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The Politics of European Union
Enlargement

While the enlargement of the European Union is of indisputable and continued

relevance, both for the development of the EU and for international relations in
Europe more generally, it has been largely neglected in the theoretical literature on
European integration.
Developed and significantly expanded from a special issue of the Journal of
European Public Policy, this volume draws on the insights from the recently emerging
theoretically informed literature on the EU’s eastern enlargement and comple-
ments these studies with original articles that combine a theoretical approach with
comparative analyses. The expert contributors focus on the broader theoretical
debates and their implications for the enlargement of the EU, as well as placing the
enlargement of the EU within the broader context of the expansion of inter-
national organizations and the study of institutions in international relations.
This volume is a key reference text presenting the ‘state of the art’ of
theoretically informed studies of European Union enlargement. It is an invaluable
resource for students and researchers of European politics and international
relations.

Frank Schimmelfennig is Professor of European Politics at the Swiss Federal

Institute of Technology, Zürich, and author of The EU, NATO and the Integration of
Europe: Rules and Rhetoric (Cambridge University Press).

Ulrich Sedelmeier is Associate Professor in International Relations and European

Studies at the Central European University, Budapest, and author of the forth-
coming Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement (Manchester University Press).
Routledge Advances in European Politics

1 Russian Messianism 12 The European Union and e-Voting

Third Rome, revolution, Communism Addressing the European Parliament’s
and after internet voting challenge
Peter J. S. Duncan Edited by Alexander H. Trechsel and
Fernando Mendez
2 European Integration and the
Postmodern Condition 13 European Union Council Presidencies
Governance, democracy, identity A comparative perspective
Peter van Ham Edited by Ole Elgström

3 Nationalism in Italian Politics 14 European Governance and

The stories of the Northern League, Supranational Institutions
1980–2000 Making states comply
Damian Tambini Jonas Tallberg

4 International Intervention in the 15 European Union, NATO and Russia

Balkans since 1995 Martin Smith and Graham Timmins
Edited by Peter Siani-Davies
16 Business, the State and Economic
5 Widening the European Union Policy
The politics of institutional change and The case of Italy
reform G. Grant Amyot
Edited by Bernard Steunenberg
17 Europeanization and Transnational
6 Institutional Challenges in the States
European Union Comparing Nordic central governments
Edited by Madeleine Hosli, Adrian van Deemen Bengt Jacobsson, Per Lægreid and
and Mika Widgrén Ove K. Pedersen

7 Europe Unbound 18 European Union Enlargement

Enlarging and reshaping the boundaries A comparative history
of the European Union Edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert
Edited by Jan Zielonka
19 Gibraltar
8 Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans British or Spanish?
Nationalism and the destruction of Peter Gold
tradition
Cathie Carmichael 20 Gendering Spanish Democracy
Monica Threlfall, Christine Cousins and
9 Democracy and Enlargement in Post- Celia Valiente
Communist Europe
The democratisation of the general public 21 European Union Negotiations
in fifteen Central and Eastern European Processes, networks and institutions
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Christian W. Haerpfer
22 Evaluating Euro–Mediterranean
10 Private Sector Involvement in the Euro Relations
The power of ideas Stephen C. Calleya
Stefan Collignon and
Daniela Schwarzer 23 The Changing Face of European
Identity
11 Europe A seven-nation study of (supra)national
A Nietzschean perspective attachments
Stefan Elbe Edited by Richard Robyn
24 Governing Europe 29 Kosovo
Discourse, governmentality and The politics of identity and space
European integration Denisa Kostovicova
William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr
30 The Politics of European Union
25 Territory and Terror Enlargement
Conflicting nationalisms in the Basque Theoretical approaches
country Edited by Frank Schimmelfennig and
Jan Mansvelt Beck Ulrich Sedelmeier

26 Multilateralism, German Foreign 31 Europeanizing Social Democracy?

Policy and Central Europe The rise of the party of European
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27 Popular Protest in East Germany
Gareth Dale 32 Conflict and Change in EU Budgetary
Politics
28 Germany’s Foreign Policy towards Johannes Lindner
Poland and the Czech Republic
Ostpolitik revisited 33 Gibraltar, Identity and Empire
Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff Edward G. Archer
The Politics of European
Union Enlargement
Theoretical approaches

Edited by Frank Schimmelfennig

and Ulrich Sedelmeier
First published 2005
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.
“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”
© 2005 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier for selection and
editorial matter; individual contributors their contributions
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
The politics of European Union enlargement: theoretical approaches/edited
by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier.
p. cm.–(Routledge advances in European politics; 30)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. European Union–Membership. 2. Geopolitics–Europe. I.
Schimmelfennig, Frank, 1963– II. Sedelmeier, Ulrich, 1967– III. Series.
JN30.P6533 2005
341.242⬘2–dc22 2004028648

ISBN 0-203-00872-3 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0–415–36129–X (Print Edition)

Contents

List of tables ix
List of figures xi
List of contributors xiii
Preface and acknowledgements xv

PART I
Introduction 1

1 The politics of EU enlargement: theoretical and comparative

perspectives 3
FRANK SCHIMMELFENNIG AND ULRICH SEDELMEIER

PART II
The politics of accession in applicant countries 31

2 Scandinavia and Switzerland: small, successful and stubborn

towards the EU 33
SIEGLINDE GSTÖHL

3 The demand-side politics of EU enlargement: democracy and

the application for EU membership 52
WALTER MATTLI AND THOMAS PLÜMPER

4 The struggle over EU enlargement: a historical materialist

analysis of European integration 75
ANDREAS BIELER

PART III
The macro-politics of enlargement 97

5 Constructing institutional interests: EU and NATO enlargement 99

KARIN M. FIERKE AND ANTJE WIENER
viii Contents

6 Eastern enlargement: risk, rationality and role-compliance 120

ULRICH SEDELMEIER

7 The community trap: liberal norms, rhetorical action and the

eastern enlargement of the European Union 142
FRANK SCHIMMELFENNIG

8 Liberal community and enlargement: an event history analysis 172

FRANK SCHIMMELFENNIG

9 Preferences, power and equilibrium: the causes and consequences

of EU enlargement 198
ANDREW MORAVCSIK AND MILADA ANNA VACHUDOVA

10 Geopolitics and the eastern enlargement of the European Union 213

LARS S. SKÅLNES

PART IV
The substantive politics of enlargement 235

11 Sectoral dynamics of EU enlargement: advocacy, access and

alliances in a composite policy 237
ULRICH SEDELMEIER

12 Institutions, policy communities and EU enlargement: British,

Spanish and Central European accession negotiations in the
agricultural sector 258
LORENA RUANO

PART V
Theory, enlargement and European integration 277

13 Deepening and widening integration theory 279

MARKUS JACHTENFUCHS

14 Enlarging the European Union: reflections on the challenge

of analysis 287
HELEN WALLACE

Index 295
Tables

1.1 Dependent variables and comparative strategies in the enlargement

literature 7
1.2 Theoretical positions in the politics of EFTA and eastern
enlargement 17
2.1 Export shares of the internal market and estimated trade barriers 37
2.2 Potential identity-related constraints to integration 46
3.1 The impact of democracy on ‘institution-building’ market reforms
across Central and Eastern European countries 61
3.2 A summary 68
3.3 Determinants of EU application: results from a Cox survival
regression with time-varying co-variates 69
6.1 Key dates in the eastern enlargement decision 128
7.1 Member-state preferences on enlargement 144
7.2 Member-state shares of EU exports to CEECs and EU economic
output 145
7.3 Data on the selection of CEECs for accession negotiations 153
8.1 Independent variables 177
8.2 Institutionalization model 1 182
8.3 Institutionalization model 2 182
8.4 Institutionalization model 3 183
8.5 Institutionalization model 4 183
8.6 Application model 1 184
8.7 Application model 2 184
8.8 Application model 3 185
8.9 Application model 4, EU 185
8.10 Accession model 1 187
8.11 Accession model 2 187
8.12 Accession model 3 188
8.13 Exclusion model 1 190
8.14 Exclusion model 2 190
8.15 Exclusion model 3 191
9.1 Enlargement rounds and asymmetric interdependence 201
10.1 EC trade with Eastern Europe, 1988–92 227
x Tables
10.2 France’s trade balances (imports–exports) with Eastern Europe,
1989–92 227
10.3 French trade balances (imports–exports) in sensitive sectors,
1990–92 228
11.1 Influence of policy advocates on sectoral policies in a composite
policy 246
11.2 Likelihood of an accommodation of applicant preferences in
sectoral policies if strongly opposed by sectoral interest groups 251
11.3 Effect of the status of policy paradigms on the likelihood of
accommodation 253
Figures

3.1 Political support and government’s choice of inefficient policies 64

3.2 The impact of regime type on the support maximizing market
distortion 65
3.3a Economic crisis and the reduction of market distortion in genuine 66
democracies
3.3b Economic crisis and the reduction of market distortion in less
democratic countries 66
Contributors

Andreas Bieler is a senior lecturer in the School of Politics at the University of

Nottingham.
Karin M. Fierke is a reader in the School of Politics and International Studies,
Queen’s University, Belfast.
Sieglinde Gstöhl is Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges.
Markus Jachtenfuchs is Professor of Political Science at the International
University, Bremen.
Walter Mattli is University of Oxford Lecturer in International Relations.
Andrew Moravcsik is Professor of Politics at Princeton University.
Thomas Plümper is Assistant Professor at the Department of Politics and
Management, University of Konstanz.
Lorena Ruano is Professor of International Relations at the Centro de
Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Mexico City.
Frank Schimmelfennig is Professor of European Politics at the Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology, Zürich.
Ulrich Sedelmeier is Associate Professor at the Department of International
Relations and European Studies at the Central European University, Budapest.
Lars S. Skålnes is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of
Oregon.
Milada Anna Vachudova is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
Helen Wallace is Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies,
European University Institute.
Antje Wiener is Professor in the School of Politics and International Studies, and
Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Queen’s University, Belfast.
Preface and acknowledgements

This volume builds on contributions to a special issue of the Journal of European

Public Policy (‘European Union Enlargement: Theoretical and Comparative
Approaches’, vol. 9, no. 4, August 2002). We have complemented these contribu-
tions with articles published elsewhere and original articles with the aim of bring-
ing together some of the key theoretically informed literature on EU enlargement.
The special issue developed from a workshop ‘Governance by Enlargement’ at
Darmstadt University of Technology in Germany in June 2000, funded by the
Volkswagen Foundation’s ‘Global Governance’ programme, and benefited from
Jean Monnet fellowships at the EUI’s Robert Schuman Centre in 2001–2. The
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES) supported this volume
with a visiting fellowship for Ulrich Sedelmeier in 2003 and agreed to pay the
indexing costs.
For the publication of this volume, we would like to thank Jeremy Richardson,
the editor of JEPP, for his support, as well as Heidi Bagtazo, Harriet Brinton and
Grace McInnes at Routledge, and two anonymous referees.
For their help with obtaining permission to reprint original articles we are
extremely grateful to Katie Halliday at Taylor & Francis, Liz Cooper at Oxford
University Press, Anna Clifford at Sage, Andrzej Tymowski at the American
Council of Learned Societies, and Christina Ellas at MIT Press Journals.

We gratefully acknowledge the following permissions:

From Taylor & Francis to reprint the following articles that originally appeared in
the Journal of European Public Policy, http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals:

● Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Theorising EU Enlargement:

Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research’, Journal of European
Public Policy, 9(4) (2002): 500–28.
● Sieglinde Gstöhl, ‘Scandinavia and Switzerland: Small, Successful and
Stubborn towards the EU’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(4) (2002): 529–49.
● Walter Mattli and Thomas Plümper, ‘The Demand-Side Politics of EU
Enlargement: Democracy and the Application for EU Membership’, Journal of
European Public Policy, 9(4) (2002): 550–74.
xvi Preface and acknowledgements
● Andreas Bieler, ‘The Struggle over EU Enlargement: A Historical Materialist
Analysis of European Integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(4) (2002):
575–97.
● Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘Liberal Community and Enlargement: An Event
History Analysis’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(4) (2002): 598–626.
● Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Sectoral Dynamics of EU Eastern Enlargement: Advo-
cacy, Access and Alliances in a Composite Policy’, Journal of European Public
Policy, 9(4) (2002): 627–49.
● Markus Jachtenfuchs, ‘Deepening and Widening Integration Theory’, Journal
of European Public Policy, 9(4) (2002): 650–7.
● Helen Wallace, ‘Enlarging the European Union: Reflections on the Challenge
of Analysis’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(4) (2002): 658–65.
● Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener, ‘Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and
NATO Enlargement’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(5) (1999): 721–42.

The following material is reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press,

www.oup.com:

● Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Eastern Enlargement’, from Risk, Reforms, Resistance and

Revival (The State of the European Union, vol. 5, 2000), ed. Maria Green Cowles
and Michael Smith.

The American Council of Learned Societies granted permission to reproduce the

following article:

● Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Vachudova, ‘National Interests, State Power

and EU Enlargement’, East European Politics and Societies, 17(1) (2003), 42–57.

