Title

Heirs Ardona vs. Reyes

Case
G.R. No. L-60549

Petitioners challenged expropriation of land for tourism development, arguing

unconstitutionality and lack of public use. SC upheld PTA's authority, ruling tourism
served public purpose and expropriation valid.

Facts:
Parties Involved:
 Petitioners: Heirs of Juancho Ardona (represented by Gloria Ardona),
Anastacio C. Cabilao, Heirs of Cipriano Cabilao (represented by Jose Cabilao),
and others.
 Respondents: Hon. Juan Y. Reyes (Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of
Branch I, Court of First Instance of Cebu), and the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA).
Background: The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Presidential Decree
No. 564 (Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority) and Proclamation No.
2052, which declared certain barangays in Cebu City and municipalities in Cebu as
tourist zones. The PTA filed four expropriation cases (Civil Cases Nos. R-19562, R-
19684, R-20701, and R-21608) to acquire 282 hectares of land in barangays
Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, for the development of integrated resort complexes.
Purpose of Expropriation: The PTA intended to construct a sports complex,
clubhouse, golf course, children's playground, and other facilities to promote
tourism. It also planned to develop an electric power grid, deep wells for water
supply, and a complex sewerage and drainage system.
Opposition by Petitioners: The petitioners argued that the expropriation lacked a
public use requirement, violated the land reform program, and was unconstitutional.
They also claimed that the Court of Agrarian Relations, not the Court of First
Instance, had jurisdiction over the cases since the land was under the land reform
program.
Issue:
1. Whether the expropriation of private property for tourism purposes violates
the "public use" requirement under the Constitution.
2. Whether the properties subject to expropriation, being within the land reform
area, are exempt from expropriation for tourism purposes.
 3. Whether the issuance of writs of possession was premature without first
establishing the necessity for the expropriation.
4. Whether Proclamation No. 2052 and Presidential Decree No. 564 are
unconstitutional.
5. Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the expropriation
cases.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, upholding the authority of
the Philippine Tourism Authority to expropriate the lands for tourism development.
The Court ruled that the expropriation was for a public purpose and that the
issuance of writs of possession was valid under Presidential Decree No. 1533. The
Court also held that the land reform program did not preclude the expropriation of
the lands for tourism purposes.
Ratio:
1. Public Use Requirement: The Court adopted a liberal interpretation of
"public use," ruling that the promotion of tourism and economic development
served a public purpose, even if private entities would operate some facilities
within the tourism complex.
2. Land Reform vs. Tourism Development: The Court found that only a
minimal portion of the expropriated land was under the land reform program
and that the development of the tourism complex would benefit the
community, including the displaced landowners, through employment and
better living conditions.
3. Prematurity of Writs of Possession: The Court held that the issuance of
writs of possession was valid under Presidential Decree No. 1533, which
allowed the PTA to take immediate possession of the properties upon
depositing 10% of their value.
4. Constitutionality of Proclamation No. 2052 and Presidential Decree
No. 564: The Court upheld the constitutionality of these decrees, finding that
they were enacted for the public welfare and did not violate the Constitution.
5. Jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance: The Court ruled that the Court
of First Instance had jurisdiction over the expropriation cases, as the land
reform program did not exempt the properties from expropriation for public
purposes.
The Court emphasized deference to legislative policy and the presumption of
validity of statutes, concluding that the expropriation was a legitimate exercise of
the State's power of eminent domain.

