CJA e-Newsletter

Chandigarh Judicial Academy for Punjab & Haryana High Court

for circulation among the stakeholders in Judicial Education

VOLUME : 10 ISSUE : 02 FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY, 2025

EDITORIAL BOARD :
EDITOR–IN-CHIEF
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma
Judge, Punjab & Haryana High Court
President, Board of Governor, CJA
CHIEF EDITOR
Sh. Ajay Kumar Sharda
Director (Administration)-cum-
District & Sessions Judge
EDITORS
Dr. Gopal Arora
Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-
Faculty Member
Dr. Mandeep Mittal
Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-
Faculty Member
Dr. Mahima Tuli
Research Fellow
IN THIS ISSUE :
 From the Desk of Chief Editor: Deemed Sanction under Indian Criminal Law
 Latest Cases: Civil
 Latest Cases: Criminal
 Latest Cases: Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
 Events with Pictorial Glimpses

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 Deemed Sanction under Indian Criminal Law
The issue of sanction for prosecuting public servants has always been a critical aspect
of criminal jurisprudence in India. A recent ruling by the Supreme Court of India in the
case of Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another, 2025 INSC 267 has once again
brought this subject into focus, particularly regarding the non-existence of a ―deemed
sanction‖ under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).
However, the newly enacted Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)
introduces a statutory provision for deemed sanction, thus altering the legal landscape.
On February 25, 2025, a Supreme Court bench comprising Justice BV Nagarathna and
Justice Satish Chandra Sharma clarified that Section 197 of CrPC does not envisage a
concept of deemed sanction. The ruling came while quashing a case against a public
servant due to the lack of prior sanction. The complainant and prosecution relied on
landmark cases such as Vineet Narain v. Union of India (AIR 1998 SC 889) and
Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh ((2012) 3 SCC 64) to argue that if the
sanctioning authority fails to provide sanction within a stipulated period, it should be
deemed granted. However, the Court rejected this argument, holding that neither of
these cases established the concept of deemed sanction under Section 197.
The Court clarified that the Vineet Narain judgment primarily dealt with the investigation
powers and procedures of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Central
Vigilance Commission (CVC). While the ruling emphasized adherence to time limits for
granting prosecution sanction, it did not state that failure to grant sanction within the
prescribed period would result in a deemed sanction. Similarly, the Subramanian
Swamy case contained a separate concurring judgment by Justice GS Singhvi, which
suggested guidelines for Parliament‘s consideration. One such guideline proposed that
if no decision on sanction is made within the extended time limit, it should be deemed
granted. However, the Court pointed out that this proposition was never incorporated
into the CrPC, and judicial interpretation cannot read such a mandate into the statute
where none exists.
Unlike the CrPC, the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 introduces a statutory
provision for deemed sanction. The second proviso to Section 218(1) BNSS states:
―Provided further that such Government shall take a decision within a period of one
hundred and twenty days from the date of the receipt of the request for sanction and
in case it fails to do so, the sanction shall be deemed to have been accorded by
such Government.”

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 This provision marks a significant shift, ensuring that undue delays in granting
prosecution sanction do not become a shield for public servants facing serious
allegations. If the competent authority does not take a decision within 120 days, the
sanction is deemed to have been granted, allowing the prosecution to proceed.
The Supreme Court‘s ruling in Suneeti Toteja came in an appeal filed by a public
servant who was prosecuted without prior sanction. In this case, the sanctioning
authority eventually denied sanction, albeit beyond the stipulated period, due to the
delayed receipt of the request. The respondents argued that since the sanction was not
granted within the prescribed timeframe, it should be deemed granted. However, the
Court held that the absence of a statutory provision for deemed sanction under Section
197 CrPC means that prosecution cannot proceed without explicit sanction. The Court
ruled that the Magistrate was wrong in taking cognizance of the offence in the absence
of a valid sanction and that the High Court failed to appreciate the lack of such
sanction. Consequently, the chargesheet, summoning order, and all further
proceedings were quashed.
This ruling highlights the limitations of the current legal framework under CrPC, where
sanction deemed is not recognized. The introduction of BNSS, 2023, however,
provides a statutory mechanism to prevent indefinite delays by making sanction
automatic if not granted within 120 days. This change ensures that cases against
public servants are not stalled due to bureaucratic inertia. At the same time, it
underscores the importance of legislative intervention in addressing procedural
inefficiencies rather than relying on judicial interpretations to fill gaps in the law. Moving
forward, the implementation of BNSS will bring much-needed clarity and accountability
in cases involving public servants.
Ajay Kumar Sharda
Director (Administration)

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 LATEST CASES: CIVIL
"The ultimate object of any process of selection for entry into a public service is to
secure the best and the most suitable person for the job, avoiding patronage and
favouritism. Selection based on merit, tested impartially and objectively, is the
essential foundation of any useful and efficient public service.”

