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PHILOSOPHY
AS
DIPLOMACY:
ESSAYS IN ETHICS
AND POLIGY-MAKING

A. Pablo Iannone

Y HUMANITIES PRESS
New Jersey
First published 1994 by Humanities Press International, Inc.,
Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey 077106.
© 1994 by A. Pablo Iannone
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Iannone, A. Pablo.
Philosophy as diplomacy : essays in ethics and policy making / A.
Pablo Iannone.
p.. em,
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-391-—03808-7
1. Policy sciences—Moral and ethical aspects. I. Title.
H97.116 1993
174’.932—dc20 92-—39814
CIP

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be

reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without written permission from the publisher.
Printed in the United States of America
To my wife, Mary Kay Garrow, whose wealth of
policy-making experience provided an everyday
touchstone for this book’s ideas, and to our
daughters, Alejandra Emilia and Catalina Patricia,
whose joy of life and incipient love of learning
provided an everyday touchstone for this book’s
aspirations.
 Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2022 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/philosophyasdiplOO0O0Oiann
 Contents

Preface xl

1 Issues and Issue-Overload: A Challenge to

Moral Philosophy
DIALOGUE
Social Traps: High-Tech Weapons, Rarefied
Theories, and the World of Politics 15
DIALOGUE
Social Choice Theory: Formalism Infatuation and
Policy-Making Realities eM
DIALOGUE
Informing the Public: Ethics, Policy-Making, and
Objectivity in News Reporting 40
DIALOGUE
Critical Interaction: Judgment, Decision, and the
Social Testing of Moral Hypotheses 55
DIALOGUE
Philosophy as Diplomacy 70
DIALOGUE
A Delicate Balance: Reason, Social Interaction,
Disruption, and Scope in Ethics and Policy-
Making 87
DIALOGUE
Practical Equity: Dealing with the Varieties of
Policy and Decision Problems ale
DIALOGUE
Between Triviality and Worth: Computers,
Education, and Self-Esteem 151
DIALOGUE

Vil
vill CONTENTS

10 Like the Phoenix: Ethics, Policy-Making, and the

U.S. Nuclear Energy Controversy 165
DIALOGUE
11 Bridging Gaps in Babel: Ethics, Technology, and
Policy-Making 181
DIALOGUE
12 Between Negotiation and Combat: Ethics,
Politics, and Regional Wars in a Fluid World
Order 196
DIALOGUE

Notes 215
Selected Bibliography 237
Index 261
So far as morals go, there probably has never been an age quite
so perplexed and torn by discord as the present one, or so little
disposed to be submissive to the admonition of the good and
great; and the reason is that for large numbers of people the
things valued in the past have lost their motive power, and no
one seems to know just how to go to work to replace them.

—A. K. Rogers, Ethics and Moral Tolerance

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 Preface

It has been said that life is like a foreign language: Everyone mispronounces
it. This book grew from the realization that the analogy tellingly applies to
policy-making. It obviously applies when different societies or cultures are
involved, but it also applies within comparatively homogeneous cultures or
social groups, for example, within the United States or within Western
Europe. That it does is evidenced by the lack of integration between the
languages, concepts, methods, and practices of the branches of inquiry and
the institutions relevant to policy-making. These include political science,
sociology, economics, technology and business studies, and philosophy, as
well as the academic institutions connected with them. The fragmentation,
however, reaches outside academia, to the relations between the studies and
academic institutions on the one hand and governmental institutions on the
other. Indeed, partly because modern societies have become enormously
complex and modern technology has become extremely esoteric, the frag-
mentation has reached an unprecedented degree in the relations between all
of the said studies and institutions and the public at large.
Such fragmentation constitutes a significant obstacle to politically sound
and morally sensitive policy-making. This book is designed to help correct
the situation by attaining two objectives. The first is to achieve greater
integration between the languages, concepts, and methods of the social
sciences and technology and business studies and institutions, those of ethics
and sociopolitical philosophy, and those of the policy-making community,
in a manner reasonably accessible to the general public. The second objective
is to outline an approach for dealing, in a politically sound and morally
sensitive manner, with policy-making problems that arise in this fragmented
situation. The book builds on work carried out in my previous Contem-
porary Moral Controversies in Technology (Oxford, 1987) and Contem-
porary Moral Controversies in Business (Oxford, 1989). These provided
evidence for the said lack of integration and began to help correct the
situation in the areas of business and technology. In doing so, they outlined
a theoretical framework that combines rights, consequences, and pragmatic
considerations. This framework is substantially developed in the present book.
In developing this framework, the book also develops a conception of
philosophy as diplomacy. This conception has been rarely, if at all, discussed
by philosophers. It applies primarily to ethics and sociopolitical philosophy,
X1
xi PREFACE

but it also has applications to other areas of philosophy. One reason this
concept has such a wide scope of application is that there is no sharp line
separating ethics and sociopolitical philosophy from other areas of philoso-
phy such as epistemology and the philosophy of science. Another reason is
that the conception of philosophy as diplomacy paradigmatically applies to
policy- and decision-making in institutional contexts, and, in the twentieth
century, such policy-making is involved in the practice of all or nearly all
philosophy, regardless of school or tradition.
The notion of philosophy as diplomacy is discussed throughout the book,
especially in Essay 6. However, since the term diplomacy has various senses,
some of which have acquired derogatory implications, some indication of
the sense in which I use diplomacy in this book is necessary. As I further
explain in Essay 6, by diplomacy I do not mean, as cynics would have it, the
activity of saying and doing the nastiest things in the nicest way. Rather, I
mean the activity of dealing with relations between groups or individuals so
that ill does not prevail. In this activity, social decision procedures are
crucial. They range from those that primarily appeal to reason and involve
meaningful dialogue, such as discussion of merits and negotiation, to others
that are primarily confrontational, such as strikes and other pressure tactics.
A concern with the policy-making role and justification of all these social
decision procedures plays a central role in this book.
As indicated, the book is primarily concerned with policy-making, that is,
with a characteristically forward-looking activity. It is not designed (though
it may also be of use) to explain or pass judgment on social change, its
history, or any of its stages. No doubt, these are intellectually valid enter-
prises, and their results are relevant to the present study. Precedents and
recurrent circumstances are useful in establishing the feasibility of policy and
decision options. However, in and of themselves, those studies are primarily
backward-looking—not, like this book, aimed at the future.
In accordance with the book’s integrative purpose, its primary (though
not exclusive) method of research and presentation is one that has been used
in both philosophy and social process studies. It consists in merging descrip-
tion and argument. That is, it describes a number of cases or observations to
exemplify categories, classifications, and theories and then uses the same or
similar cases or observations as evidence for the utility or accuracy of the
categories, classifications, and theories. This method is current in social
science. For example, Lewis Anthony Dexter has recently used and de-
scribed it in his “Intra-Agency Politics: Conflict and Contravention in
Administrative Entities.” It is also current in philosophy among philoso-
phers who practice conceptual analysis but move beyond that method, in an
attempt to connect the results of scientific research and the experiences of
the general public with the theoretical aims of ethics and sociopolitical
 Preface xiii

philosophy. A recent work that exemplifies this approach is David Bray-

brooke’s Meeting Needs.”
The methodological approach just described is justified on both philoso-
phical and social science grounds. From a philosophical standpoint, a sound
moral assessment of policies and decisions depends on the establishment of a
morally sensitive characterization and classification of the problems the
policies and decisions address. One might think that this is the type of study
social scientists, not philosophers, would pursue because, as indicated, the
method used here relies heavily on the discussion of cases and observations
about how policymakers deal with them. However, the said impression is
mistaken. Hypotheses and theories in moral philosophy, especially those
about policy-making, are significantly confirmed or disconfirmed through
their applications. Hence, a concern with cases and observations, and the
taxonomy issuing from them, is philosophically crucial.
From a social science standpoint, the characterizations and classifications
of cases developed in this book should prove useful. They contribute to
structuring the enormous body of available case studies in a manner that is
readily applicable to policy- and decision-making. This meets a policy-
making as well as a scientific need, for without such characterizations and
classifications, the results of these studies remain largely unstructured
data—not a body of knowledge applicable to new policy and decision cases.
And with inadequate categories and classifications, the applications to
policy-making are questionable.
To be sure, taxonomies exist in both social science and philosophy. But
their purpose has been geared primarily to the study of social change,
its history, and stages, not the moral assessment of policies and decisions.
In addition, when concerned with policy-making, various categories and
classifications are incomplete and, at times, slanted toward a conflict (or,
alternatively, a consensus) model of society. Hence, there is a need for the
characterizations and classifications of cases that this book develops.
The book is of interest to the initiated and is reasonably accessible to the
uninitiated. Philosophical language and categories are introduced by refer-
ence to concrete problems, and the language and categories used in discus-
sions of cases are those used by policymakers and ordinary people. This
helps meet the needs of those who are more familiar with the world of
political, economic, and other everyday decisions than with that of philoso-
phy. It also helps clarify the extent to which particular positions in moral
philosophy have practical applications in the actual policy-making world.
The book is unique, or nearly unique, in that its treatment of theoretical
and practical problems is guided by a concern crucial to the integrative
approach it develops: a concern with the applicability of theories in ethics
and social and political philosophy to actual policy-making practice. I know
xiv. PREFACE

of few other books that do this with the degree of detail, comprehensiveness,
and reliance on empirical information found in this book. First, most books
being published in the area of philosophy and policy-making presuppose
somewhat simplistic conceptions of policy-making. Second, most of them
rely much less on empirical social studies. Third, most of them use primari-
ly, if not exclusively, philosophical language and categories. Hence, they
make it difficult, if not impossible, to establish the extent to which the
particular positions they take in moral philosophy have practical applica-
tions in the actual policy-making world.
In addition, some books in the area have an advocative slant that is
betrayed by their disregarding or misconstruing influential traditions in
ethics. For example, some characterizations of utilitarianism currently in-
voked in the philosophy literature are largely preposterous straw men quite
unrelated to classical utilitarianism as formulated by Bentham, Mill, and
Sidgwick. That they are is no discovery. David Braybrooke mentioned it in
his Ethics in the World of Business,’ yet the matter is still to be corrected.
This book, in contrast, is sensitive to ethical traditions. It outlines a theory
that is a partial synthesis of consequentialist, deontological, character-based,
and pragmatic concerns. Also, the book is in no way an advocacy book
though, of course, it is not neutral. In fact, it builds a case for a set of
conditions, which are formulated in Essay 8’s hypotheses, for dealing with
policy-making problems in a politically sound and morally permissible manner.
In addition to this preface, the book consists of twelve essays, twelve short
dialogues connecting the essays to each other, a selected bibliography, and
an index. The essays are largely self-contained but, taken together, they
carry out the book’s two primary tasks. The first is largely taxonomical,
involving the previously mentioned characterization and classification of
cases in a manner that permits greater integration between the social
sciences. It consists in describing crucial political, economic, and organi-
zational conditions that constrain the applicability of moral theories to
policy-making. Its upshot is one of the book’s objectives: to achieve greater
integration between the languages, concepts, and methods of the social
sciences and technology and business studies and institutions, those of ethics
and sociopolitical philosophy, and those of the policy-making community in
a manner reasonably accessible to the general public.
The book’s second task is primarily normative. It consists in using the said
constraints, together with other moral concerns, to formulate hypotheses for
dealing with policy-making problems in a politically sound and morally
permissible manner. In the process, the book examines the applicability of
various theories such as rational choice, decision, game, and social choice to
policy-making problems. It also examines the role of various concepts such
as objectivity, judgment, decision, moral rules, laws, principles, and social
 Preface xv

decision procedures as they apply to those problems.

The essays are wide ranging. Some examine traditional positions in moral
philosophy as they apply to current policy-making problems. Others dis-
cuss recently developed theories and advance equally recent positions. But
all are united by their focus on policy-making problems posed about matters
of current concern.
Many of these matters are technology related. They include fetal research,
new health care technologies and genetic engineering, environmental de-
terioration and its relation to energy and materials technologies, and high-
tech weapons in the post—cold war international order. However, not all the
policy problems addressed in the book’s essays are prompted by technolo-
gical developments. Some essays discuss policy-making problems related to
such matters as objectivity in news reporting, civil rights, preferential
treatment, and abortion.
As always, I accept responsibility for my mistakes, but there would have
been many more had I not benefited from the many discussions about
philosophy and policy and decision problems I had with teachers, friends,
and colleagues for the past two decades. Among these, I owe the greatest
thanks to Lewis A. Dexter and David Braybrooke for their encouragement
and sound advice at crucial moments in the book’s development. Thanks go
also to the members of the Department of Philosophy at Dalhousie Univer-
sity, and the visitors present during my 1987 visit, for their comments on an
early draft of what is now Essay 11. I also thank my colleagues and former
colleagues at Central Connecticut State University, especially David Blitz,
Lee Creer, Eleanor Godway, and Judith McBride, for their helpful com-
ments on drafts of what eventually became sections of this book. Special
thanks go to Mario Bunge for his encouragement and help and for providing
office space and access to McGill University’s resources during my 1990
visit. For the comments on topics related to my project that they made, at
different times, during the past two decades, I am also grateful to Tom
Auxter, Annette Baier, Kurt Baier, Robert J. Baum, Geoff Bryce, Claudia
Card, Margaret Carter, Elizabeth Diaz Herrera, Tom Garrow, Patrick W.
Hamlett, William Hay, Richard P. Haynes, John Jakovina, Don Kanel, John
P. Kavanagh, Susan Levine, Robert B. Louden, Maria C. Lugones, Jon N.
Moline, Tom Simon, Marcus G. Singer, Axel Stern, and Suzanne Stern-
Gillet. For their extremely effective library support services, I also thank the
staff at the Central Connecticut State University Elihu Burritt Library,
especially Emily S$. Chasse, Norma Chute, Marie A. Kascus, Barbara Sullivan
Meagher, Faith A. Merriman, Joan G. Packer, and June Sapia Welwood. I
should also mention and thank the Connecticut State University and the Con-
necticut Department of Higher Education for providing funds supporting
the research that led to this book, the Central Connecticut State University
xvi PREFACE

College of Arts and Sciences for granting reassigned time, the Yale Univer-
sity Libraries for granting the library privileges that gave me access to their
priceless resources, and the Department of Philosophy and the Institute for
Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison for provid-
ing the excellent academic conditions under which the project leading to this
book took shape about one and a half decades ago. And I very much thank
Keith M. Ashfield, president of Humanities Press, for his editorial sense and
encouragement, the project reviewers for their invaluable and detailed
comments, Humanities Press’s Production Editor, Karen Napolitano Starks,
for her patience and sound editorial advice, and all the Humanities Press staff
members with whom I had the pleasure of working during the book’s
planning and production process,
What I owe my wife, Mary Kay Garrow, for her unfaltering encourage-
ment, experienced policy- making comments, and sound editorial sugges-
tions, as in my previous philosophy books, I cannot possibly repay. They
were invaluable. As for our daughters, Alejandra Emilia and Catalina
Patricia, they have played an essential part in all this by simply being with
us, which has filled my life with happiness.
 Issues and Issue-
Overload: A Challenge
to Moral Philosophy

There is hardly a matter of policy that is free from controversy today. The
list ranges from nuclear energy and environmental deterioration; through
genetic engineering, fetal research, and abortion; to preferential treatment in
education and business and the international debt. Indeed, it keeps growing
at an accelerating pace, prompting greater numbers of increasingly heated
discussions, some highly confrontational.
These discussions constitute issues, which I define initially as sharp differ-
ences of opinions or conflicts of demands, together with what people do to
uphold their opinions or satisfy their demands. They are certainly not cool
and detached discussions about the matters of concern.’ This conflictive
nature of issues, together with their complexity and sheer multiplicity, poses
policy and decision problems over and above those posed by any one issue
in isolation. Among these is what I call issue-overload. This is a situation in
which issues are so many, complex, or intractable that they exceed, or nearly
exceed, what ordinary individuals can understand and ordinary societies can
handle through the courts, legislation, or executive or other institutional
channels as traditionally set up.
In this essay, I focus on issues and issue-overload. That is, I am not
concerned with the matters at issue per se. Rather, I focus on the social facts
of the issues and issue-overload and ask: What type of ethical theory is best
suited for dealing with policy and decision problems posed by issues and the
fact of issue-overload itself?

THE THESIS
I argue for one main thesis: The ethical theories best suited for dealing with
such problems include social decision procedures that go beyond such
primarily argumentative ones as discussion of merits and negotiation. These
additional procedures range from those that primarily involve appeals
to reason and reliance on meaningful dialogue, such as mediation and

+f
2 ISSUES AND ISSUE-OVERLOAD

arbitration, to those that primarily involve tactics, such as manipulation,

outflanking, boycotts, and strikes, in which reason and meaningful dialogue
are not predominant.” Of course, theories of this type do not exclude moral
rules, laws, and principles from the process of dealing with problems moral-
ly, but these are not their only crucial components. Such theories have a
pragmatic component as well.
To take the position just formulated is in no way to hold that the ethical
theories best suited for dealing with policy and decision problems are strictly
pragmatic. As I argue in this and later essays, they must combine consequen-
tialist, deontological, and pragmatic considerations. This combination makes
them sensitive to the various components of actual policy and decision
problems, hence preferable to alternative, simplistic theories.

POINTS OF METHOD
In accordance with the book’s primary method, I argue for the above thesis
by merging description and argument. That is, I describe cases or observa-
tions to exemplify certain hypotheses and then use the same or similar cases
or observations as evidence for the utility or accuracy of the said
hypotheses.* In applying this method, I discuss and rely on observations
from some notable contributions to the topic of discussion. First, I examine
Daniel C. Dennett’s ‘““The Moral First Aid Manual.’’* I follow Dennett in
holding that the type of theory needed should be sensitive to real time
constraints. However, I argue that this should not involve the moral cost of
Dennett’s suggestion: the undermining of critical scrutiny in ethics.
Second, I discuss Marcus G. Singer’s conception of a moral issue as it
relates to policy-level shifts. I argue that, though it is a significant contribu-
tion to the subject, this conception has four limitations that make it too
narrow and unclear for dealing with the entire range of moral problems
related to policy- and decision-making about issues. Accordingly, I further
refine the definition of isswes presented at the outset, so that it is free from
such limitations. The fact of social conflict, however confrontational it may
be, is placed at the center of issues.
Finally, I discuss a central aspect of Habermas’s theory: steering away
from conflict and making consensus the touchstone of morally acceptable
policies and decisions. This discussion involves a critical examination of
modifications suggested by Jon Elster. Though largely in agreement with
Elster’s criticisms, I argue that his suggested alternative does not go far
enough. Accordingly, I sketch a theory that is neither simply consequential-
ist nor simply deontological. It combines both types of considerations and is
sensitive to pragmatic constraints. The main components of this theory are
further developed in the remainder of the book.
 Issues and Issue-Overload 3

SOME GAUTIONARY REMARKS

This essay’s approach may cause impatience among both philosophers and
social scientists. Philosophers, eager to reach the thick of philosophical
argument, may find it conceptually too sketchy. Social scientists may grow
impatient for more than one reason: Those eager to deal empirically and in
great detail with particular cases may find the essay too theoretical; those
primarily interested in social science discussions may feel that the essay
covers ground already adequately covered by their own studies of policy-
making’s problems in general or of nonethical rational contributions to
policy-making. In response, I can only ask for patience and offer a few
reasons for the approach taken here.
First and foremost, in this essay, I am not primarily concerned with what
is problematic about policy-making generally. Nor am I primarily con-
cerned with nonethical rational contributions to policy-making. These mat-
ters are no doubt of interest in social science, and this essay has something to
offer toward clarifying them, but their exhaustive elucidation falls outside its
scope. The book, however, does address them to some extent in Essays 2 and
3 and, to a lesser extent, in Essays 6, 7, and 12.
Second, what does fall within the scope of this book and, in particular, of
this essay, is an introductory discussion of politics and policy as these are
relevant to applied ethics. Such a discussion may at times seem trivial to
political scientists. I can only suggest that they skip the trivial sections. What
I cannot do is omit them. Trivial matters of politics and policy-making need
attention in moral philosophy, where actual politics and policy-making have
often been significantly disregarded.
Throughout, this book emphasizes the fact that whether specific pieces of
conduct or policies are permissible (or even required) when dealing with
given problems depends on economic, political, and other pragmatic con-
straints. Such constraints are especially pressing when dealing with problems
posed by issues or, as in issue-overload, by their combination. A more
detailed examination of the complex case of issue-overload indicates the
nature and significance of these constraints and sets the stage for assessing
specific moral theories.

ISSUE-OVERLOAD AS MANIFESTED IN GOURT-GASE

OVERLOAD IN THE UNITED STATES
Issue-overload can manifest itself in a variety of settings, for example, in a
judicial or legislative setting. Depending on the setting, issue-overload has
some different sources and effects and calls for different remedies. Yet in each
setting, certain general features of issue-overload are involved. Here, though I
focus on court-case overload, I am concerned with these general features.
4 ISSUES AND ISSUE-OVERLOAD

In the United States, issue-overload has often—though not exclusively—

manifested itself in court-case overload. Evidence and an interpretation of
this development were provided by Eugene Kennedy at the end of the 1970s
in the New York Times Magazine:
Many social critics have noted with alarm the tendency to use the courts
excessively, with judges now running prisons, hospitals and school sys-
tems; their decisions replace those of physicians in assaying diagnosis and
treatment, they signal if the ball game may be played, if the strike can be
held, if the child may receive a certain medical treatment. Then, hundreds
of other issues became the courts’ business as the nation lost faith in other
forms of negotiation and gave the courts power they did not seek, without
any guarantee that they could exercise it prudently or effectively over a
long period of time.
The 70’s were the setting for bringing down on the nation the old
Mexican curse, “May your life be filled with lawyers.’
One might object that this description provides evidence of litigiousness,
imprudence, and burdens on judges and litigants, but no evidence of exces-
sive strain on the U.S. court system, let alone the society. However, there is
evidence that such strain has resulted from excessive or misplaced litigious-
ness. David L. Bazelon, a federal judge who dealt with many issue-related
cases over more than three decades, has described how the shift toward
litigiousness destabilizes the society in politically and economically signi-
ficant ways.° Indeed, his views have been echoed by the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment, the American Bar Association, and business. In mid-1980, they
supported a bill encouraging Federal agencies to settle their disputes through
mediation rather than litigation. Its purpose was to avoid overload caused by
issues such as the eighteen-year court battle between the Food and Drug
Administration and peanut butter makers about the percentage of peanuts
their product should have, and conflicts concerning the cleanup of haz-
ardous wastes sites and the savings and loan crisis.

THE GHALLENGE TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY

As the preceding discussion makes plain, issue-overload results not only
from the number of issues or the speed with which new ones develop but
also from addressing the issues through inadequate and costly institutional
channels. In democracies, where public accountability is crucial, it may also
result from addressing them through institutional channels that make little if
any room for this accountability. In general, frequent mismatches between
issues and the procedures used for addressing the policy and decision prob-
lems they pose are indicators of issue-overload. When, as a consequence of
these mismatches, a crucial social institution or sector—or an entire
 Issues and Issue-Overload 5

society—is politically undermined (e.g., through loss of public acquie-

scence) or economically destabilized (e.g., by runaway inflation or by an
enormous national debt), issue-overload is present.
Once this situation develops, the overloading factors become pragmatic
constraints. That is, they limit the social decision procedures that are politi-
cally sound and morally permissible for dealing with the situation. No
doubt, in overload situations, available information suggesting how to cut
the inflation rate or rebuild public trust is both politically and morally
crucial. But it is equally crucial for this information to be put to policy-
making use. And this is accomplished by communicating, evaluating, and
contributing to settle the information’s practical import through the ongoing
policy-making dialogue found in every political system. Static moral
theories that ignore, or treat as a mere political externality, the ongoing
nature of political discourse are inadequate. And those theories that under-
mine critical scrutiny in this dialogue are equally inadequate.
One aspect of policy and decision problems that has special significance
concerning issues and issue-overload is time constraints. In “The Moral First
Aid Manual,” Daniel C. Dennett argues that philosophical practice and
traditional ethical theories are inadequate in this regard:
For the most part philosophers are content to ignore the practical prob-
lems of real-time decision-making, regarding the brute fact that we are all
finite and forgetful, and have to rush to judgment, as a real but irrelevant
element of friction in the machinery whose blueprint they are describing.
It is as if there might be two disciplines— ethics proper, which undertakes
the task of calculating the principles of what the ideal agent ought to do
under all circumstances—and then the less interesting “merely practical”
discipline of Moral First Aid, or What to Do Until the Doctor of Philoso-
phy Arrives, which tells, in rough-and-ready terms, how to make “on
line” decisions under time pressure.
In practice, philosophers acknowledge, we overlook important con-
siderations—considerations that we shouldn’t overlook—and we bias
our thinking in a hundred idiosyncratic—and morally indefensible—
ways; but in principle, what we ought to do is what the ideal theory (one
ideal theory or another) says we ought to do.”
Dennett wisely acknowledges that in philosophy or, for that matter, in
science, to theorize is to simplify, hence to develop idealizations of reality.
The problem is determining which idealizations help deal with ethical
problems and issues and which, as he says, “will just land us with diverting
fairy tales.’”®
This is sound doctrine. What about Dennett’s suggested solution, the first
aid manual? At one point, Dennett describes it as “the book the ideally
rational agent would write as his own vade mecum, written in the light of his
6 ISSUES AND ISSUE-OVERLOAD

perfect self-knowledge about his many limitations.”? This description,

however, is a bit too simple, for the manual has varied purposes. For
example, Dennett imagines it “to be framed as advice to a rational, heeding
audience,” but also as rendering agents “impervious to the invasions of
hyperrationality.” Given this latter purpose, the manual “can also be viewed
as not having achieved its end unless it has the effect of changing the
“operating system”—not merely the “data,” not merely the contents of
belief or acceptance—of the agents it addresses.”’° As Dennett acknowl-
edges, “For it to succeed in such a special task, it will have to address its
target audiences with pinpoint accuracy.’ Hence, as Dennett infers,
“There might, then, be several different Moral First Aid Manuals each
effective for a different type of audience.’’*
This notion of several moral first aid manuals, each giving on-line moral
advice to a different audience, has significant shortcomings. I mention
three here.
First, the moral first aid manuals’ emphasis on ready answers undermines
a central feature of ethics: critical scrutiny. It simply aims at fulfilling the all
too common desire to be told what to do, no questions asked. This amounts
to putting authority in the place of reason—too high an ethical cost to pay
for acting effectively under pressure.
No doubt, there are people who would be more likely to act rightly were
they simply to follow such ready advice instead of thinking about what to
do. And in very special cases, a bit of moral first aid may be unavoidable.
However, right behavior is not the only or main thing to secure in ethics.
The openness of ethical discourse and unsurrendered freedom of thought are
equally if not more significant. The question is how not to preclude or
undermine them while taking into account, as one must, time and other
constraints on policy- and decision-making.
Second, the task of writing the manuals raises a cluster of questions: Who
could write such a book? Under what conditions would such a person have
written it? Dennett’s answer, like the sort of theory he criticizes, falls prey to
the excesses of idealization. He states that the first aid manual would be “‘the
book the ideally rational agent would write as his own vade mecum, written
in the light of his perfect self-knowledge about his many limitations.””!> Why
appeal to an ideally rather than ordinarily rational agent, and perfect self-
knowledge (we may lack the time to attain it) rather than adequate knowl-
edge for the task at hand?
In contrast with Dennett’s vision and with the approaches he criticizes, it
appears that the guidelines to be sought should be developed by ordinarily
rational agents with adequate, though by no means perfect, knowledge for
developing them. These agents would have a general knowledge of the
world’s workings: an awareness of relevant findings in the sciences, an
 Issues and Issue-Overload 7

adequate sense of the various ethical concerns relevant to the guidelines,

some policy-making or related practical experience. Also, the process for
developing the guidelines sometimes needs to involve limited interactions
with alternative solutions. And it needs to involve ongoing interactions and
discussions among those affected by the problems and those involved in
making policy about the problems (who are often different people).'*
This leads to the third shortcoming of Dennett’s approach. It undermines
the discussions just mentioned because it presupposes acquiescence to au-
thority as a rule. Hence, it cannot help but undermine the political system by
making it unresponsive to the outcome of these social decision procedures of
interaction and public discussion.

