Natural Gas Demand and Supply. The committee con-
sists of five experts from academia, state government, and industry with
12 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

expertise in reservoir characterization, resource assessment, gas recovery

technologies, oil and gas exploration and development, energy econom-
ics and modeling, environmental health, and safety. Brief biographies of
the committee members appear in Appendix A. The committee held a
workshop on April 21, 2003, in Washington, D.C. The workshop included
participants from academia, industry, federal and state government agen-
cies, and nonprofit organizations. An agenda for the workshop is given in
Appendix B.
This workshop summary is not a comprehensive report on natural gas
but rather a synopsis of the presentations and discussions at the workshop.
There are many important and timely topics related to natural gas supply
and demand that were not discussed at the workshop. These include but
are not limited to (1) factors that influence private-sector investment in natu-
ral gas; (2) natural gas transportation infrastructure and pipeline capacity;
(3) natural gas storage; (4) significant environmental benefits of natural gas
over other fossil fuel energy sources; (5) the impact of U.S. policy on per-
turbing the global trends of decarbonization of energy sources; (6) the im-
pact on U.S. and global economies of a transition to a natural gas economy;
(7) carbon sequestration; (8) the national security effects of a U.S. transition
to natural gas, and (9) a review of the EIA models.
By design the workshop focused on natural gas demand and factors
that cause uncertainty in demand, North American supply estimates and
variability in those estimates, natural gas resource and reserves, and ways
to meet future U.S. natural gas demand—especially through technology
and LNG transportation. Several additional issues were brought forward
during the workshop, including (1) the impact of tax incentives and royal-
ties on the natural gas supply, (2) the growing need for research and
technology as the natural gas resource base becomes increasingly uncon-
ventional, (3) the significant decrease in private-sector research and devel-
opment funding, (4) the need for new federal-private research and tech-
nology models, and (5) the significant decline in the number of graduate
students enrolled in geosciences and petroleum engineering who will be
available to replace retiring workers over the next decade as the oil and
gas industry faces the loss of well over half its technical workforce.
This summary does not contain any conclusions or recommendations.
It is intended for multiple audiences, including the federal sponsors, other
federal agencies, policymakers, consultants, scientists, and engineers.
Chapter 2 examines the outlook for U.S. natural gas demand. Chapter 3
examines the North American natural gas supply. Chapter 4 considers
options for meeting the U.S. natural gas demand, and Chapter 5 provides
a workshop summary and highlights overarching issues discussed dur-
ing the workshop.
 2

U.S. Natural Gas Demand

N
atural gas is considered by many as the transition fuel, or bridge,
to a continually lower carbon-fueled and eventually hydrogen-
fueled, economy. How well this clean, versatile energy source
will meet this role will depend greatly on how long natural gas remains
reliable and affordable. After years of stability, natural gas prices have
recently become volatile and have been trending upward. Recent natural
gas wellhead prices (monthly average for 2000 through 2002) have ranged
from about $2 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) to over $8/Mcf, in a roller
coaster fashion (see Figure 2.1). At the start of 2003, wellhead prices for
natural gas again resumed their roller coaster climb, reaching an estimated
$6.70/Mcf (average for March 2003) before once again heading down
(EIA, 2003b). These increasing and volatile gas prices are raising concerns
about the electric power market’s high reliance on natural gas. They are
also beginning to price industrial demand out of the market and are im-
pairing investments in gas supply. Price instability is one reason natural
gas companies are reluctant to make long-term contracts similar to those
made by coal companies.
Price volatility and supply reliability are of particular concern to the
electric power sector. Future availability and prices for domestic electric-
ity are linked to the outlook for gas supply, as essentially all new near-
term power capacity and the great bulk of new long-term power capacity
are projected to be gas fired. Because of higher prices and price volatility,
projections of natural gas use for electric power generation have already
been reduced in the most recent EIA (2003a) Annual Energy Outlook. The
recently volatile and high natural gas prices have weakened the competi-

13
14 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

Monthly National Average Wellhead 9.0

8.0
Natural Gas Prices ($/Mcf)

7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
Jan 00

Apr 00

Jul 00

Jan 01

Apr 01

Jul 01

Jan 02

Apr 02

Jul 02

Jan 03

Apr 03
Oct 00

Oct 01

Oct 02
FIGURE 2.1 Monthly wellhead prices for natural gas for the period January 2000
to March 2003. SOURCE: EIA (2003d).

tive position of domestic industries utilizing natural gas, such as ammo-

nia and methanol (particularly if feedstock ethane and propane are left in
the gas stream). High prices for natural gas have also led the industrial
sector to significantly reduce (and some sectors to curtail) its use of natu-
ral gas in the past 5 years, particularly during the first half of 2003. Be-
cause of price volatility, the natural gas production industry (awaiting
assurance that the recent price rise is more than just a temporary phenom-
enon) has been slow to respond to the market’s price signals.
The U.S. natural gas drilling rig count averaged only 746 rigs during
the first quarter of 2003, up 11 percent compared to the first quarter of
2002, even though wellhead gas prices averaged $5.54/Mcf during this
time, about two and one half times higher than the first quarter of 2002
(EIA, 2003c). Following a period of sustained higher wellhead natural gas
prices, averaging $5/Mcf during the second quarter of 2003, and expecta-
tions that prices will remain strong into 2004, development of natural gas
is increasing, with over 900 rigs drilling for natural gas in the United States
in June 2003. A portion of the price volatility has been due to a lack of
timely and comprehensive information on actual and expected gas de-
mand, in a market where small volumes of surplus or shortage in the
demand and supply balance can lead to significant short-term price vola-
tility (Matt Simmons, Simmons and Company International, personal
communication, 2003).
Projected consumption of natural gas is expected to remain flat for
U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND 15

the next 2 years, with an anticipated rebound in industrial production

and continued growth in new natural gas-fired electric power countering
energy conservation and loss of gas demand in the petrochemical sector
(EIA, 2003a). However, the longer-term outlook for natural gas consump-
tion is less certain and will depend greatly on its affordability by the in-
dustrial sector, its competitive position for new power facilities, and the
energy conservation and efficiency response to higher recent gas prices.
In addition, proposed energy policies, such as the Bush Administration’s
Clear Skies Initiative, conservation, and international pressures to address
carbon emissions and global climate change will further influence the de-
mand and price for natural gas in coming years. This chapter examines
the outlook for natural gas demand and the forces that will shape the role
it may play in our domestic energy future.

PROJECTING NATURAL GAS DEMAND

Fundamental to any projections of natural gas demand are expecta-
tions for economic growth, assumptions for overall energy consumption,
and economic competition among the fuels.

Growth of the U.S. Economy

The output of the U.S. economy—its gross domestic product (GDP)—
is projected to increase by an average of 3 percent per year between 2001
and 2025 (EIA, 2003a). While this projected growth rate is less than what
was achieved in the second half of the 1990s, it is comparable with long-
term (years 2001 to 2025) economic growth expectations by other forecast-
ers. For example, Global Insights, Inc. (GII, formerly Data Resources, Inc.–
Wharton Energy Forecasting Associates) forecasts long-term GDP growth
of 3.1 percent per year (EIA, 2003a). Shorter-term (years 2001 to 2012) eco-
nomic growth expectations are 3.2 percent by the Office of Management
and Budget and 3.1 percent by the Congressional Budget Office, both in
line with near-term economic growth assumptions in the 2003 Annual
Energy Outlook.

Primary Energy Demand

Primary energy use is projected to grow by an annual average rate of
1.5 percent between 2001 and 2025 (EIA, 2003a). As such, total domestic
energy consumption would increase from 97 quads in 2001 to 139 quads
in 2025. The slower growth in energy use compared to GDP growth re-
flects an expected decline in energy intensity due to efficiency improve-
ments in end-use energy applications, higher efficiencies in electric power
16 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

1.25

1.00
Index, 1970=1

0.75

0.50

0.25

History Projections
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2025

Year

Energy use per capita

Energy use per
dollar of GDP

FIGURE 2.2 Energy use in the United States per capita and per dollar GDP from
1970 to 2025 (index, 1970 = 1). SOURCE: EIA (2003a, p. 5).

production, and shifts in the economy toward less energy-intensive in-

dustries (see Figure 2.2). The 2003 Annual Energy Outlook projections
(EIA, 2003a) for annual growth in primary energy consumption of 1.5 per-
cent are somewhat higher than the 1.3 percent annual growth projected
by GII (from 2001 to 2020).

Competition among Fuels

Assuming natural gas prices moderate and become less volatile, natu-
ral gas consumption is projected to increase faster than consumption of
competing fuels—coal, nuclear, petroleum, and renewables (EIA, 2003a).
Consumption of natural gas is projected to grow from 22.4 Tcf (61 Bcf/
day) in 2002, to 27.1 Tcf (74 Bcf/day) in 2010, to 34.9 Tcf (96 Bcf/day) in
2025 (see Figure 2.3) (EIA, 2003a). This equates to an average annual in-
crease in natural gas consumption of 2 percent per year and is faster than
the expected growth in overall primary energy consumption. The bulk of
U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND 17

60 History Projections

50
Quadrillion BTU

40

30

20

10

0
1970 1980 1990 2001 2010 2025

Year

Petroleum Nuclear
Natural gas Nonhydroelectric
Coal renewables
Hydroelectric

FIGURE 2.3 U.S. energy consumption by fuel for 1970 to 2025. SOURCE: EIA
(2003a).

the increase is from electricity generation as the share of natural gas in

this market, assuming natural gas is available at moderate prices, is ex-
pected to increase from 17 percent in 2001 to 29 percent in 2025 (see Figure
2.4) (EIA, 2003a). In the past four years (1999 to 2002), the industry added
144 gigawatts (GW) of electricity generation capacity, of which 138 GW
has been natural gas-fired. Assuming natural gas prices remain moderate,
as forecast by the 2003 Annual Energy Outlook, 80 percent of the new
electricity generation capacity of the 428 GW projected to be needed by
2025 would be fueled by natural gas, if available and competitively priced.