- Manoj Misra, J. in Tej Prakash Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan, (2025) 2 SCC 1,
para 49

Balbir Singh &Anr. Etc. Vs. Baldev e. When an appeal is prescribed under a
Singh (D) through his LRS. &Ors. Etc.: statute and the appellate forum is invoked
2025 INSC 81-HELD-The Hon‘ble and entertained, for all intents and
Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of purposes, the suit continues. When a
merger and scope of section 28 of SRA. higher forum entertains an appeal and
The doctrine of mergeras affirmed and passes an order on merit, the doctrine of
reiterated by three-Judge Benches in merger would apply.
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri The Court also touched upon
MahadeshwaraSahakaraSakkareKarkhane various facets of pending appeals against
Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376 and in Chandi decrees for specific performancesand
Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC application under section 28 and observed
724, is: the following:
a. The doctrines founded on the rationale a. It is clear that Section 28 gives
that there cannot be more than one power to the court either to extend
operative decree at a given point of time; the time for compliance with the
b. The doctrine of merger applies decree or grant an order of
irrespective of whether the appellate court rescission of the agreement. These
has affirmed, modified or reversed the powers are available to the trial
decree of the trial court. When a decree or court which passes the decree of
order passed by an inferior court, tribunal specific performance. In other
or authority was subjected to a remedy words, when the court passes the
available under the law before a superior decree for specific performance, the
forum then, though the decree or order contract between the parties is not
under challenge continues to be effective extinguished. To put it clearly the
and binding, nevertheless its finality is put decree for specific performance is in
in jeopardy; the nature of a preliminary decree
c. It would also not make any difference if and the suit is deemed to be
the order is a speaking or non-speaking pending even after the decree;
one; b. Section 28 (1) makes it clear that
d. The doctrine of merger is based on the the court does not lose its
principles of propriety in the hierarchy of jurisdiction after the grant of decree
the justice delivery system.The doctrine is for specific performance nor it
a common law doctrine that stems from the becomes functus officio. In deciding
idea of maintenance of the decorum of the an application under Section 28(1)
hierarchy of courts and tribunals; of the Act, the court has to see all

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 the attending circumstances the court has to specify the period
including the conduct of the parties; within which the payment has to be
c. Where a decree is transferred for made;
execution to a transferee executing i. The Court should also take notice of
court then certainly the transferee the factsas towhether the said
court is not the original court and deposit was made within the
the executing court is not the ―same stipulated time, whether extension
court‖ within the meaning of Section of time was sought or granted and
28 of the Act; also whether any explanation has
d. But when an application has been been furnished for the delay in
made in the court in which the making of the deposit etc.;
original suit was filed and the j. The decree for specific performance
execution is being proceeded with, has been described as a preliminary
then certainly an application under decree. The power under Section
Section 28 is maintainable in the 28 of the Act is discretionary and
same court; the court cannot ordinarily annul the
e. There could be a decree which may decree once passed by it. Although
say that if the plaintiff fails to deposit the power to annul the decree exists
the balance sale consideration yet Section 28 of the Act provides
within the stipulated time period, the for complete relief to both the
suit shall automatically stand parties in terms of the decree.
dismissed; S. Shobha vs. Muthoot Finance Ltd. :
f. Section 148 of the Code of Civil 2025 INSC 117-HELD-The Hon‘ble
Procedure (C.P.C.) empowers the Supreme Court summed up as to what
Court to deal with events that might constitutes ‗State‘ within Article 12 of the
arise subsequent to an order, for the Constitution of India, so as to entertain a
purpose of enlarging time for writ, in the following words,
payment even though it had been “9. We may sum up thus:
peremptorily fixed. The provision (1) For issuing writ against a legal entity, it
must be liberally construed; would have to be an instrumentality or
g. It is well settled position of law that agency of a State or should have been
when time for payment of money is entrusted with such functions as are
extended, it does not mean a Governmental or closely associated
modification of the decree. The trial therewith by being of public importance or
court has power to extend the time, being fundamental to the life of the people
and the expression ―such further and hence Governmental.
period as the court may allow‖ (2) A writ petition under Article 226 of the
would mean the court which had Constitution of India may be maintainable
passed the decree, or, where the against (i) the State Government; (ii)
application under Section 28 of the Authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an
Act of 1963, is filed; instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a
h. Order XX Rule 12-A C.P.C. company which is financed and owned by
provides that in every decree of the State; (vi) a private body run
specific performance of a contract, substantially on State funding; (vii) a

