Scenarios for the future of peace operations

JAÏR VAN DER LIJN 1

When thinking about the future, it lies in human nature to extrapolate

developments and trends from the past. However, as social-ecological systems
are inherently complex, and thus uncertain and unpredictable, it is not possible
to precisely predict the future by extrapolating from the past, or in fact by any
other method. Therefore, when looking into the future of peace operations, as
undertaken in the current exercise by the UN Department of Peace Operations,
it may be helpful to map out alternative future pathways: that is, scenarios. Not
only do such scenarios stimulate discussion, but they may also serve as an
instrument for policy planning, as they explore plausible futures that require
forward thinking.
The scenarios presented in this paper are thus not predictions.2 Their purpose
is to depict what may happen in the coming 5 to 10 years by providing a 360-
degree view of foreseen alternative futures. For this reason, they cover the
widest possible variety of potential outcomes and developments to maximize
the potential for discussion, helping policymakers embrace uncertainty and
prepare for what may come. As the future unfolds, it will not look exactly like
any of the scenarios described below, but it is likely to include some features
from some or all of them.

I. The future of international security in four scenarios

How the future of peace operations will develop ties in closely with how the
world will develop in the next two decades. This in turn depends on the degree
of cooperation within the world system (i.e., will the world system develop in
the direction of increased cooperation and integration or of declining
cooperation and fragmentation?) and on the type of actors playing a role in
security in the world system (i.e., is our security determined mainly by states or
by non-state actors?). This paper applies a scenarios grid, consisting of two axes
based on these two key uncertainties, which was developed in 2010 for the
Future Policy Survey for the Netherlands armed forces. The result was four
scenarios: Multilateral, Multipolar, Fragmentation and Network. Two scenarios
are state-centric: Multilateral and Multipolar. In the first there is more effective
cooperation between states, while in the second there is mainly rivalry and non-
cooperation between states and poles (superpowers and power blocs) in the
international system. The two non-state-centric scenarios – Fragmentation and
Network – are based on the rise of non-state actors. States are still present in the
1 Dr Jaïr van der Lijn is Director of the Peace Operations and Conflict Management Programme at the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
2 This paper is based on: Jaïr van der Lijn, The future of peace operations, Clingendael Futures,
Scenario Paper, Clingendael Institute: The Hague 2013, <https://bit.ly/2Lraw52>.
2 SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS
world system, but non-state actors have gained so much influence that states
can no longer be considered the main actors that matter. While in the
Fragmentation scenario it is mostly ‘every (wo)man for him/herself’, in the
Network scenario there is cooperation on a global scale between various types
of actors that are closely connected and mutually interdependent. These
scenarios are summarised in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: The scenario grid

Source: Netherlands Ministry of Defence, Future Policy Survey, 2010.

II. The future of operations in these scenarios

To assess how peace operations may develop in the future, the following seven
questions are asked for each of the quadrants:

1. What? What kind of peace operations prevail?

2. Who? Who carries out peace operations?
3. Where? Where are peace operations likely to be deployed?
4. How long? What is likely to be the duration of missions?
5. How? Which type of instrument is leading?
6. Why? For which reasons are peace operations deployed?
7. How many? How frequently are peace operations deployed?
8. What role? What role does the UN play in peace operations?

Figure 2 gives a concise overview of answers to these questions and the future
of peace operations in each quadrant. The description of operations in each
quadrant is further elaborated on in the following paragraphs.
 SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS 3

Figure 2: The future of peace operations in the scenario grid

Multipolar Multilateral

Two sorts of operations prevail in this quadrant: Two sorts of operations prevail in this quadrant:
1. a) Traditional peacekeeping 1. a) (Military intervention followed by)
b) (Military intervention followed by) Humanitarian operation
Stabilization operation b) (Military intervention followed by)
2. a) UN (potentially OSCE) Nation-building operation
b) Regional organizations 2. UN and other organizations
3. a) At the fringes of or between the poles 3. Fragile states
b) Inside poles and in their ‘backyards’ 4. Long term
4. Long term 5. a) Civilian humanitarian lead
5. Military lead b) Civilian development lead
6. Pole or alliance security, maintenance of 6. Positive peace: human security, democracy
status quo and human rights
7. Medium frequent 7. Frequent
8. Implementation and support 8. Implementation, support and norm setting