OUTLOOK FOR U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND

Historical Perspective
The overall consumption of natural gas increased moderately but
steadily during the 1990s from 19.2 Tcf (53 Bcf/day) in 1990 to 22.4 Tcf (61
Bcf/day) in 1999, an annual average increase of 1.5 percent per year (see
18 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

History Projections
4,000
Electricity Demand
5,252

3,000 1,392
Billion Kilowatt-hours

1970 2025
2,000

1,000

0
1970 1980 1990 2001 2010 2025

Year

Petroleum Nuclear
Natural gas Renewables
Coal

FIGURE 2.4 U.S. electricity generation by fuel for 1970 to 2025. SOURCE: EIA
(2003a).

Figure 2.5) (EIA, 2003c). Much of the growth was due to increased use of
natural gas for electric power, including industrial use of combined heat
and power. During this time, natural gas prices at the wellhead were rela-
tively low and stable, averaging less than $2.00/Mcf and ranging from
$1.55 to $2.32/Mcf (in nominal dollars).
Ten years of stability in natural gas prices and predictability in de-
mand came to a halt in late 2000. Low rainfall in the northwest led to a
decline in hydroelectric power production. Electricity generation from
hydroelectricity was 266 billion kilowatt-hours (kwh) in 2000, down from
309 billion and 414 billion kwh, respectively, in the previous 2 years (EIA,
2003a). The year 2000 also saw a cold winter, following two mild winters.
Heating degree-days in year 2000 were 4,460 compared to 4,169 and 3,951
in the previous 2 years (EIA, 2003c). Driven by increased electricity and
heating demand, consumption of natural gas jumped by 1.1 Tcf (3 Bcf/
day) to 23.5 Tcf (64 Bcf) in 2000 (EIA, 2003a). With the increase in demand
U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND 19

History Projections
35

Net Imports
30

25
Consumption
Natural Gas (Tcf)

20 Natural Gas Net Imports,

2001 and 2025
6 (Tcf)
15 Production
5
4
10 3 2025
2
1 2001
5 0
Pipeline Liquefied
Natural Gas
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Year
FIGURE 2.5 Natural gas production, consumption, and imports for 1970 to 2025.
SOURCE: EIA (2003a).

came major increases in natural gas wellhead prices that averaged $5.77/
Mcf in December 2000 and $8.06/Mcf in January 2001 (EIA, 2003e). Over-
all, wellhead prices for natural gas averaged $3.70/Mcf in 2000 and $4.02/
Mcf in 2001, up considerably from $2.19/Mcf in 1999, the last year of stable
natural gas prices (EIA, 2003c). The higher natural gas prices induced con-
servation as well as the beginning of demand destruction in selective in-
dustrial sectors, reducing natural gas demand and causing a temporary
decline in gas prices. In 2002, natural gas prices (at the wellhead) aver-
aged $2.96/Mcf as gas consumption stabilized at 22.4 Tcf (61 Bcf/day)
(EIA, 2003c).

Recent Situation
Preliminary data indicate that natural gas consumption may remain
relatively flat for 2003 and 2004. Meanwhile, natural gas prices (at the
wellhead) are expected to average $5/Mcf in 2003, declining to about
$4.30/Mcf in 2004 (EIA, 2003c). With working natural gas in storage at the
end of the winter heating season at 680 Bcf, the lowest end of March gas
storage level since 1976 (the first year recorded by the EIA), it is not sur-
prising that gas prices are expected to remain strong through 2004 (EIA,
2003c). With higher domestic gas production and lower demand during
20 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

the second quarter of 2003, approximately 1,100 Bcf of natural gas has
been added to storage. While the recent rate of injection into storage has
been impressive, the volume of working gas in storage is still about 15
percent below the 5-year average, providing the basis for continued high
near-term gas prices and its associated loss (and possible destruction) of
industrial demand.

Longer-Term Expectations
In the longer term, consumption of natural gas has been projected by
the EIA (2003a) and other forecasting organizations to once again grow
and to grow steadily, reaching 27.1 Tcf (74 Bcf/day) in 2010, 32.1 Tcf (88
Bcf/day) in 2020, and 34.9 Tcf (96 Bcf/day) in 2025. The majority of this
consumption increase is projected to be from the use of natural gas for
electric power generation and from the restoration of domestic industrial
demand (see Figure 2.6). Over 60 percent of the 11.7 Tcf (32 Bcf/day) of
projected growth in annual natural gas consumption, between 2002 and
2025, would be from these two sectors (see Table 2.1).

History Projections
12

10
Natural Gas Consumption

8
(Tcf )

0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Year

Industrial Residential
Electric Commercial
generators CNG vehicles

FIGURE 2.6 Natural gas end-use consumption by sector for 1990 to 2025.
SOURCE: EIA (2003a).
U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND 21

TABLE 2.1 Projected U.S. Natural Gas Consumption in Tcf

for 2002 to 2025

Sector 2002 2010 2020 2025

Residential 04.9 05.5 06.0 06.2

Commercial 03.2 03.7 04.2 04.4
Industrial 07.1 08.9 10.1 10.9
Electric generation 05.5 06.8 09.4 10.6
Other 01.7 02.2 02.4 02.8
TOTAL 22.4 27.1 32.1 34.9

SOURCE: EIA (2003a).

The most critical assumption underlying EIA’s projected growth in

natural gas consumption (EIA, 2003a) is that natural gas prices will de-
cline from current high levels and remain relatively moderate, between $3
and $4/Mcf (in real-year 2001 dollars) (see Figure 2.7). Another key as-

History Projections
4. 5

4. 0
AEO2003
3. 5

3. 0 AEO2002
2001$/Mcf

2. 5

2. 0
7
1. 5

1. 0
1.55
0. 5 Nominal dollars
1995 2025
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2025

Year

FIGURE 2.7 U.S. average annual natural gas wellhead prices for 1970 to 2025 in
2001 dollars per thousand cubic feet. SOURCE: Figure was prepared for Annual
Energy Outlook 2003 Press Release, November, 2003. Data are from EIA (2002a,
2003a).
22 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

sumption behind the projected increase in natural gas consumption is that

natural gas will continue to be used in already installed electric power
plants and will win the lion’s share of the expected new electric power
capacity. High-efficiency natural gas combined-cycle power plants have,
for some time, had a competitive advantage over new coal and nuclear
power plants. This cost advantage is expected to generally remain in place
through 2025 (EIA, 2003a) (see Figure 2.8). Regional differences in fuel
prices, incentives (or requirements) for using renewable energy such as
wind power, and a desire to maintain a mix of fuels, have enabled coal
and renewables to capture a portion of the future market in electric power.
However, the cost advantage of natural gas in power generation be-
gins to erode once wellhead natural gas prices climb above $4/Mcf, un-
less substantial progress continues to be achieved in the efficiencies of
advanced gas combined-cycle power plants. With current wellhead natu-
ral gas prices above $5/Mcf and projected to be $4/Mcf in the year 2025,
considerable uncertainty exists as to whether natural gas will continue to
“win” in the power generation growth market (EIA, 2003a).
The past 2 years have also seen a loss in industrial demand for natural
gas of 1.2 Tcf (over 3 Bcf/day), with a possibility that much of this loss is
permanent due to high volatile natural gas prices. As such, the longer-
term consumption of natural gas in the industrial sector may well be con-
siderably less than projected by the EIA (Matt Simmons, Simmons and
Company International, personal communication, 2003).
On the one hand, higher natural gas prices would shift the critical
electric power and industrial markets toward other fuels. On the other,
concerns about global warming and constraints on carbon emissions
would tilt the balance back toward natural gas. Advanced carbon capture
and storage technology could help the economic position of coal in a car-
bon-constrained world and help balance the competition.

Comparison with Other Forecasts

The projections for natural gas consumption and prices in the 2003
Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2003a) are, in general, quite comparable
with other major forecasts, such as those by Global Insights, Inc. (GII) and
the Petroleum Industry Research Association (PIRA) (see Table 2.2). This
is due in part to the fact that the basic assumptions for economic growth,
primary energy demand, electricity demand, and future natural gas prices
in these forecasts are similar:

• The projection for year 2015 natural gas consumption of 29.5 Tcf in
the 2003 Annual Energy Outlook is essentially the same as by GII and 2
percent higher than by PIRA.
 7 Variable costs
2010 Fixed costs 2025

6 Capital costs

5
U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND

2001 Cents per Kilowatt-hour

2

0
Pulverized Advanced Advanced Nuclear Pulverized Advanced Advanced Nuclear
Coal Coal Gas Coal Coal Gas
Combined Combined
Cycle Cycle

FIGURE 2.8 Projected levelized electricity generation costs for baseload technologies from 2010
to 2025 in 2001 cents per kilowatt-hour. SOURCE: EIA (2003a).
23
24 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

TABLE 2.2 Comparisons of Forecasts and Assumptions

Annual Energy Outlook

Basic Demand Factors 2003 GII PIRA

Economic growth (%; average annual

2001-2025) 3.0 3.1
4,48
Primary energy demand (%; average
annual, 2001-2025) 1.5 1.3
4,4
Electricity sales in 2015 (billion kwh) 4,481 4,583

Natural gas in 2015 L-48 wellhead 3.55 3.14 N/A

price (2001 $/Mcf)
4,4
Consumption (Tcf) 29.5 29.4 28.8

SOURCE: EIA (2003a).