MIT Press Journals granted permission to reprint the following article:

● Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical

Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, International
Organization, 55(1) (2001), pp. 47–80. © 2001 by the IO Foundation and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier,

Mannheim and Budapest
Part I

Introduction
1 The politics of EU enlargement
Theoretical and comparative perspectives1

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier

The study of enlargement: political relevance, theoretical

neglect and methodological shortcomings
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) is a key political process, both for
the EU and for international relations in Europe. While enlargement was a
sporadic event for much of the EU’s history, the end of the Cold War dramatically
increased its salience and established it as a permanent item on the EU’s agenda.
Three members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) joined in 1995 (Austria,
Sweden, Finland). Eight Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) – the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia
– plus Cyprus and Malta acceded in May 2004. Bulgaria and Romania are
currently engaged in accession negotiations and had 2007 confirmed as a plausible
date for membership. The Commission has cautiously recommended opening
accession negotiations with Turkey. The EU has also acknowledged the member-
ship perspective of the countries of the western Balkans and the Commission
issued a positive opinion on Croatia’s application.
The EU’s transformation from an exclusively West European organization into
the centre of gravity of pan-European institution-building makes it a dominant
locus of domestic policy-making and transnational relations for the entire region.
‘Europe’ is increasingly defined in terms of the EU; the ‘Europeanization’ or
‘Europeanness’ of individual countries has come to be measured by the intensity of
institutional relations with the EU and by the adoption of its organizational norms
and rules (see, e.g., Katzenstein 1997b: 262; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2005).
EU enlargement has far-reaching implications not only for the political shape of
Europe but also for the EU’s institutional set-up and its major policies. In the case
of eastern enlargement, this was reflected in the tough intra-EU negotiations over
the budget, the agricultural and regional policies, and the representation of
members in EU institutions.
In light of its political relevance, it is striking that EU enlargement has been a
largely neglected issue in the theory of regional integration (see also Friis and
Murphy 1999; Wallace 2000). The classical approaches to the study of integration
such as neo-functionalism and transactionalism mentioned the geographical
4 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier
growth of international communities only in passing (see Deutsch 1970: 4, 43–4;
Haas 1968: 313–17; Schmitter 1969: 165). This is not surprising: analysing the
establishment and stabilization of regional organizations logically precedes study-
ing their territorial expansion. Moreover, the heyday of regional integration
theory had come to an end before the EU’s first enlargement in 1973.2 In addition,
the subsequent move towards the analysis of substantive policies and the adoption
of theoretical frameworks from comparative politics (such as neo-corporatism and
network analysis) did little to further research on such a polity-building issue as
enlargement (see Friis and Murphy 1999: 213). It is more surprising that the
revival of regional integration studies in the early 1990s and the theoretical debate
between ‘intergovernmentalism’ and ‘supranationalism’ still focused exclusively
upon such issues of ‘deepening’ as the Single European Act, Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU), or legal integration.
The increased salience of enlargement since the end of the Cold War resulted in
a sizeable body of literature. While much of this literature consists of descriptive
studies of single cases – such as single enlargement rounds, single countries, or
single policy areas – the EFTA and eastern enlargement have also triggered
theory-oriented work. These analyses have started to address a number of weak-
nesses that have characterized the study of enlargement, namely (1) an insularity
of the study of EU enlargement which divorced it from the study of other
international organizations; (2) the lack of comparative research designs; (3) an
underspecification of dependent variables and a neglect of important dimensions
of enlargement; and (4) an underspecification of explanatory factors or indepen-
dent variables, and a subsequent neglect of exploring alternative explanations.
Yet more work in this direction is necessary to make the insights of these studies
more generalizable and thus to contribute to our cumulative understanding of
enlargement.
The goal of this volume is to bring together in a systematic form the insights
from recent theoretically informed studies of EU enlargement. These studies
provide examples of comparativist and statistical analyses of EU enlargement and
explore under-researched aspects of the enlargement process. More generally,
they contribute to the debate between rationalist and constructivist analyses in
international relations (IR) theory.
This introductory chapter makes three main contributions to structuring the
study of EU enlargement. First, we provide a conceptualization of enlargement
that relates EU enlargement to the study of international organizations more
broadly. We thus define EU enlargement as a process of gradual and formal
horizontal institutionalization. We then distinguish four main dimensions of a
thus-defined enlargement, draw out the key research questions in each of them,
and propose comparative research strategies to address them. Our second goal is
theory development. We suggest that, rather than striving for some kind of
‘enlargement theory’, it is more fruitful to link up the study of enlargement (as
institutionalization) with the study of institutions in IR and European integration
studies. Drawing on two basic approaches to the analysis of international
organizations – rationalist and sociological or constructivist institutionalism – we
 The politics of EU enlargement 5
derive core hypotheses on the conditions of enlargement. Finally, we demonstrate
the usefulness of these theoretical approaches in structuring the debate in an
overview of the state of research on EU enlargement.

Enlargement: definition and research focus

Definition
Even though this is a book on the enlargement of the EU, our conceptual and
theoretical focus is more general. To encourage comparative analysis, our defini-
tions, research foci, and hypotheses can also be applied to the enlargement of other
regional organizations. We propose to define the enlargement of an organization
as a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules
and norms.
Institutionalization means the process by which the actions and interactions of
social actors come to be normatively patterned. The difference between ‘hori-
zontal’ and ‘vertical’ institutionalization corresponds to the common usage of
‘widening’ and ‘deepening’. Horizontal institutionalization takes place when institu-
tions spread beyond the incumbent actors, that is, when the group of actors whose
actions and relations are governed by the organization’s norms becomes larger.
Organizational membership and organizational norms are formally defined. It is
therefore reasonable to concentrate on formal and purposive acts of horizontal
institutionalization such as the conclusion of association agreements or the signing
and coming into effect of accession treaties. However, organizational norms also
spread informally (‘diffuse’) beyond the boundaries of the organization, both to
aspiring members and to states that have no intention to join. Such diffusion might
result from unilateral adaptation in order to mitigate negative externalities of
regional integration itself, or from a convergence of practices when non-members
consider institutional templates of the organization as viable responses to broader
systemic challenges. We suggest focusing on purposive alignment with organiza-
tional rules, either more narrowly with a view to accession, or more broadly when
changes in institutional practices are a direct response to regional integration.
Horizontal institutionalization is a matter of degree, and enlargement is best
conceptualized as a gradual process that begins before, and continues after, the
admission of new members to the organization. Even in the absence of full
membership, outside actors might follow certain organizational norms and rules.
Non-members align with organizational rules as a result of the organization’s
accession conditionality, or because these rules are embodied in formal agree-
ments that create an institutional relationship short of full membership, such as
association agreements or agreements to participate in selected policies of the
organization (e.g., the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement or the Swiss
treaties with the EU). Conversely, new members of the organization may negotiate
post-accession transition periods before applying some of its norms, or they might
begin to participate in some of the organization’s policies at different times – as in
EMU or the Schengen Agreement.
6 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier
What are the consequences of such a definition of enlargement? First, by
defining enlargement as institutionalization, we establish an explicit link to the
study of institutions and open the analysis of enlargement to theories about the
establishment and effects of institutions. Second, it widens the field of enlargement
studies beyond the narrow focus on decisions about formal membership. Such a
wider focus includes, for example, horizontal institutionalization short of
membership, the expansion of the organization’s substantive policies, and the
impact of horizontal institutionalization in the applicants, the member states, and
the organization itself.

Research focus: dimensions of enlargement, dependent variables, and

comparative strategies
We can distinguish four main dimensions or aspects of enlargement, which
generate separate dependent variables for the study of enlargement. The literature
on EU enlargement has focused primarily on three dimensions of enlargement.
These dimensions concern the politics of EU enlargement: they analyse the process
leading to enlargement, or to decisions on formal acts of horizontal institutional-
ization. These dimensions could be labelled respectively as (1) applicants’ enlarge-
ment politics, (2) member state enlargement politics, and (3) EU enlargement
politics. We suggest that, in the last case, it is useful to distinguish between the
macro- or polity dimension and the substantive or policy dimension. While these
three dimensions of the politics of EU enlargement are the main focus of this
volume, a further dimension started to receive more attention only recently:
(4) the impact of enlargement, i.e., the effects of these formal acts of horizontal
institutionalization.
In this subsection, we identify the main research questions in each of these main
dimensions of enlargement in order to encourage a clearer specification of
dependent variables, which should facilitate debate and make research results
more comparable. Moreover, we observe that, to the extent that theoretical studies
exist, they have been primarily single case studies. We thus suggest how in each
dimension a broadening of the empirical focus can lead to a more comparative
research design towards more cross-sectional and longitudinal studies.3 Cross-
sectional studies compare the politics of different applicants and member states,
the EU and other regional organizations, diverse policy areas, and the impact of
enlargement in different domestic and international settings. Longitudinal studies
take the comparison further to the study of applicant and member-state politics
over time, the analysis of different enlargement rounds, and short-term and long-
term impacts. Table 1.1 maps the state of the literature on the basis of these
suggestions about dependent variables and comparative strategies.4

(1) Applicant enlargement politics

The basic question with regard to this dimension is why and under which condi-
tions non-members seek accession to a regional organization. Since horizontal
 The politics of EU enlargement 7
Table 1.1 Dependent variables and comparative strategies in the enlargement literature

Single case Cross-sectional (Cross-sectional and)

comparison longitudinal comparison

Applicants’ Bieler 2000; Fioretos Mattli 1999;

politics 1997; Ingebritsen 1998; Schimmelfennig
Smith 1999; Mattli ch 8; Bieler
and Plümper; Gstöhl
Member- Hyde-Price 2000;
state politics Tewes 1998;
Collins 2002
EU macro- Friis 1998a, 1998b;
politics Schimmelfennig ch. 7; Fierke and Wiener;
Sedelmeier ch. 6; Schimmelfennig
Moravcsik and ch. 8
Vachudova;
Skålnes
EU Haggard et al. 1993; Ruano
substantive Papadimitriou 2002;
politics Torreblanca 2001;
Sedelmeier ch. 11
Impact of Falkner 2000 Börzel 1999;
enlargement Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2005

institutionalization does not result only from full membership in a regional

organization, the broader question is under which conditions outsiders pursue a
change in their institutional relationship with the regional organization and what
kind of institutional relationship they prefer. Especially with regard to the EFTA
enlargement, there is already a sizeable body of theoretically informed literature,
which goes beyond single cases and uses cross-sectional comparisons within the
same enlargement round. These insights can be improved through longitudinal
comparisons across enlargement rounds (Mattli 1999; Bieler ch. 4 this volume;
Schimmelfennig ch. 8 this volume) and comparisons with cases of countries that
chose not to join (Gstöhl ch. 2 this volume) or to apply (Mattli and Plümper ch. 3
this volume).

(2) Member-state enlargement politics

The main question is under which conditions a member state of a regional
organization favours or opposes enlargement to a particular applicant country.
Theoretical studies of this dimension usually focus on single member states
(Collins 2002; Hyde-Price 2000; Tewes 1998). Even descriptive studies that
compare more than one member state are extremely rare (Lippert et al. 2001).
More systematic insights could be gained from comparisons of more member
states and/or across enlargement rounds. Furthermore, while studies of this
dimension of enlargement have concentrated mainly on member states, the focus
8 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier
could be broadened to analyse actors within the regional organization other than
national governments, such as institutional actors.

(3) EU enlargement politics

Under which conditions does the regional organization admit a new member, or
modify its institutional relationship with outside states? There are two analytically
separate dimensions to this question, which relate to the macro-dimension and the
substantive dimension of enlargement respectively.
The macro-dimension relates to the EU as a polity and concerns the question of
candidate selection and patterns of national membership of the organization. The
main questions are why the organization prefers to admit one state rather than
another and why it offers membership rather than some other form of (or no)
institutional relationship. While there is an emerging body of theoretical literature
on this dimension, studies have focused on single cases, mainly eastern enlarge-
ment (Friis 1998a, 1998b; Moravcsik and Vachudova ch. 9 this volume; Schimmel-
fennig 1998, ch. 7 this volume; Sedelmeier forthcoming, ch. 6 this volume; Sjursen
2002; Skålnes ch. 10 this volume). Preston (1997) provides a rare, but still pre-
dominantly descriptive, comparative analysis of successive EU enlargements.
There are some cross-sectional comparisons with the same enlargement round
of other international organizations, mainly between the eastern enlargements of
the EU and NATO. However, most of these studies are fairly descriptive (Croft et
al. 1999, Smith and Timmins 2000; Sperling 1999) and only few are theoretical
(Fierke and Wiener ch. 5 this volume; Schimmelfennig ch. 8 this volume, 2003).
For such cross-sectional and longitudinal comparisons, the basic question
concerns variations in the pattern of organizational size and national membership.
Why are some states more integrated than others, and why are they members of
one organization but not of another? Why do some organizations have a larger
membership and expand more quickly than others?
The substantive or policy dimension of EU politics concerns the concrete substance of
the organizational rules that are horizontally institutionalized. Theoretical analyses
of the macro-dimension have often neglected this dimension (but see Sedelmeier
1998, forthcoming). Studies of the substantive dimension seek to explain the
specific outcomes of accession negotiations in distinctive policy areas, but also the
nature of pre-accession conditionality or association policies (Friis 1998c; Jileva
2004; Smith 1998; Torreblanca 2001). The key question is to what extent out-
comes reflect the preferences of certain actors, such as the applicants, member
states, societal interest groups, or institutional actors. Explicitly comparative
theoretically oriented studies in this dimension are rare. In the case of eastern
enlargement, most cross-sectional comparisons focus on variations in outcomes
across different policy areas (Haggard et al. 1993; Papadimitriou 2002; Sedelmeier
ch. 11 this volume). However, trade liberalization between the EU and the CEEC
candidates could be also analysed in a comparison with negotiations between the
USA and Mexico in NAFTA (Phelan 2004). Even rarer are longitudinal studies
 The politics of EU enlargement 9
that compare policy outcomes in one issue area across enlargement rounds (Ruano
ch. 12 this volume).

(4) Impact of enlargement

Enlargement affects both the organization and the state to which its institutional
rules are extended. Frequent questions are how enlargement affects the distribu-
tion of power and interests in the organization and its effectiveness and efficiency
(see, e.g., Steunenberg 2002); how enlargement influences the organization’s
identity, norms, and goals; and what is the effect of a widening of membership on
the prospects for a deepening of integration within the organization. However,
most relevant for the study of horizontal institutionalization is the impact of
enlargement on new members and non-members. Here, the main questions are:
How does enlargement change the identity, the interests, and the behaviour of
governmental and societal actors? Under which conditions do they conform to the
norms of the organization?
This dimension has been relatively neglected in theoretical studies of enlarge-
ment. The literature on ‘Europeanization’ has analysed the effects of membership
on new members, but mainly in single case studies (Falkner 2000) or comparisons
between new and ‘old’ member states (Börzel 1999). Only recently have their
insights been applied to study the pre-accession effects on candidate countries.
Some studies of eastern enlargement have combined insights from theoretical
studies of the impact of international organizations, the Europeanization literature,
and the literature on the transformations in the CEECs (e.g., Goetz 2001; Grabbe
2001; Jacoby 2004; Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005;
Vachudova 2005). Such studies have redressed the picture of a mainly descriptive
literature on the effect of the EU on the candidates, which was often limited to
single countries and single policy areas. While we emphasize that this is a central
dimension of enlargement, which requires more research, the contributions in this
volume focus on various dimensions of the politics of EU enlargement.