Examples: Examples:
a) UN in UNTSO, UNDOF and UNMOGIP a) UN in UNOSOM, MINURCAT and
b) NATO in Libya and Balkans, ECOWAS/CIS UNAMID
and other regional organizations’ missions b) UN in UNTAC and ONUMOZ, and UN and
regional organizations in Kosovo and
Timor-Leste
Fragmentation Network

One sort of operation prevails in this quadrant: Three sorts of operations prevail in this
quadrant:
1. Military interventions
2. Unilateral and ad hoc coalitions 1. a) (Military intervention followed by)
3. Close to the interveners Stabilization operations
4. Short term b) (Military intervention followed by)
5. Military lead Humanitarian operations
6. National or state security interests c) Police missions
7. Infrequent 2. Hybrid operations of UN, regional
8. Monitoring, at best organizations and states, in cooperation with
corporations, PMCs, PSCs and NGOs
Examples: 3. Unconnected and resource-rich areas
Ethiopia/Kenya in Somalia 4. Long-term networked (different
organizations)
5. Networked lead
6. a) Positive peace: human security,
democracy and human rights
b) Economic security interests
7. Frequent
8. Coordination and support

Examples:
4 SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS
a) NGO operations, such as Nonviolent
Peaceforce in Sri Lanka and Georgia
b) Anti-piracy off the coast of Somalia
c) A potential police mission in Ciudad Juárez,
Mexico

Peace operations in a multipolar scenario

In this quadrant, different poles take care of their own security. Regional
organizations have developed capabilities to deploy their own crisis
management operations. Interests rather than values, such as protection of
civilians, count. As a result of a lack of cooperation between Security Council
members, in the Multipolar quadrant the great powers tacitly agree to deploy
peace operations less frequently. Consequently, the number of ongoing
missions has decreased. Those operations the Security Council manages to
agree on are traditional peacekeeping operations. Military interventions and
more robust operations still sometimes take place, but without a Security
Council mandate. NATO or other out-of-area operations – such as the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan – have become
a relic of the past, as poles do not allow competing poles to operate in either
their own spheres of influence or in contested areas. There are mainly two types
of peace operations in this quadrant: 1) traditional peacekeeping operations at
the fringes of or between the poles; 2) more robust stabilization operations,
sometimes after military interventions in unstable zones inside poles or in the
‘backyards’ of poles.
The UN is generally the only organization with sufficient legitimacy to deploy
missions at the fringes of or between poles. Such missions have limited observer
mandates and are directed at maintaining the status quo, preventing clashes, and
maintaining stability between the poles. They generally have a first generation
peacekeeping character, such as the UN Disengagement Observer Force
(UNDOF) and the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle
East, or the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).
These operations are military only and consist of light infantry units with a
monitoring or observer mandate. The main powers that lie at the heart of the
poles do not contribute to these operations as this might set off fears among
their competitors. Smaller or neutral countries are the main contributors to these
operations. Moreover, due to the frequent use of vetoes the number of these
types of operations has decreased compared to current numbers. Potential
operation areas are where the Indian and Chinese or the US and Chinese poles
clash. In Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) may also be a potential organization for deployment in the Western
Balkans, and apart from Russia, in the former Soviet area.
With regard to missions deployed in cases of instability within poles or in the
‘backyards’ of poles, the core – generally in the context of a regional
organization-led operation – intervenes militarily and deploys a stabilization
mission. These operations are aimed at strengthening alliance or pole security,
 SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS 5