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private body discharging public duty or nevertheless, there must be the public law
positive obligation of public nature; and element in such action.
(viii) a person or a body under liability to (8) According to Halsbury‘s Laws of
discharge any function under any Statute, England, 3rd Ed. Vol.30, p.682, ―a public
to compel it to perform such a statutory authority is a body not necessarily a county
function. council, municipal corporation or other
(3) Although a non-banking finance local authority which has public statutory
company like the Muthoot Finance Ltd. duties to perform, and which perform the
with which we are concerned is duty bound duties and carries out its transactions for
to follow and abide by the guidelines the benefit of the public and not for private
provided by the Reserve Bank of India for profit‖. There cannot be any general
smooth conduct of its affairs in carrying on definition of public authority or public
its business, yet those are of regulatory action. The facts of each case decide the
measures to keep a check and provide point.‖
guideline and not a participatory Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd.
dominance or control over the affairs of the Vs. M/s. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls
company. Ltd. and Anr. : 2025 INSC 73 -When the
(4) A private company carrying on banking bar under the provisions of Order II
business as a Scheduled bank cannot be Rule 2 CPC would stand in the way of
termed as a company carrying on any the institution of the second suit by the
public function or public duty. original plaintiff-HELD-The Hon‘ble
(5) Normally, mandamus is issued to a Supreme Court discussed the principles
public body or authority to compel it to governing the applicability of Order II Rule
perform some public duty cast upon it by 2 CPC and the several ―tests‖ and held
some statute or statutory rule. In that in view of the facts and circumstances,
exceptional cases a writ of mandamus or a the bar under the provisions of Order II
writ in the nature of mandamus may issue Rule 2 CPC would not stand in the way of
to a private body, but only where a public the institution of the second suit by the
duty is cast upon such private body by a original plaintiff i.e. respondent no. 1.
statute or statutory rule and only to compel I. General Principles underlying Order II
such body to perform its public duty. Rule 2 CPC
(6) Merely because a statue or a rule 47. On a conspectus of the aforesaid
having the force of a statute requires a discussion, what follows is that:
company or some other body to do a i. The object of Order II Rule 2 is to prevent
particular thing, it does not possess the the multiplicity of suits and the provision is
attribute of a statutory body. founded on the principle that a person shall
(7) If a private body is discharging a public not be vexed twice for one and the same
function and the denial of any rights is in cause.
connection with the public duty imposed on ii. The mandate of Order II Rule 2 is the
such body, the public law remedy can be inclusion of the whole claim arising in
enforced. The duty cast on the public body respect of one and the same cause of
may be either statutory or otherwise and action, in one suit. It must not be
the source of such power is immaterial but, misunderstood to mean that all the
different causes of action arising from the

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same transaction must be included in a vi. The defendant must also have
single suit. produced the earlier plaint in evidence in
iii. Several definitions have been given to order to establish that there is an identity in
the phrase ―cause of action‖ and it can the causes of action between both the
safely be said to mean - ―every fact which suits and that there was a deliberate
would be necessary for the plaintiff to relinquishment of a larger relief on the part
prove, if traversed, in order to support his of the plaintiff. vii. Since the plea is a
right to the judgment of the Court‖. Such a technical bar, it has to be established
cause of action has no relation whatsoever satisfactorily and cannot be presumed
to the defence that may be set up by the merely on the basis of inferential
defendant, nor does it depend upon the reasoning.
character of the relief which is prayed for II. Status/Stage of the first suit is
by the plaintiff but refers to the media upon immaterial for the applicability of Order
which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive II Rule 2 CPC
at a conclusion in his favour. 51. In light of the aforementioned, it is re-
iv. Similarly, several tests have been laid affirmed that the stage at which the first
out to determine the applicability of Order II suit is, would not be a material
Rule 2 to a suit. While it is acknowledged consideration in deciding the applicability
that the same heavily depends on the of the bar under Order II Rule 2. What
particular facts and circumstances of each needs to be looked into is whether the
case, it can be said that a correct and cause of action in both suits is one and the
reliable test is to determine whether the same in substance, and whether the
claim in the new suit is in fact founded plaintiff is agitating the second suit for
upon a cause of action distinct from that claiming a relief which was very well
which was the foundation of the former available to him at the time of filing the first
suit. Additionally, if the evidence required suit. Therefore, the fact that the first suit
to support the claims is different, then the i.e., O.S. No. 28 of 2008 is still pending
causes of action can also be considered to before the concerned court would have no
be different. Furthermore, it is necessary material impact in deciding whether the
for the causes of action in the two suits to subsequent suit filed as O.S. No. 122 of
be identical in substance and not merely 2008 is barred by the principles under
technically identical. Order II Rule 2.
v. The defendant who takes shelter under III. The plaints have to be read as a
the bar imposed by Order II Rule 2(3) must whole to determine the applicability of
establish that (a) the second suit was in the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC for
respect of the same cause of action as that the purpose of rejection of plaint under
on which the previous suit was based; (b) Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC
in respect of that cause of action, the 56. Order VII Rule 11(d) reads as - ―where
plaintiff was entitled to more than one the suit appears from the statement in the
relief; and (c) being thus entitled to more plaint to be barred by any law‖. In light of
the aforesaid, it follows that before
than one relief, the plaintiff, without any
rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule
leave obtained from the Court, omitted to 11(d), the Courts must ensure that the
sue for the relief for which the second suit plaint is read as a whole and its entire
had been filed. averments are looked into. A few lines or