• The 2003 Annual Energy Outlook expects somewhat (14 percent)

higher gas prices in the year 2015 than does GII.

Given their relatively moderate expectations for natural gas prices, all
three of these major forecasts expect that natural gas consumption will
approach 30 Tcf in the middle of the next decade. Given the loss of indus-
trial demand and the history of residential and commercial energy con-
servation when faced with high volatile prices, there is considerable
uncertainty as to whether natural gas will meet these consumption expec-
tations. Some workshop participants commented that, with higher gas
prices, they were now questioning the 30-Tcf projections or thought there
would be a delay in reaching the 30-Tcf level. Whether natural gas can
meet these expectations requires that it remain reliable and affordable.
The section titled “Sensitivity Analyses” will examine several of the forces
that may shape the future price of and demand for natural gas.

OUTLOOK FOR CANADIAN AND MEXICAN

NATURAL GAS DEMAND
To a large extent the United States is part of an integrated North
American natural gas market with Canada and Mexico. As such, changes
in demand for natural gas in these two countries will directly affect the
outlook for the U.S. demand.
U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND 25

Changes in Canadian Natural Gas Demand

Currently, Canada consumes 3 Tcf (8 Bcf/day) of natural gas annu-
ally. With a productive capacity of 6.4 Tcf, this enabled Canada to ex-
port a net 3.6 Tcf/year (10 Bcf/day) to the United States in 2002, ac-
counting for 16 percent of U.S. gas consumption (Greg Stringham,
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, personal communication,
2003).
For the past decade or so, Canadian natural gas consumption has
grown relatively moderately, from 2.1 Tcf (5.8 Bcf/day) in 1990 to its cur-
rent level. However, because of increased growth in gas-fired electricity
generation and significant expansions in oil sand development, Canada’s
internal demand for natural gas is expected to increase substantially in
the next several years (Greg Stringham, Canadian Association of Petro-
leum Producers, personal communication, 2003).
In 2002, oil sands provided nearly 0.8 million barrels per day of pro-
duction and consumed 300 million to 400 million cubic feet per day
(MMcf/day) of natural gas, as part of the extraction, separation, and up-
grading process. Approximately $7 billion (Canadian) is being spent on
construction of new oil sand facilities and expansions, with another $25
billion (Canadian) announced. At a ratio of 0.5 to 1 Mcf of natural gas for
every barrel of oil sands produced and assuming that natural gas remains
the “fuel of choice,” the use of natural gas by the oil sands industry is
projected to reach 500 to 1,000 MMcf/day (0.3 Tcf /year) by 2010 and will
be considerably higher in future years. Technology is key in the oil sands
development. Recent promising advances in technology and greater use
of petroleum coke could substantially reduce gas consumption in new oil
sands projects (Greg Stringham, Canadian Association of Petroleum Pro-
ducers, personal communication, 2003).

Changes in Mexican Natural Gas Demand

Currently, Mexico imports about 700 MMcf/day (0.26 Tcf/year) of
natural gas from the United States. In the near term, from now to 2010,
Mexico is expected to maintain its natural gas imports from the United
States at about this level (EIA, 2003a). In the longer term, and particu-
larly if LNG terminals are installed in Baja, California, Mexico’s natu-
ral gas demand is expected to be met by growth in its internal produc-
tion and by LNG imports, enabling the flow of gas to reverse (EIA,
2003a). However, considerable uncertainty surrounds the outlook for
Mexico’s natural gas consumption, particularly given its plans for eco-
nomic growth and improved environmental practices (EIA, 2003f).
26 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
The outlook for U.S. natural gas demand depends on numerous as-
sumptions and expectations, including the rate of domestic economic
growth, future natural gas and competing energy prices, pending energy
legislation and policies, and the reliability of natural gas supplies. As
shown by recent events, the factors governing gas demand can change
dramatically as new information and conditions emerge.

Example of Rapid Changes in Demand Assumptions

An example of how rapidly and significantly basic assumptions on
natural gas demand can change is illustrated by the events that followed
the National Petroleum Council’s 1992 study on natural gas (National
Petroleum Council, 1992). This study set forth two bounding forecasts for
the year 2000 gas demand. The “low case” scenario with a demand esti-
mate of 18.5 Tcf for 2000 projected little growth in natural gas demand
from 1990. The “high case” scenario with a demand estimate of 20.8 Tcf
for 2000 had modest expectations for growth.
Actual natural gas consumption in 2000 was 24.3 Tcf, 2.6 Tcf higher
than projected for the “high case.” Clearly, many of the assumptions under-
lying the natural gas demand forecast in the study quickly became out-
dated. When the National Petroleum Council updated its study in 1999, it
noted that the low case scenario “had proven to be so far from actual results
that it did not merit further study or analysis.” And even the high case
scenario “had proved to be too low to capture the real growth that occurred
in the 1992-98 period” (National Petroleum Council, 1999).

Assessment of Key Uncertainties

One approach for examining uncertainty in projections of demand is
to use sensitivity (or “delta”) analyses to evaluate the impact of assump-
tions or actions on the baseline projection. To gain insight on key uncer-
tainties, sensitivity analysis is performed for three cases: (1) higher and
lower economic growth; (2) changes in the pace of technological progress
and the size of the accessible natural gas resource base; and (3) a carbon
constrained future, similar to the expectations set forth in legislation pro-
posed by Senators McCain and Lieberman.1 A fourth sensitivity analysis,

1Senate bill 139. A bill to provide for a program of scientific research on abrupt climate

change, to accelerate the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States by
establishing a market-driven system of greenhouse gas tradeable allowances that could be
U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND 27

TABLE 2.3 Expectations for Natural Gas Demand and Long-Term

Wellhead Prices Caused by Differences in Assumptions for Economic
Growth

2010 2025

Actual Reference Low High Reference Low High

2002 Case Growth Growth Case Growth Growth

Demand (Tcf) 22.4 27.1 26.3 28.1 34.9 31.8 37.4

Wellhead Price 02.96 03.29 03.17 03.59 03.90 03.83 04.50

($/Mcf)

SOURCE: EIA (2003a).

examining the impact of alternative world oil prices on natural gas de-
mand and prices, showed that even significant differences in world oil
prices would have only very modest impacts on U.S. natural gas demand
and prices (EIA, 2003a).

Sensitivity Analysis 1: Economic Growth

A fundamental uncertainty is future growth in the U.S. economy.
While the 2003 Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2003a) reference case uses
an average annual growth rate of 3 percent (from 2001 to 2025), the report
also includes low (2.5 percent) and high (3.5 percent) economic growth
cases. These relatively modest annual differences in expectations for eco-
nomic growth have a major impact on long-term gas demand and prices
(see Table 2.3):

• Higher or lower economic growth would cause gas demand to go

up or down from the reference by about 1 Tcf in 2010 and by 2.5 to 3 Tcf in
2025.
• Higher economic growth would cause wellhead prices for natural
gas in the year 2025 to increase by about 15 percent, from $3.90 to $4.50/
Mcf (in constant 2001 dollars).

used interchangeably with passenger vehicle fuel economy standard credits, to limit green-
house gas emissions in the United States and reduce dependence upon foreign oil, and en-
sure benefits to consumers from the trading in such allowances.
28 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

Sensitivity Analysis 2: Technology and Resources

The rate of technological progress and the size of the accessible re-
source base are two factors that can be affected by energy policies and the
level of research and development investment.

Technological Progress
In the past, investments in research and development have led to im-
portant advances in natural gas exploration and production technology.
These technologies have improved exploration success rates, lowered well
drilling and completion costs, and improved gas recovery per well. These
advances have enabled the industry to access new natural gas supplies
from geologically complex unconventional gas resources and deep off-
shore waters while keeping costs lower than they otherwise would have
been. The analysis shows that a relatively modest change in the rate of
technological progress, from the current trends imbedded in the reference
case, would have significant impacts on future natural gas prices and de-
mand (see Table 2.4 and Figure 2.9).

• In a low technology progress world (15 percent decline in the rate

of technological progress from the technology trends imbedded in the ref-
erence case), the wellhead price for natural gas would be $4.60/Mcf (in
the year 2025). This higher price drives out over 2 Tcf of annual gas de-
mand (in the year 2025) and places natural gas in a much less favorable
competitive position in the electric power market (Mary Hutzler, EIA,
personal communication, 2003.).
• In a high technology progress world (15 percent increase in the rate
of technological progress), the wellhead price for natural gas would be

TABLE 2.4 Expectations for Natural Gas Demand and Long Term
Wellhead Prices Due to Low and High Rates of Technological Progress

2010 2025

Actual Reference Low High Reference Low High

2002 Case Tech Tech Case Tech Tech

Demand (Tcf) 22.4 27.1 26.4 27.6 34.9 32.7 36.7

Wellhead price 2.96 3.29 3.64 2.97 3.90 4.60 3.76

(2001; $/Mcf)

SOURCE: Mary Hutzler, EIA, personal communication, 2003.