TASKS FOR MORAL PHILOSOPHY

In the approach I am proposing, the guidelines’ purpose is something other
than to tell people what to do. If morality is to make room for reason among
ordinary people, then it should not lead to something like a platoon where
the commander issues moral orders. Nor is the guidelines’ purpose to tell
people what they ought to do, though this is not generally objectionable.
Rather, it is to guide policy-making, which involves giving directions for
three activities: (1) identifying issues; (2) focusing on the types of social
conflicts they involve—from mere controversies to the sharpest confronta-
tions; and (3) deciding what social decision procedures may be used to deal
with the policy and decision problems the issues pose individually or, as in
issue-overload, in combination with others. Here, it is crucial that the
guidelines help ask sensible questions rather than find answers to questions
that misconstrue political or moral realities.’°
Given this purpose, a taxonomy of issues that is reasonably accessible to
ordinary policymakers is needed. Such a taxonomy, and the questions formu-
lated with the taxonomy’s help, will not use excessively technical language. For
if the sought guidelines are to guide ordinary policymakers, as intended, their
language should not sacrifice clarity to technicality or precision.
To say this in no way implies that studies formulated in more technical
language are of no use. On the contrary. Dennett himself envisions system-
atic empirical studies in psychology and formal analyses of task domains and
the useful heuristics for them, of the sort sometimes produced by people
studying artificial intelligence.'® No doubt, this would fit the approach I am
suggesting. In addition, empirical studies by sociologists and political scien-
tists should complete the picture.'”
At any rate, a taxonomy of policy and decision problems would help
distinguish the different levels at which questions need to be asked. For
example, in discussing issues concerning abortion policy, one needs to
8 ISSUES AND ISSUE-OVERLOAD
address the higher-level question: Is the policy question what abortion
policies should we have, given that there is controversy and even confronta-
tion about it and that this economically and politically destabilizes large
social sectors or society itself? or rather, what abortion policies should we
have, given abstract principles of right and wrong and regardless of the
controversy, the confrontation, and their destabilizing consequences? This
shifts the issue to the policy level. I consider this type of shift next. The
needed taxonomy is outlined in Essay 7.

LEVELS OF POLIGY AND DECISION PROBLEMS

Marcus G. Singer has discussed questions that arise about issues at a policy
level other than that predominantly presupposed by the exchanges among
those involved in the issues. In “Moral Issues and Social Problems: The
Moral Relevance of Moral Philosophy,” he says:

Where there exist strong differences of opinion on opposing sides of some

moral matter we have a moral issue, as I shall call it, rather than a moral
problem, for there is something at issue. The discussions that are resorted
to as means of settling them often turn into disputes, controversies, or
conflicts, some of which, owing to the failure of other mutually agreed-on
means of resolving them, may be resolved only by threats, intimidation,
terrorism, or warfare—at least this is what the parties may resort to. ...
For every issue on which opinion is inflamed, in which the controversy
gets worse and degenerates into conflict ... the society has a problem, the
problem of how best to resolve the issue. Thus every serious, strongly felt,
and long-standing moral issue in a society constitutes a social problem,
which in turn is itself a moral problem—a second order moral problem—
of how best and most effectively to settle the issue.!

This characterization constitutes a significant contribution to social ethics.

However, it has at least four limitations that make it inadequate for dealing
with problems posed by issues in all their variety.
First, Singer’s characterization of issues restricts them to differences of
opinion. It excludes conflicts—especially highly confrontational
situations—that appear to be dominantly, though not merely, conflicts of
demands. Think of labor disputes in which moral opinions are voiced, but
they turn out to be largely a front for sheer demands on the part of
management or labor. Think of organized crime or drug-cartel wars. Con-
flicts such as these sometimes pose a second-order policy problem for
society, even though they amount to conflicts of demands, with opinions
and reasons being used merely as persuasive tools for satisfying the de-
mands. Any approach and guidelines like the ones needed to deal with issues
and their collective consequences on large social sectors or entire societies
 Issues and Issue-Overload 9

should apply to these cases too. Singer’s characterization of issues is too

narrow to help in this respect.
In defense of Singer’s characterization, one might point out that it is not
intended to cover the cases just mentioned, because its purpose is to char-
acterize moral issues. And, given the motivations in the above-mentioned
disputes, one might argue that the issues are not moral. This position, if
sound, merely justifies Singer’s characterization. It does not make it any less
limited. The second-order policy problems for society are still not covered
by it.
Second, Singer’s conception is also too narrow to cover moral problems.
Although in the above cases there is largely something at stake but nothing
at issue, and those opposing each other are not themselves moved by moral
considerations, the second-order policy problems posed by such conflicts of
demands are nonetheless moral problems. Society and individual lives are
disrupted by such conflicts, and there are viable (however imperfect) policy-
making opinions for dealing with them. Singer’s characterization of second-
order moral problems falls short of covering not just the whole range of
second-order policy problems but, as a result, the whole range of second-
order moral problems as well.
Third, this characterization does not cover third-order questions, which
sometimes become the core of issues themselves. Their general form is: Should
the question be asked at the first-order level (e.g., What, if any, abortions are
morally permissible and what abortion policies are accordingly justified, re-
gardless of any controversy or confrontation there may be about it?) or
second-order level (e.g., What abortion policies are justified, given that there is
a societally disruptive controversy and even confrontation about it?)?
Finally, Singer’s characterization is not sufficiently clear about the relation
of disputes, controversies, or conflicts to moral issues. At the beginning of
the paragraph quoted above, he says, ““Where there exist strong differences
of opinion on opposing sides of some moral matter we have a moral issue.””'”
Here, an issue would appear to be simply the strong differences of opinion
on opposing sides of some moral matter. A bit later, however, a controversy
and its degeneration into conflict are said to occur im an issue. Are they then
part and parcel of issues or merely a political externality?
Since the guidelines needed should cover all levels of moral issues and
moral policy and decision problems posed by issues, the wider notion of an
issue should be adopted. Accordingly, the position I am taking is that social
conflicts, however heated, are part and parcel—indeed, are at the very
core—of issues. Further, since some of these conflicts are irreducible during
the time available for dealing with the issues, ethical guidelines must make
ethically acceptable room for compromise, voting, bargaining, negotiation,
and other procedures for dealing with opposing demands or opinions. What
10 ISSUES AND ISSUE-OVERLOAD

the appropriate procedure is will depend on the type of issue being faced. I
should add, however, that this position does not rule out the search for
consensus in dealing with issues of certain types. But this is best discussed by
reference to recent discussions in the ongoing consensus-conflict debate.

GONSENSUS, CONFLICT, AND ETHICAL THEORIES

What constraints do social conflicts create on ethical theories meant to help
guide policy and decisions about issues and issue-overload? None according
to some theories. Jiirgen Habermas’s theory, for example, rules out any
procedure for dealing with conflict except discussion of merits. According to
this theory, the goal of politics should be rational agreement attained through “a
cooperative search for truth in which only the force of the better argument
prevails.””° As Jon Elster sees Habermas’s theory, “the decisive act is that of
engaging in public debate with a view to the emergence of consensus.”””
Elster is largely in sympathy with this theory, yet fears “that it might be
dismissed as Utopian, both in the sense of ignoring the problem of getting
from here to there, and in the sense of neglecting some elementary facts of
human psychology.””* Accordingly, his objections focus largely on how
difficult it is to reach a consensus and how questionable it is to seek it or even
approach it, let alone to require that everyone be involved in the task.”?
Elster describes his own position about the place of consensus in policy- and
decision-making in a manner reminiscent of Dennett’s views:
It is the concern with substantive decisions that lends the urgency to
political debates. The ever-present constraint of time creates a need for
focus and concentration. . . . Yet within these constraints arguments form
the core of the political process.”*
This sensitivity to time constraints is a move in the right direction but, I
believe, a somewhat simplistic doctrine. As previously indicated, the con-
straints on argument in politics go far beyond matters of time. The discus-
sion in preceding sections indicates that some policy and decision problems
are intractable because of the type of social conflict (e.g., the confrontation)
that poses the problem, or because of other social circumstances (e.g., the
existence of issue-overload). Even if time were not of the essence (which it
often is), seeking consensus might be an irrelevant way of dealing with the
problem. It might be as irrelevant as trying to give reasons for being rational
to those who are set on not listening to reason at all. I next sketch a theory of
the type needed to soundly deal with the variety of policy and decision
problems.
 Issues and Issue-Overload 11

POLIGY-MAKING, MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE,

AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
The type of theory needed for soundly addressing policy and decision
problems should be sensitive to the variety of policy-making problems in
which reason and meaningful dialogue are not the only components. The
ones I have emphasized in this essay are problems about issues. Con-
cerning them, the type of theory needed should focus on two questions that
are crucial for ethically and politically sound policy- and decision-making:
What is the type of conflict involved in the issue or combination of issues
posing the policy and decision problem? And, given time pressures and
other pragmatic constraints (e.g., the unsettled nature of some of the con-
cerns involved), what are the likely social implications of the conflict or
combination of conflicts and of various viable social decision procedures for
dealing with it? Focusing on these questions provides evidence that, from
the standpoint of the type of theory suggested, the variety of policy and
decision problems is taken seriously, as is the variety of social decision
procedures for dealing with these matters.”
The theory I am suggesting combines deontological and consequentialist
considerations with the pragmatic constraints of time, social attitudes, po-
litical institutions, economic realities, technological feasibility, and the often
unknown or even unsettled nature of data about these things. It is guided by
two overall hypotheses. One concerns ethics. It is the range hypothesis.
According to it, there is a range of ethical problems with the following
characteristics: At one extreme, individual rights carry much more weight
than any other consideration in dealing with problems because, for example,
natural rights are significantly and unequivocally at stake in those problems.
At the other extreme, consequences carry the most weight because, for
example, the very existence and well-being of a reasonably good society are
at stake. In between, rights and consequences have less decisive weight,
though, fortunately, they often reinforce each other. Sometimes, however,
they appear to conflict with each other, constituting hard cases to deal with.
All along the range of problems, pragmatic considerations set limits to
alternatives that would otherwise have served to address the problems.”®
This hypothesis finds support in the cases and observations made
throughout the previous discussion. So does the second: the balance hypoth-
esis. According to it, there is a range of policy and decision problems with
the following characteristics: At one extreme, the search for feasible and
effective policies and decisions through a reliance on meaningful dialogue
and the use of reason carries much more weight than any other considera-
tion; time and other constraints make the search possible. At the other
extreme, the need to deal with the social facts posing policy and decision
12 ISSUES AND ISSUE-OVERLOAD

problems (e.g., with the conflicts central to the abortion issue, or with public
acquiescence to socially disastrous environmental practices) carries more
weight than any other consideration. Meaningful dialogue and the use of
reason are not dominant in these circumstances, which involve a clear and
immediate threat to the very existence and well-being of one or more
reasonably good societies. In between, the search for policies and decisions
through reliance on reason and meaningful dialogue, and the pressing need
to deal with the problems, have less decisive weight, though, fortunately,
they often reinforce each other. Sometimes, however, they appear to conflict
with each other, constituting hard cases to deal with. All along, pragmatic
considerations set limits on (1) the extent to which the cases can be empha-
sized, and (2) the procedures suited for realistically attending to them.
The theory just sketched is outlined in more detail in the book’s remain-
der. It treats a variety of social decision procedures—from bargaining,
voting, and compromise to lottery, arbitration, policy insulation, and
manipulation—as no less morally crucial than discussion of merits and no
less politically crucial than confrontational procedures such as striking and
combat. This is how things should be. Depending on the circumstances, each
one of these procedures constitutes a politically viable and morally prefer-
able alternative to seeking to rely only on reason and dialogue and invariably
opting for nonrational, often confrontational, procedures. Exaggerating the
role of reason and unreason can only undermine morality and paralyze
politics. As the preceding discussion suggests, the approach this book adopts
is best suited for avoiding these consequences. If systematically pursued, it
offers a chance of cementing society along morally acceptable lines. It will
certainly not eliminate the fact that most currently significant policy and
decision problems involve social conflict. But dealing with this fact from this
book’s standpoint involves a less wide-eyed and less divisive process.
 Dialogue

— You are jumping to conclusions! Suppose that Habermas’s

theory has the shortcomings you suggest. This does not in any way
mean that all moral theories do. To be sure, Dennett argues that
utilitarian as well as Kantian theories fail to provide advice in very
concrete situations, when time is of the essence. But why accept his
arguments so readily?

— You are right in thinking that more arguments than Dennett

provides are needed to establish that both utilitarian and Kantian
theories are unable to provide advice in such situations. Indeed, I
will give some in later essays. There is, however, no good reason
why I should not indicate my position in the book’s first essay. I
agree with Dennett’s assessment of the theories, although I disagree
with his suggested solutions. Besides, in this essay, my main pur-
pose was not to discuss the theories. Rather, it was to characterize
issues and issue-overload and argue for some features that theories
need to have if they are to be of help in dealing with issues and
issue-overload.

— OK. But putting that matter aside, why argue in the manner you
do? First, you point out that there are certain realities about the
world of policy. Then you argue that if we take them into account,
we should end up with the type of moral theory capable of helping
address those realities. It is not a very startling discovery that a
theory that incorporates pragmatic considerations is sensitive to
pragmatic constraints.

— I grant you that this is an almost tautological point to make; but,

given the disregard that traditional moral theories display for the
facts of politics, it is necessary to make it. However, this point is not
my argument. Instead, I argue that the ethical theories best suited
for dealing with issues and issue-overload must include not just

13
14. DIALOGUE

abstract moral rules, laws, and principles but also social decision
procedures (from mediation to strikes) that go beyond primarily
argumentative ones. This is something that traditional moral
theories do not do.

— In any case, even if traditional moral theories have the short-

comings you and Dennett suggest, why should new ones, developed
along the lines of rational choice theory and its offspring (decision,
game, and social choice theory), have the same shortcomings? These
are theories you have not discussed, and Dennett says little, if
anything, about them. Yet they are widely touted as theories cap-
able of helping us deal with the situations in which issues and
issue-overload trap us.

— You seem to be reading my mind. I entirely agree that the

theories you just mentioned need discussion, though I am not sure
that they are as different in approach from some traditional moral
theories as you seem to imply. Indeed, I will discuss them in the
essays coming up, after outlining a taxonomy of the social traps you
mention. Be patient, and you may find that apparently trivial start-
ing points have not so trivial consequences for both moral and
political theories.
py) Social Traps:
High-Tech Weapons,
Rarefied Theories,
and the World
of Politics

Dealing with international conflicts, economic difficulties, and environmen-

tal decay often leads to social traps. These are situations in which, indi-
vidually or in groups, people are stuck behaving in a manner they perceive as
favorable to their aims when, in fact, it is contrary to them.’ This essay is
about social traps in policy-making. It asks: Can rational choice, decision,
and game theory help deal with social traps? How? What, if any, are these
theories’ shortcomings? Do any other theories appear more plausible? I
argue that rational choice, decision, and game theory are of little help in
dealing with social traps in policy-making, whether as theories or merely as
heuristic devices. Establishing this thesis prepares the groundwork for estab-
lishing Essay 3’s thesis that “‘satisficing” theories are better suited for dealing
with social traps.
The ensuing discussion emphasizes problems posed by high-tech weapons
escalation and proliferation and examines actual constraints on addressing
these problems. Its results, however, should be relevant to the examination of
how the said theories apply to policy and decision problems about environ-
mental deterioration, economic instability, overpopulation, and a variety of
other matters. Before proceeding, I sketch a typology of social traps, which
should help examine the applicability of rational choice, decision, and game
theories to the policy and decision problems posed by social traps.

TYPOLOGY OF SOGIAL TRAPS

Some social traps result from ignorance; others, from more knowledge than
one can handle; still others from lack of cooperation; and others from

15
16. SOCIAL TRAPS

conflict. Ignorance leads to traps in various ways. In time delay traps, people
misperceive the amount of damage their behavior does to their aims because
the damage is delayed—as in deficit-building public spending. In sliding
reinforcer traps, the damage is misperceived because it gradually increases
over time—as in the use of agricultural methods that cause soil erosion. And
there are total ignorance traps, in which the damage, present or future, is not
known at all. An example is the 1941-1971 use of diethylstilbestrol (DES) in
the United States to prevent miscarriages.
As stated, traps may result from things other than ignorance. In overload
traps, the damage results from excessive information that the individual or
group tries to process but cannot—as in the U.S. court overload. There are
also externality traps, in which the actions of others or simply the external
circumstances cause one’s otherwise harmless behavior to damage one’s
aims. Some of these are parameter traps, in which others (e.g., hostage
takers) or the circumstances (e.g., natural catastrophes) confront people with
desperate choices. Others are collective traps, in which the actions of enough
others cause one’s otherwise harmless behavior to damage one’s (and some-
times also their) aims. Some of these are noncooperation traps, and others are
conflict traps. Overpopulation, where the overall effects but not the indi-
vidual decisions are interdependent, exemplifies a noncooperation trap. The
arms race, where the decisions themselves are interdependent, exemplifies a
conflict trap.? Of course, the traps just described, and others, can form
hybrid types of social traps.
One of the questions I address is: Can rational choice, decision, and game
theory help deal with social traps in policy-making? To establish this, let us
first briefly characterize these theories and their intended applications in
policy-making.

RATIONAL GHOIGE THEORY, POLIGY-MAKING

DECISIONISM, AND STRATEGIG GAMES
The standard version of rational choice theory purports to tell us what to do
in order to achieve our aims, but not what these aims should be. It has four
main components: (1) the set of feasible courses of action, that is, the courses
of action that satisfy (or are rationally believed to satisfy) various logical,
physical, and social constraints; (2) the causal connections (or the set of
beliefs about the causal connections) that determine which courses of action
lead to which outcomes; (3) a subjective ranking of the feasible courses of
action, typically on the basis of the outcomes they are expected to have; and
(4) the notion that to choose rationally is to choose the highest ranked
among these courses of action.?
The application of rational choice theory to policy analysis is decision
theory. It was initially applied to the study of military operations, logistics,
 Social Traps 17

and tactics during World War II. In the early 1950s, it was formalized at the
Rand Corporation and other policy-oriented institutions. From then until
the 1960s, it was widely used in microeconomics—primarily in the context
of market transactions—management science, and military strategy.* The
structure of decisions was thought to be the same for all cases. In The
Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, for example, Hitch and McKean
say: “How choices should be made—the whole problem of allocating scarce
resources among competing ends—is the stuff of economics and the subject
of this book.’ Indeed, this methodology came to be called decisionism.® In
accordance with rational choice theory, the decisionist approach requires
rational policymakers to specify their aims; specify the feasible courses of
action to attain these aims; rank them, typically by appeal to the outcomes
they are expected to have; and choose that which ranks the highest. In
addition, it envisions a unitary, consistent policymaker or a group acting
consistently and as a unit.”
In the 1970s and 1980s, rational choice theory’s offspring, game theory,
attracted the attention of sociobiologists, philosophers, and even more po-
litical scientists. This is the theory of rational choice as it applies to conflicts.
Most conspicuously, it applies to conflicts involved in those externality traps
that involve strategic decisions, that is, decisions that are interdependent. Its
main component is the payoff matrix. In the simplest case of a two-parties
game, the payoff matrix is that shown on page 18.
In accordance with rational choice theory, game theory assumes that to be
rational is always to act to maximize one’s expected utility. It also assumes
that there is a utility function that can be precisely calculated for everyone
and everything.®
I next address the questions: Can rational choice, decision, and game
theory help deal with social traps in policy-making? What, if any, are their
shortcomings? My treatment is not exhaustive. It focuses on a collective type
of trap—or presumed trap—involving conflict: high-tech weapons escala-
tion and proliferation. Within this framework, I describe some crucial moral
and political considerations that such theories, and any modifications that
preserve them, cannot take into account. In other words, I formulate reasons
for abandoning these theories. At the same time, I set the stage for a
consideration of alternative, satisficing theories in dealing with social traps
and related policy-making situations.

THE GASE OF HIGH-TEGH WEAPONS:

ESCALATION AND PROLIFERATION
Since the cold war ended sometime in 1990, the arms race between the
superpowers has slowed down, though it has not ended. But the catch-up
race involving other countries has reached new speeds. This is no minor
18 SOCIAL TRAPS

A, ( Un, Vi) ( Uj, )

A, (Ua, Vor) (Us2, Vo)

In this matrix, u,, is the expected utility of player A, and v,, is the expected utility of player B,
when player A chooses strategy A, and player B chooses strategy B,. In more complex cases, u;;
is the expected utility of player A, and v,; is the expected utility of player B, when player A
chooses strategy A, and player B chooses strategy B;. In accordance with common practice, 1
and ; are variables for natural numbers.

matter. Consider nuclear weapons: To be sure, two countries are in posses-

sion of by far the largest nuclear arsenals—the United States and Russia.
However, they are not the only ones currently capable of using nuclear
weapons. China, France, and the United Kingdom can use them too. Nor
are these five countries the only ones with nuclear weapons capability.
Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa are known to be
capable of producing them. Indeed, there have been concerns that some of
them are doing precisely that.”
In addition, all these countries have been involved in at least one interna-
tional war during the twentieth century; some have been under military or
quasi-military dictatorships; and some of the latter have shown little re-
straint on war matters.'° Add to this the fact that other nonnuclear countries
involved in recent international confrontations have other high-tech
weapons. For example, about two months after Iraq’s August 2, 1990,
invasion and annexation of Kuwait, intelligence reports indicated that Iraq
had more than its well-known chemical weapons capability. It also had a
sizable stockpile of biological weapons and was expected to have a militarily
significant biological weapons program by early 1991. The ex-Soviet Union,
Israel, Syria, and other nations are also known to have done extensive
research into this type of weapon. To complicate matters, the use of these
weapons can easily proliferate, and their production sites can be identified
only with great difficulty, because they can be produced in almost any
 Social Traps 19

pharmaceutical laboratory. In addition, the size of the stockpiles increases

the chance of theft, and the wide dispersion of these weapons makes breaks
in the chain of control more likely.'!
Such a situation suggests that a high-tech weapons confrontation could
start in a number of places, setting up a chain of retaliatory measures
sufficient to destroy human, if not all, life in large regions or even on the
entire planet. The risk that these weapons will be used and lead to escalation
grows as they become smaller and more accurate, because these modifica-
tions foster visions of so-called surgical strikes and graduated uses of these
weapons, especially nuclear weapons, in battle. Under what constraints is
this all happening? I turn to this question next, beginning with the most
commonly recognized variables in the situation. For the purposes of this
discussion, I describe them in the manner typical of rational choice, decision,
and game theories.
VARIABLES OF THE HIGH-TEGH WEAPONS RAGE
As the preceding discussion indicates, a variety of states could use high-
tech weapons, as could a variety of terrorist groups.'* This is a significant
epistemological variable of the high-tech weapons race. To be sure, a few
states have far greater knowledge of and technological ability to produce and
use the weapons, but a great and growing number of additional states and
other groups have enough relevant knowledge and ability to use them.
There is also the behavioral variable. Though different states and other
groups are led into the arms race by a variety of reasons, they share
significant tendencies whose aims constitute the national interest of each
country. Each tends to (1) try to increase its security; (2) decrease its
members’ anxiety, if possible; and (3) behave so as to preserve ideas, values,
or principles predominant among its members.
These ideas, values, and principles may sometimes be upheld by a coun-
try’s public officials merely as a way of defending a public image or saving
face at the international level. Other times, they may go deeper than that.’
Sometimes, they may be somewhat forgotten.'* In any case, these ideas,
values, and principles do not generally rule out some form of cooperation.
Such cooperation may be understood as peace—the notion predominantly
used in cold war Soviet Union official statements. Or it may be understood
as fairness or equitability—a notion frequently used in U.S. official state-
ments. In any case, cooperation cannot be inconsistent with the aims of
increasing security and decreasing anxiety.
Next, significant among the variables of the high-tech weapons race are
resources. They set constraints on the way in which the various aims or
motivations involved in the behavioral variable can and should be balanced
against one another. The resources are those that a state (or group) has at its
disposal to keep up with the race.
20. SOCIAL. TRAPS

Finally, the situation just described points to a fourth variable of the arms
race, the liberty variable: Each participant is at liberty to introduce a new
device or weapon whenever and however it pleases, so long as its resources
permit, its knowledge makes it possible, its motivation does not falter, and
existing treaties (whose force, at any rate, is often questionable) do not rule
it out.
Given these variables alone, countries often appear to be stuck generating
high-tech weapons escalation and proliferation. That is, they appear caught
in a social trap. Let us next see how it is supposed to work.
THE ESCALATION AND PROLIFERATION PROCESS
Given the above variables alone, four main steps lead to escalation and
proliferation. First, at each juncture, the countries involved are expected to
develop their high-tech weapons arsenals for the sake of their national
interest. For example, even now that the cold war is over, the United States
and the ex-Soviet Union are expected to develop weapons usable in regional
confrontations such as that prompted by Iraq’s August 1990 invasion and
annexation of Kuwait.'° Second, this expectation is perceived as a threat to
other countries involved—for one, to Iraq. Third, it is taken for granted that
each country should act for the sake of its own national interest. Hence,
fourth, those behind in the race try to catch up—for instance, Iraq tries to
develop biological and nuclear weapons.'® Those ahead try to stay ahead.
And those in the middle try to keep up with one another and, in some cases,
surpass the others. As a consequence, the number of weapons escalates.
Partly as a result of this, the weapons become much easier to obtain by those
countries that still lack them.
Whenever a country makes a decision to escalate, insecurity and anxiety
may decrease, but this is a short-lived development that lasts only until the
other side’s escalation takes place. At decision time, however, the short-term
benefits of minimizing insecurity and anxiety outweigh the later and greater
dangers of continued escalation. After all, those greater dangers are later
dangers; those dangers posed by failure to escalate are perceived as clear and
present and, quite arguably, are so.’” Hence, the race is not blatantly a result
of misjudgment or ignorance of likely risks. Indeed, all policymakers in
charge can be said to be fully aware of the situation. And they are generally
guided by the same overall motivation: avoiding the destructive conse-
quences of the arms race.
A HIGH-TEGH WEAPONS TRAP?
If the preceding account were all there is to the societal problem posed by
the high-tech weapons race conflict, the viable options for dealing with the
problem would, no doubt, be quite restricted. Some would argue that the
situation is a social trap. If it is, its nature is hybrid, involving elements of at
 Social Traps 21

least collective conflict, time delay, and sliding reinforcer traps.