and are likely to operate at the higher end of the spectrum of violence. In each
pole other values will be used to justify and legitimize these military
interventions or stabilization operations. Europe may still legitimize its
missions with concepts such as democracy and human rights, but China may
frame its military interventions through a sovereignty or stability discourse. If
the core of the pole does not support a mission, little will happen. Generally,
such stabilization operations do not have a Security Council mandate. Further,
they are likely to reflect current and past operations such as Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operations
in West Africa, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) operations in the
former Soviet Union or NATO-led operations in Libya and the Balkans.
Potential future deployment areas in the case of the European pole are regions
such as North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans.
Both sorts of operation have a relatively long duration because, in general,
political processes needed for peace do not get off the ground as conflicting
parties are often able to get military support from other poles.

Peace operations in a multilateral scenario

In the Multilateral quadrant relationships in the Security Council are largely
cooperative. Conflicts are generally solved at the negotiation table. In fragile
states the ‘international community’ cooperates to overcome threats, mainly to
human security, democratization, strengthening human rights and for the
purpose of protection of civilians. The fragile states are particularly located in
a ‘belt of instability’ that runs from Central America, from West to East Africa,
and into the Middle East and South Asia.
Next to protection of civilians, R2P has gained general acceptance, and if
governments do not live up to their responsibilities, they face diplomatic
pressure and ultimately Security Council mandated (humanitarian) military
intervention to enforce cooperation and human security, such as in Libya.
Subsequently, if sufficient political will is lacking or there is no capacity to deal
with the underlying causes and issues, humanitarian operations are deployed to
deal with the consequences of fragility and conflict, to protect civilians, and to
ensure human security. These operations consist of a military component which
– in order to ensure neutrality – is often separate from, but provides support to,
humanitarian assistance. They tend to last for a long time, as a political process
to solve the underlying problems and causes has not gained momentum. Such
operations resemble the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), the UN Mission
in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), and the AU/UN
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
Particularly after peace agreements, but also in some cases after
(humanitarian) military interventions, broadly-mandated multidimensional
robust nation-building operations are deployed. Such nation-building
operations consist of large civilian components, as well as police, to address the
6 SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS
underlying problems and causes of fragility in the host states. Attention is given
to, among other issues, the rule of law; human rights; democratization;
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and security sector
reform (SSR). These missions are generally deployed for a longer period and
have a civilian development assistance lead. The military aspects of operations
are embedded in a wider integrated approach, and in an increasing number of
cases they can be called civilian missions only. These nation-building
operations are similar to the UN operations deployed after comprehensive peace
agreements in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and Cambodia (UNTAC), or after the
humanitarian emergencies or interventions in Timor-Leste and Kosovo.
The UN is the key actor in missions in this quadrant, not only because all
missions are UN mandated, but also because it is heavily involved in most
missions. Nonetheless, particularly when the UN is overburdened or does not
have the operational capacity, regional organizations – such as NATO, the EU,
the Organization of American States (OAS) or the AU – may step in. Those
organizations may take care of whole missions, or provide bridging operations
or over-the-horizon forces. Such a division of labour is possible because there
is a high level of trust and understanding between countries and organizations.
The permanent members of the Security Council are relatively forthcoming in
contributing civilian and military personnel to both high- and low-end
operations, while the BRICS countries get an increased influence in the
peacekeeping agenda.

Peace operations in a network scenario

In the Network quadrant the international system is more complex than it has
ever been. States and intergovernmental organizations are no longer dominant,
but cooperate on an equal footing with non-state actors such as corporations,
private military companies (PMCs), private security companies (PSCs), non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and so on. The world has become non-
polar, and the global market economy and global civil society determine the
direction of developments in the international system. The Security Council is
no longer the arena where decisions are made; networked alliances and informal
groupings of various actors ensure global governance. Often solutions are found
in international regimes, codes of conduct, and international law in which non-
state actors are also integrated. Those connected to the network grid of the
international system are doing well, but regions, groups and individuals that are
not lag behind.
The challenges in this quadrant are also networked. Criminals, terrorists and
pirates cooperate closely in their struggle over market share of the unconnected
people and areas that have been called the ‘gap’. This ‘gap’ is mainly located in
the ‘belt of instability’ which runs from Central America, through West to East
Africa and into the Middle East and South Asia. However, there are also smaller
areas and groups that have not been able to keep up with the network and which
have lost their connection in regions that are largely connected, such as Europe
and North America.
 SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS 7