U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND 29

Natural Gas Wellhead Price, 2012, and 2025

(2001$/Mcf)
$5
40 $4

$3
35
$2

$1
30
$0
2012 2025
Natural Gas (Tcf)

25
Consumption
20
7 Natural Gas Net Imports in 2025
6 (Tcf )
15
Production
5
4
2002 Technology
10 3
Slow Technology
2
Reference
1
5 Rapid Technology 0
Pipeline Liquefied Natural Gas
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

History Projections

FIGURE 2.9 Natural gas production, consumption, and imports for 1970 to 2025
in trillion cubic feet as a function of technological progress. SOURCE: Mary
Hutzler, EIA, personal communication, 2003. Data are from EIA (2003a).

considerably lower, at $3.76/Mcf (in the year 2025). This would provide
significant savings to consumers (annual savings in costs of $18 billion in
the year 2010 and $31 billion in the year 2025) as well as significantly
lower finding and development costs for natural gas producers (Mary
Hutzler, EIA, personal communication, 2003).

Resource Base
Considerable uncertainty and controversy exists with respect to the
size of the underlying natural gas resource base, particularly with respect
to unconventional natural gas (Keith Shanley, Stone Energy, personal
communication, 2003; Ben Law, Pangea Hydrocarbon Exploration, per-
sonal communication, 2003). Equally uncertain is the portion of this re-
source that will ultimately be accessible, unconstrained by either physical
or technical limits.
30 U.S. NATURAL GAS DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND TECHNOLOGY

TABLE 2.5 Expectations for Natural Gas Demand and Long Term
Wellhead Prices Caused By Differences in Assumptions for the Size of
the Resource Base

2010 2025

Actual Reference Low Reference Low

2002 Case Resource Case Resource

Demand (Tcf) 22.4 27.1 26.6 34.9 32.9

Wellhead price
(2001;$/Mcf) 2.96 3.29 3.54 3.90 4.84

SOURCE: Mary Hutzler, EIA, personal communication, 2003.

• The analysis shows that a 25 percent lower-than-expected U.S.

natural gas resource base, due potentially to smaller or less accessible
tight gas sand resources, would increase gas prices in 2025 by nearly
$1.00/Mcf (see Figure 2.10) (Mary Hutzler, EIA, personal communication,
2003).
• With a low natural gas resource base and higher gas prices, gas
consumption would decline by 2 Tcf in 2025, with an even larger drop in
domestic production. Significantly increased reliance on natural gas im-
ports would be required to balance demand and supply (see Table 2.5)
(Mary Hutzler, EIA, personal communication, 2003).

Carbon Emission Constraints

The long-term outlook for natural gas could change substantially
should constraints emerge on carbon emissions. As the cost of using
higher carbon-based fuels (such as coal and oil) increases (or faces limits
on its use), the preference for using natural gas would increase.

• The analysis shows that with carbon constraints, natural gas de-
mand would increase by 2.4 Tcf in 2020 and 1.5 Tcf in 2025 (see Figure
2.11).
• With carbon constraints, natural gas wellhead prices would be
about $0.50/Mcf higher in 2020 ($3.90/Mcf versus $3.42/Mcf in the refer-
ence case). By 2025 the price difference would narrow to about $0.30/Mcf
($4.21/Mcf versus $3.90/Mcf in the reference case) (see Table 2.6).
• In a special sensitivity run prepared for this study, the EIA showed
 Natural Gas Wellhead Price, 2005, 2015, and 2025
(2001$/Mcf)
$5
35
$4
$3
30 Net Imports
$2
$1
25
$0
2005 2015 2025
Consumption
20
Natural Gas Net Imports in 2025
7 (Tcf)
15 Production
6

Natural Gas (Tcf)

5
10 4
Low Lower 48 Resource 3
Reference 2
5 High Lower 48 Resource 1
0
Pipeline Liquefied Natural Gas
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

History Projections

FIGURE 2.10 Natural gas production, consumption, and imports for 1970 to 2025 in trillion cubic
feet as a function of the resource base. SOURCE: Mary Hutzler, EIA, personal communication,
31

2003. Data are from EIA (2003b).

 32

Natural Gas Wellhead Price, 2016 and 2025

40 (2001 $/Mcf)
$5
35 $4
$3
$2
30
$1
$0
25 2016 2025

Consumption
20
Natural Gas Net Imports in 2025
7
Production (Tcf)

Natural Gas (Tcf)