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passages must not be read in isolation and cause of action different from that on which
it is imperative that the pleadings are read the first suit was based and that the
as a whole for ascertaining the true import identity of the causes of action in both the
of the averments therein. suits must be the material consideration
In performing such a holistic reading, it before the court which decide the
must be deduced whether the causes of applicability of this provision to a second
action in both the suits are identical in suit filed by the plaintiff. It would be
substance in order to sustain a successful incorrect for us to hold that merely
plea under Order II Rule 2. It would be a because the pleadings in the plaint filed in
reductive approach to only cull out the O.S. No. 28 of 2008 and the plaint filed in
cause of action paragraphs from the O.S. No. 122 of 2008 are similar to some
respective plaints and decide that they extent, the causes of action are also
disclose the same cause of action on mere identical.
comparative overview. Rejecting the plaint in the second suit i.e.,
IV. Application of the principles in Order O.S. No. 122 of 2008 would result in
II Rule 2 CPC to the institution of a suit depriving the respondent no. 1 from
for specific performance when the relief claiming the relief of specific performance
of permanent injunction was sought in of the agreement for sale dated
a previous suit. 24.01.2007 and the cancellation of the sale
71. However, in our opinion, the Trial Court deed dated 24.01.2008. In this regard, we
had unfortunately failed to address a key have examined the entire factual matrix
aspect - whether more than one relief in along with the causes of action on which
respect of the cause of action which both the suits were founded, through a
formed the foundation of the institution of holistic reading of the plaints placed before
the first suit was ―available‖ to the us.
respondent no. 1? In our opinion, the reliefs in the subsequent
In other words, whether the relief of suit are in fact founded on a cause of
specific performance and the relief to pray action which is distinct from that which is
for the cancellation of the sale deed dated the foundation of the former suit. The facts
24.02.2008 executed in favour of the which are necessary to be proved and the
appellant were ―available‖ to the evidence to support the claims in the
respondent no. 1 at the time of filing the second suit are also different from that of
first suit in view of the ban imposed on the the first suit. Therefore, it cannot be said
registration of sale deeds at the that the respondent no. 1 could have
Thyagavalli village by the G.O. dated prayed for the reliefs claimed in the
08.08.1986 issued by the Government of subsequent suit at an earlier stage.
Tamil Nadu and the notification dated
23.10.2006 issued by the TNEB which Sunkari Tirumala Rao &Ors. Vs. Penki
exclusively allowed the appellant to Aruna Kumari : 2025 INSC 92-HELD-The
register the sale deeds at the Thyagavalli Hon‘ble Supreme Court discussed the
village where the suit property is situate. applicability of Section 69 of Partnership
V. The “entitlement to” along with the Act, and upheld the order passed by the
“availability of” the relief as a requisite High Court.
in determining the applicability of Order ―8. It is evident from a reading of sub-
II Rule 2. sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 that it
assumes a mandatory character. Section
86. It is established law that the principles
69(1) prohibits a suit amongst the partners
governing the applicability of the provisions
of an unregistered partnership firm, for the
of Order II Rule 2 do not operate as a bar
enforcement of a right either arising from a
when the subsequent suit is based on a
contract or conferred by the Act, unless the

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suit amongst the partners is in the nature firm. Thus, the suit was clearly hit by
of dissolution of the partnership firm and/or Section 69 of the Partnership Act and was
rendition of accounts. Section 69(2) not maintainable.‖
prohibits the institution of a suit by an 12. In the case on hand, the petitioners
unregistered firm against third persons for (original plaintiffs) had filed the suit for
the enforcement of a right arising from a recovery of money in their capacity as
contract. As a consequence, a suit filed by partners of an unregistered partnership
an unregistered partnership firm and all firm, against the respondent (original
proceedings arising thereunder, which fall defendant) in her capacity as a partner of
within the ambit of Section 69 would be the same unregistered partnership firm.
without jurisdiction. The Trial Court itself had arrived at a
9. This Court in Seth LoonkaranSethiya finding that the agreement executed
and Others v. Mr. Ivan E. John and Others between the parties was in fact a
reported in (1977) 1 SCC 379 had partnership deed and not a bond as
categorically held that Section 69 is claimed by the petitioners.
mandatory in character and a suit instituted 14. A perusal of the partnership deed
by a plaintiff in respect of a right which was clearly reveals that the sum of Rs.
vested in him by virtue of a contract and 30,00,000/- which was given to the
entered into in his capacity as a partner of respondent and which is now sought to be
a partnership firm, would be void, if such a recovered, was rendered by the petitioners
firm was unregistered. The relevant as capital for the purpose of acquiring 75%
observations are as under: shares collectively in the partnership firm.
―21. A bare glance at the section is enough As per the arrangement, the respondent
to show that it is mandatory in character was to hold the remaining 25% shares.
and its effect is to render a suit by a Therefore, there is no doubt that the suit
plaintiff in respect of a right vested in him for recovery was filed by a set of partners
or acquired by him under a contract which together on one side, against another
he entered into as a partner of an partner, for the purpose of enforcing a right
unregistered firm, whether existing or accruing under the agreement.
dissolved, void. In other words, a partner of 15. It is a clear as a noon day that the
an erstwhile unregistered partnership firm present suit had not been instituted by or
cannot bring a suit to enforce a right on behalf of the firm against any third
arising out of a contract falling within the persons so as to fall under the ambit of
ambit of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. Section 69(2). The petitioners have also
In the instant case, Seth Sugan Chand had not filed the instant suit for enforcing any
to admit in unmistakable terms that the firm statutory right conferred under any other
―Sethiya& Co.‖ was not registered under law or a common law right so as to exempt
the Indian Partnership Act. the application of Section 69. Hence, the
It cannot also be denied that the suit out of rigours of Section 69(1) would apply on
which the appeals have arisen was for such a suit and the partnership firm being
enforcement of the agreement entered into unregistered would prevent the petitioners
by the plaintiff as partner of Sethiya& Co. from filing a bare suit for recovery of
which was an unregistered firm. That being money from the respondent.‖
so, the suit was undoubtedly a suit for the
benefit and in the interest of the firm and Dr. Mandeep Mittal
consequently a suit on behalf of the firm. It Additional District & Sessions Judge
is also to be borne in mind that it was -cum-Faculty Member, CJA
never pleaded by the plaintiff, not even in
the replication, that he was suing to
recover the outstandings of a dissolved