The UN, as an intergovernmental organization, has become just one of the

players in peace operations because different actors – often non-state
organizations, companies and ad hoc coalitions of the willing – work together
in hybrid missions. While the UN still plays a role in the implementation of or
support to parts of such missions, as well as in coordination, large parts of
missions are outsourced, meaning that military or police components are at
times implemented by PMCs or PSCs, and humanitarian and development
components by NGOs. In fact, some peace operations have been completely
outsourced. For example, NGO monitoring missions have become common
practice. Success of these missions is largely determined by the extent to which
all these different actors are able to work together in an integrated approach in
dealing with the problems at hand. In addition, cooperation between missions
has increased: regionally – different operations deployed simultaneously, such
as currently in CAR, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa; and chronologically –
different operations deployed during different stages of a peace process, for
example between initial-entry operations and follow-up missions.
Non-state actors have a large influence over where missions are deployed.
Often the interests of companies lead. Although economic security is key,
humanitarian norms are still advocated by NGOs. In the case of grave human
rights violations, public opinion continues to cry out for action. R2P, however,
has become a difficult concept as non-state actors have also become security
providers and are held responsible to protect. Consequently, peace operations
are particularly deployed to places where there are resources and transportation
lanes, where criminality affects economic interests, or where the gravest human
rights violations take place. These areas are primarily located in the ‘gap’, but
also in unconnected areas outside the gap. The latter operations are small as they
only have to focus on smaller regions, cities or even parts of cities, and are
generally police mission in character. These stabilization, humanitarian and
police operations are deployed for longer periods dealing with the economic or
human security effects of ‘unconnectedness’. Often, however, the underlying
causes are left unaddressed as this would require a complete overhaul of the
global economic system.

Peace operations in a fragmentation scenario

In the Fragmentation quadrant the international system is crippled and
remilitarized, as distrust rules. Non-state actors – such as Islamic State and the
Lord’s Resistance Army – have taken over, or at least create significant levels
of violence, in large parts of the world and provide some governance in those
regions they control.
Although the need for peace operations to deal with the violence and mistrust
is enormous, the ability to actually deploy them is limited. Agreement on the
deployment of missions is rare, and neither the UN nor regional organizations
embody the trust needed for their deployment. Although the market for NGOs
8 SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS
is endless, they have only very limited possibilities to actually do anything. The
best the UN can do is monitor interventions and report on violations of human
rights, international and humanitarian law.
It is debatable whether interventions in this quadrant can actually be called
peace operations because most international (military) interventions are actually
unilateral or ad hoc coalitions’ military invasions and occupations. Nonetheless,
the countries undertaking them portray their actions as peace operations to
increase their legitimacy. These military interventions are short, take place in
the immediate neighbourhood of the intervening countries, and the military is
clearly in the lead. Operations are mainly high end, initial entry and short
lasting. Neither international nor human security is a leading motive for them.
The concept of R2P is alien to this world, while efforts to realize PoC or human
rights are rhetorical at best. National or state security determines where
interventions take place because the (national) security interests of individual
states or governance units rule in this scenario. Recent examples of such
operations are the military interventions of Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia.

Conclusions and recommendations

Reflecting on insights from the current debate on peace operations based on
probable future developments in the international system and scenarios, it
appears that what the literature regards as probable is often actually uncertain.
The importance of civilians in operations, the role of PMCs and PSCs, the
regionalization of peace operations, and the involvement of Western as well as
BRICS countries are not developments that take place in all scenarios. They
depend on the quadrant in which international security finds itself in the future.
Similarly, uncertainty with regard to the future of protection of civilians, R2P,
human rights and democratization is quadrant-specific.