Constitutional Provisions on Eminent Domain

  The Constitution contains three key provisions regarding the exercise of
eminent domain:
 Section 2, Article IV: Private property cannot be taken for public use
without just compensation.
 Section 6, Article XIV: The State may transfer utilities and private
enterprises to public ownership for national welfare or defense, with
just compensation.
 Section 13, Article XIV: The Batasang Pambansa may authorize the
expropriation of private lands for subdivision and resale to deserving
citizens, also with just compensation.
Restraints on Sovereign Power
 The power of eminent domain is essential to state sovereignty but is
restrained by constitutional provisions requiring public use and just
compensation.
 The case of Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus emphasizes that the Bill of
Rights serves to limit sovereign power rather than grant it.
Definition of Public Use
 Traditional purposes for expropriation include infrastructure projects like
roads and schools, but the definition of "public use" has evolved.
 The notion that "public use" is limited to direct public enjoyment has been
rejected, allowing for broader interpretations.
General Welfare and Public Use
 The current understanding is that any project beneficial to the general
welfare satisfies the public use requirement.
 Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando noted that the Constitution supports
expropriation for purposes like subdividing land for resale and transferring
utilities to government control.
Tourism as Public Use
 The argument that promoting tourism does not constitute "public use" is
weak, as private businesses operating within public infrastructure do not
negate the public character of expropriations.
 Examples include airports and piers that serve private companies but are still
considered public use.
Judicial Deference to Legislative Policy
 Historical cases demonstrate a consistent judicial deference to legislative
policy in eminent domain matters, affirming the legislature's authority to
determine public purposes.
Non-Impairment of Contracts Clause
 The non-impairment clause does not prevent the exercise of police power or
eminent domain.
 Legislative actions aimed at public good cannot be obstructed by private
contracts.
Compliance with Presidential Decree No. 42
 The petitioners claimed that the orders for immediate possession were
premature due to a lack of established necessity.
 Under Presidential Decree No. 42, the government can take immediate
possession upon depositing 10% of the property's value, which was upheld in
previous rulings.
Forcible Ejectment and Land Reform
 The petitioners argued that expropriation would lead to criminal forcible
ejectment under Presidential Decree No. 583.
 This decree pertains to tenant-farmer rights and does not apply to state
expropriation for public purposes.
Presumption of Validity of Statutes
 Statutes aimed at public good carry a presumption of validity, and courts will
not invalidate laws unless there is a clear constitutional violation.
 The burden of proof lies with those challenging the statute.
Development Plans and Public Benefits
 The development plan for the expropriated land includes public amenities
and employment opportunities, which support the public interest.
 The court dismissed the petition, affirming the PTA's right to expropriate land
for tourism development.
Conclusion
 The petition for certiorari was dismissed for lack of merit, affirming the PTA's
authority to proceed with expropriation for tourism purposes.
 The decision reflects a balance between private property rights and the
state's interest in promoting tourism and public welfare.

EN BANC
[ G.R. Nos. 60549, 60553-60555. October 26, 1983 ]
HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA (REPRESENTED BY GLORIA ARDONA)
ANASTACIO C. CABILAO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO CABILAO (REPRESENTED BY
JOSE CABILAO) MODESTA CABILAO, HEIRS OF ROMAN CABUENAS
(REPRESENTED BY ALBERTO CABUENAS), AGRIPINO GABISAY AND
PRUDENCIA MABINI, ANTONIO LABRADOR AND LUCIA GABISAY, GERONIMO
MABINI AND MARCELINA SABAL, INOCENCIO MABINI AND ARSENIA REYES,
PATRICIO MABINI AND GREGORIA BORRES, ANICETO GADAPAN AND
MAXIMA GABISAY, BARTOLOME MAGNO AND CALINECA E. MAGNO, ALBERTO
CABUENAS, NARCISO CABUENAS AND VICTORIA CABUENAS,
EUTIQUIOSENO, HEIRS OF ESPERIDION CABUENAS (REPRESENTED BY
ALBERTO CABUENAS), MAXIMINA NAVARO, SULPICIO NAVARO, EDUARDO
NAVARO, MARTINIANO ROMA (IN REPRESENTATION OF ARCADIO MABINI,
DECEASED), MARTIN SENO, FAUSTO ARDA, MAXIMA CABILAO, ESTRELLA
SENO, EDUVEGIS S. CABILAO, ROSARIO CABILAO, MINORS DANILO,
SOCORRO, JOSEFINA AND MARITES ALL SURNAMED CABILAO, JUAN BORRES
(REPRESENTED BY FRANCISCA BORRES), RAMON JABADAN, JESUS ALIPAR
AND LEONILA KABAHAR, ANTONIO LABRADOR, HEIRS OF NICASIO GABISAY
(REPRESENTED BY ARSENIO GABISAY), PACIFICO LABRADOR, DEMETRIO
LABRADOR AND FRUCTOSA TABURA, VENANCIO DEL MAR, MARINO DEL
MAR, HEIRS OF TEODORA ARCILLO (REPRESENTED BY BRIGIDA ARCILLO)
DIONISIA GABUNADA, HEIRS OF BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO
(REPRESENTED BY FELICIDAD SADAYA FRANCISCO), HEIRS OF VICTORIA C.
CABUENAS (REPRESENTED BY ALBERTO CABUENAS) HEIRS OF CIPRIANO
GABUNADA (REPRESENTED BY CLAUDIO GABUNADA), PETITIONERS, VS.
HON. JUAN Y. REYES, EXECUTIVE JUDGE AND PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH
I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, AND THE PHILIPPINE TOURISM
AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction challenging the

constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564, the Revised Charter of the
Philippine Tourism Authority, and Proclamation No. 2052 declaring the barangays of
Sibugay, Malubog, Babag and Sirao including the proposed Lusaran Dam in the City
of Cebu and in the municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete in the province of Cebu as
tourist zones. The petitioners ask that we restrain respondents Court of First
Instance of Cebu and the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) from enforcing and
implementing the writs of possession issued in four (4) expropriation cases filed by
PTA against petitioners: Civil Cases Nos. R-19562, R-19684, R-20701, and R-21608
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch I).
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) complaints with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land
situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority
"to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any
private land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in
Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the
development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined
geographic areas with potential tourism value. As uniformly alleged in the
complaints, the purposes of the expropriation are:

... ... ...

"Plaintiff, in line with the policy of the government to promote tourism and
development of tourism projects will construct in Barangays Maiubog, Busay and
Babag, all of Cebu City, a sports complex (basketball courts, tennis courts, volleyball
courts, track and field, baseball and softball diamonds, and swimming pools), club
house, golf course, children's playground and a nature area for picnics and
horseback riding for the use of the public.
"The development plan, covering approximately 1,000 hectares, includes the
establishment of an electric power grid in the area by the National Power
Corporation, thus assuring the supply of electricity therein for the benefit of the
whole community. Deep wells will also be constructed to generate water supply
within the area. Likewise, a complex sewerage and drainage system will be devised
and constructed to protect the tourists and nearby residents from the dangers of
pollution.
"Complimentary and support facilities for the project will be constructed, including
public rest houses, lockers, dressing rooms, coffee shops, shopping malls, etc. Said
facilities will create and offer employment opportunities to residents of the
community and further generate income for the whole of Cebu City.
"Plaintiff needs the property above described which is directly covered by the
proposed golf course."

... ... ...

The defendants in Civil Cases Nos. R-20701 and R-21608 filed their respective
Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or Reconsideration. The defendants in Civil
Case No. R-19562 filed a manifestation adopting the answer of defendants in Civil
Case No. R-19864. The defendants, now petitioners, had a common allegation in
that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution.
In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public
use, that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of
private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the
intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land
reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by legislative fiat is
constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform
program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance,
that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.
The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the Philippine National Bank,
Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533, the lower court issued separate orders
authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the
issuance of writs of possession.
On May 25, 1982, petitioners filed this petition questioning the orders of the
respondent Judge. The respondents have correctly restated the grounds in the
petition as follows:

... ... ...