Theoretical approaches to enlargement: rationalism,

constructivism, and hypotheses for enlargement
We propose to embed the analysis of enlargement in the current IR debate between
rationalist and sociological or constructivist institutionalism (see, e.g., Katzenstein
et al. 1999; on its relevance for EU studies, Christiansen et al. 1999; Aspinwall and
Schneider 2001). This debate offers a broad spectrum of assumptions and
hypotheses about the conditions of institutionalization and about institutional
effects. It spans the two disciplines that have contributed most to the social science
analysis of institutions: economics and sociology. Furthermore, linking the study
of enlargement to the analysis of institutions in IR and the general social sciences
prevents theoretical insularity. Finally, it is our impression that the growing body
of theoretically oriented work on enlargement fits in well with this debate. After
10 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier
briefly outlining the theoretical foundations of both institutionalist approaches, we
specify hypotheses for the dimensions or dependent variables in the study of
enlargement.

Theoretical foundations
Rationalism and constructivism do not provide us with fully elaborated and inter-
nally consistent competing hypotheses on enlargement that we could rigorously
test against each other: first, both rationalism and constructivism are social meta-
theories defined by a set of (mainly ontological) assumptions about the social
world rather than by specific hypotheses. There is a variety of substantial theories
based on either rationalist or constructivist assumptions that attribute preferences
and outcomes to different factors and lead to different and even contradictory
expectations about enlargement. Second, the differences between rationalist and
sociological theories of institutions are multidimensional and often a matter of
degree rather than principle. It is therefore more useful to regard the two insti-
tutionalisms as partially competing and partially complementary sources of
theoretical inspiration for the study of enlargement (on synthesis between different
institutionalisms, see, e.g., Jupille et al. 2003). In the following, we will nevertheless
construct two ideal types of a rationalist and a sociological analysis of enlargement
in order to portray the theoretical alternatives as clearly as possible.
At the most fundamental level, rationalist and constructivist institutionalism are
based on different social ontologies (individualism and materialism in rationalism
and a social and ideational ontology in constructivism) and assume different logics
of action – a rationalist logic of consequentiality opposed to a constructivist logic of
appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989: 160). These divergent premises are
reflected in different perspectives on the causal status and purposes of inter-
national organizations which, in turn, lead to competing hypotheses about the
rationale, the conditions, and the mechanisms of enlargement.
In rationalist institutionalism, the causal status of institutions generally remains
secondary to that of individual, material interests. Institutions are treated as
intervening variables between the material interests and the material environment
of the actors, on the one hand, and the collective outcomes, on the other. They
provide mainly constraints and incentives, not reasons, for action; they alter cost–
benefit calculations, not identities and interests. By contrast, in the constructivist
perspective, institutions shape actors’ identities and interests. Actors do not simply
confront institutions as external constraints and incentives towards which they
behave expediently. Rather, institutions provide meaning to the rights and
obligations entailed in their social roles. Actors conform with institutionally
prescribed behaviour out of normative commitment or habit.5
The different conceptions of institutions are reflected in the functions and
workings that both theories typically ascribe to international organizations. In the
rationalist account, international organizations are instrumental associations
designed to help states pursue their interests more efficiently. According to Abbott
and Snidal (1998), they are attractive to states because of two functional
 The politics of EU enlargement 11
characteristics that reduce transaction costs: centralization and independence.
International organizations render collective action more efficient, e.g., by pro-
viding stable negotiating forums, pooling activities, elaborating norms, and acting
as a neutral information provider, trustee, allocator, or arbiter. Moreover, states
pool and delegate authority to international organizations in order to ‘constrain
and control one another’ (Moravcsik 1998: 9). By removing the interpretation,
implementation, and enforcement of agreements from the reach of domestic
opposition and from the unilateral control of state governments, international
organizations raise the visibility and the costs of non-compliance (ibid.: 73–4).
Rationalist IR theories generally do not accord international organizations the
status of purposive and autonomous actors in international politics. Although the
economic theory of bureaucracy suggests that international agencies try to
maximize their resources and turf, these theories regard the states’ concern for
autonomy as too strong, and the power of international bureaucracy as too limited,
for international organizations to represent anything but the instruments of states.
Moreover, rationalist theories conceive international organizations as clubs, that is,
voluntary groups ‘in the sense that members would not join (or remain in the club)
unless a net gain resulted from membership’ (Sandler and Tschirhart 1980: 1491).
Whereas rationalist institutionalism emphasizes the instrumental, regulatory,
and efficiency-enhancing functions of international organizations, sociological
institutionalism sees them as autonomous and powerful actors with constitutive
and legitimacy-providing functions. International organizations are ‘community
representatives’ (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 24) as well as community-building
agencies. Their origins, goals, and procedures are more strongly determined by
the standards of legitimacy and appropriateness of the international community
they represent (and which constitute their cultural and institutional environment)
than by the utilitarian demand for efficient problem-solving (see, e.g., Barnett and
Finnemore 1999: 703; Katzenstein 1997a: 12; Weber 1994: 4–5, 32). International
organizations ‘can become autonomous sites of authority . . . because of power
flowing from at least two sources: (1) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority
they embody, and (2) control over technical expertise and information’ (Barnett
and Finnemore 1999: 707). Due to these sources of power, international organiza-
tions are able ‘to impose definitions of member characteristics and purposes upon
the governments of its member states’ (McNeely 1995: 33; cf. also Finnemore
1996). For instance, they ‘define international tasks [and] new categories of actors
. . . create new interests for actors . . . and transfer models of political organizations
around the world’ (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). On the basis of these theor-
etical foundations, we present some core rationalist and constructivist hypotheses
for the enlargement of international organizations.

Rationalist hypotheses
Rationalist explanations of enlargement involve two steps: first, the explanation of
applicant and member state enlargement preferences and, second, the explanation
of organizational collective enlargement decisions at the macro- and policy levels.
12 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier
Applicant and member state politics
As in all rationalist theory, expected individual costs and benefits determine the
applicants’ and the member states’ enlargement preferences. States favour the kind
and degree of horizontal institutionalization that maximizes their net benefits. More specific-
ally, a member state favours the integration of an outsider state – and an outsider
seeks to expand its institutional ties with the organization – under the conditions
that it will reap positive net benefits from enlargement, and that these benefits
exceed the benefits it would secure from an alternative form of horizontal
institutionalization. This general hypothesis, however, begs the question of what
the relevant costs and benefits are. In this respect, rationalist hypotheses vary to a
great extent. First, we can distinguish three categories of costs and benefits thought
to be most relevant for the enlargement preferences of applicants and members.
These are transaction (or management), policy, and autonomy costs and benefits.
Transaction costs rise for the member states because additional members require
additional organizational infrastructure and make communication within the
organization more cumbersome and costly. Additional members usually also
increase the heterogeneity of the membership, and ‘the costs of centralized
decisions are likely to rise where more and more persons of differing tastes
participate’ (Sandler et al. 1978: 69). Applicants have to establish delegations at the
headquarters of the organization and incur costs of communication, coordination,
and supervision in the relations between these delegations and capitals. These
costs are balanced by benefits such as the provision of organizational services to
the member states and faster communication and coordination between incum-
bents and new member states.
For the member states, policy costs come in the form of crowding because, in an
enlarged organization, they have to share collective goods with the new members.
For the applicants, policy costs involve membership contributions and the adapta-
tion of domestic policies (see Mattli and Plümper ch. 3 this volume). Conversely,
the incumbent members obtain policy benefits from the contributions of new
members to the club goods, and applicants can expect to benefit from being able to
participate in the club goods.
Autonomy costs arise because horizontal institutionalization implies foregoing
unilateral policy options both for the member states and for the applicants. For
member states, which have already lost policy-making autonomy in the integrated
issue areas, autonomy costs mainly consist in having to accord new members equal
decision-making rights. In general, under the EU’s qualified majority voting rule,
the individual member states’ degree of control over outcomes decreases with
enlargement (see, e.g., Kerremans 1998). In return, member states may gain better
control over external political developments in the applicant states. For the latter,
the greatest cost is the loss of policy-making autonomy as a result of membership.
This loss, however, can be balanced by both the right to participate in organiza-
tional decision-making and the protection of state autonomy provided by the
organization against other states or domestic society.
Second, rationalist IR theories differ with regard to the kind of cost–benefit
 The politics of EU enlargement 13
calculations that states typically make (see, e.g., Baldwin 1993; Hasenclever et al.
1997: chs 3–4). Neo-liberal institutionalists assume that states care mainly about their
own absolute gains and losses. Whereas enlargement must result in net welfare
benefits in order to find support, autonomy benefits and costs are secondary. By
contrast, realists assume that state actors are concerned mainly with external autonomy
and power. In international cooperation, they worry about the distribution of
benefits among the participating states, because the relative gains and losses vis-à-
vis other states will affect their future international power position and security.
Correspondingly, a member state favours enlargement, and a non-member state
bids to join an international organization, if this is a necessary and efficient means
to balance the superior power or threat of a third state (or coalition of states) or to
increase its own power (see, e.g., Walt 1987; Waltz 1979: 117–27). A third strand
of rationalist institutionalism assumes that states are indeed most concerned about
their autonomy, but not so much vis-à-vis other states as in relation to their own societies
(Vaubel 1986; Wolf 1999). Focusing on applicant states, Mattli (1999) integrates
both external and internal autonomy concerns: state leaders will be willing to bear
the autonomy costs of integration only in order to retain political power. Assuming
that a government’s re-election chances will depend mainly on economic perform-
ance, ‘a country seeks to integrate its economy only when there is a significant
positive cost of maintaining its present governance structure in terms of foregone
growth (as measured by a continuing performance gap between it and a more
integrated rival governance structure)’ (Mattli 1999: 81; see also Mattli 2000).
The third difference concerns the material conditions that determine a state’s
cost–benefit calculations. Rationalist approaches to enlargement have identified
various sources of enlargement preferences. Among these are general systemic conditions, such
as changes in the world economy, in technology, or the security environment – for
instance, the denationalization of the economy creates incentives for joining an
international economic organization. Then there are organization-specific systemic
conditions, such as the degree of integration of the organization – for example, the
deepening of economic integration in the organization will create negative
externalities for outsiders (diversion of trade and investment) and trigger demand
for membership. Alternatively, a high degree of integration may deter states that
value autonomy highly. Also involved are the positional characteristics of states, such as
the extent of their economic dependence on a regional organization or their
geographical position – for instance, the more trade dependent a state is on the
members of an economic union, the stronger its demand for membership. Finally
there are subsystemic conditions and domestic structure, such as the relative strength of
economic sectors or factors – for instance, the stronger the capital- or export-
oriented sectors, the greater the demand for integration.

EU macro- and substantive politics

According to club theory, the most pertinent rationalist approach to the optimal
size of organizations is that the organization expands its institutions and membership if, for
both the member states and the applicant states, the marginal benefits of enlargement exceed the
14 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier
marginal costs. In the club-theoretical perspective, enlargement will continue until
marginal costs equal marginal benefits. This equilibrium indicates the optimal size
of the organization (Buchanan 1965: 5; Padoan 1997: 118). However, the
outcomes of organizational enlargement politics also depend on (1) constellations
of bargaining power and (2) formal decision-making rules.
It is not necessary that enlargement as such is beneficial to each member. Enlarge-
ment can also result from unequal bargaining power among the incumbents.6
Member states that expect net losses from enlargement will agree to enlargement if
their bargaining power is sufficient to obtain full compensation through side-
payments by the winners (which, in turn, requires that the necessary concessions
do not exceed the winners’ gains from enlargement). Otherwise, the losers will
consent to enlargement if the winners are able to threaten them credibly with
exclusion (and if the losses of exclusion for the losers exceed the losses of
enlargement).
The other factor to take into account is formal decision-making rules. In general,
enlargement requires the consensus of all member states. In the EU, three further
extensions have to be taken into account. First, accession and association treaties
have to be ratified by national parliaments and accession treaties must or can
be subjected to a referendum in the applicant countries as well as in some of
the member states. Second, association and accession require the consent of the
European Parliament (EP) under the assent procedure.7 Finally, EU policies that
are affected by enlargement (such as agriculture, trade, or regional policies) are
governed by different policy rules and decision-making procedures. These rules
and procedures privilege individual governments and interest groups in the
distributional politics of enlargement (see Wennerlund 2000).

Constructivist hypotheses
In contrast to rationalist hypotheses, sociological explanations of enlargement
usually start not with actor preferences but at the systemic, ‘organizational’ level.
However, to the extent that they allow for ideational conflict, the differentiation
between the state level and the EU level can be upheld. According to constructivist
institutionalism, enlargement politics will generally be shaped by ideational,
cultural factors. The most relevant of these factors is ‘community’ or ‘cultural
match’ (see, e.g., Checkel 1999; Cortell and Davis 2000), that is, the degree to
which the actors inside and outside the organization share a collective identity and
fundamental beliefs. Studying enlargement in a constructivist perspective, then,
consists primarily in the analysis of social identities, values, and norms, not in the
material, distributional consequences of enlargement for individual actors.

Applicant and member-state politics

Applicants and members ‘construct’ each other and their relationship on the basis
of the ideas that define the community represented by the international organiza-
tion. Whether applicant and member states regard enlargement as desirable
 The politics of EU enlargement 15
depends on the degree of community they perceive to have with each other. The
general hypotheses about applicant and member-state politics are highly similar:
The more an external state identifies with the international community that the organization
represents and the more it shares the values and norms that define the purpose and the policies of
the organization, the stronger the institutional ties it seeks with this organization and the more the
member states are willing to pursue horizontal institutionalization with this state.
With regard to the EU, applicant and member-state politics are about whether
an applicant state is ‘European’, subscribes to the integrationist project of an ‘ever
closer union’, adheres to the liberal-democratic political value foundations of the
EU, or shares the norms underlying specific EU policies (see Gstöhl ch. 2 this
volume). Depending on the extent of the domestic consensus on the applicant
state’s identity and policy norms, applicant politics will be more or less contro-
versial and the resulting enlargement preferences will be more or less stable and
strong.
On average, in the constructivist perspective, we would expect greater conflict
within applicant states on the enlargement issue than within the member states.
First, for an applicant state, the decision to join a regional organization, and in
particular the EU, constitutes a major political reorientation, whereas, for the
member states, the decision to enlarge an existing organization is more a matter of
policy continuity. Second, member states can be assumed to share the constitutive
values and norms of their community organization and to have been exposed, for a
certain time, to socialization within the organization.