There are a variety of reasons to consider it a social trap. First, changing
the underlying motivations would not, by itself, do much to change the
problem. Some of these motivations do not even conflict: All states involved
are determined to avoid nuclear holocaust and comparable catastrophic
consequences of the race. And when the underlying motivations do conflict,
they are unlikely to change readily. Each state is committed to increase its
security and decrease the anxiety among members of its population and will
take actions to accomplish this.
A second reason for considering the situation a social trap is that actions
taken are likely to be unilateral. Even when they are the result of talks
between the states involved, the decision to rely on these talks and perform
or omit actions on the basis of these talks is itself unilateral and may be
secretive. Or, if there was an agreement, the states may manipulate the
agreement’s meaning. As was the case with the 1972 ABM treaty, they may
even manipulate the meaning of agreed-upon interpretations.'®
Only actions aimed at building trust between the states involved will tend
to minimize such developments. However, such a process takes time,
perhaps more time than those involved are prepared to wait in order to
prevent a catastrophe. This is evidenced by the United States’ slowness and
relative reluctance to accept the Soviet Union’s disarmament proposals
shortly after the cold war ended. The expressed grounds were that the old
order might return to power and reinstate the cold war at any time.'” Hence,
setting out to change-motivations alone will not do.
Nor will it do to set out to enlighten those in charge about the likely
eventual catastrophe the race will lead to. Except for a few public officials
who were influential in the United States during the 1980s and appeared
convinced that things would be fine so long as there were enough tables for
everyone to crawl under, policymakers know the likely nightmarish out-
come of the race.?° Nor can the resources of the other powers involved be
easily exhausted as a means of bringing the race to an end (though it appears
to have been tried in the late 1980s). Finally and obviously, no appeal to a
higher enforcing authority to stop the race and get rid of the weapons is
possible. There is no such authority.
Does the situation then amount to a social trap? How—if at all—can
rational choice, decision, and game theory help resolve this matter? Can
other theories do better?

THE POVERTY OF RATIONAL GHOIGE

THEORY AND ITS OFFSPRING
As stated, rational choice theory is applied to policy-making through deci-
sion theory and, specifically, to social conflict through game theory. The
22 SOCIALAIRAPS

four variables in game theory— epistemological, behavioral, resources, and

liberty —can be described in a variety of ways. For instance, the only aim
game theory ascribes to the countries involved in the arms race is the
maximization of their own individual interests. But this interest is open to
interpretation. Some think that if a country aims at maximizing its national
interest it also aims at maximizing the difference between its advantage and
that of competing countries. In the high-tech weapons race, these thinkers
tend to be hawks. They aim at attaining or, if already there, keeping and, if
possible, increasing their technological edge. For them, cooperation with the
enemy is unthinkable, and the enemy’s gaining the advantage is worse than
the risk of generalized destruction.
Others, however, think that a country’s maximizing its national interest
has nothing to do with increasing the gap between its own advantage and
that of others. In the case of the high-tech weapons race, they are
sometimes— quite inappropriately —called doves. For them, cooperation is
thinkable, and generalized destruction is the worst possible fate. But they
think that it is possible for one country to surpass others without bringing
about generalized destruction. They prefer having a weapons advantage over
the enemy rather than the other way around.
Still others argue that cooperation is the only way. First, generalized
destruction is irrational. And second, in the real world, increasing the
weapons gap over a competing country simply leads that country to escalate,
thus making generalized destruction more likely.
Can rational choice, decision, and game theory help settle these differ-
ences? It cannot. By itself, it can simply help bring out the different inter-
pretations of the utilities, and hence the expected utilities involved. As Mario
Bunge puts it, “all the utilities (and probabilities) handled by decision theory
and its offspring are assumed to be subjective.’’”!
This poverty of game theory might be described as parsimoniousness by
its partisans.”* Yet its lack of content limits it to being at best a heuristic
model for studying policy-making situations, not a theory for dealing with
them. It cannot address the previously formulated question: Does the situa-
tion amount to a social trap? This is an empirical question, and game theory
is merely a mathematical tool incapable of furnishing the data needed to
answer it. Is game theory (or rational choice or decision theory) at least
heuristically useful to find the needed data?

THE POLITIGS OF HIGH-TEGH WEAPONS

If used as a heuristic model, rational choice, decision, or game theory may
help bring out the need to empirically investigate the previously discussed
four variables of the high-tech weapons race. It may even tell us, given
 Social Traps 23

certain specified conditions, what situations to avoid. But it would be a

misleading model if it left things at that, for those components are not the
most significant ones. Another component is the political variable. One
might think that this is covered by the behavioral variable, but it is not. It
cannot be, because of the tunnel-vision aims and unilateral decisions charac-
teristic of the behavioral variable when described, as above, within the
constraints of rational choice, decision, and game theories.
The political variable concerns the place and policy-making limitations of
modern states as they relate to public response under the above-described
state of affairs. There is, no doubt, an authority relationship between states
and their members who, at the international level and given the absence of
world government, are subjects rather than citizens.?> As Hannah Arendt
suggested, however, this relationship between those who command and
those who obey depends partly on “the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and
legitimacy both recognize and where both have their predetermined stable
place.””?*
One consequence of the arms race is to erode this hierarchy by eroding
public recognition of state authority on matters of foreign policy. This is
especially so when such matters are supposed to include conventional or
nuclear war (as they traditionally do) as one of the options open to states in
the pursuit of their interests.7” Until recently, public response to high-tech
wars as an extension of state foreign policy was, by and large, simple
acquiescence. It appears to have resulted partly from a sense of policy-
making powerlessness, partly from a belief that official policymakers are to
be trusted and know better, partly from anxiety about the likely catastrophic
consequences of the race, and partly from sheer psychological resistance to
face it. But this has changed with the appearance of the peace and related
nontraditional movements both in the West and, now more than ever before,
in the East.7°
This is not to say that these movements have clear aims or a well-worked-
out strategy, nor that they are likely to succeed. Rather, they are evidence of
a political variable not covered by the behavioral, epistemological, resources,
or liberty variables typically considered in rational choice, decision, and
game theory descriptions of the situation. The significance of politics has
been known all along by political scientists, policymakers, and ordinary
people. It needs to be mentioned here simply because it gets lost in theoreti-
cal approaches such as those previously described. It is also worth mention-
ing because it makes room for additional policymaking options that cast
doubt on the notion that the high-tech weapons escalation and proliferation
process is a social trap.
In fact, politics provides a crucial element for establishing the shortcom-
ings of rational choice, decision, and game theories as theories and as
24 SOCIAL TRAPS

heuristic models. These shortcomings concern the ongoing process of po-

litical and, indeed, moral evaluation in policy-making. In a rational choice,
decision, or game theory approach, the choice must be made on the basis of
utilities and probabilities as determined at decision time. That is, the data
must be all in. But this rarely, if ever, happens. Aside from the problem of
determining probabilities in an objective manner, there is no reason to
believe that, at decision time, all expected consequences will have the same
utilities as in the future.”” So, for reasons of prudence, the parties involved
may want to leave options open so that these are worked out through
negotiation, bargaining, and other social decision procedures.
For example, the parties involved may want to engage in political dia-
logue, negotiation, and bargaining concerning arms reductions. This is not
just a matter of gathering further evidence to make more accurate predic-
tions or determine utilities more precisely, so that a sounder political judg-
ment can be formed.** The utilities themselves are worked out in the
process, because people’s attitudes and judgments about the alternatives
change with the process. It is high time to pursue a line of research that—
like that pursued in the ensuing essays—makes room for this aspect of the
policy-making process. The alternative is to remain caught in the rational
choice, decision, and game theory trap.
 Dialogue

— I grant you that rational choice and game theories simplify

reality. But why shouldn’t they? As Milton Friedman said in his
Essays in Positive Economics in 1953 (p. 14), a theory is the more
important the more its postulates are unrealistic.

— As for Friedman’s dictum, let me just say that it would turn

many a highly unscientific theory—say, astrology —into very im-
portant ones. But this would make them no less unscientific.

— The point of the dictum, however, is that important scientific

theories are important because, against what we would realistically
expect, they explain much with little. Simplicity, after all, is a
scientific desideratum.

— Granted that, within limits, there is something to be said for

simplicity of explanation. However, if things were as simple as you
make them sound, one explanation—God’s will—should suffice to
explain everything, and even rational choice theory and its offspring
would have to be discarded. The point is that, as Mario Bunge made
plain in The Myth of Stmplhicity ini 1963, there are many kinds of
simplicities. The question is, which ones bring us closer to the truth.
My position is that rational choice theory and its offspring are
simple, but they attain their simplicity by being so abstract that they
are incapable of approaching the truths of policy-making, hence,
they have no sound application to it.

— At any rate, even if you had established that rational choice

theory and game theory have shortcomings, there are no better
alternatives to them. Hence, since some theory is better than none at
all, you have not debunked them yet.

25
26 DIALOGUE

— First, it is not obvious that in policy-making some theory—

however inadequate—is better than no theory at all. Second, as I
will argue, there are better theories.

— There is something else you should do. You should show how
your critique applies to social choice theory. So far, you have not
discussed it.

— Right. Once again, you are reading my mind. This is precisely

what I will do next.
 Social Choice Theory:
Formalism Infatuation
and Policy-Making
Realities

Social choice theory is a source of fascination for many scientists and

philosophers concerned with social matters. This fascination results from the
precision of the theory’s mathematical formalism: Conditions are exactly
formulated in axioms, which, together with valid rules of inference, help
prove theorems. There is no doubt about these features of the theory. What
is doubtful, however, is that the theory provides useful insight into the
relations between individual preferences and social welfare or collective
decisions. For one thing, how is the theory applicable to actual policy-
making? This is the main question I address. In addressing it, I also ask:
What are some of the features traditionally associated with social choice
theory as a field of study? How do current approaches in social choice
theory reflect these features? What features are crucial for an approach to
belong in the social choice theory category? After answering these ques-
tions, I return to my main concern and ask: How, given these features, is
social choice theory applicable to actual policy-making? And what, if any,
alternative theories promise to do better?
I argue for seven theses. First, a crucial feature of social choice theory is
the requirement that, in applying the theory to policy and decision prob-
lems, the social decision function be known at decision-making time.
Second, in many significant policy-making situations, this requirement can
be satisfied only by disregarding the social process of critical scrutiny and
social interaction that helps work out many policy-making data. Third,
social choice theory as a field of study must treat policy-making decisions as
mere logical consequences of given data fixed at decision-making time.
Fourth, this leaves room only for approaches—social choice theories—that
are hopelessly static and disregard the interactive and ongoing nature of
critical scrutiny and other social decision procedures involved in forming

27
23 SOCIALCHOICE THEORY

policy judgments and decisions. Fifth, primarily for this reason, the entire
field of study—not just any particular social choice theory—is useless as a
tool for sound policy-making. Sixth, because it is misleading, social choice
theory as a field of study is also useless as a source of heuristic models for
policy-making understanding and guidance. Seventh, satisficing theories are
applicable and much more promising in this regard.

POINTS OF METHOD
Discussions of social choice theory are sometimes confused by the fact that
those involved have different conceptions of the theory. Amartya Sen, for
example, views it first as a field of study and then as a particular approach or
collection of approaches typically used in this field of study.’ Others appear
to view it only in the latter, narrower sense.” This tends to confuse the
discussions, because criticisms of particular approaches are sometimes pre-
sented as criticisms of the field of study. In fact, Amartya Sen defends social
choice theory against some criticisms on the grounds that they deal merely
with particular social choice approaches, not social choice theory as a field
of study.’
Of course, in and of themselves, criticisms of particular social choice
approaches are not criticisms of social choice theory as a field of study, but
they may point out its shortcomings. Indeed, as I argue, this is precisely the
situation concerning the applicability of social choice theory to policy-
making. Given the features that any approach belonging in this field must
have, no such approach can have significant application to actual policy-
making.
This is not to say that social choice theory is inadequate as a field of study
in general. I leave that matter open. My position concerns what has been
thought to be its significant— indeed, predominant—area of application:
policy--making. I argue that, in policy-making, the theory is inadequate
because of its hopelessly static nature. Before proceeding, however, let us
characterize the theory and the types of interpretations it can have.

ARROW’S UNINTERPRETED GONGEPTION

Arrow’s conception of the main problem of social choice theory is uninter-
preted. The problem is to try to arrive at a social preference ordering, R,
from an n-tuple of individual preference orderings (r, . . . r,,), where for each
person in a group of » people there is a corresponding ordering. The social
welfare function R = f (r,... 7,) is supposed to arrive at this ordering.
According to Arrow, this ill happen given three conditions: (1) the func-
tion’s domain is unrestricted—that is, fworks for any n-tuple of individual
preference orderings; (2) f is always Pareto optimal—that is, its orderings
 Social Choice Theory 29

are such that not all the parties can be made better off in terms of utility in an
alternative feasible ordering; and (3) f is independent of other alternatives—
that is, the social ranking of any pair of alternatives (x, y) depends only on
the 7-tuple of individual rankings of that pair.

INTERPRETING SOGIAL RANKING

Various interpretations of social preference or ranking of alternatives can be
adopted in using the theory. For example, with the outcome evaluation
interpretation, the ranking is simply a matter of social welfare judgments. It
amounts to the statement that, according to the individual preferences
expressed, x is better than y. In contrast, with the revealed preferences
interpretation, the ranking is a matter of preferred social decision proce-
dures. It amounts to the statement that decision-making in society should be
organized so that y is never chosen whenever x is feasible. Of course, other
interpretations are also possible.* The fact remains, however, that one inter-
pretation of social choice theory concerns social decision procedures. This
interpretation is crucial for any policy-making application of the theory.
Hence, I will use it in addressing this essay’s main question: How is social
choice theory applicable to actual policy-making? This does not mean,
however, that my criticisms will be limited to it. As previously indicated,
they will focus on central features of social choice theory as a field of study
and on features that, as a consequence, any of its interpretations must have.
In order to discuss the features of social choice theory and those of its
interpretations realistically, I next sketch the actual social context in which
the theory has come into being and gained acceptance. That is, I sketch the
theoretical and historical background of social choice theory through that of
its ascendants: rational choice and decision theory.

SOGIAL GHOIGE THEORY, RATIONAL GHOIGE THEORY,

AND DEGCISIONISM
Social choice theory can be interpreted as yielding injunctions about how
social decision-making should be organized in society. Indeed, its applicabil-
ity to policy-making depends on this interpretation. But based on this
interpretation, social choice theory amounts to a straightforward application
of rational choice theory.
As discussed in the previous essay, the standard version of rational choice
theory purports to tell us what to do in order to achieve our aims, but not
what these aims should be. It has four main components: (1) the set of
feasible courses of action, that is, the courses of action that satisfy (or are
rationally believed to satisfy) various logical, physical, and social con-
straints; (2) the causal connections (or the set of beliefs about the causal
30 SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY

connections) that determine which courses of action lead to which out-

comes; (3) a subjective ranking of the feasible courses of action, typically on
the basis of the outcomes they are expected to have; and (4) the notion that
to choose rationally is to choose the highest ranked among these courses of
action.> As for the connections between rational choice theory and social
choice theory, they concern decisionism—the application of rational choice
theory to policy analysis discussed in the previous essay® and summarized
below.
In accordance with rational choice theory, the decisionist approach re-
quires rational policymakers to specify their aims; specify the feasible
courses of action to attain these aims; rank them, typically by appeal to the
outcomes they are expected to have; and choose that which ranks the
highest. In addition, it envisions a consistent policymaker or a group acting
consistently, if not as a unit.” When decision theory is applied in the context of
translating individual preferences into collective preferences concerning how
social decision-making should be organized, it yields an interpretation of social
choice theory that is crucial for its applicability to policy-making. Is the
theory, based on this interpretation, useful for policy-making purposes?

SOGIAL GHOIGE THEORY AND POLIGY-MAKING

Politics provides a crucial element for establishing the shortcomings of social
choice theory both as a theory and as a heuristic model. This shortcoming
concerns the ongoing process of political and, indeed, moral evaluation in
policy-making. With a social choice theory approach, the choice must be
made on the basis of utilities and probabilities as determined at decision time.
That is, the data must be given as fixed. But there is no reason to believe that,
at decision time, all expected consequences will have some utility, let alone
the same utilities they will have in the future.* Let us examine this objection
in some detail.
THE STATIG THEORY OBJECTION AND A GURRENT RESPONSE
Aanund Hylland presents the static theory objection as follows:
Social choice theory is usually thought of as a static theory. The members
of society are those currently living and belonging to it, and the prefer-
ences considered are their present ones. But actions taken today often
affect future generations, and people’s preferences change over time.”
His response to this objection, however, does not address the objection’s full
force. He simply says:
Nothing in the formalism prevents us from including among the “‘indi-
viduals” unborn persons and several time-instances of the same person,
each with separate preferences.'©
 Social Choice Theory 31

This response takes the objection to be simply that the future preferences of
individuals cannot be included in the present set of preferences, even if we
can predict them. It is not.

SOGIAL GHOICGE THEORY AND UNSETTLED PREFERENGES

Sound policy-making is not attained by including unborn persons or
several time-instances of the same person, each with separate preferences, in
the calculations. Why include half-baked preferences that will be aban-
doned upon reflection and after interactive critical scrutiny with others
involved in the policy-making process? Part of the static theory objection
hinges on the fact that politically crucial preferences are often unsettled, and
therefore cannot be taken into account. Hylland’s suggested extension of the
theory certainly cannot help take them into account.
One might respond that the objection applies to the outcome evaluations
interpretation of social choice theory, but not to the revealed preferences
interpretation. In the latter, social decision procedures, not outcomes, are
supposed to be chosen. However, in actual policy-making, preferences for
social decision procedures are often as settled as preferences for outcomes—
if not more so. People are often taken by surprise by the policy-making
choices they face and do not know whether they prefer to negotiate or
strike; use quiet diplomacy or confrontational methods; politically insulate
an issue or, instead, expand it. Hence, in either interpretation, crucial prefer-
ences are unpredictable at decision time. But a requirement of social choice
theory —both as a field of study and as any approach in this field—is that
the data be in the form of given preferences at decision time. Hence, social
choice theory—both as a field of study and as an approach—must not just
disregard the eventual content of preferences being formed. It must also
disregard the politically crucial policy-making process through which they
are formed. In other words, it is cut off from politics and, therefore, not
soundly applicable to policy-making.
In this regard, the objection that social choice theory is static is not simply
that we cannot predict certain preferences. Rather, the objection is that we
cannot predict many preferences—sometimes crucial ones—because they
are unsettled. This points to the fact that policy-making is dynamic. But it is
dynamic in several ways, not merely, as Hylland appears to believe, because
preferences change by being transformed. Some preferences are formed, not
transformed. To be sure, they are normally formed on the basis of previous
preferences, but these need not be preferences about the same things. For
example, a preference for a quiet life might have led me to form a preference
for negotiation rather than war in dealing with Iraq’s 1990 invasion of
Kuwait, when I previously had no preference about the matter.
Second, policy-making is dynamic because it is interactive. Indeed, the
32 SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY

formation and transformation of preferences take place through this interac-

tion. In this regard, policy-making centrally includes interactive critical
scrutiny and other social procedures for reaching persuasion and mutual
adaptations.'! Social choice theory cannot make room for these at all. The
problem is not with specific social choice theories or approaches; as I have
argued and will further argue, it is a problem with social choice theory as a
field of study. But first let us consider a case.
THE GASE OF THE AUTOMOBILE AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
When automobiles were introduced in the United States at the beginning
of the twentieth century, nobody could have predicted the carnage they
were going to bring upon the population. This carnage was a significant
result of the interstate highway system, whose construction was motivated
by the cold war. And no data were then available to predict the cold war.
Nor were any data available to predict the fact that the U.S. population was
going to find the carnage tolerable enough not to outlaw the automobile or
significantly restrict its use. This is not just a matter of unpredictability. A
process involving various social decision procedures—most significantly,
critical scrutiny and social interaction with the new technology and people
affected by it—helps work out morally significant details such as these.
No doubt, from the start, the process involves reasons for morally asses-
sing policies and decisions. For example, upon cool and careful reflection,
people may prefer policy arrangements that do not preempt future
corrections—for example, those that would permit corrections when the
seriousness of smog and highway fatalities becomes evident.
In addition, the parties involved may want to leave options open, so that
these are worked out through negotiation, bargaining, and other social
decision procedures. For example, they may want to engage in political
dialogue, negotiation, and bargaining concerning automobile use. This is not
just a matter of gathering further evidence so that more accurate predictions
can be made or utilities can be determined more precisely so that a sounder
political judgment can be formed.'* That is, the utilities themselves are
worked out in the process, because people’s attitudes and judgments about
the alternatives are formed and transformed with the process. This process
of critical scrutiny and social interaction leads to the settlement of reasons
for assessing policies and decisions. For example, it leads to new attitudes
and judgments about automobile use.
POLIGY-MAKING AS AN ONGOING PROCESS
A partisan of social choice theory might argue that the preceding discus-
sion applies to isolated policy-making cases or areas and does not establish
that social choice theory is useless for all significant policy-making. But all
 Social Choice Theory 33

policy-making is dynamic. First, it is an ongoing process. And second, in

this process, a policy-making decision can, and often does, have the unpre-
dicted and unpredictable effect of turning those who favored it or its overall
outcome against both the decision and the outcome. Such situations develop
for a variety of reasons. One reason is that undesirable aspects of the
previously preferred overall outcome come to be seen as crucial, when they
were not given much importance before the decision. This seems to be
precisely the situation with a variety of policy-making decisions aimed at
introducing a market economy in the Soviet Union around 1989. In less than
one year, public opinion appeared to oppose both the decisions and the
expected outcomes previously favored.'? How can social choice theory be
applied under such circumstances? In a cumbersome manner at best.
Suppose that, as Hylland suggests, both present and future preferences are
taken into account when applying social choice theory to a policy-making
situation. When predominant preferences in the near future will become the
opposite of what they are now, including them all in the calculations would
lead to a stalemate, not to a decision. The presently predominant preferences
would balance out the future predominant preferences, and vice versa.
In contrast with social choice theory, actual policy-making has ways of
working out what preferences to take into account, how much weight to
give them, and the purpose of going along with a decision that reflects them
at a given time. After all, it has always been known that policy decisions can
have the function—and, for some, the use—of shaking up those who
currently support or acquiesce to them. For example, some nationalist
groups supporting Gorbachev’s 1989 decisions in the Soviet Union seem to
have been well aware of the likely backlash in public support Gorbachev
would face in October 1990 and later.’*
Based on these policy-making features, one might argue that social choice
theory requires new applications of the theory to circumstances as they
develop. Hence, the above problem would not arise, because only present
preferences would be considered at any one time. However, this solution
creates other equally damaging problems for social choice theory. First, such
an application process would amount to a continuous shuttling back and forth
between theory and practice. This would turn policymakers into something
akin to decapitated chickens. As a rule, it is an unrealistic solution.
Second, and more significantly, when matters of policy—not simply
decisions—are at stake, it is necessary to exercise a judicious, somewhat
comprehensive, and long-range judgment. Such a judgment takes time to
form and cannot be simply given up as soon as the political winds change."°
Hence, the suggested application process would make social choice theory
inapplicable to decisions about policy.
34. SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY

THE POVERTY OF SOGIAL GHOIGE THEORY

As the preceding discussion indicates, social choice theory has nothing to
say about the ongoing nature of policy-making. This shortcoming is a
feature of not merely one or another social choice theory approach but of
the entire field of study. According to social choice theory, one must decide
at decision time for one of the formulated courses of action. Leaving matters
open while one engages in negotiation, bargaining, and other social decision
procedures where the participants’ preferences are open is mot one of the
courses of action formulated in the feasible set. Yet it is crucial in policy-
making.
This evidences the poverty of social choice theory—a poverty that makes
it useless in policy-making. Its uselessness does not extend merely to the
isolated case of policy-making concerning automobiles, but to most, if not
all, significant policy-making. For example, it extends to policy-making
about new technologies such as genetic engineering and the use of computers
in everyday life. Beyond the very short term, the circumstances surrounding
these technologies, and the implications of their use, are not predictable—
may not even be imaginable. But they are capable of being worked out and
have been worked out to some extent—no thanks to social choice theory.
These facts are reason enough to conclude that social choice theory, both
as a field of inquiry and as particular approaches, is useless for understanding
and assessing policy-making and for making policy-making decisions. But is
social choice theory heuristically useful? No, it is useless as a heuristic model
as well because, by excluding from consideration the options just discussed,
it tends to steer people away from sound policy-making.
At this point, one might respond that, though social choice theory has the
said shortcomings, there are no better alternatives to it. Hence, given that
some theory is better than no theory at all, social choice theory has not been
debunked either as a theory or as a heuristic model. I contend that it is not
obvious that, in policy-making, some theory—however inadequate—is
better than no theory at all. But I will not pursue this matter here. Instead, I
ask whether there any alternative theories that help deal with policy-making
problems better.

SATISFIGING THEORIES
Satisficing theories, first developed by Herbert Simon, assert that people do
not seek the best alternative in the feasible set, but limit themselves to what
seems good enough.'® This is especially significant concerning the informa-
tion gathered for decision purposes; at some point, the information is
considered good enough. Various objections have been raised against
theories of this type.
 Social Choice Theory 35

THE UTILITY MAXIMIZATION OBJECTION

One might think that to engage in the process just described is to maximize
utility while taking the cost of information into account. However, as Jon Elster
states, to do this one would have to know the expected value of information.!”
But one generally does not, because it is not always—if ever—predictable. The
specific value that further information will have is also open-ended, working
itself out in the search and critical scrutiny process.
THE OPTIMAL RULES OF THUMB OBJECTION
Another objection is that optimal rules of thumb are used because, other-
wise, those using them would be wiped out by competition.'* But the rules
simply minimize or avoid disaster; they do not maximize the interests of
those who use them. Nor are the rules used as a result of a choice of the
rational choice theory type.’? It is simply contrary to fact that the rules of
thumb used are optimal. They may seem good enough to their users, but
often they are not, though they do not face their users with disaster.
THE AD HOGNESS OBJECTION
A stronger objection is that, in traditional satisficing theories, people’s
levels of satisfaction are entirely ad hoc. This points to the fact that satisfic-
ing theories need to join forces with psychology. The work leading to such
interdisciplinary effort has already been significantly carried out. People’s
levels of satisfaction can begin to be explained by appeal to such psycholo-
gical studies of moral development as those initiated by Piaget and continued
by Kohlberg, Gilligan, and Moessinger.”°
THE INCOMPLETENESS OBJECTION
A fourth objection might be that even such joining of forces between
satisficing theories and developmental psychology falls short of the mark. It
is still necessary to explain how people’s level of satisfaction and their
concomitant behavior relate to social norms. This, however, can begin to be
explained by appeal to empirical studies of organizational behavior and
norms. There is a plethora of such studies today.”

GONGLUDING REMARKS
There is no doubt that social choice theory is quite fashionable in policy-
making about matters of aggregation and collective choice. Why is this so,
given its significant shortcomings? A plausible hypothesis is that social
choice theory owes its fame to its formal precision. Indeed, it is a mathema-
tical theory. Unfortunately, as previously argued, when it comes to most, if
not all, policy-making, its mathematical formalism is useless. In contrast,
satisficing theories do not have the same shortcomings. No doubt they need
36 SOCIADCHOICE THEORY

further development and testing, but they have one crucial feature in their
favor: They are applicable to actual policy-making and promise to be fruitful
in offering policy-making understanding and guidance.
This is not to say that satisficing theories preclude mathematization. But
whatever mathematization they permit (I believe it will have to use the
theory of fractals and chaos theory because of how suitable they are to deal
with complexities and change, which are characteristic of policy-making), its
usefulness is likely, given the theories’ focus on policy-making reality. It is
high time to pursue this line of research. The alternative is to remain caught
in the currently widespread infatuation with the intellectually and politically
sterile formalism of social choice theory.
 Dialogue

— You seem very satisfied with your defense of satisficing theories.