"A. The complaints for expropriation lack basis because the Constitution does not
provide for the expropriation of private property for tourism or other related
purposes;
"B. The writs of possession or orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession
is premature because the 'public use' character of the taking has not been
previously demonstrated;
"C. The taking is not for public use in contemplation of eminent domain law;
"D. The properties in question have been previously declared a land reform area;
consequently, the implementation of the social justice provision of the Constitution
on agrarian reform is paramount to the right of the State to expropriate for the
purposes intended;
"E. Proclamation No. 2052 declaring certain barangays in Cebu City, which include
the lands subject of expropriation as within a tourist zone, is unconstitutional for it
impairs the obligation of contracts;
"F. Since the properties are within a land reform area, it is the Court of Agrarian
Relations, not the lower court, that has jurisdiction pursuant to Pres. Decree No.
946;
"G. The forcible ejectment of defendants from the premises constitutes a criminal
act under Pres. Decree No. 583;"
In their memorandum, the petitioners have summarized the issues as follows:
I. Enforcement of the Writ of Possession is Premature:
II. Presidential Decree 564 Amending Presidential Decree 189 is Constitutionally
Repugnant:
III. The Condemnation is not for Public Use, Therefore, Unconstitutional:
IV. The Expropriation for Tourism Purposes of Lands Covered by the Land Reform
Program Violates the Constitution:
V. Presidential Proclamation 2052 is Unconstitutional:
VI. Presidential Decree No. 1533 is Unconstitutional:
VII. The Court of First Instance has no Jurisdiction:
VIII. The Filing of the Present Petition is not Premature:
The issues raised by the petitioners revolve around the proposition that the actions
to expropriate their properties are constitutionally infirm because nowhere in the
Constitution can a provision be found which allows the taking of private property for
the promotion of tourism.
The petitioner's arguments in their pleadings in support of the above proposition are
subsumed under the following headings:
1. Non-compliance with the "public use" requirement under the eminent domain
provision of the Bill of Rights.
2. Disregard of the land reform nature of the property being expropriated.
3. Impairment of the obligation of contracts.
There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the exercise
of the power of eminent domain. Section 2, Article IV states that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article XIV
allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of
just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV states that
the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost
to deserving citizens.
While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment
of just compensation, the provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which
allow the exercise of police power together with the power of eminent domain in the
implementation of constitutional objectives are even more far-reaching insofar as
taking of private property is concerned.
Section 6, Article II provides:
"Sec. 6. The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and
security of all the people. Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably
diffuse property ownership and profits."

... ... ...

Section 12, Article XIV provides:

"Sec. 12. The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program
aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the
goals enunciated in this Constitution."
The equitable diffusion of property ownership in the promotion of social justice
implies the exercise, whenever necessary, of the power to expropriate private
property. Likewise there can be no meaningful agrarian reform program unless the
power to expropriate is utilized.
We cite all the above provisions on the power to expropriate because of the
petitioners' insistence on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision. The
thrust of all constitutional provisions on expropriation is in the opposite direction.
As early as 1919, this Court in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus (40 Phil. 550)
categorized the restrictive view as wholly erroneous and based on a misconception
of fundamentals.
The petitioners look for the word "tourism" in the Constitution. Understandably the
search would be in vain. The policy objectives of the framers can be expressed only
in genera! terms such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and
development of the national patrimony, public interest, and general welfare, among
others. The programs to achieve these objectives vary from time to time and
according to place. To freeze specific programs like tourism into express
constitutional provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a bulky code
and require of the framers a prescience beyond Delphic proportions. The particular
mention in the Constitution of agrarian reform and the transfer of utilities and other
private enterprises to public ownership merely underscores the magnitude of the
problems sought to be remedied by these programs. They do not preclude nor limit
the exercise of the power of eminent domain for such purposes like tourism and
other development programs.
In the leading case of Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus (supra), this Court emphasized
that the power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential
to the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive
forms. The only purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to provide some form
of restraint on the sovereign power. It is not a grant of authority -
" 'The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific
grant in the constitution. It is inherent in sovereignly and exists in a sovereign state
without any recognition of it in the constitution. The provisions found in most of the
state constitutions relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by
implication grant the power to the government of the state, but limit a power which
would otherwise be without limit.' "
The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.
Do the purposes of the taking in this case constitute "public use"?
The petitioners ask us to adopt a strict construction and declare that "public use"
means literally use by the public and that "public use" is not synonymous with
"public interest," "public benefit," or "public welfare" and much less "public
convenience."
The petitioners face two major obstacles. First, their contention which is rather
sweeping in its call for a retreat from the public welfare orientation is unduly
restrictive and outmoded. Second, no less than the lawmaker has made a policy
determination that the power of eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion
and development of Philippine tourism.
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which
circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which
possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take
private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the
Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which
impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce
public land or limited government resources.
Certain aspects of parliamentary government were introduced by the. 1973
amendments to the Constitution with further modifications in the 1976 and 1981
amendments. Insofar as the executive and legislative departments are concerned,
the traditional concept of checks and balances in a presidential form was
considerably modified to remove some roadblocks in the expeditious
implementation of national policies. There was no such change for the judiciary. We
remain as a checking and balancing department even as all strive to maintain
respect for constitutional boundaries. At the same time, the philosophy of
coordination in the pursuit of developmental goals implicit in the amendments also
constrains the judiciary to defer to legislative discretion in the judicial review of
programs for economic development and social progress unless a clear case of
constitutional infirmity is established. We cannot stop the legitimate exercise of
power on an invocation of grounds better left interred in a bygone age and time. * As
we review the efforts of the political departments to bring about self-sufficiency, if
not eventual abundance, we continue to maintain the liberal approach because the
primary responsibility and the discretion belong to them.
There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditional purposes as the
construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and
telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and
slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or
irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is not limited to
traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly limited
to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded.
In the United States, the rule was enunciated in Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 25; 99
L. ed. 27) as follows:
"We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not
desirable. The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive. See DayBrite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96 L ed 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies
have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not
for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that
the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the
Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
"Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through
the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely
the means to the end. Sec Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. 153 US 525, 529, 530,
38 L ed 808, 810, 14 S Ct 891; United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 US
668, 679, 40 L ed 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427."
In an earlier American case, where a village was isolated from the rest of North