EU macro- and substantive politics

Correspondingly, and in contrast to rationalist institutionalism, we would expect a
low degree of variation among preferences and conflict among the member-state
actors. As sociological institutionalism often assumes strong institutional and
cultural effects (‘socialization’ or ‘Europeanization’) at the systemic level, member
states will have largely homogeneous enlargement preferences. If we relax this
assumption, we expect to see more variation in preferences.
First, if there is tension among the community values and norms, then there will
not be a single, unambiguous standard shaping the enlargement preferences of the
incumbents. The debate about the priority between deepening or widening in the
EU is a case in point. Second, identification with, and internalization of, the com-
munity values and norms may vary not only among the external states but also
among the community actors. Whereas we can expect, for instance, the organi-
zational actors (such as the European Commission) to hold preferences that are
strongly influenced by the organizational norms, member-state governments may
be subject to partly competing influences from national and international identities
as well as cultural and institutional environments. Finally, the resonance of
particular organizational norms might vary across different groups of policy-
makers, depending on their functional and organizational positions. This potential
tension is particularly important for the policy dimension of enlargement. While
more general organizational norms and constitutive values might have a stronger
16 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier
impact on the macro-politics of enlargement, distinctive substantive policies might
be shaped to a larger extent by the particular norms (or policy paradigms) under-
pinning the policy area in question (Sedelmeier forthcoming, ch. 11 this volume;
Ruano ch. 12 this volume).
Even in the case of normative conflict within the organization, however, the
decision-making process will not be a bargaining process but a process of arguing
(see, e.g., Risse 2000). If, for instance, it is unclear or contested which community
norm applies in a given situation, whether organizational norms override conflict-
ing national norms, or to what degree an external state shares the fundamental
beliefs and adheres to the fundamental practices of the community, the actors
engage in discourse. They challenge the validity claims of the other actors’
preferences and definitions of the situation, put forward arguments in favour of
their positions, and seek a consensus based on the better argument. Although it
cannot always be determined theoretically what the best and convincing argument
will be in a given situation, it should be one that is based on the collective identity,
the constitutive beliefs and practices of the community, and the norms and rules of
the organization. More fundamentally, arguing and discourse have the potential to
modify old, or construct new, identities and norms. Incumbents and outsiders
continuously seek to define and redefine the boundaries of the community,
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and to interpret and reinterpret the organizational norms.
As a result, we will observe change in the definition or extension of the inter-
national community and in its enlargement practices.
Eventually, the outcome of organizational politics will again depend on the
degree of community and cultural or normative match. The organization expands (its
institutions) to outside states to the extent that these states share its collective identity, values, and
norms. The higher the degree of community and the better the cultural or norma-
tive match, the faster and the deeper will be the process of horizontal institution-
alization. Enlargement will continue until the (cultural) borders of the international
community and the (formal, institutional) borders of the international organiza-
tion match. More generally, the differentiated pattern of institutional relationships
between the organization and the states in its environment will be congruent with
their differentiated degree of cultural and normative agreement.

The state of research: focus and controversies in EFTA and

eastern enlargement
Table 1.1 (above) reflects that theory-oriented research on enlargement has
concentrated on the two major processes of the 1990s: the 1995 enlargement to
include three former EFTA members and the ongoing process of eastern enlarge-
ment. Only very few authors examine earlier enlargement rounds and compare
them with subsequent enlargements (Ruano ch. 12 this volume).
Analyses of EFTA and eastern enlargement reveal quite different patterns.
Table 1.1 shows that the dominant research focus in the two cases has been on
different dimensions of enlargement. While research on EFTA enlargement has
concentrated on applicant politics, studies of eastern enlargement have predomi-
 The politics of EU enlargement 17
nantly analysed EU (macro-)politics. In addition, we observe different patterns in
the theoretical debates between competing explanations in the two cases (see table
1.2). In the case of EFTA enlargement, rationalist explanations dominate and the
controversies are mainly among factors that all fit within a rationalist framework.
By contrast, sociological factors (values and norms) have figured more promi-
nently in accounts of eastern enlargement.
In this section, we review, and place into context, the previously rather
disjointed theoretical literature on EU enlargement. We do not intend to present a
comprehensive overview of enlargement research, but aim to indicate major
tendencies and controversies and to locate the contributions to this volume within
the literature. Our review demonstrates that the rationalist/constructivist debate is
a useful way to structure and organize these controversies. However, we do not
intend systematically to test the hypotheses that we derived in the previous section
in the cases of EFTA and eastern enlargement. Rather, we point out where contro-
versies in the study of enlargement reflect this debate. We reiterate that we do not
conceive of the debate as mutually exclusive explanations. Many of the contri-
butions combine rationalist and constructivist insights. At the same time, our
overview demonstrates that debates on some aspects of individual enlargement
rounds can plausibly be conducted exclusively in a rationalist, and on others in a
constructivist framework.

Table 1.2 Theoretical positions in the politics of EFTA and eastern enlargement

Rationalist Constructivist

Applicants’ Bieler 2000; Fioretos 1997; Gstöhl (national identity)

politics Ingebritsen 1998; Mattli 1999;
Smith 1999; Bieler (structure of
production process); Mattli and
Plümper (domestic reform
incentives); Moravcsik and
Vachudova (national interest and
bargaining power)
Member-state Collins 2002 Hyde-Price 2000; Tewes 1998
politics
EU macro- Friis 1998a, 1998b;
politics Moravcsik and Vachudova
(national interest and bargaining
power); Skålnes (geopolitics) Friis 1998c; Fierke and Wiener
(Western Cold War promises
in the CSCE Helsinki declaration);
Sedelmeier ch. 6 (EU identity
construction vis-à-vis CEECs);
Schimmelfennig chs 7, 8
(democratic community)
EU substantive Haggard et al. 1993; Sedelmeier ch. 11 (policy
politics Ruano (institutional structures) paradigms)
18 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier
EFTA enlargement

Systemic factors underpinning applicant enlargement politics

The main puzzle that studies of the EFTA enlargement identify concerns the
applicants’ enlargement politics (but see Friis 1998a). Thus, the key question
pursued is: why at the beginning of the 1990s did the EFTA countries, after a long
period of deliberate non-membership, develop an interest in closer ties with, and
membership in, the EU?
There is a broad agreement in the literature that three major developments at
the systemic level that fit well with a rationalist framework can account for the
timing of the EFTA countries’ interest in EU membership. The end of the Cold
War removed an obstacle to EU membership, since the majority of the EFTA
countries (except for Iceland and Norway) were neutral and non-aligned
(Ingebritsen 1998: 10; Mattli 1999: 88). Changes in the world economy, namely
the oil crisis and globalization, as well as the negative externalities resulting from
the deepening of EU integration, created positive incentives for a stronger
institutional relationship.
Ingebritsen (1997: 174) argues that, as a result of the oil shock, the Scandinavian
countries had embarked upon a transformation of their economic model so that
‘Scandinavian political economies shared more in common with European
institutions and policies than in the previous accession period (the 1970s).’ When
the EU launched its internal market programme, the EFTA economies performed
worse than the EU-6 in terms of economic growth and experienced a dramatic
increase in outward investment. On the one hand, therefore, the internal market
provided a strong pull, as it offered the prospect of increasing competitiveness,
while on the other hand the threat of a relocation of investment had a push effect
(see, e.g., Mattli 1999: 82, 89; Fioretos 1997: 312–16; Bieler 2000: 41–3, 73–4). The
pressure to join the internal market grew due to a ‘domino effect’ after Austria
applied for membership in 1989 (Baldwin 1995: 33).
In contrast to the broad agreement about the underlying systemic factors, there
is a more controversial debate about how these systemic factors translated into
domestic politics in individual countries. There are two distinctive questions to
this debate, which an exclusive focus on the systemic level fails to answer. The first
is about how these systemic factors translated into alliances of actors at the
domestic level that successfully pushed for EU membership. The second goes
further towards clarifying the conditions under which outsiders join by also
considering cases that did not result in accession.

Composition and structure of domestic alliances leading to accession

With regard to the first debate, Fioretos (1997) argues that export-oriented Swedish
firms successfully pushed the Swedish government to pursue EU membership by
threatening to relocate their investment. By contrast, Smith (1999) places more
emphasis on government choice than on societal pressure as well as on the political
 The politics of EU enlargement 19
power of economic ideas. He argues that the economic downturn persuaded the
Finnish and Swedish governments of the need for a radical change in economic
policy, which in turn required a fundamental change in state–society relations. EU
membership was thus a means to play a ‘two-level game’ to overcome domestic
corporatist arrangements, to which the EEA provided a strategic route: while the
EEA did not require popular approval (except in Switzerland), the fait accompli of
EEA membership created strong incentives for full membership.
Finally, Bieler’s neo-Gramscian analysis of Sweden and Austria echoes to some
extent the more constructivist notion of economic ideas as underpinning a neo-
liberal ‘hegemonic project’ (Bieler 2000, ch. 4 this volume). Otherwise, however,
Bieler argues that domestic actors react to material constraints and incentives. In
contrast to both Fioretos and Smith, he does not see either governments or societal
groups as pushing or pushed, but observes partly cross-cutting alliances between
the social forces of business and labour as well as certain state institutions. The
cleavage in these alliances relates to whether they are oriented at domestic or
transnational production processes.

Variations in domestic approval of membership

The second debate concerns competing explanations for variations in the success
of different applicants’ governments to obtain approval for their applications or
accession treaties in national referenda. Drawing on aggregate data on economic
performance, Mattli attributes the negative outcome of the Norwegian referendum
to the fact that, for the second time after 1972, the economic performance gap with
the EU had disappeared between application and ratification (1999: 85–6). Other
studies argue that these variations depended mainly on domestic structures in the
applicant countries.
In her analysis of the Nordic countries, Ingebritsen (1998) attributes the
variation in outcomes to different leading sectors in the Scandinavian economies.
Whereas Sweden and, to a lower degree, Finland are capital-intensive manufac-
turing exporters (which makes them sensitive to changes in their export markets
and to the threat of disinvestment), Norway’s income is dominated by the
petroleum sector, which not only makes this country less dependent on the Euro-
pean market but also allows it to protect its agriculture and fisheries at higher
levels than the EU. This finding is corroborated by Moses and Jenssen (1998),
whose analysis of the referenda at the county level shows that (subnational)
regions that depend on sheltered sectors were less likely to support membership
than those dependent on manufacture and trade.
Materialist and rationalist explanations, however, cannot account for the Swiss
case. Observers attribute the Swiss ‘no’ to the EEA to socio-political characteristics
such as multinationality or to voters’ concerns about neutrality, sovereignty, and
direct democracy (Arndt 1998: 268; Mattli 1999: 93–4) or simply to the Swiss
government’s poor management of the application process (Dupont et al. 1999).
Gstöhl (ch. 2 this volume) makes a more general argument that constructivist
approaches are necessary complements to an analysis of material cost and benefits,
20 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier
in order to understand how particular national identity constructions result in
‘reluctance’ towards EU membership. She emphasizes the importance in such
identity constructions of geo-historical factors (foreign policy traditions and
experiences of foreign rule), socio-political institutions, and societal cleavages.
Thus, the story of EFTA membership applications can plausibly be told in
rationalist terms. Changes in their security and economic environment led the
EFTA governments to recalculate the costs and benefits of EU membership on the
basis of their material interests in power and welfare. By contrast, identity-related
factors that could have been an obstacle to EU membership seem to have mattered
less. However, the apparent unimportance of conflicting national identity
constructions seems to have been primarily the case for governmental elites. By
contrast, for electorates in national referenda, presumed characteristics of national
identity and political culture (corporatism, neutrality) seem to have mattered more
than material cost–benefit calculations.

Eastern enlargement

Applicant politics and member-state politics

In contrast to EFTA enlargement, work on eastern enlargement has focused on
EU politics. The CEECs’ desire to join the EU appears largely uncontroversial, as
it conforms with both constructivist and rationalist expectations. The argument
that EU membership as part of the CEECs’ foreign policy object to ‘return to
Europe’ is motivated by their desire to cast off an ‘eastern’ identity and to be
recognized by the European international community as ‘one of us’ (see, e.g.,
Kolankiewicz 1993; Neumann 1993) fits well with constructivist arguments.
Indeed, Schimmelfennig (ch. 8 this volume) suggests that the extent to which
different CEECs adhere to liberal democratic norms is the most consistent
indicator of their membership applications, not just to the EU, but also to other
European organizations that are based on these values.
Likewise, material cost–benefit calculations would lead us to expect a strong
CEEC interest in EU membership (Moravcsik and Vachudova ch. 9 this volume).
The CEECs can expect to benefit not only from full economic integration in terms
of market access and incentives for foreign direct investment, but also in terms of
budgetary receipts and a voice in EU decision-making. Mattli and Plümper (ch. 3
this volume) offer a formal rationalist model that explains how the extent of
democratization in the CEECs – used by Schimmelfennig (ch. 8 this volume) as a
‘constructivist’ indicator for the degree of community between the organizations
and the applicants – can also be conceived as a ‘rationalist’ indicator for the
domestic incentives and costs of membership. They argue that the main result of
EU membership is to redress economic distortions and to maximize aggregate
welfare. Democratic regimes are more likely to pursue such policies than non-
democratic regimes. In the latter, domestic interest groups can more easily resist
changes in the status quo, which guarantees their rents at the expense of aggregate
welfare (see also, e.g., Vachudova 2001, 2005).
 The politics of EU enlargement 21
There are also only few theoretical studies of member-state politics. Again, this
appears to reflect that the member governments’ preferences (see, e.g., Grabbe and
Hughes 1998: 4–6) conform well with rationalist expectations about cost–benefit
calculations. Material conditions, in particular geographical proximity (both as
a proxy for interdependence and geopolitical interests) and socio-economic
structure (affecting gains/losses from competition for market access, investment,
and budgetary receipts), go a long way towards explaining variations in the
member governments’ preferences about the speed of eastern enlargement and the
selection of candidates (Schimmelfennig ch. 7 this volume; Sedelmeier 1994).
However, the analyses of the German case by Tewes (1998) and Hyde-Price
(2000) suggest that there is also a more sociological explanation of German govern-
ments’ support for enlargement as the result of complex role conflicts in German
foreign policy.