15 6
5
4
10 3
Carbon Cap
2
Reference 1
5 0
Pipeline Liquefied Natural Gas

0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

History Projections

FIGURE 2.11 Natural gas production, consumption, and imports for 1970 to 2025 in trillion cubic feet
as a function of carbon emission constraints. SOURCE: Mary Hutzler, EIA, personal communication,
2003. Data are from EIA (2003a).
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 APPENDIX XV
In 1687 James II. extorted from the embarrassments of the Porte
what Charles II. and his predecessors had failed to obtain from its
sense of justice. The occasion was curiously similar to the present
one. An Italian corsair, operating under a commission from the King
of Poland, robbed an English ship, the Jerusalem, of some
passengers and goods belonging to the Pasha of Tripoli and carried
them off to Malta. On the petition of the Levant Company, King
James instructed his new Ambassador Sir William Trumbull, who was
on the point of sailing for Turkey, to call in at Malta, expostulate with
the Grand Master on the protection he gave to pirates preying upon
English vessels, obtain liberation of the captives and restitution of
the stolen goods, take both to Tripoli and hand them over to their
rightful owner. This was done, and King James, in a letter to the
Grand Vizir, after describing the service rendered, proceeded “to
declare our positive resolution pursuant to the Capitulations in that
behalfe that neither We nor any of our subjects shall at any time
answer for the persons or estates of such subjects of your Imperial
Master as shall of their own accord embark themselves upon any of
our Merchants ships. But that all such persons as shall intrust either
themselves or their goods upon any English ship shall bear their own
hazard of corsairs and pyrats of what nature soever and sustain all
other accidents whereunto the sea is lyable and from which they can
only be protected by the one omnipotent God. And to this which is in
itself so highly reasonable and agreeable to the rules of common
justice, We cannot doubt of your assent.”
As at the moment the Ottoman Empire was assailed by four
Powers from without and was convulsed by rebellions from within,
the Grand Vizir readily gave his assent: “In conformity to the good
accord of peace established with the happy Port of the Empire who
is the refuge of the world, it is necessary and fit that the subjects on
both parts should be in safety one with the other; and if the subjects
of these Imperial Dominions shall enter voluntarily into the ships of
your Merchants and your Merchants shall give them a writing any
ways obliging themselves as security for said loss, or damage,
according to that writing which shall be given it shall be obeyed and
observed as to the security given for the loss or damage. And if your
Merchants are not in this manner obliged nor give a writing of such
import, the subjects of this Empire entering voluntarily into the ships
of the Merchants, any loss or damage happening so to them, there
shall be nothing pretended from your Merchants nor your subjects
on any such pretexts. This rule ... We shall keep it an established
Rule....”[320]
But alas for promises given under compulsion! Notwithstanding
this solemn engagement, the Porte clung to its favourite principle,
and every English Ambassador had to repeat, age after age, his
nation’s disclaimer of corporate responsibility. [See, for instance, the
Credentials of Abraham Stanyan (1717) and of James Porter (1746)
in S.P. Turkey, 56.] As to the Levant Company, it did what it could to
avoid trouble by instructing the Ambassadors either to forbid English
ships to carry Turks and their goods, under severe penalties (such as
making them pay double Consulage), or at least to see that the
necessary precaution was taken by a writing given at the port of
embarkation to secure the Company from any damage, in
accordance with the Grand Vizir’s letter. [See the Company’s
Instructions to Sir William Hussey (1690), to Lord Pagett (1693), to
Sir Robert Sutton (1701), in the Register already cited.]
 F O OT N OT E :
[320] For the documents (Levant Co.’s petition to Earl of
Sunderland; King James to Grand Vizir; Grand Vizir to King
James), see Register, pp. 132, 134, 151, in S.P. Levant Company,
145.
 APPENDIX XVI
Dudley North’s genius is proved and his place in the history of
Political Economy established by an anonymous pamphlet which he
published shortly before his death under the title Discourses upon
Trade, principally directed to the cases of the Interest, Coinage,
Clipping and Encrease of Money. This great little treatise, suppressed
by the Government of William III. in 1691, was reprinted, from one
of the very few copies extant, in 1856 by J. R. M’Culloch among his
Early English Tracts on Commerce. It embodies, briefly and boldly, a
system the originality and completeness of which may be judged
from the following abstract—a theory in essence similar to, in some
respects more consistent than, that enunciated by Adam Smith
generations later:
“The whole world, as to trade, is but one nation or people, and
therein nations are as persons. The loss of a trade with one nation is
not that only, separately considered, but so much of the trade of the
world rescinded and lost, for all is combined together. There can be
no trade unprofitable to the public; for if any prove so, men leave it
off: and, wherever the traders thrive, the public of which they are a
part thrive also. To force men to deal in any prescribed manner, may
profit such as happen to serve them, but the public gains not,
because it is taking from one subject to give to another. No laws can
set prices in trade, the rates of which must and will make
themselves. But when such laws do happen to lay any hold, it is so
much impediment to trade, and therefore prejudicial. Money is
merchandize, whereof there may be a glut, as well as a scarcity, and
that even to an inconvenience. A people cannot want money to
serve the ordinary dealing, and more than enough they will not
have. No man will be the richer for the making much money, nor any
part of it, but as he buys it for an equivalent price.... Exchange and
ready money are the same; nothing but carriage and re-carriage
being saved. Money exported in trade is an increase to the wealth of
the nation; but spent in war and payments abroad, is so much
impoverishment....” The tract ends with these weighty words: “No
people ever yet grew rich by policies: but it is peace, industry, and
freedom that bring trade and wealth, and nothing else.”
The author describes his propositions as “paradoxes, no less
strange to most men than true in themselves.” Their truth may still
be a matter of controversy; their strangeness at the time at which
they appeared is unquestionable. They were rank heresies against
the dominant creed of the day. According to the cardinal article of
that creed—the “balance of trade”—wealth consisted solely of
money: whatever sent the precious metals out of a country
impoverished it: whatever tended to swell the quantity of bullion in a
country added to its riches. Therefore, no trade with any country
was profitable, unless we exported to that country more value in
goods than we imported, receiving the difference in money, which
was considered the measure of our profit. North, presumably, had
his eyes opened to the fallacy of this mercantile doctrine by the facts
of our Levant trade. In the earlier days our exports to Turkey fully
paid for our imports, and in those days English writers proudly
contrasted our position with that of other nations—the French,
Dutch, Italians, Germans—who paid a balance in cash. It did not
occur to them that those nations must have found it as profitable to
pay for what they got in gold and silver as we did in goods, else they
would not have done so: and if they got their money’s worth for
their money, which no doubt they did, they were quite as well off as
the English who, of course, got no more than the worth of their
manufactures. [See Munn’s Discourse of Trade, 1621, in Geo. L.
Craik’s History of British Commerce, 1844, vol ii. pp. 19-20.]
However, before North left Turkey, our merchants had got into the
habit of sending, in addition to goods, large quantities of specie: in
other words, now the “balance of trade” was against us—and yet our
Levant trade never was more profitable! Here was a paradox to set a
sensible man thinking.
But few men can think. Acting upon the established belief, English
public opinion clamoured for the exclusion from the Kingdom of the
products of foreign countries, particularly those of our traditional
rival, France. In one of these paroxysms of popular frenzy an entire
prohibition of French goods was proclaimed by Act of Parliament
(1678). On that occasion, indeed, national hatred and religious
excitement combined to invigorate and envenom the feelings arising
from commercial jealousy, for it was the time of the ferment about
the secret designs of France and Charles, out of which sprang the
wild delusion of the Popish Plot. But the chief motive of that
legislative measure was the prevailing notion that the country was
suffering enormous pecuniary loss in consequence of our excessive
importation of French commodities. Dudley North’s comments on
that notion are refreshing: “trade is not distributed, as government,
by nations and kingdoms; but is one throughout the whole world, as
the main sea, which cannot be emptied or replenished in one part,
but the whole, more or less, will be affected. So when a nation
thinks, by rescinding the trade of any other country, which was the
case of our prohibiting all commerce with France, they do not lop off
that country, but so much of their trade of the whole world as what
that which was prohibited bore in proportion with all the rest; and so
it recoiled a dead loss of so much general trade upon them. And as
to the pretending a loss by any commerce, the merchant chooses in
some respects to lose, if by that he acquires an accommodation of a
profitable trade in other respects.” [Life of Francis North, Baron of
Guilford, 1742, p. 168.] No wonder such views were obnoxious to a
Government bent blindly on crushing France, as the Whig
Government of 1691 was, and it may be suspected that in choosing
that moment for the publication of his heresies North was actuated
quite as much by the wish to thwart the war policy of his opponents
as by the desire to promote the cause of Truth.
The Act of 1678 had been repealed in the beginning of James II.’s
reign, but immediately after the Revolution all commerce with
France was again barred. The boycott continued through the two
wars of 1689-97 and 1701-12, and the attempt made by the Tories
in 1713, when peace was restored between England and France, to
re-open the trade with the latter country, failed: the merchants took
the alarm, the Whig politicians exploited that alarm, public opinion
was roused, and the Bill was lost. We have heard the same clamour
for breaking off all commercial relations with a rival nation in our
own day—over two hundred years after Dudley North exposed the
egregious folly of such a policy.
 INDEX
Adrianople:
Court at, 24, 26, 28, 68;
Finch’s preparations for, 86-8;
entry into, 93-4;
quarters in, 94-5, 172;
foreign diplomats in, 96-7;
the city, 97;
festivities in, 68-9, 105-113, 131;
plague in, 136-7, 138, 139, 156, 163, 174;
departure from, 175-6;
Levant Company and Finch’s visit, App. XIII. 400

Affaire du Sofa, see Soffah

Aga of Pasha of Tunis, 16-20, 85-6, 305, 306

Ahmed Kuprili, Grand Vizir:

character, 12-15, 103, 104, 160, 165, 191-3, 225, 354, App. IV. 385-386;
siege of Candia, 14, 16, 132, 207;
negotiations with Poland, 31, 68;
and Pasha of Tunis, 85, 86, 173-4;
finds quarters for Finch, 95;
Finch’s audience with, 98-103;
Charles II.’s letter to, App. II. 381-382;
and Holy Sepulchre disputes, 117, 118-19, 123, 125, 158;
and Tripoli corsairs, 129, 182;
his intemperance, 132, 164, 165, 169;
and Capitulations, 134, 147, 149, 158, 159, 160, 166, 169-71, 180;
at Finch’s audience with Grand Signor, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146;
 and Vani Effendi, 153;
letters to Charles II., 170;
and Genoese Resident, 294;
his death, 191, 192, 193;
Kara Mustafa and, 325 (note)

Ak-bonar, 137

Aleppo:
Anglo-French disputes at, 72-3, 188;
customs duties at, 181, 218;
dollars consigned to, 237-243;
Hattisherif, 27, 150;
library at, App. VI. 389;
Pasha of, 237-8

Algiers pirates, 85, 244, 248-9

Allin, Sir Thomas, 85

Alloy, the, described, 257-8, 370 (note)

Ambassadors:
state kept by, 36, 39-40;
Turkish conception of responsibilities of, 273, 303-4, App. XV. 402-3

American ceremonialism, 200

Anchorage charges, 28

Ancona, 284

Angel, the, App. V. 387

Angora, 236

Argostoli, 351

Arlington, Lord, 3, 4-5, 52, 116, 121

Ashby, Mr. John:

the Pizzamano case, 211, 212-13, 214, 215-16, 218, 222, 231;
the Pentlow case, 268, 269, 271-6
Asper, 233

Austria attacked, 361, 362;

in Holy League, 364-5

Avanias, 15, 228, 229, 233, 264, 274, 281, 283, 365

Avji, the Hunter, 25, 131, 144, 146.

See Mohammed IV.

Bailo of Venice, the, 20;

and religious disputes, 119, 122, 124, 151;
and Sir John Finch, 185, 189;
Kara Mustafa and, 202, 227-8, 229-30, 281-3, 321, 359

Baines, Sir Thomas, 40-44, 353;

on the Turks, 22-3;
journey to Adrianople, 89, 90, 94;
at Karagatch, 137, 175;
and Vani Effendi, 153, 155-7;
reproves Nointel, 190-91;
pulls strings for Finch, 245;
his sedan chair, 291;
death, 344-5, 347;
burial, 352

Bairam, Feast of the, 20, 216, 222, 316

Bakshish, App. IX. 394

Barat, 266, 267

Baratlis, 266

Barbary corsairs, 83-5, 339-41, 345, 348

Barton, Edward, 119

Belgrade, 39

Bendyshe, Sir Thomas, 26, 120

Berkeley, Earl of, 312, 313

Bocareschi, Count, 133, 155, 156, 163

Books in 17th century, App. VI. 388-9

Bostanji-bashi, 248

Boza, 323, 324

Broesses, M. de, 297

Brusa, 236

Busbequius, 8;
quoted, 33

Caboga, Signor, Ambassador of Ragusa, 96, 112, 113, 250, 251

Cadileskers, 140, 142, 303, 306, 315

Caloyers, Greek, 118, 119, 151

“Cambio Marittimo,” 83

Cambridge, 2, 40, 112;

Covel at, 54-55, 369-70, 371-2

Cancellier, Levant Company’s, 51, 142, 144, 145

Candia, siege of, 14, 15, 16, 101, 132

Canizares, 119, 122

Capiji-bashi, 93, 139

Capitan Pasha, 193, 212;

the new, 248, 257, 279, 340, 341, 346

Capitulations, the, 14, 26-31, 98, 100, 293-5;

prepared, 104, 134;
 Latin Fathers and, 124-5;
postponements, 147, 149-51;
draft shown, 157, 158, 159;
the signature question, 166-7, App. XI. 396;
signed, 168, 169, 170;
not appreciated, 178-9;
difficulties in execution, 180-81;
Ahmed Kuprili maintains, 180, 193;
Grand Signor and, App. X. 395;
Kara Mustafa and, 223, 244, 249, 270-71;
and cloth trade, 247;
married Franks and, 266-7, 270-71;
Kara Mustafa holds for ransom, 292, 293-6;
silk duty under, 349