Towards the future: a guestimate on the basis of the trend

Over the past few years, the international system has increasingly become less
state-centric. Progressively, PMCs, PSCs and the private sector in general – but
also some international NGOs, Foundations, Funds and other non-state
institutions – have become players to reckon with. At the same time,
cooperation in the international system is decreasing. Particularly, the
economic, migration and health crises have contributed to states focusing more
and more on their national rather than international and human security. Rising
powers are claiming their share of influence in the global arena, and gradually
relations are perceived more and more in competitive terms. Scarce resources,
energy and arable land are becoming particularly subject to rivalry. While
Western norms and values have dominated international discussions with
concepts such as democracy, good governance and R2P, these are progressively
contested. As a consequence, the global security architecture is under stress.
While there is still agreement on many aspects, cooperation in the Security
 SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS 9

Council even over such issues as non-proliferation, conflict management and

environmental issues has faced ever more obstacles, particularly when there is
high-politics at stake. Consequently, although currently we are still in the
Multilateral quadrant, the trend is that international security is moving into the
Multipolar quadrant and in the direction of the Fragmentation quadrant. In the
process it is also heading closer to the zero point in the middle of the scenario
grid, which not only means that the world becomes increasingly diffuse and
resembles all four quadrants, but also that uncertainty is increasing.
If this expectation becomes reality, it would mean that peace operations are
likely to increasingly resemble the description given for missions in the
Multipolar quadrant. This would mean that for the purpose of pole (and in the
end their member states) interests and security, operations will still be
demanded. Should military interventions and stabilization operations within
poles or in their ‘backyards’ occur, they will increasingly use regional
institutional or ad hoc frameworks rather than those of the UN. However,
demand for UN operations at the fringes of a pole and between different poles
may still lie ahead. A continuation of the trend towards the Multipolar quadrant
would also mean that:
a) the trend of increased importance of civilians in operations may reverse;
b) the trend of an increasing role for PMCs and PSCs may reverse;
c) the regionalization of peace operations is likely to intensify;
d) the global involvement of Western as well as BRICS countries is likely to
decrease further as they will increasingly focus on state security in their
own regions or poles and on their direct neighbours; and
e) although R2P, democratization and human rights will probably still be
used as legitimization for military interventions, particularly by western
countries and organizations, and PoC for the use of violence during
operations, these concepts will probably not become a core motive for
deploying forces abroad. In fact, these concepts may lose their importance
as the normative framework for UN operations, which might evolve
further into value-less technocratic operations.

A scenario planning
It would, however, not be prudent to build strategy solely on expectations or
forecasts. For this reason, scenario planning as described at the beginning of
this paper is useful. By looking at what is expected and required in each scenario
and by comparing this with the results for other scenarios, overall conclusions
can be drawn. If something appears to be the case (or not) in all four scenarios,
it is a robust finding on the future. If something happens (or does not happen)
in all but one scenario, it is good to have thought about what to do in case the
future reality is that single scenario as well as preparing for the other likely
scenarios. The impetus for scenario-planning below, more detailed in the annex,
looks for peace operations in each scenario at the following issues:
10 SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