Whatever your particular satisficing theory turns out to be, it will
probably be a highly dynamic one emphasizing the ongoing nature
of policy- and decision-making. Am I right about this?

— Yes. I think its dynamic character is a virtue of the theory.

Don’t you?

— Other things being equal, it might be. But I’m afraid other
things are not equal. Indeed, they may serve to raise objections
against the theory.

— I’m ata loss to figure out what they are.

— For one, since your theory is meant to be politically realistic, it

will have to make room for the myriad interest groups involved in
politics. Yet, I suppose that, at some point, the theory will lead to
practical injunctions. The problem then arises: How could the
injunctions be objective, or be reached through an objective pro-
cess? They will simply be the reflection of some interest group’s
biases or some equilibrium point between the biases of various
interest groups.

— Not so fast. Policy- and decision-making do not invariably

involve fanatics pushing for their own interests. You assume that
the theory makes no room for objectivity because it is true to the
world of politics, which is a world of fanatics. Hence, objectivity
has no place in it.

— J am not assuming any such thing, though I think it is plain that

fanatics are common in politics. What I mean is that even those people
who are not fanatics have their own biases. Therefore, whatever their

Les
38 DIALOGUE

role turns out to be in evaluating or making policy according to your

theory, their biases will be reflected in the evaluations.

— I think your objection plays fast and loose with the notion of
objectivity, and a clarification of this notion is accordingly in order.

— Maybe so. But given the realistic emphasis of your theory, you
should discuss objectivity in the context of policy- and decision-
making at its most heated. It will not do to use examples drawn
from the detached conversations of tea-club members concerning
how the pyramids of Egypt were built, or how the Mayas calculated
the orbit of Venus.

— You are right. I should discuss the notion of objectivity and test
its applicability to the world by reference to heated political events.
If objectivity has any applicability in such cases, then it is also likely
to be applicable to less heated ones.

— That is a hypothesis, but I am willing to go along with it for

now. What cases will you use?

— I will focus on news reporting during electoral campaigns. You

will grant me that it is then that foul play, exaggerations, and sheer
lies tend to abound in politics, won’t you?

— I will. Except for wars, political campaigns are among the most
vicious political events.

— Your suggestion is well taken. I should also consider war-related

matters, such as the reporting of the massacre of Israeli athletes
during the 1972 Munich Olympic games. So, if objectivity makes
sense and is applicable in news reporting of events such as these,
won’t you conclude that, in all likelihood, objectivity makes sense
and is also applicable to policy- and decision-making concerning
these and other matters?

— I might then be inclined to conclude such a thing. But doing so

would in no way imply that I would be assenting to your theory.
Even if objectivity is applicable to policy- and decision-making,
your theory might not do a good job concerning such application.
 Dialogue 39

— Fair enough. Whether the theory does a good job of dealing

with objectivity, however, will have to be established after I have
substantially formulated it. For the time being, let us concentrate on
the relation between objectivity and policy- and decision-making
using, as our examples, cases of the type we just discussed.
 Informing the Public:
Ethics, Policy-Making,
and Objectivity in
News Reporting

Newspaper reports claim that Will Rogers once said: “I hope we never live
to see the day when a thing is as bad as some of our newspapers make it.””’
Slanted, exaggerated, or simply false reports, frequently emphasizing the
bad, are commonplace and have led many to doubt that objectivity can play
any role in news reporting. This is a source of uneasiness to some and elation
to others. Some claim that objectivity is a myth and hail subjectivity as the
road to freedom and rightness. Andrew Kopkind did so when he stated,
“objectivity is the rationalization for moral disengagement, the classic cop-
out from choice making.’’* This position is often echoed and extended to
policy-making in general by various philosophers. For example, J. L. Mackie
states, “there is an inescapable subjective ingredient, an element of choice or
preference, in the reasoning that supports any policy decision.’’”? According-
ly, there “is no merit in pretending that our choices are rationally con-
strained in ways that they are not. We are. . . free to mould or remould our
moral system so as better to promote whatever it is that we do value.’”*
This romantic enthusiasm is matched only by the cautious uneasiness of
those who see the subjectivist conception of political and moral life, includ-
ing news reporting, as the road to arbitrariness and caprice and away from
freedom. Along these lines, Herbert Brucker wrote, “‘it is time for all who
denounce objective news to stop and think, before American journalism
reverts to the primitive practices from which objectivity rescued it,” namely,
the practices that turned news reporting into mere propaganda.° It is not
uncommon to find philosophers taking a similar position not only about
news reporting but about the entire gamut of moral life. For example,
Ronald Milo states that if moral judgments are subjective because they
depend on our particular desires and preferences, then “we cannot convince
someone that what he proposes to do is morally wrong—even if it is a case

40
 Informing the Public 41

of torturing someone solely for the sake of amusement—provided that he

has perverse enough preferences.””®
The disagreements just described raise various questions: Is objectivity
possible in news reporting? If so, how? Is it a good thing? To what extent
and in what sense, if any, should objectivity serve as a ground for policy-
and decision-making about news reporting? And whatever the role of
objectivity in news reporting, can and should it have the same role in
policy-making? These are the questions I address. In addressing them, I
distinguish between the personal, institutional, and social testing senses of
objectivity. In the personal sense, to be objective is for a person to be free
from prejudice and bias. In the institutional sense, to be objective is for news
reporting to follow a set of rules, for example, by being merely factual or,
alternatively, by practicing interpretive reporting. It amounts to a reporting
policy or groups of policies and practices. In the social testing sense, to be
objective is for news reports and reporting practices, policies, decisions, and,
in general, ideas and social arrangements affected by them to be open to
critical scrutiny by anyone.’
I offer reasons in support of four main theses. First, though all these senses
of objectivity are relevant to news reporting, they are inadequate as a
sufficient ground for policy- and decision-making about it. Second, what is
also, and often more significant is the political context in which discussions
concerning objectivity take place, and how these discussions affect not just
news reporting but the public. Third, there is currently no good reason for
accepting the hypothesis advanced by some philosophers that, in such
discussions, conflicting, coexistent points of view are irreducible. Fourth,
even if this hypothesis is true, it does not entail that objectivity in the social
testing sense is impossible or a bad thing in news reporting or policy-
making.

THE OBJEGTIVITY GONTROVERSY IN NEWS REPORTING

There is abundant evidence that both journalists and nonjournalists are
sharply divided on whether reporting can be objective and, if so, whether it
ought to be. The situation amounts to a controversy that often centers
around whether reporters can or ought to have such psychological traits as
detachment or empathy. In other words, it often is about objectivity in the
personal sense. Those who berate objectivity argue that since no one can be
totally free from prejudice and cultural biases, no one can be detached;
therefore, no reporter, and hence no reporting, can be objective. To them,
there can be only involvement: Objectivity is impossible, so it ought not be
pursued. Subjectivity is king. In this vein, Bill Moyers is reported to have
written:
42 INFORMING THE PUBLIC

Of all the great myths of American journalism, objectivity is the greatest.

Each of us sees what his own experience leads him to see.*
This position does not go unchallenged. Some hold that though no one
can be totally free from prejudice and cultural biases, nearly everyone can be
significantly free from them. Hence, they argue, reporters can be partially
detached and objective. Objectivity is possible in the personal sense, and the
reporting of those who develop such an objective attitude concerning the
news is, as a consequence, objective. This position is typically held by those
who believe that reporting ought to be objective. The reason offered in
support of this view is that news reporting ought to give us the truth, and
objectivity attained through detachment is the way to truth. Involvement is
the way to partisanship and hence untruth. “Objectivity is the supreme
pursuit,” they say. Alan Barth took this stand when he stated: ‘““The tradi-
tion of objectivity is one of the principal glories of American journalism.”
Others are not skeptical of objectivity but cynical about it. They think
that objectivity is possible in the personal sense, as detachment. They further
think that such objectivity leads to impartiality and balance in the presenta-
tion of the news. However, they consider this a misfortune. Indeed, they
believe that news reporting ought not to strive at being objective, for if it
succeeded in this attempt, it would give us only part of the truth and also
something worse: acquiescence in the status quo. A more restrained view
along similar lines was formulated by Roberto C. Goizueta, chairman of the
Coca-Cola Co., who told an editors’ meeting:
The single most damaging trait in today’s journalism... is that in the
search for, and preoccupation with, objectivity and balance, the important
elements of context, perspective and judgment often suffer.'°
The positions just described do not exhaust those taken in the con-
troversy. Still others believe that although objectivity attained through de-
tachment is indeed a misfortune, there is another new objectivity that “does
not come by self-effacement, but by self-transcendence, and... it is... the
objectivity of the ever-questioning, ever-empathetic reporter.”’!! How and to
what extent this objectivity is possible, and why it is good, however, are left
obscure. At any rate, the controversy, as described so far, is about the possibility
and value of objectivity as freedom from prejudice and cultural biases in
reporters, and as impartial and balanced presentation in news reports.
Still other positions taken in the controversy go beyond the concern with
the character and conduct of individual reporters. They call for specific
reporting policies, thus involving objectivity in the institutional sense. Be-
fore addressing these views, let us clarify the social context in which the
controversy develops, because the reasons for adopting some form of insti-
tutional objectivity can best be understood and assessed in such a context. In
 Informing the Public 43
particular, let us focus on the fact that the controversy tends to come to the
fore when significant policy-making problems arise in the United States or
other societies. For example, it recurrently comes to the fore in the United
States, if not elsewhere, whenever the Israeli-Arab confrontation in the
Middle East flares up.’* An examination of the controversy in this type of
context should help realistically evaluate the questions formulated at the
outset. It should also help realistically evaluate the positions taken on the
matter. In carrying out this examination, I focus on the reporting of political
events, particularly during electoral campaigns. In such circumstances, both
news reporting and politics tend to converge, and objectivity and news
reporting are often tried by fire.

THE POLITIGS OF OBJECTIVITY

Discussions of objectivity in the reporting of political events are themselves
part and parcel of politics, not discussions in a world above it all. They
become especially heated, biased, and lacking in empathy during electoral
campaigns. The 1952 U.S. presidential campaign was no exception. On
September 18, it reached its hottest point. By and large, things were calm on
that day. Most papers had little of significance to report. The New York
Times reported that the Republican candidate, General Dwight Eisenhower,
was in the Midwest quoting the scriptures and calling for an “honest deal.”
The Democratic candidate, Governor Adlai Stevenson, was in Connecticut
upholding “‘ethics in politics ahead of victory.” And the Republican
vice-presidential candidate, Senator Richard Nixon, was in California de-
nouncing Democratic corruption and calling for higher ethical standards in
government. Most other papers’ reports were equally dull. But there was an
exception: On the third page of the New York Post, there was a story
revealing that a private fund was operating for Nixon’s benefit; that there
was a millionaires’ club exclusively devoted to the financial comfort of
candidate Nixon. The front-page banner read: SECRET NIXON FUND! The
inside headline said: ‘Secret Rich Men’s Trust Fund Keeps Nixon in Style
Far Beyond His Salary.” Later that day, the United Press and Associated
Press wired the story throughout the country. The political battle had
begun. It was going to last for ten days, and it was going to embattle the
press itself.
Republicans called the story a smear of their communist-fighting vice-
presidential candidate. Senator Karl Mundt called the New York Post “a left
wing smear sheet,” even though Nixon confirmed the existence of the fund
that day.'? Republican newspapers followed suit. The Boston Herald, for
example, put the story in the middle of page seventeen under a single-
column headline saying, “Politics Took Nixon Fund.” The New York
World Telegram and Sun put it on page twenty-three, in the editorial
44. INFORMING THE PUBLIC

section. The Detroit News squeezed it into a narrow spot above a large
advertisement on page nine.
Pro-Stevenson papers did quite the opposite. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch
and the Milwaukee Journal, for example, gave the story front-page treat-
ment. The Dispatch’s headline read: “‘‘Angels’ Paid Nixon $16,000 to ‘Sell
Free Enterprise,’ Paper is Told.’’"*
These events took place ten days after Stevenson had called the U.S.
newspapers a “one-party press” in a speech in Portland, in the midst of the
heated debate his statement provoked. Soon afterwards, President Truman
added to the fire when he said:

News papers, especially daily news papers, have become big business, and
big business traditionally has always been Republican. I suggest that
Americans bear this in mind, and add a dash of salt to every Republican
helping of the news, especially in
i those many papers and magazines which
do not give a fair balance of news between the two major parties.’°
His accusation was clear: By and large, newspapers and magazines had made
a practice of slanting the news in order to favor Republicans and big
business. Truman’s statement was also slanted. As our previous examples
indicate, major newspapers, whatever their political leanings, slanted the
news not just through the reports’ main text but through the headlines,
relative size and shape, and position of the reports.
The controversy spread like fire—a fact that has more than anecdotal
import. This was but one moment in the recurrent controversy about
objectivity in news reporting. And, it is realistic to believe that the con-
troversy will stay with us for quite a while. For it has been with us for at
least half a century and has become more widespread and sharper during the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, proving, so far, to be quite intractable. Why? I
suggest that this is so because the controversy reflects—indeed, is fueled
by—persistently conflicting concerns of the individuals and societal sectors
involved, and because these concerns are affected by the reports.
My hypothesis is supported by various facts. For one, few alternative
newspapers, if any, engage in objective news reporting. They believe that
such reporting would rule out advocating the concerns—the interests and
ideas—they intend to advocate. Further evidence is provided by the fact that
quite a few mainstream newspapers support objective reporting. The reasons
for this are either, as President Truman argued, that it is good for the
mainstream newspaper business or, as others would have it, that mainstream
ideals and ideas, in the United States and elsewhere, rule out advocacy and
uphold objectivity. Regardless of whether these claims are true, the con-
troversy is not simply about objectivity but also about economic interests,
political positions, moral claims, moral rules and principles, ideals, and, in
 Informing the Public 45

some cases, the wants or demands of various constituencies. Real and

persistent conflicting concerns underlie claims about objectivity and contri-
bute to people engaging in the controversy.
The preceding discussion indicates that all participants are put at risk by
the conflict, for it disrupts both the media and society —at least in the form
of generalized distrust of the media or the policy-making process. Such
disruption matters both morally and socially, and it suggests that one should
not rely merely or primarily on views about objectivity in trying to deter-
mine what to do or what policies to adopt concerning objectivity in news
reporting. The fact of the controversy, and the conflicting concerns that fuel
it, should be squarely addressed and given due weight. Disregarding them
can have consequences for the media and society that are at least as intoler-
able as those of disregarding the social need for accurate and complete
information about matters of public interest. In case there is doubt about
this point, let us consider some historical evidence that supports it.

MGGARTHYISM AND GHANGES

IN INSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIVITY
The policy of not editorializing the news was thought to uphold objectivity
and was thereby adopted and retained in Senator Joseph McCarthy’s time,
despite the disagreements and eventual controversy about it and the conflicts
that underlined the controversy. Senator McCarthy was a master at taking
advantage of this policy. He would charge that certain people in the State
Department were communists, and the media, in accordance with their
policy, would simply report what the senator had said. This policy of
objective reporting required that only the bare facts be reported, without
comment. Of course, this does not explain why his charges got front-page
coverage. The point is that a strict application of the policy, coupled with the
leeway newspeople had concerning placement and headlines, contributed to
misleading the public and had disastrous consequences for a number of
innocent citizens. Conrad C. Fink describes the situation as follows:
It was an agonizing experience for reporters of the “who-said-what-and-
when” school. They could see the senator jumping ahead, from charge to
charge, never letting rebuttal catch up. A person attacked today tried to
respond tomorrow, but by that time McCarthy was attacking someone
else, again seizing headlines. McCarthy, who thoroughly understood the
mechanics of news agency and newspaper operations, often timed press
conferences just before presses rolled. Day after day, newspapers carried
his latest charge before they could obtain balancing comment.’®
As a result, the critics of the policy multiplied, the controversy spread,
and news reporting reached a state of crisis. Had newspeople addressed the
46 INFORMING THE PUBLIC

fact of the controversy about objectivity and the conflicts of concerns it

reflected, these consequences for people and for reporting might have been
avoided. By merely using some exaggerated notion of objectivity (for exam-
ple, complete detachment)— whether in a utopian or a skeptical vein—one
fails to address the controversy, let alone the underlying conflicts. This
amounts to being lost in abstractions and caught up in the controversy, and
is likely to contribute to bringing about intolerable consequences for news
reporting institutions and policy-making in general.
Some of the consequences of merely factual news reporting were recog-
nized at the time and, as a result, changes in the institutional conception of
objectivity occurred:
From the McCarthy experience came a true turn in American journalism,
a realization that traditional efforts to balance charge with response by
quoting the other side a day or so later were inadequate. There evolved a
new, much wider definition of objectivity that requires a reporter to
provide a dimension of analysis or interpretation in addition to factual
reporting. ... This is done by inserting balancing material within a single
story, or writing an interpretive story labeled “‘news analysis” for a
newspage, often next to the spot news story itself.'7
The controversy, however, did not end here. Interpretive news reporting as
just described proved inadequate to cover the Vietnam War and cover-ups
during the Nixon administration. Analysis was then included in the news
report itself.'® This raised the question: How is objectivity possible when
interpretation is included in news reports? As a result, the so-called new
journalism developed in the 1960s and 1970s, where only advocacy was
left.'? But such advocacy also amounts to being caught up in the controversy
and, just like detachment, is likely to lead to intolerable consequences for
news reporting and policy-making. It breeds public distrust of these activi-
ties, which easily leads to alienation from the policy-making process—a sad
prospect for democracy, individual rights, and the common good alike.
New journalism advocacy, however, has not overtaken the media. A
position that shifts the emphasis from reporters’ detachment or empathy,
and reports’ factual or interpretive balance, to features of the reporting
process itself is gaining currency. Conrad C. Fink describes it as follows:
The writer . . . with a paragraph or two on how a story was researched or
which sources were contacted, can add for reader or viewer a dimension of
understanding that helps establish trust in the story, and thus in the
journalist and the newspaper or television station.”°
Establishing this trust is certainly needed if news reporting is to have the
function it must have, if societal policy-“makeing iis to make room for reason
and an informed, critical public. Citing a story’s sources and describing how
 Informing the Public 47

it was researched open it to the public’s critical scrutiny. This publicity,

which takes place at the social level, goes beyond any particular individual’s
limitations of emotion, passion, or information, making room and setting
the boundaries for objectivity in the process. But does it suffice to assess
news reporting?
Looking back at the past forty years or so, each news reporting change
that took place in the United States seems merely to have reflected a given
position taken in the controversy, whether about objectivity alone or some
selected consequences of some form of objectivity. There seems to have been
no attempt to deal with the social fact of the controversy itself. Yet, as
previously argued, this fact ought to be squarely addressed in making policy
and decisions about news reporting. Otherwise, it will be unintelligently,
because thoughtlessly, addressed, because newspeople must implicitly adopt
some news reporting practice, if not policy, as soon as they report the news.
Short of not reporting the news at all, they must report it factually, or interpre-
tatively, or in an advocatory manner, or in some combination of these or other
types of reporting. This is bound to have some effect on the conflicting concerns
that fuel the controversy. Hence, for the sake of intelligently dealing with the
fact of the controversy, its underlying concerns, and the disruption all this
brings upon news reporting, policy-making in general, and sometimes the lives
of individuals, it is crucial to establish what questions to ask in evaluating news
reporting practices, policies, and decisions.
The preceding discussion provides grounds for concluding that the ques-
tions should not simply be: Does this news reporting policy promote
objectivity in news reporting? Should it do so? Nor should it be: Does this
news reporting policy address the concerns I believe ought to be addressed?
Rather, it should first be acknowledged that there is controversy about
objectivity in news reporting, that this controversy is fueled by various
recurrent underlying concerns, and that it disrupts news reporting, policy-
making, and people’s individual lives. Then, it should be asked: What news
reporting policies are newspeople morally permitted—or required—to
adopt in dealing with the policy problem posed by the controversy, its
underlying concerns (only one of which is objectivity), and the disruption it
causes? This question is not simply about the objectivity of policies but also
about a variety of circumstances that must be balanced against one another
in sound policy-making. Of course, merely asking such a question will not
automatically put the controversy to rest, but it is likely to be addressed in a
manner free from excessive idealization, political and moral irrelevance, and
simple self-righteous or self-interested intolerance.
So far, I have argued for the first two theses of this essay: that, though all
senses of objectivity are relevant to news reporting, they are inadequate asa
sufficient ground for policy- and decision-making about news reporting;
48 INFORMING THE PUBLIC

and that what is often more significant is the political context in which
discussions concerning objectivity take place and how these discussions
affect not just news reporting but the public. This essay’s remainder ex-
amines some philosophical implications of this position and argues for the
remaining—third and fourth—theses: that there is currently no good
reason for accepting the hypothesis that when there is disagreement, some
conflicting coexistent points of view are irreducible, and that even if such a
hypothesis were true, it does not follow that objectivity in the social testing
sense is impossible or a bad thing in news reporting or policy-making.

OBJECTIVITY WITHOUT AGREEMENT

Whenever a long--worshipped idol falls, everything else seems doomed to fall
with it. This is the feeling one may get from the preceding sections, whose
upshot is that objectivity, however significant, is not a decisive ground for
establishing sound news reporting policy. A nagging question arises: Is any
news reporting policy justified, so long as it contributes to decrease (or, if a
crisis would tend to promote the common good, so long as it contributes to
increase) social conflict?
Of course not. First, it is not justified simply from a common-sense point
of view. A policy of engaging in libelous news reports, for example, is not
justified, even if it would increase social conflict that would, in the long run,
promote the common good. To think otherwise would be analogous to
thinking that if framing the innocent would lead to the common good, then
it is morally permissible. It is not. Second, like framing the innocent, libel
would lead to social and personal consequences that ordinary people of sound
mind—those not carried away by passion or emotion, and whose reasoning is
unimpaired by coercion or manipulation—would find intolerable.
The fact that ordinary people would pass such judgments presupposes a
type of objectivity in news reporting that is a feature not of any particular
reporter or report but of the news reporting process and policy-making in
general. This is objectivity as social testing. To say that news reports and
news reporting practices, policies, and decisions are socially testable is to say
that they are public. That is, they are open to the previously discussed test of
critical scrutiny and of people’s interaction with the reports, practices, policies,
decisions, and their consequences. In other words, at a very minimum, it is
always possible for anyone to give reasons for or against such practices, policies,
and decisions and to test them against actual social practice.
However, mere possibilities are among the greatest sources of neuroses
and philosophical delusions. Is the possibility of critical scrutiny one of
these sources? Since, in the midst of controversy, people are often biased,
and their views and concerns are affected differently by different reporting
 Informing the Public 49

policies, is critical scrutiny of these policies actually possible? Or are people

bound to take sides merely because one policy reflects their preferences
regardless of reason?
The answer to the latter question is no. People’s preferences matter, of
course, but people are not always carried away by passion or emotion. Nor
is their reasoning always impaired by coercion or manipulation. A modicum
of objectivity in the personal sense is not just possible, but often actual. And
if people lack information, this is not always insurmountable.
In addition, the objectivity involved in critical scrutiny does not depend
on the reporter’s objectivity at the time of reporting or ever. In fact, reports
are likely to be scrutinized because they may mislead members of the public
and affect them in ways they find undesirable. It does not matter whether
those who produced the reports or adopted or followed the policies leading
to such reports are detached or empathetic. Nor does it matter whether the
reports are balanced. It does not even matter whether the members of the
public who engage in scrutinizing the reports are detached or empathetic. In
any case, their reasons (at least reasons that formulate personal preferences,
interests, wants, attitudes, or commitments to such things as moral rules,
principles, and ideals) will often be publicly formulated in criticizing the reports.
And the process will continue, with these reasons themselves now open to
critical scrutiny. This process often leads to a settlement of differences and
conflicts. Objectivity as social testing is at the core of this ongoing process.
One might object that, as various philosophers have argued, the reasons
given are sometimes bound to remain mere formulations of personal prefer-
ences, interests, wants, attitudes, or commitments to moral rules, principles,
and ideals. There may be no common ground among those involved in the
dispute on the basis of which their particular reasons can be transcended.
Hence, objectivity is undermined. We already saw that Mackie takes an
extreme view in this regard. A philosopher who has taken a moderate
position on the objectivity-subjectivity debate, but would nonetheless agree
with the objection, is Thomas Nagel. He writes:
The distinction between subjective and objective is relative. A general
human point of view is more objective than the view from where you
happen to be, but less objective than the viewpoint of physical science.
The opposition between subjective and objective can arise at any place on
the spectrum where one point of view claims dominance over another,
more subjective one, and that claim is resisted. In the dispute over conse-
quentialism in ethics, it appears in the clash between internal and external
views of human life, both fully admitting the importance of human
concerns and ends.”!
No doubt, the clash between what one individual considers morally
overriding given his or her moral beliefs and what others (often
50 INFORMING THE PUBLIC

policymakers) consider morally overriding given their concern with a good

social life poses complex ethical problems. Decisions having moral import
must be made in the midst of disagreement about who is right because, even
if the matter could be resolved, there is not enough time to wait until
well-grounded agreement has been reached. But this does not undermine
objectivity. Lack of agreement on what takes precedence—an individual’s
moral commitment or a good social life—does not in any way entail that
judgments cannot be made about the subject. Nor does it entail that reasons
for or against the judgments cannot be formulated. That the judgments can
be made is evidenced by the fact that they often are made, however heated
the disagreement might be. In addition, they are always open to critical
scrutiny by appeal to reasons and social practice. This is all that objectivity
in the social testing sense requires.
One might object that the preceding discussion misses the point, for given
the fragmented nature of today’s world, the reasons some persons or groups
understand are not understood by others. Indeed, different persons and
groups use different languages to formulate their own reasons. Think, for
example, of the linguistic, conceptual, methodological, and practical differ-
ences concerning moral matters between the technology, business, policy-
making, and philosophy communities.” Upon realizing the extent and
depth of these differences, one might add, as Nagel does, that the “‘coexis-
tence of conflicting points of view, varying in detachment from the contin-
gent self, is... an irreducible fact of life.”
In response, it can be said, first, that the irreducibility Nagel describes is
just a hypothesis. Pointing to recurrent sharp differences of opinion between
philosophers or members of the general public on matters of moral import is
no good ground for believing that these differences are irreducible. They
may now, given our current linguistic, conceptual, methodological, and
practical differences, be irreducible. But neither languages nor conceptual
frameworks, methods, and practices are static. They can and do change.
Indeed, as I argue later, they can change through dialogue and social inter-
action so that today’s incommensurables are superseded by tomorrow’s
common ground.
Second, even if the described construction of a common ground of reasons
through social decision procedures were, at least on occasion, unworkable,
the mutual irreducibility of moral points of view does not mean that there is
no objectivity. It would if objectivity entailed shared reasons, but objectivity
at most entails that good reasons can be formulated in the process of critical
scrutiny and trial by practice. In this sense, objectivity is embedded in the
process, because it is possible to formulate good reasons for or against the
reports or the policies leading to them. In fact, such reasons are often
formulated even in oppressive social environments, and there seems to be
 Informing the Public 51

little doubt that this is a good thing. Otherwise only arbitrariness would
remain. Hence, objectivity as social testing is not only possible but actual
and, since it helps make better policy and decisions, a good thing.”4