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 LATEST CASES: CRIMINAL

“Judicial restraint is rooted in the understanding that courts should respect the
decisions made by the legislative and executive branches, provided these decisions
are legally sound and constitutionally valid. By adhering to judicial restraint, courts
avoid overstepping their constitutional role and thereby prevent potential conflicts
with the executive and legislative branches. The principle of separation of powers
supports the idea that each branch has a unique role, and mutual respect between
these branches is essential for the proper functioning of the Government.”

JB Pardiwala, J. in Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC

695, Para 54

State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh light hitherto unknown facts or

Rathore:2025 INSC 248-HELD-While circumstances.
discussing thr scope of registration of
second FIR after reteireiting the ratio in  Where the incident is separate;
Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) offences are similar or different.
(1979) 2 SCC 322; Surender Kaushik v.
Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu v. State of
State of U.P.(2013) 5 SCC 148; and P.
Chhattisgarh: 2025 INSC 242-HELD-
Sreekumar v. State of Kerala (2018) 4
While discussing the scope of Section
SCC 579 it is observed that the following
167(2) and 437(6) of CrPC, it is held by
principles emerge regarding the
Apex Court that while considering default
permissibility of the registration of a
bail it is indefeseable and statutory right
second FIR:
of accused to seek bail but in later
 When the second FIR is counter- provision the relevant factors are:
complaint or presents a rival
1. Whether the reasons for being unable
version of a set of facts, in
to conclude trial within sixty days from the
reference to which an earlier FIR
first date fixed of taking evidence, are
already stands registered.
attributable to the accused?
 When the ambit of the two FIRs is
2. Whether there are any chances of the
different even though they may
accused tampering with evidence or
arise from the same set of
causing prejudice to the case of the
circumstances.
prosecution in any other manner?
 When investigation and/or other
3. Whether there are any chances of
avenues reveal the earlier FIR or
abscondence of the accused on being
set of facts to be part of a larger
bailed out?
conspiracy.
4. Whether accused was not in custody
 When investigation and/or persons during the whole of the said period?
related to the incident bring to the

10 | P a g e
 the crime scene is not enough to invoke
Section 34 IPC. Contrarily, under Section
It cannot be claimed as matter of right. 149 of the IPC, a person can be held
liable simply for being part of an unlawful
assembly with a common intention to
Jaideep Bose v. M/s. Bid and Hammer commit a particular offence, regardless of
Auctioneers Private Limited: 2025 whether they personally intended to
INSC 241-HELD-A private complaint commit the crime. Further, it is held that
dated 22.08.2014 filed by the complainant the participation of an individual in the
/ respondent herein against the company criminal act, in one form or another, is the
and its directors, editors and journalists, key characteristic of Section 34 of the
numbering 14 accused persons, under IPC. This sets it apart not only from
Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Section 149 of the IPC but also from
Procedure, 1973 (―Cr.P.C‖) read with related offences like criminal conspiracy
Sections 499 and 500 IPC. The gravamen and abetment. Simply agreeing with
of the complaint pertains to certain news others to commit an illegal act can make
articles published in various newspapers a person liable for criminal conspiracy
viz., Bangalore Mirror, Mumbai Mirror, under Section 120 of the IPC. In such
The Times of India (Bangalore, Kolkata, cases, the agreement itself is sufficient to
Mumbai, New Delhi, and Pune Editions), establish guilt, and no additional overt act
and The Economic Times (New Delhi and is required beyond the agreement.
Mumbai editions) on 27.06.2014,
Vinod @ Nasmulla v. State of
28.06.2014, 29.06.2014, 06.07.2014,
Chhattisgarh:2025 INSC 220-HELD-It is
07.07.2014, and 20.07.2014 which
observed by the Apex Court that if the
contained alleged defamatory contents
witness who identified a person or an item
regarding the authenticity of certain
in the Test Identification Parade (TIP) is
paintings to be auctioned by the
not examined during the trial, the TIP
respondent herein. The accused were
report, which could be used to either
offences were summoned under sections
corroborate or challenge their
499 and 500 IPC. After quashing the
identification, loses its evidentiary value
summoning order the Apex Court held
for identification purposes. The reasoning
that allegations against an Editorial
behind this legal principle is that unless
Director without specific evidence of
the witness appears in court and submits
involvement in publication are insufficient
themselves to cross-examination, it
to issue summons for defamation under
cannot be determined on what basis they
Sections 499 and 500 IPC.
identified the person or item. This is
Vasant @ Girish AkbarasabSanavale v. because there is a possibility that the
State of Karnataka: 2025 INSC 221- accused may have been shown to the
HELD-Recently it is held by Apex Court witness prior to the TIP or the witness
that a conviction under Section 34 of the may have been coached to identify the
IPC requires active involvement or a accused. Therefore, if the witness who
shared common intention in committing made the identification during the TIP is
the criminal act. Simply being present at not presented during the trial, the TIP