Carolina because of the flooding of the reservoir of a dam thus making the provision
of police, school, and health services unjustifiably expensive, the government
decided to expropriate the private properties in the village and the entire area was
made part of an adjoining national park. The district court and the appellate court
ruled against the expropriation or excess condemnation. The Court of Appeals
applied the "use by the public" test and stated that the only land needed for public
use was the area directly flooded by the reservoir. The village may have been cut off
by the dam but to also condemn it was excess condemnation not valid under the
"public use" requirement. The U.S. Supreme Court in United States ex rel T.V.
A. v. Welch (327 U.S. 546; 90 L. ed 843) unanimously reversed the lower courts. It
stated:
"The Circuit Court of Appeals, without expressly relying on a compelling rule of
construction that would give the restrictive scope to the T. V. A. Act given it by the
district court, also interpreted the statute narrowly. It first analyzed the facts by
segregating the total problem into distinct parts, and thus came to the conclusion
that T.V.A.'s purpose in condemning the land in question was only one to reduce its
liability arising from the destruction of the highway. The Court held that use of the
lands for that purpose is a 'private' and not a 'public use' or, at best, a 'public use'
not authorized by the statute. We are unable to agree with the reasoning and
conclusion of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
"We think that it is the function of Congress to decide what type of taking is for a
public use and that the agency authorized to do the taking may do so to the full
extent of its statutory authority. United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co.,160 US
668, 679, 40 L ed 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427. . . ."
"... But whatever may be the scope of the judicial power to determine what is a
'public use' in Fourteenth Amendment controversies, this Court has said that when
Congress has spoken on this subject its decision is entitles to deference until it is
shown to involve an impossibility.' Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 US
55, 66, 70 I ed 162, 46 S Ct 39. Any departure from this judicial restraint would
result in courts deciding on what is and is not a governmental function and in their
invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on that question at the moment of
decision, a practice which has proved impracticable in other fields. See
Case v. Bowles, decided February 4, 1946, 327 US 92, 101, ante, 552, 559, 66 S Ct
438. New York v. United States, 326 US 572 [ante, 326, 66 S Ct 310]. We hold that
the T.V.A. took the tracts here involved for a public purpose, if, as we think is the
case, Congress authorized the Authority to acquire, hold, and use the lands to carry
out the purposes of the T.V.A. Act."
In the Philippines, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando has aptly summarized the
statutory and judicial trend as follows:
"The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt
that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project
is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not any more. As long as the purpose
of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what
is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for
resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this
power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to
state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use." (Fernando, The Constitution of the
Philippines, 2nd ed., pp. 523-524)
The petitioner's contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use"
because private concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities such
as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with even
less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private
businesses using public streets and highways do not diminish in the least bit the
public character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in
underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a
private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and
shipping companies are still for public use. The expropriation of private land for
slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the
developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.
The petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately
accorded to formulations of national policy expressed in legislation. The rule
in Berman v. Parker (supra) of deference to legislative policy even if such policy
might mean taking from one private person and conferring on another private
person applies as well in the Philippines.
"... Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means by which it will be
attained is also for Congress to determine. Here one of the means chosen is the use
of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area. Appellants argue that this
makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of another
businessman. But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress
alone to determine, once the public purpose has been established. See
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co, (US) supra; cf. Highland v. Russel Car & Snow Plow
Co., 279 US 253, 73 L ed 688, 49 S Ct 314. The public end may be as well or better
served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of
government or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public
ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community
redevelopment projects. What we have said also disposes of any contention
concerning the fact that certain property owners in the area may be permitted to
repurchase their properties for redevelopment in harmony with the over all plan.
That, too, is a legitimate means which Congress and its agencies may adopt, if they
choose. "(Berman v. Parker, 99 Led 38, 348 US 33, 34)
An examination of the language in the 1919 cases of City of Manila v. Chinese
Community of Manila (40 Phil. 349) and Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, earlier cited,
shows that from the very start of constitutional government in our country judicial
deference to legislative policy has been clear and manifest in eminent domain
proceedings.
The expressions of national policy are found in the revised charter of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, Presidential Decree No. 564:
"WHEREAS, it is the avowed aim of the government to promote Philippine tourism
and work for its accelerated and balanced growth as well as for economy and
expediency in the development of the tourism plant of the country;"