EU macro-politics
Theoretical studies of eastern enlargement have focused predominantly, and often
exclusively, on the macro-dimension of EU politics. The key question that these
studies address is why the EU decided to enlarge. Moravcsik and Vachudova (ch.
9 this volume) provide a rationalist explanation for the decision to enlarge and the
outcome of accession negotiations. The preferences of the member states appear to
reflect differences in domestic socio-economic structures that lead to an uneven
distribution of economic opportunities or competition, as well as rivalry for
receipts from the EU budget. While the uneven distribution of costs and benefits
from enlargement led to opposition from some member states, Moravcsik and
Vachudova argue that these costs were not sufficiently large for them to block
enlargement (see p. 205). The strongly asymmetrical bargaining power between
the incumbents and the CEECs allowed the reluctant EU members to minimize
the expected costs to the detriment of the new members. Skålnes (ch. 10 this
volume) draws on insights from realism to explain the EU’s decision to enlarge
with the long-term security interest of EU members. The wars following the break-
up of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo conflict raised concerns about stability in their
neighbourhood and thus led respectively to the decision to enlarge and to include
all CEEC applicants in accession negotiations.
However, the bulk of analyses of eastern enlargement are underpinned by what
is perhaps a surprisingly strong consensus that a rationalist, materialist framework
is insufficient. Counterfactuals suggest that the decision to enlarge presents puzzles
for rationalist approaches that focus on the distribution of egoistic, material prefer-
ences and bargaining power (Schimmelfennig ch. 7 this volume; Sedelmeier 1998:
2). The CEECs did not possess the bargaining power to make the reluctant
majority of member states accept their bid to join the EU, since economic inter-
dependence between the member states and the applicants is highly asymmetrical
in favour of the EU. In turn, the proponents of eastern enlargement in the EU
(Britain, Denmark, Germany) were in a clear minority and could not credibly
threaten the more reluctant governments with any attractive unilateral or
22 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier
coalitional alternative outside the EU framework (such as some form of Northern–
Central European integration). In game-theoretical language, then, the situation
was that of a ‘suasion game’ (Martin 1993: 104) in which the CEECs and the
proponents of enlargement had the dominant strategy to agree with whatever the
‘brakemen’ saw as being in their best interest. Finally, association, the initial
outcome of the enlargement process, corresponds with the ‘Nash solution’ to this
game because it protects the potential losers against the costs of trade and
budgetary competition and, for the others, it is at least more beneficial than the
status quo. The change from association to enlargement cannot be explained by
this bargaining structure.
Thus, the debate about the EU politics of eastern enlargement has been
dominated by studies that go beyond material factors. Some analyses primarily
criticize an intergovernmental bargaining model of eastern enlargement (Friis
1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Friis and Murphy 1999; 2000), but much of their argument
can still be accommodated within a rationalist framework. This concerns, for
example, the emphasis on the high degree of uncertainty characterizing the EU’s
negotiation processes, which limits the ability of actors to pin down their interests
and preferences ahead of the negotiations and allows for agenda-setting through
supranational actors (see also Smith 1998); the complexity of the negotiations
themselves; the precedence created by past practices; and the spillover from other
negotiations. Other authors start more explicitly from ideational premises and
emphasize the role of norms and identity in the enlargement process (Fierke and
Wiener ch. 5 this volume; Schimmelfennig 2003, ch. 7 this volume; Sedelmeier
forthcoming, ch. 6 this volume; Sjursen 2002). Although we should not overstate
the differences, we note that there are nuances in this broadly constructivist work,
concerning primarily (1) the nature of the norms that are relevant in the enlarge-
ment process and (2) how these norms matter.
With regard to the nature of norms and identity salient in the EU’s eastern
enlargement, Schimmelfennig (1998, ch. 7 this volume, ch. 8 this volume, 2003)
emphasizes primarily the constitutive liberal values and norms of the European
international community, which are at the basis of the membership norms
contained in the EU treaties. Indeed, his statistical event-historical analysis in this
volume presents evidence that the more a state adheres to these liberal norms, the
higher the likelihood that it will be admitted to the EU (as well as to other West
European regional organizations – the Council of Europe and NATO). Friis
(1998c) argues that the EU’s pan-European identity was a key factor in the
Luxembourg European Council’s decision to start formal accession negotiations
with all CEEC candidates at the same time. Fierke and Wiener (ch. 5 this volume)
emphasize primarily the importance of speech acts, namely the 1975 declaration of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), for the enlarge-
ment of NATO and the EU. In their argument, this speech act entailed a ‘promise’
to encourage the spread of Western democratic norms across the division of
Europe which became part of the institutional identity for both organizations.
Sedelmeier (1998, ch. 6 this volume, forthcoming) focuses more explicitly on the
discursive creation of a particular identity by the EU towards the CEECs, which
 The politics of EU enlargement 23
asserted, throughout the Cold War and after its end, a ‘special responsibility’ of
the EU for the reintegration of the peoples that had been involuntarily excluded
from the integration project. Similarly, Sjursen (2002) argues that a ‘kinship-based
moral duty’ led the EU to enlarge to the CEECs.
While not all of these accounts are very explicit about how these norms matter,
the enlargement literature reflects the debate between rationalist arguments about
the constraining effect of norms on actors’ strategies and constructivist arguments
about their constitutive effects on actors’ identities. The rationalist view underpins
the argument by Schimmelfennig (ch. 7 this volume, 2003) that the EU’s norma-
tive institutional environment enabled actors that favoured enlargement for selfish
reasons to use references to institutional norms instrumentally. Such ‘rhetorical
action’ increased their bargaining power, as it allowed them to shame reluctant
member states that were concerned about their reputation as community members
into acquiescing in enlargement. By contrast, Fierke and Wiener’s argument, that
at the end of the Cold War previous ‘promises’ were turned into a ‘threat’ (ch. 5
this volume), is based on the assumption that speech acts create inter-subjective
meanings that have a much deeper impact on identity constructions. Finally,
Sedelmeier (1998, ch. 6 this volume) argues that the effect of norms is uneven
across different groups of actors inside the EU. Those actors who identified most
closely with the EU’s identity towards the CEECs acted as principled policy
advocates. For other actors, however, the collectively asserted ‘responsibility’ and
the commitment that it entailed acted primarily as a constraint on open opposition
to enlargement, which in turn enabled the policy advocates to move policy
incrementally towards enlargement.

EU substantive politics
Most studies of EU enlargement politics focus almost exclusively on macro-
politics, with few suggestions about the implications of their insights for
substantive politics. Their failure to link their explanatory factors to substantive
policies limits their contribution to explaining the conditions under which such
substantive outcomes reflect the preferences of certain actors.
At the same time, the few theoretical studies of the substantive dimension focus
mainly on the early phase of the association policy (see, e.g., Papadimitriou 2002;
Torreblanca 2001) and offer little guidance on how to link these two dimensions of
enlargement. For example, the comparative analysis of various areas of EU policy
towards the CEECs by Haggard et al. (1993) argues convincingly that domestic
politics, rather than theories that focus on state power or international institutions,
best account for substantive policy outcomes. However, the EU’s eventual
decision to enlarge is then difficult to explain on the basis of domestic interest
group preferences alone.
Sedelmeier (1998, 2001, forthcoming) suggests that one way to link macro- and
substantive politics in eastern enlargement is to focus on the role of policy
advocates in the EU. He argues that the receptiveness of a group of policy-makers
inside the Commission to EU identity towards the CEECs did not only make them
24 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier
push for enlargement as such at the macro-level, but also led them to advocate the
preferences in substantive policies. In chapter 11 of this volume, Sedelmeier argues
that the success of such advocacy did not depend only on interest group pressure,
but also on the structure of the policy process and on policy paradigms – the sets of
ideas underpinning EU policy in the various policy areas. The combination of
these factors then determines under which conditions EU policy might accommo-
date the preferences of the candidate countries. Ruano (ch. 12 this volume) also
emphasizes the importance of the institutional structure in the specific context of
accession negotiations. She argues that the fragmentation of the EU policy process
insulated decisions on agricultural policy from wider reform pressures of enlarge-
ment, which allowed the agricultural policy community to prevent radical changes
and to shift the adjustment burden to new members.

Conclusion: rationalism, constructivism and research on

EU enlargement
For a long time, the theoretical study of enlargement has been the domain of
economics. Club theory has conceived of the EU as an economic association and
has focused on the economic costs and benefits of membership and expansion.
The general value added of the political science analysis of enlargement consists in
the improved understanding of enlargement as a political process driven by more
and other factors than just economic interests (see also Gstöhl ch. 2 ; Mattli and
Plümper ch. 3 this volume). For all their different theoretical perspectives, most
contributions to this volume agree on this point. Rationalist institutionalism
emphasizes the political economy of enlargement, including the autonomy concerns
and re-election constraints of governments, asymmetrical interdependence, and
the differential power of interest groups (Mattli and Plümper ch. 3, Moravcsik
and Vachudova ch. 9, Bieler ch. 4, Ruano ch. 12, this volume). Constructivist
institutionalism brings in ideational factors such as national identity in applicant
politics (Gstöhl ch. 2 this volume), collective identity in EU macro-politics (Fierke
and Wiener ch. 5, Schimmelfennig chs 7 and 8, Sedelmeier ch. 6, this volume), and
policy paradigms that provide the glue for sectoral policy communities in sub-
stantive policies (Sedelmeier ch. 11, Ruano ch. 12, this volume).
Obviously, both rationalist and constructivist factors play a role in enlargement
decision-making. The stronger emphasis on rationalist factors in the analysis of
EFTA enlargement, and on constructivist factors in eastern enlargement, is to a
large extent explicable by the different characteristics of both enlargement rounds
and by what researchers regard as unproblematic and puzzling. In the case of EFTA
enlargement, neither the democratic credentials nor the economic capacities of the
candidates were an issue; the puzzle was the timing of applications and the vari-
ance in referendum outcomes. In the case of eastern enlargement, it was the other
way round (but see Moravcsik and Vachudova ch. 9, Skålnes ch. 10, this volume).
At the same time, the specific foci and puzzles guiding the research on each
enlargement round limit the comparability of results and cast doubt on their
generalizability. For instance, if applicant states are indeed motivated mainly by
 The politics of EU enlargement 25
material self-interest, how far ‘down’ into their own societies and how far ‘up’ on
the EU level do material factors ‘travel’ and affect enlargement outcomes? More-
over, if EU macro-decisions do indeed reflect collective identity, membership
norms, and legitimacy concerns, is it ‘ideas all the way down’ to member-state
politics and substantive policies? Finally, does the impact of enlargement on the
EU, its member states, and the applicants result in a (constructivist) process of
social learning and internalization or in a (rationalist) process creating new
behavioural opportunities and constraints at the domestic and EU levels? In sum,
the state of research on enlargement demonstrates the limits of single-case studies
(even if they are theory-oriented) and the need for a widening of enlargement
research – to more comparative analysis and to the integration of under-
researched dimensions such as member-state politics, substantive policies, and
enlargement impact.

Notes
1 This chapter adapts an article that was originally published in Journal of European Public
Policy, 9(4) (2004): 500–28.
2 For simplicity, we use the term EU throughout.
3 To be sure, we do not suggest that only large-n studies are useful. Qualitative studies of
single cases can be just as valuable for comparative insights if they are able to test
generalizable propositions.
4 This table does not give a comprehensive bibliography of the enlargement literature. We
focus on recent theory-oriented work and its general distribution across various research
foci. Bold print denotes contributions to this volume.
5 On the different conceptions of institutions, see, e.g., Scott (1995).
6 Moravcsik (1998: 62) defines a state’s bargaining power as ‘inversely proportional to the
relative value that it places on an agreement compared to the outcome of its best
alternative policy’.
7 However, the EP is usually not seen as a major player in enlargement politics. Garrett
and Tsebelis concede that, under the assent procedure, it is ‘reasonable to conceive of
decision making in terms of the Luxembourg compromise period’ (1996: 283).
According to Bailer and Schneider (2000), the EP is constrained in the use of its veto
against accession agreements because of its integrationist stance.