11 | P a g e
cannot be relied upon to support an determining that the testimony of his
identification made by another witness. seven-year-old daughter was credible.
The Court convicted the accused based
Vinod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of on circumstantial evidence, emphasizing
Delhi): 2025 INSC 209-HELD-The that his inability to explain the
Supreme Court held that the trial court circumstances of his wife‘s death— which
made an error by simply quoting the occurred in their home with only their
contradicted portions of the witness‘s daughter as a witness—was a significant
Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements in factor. Citing Section 106 of the Evidence
brackets, without properly proving the Act, the Court noted that the accused was
prior statement through the investigating required to clarify the facts within his
officer. The court clarified the correct knowledge, which further supported the
procedure, emphasizing that when a conviction. The law regarding testimony
witness is cross-examined using their of child witness is elaborately discussed
Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements, the in para no 58 of judgment.
specific portion being used for
contradiction must first be formally
introduced as evidence through the
Dr. Gopal Arora
investigating officer before it can be
Additional District & Sessions Judge
considered. -cum-Faculty Member, CJA
Lalita v. Vishwanath& Ors.: 2025 INSC
173-HELD-It is observed by apex Court
that for an F.I.R. lodged by a deceased
person to be considered substantial; its
contents must be proven. It must be
corroborated and established for it to hold
any value in the case. The F.I.R. can also
be used by the defense to challenge the
credibility of the person who lodged it
under Section 154(3) of the Evidence Act.
If the death of the informant is unrelated
to the complaint—that is, if the informant
died of natural causes and not as a result
of injuries connected to the case—the
contents of the F.I.R. would not be
admissible as evidence. In such
situations, the contents cannot be proven
through the Investigating Officer.

The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs. Sus

Balveer Singh: 2025 INSC 261-HELD-
The Supreme Court reversed the acquittal
of a man charged with murdering his wife,

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 LATEST CASES: MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988
“To claim an absolute or unqualified right in respect of the exact “place” of burial
of a person under Article 21 and Article 25, prima facie, appears to be circumspect.
Nonetheless, a person/community cannot altogether be denied a place to carry out
last rites including inter alia burials - on the contrary, the State has a duty to
provide members of all religious communities with identified places to carry out
last rites within the confines and limits of reason and rationality.”