... ... ...

"SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State

to promote, encourage, and develop Philippine tourism as an instrument in
accelerating the development of the country, of strengthening the country's foreign
exchange reserve position, and of protecting Philippine culture, history, traditions
and natural beauty, internationally as well as domestically."
The power of eminent domain is expressly provided for under Section 5 B(2) as
follows:
2. Acquisition of Private Lands. Power of Eminent Domain. To acquire by
purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land
within and without the tourist zones for any of the following reasons: (a)
consolidation of lands for tourist zone development purposes, (b) prevention
of land speculation in areas declared as tourist zones, (c) acquisition of right
of way to the zones, (d) protection of water shed areas and natural assets
with tourism value, and (c) for any other purpose expressly authorized under
this Decree and accordingly, to exercise the power of eminent domain under
its own name, which shall proceed in the manner prescribed by law and/or
the Rules of Court on condemnation proceedings. The Authority may use any
mode of payment which it may deem expedient and acceptable to the land
owners: Provided, That in case bonds are used as payment, the conditions
and restrictions set forth in Chapter III, Sections 8 to 13 inclusively, of this
Decree shall apply."

... ... ...

The petitioners rely on the Land Reform Program of the government in raising their
second argument. According to them, assuming that PTA has the right to
expropriate, the properties subject of expropriation may not be taken for the
purposes intended since they are within the coverage of "operation land transfer"
under the land reform program. Petitioners claim that certificates of land transfer
(CLT's) and emancipation patents have already been issued to them thereby making
the lands expropriated within the coverage of the land reform area under
Presidential Decree No. 2; that the agrarian reform program occupies a higher level
in the order of priorities than other State policies like those relating to the health
and physical well-being of the people; and that property already taken for public use
may not be taken for another public use.
We have considered the above arguments with scrupulous and thorough
circumspection. For indeed any claim of rights under the social justice and land
reform provisions of the Constitution deserves the most serious consideration. The
petitioners, however, have failed to show that the area being developed is indeed a
land reform area and that the affected persons have emancipation patents and
certificates of land transfer.
The records show that the area being developed into a tourism complex consists of
more than 808 hectares, almost all of which is not affected by the land reform
program. The portion being expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly and unproductive
land where even subsistence farming of crops other than rice and corn can hardly
survive. And of the 282 disputed hectares, only 8,970 square meters - less than one
hectare - is affected by Operation Land Transfer. Of the 40 defendants, only two
have emancipation patents for the less than one hectare of land affected. And this
8,970 square meters parcel of land is not even within the sports complex proper but
forms part of the 32 hectares resettlement area where the petitioners and others
similarly situated would be provided with proper housing, subsidiary employment,
community centers, schools, and essential services like water and electricity - which
are non-existent in the expropriated lands. We see no need under the facts of this
petition to rule on whether one public purpose is superior or inferior to another
purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interests. The petitioners
have also failed to overcome the showing that the taking of the 8,970 square
meters covered by Operation Land Transfer forms a necessary part of an
inseparable transaction involving the development of the 808 hectares tourism
complex. And certainly, the human settlement needs of the many beneficiaries of
the 32 hectares resettlement area should prevail over the property rights of two of
their compatriots.
The invocation of the contracts clause has no merit. The non-impairment clause has
never been a barrier to the exercise of police power and likewise eminent domain.
As stated in Manigault v. Springs (199 U.S. 473) "parties by entering into contracts
may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good."
The applicable doctrine is expressed in Arce v. Genato (69 SCRA 544) which
involved the expropriation of land for a public plaza. The Court stated:
 ... ... ...

". . . What is claimed is that there must be a showing of necessity for such
condemnation and that it was not done in this case. In support of such a view,
reliance is placed on City of Manila v. Arellano Law Colleges. (85 Phil. 663 [1950])
That doctrine itself is based on the earlier case of City of Manila v. Chinese
Community of Manila, (50 Phil. 349) also, like Camus, a 1919 decision. As could be
discerned, however, in the Arellano Law Colleges decision, it was the antiquarian
view of Blackstone with its sanctification of the right to one's estate on which such
an observation was based. As did appear in his Commentaries: 'So great is the
regard of the law for private property that it will not authorize the least violation of
it, even for the public good, unless there exists a very great necessity thereof.' Even
the most cursory glance at such well-nigh absolutist concept of property would
show its obsolete character at least for Philippine constitutional law. It cannot
survive the test of the 1935 Constitution with its mandates on social justice and
protection to labor. (Article II, Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution reads: 'The
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the State.' Article XI, Section 6 of the same
Constitution provides: 'The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to
working women and minors, and shall regulate the relation between landowner and
tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The State may
provide for compulsory arbitration.') What is more, the present Constitution pays
even less heed to the claims of propertyand rightly so. After stating that the State
shall promote social justice, it continues: 'Towards this end, the State shall regulate
the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.' (That is the second sentence of
Article II, Section 6 of the Constitution) If there is any need for explicit confirmation
of what was set forth in Presidential Decree No. 42, the above provision supplies it.
Moreover, that is merely to accord to what of late has been the consistent course of
decisions of this Court whenever property rights are pressed unduly. (Cf.
Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172;
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of
Unions, L-2I484, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 649; Edu v. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24,1970,
35 SCRA 481; Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-
32052, July 25,1975,65 SCRA 416) The statement therefore, that there could be
discerned a constitutional objection to a lower court applying a Presidential Decree,
when it leaves no doubt that a grantee of the power of eminent domain need not
prove the necessity for the expropriation, carries its own refutation."
The issue of prematurity is also raised by the petitioners. They claim that since the
necessity for the taking has not been previously established, the issuance of the
orders authorizing the PTA to take immediate possession of the premises, as well as
the corresponding writs of possession was premature. Under Presidential Decree No.
42, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1533, the government, its agency or
instrumentality, as plaintiff in an expropriation proceedings is authorized to take
immediate possession, control and disposition of the property and the
improvements, with power of demolition, notwithstanding the pendency of the
issues before the court, upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank of an
amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property expropriated. The issue of
immediate possession has been settled in Arce v. Genato (supra). In answer to the
issue:

... ... ...