BUILDING GOMMON GROUND

What should we do, if anything, about objectivity? As for objectivity in the
social testing sense, there are some things we can do. Though it is a fact of
social life that reasons can be given for or against news reports, news
reporting actions, practices, policies, and, indeed, any aspect of social life, it
is important that such give-and-take of reasons be vigorous. So freedom of
speech and political activity should be encouraged to help objectivity in the
social testing sense flourish.
Even if no such measures are taken, the test of actual practice can be
applied to those reports, actions, practices, and policies. Of course, without
reasoning individuals, no such thing will happen. But this simply means that,
without reasoning individuals, objectivity in the social testing sense will have
no application, just as in a world without any sentences, truth as a feature of
declarative sentences is inapplicable. It does not mean that objectivity in the
social testing sense makes no sense, nor that it plays no role in actual social
life. Indeed, it makes critical scrutiny possible.”
In addition, a common ground of reasons can be built, which is evidenced
in the process of scrutinizing news reports and reporting policies. The
reports’ and policies’ perceived shortcomings are often described in ways
people—not necessarily the reporters or the individuals directly affected by
the reports—can understand and reason about. Third parties not caught up
in a passionate, emotional, inadequately informed, or manipulated discus-
sion of reports and policies—or those simply engaged in the controversy
from a different perspective—can provide critical balance to the scrutiny.
This can happen even if the third parties are not detached (after all, if they
are involved in the discussions, they will not be entirely unaffected by them).
The point is not simply that mediation and arbitration, together with
other social decision procedures, play a role in settling the disputes for
policy purposes.”° The point is that these procedures, which are not sheer
dialogue, involve and develop a commonality of practices that mutually
adjust the initially clashing points of view. As a result, the languages,
concepts, and methods of those involved merge, and a common ground of
readjusted reasons is built.”” As in many a successful marriage, mutual concep-
tual, linguistic, and practical adjustments develop as a by-product of discussions
that need not be, and rarely are, about the adjustments themselves.
As for objectivity in the personal and institutional senses, we can and
should strive to make adequate room for it. It permits and promotes critical
52 INFORMING THE PUBLIC

scrutiny, the use of reasons, and the development of common grounds

among individuals and groups with widely different moral views. And these
are badly needed if civilized societies are to survive today’s complexities and
changes. To say this, however, is not to say that everyone or anyone should
always be objective. Indeed, there are cases in which a person may be permitted,
if not required, to be quite subjective. Along these lines, in reviewing Serge
Groussard’s The Blood of Israel, which discusses the massacre of Israeli athletes
at the 1972 Munich Olympic games, Elie Wiesel wrote:
He does not attempt to be objective; he invokes no political philosophy to
justify the Commandos’ actions, and for that we are grateful. In certain
extreme situations one has no right to be objective, for objectivity leads to
neutrality and indifference.**®
This is the type of situation in which personal objectivity might be morally
objectionable.
But it is not my aim here to establish whether Wiesel’s position is sound.
Rather, it is to illustrate how certain cases may constitute an exception to the
rule of generally striving for objectivity, and to explain how the position
advanced in this essay makes room for such exceptions. This essay focuses
on the often heated controversies involving news reporting and does not rule
out any views on the grounds that they are irrational or formulated by
entirely biased individuals. Instead, it recognizes that they are formulated in
the context of objectivity as social testing, where any view is open to critical
scrutiny by anyone and to the test of actual practice. In this context, Wiesel’s
claim may well survive the challenge of critical scrutiny and trial by practice.
And so may the weaker view William James formulated in “The Will to
Believe”: That in certain extreme situations— whenever one faces a genuine
option, evidence and proof are absent or mixed, and one’s happiness is
contingent on one’s belief—one has the right to believe as one pleases.”?
When it comes to policy and decision manifestations of these views, one can,
in the ways previously indicated, distinguish what is permissible from what
is not. And the views themselves are subject to the test of critical scrutiny
and social interaction, not merely of individual opinion. In fact, the very
possibility of establishing Wiesel’s or James’s views on the basis of reasons
rather than arbitrarily preferring them is grounded in objectivity as social
testing. So are the various positions taken about news reporting and their
manifestations in conduct, practice, or policy. This is fortunate, for other-
wise, against Will Rogers’s hope, this would be the day when things are
worse than the most pessimistic of our newspapers make them.
 Dialogue

— Your position concerning shared and good reasons makes me

uneasy. I agree that objectivity entails good, though not necessarily
shared, reasons. Yet I am uneasy with the fact that opposing parties
will not always agree on what constitutes a good reason, or on what
reasons are good. When this happens, the disagreement may be-
come irreconcilable. This is not a hopeful prospect.

— I entirely agree that such a prospect provides reason for uneasi-

ness. Yet, as I argued, it does not undermine objectivity, however
much it may undermine the actualization of a moral community
among those whose disagreements turn out to be irreconcilable.
Besides, we should not jump to conclusions. As I also argued, it is
merely a hypothesis that they are irreconcilable. And even if they
are irreconcilable now, this situation may change later, depending
on what we do about it now.

— My uneasiness, however, persists. What should I do about it?

Do you have any suggestions?

— If your uneasiness results from a desire to attain certainty on the

matter, I suggest that you reconsider the soundness of such a desire.
After all, as I mention in a note to the essay, my position has a
precedent in John Dewey’s The Quest for Certainty, where he
sharply criticized this quest as misguided and a significant pitfall in
Western philosophy. Life is risky, our future is uncertain, and a
sound theory should both reflect these facts and help us deal with
them. This is what the theory I am formulating attempts. I would
consider it a failure if it disregarded or misrepresented these obvious
risks and uncertainties. If it did, it would be unrealistic and of little
help in dealing with them.

— It occurs to me, however, that part of the uneasiness I feel

concerns your approach itself. It focuses on the logic of judgments
53
54 DIALOGUE

and decisions more than I think it should. Maybe I have been

unduly influenced by the work of MacIntyre and others, but I think
that a different approach to moral philosophy should be favored. In
this alternative approach, the logic of judgments would play a
secondary role, and the character and well-being of persons would
be paramount.

— No doubt, the ethics of character and the well-being of persons

should be given more prominence than they have been given during
much of the twentieth century. Many quandaries would be avoided
if people’s attitudes and traits, and their fit in a moral community,
were a significant focus of attention and if, through education, this
led to the actualization of a more cohesive moral community. I have
no doubt that we should strive to approach this situation. Yet we are a
long way from living in such a community right now, and the issues I
discuss call for policy-making in the meantime. Indeed, I think the
notion of objectivity in the social testing sense offers a workable
connection between these short-run and long-run prospects.

— Maybe so, but you have not discussed it sufficiently for readers
to be able to tell. Besides, your focus on news reporting detracts a
bit from the role of social testing in overall philosophical discus-
sions of subjectivity.

— I am aware of that, and I will address the matter further in the

next essay. Let me mention, however, that unless we focus on
particular cases or types of cases as I did in the previous essay, we
will hardly be in a position to take more general stands concerning
objectivity or any other matters of philosophical and political in-
terest. Without careful attention to particulars, such stands will be
little more than a lot of hand waving.

— Am [to infer that you are an empiricist?

— You are to infer that I am trying to formulate a realistic theory,

partly because unrealistic theories for dealing with policy and deci-
sion problems are irrational. Indeed, they are as irrational as the
Italian Renaissance cities’ reliance on astrologers to decide whether
and when to wage war on each other. In contrast, in the attempt
to be rational, hence realistic, I pay attention to particular cases and,
in general, to the results of empirical research on matters of policy
and decisions.
5 Critical Interaction:
Judgment, Decision,
and the Social Testing
of Moral Hypotheses

The role of judgment in moral and political life has been widely questioned
during the twentieth century. In philosophy, this has been done by holding
that the distinction between evaluations or judgments on the one hand, and
decisions on the other, is a mere distinction of words, without any practical
substance to it. In short, so-called judgments and evaluations are, or in the
end depend on, arbitrary decisions or something very much like them.
Positions such as this are a source of elation to some and uneasiness to
others. Some hail the decision aspect of political and, indeed, all moral life as
the road to freedom from the authoritarianism they perceive in political and
moral doctrines based exclusively on universal rules of right judgment.’ This
romantic enthusiasm is matched only by the cautious uneasiness of those
who see the decision aspect of political and moral life as the road to ar-
bitrariness and caprice, and away from reason.” Pitting reason as authoritar-
ian rule mongering against freedom as arbitrary and foolish caprice, how-
ever, is a mistake. It is the path of good sense not to expose an exaggeration
by falling prey to another. In what follows, I seek such a balance.

VIRGINIA HELD’S AGGOUNT OF MORAL EXPERIENGE

A hypothesis that, as I will argue, undermines the place of judgment, hence
of critical scrutiny, in moral and political life has been advanced by Virginia
Held in “The Political ‘Testing’ of Moral Theories.” She says:
Moral experience . . . is the experience of consciously and conscientiously
choosing to act and to refrain from action, the experience of voluntarily
accepting or rejecting moral positions, the experience of willingly approv-
ing or disapproving in a moral sense. ... In moral experience, we decide
to take “I ought to do x,” or “‘y is morally wrong,” or “‘you ought not to

55
56 CRITICAL INTERACTION

do z,” etc., as morally valid or invalid. We do so by voluntarily acting or

refraining from action, by committing ourselves to moral stands.”
Held’s position is clear: Choice and the will are basically all there is to moral
experience. This is an exaggeration. As I will argue, it does not describe, as
the article’s title indicates, how moral theories are politically tested. Rather,
it makes them untestable, and it makes the critical scrutiny of moral ideas
and actions and the policies embodying them impossible.
A PRACTICAL INCONSISTENCY
The exaggerations in Held’s account do not just give choice and the will a
central place in moral experience (which is indeed their place), but the
exclusive role. As her statement indicates, we decide to take ought statements
and statements of right and wrong as valid or invalid. We decide to do this
by acting voluntarily or withholding approval.
One might grant that we decide to take certain statements as morally valid
or invalid by acting voluntarily or withholding approval. But one might add
that our giving or withholding approval is based on moral judgments and
not on arbitrary decisions or on blind acts of the will. This might be a
defensible position, but this is not what Held maintains. The judgments are
also a matter of choice, as she says in trying to distinguish the testing of
scientific theories from that of moral theories:
In the case of perception we ought, in some sense at least, to let the world
impose its truth on our observations, we ought to be relatively passive
recipients of the impressions that lead us to consider observation state-
ments true or false. In the case of action and of approval, on the other
hand, we ought to shape the world actively in accordance with our
choices. We ought to be relatively more active than passive . . . we ought,
in actively and voluntarily choosing how to act and what to approve of, to
impose on the world our choices of the prescriptions and judgments to
consider valid, instead of letting the world impose its facts upon us.*
This is an exaggeration, hence inaccurate. And since exaggerations are
often sources of practical inconsistencies, it is not surprising that there is one
here. Notice, first, that Held says that we ought to shape the world in
accordance with our choices, and we ought to impose our choices of what
prescriptions and judgments to consider valid in the world. That is, based on
Held’s position, even her judgments of what we ought to do must them-
selves be based on an arbitrary choice or a blind act of the will.
But if, as Held herself says, “To test something is to see how it stands up
under critical scrutiny,” her account rules out the possibility of testing any
moral theories and, for that matter, any moral ideas at all.° By putting sheer
caprice at the basis of moral inquiry, her account makes critical scrutiny and
the testing of moral theories and moral ideas impossible. It does this because
 Critical Interaction 57

it rules out a central characteristic of critical scrutiny: that whenever this

scrutiny is possible, it is possible to give reasons for or against whatever is
subject to scrutiny.® If the determination of which judgments and prescrip-
tions are to be considered valid is a mere matter of our own individual choice
or of individual decision, then no reason can be given for or against such
judgments and prescriptions.
One might object that I am selecting too unsympathetic an interpretation
of Held’s position. After all, she says that, in the case of action and approval,
we ought to shape the world actively in accordance with our choices. We
ought to impose on the world our choices of the prescriptions and judg-
ments to consider valid, instead of letting the world impose its facts upon us.
A more sympathetic interpretation would acknowledge that the terms “we”
and “‘our” are crucially ambiguous: Do they mean we (or our) one by one,
we (or our) together as a given group, or we (or our) together as all human
beings? This would make room for a less subjectivist interpretation.
In response, I must say that, in discussions such as this one, ambiguity is
not an excusing condition. Held’s account can still be faulted for not
explicitly excluding the extremely subjectivist interpretation I have attrib-
uted to her. And even if the appropriate interpretation were not subjec-
tivistic in this extreme sense, it would still be thoroughly voluntaristic.
According to Held, even the determination of which judgments and pre-
scriptions are to be considered valid is a mere matter of our choice or
decision, even if this choice or decision is somehow collective. It is nonethe-
less the case that no reason can be given for or against such judgments and
prescriptions. Hence, they cannot be subject to critical scrutiny. Held’s
account makes critical scrutiny impossible. Therefore, it makes not simply
the testing of moral theories but, more importantly, moral inquiry itself—
which is a form of critical inquiry—impossible. Only uncritical scrutiny
remains.
POLITIGAL AND MORAL QUESTIONABLENESS
Accounts such as Held’s are not merely inaccurate or sources of practical
inconsistencies. They are also politically unwise and morally objectionable
for various reasons. First, they impoverish the notions of policy assessment
and moral scrutiny. Second, they relegate conflicts such as those about the
arms race and, after the end of the cold war, about regional hegemony and
the proliferation of high-tech weapons to the realm of the arbitrary. Indeed,
non-war-related conflicts about such matters as abortion, environmental
deterioration, and race relations are also relegated to this realm. Third, as a
result of its narrow reliance on the will, such accounts as a rule tend to make
things even less governable and more conflictive than they already are. They
invariably bring things to a head, unless some arbitrary change of mind does
away with the conflicts. In other words, such accounts are not only untrue
58 CRITICAL INTERACTION

to the facts of politics. They are also a sure prescription for catastrophe.
Policy and decision problems concerning the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons and regional conflicts, as well as those
concerning abortion, environmental deterioration, and race relations, can be
soundly addressed by relying on judgment (as well as decisions and deter-
mination). They cannot be soundly addressed, as Held posits, through what
amounts to romantic—however collective—passion. But the question
arises: What leads to such romantic exaggerations? No doubt, an adequate
explanation of this fact will refer to personal and social features. But linguis-
tic features appear to play a role too. I next examine some linguistic ambi-
guities that, at least in Virginia Held’s account, appear to contribute to its
exaggerated nature.

AMBIGUITIES OF APPROVAL
In presenting her position, Virginia Held uses the term approval in a
manner that exemplifies a common linguistic pitfall. This pitfall would not
be a cause for concern if it simply led to theoretical confusion, or even moral
and political irrelevance in moral theory. But developments in moral theory,
even if irrelevant in content, have consequences in practice. Given some
time, they may well spill over into moral life. And in the case of the above
term and its related terms and concepts, it opens the door to mere self-
righteousness where reflection and a sensitive critical approach are needed.
Let us take a closer look at the term approval as well as related approval
and disapproval terms and concepts. I focus on actually operant moral and
political reasoning and use the results of the analysis as an indicator of the
extent to which accounts such as Held’s fail to reflect the realities of moral
and political thinking.”
The verb to approve has at least two senses: a judgment sense and a
decision sense. These are: “1. to speak or think favorably of, pronounce or
consider agreeable or good, judge favorably; 2. to confirm or sanction
formally, ratify.”* In the first sense, approve is often followed by the
preposition of, as in: He approves of the administration’s policies. This is the
same as saying that he “judges favorably of” the administration’s policies. In
the second, decision sense, approve is never followed by the preposition of,
as in: The Senate promptly approved the bill. This is not a judgment but a
decision the Senate made and an action it accordingly took. Its opposite is
not, The Senate promptly judged unfavorably of the bill, but The Senate
promptly rejected the bill. Hence, to approve something in this decision
sense is to sanction it.
A parallel point can be made about the verb to disapprove. In its judgment
sense, it means “‘1. co think (something) wrong or reprehensible; censure or
condemn in opinion.”!° In its decision sense, it means “2. to withhold
 Critical Interaction 59

approval from; decline to sanction: ‘The court disapproved the verdict.’”"!

Accordingly, approvals and disapprovals in the decision senses of these
terms are decisions or actions that create legal situations. They do so by, for
example, sanctioning or refusing to sanction bills into laws.!? In contrast,
someone’s approval or disapproval of something is a favorable or unfavor-
able judgment of it, not a decision. It is the outcome of an activity basically
aimed at finding out or establishing rather than merely instituting some-
thing. A parallel ambiguity can be found in policy assessment.
AMBIGUITIES OF POLICY ASSESSMENT
The ambiguities of approval have a parallel in policy assessment that is
reflected in the senses of the verb to assess. In one sense, it means the activity
of estimating the value of something, as in: We need to assess the value of
this property in order to calculate the tax the owner owes.'? In this sense of
to assess, the outcome of the assessment or estimate is an evaluation or
judgment of value and, as such, is capable of error. Either the property is
worth that much or nearly that much, or it is not. In this case, the value may
be either more or less accurately reported. Since a report is involved, and it is
capable of greater or lesser error, there is a judgment at work and, according-
ly, this sense of to assess can be called its judgment sense.
In contrast, to assess is sometimes used in its decision sense.'* An example
of this use is: We need to assess tax percentages for residential property. In
this sense, to assess means the activity of fixing or imposing the value of
something. The outcome of this activity may be justified or not—for
example, because it is fair or not—but it is in no way capable of error. The
tax percentage is what it was decided that it would be through the said
activity. In this case, the activity creates the value instead of reporting it.
EXAGGERATING THE ROLE OF JUDGMENT
Someone overly zealous in defending judgments might think that it all
comes down to a matter of judgment, because one can pass judgment on
values fixed or imposed in the above manner. No doubt, the values thus
created can sometimes be subject to critical scrutiny and thought to be
justified or unjustified. That is, correct or incorrect judgments can be passed
on them, and these judgments may be based on good, or not so good,
reasons. This, however, does not eliminate the decision sense of to assess.
Though the judgments would themselves be outcomes of an assessment in
the judgment sense, they would still be about an outcome of an assessment
in the decision sense.
The preceding discussion begins to place judgment and decision in their
proper moral and policy-making perspectives. Later essays explore their
respective policy--making functions. There is, however, a line of thought that
grants the points just made, but argues that the irretrievable subjectivity of
60 CRITICAL INTERACTION

ethics is to be found at a higher level. This is the level of the principles or

other general criteria that we use to make particular judgments about, among
other things, what decisions to make. It is argued that, though particular
practical judgments are not simply and arbitrarily chosen, the principles and
criteria on which they are based are.

ERROR THEORIES AND REASONING

In his Inventing Right and Wrong, J. L. Mackie states, “Morality is not to be
discovered but to be made.”’® Accordingly, Mackie holds that, in some
important way, all policy-making and, indeed, morality itself is irretrievably
subjective and basically arbitrary because of the element of choice or prefer-
ence it involves. He says:
[M]any of the most controversial first order moral issues... are..
questions about changing or preserving economic and social structures,
and about conflicts of interest between organized groups within a state or
between states or races; and even when one has chosen what seem to be
laudable goals, questions about the methods one may use to pursue them,
how to defend legitimate but threatened interests, to vindicate rights that
have been violated. Similar problems come up in somewhat different
forms for private citizens. ... The argument of this book yields .
answers to such questions. It cannot, since its main thesis is that there is an
inescapable subjective ingredient, an element of choice or preference, in
the reasoning that supports any policy decision. What it does offer is only
a framework of ideas within which such reasoning can go on.'®
This passage’s talk of reasoning should not lead one to believe that
Mackie’s position makes room for reason at every level of morality. In
explaining his statement that morality is not to be discovered but to be made,
he says:
[W]e have to decide what moral views to adopt, what moral stands to take.
No doubt the conclusions we reach will reflect our sense of justice, our
moral consciousness. . . .
But that is not the object of the exercise: the object is rather to decide
what to do, what to support and what to condemn, what principles of
conduct to accept and foster as guiding or controlling our choices and
perhaps those of other people as well.'”
According to this view, to invent morality is to decide not only what to do,
support, and condemn, but also—and most crucially—what principles to
use. The question then arises: Are these various decisions arbitrary? Mack-
1e’s answer is double-edged. On the one hand, he says:
 Critical Interaction 61

[T]here is no merit in pretending that our choices are rationally con-

strained in ways that they are not. We are... free to mould . . . our moral
system so as better to promote whatever it is that we do value.!®
On the other hand, however, Mackie cautions:
It does not follow . . . that an individual is free to invent a moral system at
will.... The prescription “Think of a set of rules and principles the
general adoption of which would best promote what you value and see as
worthwhile, and then follow them yourself, regardless of what you think
others will do” may well be a recipe for disaster.
The prescription “Think of a set of rules, and try to secure their general
acceptance” may be impractical. What the individual can do is... to put
pressure on some fragments of the system, so that they come gradually to be
more favorable to what he sees as valuable and worthwhile.’
According to this view, reasoning may be involved in deciding what princi-
ples to use as guiding our choices: what to support and what to condemn;
what moral views to adopt and moral stands to take; and what to do.
However, this reasoning at best concerns how our preferences or choices,
“what we see as valuable and worthwhile,”’”° will best be promoted by the
decisions resulting from our reasoning. In Mackie’s account, the preferences
and choices themselves are beyond reason, hence, beyond critical scrutiny.
Mackie does not hold that our preferences and value choices will not
change as a result of our reasoning. His position certainly makes room for
preference changes as a result of a reasoning process. But if our preferences
change as a result of such a process, this is only an interesting psychological
development in Mackie’s view. It is not a practical conclusion reached by
weighing the pros and cons of the preferences or value choices themselves,
either through our own reflection or through discussions with others. In
Mackie’s view, in the last analysis, the preferences we have and the value
choices we make are both irretrievably subjective and arbitrary.

MORAL EXPEDIENGY: MAGKIE’S GONGEPTION

OF POLIGY AND DEGISION PROBLEMS
Mackie’s account involves a questionable conception of policy and decision
problems. On this conception, an individual who has a problem of
conduct—a behavioral or decision problem—merely has a problem of
expediency in attaining or furthering a certain aim assumed not to be at issue
itself. A society with a policy problem merely has a problem of expediency
concerning what policies will best lead to attaining certain aims assumed not
to be at issue themselves. That is, it is characteristic in problems of expedien-
cy that the aims are taken for granted and assumed settled. Mackie’s account
is a perfect example of this expediency conception of policy and decision
62 CRITICAL INTERACTION

problems: What we see as worthwhile or valuable is not at issue, and the

problem is simply that of how best to promote it. It is a mere problem of
expediency, even if the expediency involved is moral expediency. This
conception, however, leaves Mackie’s account open to various objections.
POLITIGAL INAGGURAGY
First, as a matter of fact, problems of expediency in social life are not the
most frequent or significant ones. Indeed, they have no place among the
range of problems Mackie refers to, concerning such subjects as abortion,
world hunger, environmental decay, and the arms race. In these cases, the
aims themselves are characteristically at issue, and those involved often
sharply disagree about what the aims should be. No doubt, certain indi-
viduals or groups may approach the issues as if facing a mere matter of
expediency in promoting their own aims: what they see as worthwhile or
valuable. However, this is merely an element of higher-level policy and
decision problems posed by the fact that there is controversy and even
confrontation about these aims. It is in no way an accurate conception of
these higher-level policy and decision problems.
POLITIGAL AND MORAL QUESTIONABLENESS
Second, there is the problem of what to do about the conflicts of aims and
the sharp disagreements and even confrontations that accompany them. This
calls for an approach that is not, as a rule, bound to side with one aim or
another. But Mackie’s position makes no room for such a thing. According
to him, one can change aims, but at any one time, one must side with one
aim or another. Each and every individual policy-making action must be
aimed at promoting what the individual sees as worthwhile or valuable and
as having enough support from others so as to have a chance of advance-
ment. Hence, this approach fails to address the political fact of societally
disruptive conflicts that policymakers should squarely address. As a con-
sequence, it cannot address the policy and decision problems posed partly
by these conflicts. This inadequacy for dealing with the actual problems of
the political world is not simply a matter of irrelevance or inaccuracy. Given
the enormous risks many of the problems involve, it is also a politically
unwise and morally objectionable position.

PREFERENGE GHANGE AND ERROR THEORIES

ERROR THEORIES AND THE COMMON OPINION OBJECTION
In response to these criticisms, one might try to fight charges of irrelevan-
cy and misrepresentation with charges of irrelevancy. One might according-
ly say that the preceding discussion is based on ordinary conceptions of
policy and decision problems tied to ordinary notions of value. One might
 Critical Interaction 63

add that Mackie’s main thesis states that these conceptions are erroneous.
And one might proceed to argue that it is therefore irrelevant to point to the
fact that those conceptions do not agree with his thesis. Of course they do
not. After all, his theory is
an “error theory,” a theory that although most people in making moral
judgments implicitly claim, among other things, to be pointing to some-
thing objectively prescriptive, these claims are all false.?!
And it is irrelevant to argue that what an error theory says is false is widely
claimed to be true.
REASONS FOR GHANGING PREFERENCES
This response would be well taken if the notions of policy and decision
problems, and of moral problems in general, used above as alternatives to
Mackie’s notions had been shown to be as arbitrary as Mackie indicates. But
they have not. Actually, the reasons he mentions as possible bases for
deciding what principles to use in guiding our choices, what to support and
what to condemn, what moral views to adopt, what moral stands to take,
and what to do are relevant reasons for changing our preferences and value
choices. As Mackie correctly states:
Privately imagined rules or principles of action are worthless. ... What
counts is rules that are actually recognized by the members of some social
circle, large or small, and that thus set up expectations and claims. Innova-
tions and reforms are not excluded, but they must be possibly actual, not
purely utopian.”
This already points to reasons for establishing which preferences or value
choices, as embodied in given rules or principles, are worthless and which
are not. In addition, and quite curiously, Mackie says:
Notoriously, the same people and the same activities look very different
from opposing points of view. A first step is made when both sides see
that there are points of view from which each of the rival descriptions
makes some sense. A second, harder, but necessary step is made if they
can each see some force in the opposing point of view, that is, give some
weight to the values and ideals that underlie the aims of their opponents.”
To give weight to values and ideals that one did not give weight to in the
past is not simply to decide not to promote one’s preferences; it is to change
one’s preferences. To say, as Mackie does, that this step is necessary for
fruitfully dealing with societal conflicts is to point to a reason for changing
one’s preferences by changing their relative weight. No doubt, in a trivial
sense, this involves an irretrievably subjective element, since subjects must
be involved for it to happen. But this type of subjectivity is harmless,
64 CRITICAL INTERACTION

because it does not make things arbitrary at all. On the contrary, it 1s

compatible with pointing to reasons for taking a less uncompromising and
inflexible position in one’s moral thinking.
A PARADOXICAL AGCOUNT
To Mackie’s credit, it ought to be mentioned that he did not remain silent
concerning the feeling of paradox his discussion prompts. He attempts to
address it by saying that, when involved in a conflict of values and ideals like
those described above:
Trying to frame maxims which can be endorsed from all points of view, or
which represent a compromise between radically different points of
view ... you decide that after all you ought to stop and help. Your moral
conclusion, thus arrived at, now owes much less to any of your subjective
preferences. But as they have dropped out of the picture they have been
replaced by another subjective element, your endorsement of the substan-
tive practical principle of third stage universalization.”*
According to Mackie, then, one’s subjective preferences do not change.
They are replaced by one’s endorsement of a principle of universalization
that enjoins a compromise between radically different points of view in
dealing with the conflict.
The paradox remains, however. According to Mackie, the universalization
principle must be preferred and replace old preferences. Such a replacement
amounts to attributing less weight to the preferences one used to endorse
uncompromisingly. Further, this change in their weight is not a merely
arbitrary matter because, as indicated, reasons can be given for it. Indeed,
Mackie himself has given them. One is that individual preferences are not
overriding because their change is necessary for fruitfully dealing with the
conflict. Hence, the suggested defense of Mackie’s and other error theories
refutes the theories.