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Exploring the Variety of Random
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 S annálfogva maga az a forrás egy hatalmas csillagsánczczal van
megvédve, amit csak szabályszerü ostrommal lehet bevenni, erről a
csillagsánczról azután egyenesen a várba lehet leágyuzni. Viz helyett
tűz. A ki a csillagsánczot elfoglalja, azé a vár.
Ocskay a megszállás első napjától fogva ide fordítá minden
figyelmét.
A grófnőknek előre levelet küldött be a várba, mielőtt egy
puskalövés történt volna, a legudvariasabb kifejezésekben biztosítva
őket, hogy semmi gorombaság nincs a szándékában az ő méltóságos
személyeik iránt, csupán a várukat akarja elfoglalni és őket a
fejedelmi udvar vendégszeretetével megismertetni Érsekujvárott;
egyébiránt semmiben sem lesznek megzavarva, csakhogy épen az
ivásra, főzésre és mosásra szükséges vizet igyekezzenek félretétetni
nehány napra, hogy mind abban a maguk személyére nézve
szükséget ne szenvedjenek, ha majd a vízvezeték el lészen foglalva.
Mindez a legnagyobb barátsággal történt.
A mellett pedig az előnyomuláshoz szükséges intézkedések
rendesen megtétettek, úgy hogy a megszállás hetedik napján, mikor
az éj beállt, már általános ostromot lehetett fuvatni a csillagsáncz
ellen.
A vitéz hajduságot azonban a csillagsánczot védő muskétások
nem kevesebb vitézséggel fogadták; az erdő és a bástyák közötti sík
mező nem volt elfoglalható. Télidő volt, a fehér hómezőn a fekete
alakok az éj daczára is könynyen czélbavehetők.
Ocskay László, hogy példájával lelkesítse a harczosait, maga,
lovára felülve, nyargalászta körül az ostromlott redouteot, osztotta a
parancsokat, hová hordják a rőzsekötegeket a sánczárkok
betemetéséhez, hogyan vágják ki a pallizádokat, hogy törjék össze a
spanyollovagokat: a midőn egyszer csak a legjobb kommandérozás
közben egy teljes sorlövés zúdul ellene, mint valami pokolbeli
darázsraj; a lova összerogy alatta, s ő maga a sok golyó közül egyet
a czombjába kap. («Bizonyosan mérgezett volt a golyó, irá
Bercsényi, mert különben Ocskay testét nem fogja a fegyver.»)
Ocskay László, a mint a lova alól kiszabadíták, s sebesült
czombjával nem tudott többé lóra ülni, azt parancsolá, hogy
hozzanak neki valami szekeret. Kerítettek számára egy ágyutaligát.
Arra feltetette magát s tovább vezényelte az ostromot. A vére
folyhatott, a sebe sajoghatott, nem törődött vele. Csak az volt a
gondja, hogy a sáncz-árok be legyen temetve rőzsével, s akkor aztán
lábtókat lehessen vetni a sánczfalaknak. A munkát nem lehetett
félben hagyni. Az ellenség égő szurokkoszorukat hajigált a
rőzsetömeg közé, azokat a kuruczok földes kosarakkal fojtották el, az
égő gránátokat innen is, túl is kézzel hajigálták már egymásra.
Ocskay az ágyutaligához köttetve magát derekánál fogva, egyik
veszélyes pontról a másikra vágtatott tüskén-bokron keresztül, s
harsogó szava túldörögte az ostromzajt, puskaropogást.
A csillagsáncznak el kellett esni bizonynyal. Az elszánt hajduság
ellenében nem volt azt képes tovább védeni a labancz zsoldos had.
Ekkor egyszerre a gránátoktól felgyujtott cziheren keresztül egy
lovag vágtat Ocskay felé, fehér kendőt lobogtatva kezében.
Nem ismert rá, pedig talán látta is valamikor.
– A fejedelemtől jövök! lihegé a lovag, a mint Ocskay elé ért. A
fejedelem palotásainak egyenruháját viselte.
– Épen jókor, mondá neki a sebesült vezér.
– Sürgetős leveleket hoztam kegyelmednek.
– Ha megérem a reggelt, akkor majd elolvasom.
– A fejedelem parancsa, hogy rögtön olvassa kegyelmed és
teljesítse parancsát.
– Ez a parancsolat? Akkor hát menjünk a világossághoz közelebb,
hogy meglássuk a betüket.
 Az a bizonyos világosság valami meggyujtott háztető volt a
csillagsánczon belül, melynek a vésztüzét az ostromlottak nagy
erőlködéssel igyekeztek elfojtani. Ocskay odahajtatott közel ehez a
tüzhöz. A veszedelmes világításba kerülve, feltörte a fejedelem
levelét s a fény elé tartá. Igy igen jó czéltáblát mutatott a sánczot
védő muskétásoknak. A golyók egyre fűtyöltek a füle körül.
El is olvasta már a levelet; nem is egyszer, de kétszer is és még
sem mondta a szekerésznek, hogy menjenek el erről a helyről.
– A golyók ugyancsak fütyölnek, brigadéros uram! rebegé a
nyargoncz.
– Hát hiszen van okuk fütyölni; mert még úgy nem bukott meg
komédiás az aktus végén, mint én. A fejedelem azt parancsolja,
hogy «hagyjak fel azonnal Vöröskővár ostromlásával; nem kell
megsérteni a bánt.»
– És mire vár most kegyelmed?
– Arra, hogy majd talán egy golyónak lesz annyi esze, hogy nem
a fülembe fütyül, hanem a fejemen megy keresztül; akkor én nem
hajthatom végre a parancsot: a hajdu pedig a maga bolond fejével
elfoglalja Vöröskővárt. Keresse aztán a bán, hogy ki sértette meg
ilyen nagyon?
Hanem hát a golyónak volt több esze. A sáncztetőről
abbahagyták a lövöldözést. A labanczság agyon volt rémülve.
Megadásról gondolkozott.
Ekkor kellett Ocskaynak takarodót fuvatni; a hajduságát
visszahivatni a félig elfoglalt sánczokról.
Egész hiábavaló diadal volt! A megszálló csapatoknak is
meghagyá, hogy szedjék fel a sátorfáikat; térjenek téli szállásaikra:
pihenő idő van. A várbelieknek megizené, hogy az ostrom meg van
szüntetve. Tréfa volt az egész. Csak krétára játszottunk.
Azután maga is visszatért Modor városába a sebét ápoltatni.
 A kapott seb elmérgesült. Mire Modorig jutott vele, utolérték a
nyilalló fájdalmak, a mik előjelei a közelgő sebláznak.
Akkor aztán ráért, az ágyban fekve, végiggondolkozni a maga
dolgán.
– No most megkaptad, a mit kerestél! Te itt küzködöl, éjt napot
egygyé ragasztva, hogy fejedelmed számára elfogott nejét
visszaszerezd; kitalálod, minő drágaságokat lehetne adni helyette
cserébe, s mikor már mindez a kezedben van, akkor azt mondják,
hagyd abba! Kimélni kell a bánt. Te pedig kaptál egy keresztül lőtt
lábat, az a tied: azzal lefekhetel. Vétettek neked azok a Pálffy
grófok? A magad bajáért jöttél őket háborgatni? És most azokat is
megbántottad, meg a fejedelmet is. A nagyon nagy buzgóságnak ez
szokott lenni a jutalma.
Azután az otthon maradottak is eszébe jutottak: feleségét áldott
állapotban hagyá el stropkói kastélyában s rég nem kapott tőle már
levelet: ha most tudná szegény, hogy férje itt fekszik sebesülten!
Azon közben két tábori feltser is vesződött a sebesült láb
bekötözésével. Egyik tudósabb volt, mint a másik: az egyik
Göttingában végzett alchymista, a másik kitanult borbély.
Ocskay valósággal szégyenlette magát a miatt, hogy sebet
kapott. Vége volt annak a regényes nimbusznak, a mi őt eddig
környezte, hogy testét nem fogja a fegyver. A tündérmesék hősének
rangjából leszállítva látta magát a közönséges halandók sorába.
Nem sérthetetlen lovag többé: nem csodatevő táltos.
Vezértársai mind nagy megszontyolodással gyűltek ágya körül; s
maga Csajághy sem tudta kemény arczán eltitkolni megilletődését. Ő
már sok sebet kapott, de ilyen veszedelmeset sohasem. A két seb-
orvos pedig két külömböző véleményt látszott táplálni a követendő
eljárás iránt, s mikor az egyik bekötött valamit, a másik felbontotta.
Aztán ki-ki mentek a mellékszobába veszekedni: ezt úgy hiják, hogy
«consilium.»
 A mellett aztán ilyenkor minden ember orvos akar lenni, s
mindenik jó barát tud valami csalhatatlan szert ajánlani, a mi az ő
bajában használt, míg a patiens mind valamennyit odakivánja, a hol
ezek a gyógyszerek teremnek!
A két orvos disputájából az ajtón keresztül is ki lehet venni
annyit, hogy az egyik sürgősen kivánja a megsebesült lábnak
azonnal czombtőben levágását, a másik ellenben, mivelhogy
kétségtelenül mérgezett golyóval történt a megsebesítés, a solutio
continuitatisnak tüzes vassal való kiégettetését követeli.
Ezalatt megvirrad a hosszú téli éjszaka. Az utczán postakürt
hangzik: Ocskay számára érkezett levél. Pálfy grófné irta, a bán
felesége.
Thallósy az iródiák felolvasá azt a beteg előtt.
«Brigadéros uram. Kegyelmed megszabadított engemet és
szegény leányaimat az ostromlás iszonyuságaitól. Noblesse oblige.
Én viszont arról értesültem, hogy kegyelmed a mult éjjeli ostrom
alatt megsebesült. Miután kastélyomban igen jól berendezett patika
van, a legjobb franczia chymisták által instruálva: felajánlom
kegyelmednek a saját orvosomat és pharmacopœámat, bajának
sikeres meggyógyítására. És, hogy a kellő ápolásban is részesüljön
kegyelmed, a mi ilyen bajban a legfőbb dolog, elküldöm
kegyelmedhez a samaritana nénék egyik legavatottabbikát, soror
Arminiát, a kinek feladata lesz kegyelmedet, az orvosom rendeletei
értelmében ápolni. Fogadja tőlem szivesen ezt az ajánlatot.»
A felolvasott levél természetesen a legnagyobb resensust
keltette. A két orvos protestált; ők egy harmadiknak el nem tűrik a
beavatkozását; a tiszt urak pedig attól tartottak, hogy ez a bán
felesége részéről valami ravasz politika lehet: talán így akarják
Ocskayt gyógyítás örve alatt megmérgeztetni. Az ellenségtől nem
kell elfogadni az irokat és flastromokat.
Ocskay pedig a sebláz agyfeszítő hősége alatt azt kezdte
képzelni, hogy Belzebúb konyhájába jutott, s valamennyi ördög ott
tanácskozik körülötte, hogyan darabolják széjjel, hogy találjanak ki
számára bűneihez méltó kínszenvedéseket. Ő tőle magától nem is
kérdezik, hogy mi fog jobban tetszésére lenni: ha a lábait
lefürészelik? vagy ha tüzes vasakkal sütögetik? vagy pedig válogatott
mérgekkel torkig lakatják? Hiába is kérdeznék, mert aligha tudna
felelni rá. A nyelvét nem tudja megmozdítani. Az egész teste meg
van merevedve. Még lát és hall; de keverve a valót a képzelettel.
Erős akarata van, ébren lenni, sőt tettlegesen beavatkozni a körülte
történtekbe: elhatározott szándéka fölkapni a mellette levő széket s
szétverni vele az egymással veszekedő fantomokat, kenőcsös
tégelyt, tüzes serpenyőt, sebészeti eszközöket a fejükhöz hajigálni,
de aztán megint olyan érzés veszi elő, mintha jobb volna érzéketlen
darab föld gyanánt engedni magát esni fölfelé, a végtelen magasba,
s itt hagyni mindent, jót, rosszat, az egész földi chaoszt.
Egy-egy pillanatra úgy tetszett neki, mintha fölébredne, s azt
látná, hogy még mindig új alakok tódulnak az eddigi sátán-torzképek
közé a szűk szobácskába: egy szerzetes, szőrcsuhában, kötéllel a
derekán, gyógyszeres szekrénynyel a hóna alatt, azután meg egy
apácza, hosszú fehér köpenyben, fekete fátyollal a fején, veres-
kereszt a mellén, melynek ágai a nyakától az övéig s egyik vállától a
másikig érnek. A többinek mind van látható arcza, csúf, rettenetes,
borzasztó; ennek az egynek nincs: le van takarva fátyollal s épen
azért ez a legfélelmesebb.
Hah, milyen nagyon veszekesznek, egy elkárhozott fölött!
Mindenik azt akarja, hogy az övé legyen.
Utoljára az az egy apácza-forma fantom kiparancsolja
valamennyit a szobából: azok meghunyászkodnak és szót fogadnak
neki. Egyenkint kisompolyognak: az egyik veszi a fürészeit, a másik a
tüzes serpenyőjét, a harmadik a kenőcseit; némelyik visszanéz az
ajtóból, s megnyalja a száját: éhen maradt ördög! Az apácza a
lábával dobbant s azzal huss! a kéménybe föl valamennyi.
Az arcznélküli kisértet marad magára egyedül a lázbetegnél.
 Mit csinál vele, mikor egyedül marad?
Feltakarja a vérző sebet, s abban a perczben, mint a halott-fő
phosphorfényű lárvája, úgy világít keresztül az arcza a fekete
fátyolon.
Azután odahajol föléje s mint a vampyr, szívja az égő sebből a
vért. Talán a mérget? Nem! A lelkét szíja ki a seben keresztül! A láz-
beteg úgy érzi, hogy lelkének minden tehetsége elköltözik: tudás,
emlékezet, akarat, szeretet, remények; azok mind egy idegen
szellem valójával olvadnak össze: megszünik magának élni, elköltözik
egy új életszervezetbe. Utoljára elhagyja az eszmélet is: meghal,
vagy elalszik.
Ha halál volt, nagyon rövid ideig tartott; ha álom volt, nagyon
soká. Csak este későn ébredt föl belőle.
Ki tudja, hány világot bejárt a lelke abban az ismeretlen új
alakban?
Itt ezen a földön megint csak megtalálta azt a gerendás szobát,
azzal az ólomkarikás ablakkal, a min keresztül zöld, piros és sárga
fénye volt a napnak.
A szobában nem volt semmi nesz. Az ördög-alakok eltüntek, a
félelem rémnyomása is elmult a kebelről. Egyetlen alak térdelt az
ágy lábánál, az apácza; fejét a nyoszolya deszkáján nyugtatva. Most
már azt sem nézte ördögnek, de ugyanazon alak volt, a kit
deliriumában látott, fehér köpenyben, veres kereszttel a mellén, a
feje fekete fátyollal letakarva.
– Hát élek még? kérdezé, s maga is elbámult rajta, hogy a saját
hangját hallja.
Az apácza fölemelte a fejét s a kezével a szivéhez kapott. Hát
látszik, hogy nem fantom, mert a szive megdobbant. Azoknak nincs.
– Nem vágták le a lábamat? Ez volt a második szava az
ébredőnek.
 Az apácza sietett kezével és fejével tagadólag inteni.
A sebesült odanyult a kezével, hogy meggyőződjék róla: de
hirtelen visszakapta azt. Pedig nem égette meg: hanem jég volt
rajta. Az ördögök nem dolgoznak jéggel.
– Régóta alszom? kérdezé ápolójától.
– Csak reggel óta, felelé ez suttogó hangon. De többször
felébredt kegyelmed, mikor megszomjazott.
– Ahán! Egyszer a Saharában tévedtem el, másszor meg a
Vezuvba estem alá. Ki adott innom?
– Illés hollója; suttogá az apácza.
– Köszönöm a hollónak. Isten fizesse meg neki.
– A holló nem vár fizetést.
– Nem jönnek ide többé a pokolfajzatok?
– Kik azok?
– A kik meg akartak kinozni; szét akartak darabolni.
– Én kértem őket, hogy bízzák én reám a kegyelmed
meggyógyítását. És ráhagyták. Vagy él, vagy meghal. Megcsonkítani
nem engedem.
– Igaz. Ocskay féllábbal nem Ocskay többé. S ki tanította
kegyelmednek a gyógyítás mesterségét?
– A szenvedés.
– Az pedig hires professor. S mivel gyógyít kegyelmed?
– Imával és jeges-vizzel.
– Az egyik meleg, a másik hideg. S az a kettő jó minden
betegség ellen?
 – Bizony mindenik ellen.
– Még az ellen is, mikor valaki megunta az életet, s nem akar
több részt kapni a napvilágból?
– Az ellen is.
– Nem hiszem én azt. Lám én már meg voltam halva; s ez nekem
olyan jól esett. Olyan szép világ van odaát. Csak odáig a kínzó; a míg
a forró sivatag, a rémek birodalma tart; a míg innen a ködökből
kiszabadul az ember. Hanem azután csupa gyönyör és paradicsom
minden. Én már nem hiszem, hogy az életért imádkozni jó.
– Majd visszatér még a kegyelmed hite.
– Ki hozza vissza? Azt is a holló?
– Nem. A Noé galambja.
– Hát terem még az Ararát hegyén olajfa-levél?
– Talán még annál közelebb is. A míg szunnyadt kegyelmed, egy
levele érkezett Stropkóról.
– Stropkóról! kiálta föl a sebesült, hirtelen könyökére emelkedve.
– Ne kiáltson kegyelmed: mert megtudják, hogy ébren van s
bejönnek. Aztán maradjon veszteg; mert a sebe újra vérzeni fog.
– Úgy? úgy! Csak suttogva beszéljünk. Minő szinű pecsét van a
levélen?
– Rózsaszin. Tehát örömhir van benne. A czímen ez áll: Ocskay
László brigadéros uramnak, az én kedves fiam-uramnak adassék,
anyai szeretettel.
– Az anyósom irja. Törje föl kegyelmed.
Az apácza fölnyitá a levelet s odanyujtá Ocskaynak.
 A beteg sokáig nézett a levélbe, míg rájött, hogy nem bir olvasni.
A betük összefolynak a szemei előtt, s a sorok tánczolnak, mintha
mind meg volnának bolondulva.
– Nem látok a szememmel, kérem kegyelmedet, olvassa fel
nekem ezt a levelet.
Az apácza mélyen felsóhajtott. Valami olyan kisértetes volt abban
a reszketeg sohajtásban, mint mikor éjjel fölébred az ember s hallani
vél valamit az egyedüllétben, a minek az okát ki nem találhatja,
mintha egy álmában hallott panasznak a visszhangját hallaná az
ébrenlétben, mikor az álomalak már rég a semmibe tünt el.
– Óh…
Elvette kezéből a levelet s olvasá halk, döngicsélő szóval:
«Szeretett kedves fiam uram.
«Meg ne ijedjen azon fölöttébb, hogy én irok kegyelmednek és
nem a felesége; mert öröm annak az oka, a mi őt ebben
akadályozza. A mai szent advent vasárnapon Ilonka leányom
kegyelmed számára egy második fiugyermeket hozott le az angyalok
karából. Mind a ketten, hála a magasságos Istennek, épek és
egészségesek. Ha beleegyezik kegyelmed, a másodikat, a fejedelem
nevére, Ferencznek fogjuk kereszteltetni. A Mindenható oltalmazza
kegyelmedet mindennemű veszedelmei közepett.»
Ocskay majd kiszökött az ágyából: csaknem elfelejté, hogy az
egyik lábát nem szabad megmozdítania; sápadt arczán a
megdicsőülés mosolygása tündöklött. Kezét nyujtá a levél után. Nem
volt neki elég annak a tartalmát hallania, az újjai hegyével is végig
kellett azon mennie, a hogy a vakok szoktak olvasni.
Káprázó szemei észre is vették, hogy még van a levélben valami:
egy utóirat, a mi nem lett felolvasva.
– Hát ez? Mi van még itt?
 – Egy név, tán a kegyelmed feleségének a neve, saját irásával:
«Ilonka» és utána e sorszám: 100,000, száz ezer! Kegyelmetek
tudják, hogy mit jelent az?
Ők bizonyára tudják. A kik szeretnek. Hogy mi az a 100,000? Az
apáczák ezt nem találhatják ki.
Ocskay a két kezével szorítá azt a levelet a homlokához, mintha
úgy akarná annak a tartalmát a fejébe átköltöztetni. A szemeibe
visszatért az élet fénye: ajkai dicsőülten mosolyogtak.
Az apácza suttogva beszélgetett hozzá.
– Hiszi hát kegyelmed, hogy a jó ima még azt a betegséget is
meggyógyítja, a midőn nem szereti valaki az életet?
– Áldott legyen, a ki ezt leimádkozta!
– Nem érez kegyelmed fájdalmas nyilalásokat a sebeiben?
– Nem! Semmi fájdalmat nem érzek most. Meggyógyulok. Meg
akarok gyógyulni. Semmi bajom sincs. Csak gyenge vagyok a
vérvesztéstől; nem látok jól, a szemem káprázik, a mint a fejem
fölemelem. Pedig úgy szeretnék egy levelet irni – haza – a
drágámnak. Nem birok.
– Diktálja le kegyelmed én nekem. Én majd leirom a levelét a
nejéhez.
– Köszönöm, soror Arminia, az ég jutalmazza meg ennyi
jóságáért.
– A holló nem kér jutalmat.
Az apácza odahúzta a kis asztalkát az irószerekkel a sebesült
ágya mellé és odaült hozzá.
– Mondja toll alá kegyelmed, mit irjak a nevében?
Ocskay diktálta.
 – Egyetlen kincsem, angyalom, mennyországom.
Az apácza leirta egymásután: mit érté ő azt, mire valók az ilyen
megszólítások?
«Véghetetlen örömmel töltötte be szivemet drága jó anyánk
évangéliumi jó hire felőled».
Hm! Evangéliumi jó hir! Az apácza azt is csak leirta.
«Te még az életben lehordogatod számomra a mennyországot, s
alig hagysz valamit kivánnom a paradicsomból».
Merész szavak! Közeljárnak a szentségtöréshez. Az apácza leirt
mindent szórul-szóra.
«Bizony magam oda sietnék most te hozzád, – hozzátok, – hogy
a küldött 100,000-et megmilliomozva adjam vissza. Ugyanannyi
csókban…»
Ennél a szónál «csók», az apácza kezében reszketős lett a toll.
Talán nem is irta még le azt a szót soha?
A sebesült folytatá:
«De tudatnom kell veled, nehogy mások, idegenek, nagyítva
hireszteljék, s a mit úgy is meg kellene tudnod abból, hogy idegen
kéz irja levelemet: – én most ágyban fekszem; megsebesülve; de
nem veszélyesen. A golyó, mely az ostrom hevében eltalált, nem
sértett nemesebb részt. Rövid időn meggyógyulok. Tudom, hogy ez
az idő még rövidebb ideig tartana, ha a te drága ápoló kezeid
takargatnák be sebemet, ha te virrasztanál fölöttem.
Az apácza irta hiven, a mit tolla alá mondtak.
Folytatták.
«De légy megnyugodva, szerelmes bálványom. Nem vagyok
elhagyatva. Istentől rám szabott nyomoruságomban van egy áldott
lélek, ki olyan hűséggel viseli gondomat, mint te magad tennéd, egy
Istennek szentelt égi menyasszony: egy apácza. Olyan igaz angyali
szív, miként te magad vagy…»
Az apácza az asztalra dobta le a tollat a kezéből és nem irta ezt
le.
– Leirta kegyelmed? kérdezé a kór.
– Nem!
– Miért nem irja tovább kegyelmed, soror Arminia?
– Ezt?
– A mit mondtam.
– «Olyan igaz angyali sziv, miként te magad vagy».
– No igen.
Az apácza felemelte a fekete fátyolt az arczáról s odafordult
egész büszke tekintetével Ocskay felé.
– Ozmonda! hörgé az, hátravetve elszédült fejét, s abban a
pillanatban már ott járt a lelke azokon az óhajtásra méltó
virányokon, a hol a fénynek nincsen árnya, a gyönyörnek nincs
megbánása, a hol nincs elérhetlen távolság és magasság, a hol nincs
semmi lehetetlenség, a hol mindenek mindenekben tökéletesek: a
honnan ember nem kivánkozik a földre vissza többé.
Mikor e másodszori ájulásából magához tért Ocskay, késő éjszaka
volt. A lámpa ott égett az asztalon, s mellette ott látta ülni kisértetét,
az apáczát, a lefátyolozott fővel, a veres kereszttel a mellén, előtte
az imádságos könyv. Minden tagjában ernyesztő bágyadást érzett.
– Ozmonda! suttogá.
Az apácza fölrezzent; azután fölkelt a helyéről; friss vizet töltött
egy pohárba s odatartá azt a lázár ajkaihoz.