Capitulations, the Dutch, 296-8, 300

Carlowitz, Peace of, 365

Carpenter, Mr. William, 51, 142, 144

Catholics, see Roman Catholics

Ceremonialism, diplomatic, 199-200

Chandos, Lord:
appointment, 313-314, 329;
arrival, 335-6, 337;
delivers his letters, 339, 342-3;
silk duty dispute, 348, 349-50, 355-8;
his Audience delayed, 358, 364;
retirement, 364

Chaoush-bashi, 93, 139, 142, 198, 216, 239, 346, 355, 356

Chaplyn, Captain, 18-19, 304, 305, 306

Charles II.:
knights Finch, 2;
Arlington and, 5;
policy of, 9, 15, 359;
and Levant Merchants, 10-11, App. III. 384;
and Grand Duke of Tuscany, 18;
 and Rycaut, 53, 367-8;
Treaty of Dover, 69, 71, 121;
and Roman Catholics, 120-121;
letter to Grand Vizir, 99, App. II. 381-2;
letter to Grand Signor, 144, 145-6, App. II. 380-81;
gift of figs to, 170, 179-180, 209, 223;
and Turkish currency, 235;
turns against Louis, 260, 263;
appoints Finch’s successor, 311, 312, 313, 314, 329;
suspends trade with Turkey, 319, 320;
letters borne by Chandos, 337-8, 342;
resumes trade, 348-9

Chios:
Ahmed Kuprili at, 132;
French bombard, 340-41, 346, 359

Christ’s College, Cambridge:

Finch at, 2, 40;
Baines at, 40;
Covel at, 53, 55;
Finch and Baines buried at, 352;
Covel Master of, 369-70

Circassian slave, 184

Circumcision festival, 68, 105-9

Clarendon, Earl of, 121, 367

Cloth trade, English, 27-8, 149-50, 247, App. XII. 397

Coke, Mr. Thomas, Cancellier, 51, 142, 144, 145

Colbert, 50

Collyer, Jakob, 365

Collyer, Justinus, 298, 299-300, 328, 333.

See Dutch Resident

Constantinople:
city described, 24-25, 33-6, 38-9, 44-5;
 Finch reaches, 20;
Grand Signor’s dislike of, 24-6, 182;
customs duties, 27;
plague in, 24, 176-7;
religious disputes in, 55-6, 57;
Finch returns to, 176;
Grand Signor at, 182-4, 196, 278

Constantinople Embassy:
Finch’s aversion to, 4, 5;
Finch accepts, 1, 5, 11;
appointments to, App. III. 383-4;
character of post, 7-11;
chaplaincy, 54 (see Covel);
candidates for, 311-14

Constantinople factory and Pentlow case, 274

Conway, Anne, Viscountess, 3

Conway, Lord, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 22, 44, 245

Cordeliers, Spanish, 119, 122-7, 138, 150-52, 158-9, 254-5, 286

Corsairs:
and Porte, 16-17, 84-5, 340-41, App. XV. 402-3;
and English ships, 16-17, 83, 85, App. V. 387, App. XV. 402-403

Counterfeit coin, 76-7, 82, 234-7, App. I. 379

Covel, Rev. John:

Constantinople chaplain, 53-7, 66, 89;
journey to Adrianople, 90, 91;
on Adrianople quarters, 91, 94, 97, 98;
on Ahmed Kuprili, 102;
during festivities, 111-13, 250;
and religious controversy, 122, 125-6;
on Turkish Court, 131, 132;
and Bocareschi, 133;
at Karagatch, 137, 148;
at Grand Signor’s Audience, 142, 143, 144, 145;
on Vani Effendi, 154;
return to Constantinople, 176;
 in Grand Signor’s camp, 182-3;
leaves Constantinople, 287-8;
later career, 368-72

Crete, war in, 14, 118

Crim Tartar, 253

Cromwell, Oliver, 10, 15, 120

Crow, Sir Sackville, 10, 26, App. III. 384

Currency, Turkish, 233-6

Customer, Chief, see Hussein Aga

Customs-duties, 26-8, 349-50, 355-9

Cypress trees, 36

Deereham, Sir Richard, 313

Dey of Tripoli, 83, 84, 129, 182

Dishe parassi, 91, App. IX. 394

Divan, 139-40

Dositheos, 119, 125-6

Dover, Treaty of, 69, 71, 121

Dragoman of the Porte, see Mavrocordato, Dr.

Dragomans, 46-50, 204, 266, 267;

Finch’s, 50-51, 86-7, 94-5, 164, 175-6, 186-7, 203-4, 272, 315, 330.
See Draperys and Perone

Draperys, Signor Giorgio, 50-51, 89, 94, 95, 141, 144, 145-6, 164, 186-7, 188

Drink, excess in, fashionable, 60, App. VIII. 392-3

Druggermen, see Dragomans

Duquesne, Admiral, 340-41, 345, 346, 348, 359-60

Dutch:
Kara Mustafa and, 202, 228, 296-8, 300, 359;
married, 267;
rivalry with English, 28, 237, 238, 240, 242, 247

Dutch Cancellier, 294

Dutch Capitulations, 296-8, 300

Dutch Resident, 31, 160-161;

Kara Mustafa and, 202, 228, 298, 300;
Finch’s quarrels with, 299-300, 327, 332-3

Elizabethan relations with Turks, 8, 30, 46, 326-7;

with Greeks, 119

English:
Dutch and, 28, 237, 238, 240, 242, 247;
French and, 71-72, 73-6, 80-82, 261-2, 262-3;
Greeks and, 119;
Turks and, 16-17, 100-101, 224, 231-2, 236-7

English, custom-house privileges of, 246-8

English merchants, 36-9;

married, 267, 269, App. XIV. 401;
Turkish justice and, 28-30, 63, 157-8, 223-4, 231-2, 274, 307-8

English renegades, 29-30, 149, 157-8

English shipping:
pirates and, 16-17, 83, 85, App. V. 387, App. XV. 402-3;
Turks requisition, 15, 127-9

Eyre, Sir John, 10

False coin, manufacture of, 76-7, 82, 234-7

Festivities at Adrianople, 68, 105-113, 131

Finch, Sir Heneage (father), 1

Finch, Sir Heneage (brother), 1, 2, 3, 288.

See Nottingham, Earl of

Finch, Heneage (cousin), 4.

See Winchilsea, Earl of

Finch, Heneage (nephew), 2

Finch, Sir John (Baron), 1

Finch, Sir John, Ambassador at Constantinople:

family, 1-2, 4;
early career, 2-3;
knighted, 2;
in Italy, 2, 3-5;
appointed Ambassador to the Porte, 1, 5, 11;
character of post, 7-11;
his instructions, 9, App. I. 377-379;
credentials, App. II. 380-382;
the case of the Pasha of Tunis, 16-20, 85-6;
landing at Smyrna, 19-20, 22, 71;
arrival at Constantinople, 20;
audience of the Kaimakam, 20-21, 30-31;
the new Capitulations, 26-31;
life in Constantinople, 36-41, 43-5;
devotion to Baines, 40-44, 353;
Dragomans, 50-51;
colleagues and friends, 51-67;
delays presenting credentials, 69, 88, 165, 173;
Anglo-French difficulties, 69-77;
relations with Nointel, 69, 78-82;
the Tripoli corsairs, 83-5, 102, 129, 181-2;
claims of the Pasha of Tunis, 85-6, 173-4, 244, 300;
preparations for journey, 69, 86-8;
journey to Adrianople, 89-93, App. XIII. 400;
enters city, 93-4, 172;
his quarters, 94-5, 97-8, 172;
and other diplomats, 96-7;
audience of Grand Vizir, 98-103;
preparing the Capitulations, 104, 115, 134;
at festivities, 110, 134;
dispute between Greek and Latin Fathers, 116, 119, 122-6, 150-152, 158-9;
requisitioning of English ship, 127-30;
winning favour at Court, 131-4;
Capitulations promised, 134, 138;
audience of Grand Signor, 136, 139-46, 172;
Capitulations delayed, 147-8, 149-53, 157-9;
the bribery system, 159-162;
further delays, 162-8;
Capitulations signed and delivered, 168-73, 174, App. XI. 396;
return to Constantinople, 175-6;
Levant Company’s ingratitude, 178-80;
Capitulations upheld, 180-81;
Tripoli corsairs punished, 181-2;
Grand Signor at Constantinople, 182-4;
quarrel with Genoese Resident, 185-8;
difference with Nointel, 188-190;
death of Ahmed Kuprili, 191-3
Kara Mustafa, 194-5, 196-7, 207, 225-6;
the Soffah affair, 198-201, 202, 203-5, 207-8, 249;
diplomatic illness, 201-3, 210;
negotiations for an audience, 203-5, 207-8, 209-10, 216-19;
the Ashby case, 211-216, 218, 222, 227, 232;
audience of Kara Mustafa, 222-5;
on Kara Mustafa’s extortions, 227-30, 256;
the Aleppo dollars case, 237-43;
troubles to come, 244-245;
friendly Turkish dignitaries, 246-9, 326, 330;
on Kara Mustafa and Ambassadors, 250-255;
Greek and Latin Fathers again, 254-5;
description of the Alloy, 256-9;
Anglo-French disagreement, 260-62;
compact with Nointel, 262-3;
on Vizir’s return, 264-5;
the Pentlow case, 268-77;
on Court affairs, 278-84;
colleagues leave Turkey, 287-8;
contract with Levant Company expires, 288;
standing with Turks, 290-92;
the Smyrna Jew’s case, 293-5;
Kara Mustafa holds Capitulations for ransom, 295-6, 343;
 quarrels with Dutch Resident, 299-300, 327-9, 332-4;
revival of case of Pasha of Tunis, 301, 302-10;
Finch stands firm, 308-10;
proceedings suspended, 310-11, 314, 329, 330-31, 335, 336, 337;
his successor appointed, 311-14, 329;
breach with Kara Mustafa, 314-20;
on the Kehayah’s execution, 322-6, 327, 329;
Kara Mustafa’s temporary friendliness, 330-31;
awaiting Chandos, 335, 336, 337, 342;
on trouble between France and Turkey, 342, 345-7;
the Pasha of Tunis defeated, 343;
death of Baines, 344-5, 347;
departure from Turkey, 347-8, 350;
the voyage home, 350-52;
death and burial, 352