TOWARD A GRITIGAL AND INTERACTIVE APPROAGH:

THE SOGIAL TESTING OF MORAL HYPOTHESES
The preceding discussion points to an approach that takes discovery and
invention, judgment and decision, reason and choice to be closely intercon-
nected with each other and with action in the policy-making process. In this
context, moral hypotheses—from proposed rules to principles and entire
theories—and policy-making hypotheses—from proposed policies and de-
cisions to theories—can be significantly confirmed or disconfirmed through
a social testing process. I next outline some of the constraints on social
testing and the features that social testing must have.
 Critical Interaction 65

HARD-TO-FIND DATA
First, a crucial fact of social testing is that, at assessment time, it is often
unfeasible to spell out all significant implications of the policy (or theory).
Lack of knowledge or descriptive or predictive ability (if not lack of time)
prevents it, even if the details happen to be available for inspection or
discovery at the outset. Just think of predicting the specific implications of a
policy—or projecting the implications of a moral rule for assessing
policies—about the nearly 60,000 chemicals in the U.S. market (among
which about 1,000 are new) every year. In effect, only a few can be moni-
tored. And it is extremely difficult to infer which chemicals cause which
harms, or even what statistical risks are associated with the chemicals. This
difficulty is compounded when one considers the myriad other matters
relevant for concluding what would be the side effects of given policies
regulating the chemicals or the implications of morals rules for assessing
the policies.
UNSETTLED DATA
Second, the above information is not merely hard to find. It is not always
available. This is characteristically the case when new technologies are
involved—for example, as discussed in Essay 3, the automobile at the
beginning of the twentieth century, and personal computers at the end. At
the time of their introduction, some relevant considerations—for example,
public adaptability to the new technologies—are still unsettled. In any such
situation, many significant details still have to be worked out, quite often in
unpredictable fashion. This can be done only through a pragmatic process
that may include bargaining, negotiation, interaction among those involved,
and their limited and only partially controlled experience of the technologies
or business or political arrangements under discussion. This is a process of
critical scrutiny and social interaction through which reasons for assessing
practices, policies, and decisions are settled.
A PRAGMATIG PROGESS OF GRITIGAL INTERACTION
The social testing process helps work out policy-making details in a
manner that involves critical scrutiny and interaction. That is, it relies on
judgment, on individual or collective decisions to interact, and on the
resulting interaction with the new technologies and with people through
them. In doing so, it leads to the settlement of reasons for further testing
moral and policy-making hypotheses. If the details worked out do not fit the
general reasons the hypotheses specify, these hypotheses become question-
able. None of this, however, is tested, let alone settled, without critical
scrutiny. The details become settled when they survive the test—often a
recurrent test—of critical scrutiny by those going through the bargaining,
negotiation, and interaction process.
66 CRITICAL INTERACTION

SOGIAL TESTING AND GOOD SENSE

No doubt, one group of individuals may settle on something that another
group would not settle on at all. This does not depend simply on the
particular concerns at issue but also on how much care, imagination, moral
sensitivity, and political savvy the members of each group have. Some
groups may be so prone to confrontation that nothing will ever be settled
among their members. These will simply work themselves into societal
extinction (perhaps through argumentative exhaustion). But this is no reason
to fault the social testing process. Expecting the process to work regardless
of the specific people involved in it is a mistake. Indeed, it is as hopeless as
expecting sound criteria for preventing, diagnosing, and treating disease to
have their intended effect when used by careless or ignorant doctors on
equally careless or ignorant patients. Though guidelines are helpful and,
quite frequently, necessary, they are no substitute for a basic modicum of
good sense.
Since social testing is to be carried out in the actual political arena, it is
likely to involve people with various degrees of care, imagination, moral
sensitivity, and political savvy. Indeed, some are likely to be very careless,
unimaginative, morally insensitive, or lacking in political wisdom. But this is
no obstacle to carrying out the test or reason for questioning its validity. So
long as, on the aggregate, a basic modicum of good sense is predominant or
shared by a few influential individuals in the group, the test should yield
reliable results. The more critical scrutiny and trials a hypothesis survives
under such circumstances, the more confirmed it is; the less it survives them,
the less confirmed it is. If a hypothesis fails more than it survives, then there
is reason to modify, supplement, or substitute it. At no point during or after
the testing, however, should one expect total convergence of opinion or
coincidence of concerns. Nirvana and perpetual peace are not part of the real
world of politics, but reason and basic good sense can find room in this
world and work through its conflicts.
 Dialogue

— I suppose you have made your position concerning objectivity

clear enough, but at the cost of losing sight of the overall picture.
Your focus on news reporting in Essay 4 was somewhat too nar-
rowly drawn. And your distinction between the role of judgment
and that of decision in policy-making left me wondering what use it
has. How are these things relevant to the larger framework? And
what is this framework?

— As for the narrowness of my discussion of objectivity in news

reporting and war-related matters, I already explained why it ap-
plies to objectivity in policy-making generally. The applicability of
objectivity in the cases I discussed, which are among the most
confrontational ones, gives us reason to infer that it is also appli-
cable in other policy-making cases that are less confrontational
and subject to bias. Now, concerning the use of distinguishing be-
tween the role of judgment and that of decision in policy-making,
I have said a bit in discussing the social testing process. But,
granted, more needs to be said. The upcoming essays will expand on
the topic.

— OK, but that was not the main point of my question. It was how
does the discussion so far relate to your overall purposes, as stated
in the preface? For example, how does it relate to the notions of
issues and issue-overload? And how does it relate to the notion of
philosophy as diplomacy? You mentioned it in the preface, but so
far have hardly developed it.

— Let us consider issues and issue-overload first. The previous

essays provide reasons for believing that policy-making about them
need not be hopelessly subjective and arbitrary, though some-
times—such as when time is of the essence—decisions (includ-
ing decisions made in substantial ignorance of the circumstances)

67
68 DIALOGUE

may be crucial. It is at this point that the philosophy as diplomacy

approach most definitely comes into play.

— I still need some clarification of what you just said. I am quite

puzzled about the notion of philosophy as diplomacy. Are you
trying to help or harm philosophy by drawing an analogy between
philosophy and diplomacy?

— My purpose is to formulate a conception of philosophy, espe-

cially as regards ethics and sociopolitical philosophy, that is appli-
cable, sensitive to the concerns involved, and effective when dealing
with policy-making problems. Diplomacy can serve as an analogue
to formulate this conception.

— But, as you know, people often hold diplomacy in low esteem.

— Some people hold many worthwhile activities in low esteem, but

this is no reason to stop engaging in them, supporting them, or
using them as models when doing so promises to be fruitful.

— But is diplomacy itself effective? Why use as a model something

that is ineffective or in a state of crisis?

— Diplomacy has been in existence in policy-making for quite

some time and is reasonably effective.

— Some will question its current effectiveness. With the advent of

such things as nearly instantaneous communication, summit meet-
ings, and individual efforts at parallel mediation, diplomacy is not
what it used to be.

— The question is whether diplomacy is in a crisis of growth or an

insurmountable crisis. At any rate, philosophy is characteristically
in a state of crisis (its very role and rules are continuously at issue).
So why should the fact that diplomacy is (if it indeed is) in a state of
crisis make it an inadequate analogue to clarify the functions and
applications of philosophy in policy-making?

— There is, however, another reason to question your analogy. It is

not unusual for people to loathe diplomacy because of its immoral-
ity. To the extent this attitude is well-founded, how can diplomacy
 Dialogue 69

serve as an analogue for philosophy, especially for moral phi-

losophy?

— The view you mention is based on just one, not necessarily

accurate, conception of diplomacy. As I will explain, when accu-
rately and not cynically described, diplomacy is not a morally ques-
tionable activity. Indeed, it is often sensitive to the various concerns
involved in policy-making problems. After all, it needs to be sensi-
tive in order to be effective.

— I suppose this leads to discussions of the term diplomacy, the

various senses in which it is used, and the sense in which I am using
it.

— That’s right. And, to some extent, you will find such a discus-
sion in the next essay.
 Philosophy as
Diplomacy

The conception of philosophy as diplomacy has rarely been discussed by

writers in ethics and moral and political philosophy. It is not my aim to
formulate an exact, let alone definitive, definition of this conception. First, I
formulate a rough and tentative characterization of philosophy as diploma-
cy. Then, I contrast it with more traditional approaches to problems in
ethics and sociopolitical philosophy, the areas of philosophy where the
conception of philosophy as diplomacy seems to be more readily—though
perhaps not exclusively —applicable.
In particular, I characterize the uncompromising approach to policy-
making, together with the expediency conception of policy and decision
problems and the categorical conception of moral injunctions the approach
involves. I contrast them with the diplomatic approach and the conceptions
of policy and decision problems and moral injunctions associated with it,
and argue for three theses. First, the diplomatic approach is politically and
morally better suited for dealing with policy and decision problems posed
by abortion, fetal research, and other pressing and controversial matters of
social concern. Second, the conception of policy and decision problems
associated with the diplomatic approach accurately construes these prob-
lems, and the expediency conception presupposed by the uncompromising
approach misconstrues them. Third, the categorical conception of moral
injunctions involved in the uncompromising approach is questionable and,
at any rate, irrelevant to actual policy-making.
All along, I refer to cases that should help clarify what moral philosophy
as diplomacy is. This, rather than exact definitions, should suffice for the
time being. After all, exact definitions stand or fall with the theories in which
they are eventually formulated, and no full-fledged theories embodying the
notion of philosophy as diplomacy exist today. This book simply outlines
the basic elements of one such theory and gives reasons for preferring it to
current alternatives.

70
 Philosophy as Diplomacy 71

A WORD ABOUT DIPLOMAGY

As stated in the preface, by diplomacy I do not mean, as cynics would have
it, the activity of doing and saying the nastiest things in the nicest way.' I
mean, quite broadly, the activity of dealing with relations between states,
nations, other social groups, or even individuals so that ill does not prevail.
In this activity, open-ended social decision procedures such as bargaining,
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and others are crucial.
The question might arise: Why use this definition instead of the former or
some other one? One reason concerns historical accuracy. The broader
characterization seems more in accord with the wide variety of efforts taken
to be diplomatic efforts in human history, especially today. No doubt, there
is more than one current sense of the term diplomacy, as Sir Harold Nicol-
son made plain in his Diplomacy:
In current language this word “diplomacy” is carelessly taken to denote
several quite different things. At one moment it is employed as a synonym
for “foreign policy,” as when we say “British diplomacy in the Near East
has been lacking in vigour.” At another moment it signifies “‘negotiation,”
as when we say “the problem is one which might well be solved by
diplomacy.” More specifically, the word denotes the process and machin-
ery by which such negotiation is carried out. A fourth meaning is that of a
branch of the Foreign Service, as when one says “‘my nephew is working
for diplomacy.” And a fifth interpretation which this unfortunate word is
made to carry is that of an abstract quality or gift, which, in its best sense,
implies skill in the conduct of international negotiation; and in its worst
sense, implies the more guileful aspects of tact.*
Actually, Nicolson was not consistent in his use of the term diplomacy
himself. As José Calvet De Magalhaes put it, after vehemently denouncing
the confusion between diplomacy and foreign policy, Nicolson ends up
confusing the two in several passages, both in the aforementioned essay and
in another book (published in 1954) called The Evolution of Diplomatic
Method.’
De Magalhaes goes on to argue for a notion of diplomacy defined by four
main features. He writes:
The concept of diplomacy .. . can be defined as follows:
a. an instrument of foreign policy
b. for the establishment and development of peaceful contacts between
the governments of different states
c. through the use of intermediaries
d. mutually recognized by the respective parties.’
This definition may be adequate for studying diplomacy in the relations
between modern states up to the 1930s or 1940s, but not before the modern
72 “PHILOSOPHY AS DIPLOMACY

period, and certainly not after the first half of the twentieth century. In other
words, it is quite ahistorical. Let us see why.
First, the above definition rules out contacts by intermediaries that have
not yet been recognized as intermediaries. The reason De Magalhaes gives is
that, “if this envoy is not recognized by the receiving state as a legitimate
representative of the sending state, he will not be able to carry out his
mission for want of that initial official contact indispensable to start a
dialogue between states.”® However, this reason is overly legalistic and
politically unconvincing. Diplomacy can take place when a state attempts to
mediate between nations or ethnic groups that are not—but may become—
states and therefore cannot officially recognize the mediator as an envoy.
This is the case of the United States’ 1992 diplomatic efforts to intercede
between Serbians and Croatians. Another example is the United States’
efforts to start a dialogue between Israel and the PLO.
Second, as current summit diplomacy makes plain, though intermediaries
are typically part of the diplomatic picture, they need not always be present.
Of course, this is not to say that they are not desirable. As De Magalhaes
reminds us, exchanges through intermediaries would have been less risky to
the world community than the famous May 1960 meeting between President
Dwight D. Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev in Paris, where Khrushchev
made violent accusations about the U2 plane that had just been shot down
by Soviet air defenses.°
Third, mediation efforts can be effectively carried out by self-appointed
intermediaries through contacts with representatives of foreign states, even
without official recognition by any state as being legitimate representatives
of any other state. Just think of the many such missions Pope John Paul has
carried out just about everywhere, without being an official representative of
any of the parties involved. Think also of Armand Hammer in Moscow and
Jesse Jackson in Damascus. One might be inclined to classify these efforts, as
James Der Derain does in On Diplomacy, as para-diplomatic rather than
diplomatic.” Yet even then, the fact that they are seen as para-diplomatic
makes plain that they are significantly analogous to diplomatic efforts.
Hence, they are useful in this essay’s attempt to draw an analogy between
philosophy and diplomacy that proves fruitful to the application of ethics
and sociopolitical philosophy to policy-making.
In this attempt, what matters is not to formulate a definition of diplomacy
that gives us its essence—if it has one—or distinguishes it clearly and
precisely from all other activities. Rather, what matters is to characterize
those salient features of diplomacy that make the analogy between diploma-
cy and philosophy fruitful to the application of ethics and sociopolitical
philosophy to policy-making. Such a description will suffice.
This brings us back to the characterization I favor. The salient feature
 Philosophy as Diplomacy 73

displayed by diplomatic as well as para-diplomatic activities is an emphasis

on such social decision procedures as negotiation, arbitration, and media-
tion, pursued so that ill does not prevail in the relations between states,
nations, ethnic groups, other groups, and individuals. In this activity, open-
ended social decision procedures such as bargaining, negotiation, mediation,
arbitration, and others are crucial.
Analogously, as I will further explain, philosophy as diplomacy is a type
of philosophical approach—a family of philosophical theories rather than
any one theory—whose aim is to help deal with the relations between
individuals, between groups, and between individuals and groups so that ill
does not prevail. This initial characterization makes it plain that the primary
locus of philosophy as diplomacy is in moral philosophy. Indeed, in what
follows, I focus on moral philosophy and discuss the notion of moral
philosophy as diplomacy. Yet, as previously stated, I leave open the question
of whether the scope of philosophy as diplomacy extends beyond moral
philosophy into, for example, aesthetics, the philosophy of culture, the
philosophy of language, and, through it, metaphysics and epistemology.
Now let us narrow our focus and begin to place philosophy as diplomacy in
the context of traditional ethical and sociopolitical theories.

FEATURES OF PHILOSOPHY AS DIPLOMAGY

NOT SIMPLY GONSEQUENTIALIST:
A GIVIL RIGHTS GASE
To say that moral philosophy as diplomacy aims at avoiding ill is not to
say that it is primarily consequentialist. Ill may consist in the violation of a
right or failure to act in accordance with principles of justice, which are
deontological considerations.
In the conception of moral philosophy as diplomacy, the avoidance of
socially undesirable consequences does not invariably or even frequently
override the violation of rights. For example, in September 1962, Governor
Ross Barnett refused to allow a black student, James Meredith, to enroll at
the University of Mississippi. President Kennedy sent in federal marshals
and federalized the Mississippi National Guard. As a result, on September
30 and October 1, a bloody confrontation took place between frenzied
segregationist whites and the federal marshals, the federalized Mississippi
National Guard, and the regular army troops protecting the campus. It
would be preposterous to argue that it was worth sacrificing James Mere-
dith’s civil rights for the sake of avoiding the bloodshed that ensued.* After
all, peace is not justified at just any cost. This is reflected in actual diplomacy
and, by analogy, in moral philosophy as diplomacy.
74 PHILOSOPHY AS DIPLOMACY

NOT SIMPLY DEONTOLOGIGAL:

A NUGLEAR WAR GASE
The conception of moral philosophy as diplomacy is also not merely
deontological. It does not rule out the possibility that in certain cases—for
example, conflicts threatening nuclear holocaust—the social consequences
of the conflicts would be so catastrophic as to take precedence. In such a
case, otherwise relevant deontological considerations—for example, a coun-
try’s self-determination or sovereignty rights—would be overridden. And
this need not be so because other deontological considerations take prece-
dence. Suppose that the international crisis threatening nuclear holocaust is
already a conventional war. It is, therefore, a state-of-nature situation. And
in any such situation, it is at least questionable whether rights or the
obligations correlated with them carry much, if any, weight. Collective
consequences appear to have decisive weight. Indeed, they are grounds of
both overriding moral injuctions and prudential courses of action.
REALISTIG AND PRAGMATIG
The conception of moral philosophy as diplomacy does not exclude moral
rules, laws, and principles from the process of morally dealing with policy
and decision problems. However, as stated, it crucially includes social deci-
sion procedures that go beyond such primarily argumentative procedures as
discussion of merits and negotiation. These additional procedures include
mediation, arbitration, outflanking, manipulation, boycotts, and strikes. In
fact, in highly confrontational situations such as that exemplified by the
previously mentioned Mississippi case, they may even include combat.
This is crucial for distinguishing moral philosophy as diplomacy from
traditional approaches such as those I discuss later. First, as indicated, moral
philosophy as diplomacy is sensitive to the varieties of policy and decision
problems and the concurrent varieties of social decision procedures. This
makes it realistic.
Second, moral philosophy as diplomacy aims at specifying the types of
conditions under which given procedures are likely to address the problems
feasibly, effectively, and in a manner sensitive to the various concerns
involved. That is, it is an alternative to approaches that hopelessly seek
consensus, or invariably opt for confrontation, in dealing with issues and
issue-overload. This makes it realistic and, also, pragmatic.
Third, in contrast with alternative approaches, moral philosophy as di-
plomacy is realistic because it does not merely or primarily dwell on abstract
ideas. For example, in the case of abortion, it does not focus on whether the
human fetus is a person. And regarding preferential treatment, it does not
focus on whether such treatment is compatible with abstract principles of
justice. Instead, it focuses on the social fact that there is a recurrent issue that
 Philosophy as Diplomacy 75

something should be done about. (I return to this later.)

Fourth, moral philosophy as diplomacy does not presuppose that policy
and decision problems such as those previously mentioned are primarily—
let alone exclusively—settled by appeal to principles. Nor does it presup-
pose that they are fairly settled depending only or primarily on whether
principles are invoked and whether they are valid. In fact, such an appeal to
principles is but one aspect of the previously mentioned discussion of merits,
or rational discussion. This procedure includes appeal to reasons that may or
may not be principles. Only the force of the better argument is supposed to
count. Inducements and threats are to be left out. As indicated, however,
there are other decision procedures. And it is a task of moral philosophy to
establish which procedures are suited for dealing with which issues. This
leads to additional, crucial ways in which moral philosophy as diplomacy
is pragmatic.
Fifth, moral philosophy as diplomacy recognizes the central fact of
policy-making that, as discussed in Essay 5, at assessment time it is often
unfeasible to spell out all significant implications of a policy (or theory).
This points to the sixth and most crucial feature for distinguishing moral
philosophy as diplomacy from traditional approaches: Moral philosophy as
diplomacy takes seriously the fact that, as discussed in Essays 3 and 5,
certain unsettled data are worked out in the process and are not available at
the time initial policy discussions take place. Indeed, they often result in part
from such discussions. The process of critical scrutiny and social interaction
leads to the settlement of reasons for assessing policies and decisions. These
are new, previously nonexistent, and hardly predictable data.’

A TENTATIVE GHARACTERIZATION
The preceding remarks provide grounds for a tentative characterization of
moral philosophy as diplomacy in contrast with traditional approaches —
strictly consequentialist, strictly deontological, or merely pragmatic—in
moral philosophy. It should be added that moral philosophy as diplomacy
is, first of all, moral philosophy—moral theory, ethical theory, ethics as a
branch of inquiry, reflection on morality. That is, it is a critical and self-
critical study aimed at soundly dealing with problems of right and wrong,
good and bad, justified and unjustified, that arise in people’s lives.'° Further,
it is not identical to any one theory in ethics or sociopolitical philosophy.
Rather, it is an approach within which a great variety of theories can fit, such
as the one I am formulating. Having said all this, the following appears to be
a sound characterization: Moral philosophy as diplomacy is a branch of
inquiry aimed at dealing with problems of right and wrong, good and bad,
justified and unjustified, in ways that are feasible, effective, and crucially
sensitive both to the often unsettled and conflictive nature of the concerns
76 PHILOSOPHY AS DIPLOMACY

that contribute to pose the problems and to the variety of open-ended social
decision procedures that may help settle these concerns and deal with the
problems through policies and decisions, and on the basis of reasons worked
out in the policy-making process.
The specific ways that are permissible or even required when dealing with
given problems depend on the specific economic, political, and other
pragmatic constraints involved. Such constraints are especially pressing
when dealing with problems posed by issues or, as in issue-overload, by
their combination. A more detailed examination of some contrasts between
philosophy as diplomacy and traditional approaches concerning issues and
issue-overload will help clarify the notion of philosophy as diplomacy and
its applicability in ethics and sociopolitical philosophy.

UNGOMPROMISING VS. DIPLOMATIG: TWO APPROAGHES

TO POLIGY AND DEGISION PROBLEMS
Policy discussions are far from detached exchanges between phlegmatic
observers. Discussions on such topics as abortion, fetal research, animal
welfare, the environment, international development, the international debt,
and the arms race involve sharp disagreements accompanied by heated
controversy and, sometimes, outright confrontation between those in-
volved. The question is: What approach is morally and politically best suited
for dealing with the policy and decision problems such situations pose? As
previously argued, the philosophy as diplomacy approach and the specific
theory this book outlines do not exclude deontological considerations—
quite the contrary. Yet the question still remains: How are deontological
considerations regarded in the present context? In particular, are they cate-
gorical or not? This leads to an additional question: What kinds of moral
reasons enjoining or proscribing a policy or a decision are relevant for
dealing with the problems: categorical or noncategorical ones? These are the
main questions I address next.
In doing so, I focus on two policy-making approaches and the concep-
tions of policy and decision problems associated with them. One approach is
uncompromising. It treats policy and decision problems as mere matters of
moral expediency —when not of simple expediency —involved in carrying
out injunctions based on reasons that are considered categorical, inescapable,
final. The other approach is diplomatic. It treats policy and decision prob-
lems as including unsettled questions not just about the policies and deci-
sions at issue but about the reasons used to favor or oppose them. With the
diplomatic approach, reasons for or against policies and decisions are always
open to critical scrutiny and are not considered to be (let alone known to be)
categorical, inescapable, final.
 Philosophy as Diplomacy 77

Concerning these approaches, I argue for three interconnected theses.

First, the diplomatic approach is politically and morally better suited for
dealing with policy and decision problems posed by abortion, fetal research,
and other pressing and controversial matters of social concern. Second, the
conception of policy and decision problems associated with the diplomatic
approach accurately construes these problems, and the expediency concep-
tion presupposed by the uncompromising approach misconstrues them.
Third, the categorical conception of moral injunctions involved in the un-
compromising approach is questionable and, at any rate, irrelevant to actual
policy-making.
Concerning the first thesis, I argue that the diplomatic approach is politi-
cally better suited because it is more effective in reducing unnecessary
conflict. It is morally better suited because it realistically upholds—rather
than inflexibly undermines—morality. In contrast, the uncompromising
approach is ineffective in reducing conflict and undermines morality.
Regarding the second thesis, I first argue that the diplomatic conception of
policy and decision problems is accurate, because it treats the reduction of
social conflict as a consideration that can carry more weight than others.
That is, it treats social conflict itself on a par with policy and decision
considerations that concern merely specific subjects of social conflict, such
as abortion or fetal research. In contrast, the expediency conception of
policy and decision problems is inaccurate because it makes no provision for
weighing such considerations against each other. Instead, it inaccurately
treats policy and decision injunctions about such things as abortion and fetal
research in a political vacuum devoid of conflict.
As for the third thesis, I first argue that the categorical conception of
moral injunctions involved in the uncompromising approach is questionable
because it presupposes—rather than establishes—the preeminence of the
moral point of view. I then argue that it is irrelevant to actual policy-making.
Even if such moral injunctions turn out to be categorical, in some abstract
sense, at policy-making time, there are no good reasons for identifying them
as being so.

A GLOSER LOOK AT THE UNCOMPROMISING APPROAGH

AND THE EXPEDIENGY GONGEPTION
To say that the uncompromising approach treats policy and decision injunc-
tions as categorical is not to say that these injunctions are based on selfish
grounds. They can be, but need not be. The expediency conception of policy
and decision problems these injunctions lead to is often moral expediency.
Indeed, the grounds and the injunctions are often altruistic or fall some-
where between the extremes of altruism and egoism. For example, people
78 PHILOSOPHY AS DIPLOMACY

argue about abortion by appeal to rights: those of the fetus if anti-abortion,

those of the mother if pro-choice. In any case, they are certainly not selfish
arguments. Nor, judging by the individuals who offer them, is their use
motivated by selfish or self-interested considerations.
In addition, to say that the uncompromising approach treats policy and
decision problems as problems of expediency is not to say that individuals
who adopt such an approach are lacking grounds to think their injunctions
categorical. Actually, they often have carefully thought out reasons for the
finality of their position. In any case, in this conception of the problem, the
injunctions are not at issue; their justification is presumed settled. The
reasons, if recited, are simply aimed at persuading others to adopt the same
aims and, thus, supposedly contribute to a resolution of the problem. Let us
consider some examples.
With this approach, an individual may have the decision problem of
whether to demonstrate against the use of baboons for research purposes,
without having any doubt that the elimination of such use is overriding. The
only question is whether demonstrating will help attain it. Analogously, a
group or society may have the policy problem of how to preserve national
security at any cost, without there being any doubt that this aim is overrid-
ing. In this approach, then, policy and decision problems are merely prob-
lems posed by practical obstacles or uncertainties in the attainment of aims
that are assumed to be settled, because moral or other injunctions to seek
these aims are taken to be final, inescapable, or categorical.'’ This prompts
the questions: Can reasons, at least moral reasons, about policy and decision
be final, categorical, or inescapable? Can they be known to be so? If they
can, is an uncompromising approach to policy-making thereby justified?