Á
 – Köszönöm – Soror Arminia – rebegé Ocskay. Álmodtam én azt
a másik nevet?
– Álom volt. Elmult, sugá az apácza, friss jeges burkot téve a
sebkötelékre.
– Mit jelent ez az öltöny, a mit ön visel?
– Lemondást. Bűnbánatot.
– Hogyan?
– Lemondtam a világ minden örömeiről, vigalmáról: nem hevit
többé semmi szenvedély. Hogy a penitencziára mily készséggel
hajtom meg fejemet, arról tanuskodik ez a levél, a mit a kegyelmed
diktálása után irtam. S azért virasztok itt az ágya mellett, hogy
megnyerjem bűnbocsánatát; mert a mit vétettem az életemben, az
mind kegyelmed ellen volt elkövetve: kegyelmed bocsáthatja azt
meg egyedül nekem.
– Isten bocsássa meg mind a kettőnknek.
– Amen.
A lázbeteg férfi kedélye csak olyan, mint a lázbeteg gyermeké.
Ocskayt az nyugtalanította, hogy miért látja álmában is ébren is ezt
a szokatlan öltözetü alakot maga előtt. A gyermek nem szereti, ha
valami letakart arczu alak közeledik feléje.
– De minő rend viselete ez?
– A «Samaritana»-rendé.
– Soha sem hallottam ilyen apáczarendnek a hirét.
– Uj rend. Sarolta fejedelemnő alapította.
– A mi fejedelemasszonyunk?
– Már nem a mienk. Nem a földieké. Ő az általa fundált rend
főnöknője.
 – Nem értem. Hogy lehet azzá egy fogolynő?
Hát Ocskay még nem tudta azt, hogy Sarolta megszökött a
fogságából. Hisz a fejedelem maga is csak ez idő tájon tudta meg
doktor Wolffiustól, a kit nejével elküldött Karlsbadba. A fogoly
őrzésével megbizott osztrák tiszt lengyel eredetü volt: megszánta a
fejedelemnőt; paripákat kerített a számára s elhagyta őt futni a szász
határon keresztül Poroszországba. A hir még akkor ólomlábon járt:
hónapok kellettek ahoz, hogy egy ilyen titokban történt nagy eset
szájrul-szájra adva egyik országból a másikba vándoroljon. Hanem
Ozmondának legelőbb kellett ezt megtudni: mert ő vele volt a
fejedelemnővel, s ez uttal Saroltának jó szelleme sugallta azt, hogy
szökési tervét még Ozmondával se tudassa előre. A grófnő csak
akkor értesült a drága fogoly eltünéséről, mikor már késő volt azt
üldözőbe venni. A fejedelemnő elszökésének hirét szándékosan
titkolta mindenki, a ki tudott felőle. A külfejedelmek, a kiknek az
udvarához menekült, igyekeztek azt eltagadni, hogy ott van. Egyik
országból a másikba küldözték.
Ozmonda bizonyosra játszott, a mikor Ocskaynak azt mondta,
hogy a fejedelemnő zárdába vonult vissza, a mit ő maga alapított. Mi
czélra? Hogy a szomorú háboruban, melyet megakadályozni nem
tudott, a szerencsétlen áldozatokat, a sebesülteket ápolják.
Hát nem így került-e maga Ozmonda is Ocskay kórágya mellé?
– Sarolta nem fogoly és nem fejedelemnő többé; mondá
Ocskaynak.
– Tehát csak fogságot cserélt.
– Nem. Fejedelemséget cserélt.
– És a férje.
– Nem vágyik hozzá többet.
– Ki hihetné azt el?