Fireworks, Turkish, 107-8

Florence, Finch at, 3, 4, 5, 7, 18, 19, 33, 40

France:
England and, 69, 71, 121;
war with, 375, App. XVI. 406-7;
Germany and, 31, 170, 171, 361;
Spain and, 171
Turkey and, 15, 118;
crisis between, 339-342, 345, 348, 359, 361

France, King of, styled Padishah, 30

Franceschi, Domenico, 16, 17, 18

Franks:
marriages of, 266-7, App. XIV. 401;
Turks and, 11-12, 14-15, 17, 65-6, 335, 359, 360-361, 365

French:
against Turks in Crete, 15, 118;
and interpreter problem, 49-50;
ceremonialism, 200;
married factors, 267, 286;
rivalry and disputes with English, 69-70, 71-6, 80-82, 203, 206, 224, 238, 247;
war on Tripoli pirates, 339-41, 345, 348, 359
Galata, 35, 186, 266, App. XIV. 401

Genoa, 18, 234, 283

Genoese Resident, 185-8, 202, 228-9, 283, 286, 294, 321

German Emperor’s Resident, 31, 96.

See Kindsberg

German Internuncio, 263-4, 280

Germany:
France and, 31, 170, 171, 361;
supports Latin Fathers, 117

Glover, Sir Thomas, 119

Golden Horn, the, 35

Goodwill, the, App. V. 387

Grand Signor, 8, 15, 35;

and vassal corsairs, 84-5, 102, 244, 248-9, 303, 340-41.
See Mohammed IV.

Grand Vizirs, 12, 103-4, 293.

See Ahmed Kuprili, Kara Mustafa, Mohammed Kuprili

Greek and Latin Churches, feud between, 55-6, 57, 116-19, 120, 122-7, 150-52,
158-9, 254-5, 286

Greek Patriarchs, 55-6, 122

Greeks, English and, 119

Guilds, processions of, 105, 106, 257, 259

Guilleragues, M. de:
the Soffah question, 285-7, 321, 326, 334-5, 342, 346-7;
and bombardment of Chios, 340, 341-2, 346-7, 360
Gunning, Lady, 373

Haghen, Cornelius, 300

Haratch, 266, 267

Harem intrigues, 103, 324, 326-7

Harvey, Sir Daniel, 1, 4, 8, 17, 26, 177;

and pirates, 17, 85;
and Nointel, 70;
and Catholics, 121-2;
and false coin, 235, 236;
Grand Signor and, 146, App. X. 395;
Ahmed Kuprili and, App. IV. 386;
Kara Mustafa and, 207

Hasnadar, 161, 212, 215, 216, 222

Hattisherif, Aleppo, 27, 150

Hedges and Palmer, Messrs., 61-2

Hoffmann, German Internuncio, 263-4, 280

Hoggiet, 293, 305

Holland, Resident of, see Dutch Resident

Holy League, 365

Holy Roman Empire, 280

Holy Sepulchre disputes, 116-19, 122-7, 158-9, 254-5, 286

Hunter, the, 74, 81, 183

Hunter, the (Mohammed IV.), 25

Hussein Aga, Chief Customer, 134, 180-81;

friendly to Finch, 210, 246-8, 319, 320, 326;
and Ashby case, 214, 215-16;
 and Aleppo dollars, 239, 241, 242;
and Pentlow case, 366

Hyet, Mr., 95, 142, 144, 356

Ibrahim, Sultan, 25

Imperial Resident, see Kindsberg and Sattler

Interpreters, 21, 30-31, 47-8, 49-50

Italy, Finch in, 2, 3, 33

James II., 369, App. XV. 402-3

Janissaries, 91, 136, 139, 141, 256, 257, 258

Jenkins, Sir Leoline, 315, 316

Jersey, Earl of, 366

Jerusalem, the, App. XV. 402

Jerusalem:
Holy Sepulchre disputes, 116-19, 122-7, 151, 158-9, 254-5, 286;
Patriarch, 119, 125;
Nointel at, 151

Jesuits, 120

Jew, Kara Mustafa’s, 296, 298, 343, 366

Jew of Smyrna, case of, 292-3, 296

Jewish quarter, Adrianople, 94, 98

Kaftans, 20, 100, 102-3, 169, 197, 217, 219, 248

Kaimakam, 19-20, 30-31, 88

Karagatch, 137, 139, 148, 175

Kara Mustafa, 152, 193-5, 196, 230-231, 284-5;

motives of his extortions, 230-31
Ambassadors and Residents, 196-197, 202
Dutch, 202, 228, 229, 297-8, 300, 332-3, 359
English:
Finch:
diplomatic illness, 201-3, 210;
negotiations for audience, 203-8, 209-10, 216-19, 221-2;
the Ashby case, 212, 213, 216, 217-18, 219, 222, 231-2;
audience with, 222-5;
Aleppo dollars case, 238-44;
the Pentlow case, 286-76;
Capitulations held for ransom, 293-6, 343;
the Pasha of Tunis, 302-10, 314-20
Chandos:
and Charles II.’s letters, 337-8, 342-3;
silk duty case, 349-50, 355-9
French:
Nointel, 197-9, 200, 201, 207, 208-9, 226;
Guilleragues, 286-7, 334-5, 341, 342, 346-7, 360-61
Genoese, 202, 228-9, 283, 321
German, 228, 264, 280, 279, 280-81
Polish, 251-4, 255, 259-60, 279
Ragusan, 228, 230, 250-51, 284
Russian, 255, 256, 279-80
Venetian, 202, 227-8, 229-30, 279, 281-3, 321, 359
the Soffah affair, 198-9, 203, 207 208, 286, 290, 334-5, 341, 342, 343, 346-7;
and Capitulations, 223, 244, 293-6, 343;
extortions from Turks, 230, 256;
the Russian war, 257, 258, 265, 361;
and married Franks, 267, 270;
his Kehayah executed, 323-5, 326, 327, 329;
attacks Austria, 361-2;
defeated, 363-4;
executed, 364

Kehayah, Ahmed Kuprili’s (Soliman), 86, 104;

Finch interviews, 114, 115, 116, 125;
and requisitioning of English ship, 127-8;
and delayed Capitulations, 134, 138, 147, 150, 158, 166-7, 174;
and title of Padishah, 150, 159, 160-161, 173;
 and customs dues, 180-181;
and Tripoli corsairs, 182;
and Ahmed’s death, 191;
becomes Master of the Horse, 195, 323, 324, 331-2;
Kara Mustafa and, 323, 324, 326, 331;
sent to Mecca, 332;
becomes Vizir, 365

Kehayah, Kara Mustafa’s, 197;

refuses Finch’s Bairamlik, 216-217;
and Aleppo dollars, 239, 241;
and Polish Ambassador, 254;
and Pentlow case, 272, 273, 276;
threatens tax on Ambassadors, 283;
and case of Pasha of Tunis, 218, 306, 307, 315, 316, 317-18, 319;
executed, 320-25
his successor, 355, 356

Kindsberg, Count, German Emperor’s Resident, 31, 96-7, 133;

Kara Mustafa and, 228, 263, 279, 280;
death of, 264, 280-81

Kislar Aga, 103, 319, 323-4, 326

Knatchbull, Major, 313

Konaks, 90

Kuchuk Chekmejé, 90

La Croix, M. de, 96, 97

Landed and trading classes, 58-9, App. VII. 390

Latin and Greek Churches, feud between, 55-6, 57, 116-19, 120, 122-7, 150-52,
158-9, 254-5, 286

Lawson, Sir John, 85

Lello, Henry, 119

Leopold, Emperor, 362

Leopold, Prince, 3

Leslie, Walter, 96

Levant, luxuries of the, 37-9

Levant Company, 7;
Charter of, 10, App. III. 383-4;
and Ambassador’s appointment, 7, 10-11, App. III. 383-4;
instructions to officers by, App. VI. 388-9;
trade of, App. XII. 397-8;
and Pasha of Tunis, 17-18;
opposes credit system, 178, App. XII. 397-9;
forbids temeens, 235, 236-7, 238;
imports Lion dollars, 237;
false economy of, 238, 243;
and Pentlow case, 270-71;
and suspension of trade with Turkey, 319-20, 337-8;
forced to resume trade, 348-9
Finch and, 9, 11, 178-9, 288, 311
Treasurer of, see North