THE PHILOSOPHIGAL GONTROVERSY ABOUT

GATEGORIGAL MORAL REASONS
Discussions of the finality of reasons have tended to focus on moral injunc-
tions, that is, moral reasons to act one way or another. Kant, most notably,
thought that the categorical imperative presented some moral injunctions as
ends in themselves, “objectively necessary, without regard to any other
end.” In contrast, the apparent finality that reasons of etiquette, prudence,
or politics may possess is conditional on the ends or purposes of etiquette,
prudence, or politics. According to this view, one ought to do what eti-
quette, prudence, or politics requires in given circumstances, if the ends of
etiquette, prudence, or politics are ends that one wants. One ought to do
what morality requires regardless of one’s wants, desires, or interests.!>
It has been objected that, at best, moral reasons are final all moral things
considered, but not from the nonmoral standpoint of, for example, etiquette,
 Philosophy as Diplomacy 79

prudence, or politics. Along these lines, Philippa Foot has argued that
“moral judgments have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do
statements about matters of etiquette.’”’!* In response, Lawrence C. Becker
has argued that the moral point of view, moral reasons, moral justifications,
and the like are not separate in kind from nonmoral ones. They simply
broaden the scope of considerations that are relevant in principle. In certain
cases, however, reasons such as those of etiquette may have too little weight
to make a difference. From this, Becker concludes, “‘a valid moral judgment
is by definition overriding. Its action-guidance is ‘inescapable’ or ‘binding’
in the sense that there is nothing more to consider—nothing which might be
introduced to enlarge the inquiry further and make the prescription subject
to withdrawal.”?°
Whatever its virtues, Becker’s view on the no-holds-barred nature of
moral considerations hardly makes valid moral judgments categorical. For it
does not establish that the inquiry should indeed be broadened and that
practical reasons should not be merely of etiquette, selfish, or political.
Simply saying that all such considerations are relevant from the moral point
of view does not establish the priority of such an all-encompassing point of
view over other, narrower ones. Hence, it has not been disproved that, at
best, moral reasons are final all moral things considered, but not from
nonmoral—narrower—points of view.

HOW GATEGORIGAL GAN REASONS IN POLIGY-MAKING BE?

My present concern is something other than determining the status of moral
judgments. It is to argue that even if valid moral judgments formulating
moral injunctions are categorical, this is irrelevant to whether people are
moral or not and to policy-making in the actual world.
First, suppose that valid moral judgments are categorical. This would be a
logical, not a motivational, feature of moral judgments. It would be incap-
able of preventing moral people from ceasing to be moral and of convincing
the immoral to be moral. Thinking otherwise amounts to what Philippa
Foot described as “‘trying to give the moral ‘ought’ a magic force.”'®
Second, suppose that valid moral judgments are not categorical. This
logical, not motivational, feature of moral judgments would not incline
people to cease to be moral. Nor would a motive to be moral be lacking that
would have been present had valid moral judgments been categorical. Moral-
ly inclined people would still do what they ought to do, regardless of
whether they ought to do it categorically or simply because the circum-
stances, relevant moral rules and principles, and their commitment to living a
good life with others require it.
Third, concerning the claim that the status of moral injunctions is
80 PHILOSOPHY AS DIPLOMACY

irrelevant to policy-making, suppose that at least some moral injunctions are

categorical. This would have no effect on policy-making unless there were
conclusive grounds for believing which ones were categorical. In policy-
making, however, one does not come easily or definitively by such grounds.
Fourth, identifying categorical injunctions is especially difficult, if not
impossible, when new technologies are involved. As previously argued, at
the time of their introduction, some relevant considerations are still un-
settled. Without clairvoyance, one could not possibly conclude beyond
all reasonable doubt what ought to be done, categorically, about a new
technology.
To offer the last two arguments is not, of course, to argue that one cannot
have very good reasons for reaching certain conclusions. Rather, it is to
argue that, in policy-making, these reasons are not simply open to critical
scrutiny but are characteristically conditional. Even if there were a set of
reasons that served to establish some categorical moral injunction, those
reasons would be difficult to know without any doubt. And some reasons
are not worked out or predictable at the outset.
The arguments just given provide reason to believe that categorical injunc-
tions are irrelevant to whether people are moral and whether policies are
sound. But the previously discussed uncompromising approach to policy-
making, and its associated expediency conception of policy and decision
problems, crucially depend on the assumption that moral injunctions are not
only categorical and relevant but also decisive for policy-making. Since this
assumption is false, the approach and its associated expediency conception
of policy and decision problems are unwarranted. An adequate approach
and conception should begin by being realistic.
I next develop the more realistic—diplomatic—approach sketched at the
outset and its associated—conflict government—conception of policy and
decision problems. In carrying out this task, I focus on the case of abortion.
Given its intractability, abortion serves as a test for the uncompromising as
well as the diplomatic approach. Indeed, it is one of those cases in which
such approaches are tried by fire.

THE GASE OF ABORTION: TOWARD A DIPLOMATIG

APPROAGH TO POLIGY AND DECISION PROBLEMS
An urgent matter of social concern can be the focus of a variety of moral
problems. Consider abortion. When a woman is faced with the problem of
whether (and not simply how or where) to have an abortion, she has a moral
decision problem—that is, a behavioral moral problem, or a moral problem
of conduct. So does a physician faced with the problem of whether (and not
simply how most effectively or profitably or without legal liability) to
 Philosophy as Diplomacy 81
perform an abortion. These are not mere problems of expediency. Those
who have the problems are being torn up by the fact that some of their moral
notions (e.g., their moral values) have come into conflict; they must make up
their minds about what to sacrifice to what, and they find it distressingly
difficult to do so. Their lives are disrupted by an internal conflict, whatever
the source of the conflict is.
This does not mean that such problems are not political. In fact, they often
are. They are often partly the result of political arrangements. However, the
conflicts of moral notions —of values, interests, ideals, rules, principles, and
the like—that contribute to pose the problems are internal to the persons.
Indeed, their lives are being disrupted by these conflicts, which are central
constituents of the moral decision problems being faced.
In cases such as that of abortion, the conflicts significantly disrupt a
person’s life and may even threaten a moral crisis. In less pressing cases, such
as when life or basic liberties are not at stake, they may cause only momen-
tary disruption. Yet they are never practically indifferent matters. They are
never mere matters of preference, such as whether or not to grow petunias in
the garden. Nor are they mere matters of arbitrary decision, such as whether
to go into a building through the right or the left of two adjacent doors.
Although such moral decision problems are often political, they are not
identical with policy problems. The latter, of course, are also political but,
unlike moral decision problems, they are not about the conduct of particular
individuals. In fact, they arise beyond the realm of any one individual’s
personal experience.
Consider, for example, the matter of whether the federal government
should provide funding for abortions. When this point is raised, the problem
does not arise simply within the confines of any one individual’s personal
experience. It arises in society at large, at the most encompassing levels of the
public policy realm. It is a societal problem, and an individual’s experience in
and of itself is of no help in conceptualizing the problem. We may indeed
wonder whether we could bring ourselves to pay for an abortion, but this is
to wonder about an importantly different matter: about what our values,
ideals, obligations, duties, moral rules, or principles are. Or we may try to
imagine the suffering of a woman forced to have an unwanted baby because
of her inability to pay for an abortion. But this, though it may raise (and has
raised) policy problems about abortion, is not itself a policy problem. To
conceptualize policy problems about abortion realistically, one needs to
consider policymakers facing abortion policy decisions. For example, one
needs to consider a legislator facing the decision of what abortion funding
policy to have, or a Supreme Court justice facing the decision of what
abortions, if any, to interpret as permitted by law.
In these cases, the problems are not simply about what policy to have in a
82. PHILOSOPHY AS DIPLOMACY

political vacuum. They are partly about social conflicts concerning these
policy problems—conflicts that are significantly disruptive of society. To
what extent they are disruptive is a policy concern and contributes to pose
the actual policy problem: what abortion policies to have, given that there is
a societally disruptive conflict about abortion.” This is the actual policy
problem, because, like any policy and decision problem about controversial
matters, it arises and must be dealt with in the midst of conflicts in which the
aims themselves are at issue. The conception of policy and decision problems
associated with the diplomatic approach is accurate because it captures this
crucial feature of the problems.
In contrast, the expediency conception fails to capture precisely this
feature. First, it treats the conflicts as mere political externalities—simply as
obstacles, or help, in the carrying out of categorical injunctions and the
striving to attain aims not themselves at issue. But in the actual world of
politics, conflicts about the aims—whether based on wants, claims, in-
terests, needs, advantages, values, ideals, attitudes, traits, rules, obligations,
rights and duties, or principles—are unresolved. Hence, from the stand-
point of political reality, the expediency conception of policy and decision
problems is false. This is a good reason to reject the nonmoral expediency
conception of policy and decision problems.
Second, it follows that, from the standpoint of morality, the expediency
conception of policy and decision problems is unsound. Since moral injunc-
tions about policy- and decision-making are presumably meant to guide us,
they must be sensitive to the actual political circumstances in which the
policy and decision problems we face arise. But since, as previously argued,
the expediency conception is politically false, it prevents moral injunctions
from being sensitive.
Third, the expediency conception misconstrues moral problems, which
are typically prompted by conflicts of concerns that involve such things as
mutually conflicting rules, obligations, claims, rights and duties, needs,
interests, wants, advantages, desires, attitudes, and traits. And in failing to
reflect the conflicts, the expediency conception conspicuously fails to make
room for moral problems about the conflicts. Hence, the expediency con-
ception is false from a moral standpoint.
Fourth, the expediency conception undermines morality. Its failure to
make room for moral problems about conflicts—this lack of moral
circumspection—partially, if not entirely, undermines critical scrutiny and
the openness of moral discourse. This undermines morality and moral
reasoning by turning them into mere dogmatic—however well-
articulated—mores. It follows that, in policy-making, the expediency con-
ception should be rejected, together with the uncompromising approach to
policy-making that presupposes it.
 Philosophy as Diplomacy 83
Is there room for this conception and approach at the individual decision
level? Hardly so. As the previous discussion of policy problems concerning
abortion indicates, in many policy problems individuals are not isolated. A
crucial characteristic of policy problems is that people are collectively —
even if not individually —faced with them. Their society is disrupted. In the
case of abortion, society is disrupted because people are sharply divided
about which abortion policies should be introduced, and they confront each
other in trying to bring about adoption of the policy they want. Society is
disrupted by a societal conflict of values or demands and by what people do
to uphold their values or satisfy their demands. Many individuals, however,
manage to live through it without having their personal lives disrupted by
this societal conflict at all. They live through it without any internal conflict
of values. Some go ahead and have or help others have abortions without
questioning whether it is right for them to do so. Others go ahead and have
or help others have babies without questioning whether it is right for them
to do so. However, some of those who have or help others have babies say
that abortion is murder and want it outlawed. And some of these who have
or help others have abortions say that having babies is irresponsible and
outlawing abortions sheer intolerance. These people have answers about the
moral notions at issue.
It is characteristic of such policy problems that many of the people who
are collectively faced with them have answers about the moral notions at
issue. Although they may have questions about the most expedient way to
uphold those notions, they have no moral problems of conduct. The sound-
ness and finality of their moral injunctions to pursue whatever individual
aims they pursue are presumed settled. Indeed, some people seem to have
simply demands and no questions whatsoever about what they are entitled
to demand; they presuppose the expediency conception of individual deci-
sion problems. Yet when people have moral problems of conduct, they
characteristically have distressing questions about which of their moral
notions they ought to sacrifice, not answers or mere demands. Hence, the
expediency conception does not adequately capture the nature of moral
problems of conduct.
Nor does the expediency conception capture the nature of the political
decision problem these people face. This is the problem of what policy to
support, given that there is social conflict about what policies to have; that
the conflict disrupts society to some extent; and that policy-making should
try to curb this disruption, and that inflexible or thoughtless support of an
uncompromising position does precisely the contrary.
The path of both political and moral realism, circumspection, and wisdom
points to the previously described diplomatic approach and conception of
policy and decision problems. From their standpoint, policy and decision
84 PHILOSOPHY AS DIPLOMACY

problems are treated as including unsettled questions not just about the
policies and decisions at issue but about the reasons used to favor or oppose
them. Here, reasons for or against policies and decisions are always open to
critical scrutiny and are characteristically conditional. It is not presumed (let
alone known) that they are categorical, inescapable, final.

GONGLUDING REMARKS
The philosophy as diplomacy approach to policy-making and its associated
conflict government conception of policy and decision problems are in no
way a cure-all. They do not preclude the possibility that an official
policymaker—or anyone, for that matter—may have a problem of con-
science in dealing with a policy problem crucially posed by a societal
conflict. This can certainly happen. For instance, a Catholic Supreme Court
justice who believes that laws that stop Medicaid funding for poor women’s
abortions are unconstitutional may have one such personal problem when
having to vote on a case covered by these laws. The policy problem partly
addressed by the decision, however, is different from the justice’s problem of
conscience. The policy problem is partly posed by the societal disruption
resulting from the clash of demands or opinions about public funding for
abortions, together with what people do to uphold their opinions and satisfy
their demands. It is not at all posed by the fact that the judge has certain
religious beliefs, although the problem of conscience is posed by these
beliefs in combination with the duties attached to the judge’s office and the
civil law.
In addition to matters of conscience, the philosophy as diplomacy approach
and the conception of policy and decision problems bring into focus a variety of
related problems. As this essay’s discussion indicated, these include the
problems of whether ethics is autonomous and whether ethics is always
overriding. This is a virtue rather than a shortcoming, for it helps address the
problems in a manner directly relevant to the actual world of politics and
morality and avoids the risk of reducing them to some meta-meta-ethical
equivalent of detached exchanges between phlegmatic observers.
 Dialogue

— Your notion of philosophy as diplomacy is clearer now than

before, but I am still not sure that it works. You have tried to show
how it works in a few cases. Are there any principles according to
which one should put it to work?

— I believe so. In Essay 8, I will formulate and give reasons in

support of the principle of practical equity and various laws that fall
under this principle and apply to special types of policy-making
cases. Of course, even after I have given all such reasons, the
principle and the laws will still be largely hypotheses, which is what
I call them. To establish that they are actually principles or laws, it
will be necessary to confirm them sufficiently through the critical
scrutiny and social interaction process I have been describing.

— Why is it that, instead of feeling that I now have some answers, I

feel that the questions have multiplied to the point of making me
dizzy? Let me explain what I mean. You just said that the principles
depend on the type of case. How many types are there? Are there as
many principles as types? On what basis do you distinguish be-
tween types? I wanted one question answered, and your response
has led me to ask three more.

— That is the nature of inquiry. The more answers we get, the

more questions arise. However, as we get more answers, we pre-
sumably attain greater knowledge. As for the additional questions
you just asked, I cannot answer them at once, but I could tell you a
bit about the types of cases I have in mind.

— It seems to me that, if the application of your theory’s principles

depends on the type of cases involved, your theory should include
not merely some impressionistic discussion but a taxonomy of these
cases. Otherwise, how could we apply the principles in a reliable

85
86 DIALOGUE
manner? This would raise questions about its application, hence
about whether philosophy as diplomacy, your overall approach,
actually works.

— Iagree, but I am curious to know the reasons for what you just
said.

— My reasons are simple. You can establish that the approach

works only by formulating a theory that falls under this approach
and testing it through its applications. Such testing, if at all possible,
is inadequate without a taxonomy of the types of cases to which the
theory is supposed to apply.

— You are absolutely right. Fortunately, I think I can satisfy your

curiosity. I next try to present the needed taxonomy.
 7 A Delicate Balance:
Reason, Social
Interaction,
Disruption, and Scope
in Ethics and
Policy-Making

Social conflict is a source of abhorrence to some and hope to others. Some

abhor it on the grounds that it undermines social progress. Auguste Comte,
for example, thought that social conflict involved a tendency toward insur-
rection that “‘would be fatal to humanity, and distract all progress,” if left
unchecked.’ Others find hope in social conflict on the opposite grounds:
that it is the way to social progress. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, for
example, saw the proletariat “struggling for mastery“‘ with other classes
toward “‘the abolition of the old form of society in its entirety and of
mastery itself,” that is, toward liberation.* Here, I seek to investigate the
moral and policy-making significance and limits of social conflict, consen-
sus, and their varieties. In addressing this topic, I also inquire whether other
variables are equally or more crucial for describing policy-making problems
in a manner helpful for morally sensitive, yet effective, policy-making. The
essay further expands on the descriptions and examples of policy-making
problems and their levels provided by the previous essays and outlines a
taxonomy of the problems.
I ask: How should policy and decision problems be described to help
make not just politically effective but morally sensitive policy and decisions
about them? Should they all be described as conflictual or, alternatively, as
consensual? Or should social conflict be highlighted in some cases and
consensus in others? For what purposes? At any rate, how crucial are these
forms of social interaction in posing policy and decision problems? Are

87
88 A DELICATE BALANCE

other variables (e.g., the scope of a given conflict and the social consequences
it has for individuals and groups) equally or more crucial? For what pur-
poses? What questions do all these variables prompt, and what policy-
making guidelines do they suggest?
I argue for eight theses, all of which reflect the fact that from both a
policy-making and a moral standpoint, what is needed in describing policy
and decision problems is balance. First, policy and decision problems arise in
the midst of various types of social interaction that are not adequately
described by referring simply to conflict or, alternatively, to consensus.
Second, it also matters whether the interaction is rational or nonrational,
that is, whether or not it predominantly involves meaningful dialogue and
critical scrutiny. Third, given this additional variable, social interaction can
range from predominantly conflictive and nonrational, through predomi-
nantly conflictive but rational, to predominantly consensual, which can also
be rational or nonrational. Fourth, the specific type of interaction a policy
and decision problem involves is crucial for establishing which social deci-
sion procedures to employ in dealing with the problem. Fifth, the specific
scope of a policy and decision problem is also crucial for establishing which
social decision procedures to employ. Yet, sixth, none of these is individual-
ly or jointly sufficient for establishing how urgent it is to do something
about the problem. Seventh, crucial for assessing this urgency is the com-
bination of the social scope of interaction—that is, whether it is local,
regional, national, international, or global—and the social consequences of
this interaction—that is, whether this interaction harms individuals or dis-
rupts groups and, if so, how much. Eighth, the more urgent a policy-making
problem that predominantly involves nonrational interaction (e.g., one
posed by military oppression), the more applicable and, arguably, more
morally justified are social decision procedures that bypass meaningful
dialogue such as civil disobedience, external sanctions, and, in certain cases,
force. This latter thesis also brings out the policy-making significance of all
the above features, which has already been evidenced by the various cases
discussed in previous essays and will be reflected by the taxonomy I will sketch.
As a by-product of my main discussion, I explain in some detail various
exaggerations in traditional conflict and consensus models. I also mention
limitations of such theories as ethnomethodology, phenomenology, and
exchange theory, which tend to focus on the microlevel of social life.

SOME GAUTIONARY REMARKS

ABOUT THE TAXONOMY’S PURPOSES
AND SIGNIFIGANGCE
The essay’s theses and the taxonomy they involve should be useful to
policymakers concerned with engaging in policy-making in a morally sensi-
 A Delicate Balance 89

tive and effective fashion. In the ensuing discussion, this is what I mean
when I say that the taxonomy is useful to policymakers. As the book’s
preface and previous essays make plain, I do not mean that it is useful for
promoting the factional or sectarian aims of this or that policymaker, or of
this or that group of a given policymaker’s liking.
As I argued at length in the previous essays, an exclusive concern with
such aims is both a recipe for policy-making disaster and morally objection-
able. Hence, the position I am taking is in conflict with the cynical approach
suggested by conflict theories, according to which every policy-making
motive is egoistic or sectarian, and moral considerations are a mere matter of
ideology. My position is also in conflict with consensus theories, which take
consensus to be a touchstone of social desirability. As I will argue later, from
a moral standpoint, consensus is sometimes unjustified.
The book’s preface and previous essays make plain that this book is
concerned with policy-making—a characteristically forward-looking activ-
ity. It is not designed to help explain or pass judgment on social change, its
history, or any of its stages. Though these are intellectually valid enterprises,
and their results are relevant to the present study, such studies are primarily
backward looking.
To say, as I do in this essay, that, in order to establish the urgency of
policy-making problems, it is crucial to focus on their social scope and social
consequences, is not to say that these suffice to solve the problems. Indeed,
in order to deal with the problems soundly, one must establish which type of
social interaction is predominantly involved in the situation posing the
problems. Without doing this, one cannot establish which social decision
procedures are likely to be effective in dealing with the problems. More
specifically, in order to select effective social decision procedures, one needs
to establish whether the social interaction involved in a given problem is
primarily conflictive or consensual and whether it primarily involves
meaningful dialogue and appeal to reasons.
Of course, after having established all this, a crucial moral question still
remains: What policies, decisions, and social decision procedures are per-
missible in dealing with specifiable policy problems? Since this essay does
not address this question, it does not attempt to provide complete criteria for
finding morally sensitive solutions to policy-making problems. Essay 8 will
do this, subject to the various qualifications formulated in previous essays
and partly systematized in the current one. The present essay is a systematic
prolegomenon to such a task; this is its point and that of the taxonomy it
formulates. Its justification is obvious: A sound moral assessment of policies
and decisions depends on the establishment of a morally sensitive classifica-
tion of the problems that the policies and decisions address.
The previous essays have provided a variety of descriptions and examples
of policy-making problems and discussed their levels. The present essay
90 A DELICATE BALANCE

aims at outlining a taxonomy of the problems in a manner that reflects those

descriptions, examples, and discussions.
In this connection, a further point of the taxonomy and this essay is to
help clarify how the crucial components of policy and decision problems—
not the least of which is their scope—are frequently ignored both in ethical
and in policy-making discussions and theories.
ABOUT THE ESSAY’S METHOD
The method this essay uses was previously discussed concerning the book
as a whole. It has been employed in both philosophy and social process
studies and consists in merging description and argument. That is, it involves
describing a number of cases or observations to exemplify categories and
classifications, and then using the same or similar cases or observations as
evidence for the utility or accuracy of the categories and classifications.°
This method may cause impatience among both philosophers and social
scientists. Philosophers, eager to reach the thick of philosophical arguments,
may find it too sketchy and argue that it fails to address in a useful manner
the moral issues it purportedly classifies. Social scientists, eager to deal
empirically and in great detail with particular cases, may find it too theoret-
ical. In response, I can only say that a sound moral assessment of policies
and decisions depends on the establishment of a morally sensitive classifica-
tion of the problems that the policies and decisions address. The present
essay aims at outlining this classification.
One might object, however, that the search for such classifications is the
type of study social scientists—not philosophers—would pursue. But this
objection is mistaken. Hypotheses and theories in moral philosophy, espe-
cially those concerned with policy-making, are significally confirmed or discon-
firmed through their applications. Hence, a concern with cases and observa-
tions, and the taxonomy issuing from them, is philosophically crucial.
As for the impatience from a social science standpoint, the taxonomy this
essay formulates should prove useful in structuring the enormous body of
available case studies in a manner readily applicable to policy- and decision-
making. This meets a policy-making as well as a scientific need. Without
such a taxonomy, the results of these studies remain largely unstructured
data rather than a body of knowledge applicable to new policy and decision
cases. And with inadequate categories and classifications, the applications to
policy-making are questionable.
To be sure, taxonomies exist in both social science and philosophy. But
their purpose has been primarily geared to the study of social change, its
history, and stages, not to the moral assessment of policies and decisions. In
addition, when concerned with policy-making, various existing categories
and classifications are incomplete and, at times, slanted toward a conflict or,
 A Delicate Balance 91

alternatively, a consensus model of society. Hence, there is a need for this

essay’s task.
GONSEQUENTIALIST OR DEONTOLOGIGAL?
AN OPEN QUESTION
To say that the social consequences of a conflictive (or consensual) type of
social interaction contribute to pose policy and decision problems is not to
take a consequentialist position. It is not to say that policies and decisions
aimed at addressing problems should be evaluated on the basis of the
desirability or undesirability of their consequences alone, if at all. They
could, without inconsistency, be assessed on the basis of principles of justice
or other deontological notions.
No doubt, policymakers doing their job have to address the fact that a
certain type of social interaction (e.g., the abortion controversy) has con-
sequences for society and individuals. But this is not to say that policymak-
ers should address this fact because, otherwise, undesirable consequences
would follow. They could be required to address it because of deontological
considerations. One such consideration is the fact that, in some cases,
policymakers took an oath of office and the duties of that office include that
obligation. Another consideration is the fact that the said interaction may
involve the violation of individual rights or, at the level of groups, under-
mine the conditions for the applicability of individual rights.
Alternatively, policy-making need not be based on these or any other
deontological reasons but, instead, on the previously mentioned consequen-
tialist reasons. Accordingly, this essay leaves open the possibility of relying
only on deontological reasons, only on consequentialist ones, or on a
combination of both. My concern here is simply to sketch categories and
classification criteria—a taxonomy for characterizing policy and decision
problems in a manner that makes room for morally sensitive, yet effective,
policy-making.

THE GONSENSUS-GONFLICT DEBATE

Opposite views and attitudes about social conflict have been displayed in
recurrent debates in both philosophy and social science. In 1958, for exam-
ple, Ralf Dahrendorf spearheaded an attack on the consensus model associ-
ated with functionalism:
As with change, we have grown accustomed to look for special causes or
circumstances whenever we encounter conflict; but . . . a complete turn is
necessary in our thinking. Not the presence, but the absence of conflict is
surprising and abnormal.*
92 -A DELICATE BALANCE

Not long afterwards, in a book coedited by Talcott Parsons, the leading

functionalist at the time, Edward Shils, wrote in one of the essays:
Modern society, especially in its latest phase, is characteristically a consen-
sual society.
The debate raged for some years. In 1968, Robin Williams pointed out the
simplistic exaggerations in Dahrendorf’s and Shils’s views:
Actual societies are held together by consensus, by interdependence, by
sociability, and by coercion. The actual job is to show how actual social
structures and processes operating in these ways can be predicted and
explained.®
An analogous position was taken by the functionalist Robert Merton:
It is not enough to refer to the “institutions” as though they were all
uniformly supported by all groups or strata in the society. Unless sys-
tematic consideration is given to the degree of support of particular
institutions by specific groups we shall overlook the important place of
power in society.”
Shortly after these remarks were made, the consensus-conflict debate in
sociology began to decline.* At the same time, studies of conflict in social
organizations developed, but some areas were left largely untouched.’
As I argue next, there were good reasons to put aside the consensus-
conflict debate in the manner in which it had been formulated. Yet theoretic-
al discussions in the social sciences shifted their focus in a manner that
amounted to throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Some significant
questions were not even asked, for example: What are the varieties, signi-
ficance, and limits of social conflict and consensus for the assessment of
policies and decisions? To address questions such as this, one needs to go
beyond the currently predominant concerns of ethnomethodology, phe-
nomenology, exchange theory, and any other studies that tend to focus on
the microlevel of social life. I turn to some of these largely forgotten
questions in the ensuing discussion.