". . . whether the order of respondent Judge in an expropriation case allowing the
other respondent,... to take immediate possession of the parcel of land sought to be
condemned for the beautification of its public plaza, without a prior hearing to
determine the necessity for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, is vitiated
by jurisdictional defect, . . ."
this Court held that:
". . . It is not disputed that in issuing such order, respondent Judge relied on
Presidential Decree No. 42 issued on the 9th of November, 1972. (Presidential
Decree No. 42 is entitled 'Authorizing the Plaintiff in Eminent Domain Proceedings to
Take Possession of the Property involved Upon Depositing the Assessed Value for
Purposes of Taxation.') The question as thus posed does not occasion any difficulty
as to the answer to be given. This petition for certiorari must fail, there being no
showing that compliance with the Presidential Decree, which under the Transitory
Provisions is deemed a part of the law of the land, (According to Article XVII, Section
3 par. (2) of the Constitution: 'All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and
acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the
law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after lifting
of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or
superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other
acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or
repealed by the regular National Assembly') would be characterized as either an act
in excess of jurisdiction or a grave abuse of discretion. So we rule."
Likewise in Ramos v. Philippine Tourism Authority (G.R. Nos. 52449-50, June 9,
1980), this Court held:
". . . condemnation or expropriation proceedings is in the nature of one that
is quasi-in-rem, wherein the fact that the owner of the property is made a party is
not essentially indispensable insofar at least as it concerns the immediate taking of
possession of the property and the preliminary determination of its value, including
the amount to be deposited."
In their last argument, the petitioners claim that a consequence of the expropriation
proceedings would be their forcible ejectment. They contend that such forcible
ejectment is a criminal act under Presidential Decree No. 583. This contention is not
valid. Presidential Decree No. 583 prohibits the taking cognizance or
implementation of orders designed to obstruct the land reform program. It refers to
the harassment of tenant-farmers who try to enforce emancipation rights. It has
nothing to do with the expropriation by the State of lands needed for public
purposes. As a matter of fact, the expropriated area does not appear in the master
lists of the Ministry of Agrarian Reforms as a tenanted area. The petitioners' bare
allegations have not been supported with particulars pointing to specific parcels
which are subject of tenancy contracts. The petitioners may be owner-tillers or may
have some form of possessory or ownership rights but there has been no showing of
their being tenants on the disputed lands.
The petitioners have failed to overcome the burden of anyone trying to strike down
a statute or decree whose avowed purpose is the legislative perception of the public
good. A statute has in its favor the presumption of validity. All reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law. The courts will not set
aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case (People v. Vera, 65
Phil. 56). And in the absence of factual findings or evidence to rebut the
presumption of validity, the presumption prevails (Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc. v. Mayor
of Manila, 20 SCRA 849; Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424).
The public respondents have stressed that the development of the 808 hectares
includes plans that would give the petitioners and other displaced persons
productive employment, higher incomes, decent housing, water and electric
facilities, and better living standards. Our dismissing this petition is, in part,
predicated on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the
expropriation of the 282 hectares already identified as fit for the establishment of a
resort complex to promote tourism is, therefore, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Conception Jr., Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Piano,
Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., see concurrence and dissent.
Teehankee, J., dissented on the grounds stated in Justice
Makasiar's separate opinion. Petitioners have the personality to file the petition at
bar, as conceded by public respondent itself in having filed the expropriation case
against them.
Aquino, J., in the result.
Abad Santos, J., with Justice Makasiar.
De Castro, J., is on leave.