• Quantitative ambition level: the size and number of peace operations

deployed. This can range from low to high.
• Mission duration: may vary from a short to long presence.
• Force projection: the expected distance between the TCC/PCCs and
areas of operation.
• Mission area: the expected mission area(s).
• Level of international cooperation: the intensity and depth of
international cooperation.
• UN partners: the partners of the UN with whom this cooperation takes
place.
• Level of civil/military cooperation: the intensity and depth of
cooperation between the military component and partners.
• Partners: which partners these are.
• Particularly required military capabilities for the UN: the military
capabilities particularly needed in UN peace operations.
There is no certainty about the future of peace operations. There are no
developments that are sure to happen. This means that also in the scenario
planning there are few robust policy options that work in all scenarios and are
therefore guaranteed to be successful. Looking ahead, much depends on the
level of cooperation in the international system. One of the most robust findings
is that peace operations are likely to remain long-term affairs. They are still
likely to be deployed frequently, but not as frequently as today. The locations
where they are deployed are still likely to be unstable or fragile areas – such as
Central America; west, central and east Africa; and South Asia – although
probably closer to the fringes or in the ‘backyards’ of poles. Military
interventions probably continue to take place, most often as an introduction to
follow-up operations. The military component is probably still requested to
perform a wide variety of tasks in peace operations. The required force
projection of TCCs/PCCs is likely to remain global to regional. In addition, the
UN probably needs to continue to cooperate with international partners,
particularly regional organizations such as the AU, the EU and NATO.
Less robust are findings about the likely types of peace operation. They are
still likely to include stabilization or humanitarian operations, as traditional
peacekeeping, nation-building or police (anti-crime) operations are more
scenario-specific. Ways to ensure flexibility may be considered so that, if a
particular scenario becomes reality, such operations can still be implemented,
but restructuring the UN for particular sorts of operation would be suboptimal.
Human security may still play a role, but the more international security moves
away from the Multilateral quadrant, the less idealistic the motives for
deployment become and the more ideals are used for legitimization only.
Similarly, the more the international system moves away from the Multilateral
and Networked quadrants, the more operations once again become military led
and the less civilian capacities are needed. Furthermore, the more the
international system loses its state-dominated character, the more the UN – but
also regional organizations such as the EU and NATO – lose their position in
 SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS 11

peace operations. The more networked the future becomes, the more NGOs,
PMCs, PSCs and other non-state actors will also play a role. Such a Network
scenario would also require particular attention for the increased civil-military
cooperation, while in all other scenarios the level of such cooperation probably
remains at the current or lower levels.
12 SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Annex: Issues for future peace operations in each scenario

Multipolar Multilateral Network Fragmentation
Quantitative Medium High High Low
ambition level
Mission Long/medium Long Long Short
duration
Force Regional Global Global Sub-regional
projection
Mission area Middle East Belt of Belt of Near TCC/PCC
and northern instability instability
Africa; (Central (Central
Caucasus; America; west, America; west,
Caspian area; central and central and
Balkans; east Africa; east Africa;
Southern and Middle East Middle East
central Europe and South and South
Asia) Asia) and
other
unconnected
areas that may
also be found
in otherwise
stable ‘core’
countries.
Level of High/medium High High Low
international
cooperation
UN partners Different International Networked Operationally
regional and regional (inter)state and and logistically
organizations organizations non-state independent
for efforts such as: organizations, and mostly
inside poles. NATO; EU; such as self-reliant
The UN itself AU international countries
conducts PMCs, PSCs, undertake
traditional NGOs and operations;
peacekeeping corporations cooperation is
operations only on an ad
hoc basis and
mainly
monitoring
these efforts
Level civil Low Medium High Low
military
cooperation
Partners Diplomacy; Diplomacy; Diplomacy; -
gendarmerie development; development;
humanitarian; humanitarian;
gendarmerie civilian police;
and civilian non-state
police organizations,
such as
 SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS 13

international
PMCs, PSCs,
NGOs and
corporations
Particularly Light infantry; Special Special (Maritime)
required gendarmerie; Forces; Forces; surveillance
military air transport; expeditionary expeditionary
capabilities for and (maritime) light infantry; light infantry;
the UN surveillance high end land high end land
intervention intervention
capabilities; capabilities;
gendarmerie; gendarmerie;
SSR; rule of SSR; rule of
law; law;
intelligence; intelligence;
air transport; air transport;
air-to-ground; air-to-ground;
close air close air
support; and support; and
(maritime) (maritime)
surveillance surveillance
All these
capabilities
may, however,
also be
outsourced)