-Satish Chandra Sharma, J. in Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 173, para 18
SRS Travels vs. KSRTC Workers: 2025 functions. The exclusion of stage carriage
SCC OnLine SC 254 - State Transport permits from this delegation does not imply
Authority possesses power to delegate that all permit functions are inherently non-
its functions under Section 68(5) of MV delegable; rather, it reflects a calibrated
Act-HELD- The Court noted that Section approach that distinguishes between
68(5) of MV Act unambiguously confers complex adjudicatory functions and routine
upon the STA and RTA the power to administrative tasks. Furthermore, from a
delegate its functions provided that rules practical standpoint, the STA is entrusted
are framed under Section 96 of the Act. In with a wide range of responsibilities under
the present context, the delegation in the Motor Vehicles Act, and its workload
question concerns the grant of permits that necessitates delegation to ensure timely
are not stage carriage permits. service delivery. The Secretary, being a
high-ranking officer with substantial
The language of Rule 56(1)(d) of KMV expertise in transport administration, is well
Rules explicitly differentiates between the equipped to handle routine permit
grant of stage carriage permits, which applications. The delegation mechanism is
involve complex and inherently quasi- not a blank check for arbitrary decision-
judicial considerations, and other types of making; it operates within the boundaries
permits that are essentially administrative and conditions prescribed by the enabling
in nature. The fact that only the grant of rules framed under Section 96 of the MV
stage carriage permits is excluded from Act. This ensures that, while administrative
delegation underscores the Legislature‘s efficiency is achieved, there remains
intention: routine and time-sensitive adequate oversight and accountability
permits such as contract carriage, special, through the broader STA framework. The
tourist, and temporary permits can be Court pointed out that the High Court‘s
efficiently processed through delegation to reasoning in this regard appears to have
a competent officer like the Secretary, conflated the inherent quasi-judicial nature
thereby ensuring that administrative of certain decisions with the broader
functions are not unduly delayed by the statutory power of delegation. The High
need for a full board‘s involvement. The Court held that because permit-granting is
Court pointed out that Section 68(5) of the quasi-judicial, it cannot be delegated to a
MV Act, coupled with the specific language single officer. However, this view fails to
of Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules makes it recognize that delegation does not remove
clear that the Legislature intended for the judicial oversight from the process;
STA to delegate certain routine permit instead, it merely streamlines routine
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functions that do not require the full prospects and a multiplier of 18 would
deliberative process of the STA. The have to be applied in view of the age of the
practical impact of not allowing delegation appellant. Therefore, the Court held that, in
would be to overload the STA with routine the present case, the compensation under
functions, potentially causing undue delays this head would be Rs. [4,358 + (40% of
and inefficiencies in the permit-issuance 4,358)] x 12 x 18 = Rs.13,17,859/- and
process. Such delays could disrupt the rounded it off to Rs. 13,18,000/-.
balance of public transport service Pain and Suffering
delivery, which the Legislature clearly The Court noted that in the present case
sought to improve by liberalizing the the appellant will remain dependent on
regime for non-stage carriage permits. In another person for the rest of her life. Even
this light, the delegation of routine permit- though the physical age will increase, her
granting powers is not only legally mental age will be that of a child studying
permissible but is also necessary to meet in the 2nd Standard. Effectively, while her
the practical demands of an evolving body grows, she will remain a small baby.
transport sector. Therefore, the power of The Court said that similar to the case of
the STA to delegate the issuance of Kajal (supra), the appellant will also miss
contract carriage, special, tourist, and out on partaking in activities which she
temporary permits to its Secretary is fully would have normally done, if she had not
supported by the statutory provisions of met with this unfortunate accident. Noting
Section 68(5) of the MV Act, and Rule that the High Court, vide impugned
56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules, 1989. judgment and order, only enhanced the
compensation under the head of pain and
Baby Sakshi Greola vs. Manzoor Ahmad suffering from Rs. 50,000/- as awarded by
Simon: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3691– the Tribunal to Rs.1,00,000/-., the Court
Enhancement of compensation to Rs. said that the same is not commensurate to
50.8 Lakhs for mental and physical the impact the unfortunate accident had
disabilities suffered by minor in Motor and will have on the appellant as well as
Vehicle Accident-HELD- The Court relied her family members for the rest of their
on Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4 SCC lives. The Court viewed that the
413, and Master Ayush v. Branch compensation should be enhanced further
Manager, Reliance General Insurance and awarded compensation to the tune of
Company Limited, (2022) 7 SCC 738, Rs. 15,00,000/- to the present appellant
wherein it was held that taking notional under the head of pain and suffering.
income is not the correct approach. Loss of marriage prospects
Instead, the minimum wages payable to a
skilled workman in the State concerned The Court reiterated the evidence given by
has to be taken into consideration the doctor vide the disability certificate
because, that would be the minimum wherein she has opined that the mental
amount which she would have earned on status of the appellant would be the same
becoming a major. Thus, the Court as that of a child studying in the 2nd
concluded that to arrive at the Standard/Class. Further, it was stated that
compensation to be awarded under the the appellant would also have severe
head of loss of income and earnings due to apathy and therefore, maintaining/forming
disability, 40% should be added for marital/familial bonds with the
14 | P a g e
aforementioned conditions for the life and on a full-time basis. Considering
appellant is very difficult. The Court said her medical situation, the attendant would
that the appellant, therefore, has not only have to be skilled and not unskilled. The
lost her childhood but also her adult life. appellant would be requiring special care
Remarking that marriage/companionship is and attention which can only be provided
an integral part of the natural life of a by a skilled attendant. It was, therefore,
human being, the Court noted that the incorrect on the part of the High Court to
though the appellant is capable of proceed on the basis that the appellant
reproduction, it is near impossible for her could be taken care of by an unskilled
to rear children and enjoy the simple attendant and that too on a part-time basis.
pleasures of marital life and Therefore, relying on Kajal (supra) and
companionship. However, the Tribunal in Master Ayush (supra), the Court enhanced
the present case did not award any the compensation to Rs.9,42,000/-, under
compensation to the appellant under this this head.
head and the High Court, in appeal, Future Medical Treatment
without appreciating the impact of the non- The Court noted that the appellant would
pecuniary loss suffered by the appellant be requiring medical assistance in the form
only awarded compensation of Rs. of medicines, diapers, etc., so as to live a
1,00,000/- for the loss of marriage relatively comfortable life. Thus, the family
prospects. Therefore, the Court opined that of the appellant must be financially
this is a fit case where the compensation equipped to deal with the medical
awarded under the head of loss marriage conditions, current and potential.
prospects by the High Court is inadequate Therefore, the Court enhanced the
and the same must be enhanced to Rs. compensation to be awarded under this
5,00,000/- . head to Rs.5,00,000/-. The Court, while
Attendant Charges enhancing the total compensation to
The Court noted that the High Court 50,87,000/, upheld the enhanced rate of
observed that owing to the condition to interest by the High Court from the date of
which the appellant has been reduced, she the filing of the claim petition till the actual
would require the services of an attendant, realisation. Further, it directed the
though part-time. Thus, it adopted the Insurance Company to disburse the
minimum wages of an unskilled worker in compensation awarded to the appellant as
Delhi at the time of the accident being Rs. above. The Court directed that at present
3,934/-, for a part time attendant, and an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- should be
applied the multiplier of 18. Considering disbursed to the father of the appellant as
the same, the High Court computed her guardian. It was further directed that
attendant charges to be awarded as Rs. the rest of the amount be invested in one
(3,934/- ÷ 2) x 12 x 18 = Rs. 4,24,872/- or more Fixed Deposits Receipts so as to
and rounded it off to Rs. 4,25,000/-. The attract the maximum rate of interest. The
Court opined that the approach of the High interest amount was directed to be payable
Court on appreciation of the evidence that to the guardian of the appellant every
the appellant would only be requiring a part month.
time attendant is erroneous. On the
contrary, the appellant would be Dr. Mahima Tuli
dependent on an attendant throughout her Research Fellow
15 | P a g e
 EVENTS OF THE MONTH