Ő
 – Az, a ki Saroltát úgy ismeri, mint én. Ő az égi koronáját nem
adja a földi koronáért. Neki a hite a világa. Ő buzgó pápista.
– Hát Rákóczy nem az?
– Csak volt az. A midőn fölajánlotta az ország koronáját egy
eretnek számára, megszünt a katholikus hit oszlopa lenni.
– Ki az az eretnek?
– Kegyelmetek előtt még, jól tudom, titkolják. Mert sejtik jól,
hogy sokan vannak még nagy Magyarországon, a kik nem tudnának
a lelkükkel békében maradni annál a gondolatnál, hogy szent István
koronája, az angyaloktól hordott, a pápáktól megszentelt ősereklye,
egy kálvinista fejére kerüljön; mert hisz a porosz király kálvinista.
– De hát ki mondja azt, hogy a porosz királyt kinálta meg
Rákóczy a koronával? Miért nem teszi azt a saját fejére, ha
kivívhatja?
– Ne jőjjön kegyelmed indulatba. Még lázba hozza vele magát.
Higyje azt, hogy nem mondtam igazat. Miért is hoztam ezt most elő.
A helyett, hogy enyhíteném a baját, még keserübbé teszem.
Bocsássa meg bűnömet. Csendesüljön le és aludjék.
– Nem tudok lecsendesülni. Kitől tudja a grófnő ezeket?
– Én nem vagyok grófnő, hanem soror Arminia. Nem tudok
kegyelmednek most többet mondani. Majd ha felgyógyul s a dolog
világosabb lesz. Még most csupa zürzavar az. Nem egyébért hoztam
elő, csak hogy kegyelmeddel megértessem, mi okozta azt, hogy a
fejedelemasszony a világtól végkép visszavonuljon és vele együtt én
is. Asszonyszív nem bir meg ilyen megpróbáltatásokat. Nekünk
kettőnknek nincs helyünk ebben a most támadó uj világban többé.
Beszéljünk másról. Beszéljünk a kegyelmed leveléről, a mit
feleségéhez diktált. Lássa, mindent leirtam hiven. Még azt is, hogy
angyalok vagyunk mind a ketten: egymáshoz hasonlók. Hát hiszen
miért ne lehetnék én is angyal, ha egyszer el lettem temetve, a
bűnbánat tisztító tüzében fehérre mosva? Nem rablom el tőle ezt a
nevet s nem dobom el magamtól. Legyen ő az, a ki boldog és élve
marad; legyek én az, a ki kiszenvedett. Igazán kiszenvedtem. Ki
vagyok békülve az egész világgal. A magam szenvedéseit nem érzem
többé, csupán a másokét. Nincs, a mit szeressek, nincs, a mit
gyülöljek ezen a világon. Elolvassam kegyelmednek még egyszer, a
mit nekem e levélben diktált?
Ocskay némán intett.
Az apácza végig olvasta a mult este irott sorokat. «Ezt» elolvasni
igazán vezeklés lehetett rá nézve: nehezebb az önkorbácsolásnál.
Azzal kezébe adta Ocskaynak a tollat, hogy irja a nevét a levél
alá, s hogy azt fektében végezhesse, az imádságos könyvét tette a
levél alá. Azután összehajtogatta azt s Ocskay pecsétnyomó
gyűrüjével lepecsételé. A czímet kivülről ráirta szépen: «Ezen
levelem adassék nemes és nemzetes Ocskói Ocskay Lászlóné
asszonynak, született nemes és nemzetes Tisza Ilonának, az én
szerelmetes hitvestársamnak, igaz szeretettel ajánlva, Sztropkó
várában».
– Az a bizalmas szolgája a kegyelmed háznépének, a ki onnan
hazulról hozta az «evangéliumos» levelet, ezt a kegyelmedét most
visszatérőben elviheti. Ismerem jól a jámbor fiut, Marczinak hiják.
Valaha a szegény Tisza Gábornak volt az inasa, a kit mi öltünk meg
ketten.
Rettenetes közösség! Egy megölt ártatlan embernek a vére kettő
közt megosztva.
Ocskay teste végig borzongott erre a szóra.
– Miért emlegeti ezt föl most előttem?
– Fáj talán?
– Irtózik tőle a lelkem. Elég embervért ontottam életemben.
Számba sem veszem. De ennek minden cseppje éget. Jó barát vére

É
volt. Édes rokonomé. Tulzott indulatok gerjedelme miatt lett kiontva.
És ezt még nem gyóntam meg soha és nem kaptam érte absolutiót.
– Hát hisznek még Magyarországon a férfiak absolutióban,
Istenben, másvilágban? Én azt képzelem, hogy ez a hit már csak az
asszonyokra maradt. Kisértetlátás már csak gyermekek rosz szokása.
Takarja be kegyelmed az arczát és aludjék. Nem jönnek vissza a
halottak a sirból.
– Az enyim sokszor föltámad, rebegé a sebesült férfi,
félkönyökére emelkedve. Nem tudok imádkozni miatta. Valahányszor
közeledni akarok az éghez, utamat állja. Megállít. Visszakerget.
– S úgy-e, milyen nagy szenvedés az: mikor az ember akarna és
nem térhet az éghez, a hová úgy jár boldog-boldogtalan, örömében-
bánatában, mintha hazamenne; hálát adni, mikor örül, vigaszt kérni,
mikor szenved. És «ti» ezt az eget akarjátok egy egész ország fölött
bezárni.
– Kik?
– Te! Ocskay László. És mindazok, a kik veled egy zászló alatt
végzik a vérontás iszonyú munkáját. Hát nem látja a lelked maga
előtt azt a rettenetes képet, a midőn az uj vallás hatalomra kerül,
hogy kihajigálja a szenteket a templomokból, s az ave Maria helyett
azt énekelje, hogy: «ordítsd óh oroszlán, hogy ő rettenetes!» Hogy
az áldó, a bűnbocsátó Isten, az idvezítő szentháromság helyébe
odahozza a rettenetes Jehovát, a ki az apák bűneit megbünteti a
gyermekekben, a kinek a szavára «a tigris idétlent szül a
pusztában»; hogy leverje a keresztet tornyaikról, az idvezítő
jelvényét, s helyébe tegye a csillagot, a napimádók symbolumát, a
kakast, a pogányok czégérét.
– Az nem igaz!
– Nem igaz? mondod. Hát nem volt-e ez már egyszer így? még
száz éve sincsen. Hogy elvették szentegyházainkat, odaadták
prédikáló tanyául lutheránusoknak, kálvinistáknak. Seregestől
hajtották az országból hitünk martyrjait s a vásárpiacz közepén
komédiát játszottak szent szertartásainkból. Nem így lesz-e megint,
ha egy kálvinista fején lesz Magyarország koronája?
– Hallgass el! Ne kínozz! Nem hiszek semmi szavadnak. Nem
hiszek ennek az öltözetnek sem, a miben most előttem megjelentél.
Nem ápolni jöttél ide, hanem kínozni. Mikor tudod, hogy erőtlen
vagyok. Itt fekszem, mint egy darab sár. Hagyj el engem. Nem
kivánok semmi ápolást. Ha élek, élek; ha meghalok, az is jó. Azt
teszi velem Isten, a mit akar.
– Látod, hogy lelkedben máris kálvinista vagy. A prædestinácziót
hiszed. A legiszonyúbb rémbálványt, a mit emberi ész, a sötétben
eltévedve, kigondolt. A helyett az édes megnyugtató hit helyett,
hogy van egy magasabb lény, a ki az embernek megengedi, hogy jó
legyen, ha bűnbe esett megtérjen; ha elbukott, felkelhessen, ha
gyönge, erőt ád neki, ha nem lát, felvilágosítja, ha végveszélybe
jutott, hivására megjelen és csodatételeivel megszabadítja; a
szemmel látott, a szivünkkel érzett áldásteljes Istenatya helyébe oda
állították az alaktalan fátumot, a ki előre kimondta, megirta
mindenkire, már a születése órájában, ki legyen jó, ki legyen rosz? ki
ragyogjon fényben, ki merüljön el fertőben? a kihez hasztalanul
imádkozik a szerencsétlen: meg van irva, hogy neki szerencsétlennek
kell lenni. A gyilkos hiába imádkozik: ne vigy a kisértetbe, az áldozat
hiába imádkozik szabadíts meg a gonosztól; meg van róluk irva,
hogy nekik össze kell találkozniok, az egyiknek gyilkolni, a másiknak
halni kell. S a vétkező hasztalan keres nála bocsánatot: nincs irgalom
számára, meg kell fizetni azért, a mivel adós. Az áldó Isten helyébe,
a ki mindent ád ingyen, ezer kézzel, s minden keze jobb kéz, arany
kéz, s a ki mindent megbocsát egy töredelmes szivért, e helyett oda
van állítva egy minden élők és csillagok fölött uralkodó uzsorás, a
kinek csak egy keze van, az is vaskéz, a ki megfizetteti a
gyermekeket az apák adósságaiért negyediziglen s ledobálja az
égből a csillagokat, ha ellene vétettek. És ennek a birodalmáért
harczolsz te és a te társaid fejedelmestől együtt.
 Ocskay arczán a hideg veriték csurgott alá. Kezdett a láz
deliriumába visszaesni. Szemei kápráztak. Keresztet vetett magára.
– Hagyj magamra. Ne kínozz tovább. Akár gonosz lélek vagy,
akár jótétlélek: hagyj el.
– Elhagylak. De itt marad veled az igazság, a mit hozzád
elhoztam. Ha elfogadod, meggyógyít, ha elveted, megöl.
– Nem igaz! Nem hiszem. Nem teszi azt a fejedelem.
– Álmodjál felőle. Ébren engem nem látsz többé, a míg látni nem
kivánsz. Ha egyszer hivni fogsz, visszajövök: s akkor majd
bebizonyítom, hogy mind igaz volt, a mit mondtam.
– «Óh én uram, én fejedelmem!» hebegé Ocskay. Már ekkor az
álomországban beszélt.
Azokat a képeket látta iszonytató változatokban lelke előtt végig
foszladozni, a miket Ozmonda eléje vázolt. Az egymás ellen küzdő
Isteneket, az ostromra kelt templomokat. S az álmok, a miket a
hagymáz tüze éget bele a szívbe, örökre feledhetlenek maradnak.
Késő délest volt másnap, mire ismét magához tért.
Ágya mellett látta ülni akkor is az apáczát, lefátyolozott fővel,
olvasóval a kezében.
– Soror Arminia; suttogá bágyadtan.
– Az én nevem soror Theodora: viszonzá egy öreges, törődött
hang a fátyol alól.
Más váltotta fel Ozmondát.
Néhány nap múlva jobbra fordult Ocskay baja: sebe gyorsan
kezde gyógyulni. Az a seb, a mit a golyó ütött. Nem az a másik: az
nyitva volt és egyre vérzett.
 Egy napon azt mondá, hogy szeretné, ha soror Arminia váltaná
fel ismét a másikat az ápolásban.
Óhajtásának elég lett téve. Az öregebb apáczát felváltotta a
fiatalabb.
És akkor aztán Ozmonda elhozta magával mindazokat a
leveleket, a miket a külföldi követségek útján Pálffy bán kapott
Rákóczynak a porosz királylyal folytatott alkudozásairól a magyar
korona iránt; s egyuttal Péter orosz czár ajánlatait Rákóczyhoz a
lengyel korona elfogadása végett.
Ez volt az igazi megmérgezett golyó, nem az a másik.
És senki sem vette észre, mi történik itten? Még a gyanakodó
Csajághy sem.
Hogy egy szelid, ájtatos apácza hogy támasztja fel a halálból
Ocskayt, s hogy teszi a helyett halálos beteggé a lelkét.
Már az maga, hogy ezeket a leveleket fel hagyta maga előtt
olvasni Ocskay, nagy megtántorodás volt tőle. Az apácza szépen az
imádságos könyvébe hajtogatva hozta el azokat magával; mikor
egyedül maradt az ápolt sebesülttel, felnyította a könyvét és
olvasott, ha rálesett valaki, ha rajtakapták: – ájtatos litánia volt, a
mit betege fölött elimádkozék. Ocskay tudta jól, hogy ezek az ő
eltérítésére voltak szánva. Mégis engedte megismertetni? Talán a
lelkében bizott még, hogy azt igazán nem fogja semmi fegyver.
A legveszélyesebb volt a lelkére nézve egy levele Wratislaw
kaczellárnak, a mit az Prágából irt Pálffy János bánnak. Ebben az
Érsekujváron és Nagyszombatban szerzett tapasztalatai voltak leirva
az osztrák kormányférfinak.
Az adatok, a miket Wratislaw e levelében felsorolt mind a
legnagyobb szavahihetőség bélyegével birtak; mind olyan hűséges
rajzai voltak a helyzetnek, a minőket Ocskay maga tudott volna
legjobban kifesteni. A Rákóczy környezetében levő főurak nagy
részének elégedetlensége a háborúviseléssel, vágyódása a béke
után, a fővezérek versengése; az út és mód magában a magyar
nemzetben egy királypárti hatalmas ligát támasztani. A magyart
addig le nem fogják győzni soha, amíg az idegen erőszakos keze
küzd ellene; de kibékíthetik, megjuhászíthatják, ha saját jobbjai
csoportosulnak egy legitim zászló körül, melyet a törvényes király
lobogtat. Elszámlálja Wratislaw név szerint, kikre lehetne számítani.
(Merész kisérlet volt Ozmondától és azoktól, a kik ezt a levelet a
kezére bízták, hogy e neveket Ocskayval közölte, a kiről még azt
kellett tudnia, hogy vakbuzgó híve Rákóczynak; hátha egyenesen
bevádolja őket e levél nyomán?)
«Hanem mindezekkel nincs még semmi nyerve;» így végzi
Wratislaw a levelet. «Nekünk egy igazi hadvezéri talentumot kellene
megszereznünk a magyar táborból s az említett urak közül egyik sem
az. Jó partizánvezérek, de arra nem valók, hogy hadvezetés bizassék
rájuk. Egyedül egy van közöttük, aki valódi magasabb katonai
tehetséggel bír, Ocskay László, a kit én távolról is, közelről is eléggé
kiismertem. Ő nekünk jelenleg a legnagyobb malleusunk. De
lehetetlen, hogy sokáig az maradjon. A többi hadvezérek, a fejedelmi
udvaronczok folytonos boszantásait nem állhatja ki sokáig. Mindenütt
derogálnak neki. Minden hibáját nagyítják, minden érdemét
kisebbítik. Ha bort iszik, s jó kedve van, azt mondják, hogy részeges
és szokása szerint dorbézol; ha egy csúf czigányleánynyal
muzsikáltat magának a sátorában: azt mondják, sybarita életet él;
ha meg a feleségéhez megy haza, azt mondják, «andapál katonája»
lett; zsoldot nem adnak a katonáinak, s ha ő maga rekvirálásból
szerzi be a zsoldot, azt mondják, rabol és sarczoltat; ha előre tör,
akkor azt mondják, úgy kell neki, miért ment oda? s cserben
hagyják; ha kivágja magát, azt mondják: megretirált; ha fényes
győzelmet aratott, akkor annak az érdemét átruházzák egy másikra,
aki azt messziről nézte. Én tudom jól, hogy milyen hive ő most a
fejedelemnek és az egész fölkelés ügyének, a magyar szövetséges
rendeknek; de azért már veszett nevét költék, minden mozdulatára
Árgus-szemekkel vigyáznak. Bercsényi maga azt irta felőle a
fejedelemnek: «Ocskay László uram felől rosz szél fú»! Az öcscse,
Sándor és valami Csajághy nevű főstrázsamester már sokszor
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