Levantine Families, 267, App. XIV. 401

Libraries, 17th century, App. VI. 388-9

Lion dollars, 233, 235, 236, 237-43

Lorraine, Duke of, 262, 263

Louis XIV.:
Charles II. and, 69, 71, 260, 263;
and Soffah, 334;
and Barbary pirates, 339, 342, 359;
and Turkish campaign against Austria, 361, 362

Lucaris, Cyril, 119-120

Luigini, 233-6

Mahomet Kuprili, see Mohammed Kuprili

Majorca corsairs, 72

Malta, Finch at, 19

Marriages of Franks, 267, App. XIV. 401

Mary and Martha, the, 183

Matthewes, Sir Phi., 313

Mavrocordato, Dr., Dragoman of the Porte, 100, 140, 143, 144, 164, 168, 198,
217, 239, 300

Mediterranean, the, 16, 17, 18, 304, 306

Meletios, 119

Merchants trading into Levant Seas, see Levant Company

Mohammed IV., Grand Signor, 24, 25, 105-6;

and hunting, 25, 259;
dislike of Constantinople, 24-6, 182;
and Capitulations, 27, 166-8, 169;
forbids tobacco, 63;
at his festivities, 68-9, 87, 105-6;
requisitions English ship, 127-8;
prohibits intoxicants, 131, 148, 153, 322, 324;
flees plague, 137;
Finch’s audience with, 138, 140, 143-6;
and Vani Effendi, 153-4;
signature to Capitulations, 166-8, 169;
letters to Charles II., 170;
in Constantinople, 182-3;
leaves Constantinople, 191;
and death of Ahmed Kuprili, 192, 231;
returns to Constantinople, 196;
demands on Kara Mustafa, 231;
in Silistria, 251;
his Alloy, 257-258;
fills Seraglio, 278;
returns to Adrianople, 317, 318;
executes Kehayah, 322-3, 324, 325;
 and Soliman, 331;
Charles II.’s letters to, 337-8, App. II. 380-381;
and corsairs, 84-5, 102, 244, 248-9, 303, 340;
and Guilleragues, 346;
reign ends, 365

Mohammed Kuprili, 12, 13, 225, App. IV. 385-6

Moldavia, Prince of, 51, 256, 284

Money, Turkish, 233-6

More, Henry, 352

Morosini, Signor, 185, 282.

See Bailo of Venice

Mufti, the, 105, 132, 149, 152, 158, 269, 357

Muhurdar, 166, 168

Munden, Sir Richard, 261

Murad III., 26

Muscovy:
campaign against, 32, 257, 258, 265, 361;
Embassy from, 255-6, 259-60, 279-80

Mustafa Pasha, 152.

See Kara Mustafa

Muteferrika, 133, 134

Naculs, 110

Narbrough, Admiral Sir John, 129, 181-2, 244, 248-9

Neale, Mr. Thomas, 313

Nicholas, Secretary, 121

Nicusi, Panayoti, 117, 118

Nimeguen, Treaty of, 263

Nishanji-bashi, 140, 141, 142, 159

Nointel, Marquis de, 69;

and Smyrna disturbance, 72, 73;
Rycaut and, 73-5, 77, 82;
Finch’s interview with, 78-82;
at Adrianople, 95;
and religious disputes, 117, 118, 122, 123, 151, 152;
Ahmed Kuprili and, 165;
quarrel with Finch, and reconciliation, 188-91;
Kara Mustafa and, 197-9, 200, 201, 207, 208-9, 227, 229;
the Soffah question, 198-201, 206, 207, 208-9;
Anglo-French compact with Finch, 262-3;
leaves Turkey, 287

North, Hon. Dudley:

early career, and character, 57-67;
economic genius, 67, 373-4, App. XVI. 404-6;
and journey to Adrianople, 87, 90, 94, 95;
at festivities, 106, 110-11, 113-14;
and religious disputes, 124;
during plague, 137-8;
at Grand Signor’s audience, 142, 144-5;
and Capitulations negotiations, 157, 160, 161, 167-8;
leaving Adrianople, 175;
on Ashby case, 211, 232;
and Kara Mustafa, 226;
and Aleppo dollars, 239, 242, 243;
Hussein Aga and, 248;
in Adrianople, 272;
leaves Turkey, 287;
a candidate for Embassy, 312-13;
resumes trade too soon, 348;
political career, 372-5;
trial, 374-5;
pamphlet by, App. XVI. 404-6;
back in Turkey trade, 375;
farming, 375;
death, 376
North, Lady Dudley, 373

North, Montagu, 62, 287, 356

Nottingham, Earl of, 2, App. VII. 390

Ottavi, 233-6

Oxford, the, 336, 337, 347, 348

Padishah, the title of, 30-31, 145, 150, 159, 160, 172-3

Padua, Finch at, 2, 40, 168

Pagett, Lord, 365, 366-7

Palatine of Kulm, 251-3, 254, 255

Palmer, Mr., 61-2

Panayotaki, 117-18

Parker, Captain, 75

Pasha of Aleppo, 237-8, 243

Pasha of Tunis, 16-20, 85-7, 173-4, 218, 244, 248;

his Vakil, 218;
his case revived, 301-11, 314-17, 329, 330, 335, 337;
Chandos defeats, 343

Pashas and Pashaliks, 91

Patriarch of Constantinople, 122

Patriarch of Jerusalem, 119, 125

Pay day of troops, 136, 140-141

Pentlow case, 268-76, 365, 366-7

Pera, 35, 38, 162, 165, 176, 267, 335;
illicit still at, 186

Perone, Signor Antonio, 51, 86-7, 88, 92, 94-5, 164, 166-7, 272

Peskeshji-bashi, 139, 141

Pickering, Dr., 142

Pirates:
and English shipping, 16-17, 72-3, 83, 85, App. V. 387, App. XV. 402-3;
French and, 72-3, 339-41, 345, 348, 359;
the Porte and, 16-17, 84-5, 102, 244, 248-9, 303, 340-41, App. XV. 402-3

Pisa, Finch at, 2

Pizzamano, Signor, 211, 212, 214-15, 216, 222

Plague, 39;
in Adrianople, 136-7, 138, 156, 163, 168, 174, 175-6;
in Constantinople, 39, 176-7;
in Karagatch, 148;
Ambassadors die of, 252-3, 264

Podolia, 254

Poland:
Turkey and, 14, 31, 32, 68;
peace negotiations, 210, 251-3, 254, 264;
and Holy Sepulchre, 254;
announces truce with Muscovites, 279;
and Turkish overthrow, 363-4;
in Holy League, 365

Polish Ambassador, Kara Mustafa and, 251-4, 255, 259-60, 279

Pope and Turks, 284

Popish Plot, 372, App. XVI. 406

Prince, the Turkish, 108-9, 258

Puntiglio, Finch and, 20, 30-31, 78, 80, 87, 88, 95-6, 188-9, 199, 200, 203-4, 210,
217, 219, 299, 326, 327-9

Queen Regent, 324, 326

Ragusa, Ambassador of:

at Adrianople, 96, 112, 113;
Kara Mustafa and, 228, 230, 250-51, 284

Rais Effendi, 104;

and Capitulations, 114, 134, 147, 149, 157, 159, 166, 167, 172, 173, 174;
and audience with Kara Mustafa, 204-5;
and Kara Mustafa’s extortions, 229, 230;
and Palatine of Kulm, 254;
and Pasha of Tunis case, 302, 306, 330-31, 336

Rayahs, 266, 267, App. XIV. 401

Renegades, 29-30, 107, 149, 157-8, 212

Residents and Ambassadors, 205-6

Roe, Sir Thomas, 120, 220-21, 285 (note)

Roman Catholics:
in England, 119, 120, 121, 126;
in Turkey, 48-9, 120, 121;
Charles II. and, 120-121

Russia:
Turco-Polish campaign against, 32;
Kara Mustafa attacks, 255-60, 264, 361;
peace negotiations, 279-80;
in Holy League, 361

Rycaut, Sir Paul, 51-3, 66;

and Anglo-French disputes, 71, 73-75, 77, 82, 261;
and Turks, 133 (note), 290;
on Ahmed Kuprili, App. IV. 386;
and Ashby case, 211-12;
and coining, 236;
 and Pentlow case, 271, 273, 276;
leaves Turkey, 287;
desires Constantinople Embassy, 312, 313;
subsequent career, 367-8

St. Demetrius Hill, 177, 264

St. Gothard, battle of, 14

St. John, Mrs., 366, 367

Sattler, Imperial Resident, 263, 264, 280

Scanderoon, 72, 218

Scutari, 36

Sedan chairs, Turks and, 291

Selivria, 91, 191

Seraglio, Grand Signor’s, 35, 182, 278;

intrigues in, 103, 324, 326-7

Seven Towers, 208, 228, 282, 298, 317, 346

Silk duty dispute, 349-50, 355-9

Smith, Mr. Gabriel, 268, 269, 271, 272-6

Smith, Dr. Thomas, 54

Smyrna:
Finch lands at, 19, 20, 71-2;
Anglo-French disputes at, 71-2, 73-6, 80-82, 261-2;
library at, App. VI. 389;
life in, 38-9;
North at, 59-60

Smyrna factory, 20, 27, 38-9, 60, 165-6;

and Ashby case, 213, 218;
and Pentlow case, 274, 276
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