 A Refresher-cum-orientation Course for Civil Judges from the States of Punjab, Haryana
and UT Chandigarh was organized at Chandigarh Judicial Academy on 08.02.2025. The
resource persons for the said training were Sh. H.S. Bhangoo, Faculty Member, CJA,
(Course Coordinator),Sh. Pradeep Mehta, Faculty Member, CJA, Dr. Gopal Arora, ADJ-
cum-Faculty Member(Course Coordinator), CJA and Ms.Parminder Kaur, ADJ-cum-
Faculty Member, CJA.

 An ECT_4_2024: Advocate/Advocates Clerk E-Courts in pursuance to the e-

committee special drive training and outreach programme through the Chandigarh
Judicial Academy was scheduled to be held at the District Headquarters/Sub- Division on
day convenient within 03rd to 10th February, 2025.

 An ECT_10_2024: Programme for technical staff-Hardware and Software

maintenance, data replication, data monitoring, VC equipment, LAN Connection
Etc. was held at the Chandigarh Judicial Academy on 8th & 9th February, 2025 for the
technical staff and NIC Coordinator at the High Court through Chandigarh Judicial
Academy through master trainers selected by CPC through physical/Online mode.

 The Inaugural function for one year Induction Training Programme for a group of 110
newly appointed HCS (JB) was held on February 16, 2025. The Induction Training was
inaugurated by Hon‘ble Mr. Justice Surya Kant, Judge, Supreme Court of India in the
august presence of Hon‘ble Mr. Justice Sheel Nagu, Chief Justice, Punjab & Haryana
High Court and Patron-in-Chief, CJA, Hon‘ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma,
President, Board of Governor, CJA along with other Hon‘ble judges of the High Court.
The ceremony was also graced by former judges, other distinguished guests from the
Hon‘ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana and parents of the officers. The vote of thanks
was extended by Sh.Ajay Kumar Sharda, District & Sessions Judge-cum-Director
(Administration) on behalf of the Chandigarh Judicial Academy.

 An ECT_17_2024: ICT & e-Courts Induction Programme for the newly recruited
Civil Judges were held at their respective place of posting through the Chandigarh
Judicial Academy on 18.02.2025 and 19.02.2025 for the newly recruited Civil Judges
from the State of Punjab.

 A Refresher Course on ECT_14_2024: Cyber Laws and Appreciation and Handling

of Digital evidence were held at the Chandigarh Judicial Academy on 22.02.2025 for
the Trainee Judicial Officers from the States of Punjab & Haryana undergoing Training at
the Chandigarh Judicial Academy. The Resource persons for the said course were Ms.
Deepa Singh, Advocate Punjab and Haryana High Court and Sh. Gurcharan Singh,
Faculty, CDTI, Chandigarh.

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 Refresher-cum-orientation Course for Civil Judges from the States of Punjab,
Haryana and UT Chandigarh

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 Inaugural function for one year Induction Training Programme for a
group of 110 newly appointed HCS (JB)

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 Refresher Course on ECT_14_2024: Cyber Laws and Appreciation and
Handling of Digital evidence

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