GONSENSUS SITUATIONS: A BLIND SPOT

IN THE GONFLIGT MODEL
Some policy-making problems cannot be interpreted in conflictual terms
without overstepping the bounds of common sense and the constraints of
observation. Consider the problem of whether foreigners visiting the United
States should be allowed free entrance to national parks. Or consider the
problem of determining the number of commemorative stamps to be issued
in a given year. Ordinarily, although cases of this type may not involve
 A Delicate Balance 93

unanimity, they rarely involve conflict. Consensus is predominant, and the

problems can be addressed simply by discussion of merits.
One might object that these cases involve hidden conflict. To say this,
however, is to fly in the face of perfectly good evidence and common sense
and, at the very least, calls for argument. But no such argument is given, and
until a sound one is given, the hidden-conflict view will remain mere
speculation.
In response, one might attempt to shift the burden of proof by arguing,
along the lines of Dahrendorf’s previously mentioned statement, that “the
absence of conflict is surprising and abnormal.”'° But this response would
beg the question. Even if we grant that the absence of conflict is surprising
and abnormal because conflict is frequent, it does not follow that there are
no significant cases involving little or no conflict. One might as well argue
that since air is common where we normally live, the absence of air—say, at
high altitudes—is surprising and abnormal and, therefore, there is no such
thing as situations in which air is absent. Such cases as those mentioned in
the first paragraph of this section provide good reason to conclude that the
wholesale conflict model is an exaggeration. Accordingly, any policy-
making positions that presuppose it (e.g., some Marxist positions as well as,
arguably, Schumpeter’s market version of social choice theory) are flawed."
In defense of the conflict model, one might grant that consensus situations
are theoretically significant because they make plain the simplistic nature of
conflict models, but ask: Are they practically and morally significant? The
answer is that they are practically significant because they help establish that,
however infrequent, consensus is not entirely unattainable in the real world.
And this, in turn, makes them morally significant. Let us see why.
Since consensus is not entirely unattainable, it is not entirely relegated to
the realm of unrealistic moral ideals. Indeed, it often exists and is sought
among small groups such as families, Quaker groups, and even a few
philosophy departments. In addition, it can arguably be said that consensus
exists across entire societies concerning such things as humanitarian aid to
victims of natural calamities (e.g., floods and earthquakes) and Red Cross aid
to victims of some human activities, such as wars.
Hence, it is sometimes realistic, and therefore morally sensitive, to recog-
nize the existence of consensus in assessing policy-making. In addition, it is
realistic, hence morally sensitive, to recognize those situations in which,
though not existent, consensus is attainable. These points are crucial for
avoiding moral cynicism. Indeed, the alternative—unrealistic, wholesale
denial of consensus—leaves the door wide open to the worst excesses of
realpolitik.
It is also obvious, however, that some policy-making problems concern
highly conflictive situations. Think, for example, of those concerning
94 A DELICATE BALANCE

abortion, preferential treatment, and environmental deterioration. Hence, a

wholesale consensus model is equally exaggerated, and my first thesis fol-
lows: Policy and decision problems arise in the midst of various types of
social interaction not adequately described by simply referring to conflict or,
alternatively, to consensus.

UNGRITIGAL AGQUIESGENGE OR GRITIGAL AGGEPTANGE

The complexities of actual policy-making situations go deeper than some-
times primarily involving conflict and other times primarily involving con-
sensus. Let us first focus on consensus.
There is a further reason why consensus is morally significant in policy-
making: Consensus is not always a good thing. Consensus is sometimes
good, or at least morally defensible, when it has been reached through an
open, critical process of reasoning and exchange of opinions. No doubt, the
views reached through consensus may still be false, and the consensus
reached may be weak. It may be merely an excessively tentative, uncon-
vinced, and hesitant willingness to go along with certain views. Whatever its
shortcomings, however, this form of consensus is morally defensible, be-
cause appeals to reason and meaningful dialogue have been instrumental in
reaching it, and there is room for correcting current views through further
appeals to reason and meaningful dialogue.
In other cases, consensus may be morally questionable if not outright
objectionable. It may be based not on reason and critical scrutiny but merely
on fear, blind faith, unreflectiveness, sheer tenacity, or many other varieties
of unreason. No doubt, the views thus reached may happen to be true, and
the circumstances (e.g., confusing evidence, together with the urgent need to
reach consensus) may justify the manner in which consensus was reached.
However, there is a social cost involved: inflexibility, imperviousness to
reasoned-out social change, generalized unreflective acquiescence. This
prompts the morally valid question: Is such a consensus justified? The fact
that this question is morally valid is evidence that the said consensus is
morally questionable, that it is open to challenge and in need of justification
from a moral standpoint.
Further, if the answer turns out to be that the circumstances did not
justify reaching consensus in such a nonrational manner, then the consensus
thus reached, even if the opinions on which there is consensus are true,
would be morally objectionable. Regardless of whether a given form of
consensus is morally defensible, the mere fact that it may or may not be so
indicates that it is significant for morally sensitive policy-making. Analo-
gously, it is morally crucial to face up to the varieties, in both nature and
moral significance, of those policy-making situations that involve conflict.
 A Delicate Balance 95

CONTROVERSIES AND GONFRONTATIONS

A controversy (e.g., the preferential treatment controversy) is a social con-
flict that involves sharp differences of opinions or conflicts of demands. Yet,
however heated these may be, there is significant room for the use of reason
and meaningful dialogue between those whose opinions or demands are
opposed. That is, such things as manipulation, threats, and the use of
sanctions or force may be present, but they are not predominant. Were they
predominant, one would be faced with a confrontation (e.g., a conspiracy, a
violent strike, or a war), and negotiation or discussion of merits would have
little, if any, effect on the situation. That is, negotiation and discussion of
merits, which involve appeals to reason and meaningful dialogue, are pre-
dominant in controversies and secondary, if at all present, in confrontations.
Hence, confrontations, like controversies, are social conflicts, but they differ
from controversies in the degree to which appeals to reason and meaningful
dialogue play a role in them.
Accordingly, social decision procedures that center on appeals to reason
and meaningful dialogue have little, if any, application in confrontational
situations. When dealing with confrontations, procedures that bypass
appeals to reason and meaningful dialogue are more likely to be effective,
which does not mean that just any of them is therefore justified. The features
of the situation are crucial for establishing which procedure to use; but the
justified ones will be among those that are effective. Otherwise, policy-
making would not be in accordance with its practical aim of doing some-
thing about a situation.
The facts that there are two crucial types of conflict, that there are two
crucial types of consensus, and that different social decision procedures are
applicable in each type of case serve to establish this essay’s second, third,
and fourth theses. The second thesis is that, in morally and politically
characterizing a situation that prompts a policy-making problem, whether it
involves predominantly conflict or consensus is not the only consideration;
whether the interaction is rational or nonrational, also matters. The third
thesis is that, given this additional variable, social interaction can range from
predominantly conflictive and nonrational, through predominantly conflic-
tive but rational, to predominantly consensual, which can be rational or
nonrational. The fourth thesis says that the specific type of interaction
involved is crucial for establishing which social decision procedures to
employ in dealing with the problem.
96 A DELICATE BALANCE

MAGROSOGIETAL MATTERS: A FORSAKEN

GONGERN IN SOGIOLOGIGAL STUDIES
The features of policy problems these theses describe, however, are not
sufficient to establish how urgent it is to do something about a problem.
Also crucial are the social scope of interaction, and its social consequences.
Yet these, as well as the various types of consensus and conflict, are largely
ignored in many current social studies.
As Thomas J. Bernard states in The Consensus-Conflict Debate, the
“criticisms that conflict theory raised against functionalism have generally
been sustained, and now have entered into the mainstream of sociological
thinking.”’’* Yet, as he also says,
conflict theory has not assumed a major role in academic sociology;
rather, attention has shifted to new topics that are largely unrelated to
either consensus or conflict theories— ethnomethodology, phenomenolo-
gy» exchange theory, and other theories... that tend to focus on the
“microsociological” world of everyday life, rather than on “macroso-
ciological” phenomena such as social structure and process.'°
From a policy-making standpoint, this situation is unfortunate. Many
significant policy and decision problems—from those about abortion,
through those concerning the ozone layer or the greenhouse effect, to those
posed by the many ongoing regional wars—arise at the macrosocietal level.
And microsociological studies are of little help concerning them. In addi-
tion, as previously stated, the results of such microsociological case studies
remain largely unstructured data, not a body of knowledge applicable to
new policy and decision cases.
This is not to say that microsociological studies are without merit. On the
contrary. But they are of little use in the moral evaluation of policies and
decisions meant to address problems at the macrosocietal level. Hence,
wisdom suggests that balance and structure be restored. The ensuing discus-
sion is meant to contribute to attaining these things.

MAGROSOGIETAL VS. MIGROSOGIETAL:

A SIGNIFIGANT MATTER OF SGOPE
To say that a situation is macrosocietal is to say that it affects one or more
societies or large societal sectors, such as business and the scientific com-
munity. That is, it is not limited to the microlevel of everyday individual
lives, localities, or minor regions. This distinction is analogous to that between
microeconomics and macroeconomics in economic theory.'* As for other social
sciences, they draw the distinction but do not all currently focus on the
macrosocietal level. For example, much of current sociology does not.
 A Delicate Balance 97

An analogous development can be found in moral philosophy. A distinc-

tion between the macrolevel and the microlevel of social life has been drawn,
and the significance of macrosocietal facts (e.g., individual freedom and
responsibility) has been discussed.'° Yet, during the twentieth century,
much emphasis has been placed on individual action, which takes place at the
microsocietal level. To be sure, there is now a greater readiness, if not a
trend, to emphasize policy matters in engineering ethics, technology ethics,
and science and society studies.'® And health care ethics, with an emphasis
on the entire health care system and all those involved in it, is replacing
medical ethics, with its exclusive emphasis on the physician-patient rela-
tionship and the no doubt valid problems of conduct it prompts. However,
this growing emphasis on policy is unlikely to bear fruit unless policy
problems that arise at the macrosocietal level (e.g., those posed by volatile
international markets) are distinguished from those that arise at the microso-
cietal level (e.g., the problem of how much money to allocate for education
in a town’s budget). These different types of problems cannot be addressed
realistically, let alone in a morally sensitive manner, with the same type of
policy treatment.
Hence, there is good reason for inferring this essay’s fifth thesis: The
specific scope of a policy and decision problem is crucial for establishing
which social decision procedures to employ in dealing with the problem. For
example, it is feasible to have a referendum to resolve a town’s budgetary
problem, but a referendum would hardly be a realistic way of addressing
international economic policy problems such as those posed by international
market volatility. Indeed, given the highly technical nature of this problem, a
referendum would be a morally questionable way of addressing it.

NONDESTABILIZING VS. DESTABILIZING GONSEQUENGES

Conflicts can be disruptive and, in cases of significant disruption, they can
destabilize a locality, region, social sector, or one or more societies. When a
social conflict is destabilizing it not only inconveniences a lot of people (who
have to deal with the demonstrations and protests involved) but also it tends
to threaten the well-being or very existence of a social group either economi-
cally or politically. In what follows, I focus primarily on destabilization that
takes place at the macrosocietal level. The destabilizing effects range from
such things as poverty leading to widespread discontent, to armed insurrec-
tion or mass migrations. These effects make societies politically or economi-
cally unstable by undermining predictability and cooperation.
DESTABILIZATION AND PREDICTABILITY
Conflicts undermine the predictability of others’ behavior because, at least
in some conflict situations, one has little knowledge of what others will do.
98 A DELICATE BALANCE

This is especially so in or near extreme state-of-nature situations. In such

situations, as Hobbes said, there are no common ways of doing things, and
all one can expect is that others will do what they think is in their own
self-interest.!” But lack of knowledge is not the only source of unpredictabil-
ity. Jon Elster has usefully described cases in which unpredictability results
from having too much knowledge about others, failing to use the knowledge
we have, or being in a situation with no, more than one, or highly unstable
equilibria—that is, states in which no agent has an incentive to behave
differently.'®
DESTABILIZATION AND NONGOOPERATION
Conflicts and noncooperation also undermine societies. Widespread discon-
tent and mass migrations—think, for example, of the East Germans’ 1989
exodus to West Germany—constitute a situation in which individuals and
groups emphasize their own concerns to the detriment of those of others. For
example, in the 1989 migration, the actions of individuals or groups created
externalities that were not better for all—at least not better for West German
workers who faced increased competition for jobs. Such a situation is not
extreme but, nonetheless, is a bit closer than before to the state of nature
Hobbes described as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”??

ASSESSING URGENGY
The preceding discussion makes plain that there is a range of situations that
vary by type of interaction, scope, and degree of social disruption and that
these variations are morally and politically significant. The disruption they
cause may take the form of violations of individual rights or political or
economic disruption, which may amount to destabilization of entire groups,
social sectors, or societies. Simply focusing on the type of interaction, however,
tells us nothing about how urgent it is to find a solution. Urgency depends on
the degree of social disruption and the extent and nature of individual rights
violations the situation involves. That is, the assessment of urgency depends
partly on the scope of the problem, but crucially on the consequences for the
individuals and groups affected. Does the conflict, for example, tend to destabil-
ize One Or more societies, as war would? Does it tend to undermine programs in
whose absence societies or large social sectors would be disrupted and their
members undergo intolerable hardships?
The points just made are good reasons for inferring theses six and seven:
Neither the type of social interaction nor the scope of the policy-making
problem is individually or jointly sufficient for establishing how urgent it is
to do something about the problem. Crucial for assessing this urgency is the
combination of the social scope of interaction—whether it is local, regional,
national, international, or global—and the social consequences of this
 A Delicate Balance 99

interaction—that is, whether this interaction harms individuals or disrupts

groups and, if so, how much. Let us examine some salient cases that clarify
and provide evidence for the latter points and set the stage for establishing
this essay’s last thesis.

SOME SALIENT GASES

GASE 1. ABORTION AS POPULATION GONTROL:
A NONDESTABILIZING GONTROVERSY
In August 1984 at the Mexico City United Nations International Confer-
ence on Population, the U.S. delegation prompted controversy at home and
abroad by announcing that it would withhold aid from organizations that
promoted abortions, thus endangering the funds the United States provided
to the International Planned Parenthood Federation through the United
States Agency for International Development.*° The demand for assurances
that abortion programs would not be promoted was met to the U.S. delega-
tion’s satisfaction, and a conference report was adopted, but not without
further controversy and a two-and-a-half-hour debate about the propriety
of including an Arab-supported resolution that implicitly condemned Israeli
settlements on the West Bank of the Jordan River.?!
The type of social interaction involved in this case was a controversy.
However heated and loaded with political manipulation, the conflict made
predominant room for appeals to reason and meaningful dialogue. It may
have been the case that no amount of reasonable dialogue would have
changed the Reagan administration’s position on the matter, but this is
sheer speculation. And even if it were true, it does not mean that reason and
meaningful dialogue had only a secondary role in the dialogue. Indeed,
whatever changes took place in the other participants’ positions were not
primarily the result of threats or the use of force, but of bargaining, which
significantly involved the use of reason and meaningful dialogue.
The fact that the conflict was a controversy, however, provides no
grounds for assessing how urgent it was to do something about it. The
controversy might have had no significant effects. To establish whether it
would have had them, one has to examine the conflict’s scope and likely
consequences. As for its scope, it was macrosocietal, since it affected various
societies. But how serious were its likely social consequences?
The conflict would appear not to have destabilized any society or large
social sectors, though it no doubt affected the societies targeted by the policy
decision. To come to terms with it, these societies had to adapt to the new
situation. The controversy also had consequences for individuals, because it
resulted in an agreement that led to changes in the countries involved, and
these changes affected their inhabitants.
100 “A-DELICATE BALANCE

These, however, were consequences of agreeing to the U.S. demands, not

consequences that made it urgent to do something about the controversy the
United States had started. What created this urgency was, primarily, the
likely consequence that, if the demands were not met and the controversy
continued unsettled, the funds the United States provided to the Interna-
tional Planned Parenthood Federation through the United States Agency for
International Development would have been endangered.
The consequences that were likely to result from the controversy itself for
both individuals and society were morally significant. In general, conse-
quences such as these, and their weight relative to each other, crucially
matter in establishing the urgency of doing something about the situation. In
addition, in order to establish how to deal with the situation, it is morally
and politically crucial to establish what type of conflict is leading to such
consequences. Policy-making cannot be effective or morally sensitive—
indeed, it can backfire politically and undermine morality —if a controversy
is mistaken for a confrontation, or vice versa. Hence, since they help clearly
focus on these crucial matters, the distinctions drawn and categories de-
scribed here should be of use in the ethics of policy-making.
GASE 2. NUGLEAR WASTES:
A PARTLY DESTABILIZING GONTROVERSY
In October 1984, controversy broke out in Canyonlands, Utah, over the
then likely prospect that at least one of two nearby sites would be selected,
in accordance with the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, to store radioactive
wastes expected to remain toxic for at least a hundred centuries.”” In Decem-
ber 1984, the Energy Department picked sites in Texas, Nevada, and
Washington as the leading candidates to be the United States’ first perma-
nent burial ground for nuclear waste, but it immediately ran into legal and
political opposition and was submerged in controversy—a conflict still
raging years later.”
The type of social interaction in this case is, like in the previous one, a
controversy. Though its scope is macrosocietal, it does not go beyond the
national level. The controversy’s consequences, in themselves, are not de-
stabilizing. Yet the nuclear waste controversy is but a moment in the United
States’ nuclear energy controversy. And, as I discuss in Essay 10, the
consequences of this recurrent controversy arguably have included a relative
destabilization of the U.S. nuclear energy industry. In this regard, the policy
situation seems to be different from that in Case 1, since a sizable business
sector is destabilized. And this result is morally significant because indi-
vidual lives—those of nuclear employees who, as a result of this destabiliza-
tion, will probably lose their jobs—are likely to be undermined. These
consequences are crucial for establishing the degree of urgency for dealing
 A Delicate Balance 101

with the problem. So are the health risks the waste would pose for those
living near the sites and the possible correlative violation of their right not to
be made to take avoidable health risks without their participation in the
relevant policy-making process.
In addition, policymakers need to establish how to deal with the problems
posed by the above situation. That is, they need to establish whether to
resolve it through negotiation, mediation, arbitration, a referendum, or
other social decision procedures. In order to establish all these things, it is
crucial to determine what type of social interaction the situation involves. As
discussed, it is a controversy. Hence, though some or other of the social
decision procedures just mentioned may be both effective and morally
sensitive, others would be politically unsound and morally questionable if
not outright impermissible.
For example, given the history of the nuclear energy controversy in the
United States, it would be imprudent to try to settle the matter by decree.
This would lead to a public outcry, if not lawsuits against the agencies
involved. Further, it would be morally questionable and, arguably, imper-
missible for a variety of reasons. One is the fact that such an autocratic
decision would disrupt individual lives, and possibly regions, and further
disrupt the nuclear industry by increasing the controversy. Another is the
fact that individual rights to participation in the nuclear policy-making
process would be violated. Just as, at the time of the American Revolution,
there was no justification for taxation without representation, there is now
no justification for taking public health risks without participation. In any
case, all these considerations are clearly brought into focus by the distinc-
tions and categories this essay develops, which, therefore, are of use in the
ethics of policy-making.
GASE 3. ANIMAL RIGHTS CONFRONTATIONAL ACTIVISM:
NONDESTABILIZING GONFRONTATIONS
In July 1985, scores of animal rights activists occupied the offices of the
National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland, to publicize the plight
of baboons used for research purposes at the University of Pennsylvania’s
Head Injury Clinical Research Center in Philadelphia. They charged that the
research pursued at the Center was inhumane and without scientific merit.
Their evidence was based on sixty hours of videotapes stolen from the lab in
1984 by the underground Animal Liberation Front.** In November 1988, a
bomb was planted near the parking spot used by the chairman of US. Surgical
in Norwalk, Connecticut, because the firm demonstrates its surgical staplers on
about 1,000 anesthetized dogs each year, killing them afterwards.”
In contrast with the previous cases, the conflict involved here is a con-
frontation, not a controversy. That is, the use of reason and meaningful
102 A DELICATE BALANCE

dialogue is not predominant in the social interactions between the activists

and the representatives of the powers that be. This is a significant difference
for the moral assessment of policy and decision, because as long as current
attitudes persist, discussions of merits or simple negotiations are unlikely to
work. Hence, other approaches may be justified. This is a morally significant
aspect of the situation that an excessive emphasis on consensus is likely to
miss, but the distinctions and categories in this essay easily bring it out.
In addition, though the acts described are somewhat isolated, the con-
flict’s scope reaches the macrosocietal level, since it affects the U.S. science
and technology sector. Concerning its consequences, there is reason to
believe that the conflict has harmed (though hardly destabilized) science and
technology in the United States. This is a consideration relevant for estab-
lishing how urgent it is to address the problem. An overall judgment of
urgency should also establish such things as how far such harm has gone,
how serious it is, and how it harms either nonhumans or the interests of
those who stand up for nonhumans. Finally, in establishing how to deal with
the policy-making problem posed by the situation, the type of social interac-
tion involved—confrontation—is also crucial.
The preceding discussion gives reasons to part company with the pre-
viously mentioned microsociological studies in ethnomethodology, phe-
nomenology, and exchange theory. It also gives reasons to part company
with moral theories that focus exclusively on individuals, the actions they
perform, the obligations or rights they have, and the consequences they under-
go. In contrast with all these, the approach taken here is politically and morally
more helpful. Without disregarding the effects on individuals, it also pays
attention to the macrosocietal aspects and consequences of the situation.

GASE 4. THE IRANIAN GRISIS:

A DESTABILIZING GONFRONTATION
When conflicts bring about or threaten imminently to lead to conse-
quences that amount to states of nature, they are often called crises. For
example, when Iran took U.S. citizens hostage, there was a crisis called ‘“‘the
Iranian crisis.” This was a macrosocietal confrontation that seriously des-
tabilized not just the United States with sudden oil shortages, or Iran with
enormous military pressures, but the world community at large. The crisis
constituted a serious threat to world peace and to the character of the world
community itself.”
In light of the preceding discussion and the fact that the conflict was a
crisis, it would have been a mistake to treat it as a mere controversy or as
involving nondestabilizing consequences at the macrosocietal level. Avoid-
ing these mistakes, of course, does not guarantee success in addressing it. But
it at least points in the right direction by focusing on the conflict as a
 A Delicate Balance 103

macrosocietal confrontation whose very occurrence is destabilizing at that

level. In cases of this type, dialogue characteristically is not meaningful, and
the consequences to individuals and large social sectors or entire societies are
serious. Hence, these situations pose urgent policy-making problems that
are unlikely to be effectively addressed through discussion of merits or
negotiation. Other, more confrontational policy-making approaches—from
economic and political sanctions to combat—are both politically more
realistic and morally more sensitive than less confrontational ones.
No doubt, negotiated solutions are preferable if they are possible. But in
cases of this type, other, more drastic policy approaches are often necessary
before meaningful negotiations are possible. These crucial political and
moral matters are discussed in some detail in Essay 12. At any rate, the
taxonomy here developed helps focus on them.
CASE 5. THE BHOPAL GONTROVERSY:
A MIGROSOGIETAL, YET INTERNATIONAL, GONFLICT
In February 1989, Union Carbide and the Indian government reached a
settlement whereby Union Carbide agreed to pay $470 million for the 1984
Bhopal methyl isocyanate leak that killed more than 3,300 people and
injured tens of thousands. This settlement sparked a controversy on the
grounds that the victims had been betrayed.”
Although this controversy is international and involves legal actions
taken under two legal systems, it does not affect entire societies or societal
sectors. It would appear to be microsocietal, that is, primarily having to do
with the everyday lives of individuals or small social units such as towns
and firms.
As for its consequences, the conflict over Bhopal’s legal settlement has
harmed the victims. They received little or no economic compensation or
access to adequate health care. Whatever they did receive came too late for
many of them. This is a good reason to redirect strategies away from seeking
redress through courts of law in similar cases. Although it was urgent to do
something about the victims and the conflict, the court action was inadequate
for helping the victims and helped increase the conflict unnecessarily. Here, as
in the other cases discussed in this essay, the taxonomy proposed helps redirect
attention to these politically significant and morally sensitive matters.
GASE 6. ARGENTINA’S DIRTY WAR: POWER ELITES
AND MAGROSOGIETALLY DESTABILIZING GONFLICTS
The preceding cases are not meant to imply that conflicts posing policy
problems at the macrosocietal level must necessarily be widespread—only
that the scope of their effect must be. In fact, there are macrosocietal policy
and decision problems posed by conflicts between only a few, but highly
influential, people or groups. These are power elite conflicts, such as the one
104 A DELICATE BALANCE

that took place in Argentina mostly between 1974 and 1983. It was a conflict
between a number of military officers actively supported by a few small
extreme right groups and the constitutionally elected though widely discred-
ited government of President Isabel Perén. A military takeover was staged,
President Perén was arrested, and, beginning on March 24, 1976, military
officers and their extremist supporters carried out their extermination poli-
cies against a great number of people.
Extermination policies were, no doubt, morally impermissible when deal-
ing with active opponents to the military regime. But the policies went far
beyond that, on the assumption that the goal of exterminating the opposi-
tion justified the cost of eliminating people who might turn out to be
innocent. As a result, a great number of Argentines, among them many
bystanders caught off guard, were, as the phrase went, “‘taken out of socie-
” The infamous “dirty war” had begun.
A large societal sector in Argentina—indeed, the society as a whole—
experienced the consequences of the conflict. The military government’s
policies left somewhere between 9,000 and 30,000 people tortured and killed
(the official word was “‘disappeared’’), plus many others tortured or exiled
or both. They also led to fraudulent acquisition of property through repres-
sion, a generalized loss of public trust, and, after the South Atlantic armed
conflict with Great Britain and the economic and political chaos it hastened,
the collapse of the regime.”®
These facts leave no doubt that the conflict, though restricted to a small
elite of active participants, posed a macrosocietal policy and decision prob-
lem. It made Argentinian society both politically and economically unstable
and caused widespread harm among individuals. Indeed, it eventually be-
came an extreme form of a macrosocietal policy problem: a macrosocietal
crisis. Hence, it was no doubt urgent to deal with it.
However, as the events that transpired made plain, the thorough gov-
ernmental oppression and terror involved, the nature of Argentinian terri-
tory, and the size and nature of Argentinian armed forces and police made
internal violent resistance unlikely to succeed. Only other confrontational
social decision procedures such as foreign sanctions and citizens’ nonviolent
resistance had a good chance of being politically effective. Arguably, they
also were morally sound and, to some extent, had the desired effect of slowly
forcing the regime to weaken its stand. Finally, the worsening economy and
the South Atlantic war and its aftermath overtook the regime.
The implications discussed concerning this and the previous cases provide
grounds in support of our remaining—the eighth—thesis. It says: The more
urgent a policy-making problem that predominantly involves nonrational
interaction (e.g., that posed by military oppression) is, the more applicable
and, arguably, more morally permissible are social decision procedures that
 A Delicate Balance 105

bypass meaningful dialogue such as civil disobedience, external sanctions,

and, in certain cases, force. This thesis, whose implications will be developed
in the ensuing essays, further brings out the policy-making significance of all
the features of policy problems crucial to our taxonomy.

ASKING POLIGY-MAKING QUESTIONS

BASED ON THIS ESSAY’S TAXONOMY
The main thrust of the preceding discussion is to bring out the moral and
policy-making significance of a number of features found in policy-making
situations. Given their significance, those features prompt a series of policy-
making questions that, for the sake of making politically sound and morally
permissible policy and decisions, policymakers—both official ones and
ordinary individuals in a position to influence policy-making—would do
well to ask:
1. Is the situation predominantly conflictual or consensual?
2. Does the situation predominantly make room for appeals to reason and
meaningful dialogue—that is, is it predominantly rational—or not?
3. Does the situation arise at the macrolevel or microlevel of social life?
4. Is the situation destabilizing of one or more groups—possibly entire
societies—or not?
5. Does the situation involve violations of individual rights and, if so,
what is the nature and extent of these violations?
There are, no doubt, additional questions worth asking. Yet the ones just
formulated are invariably crucial to achieving a politically and morally
sound perspective on the policy-making problems posed by the situations
faced. All of them ought to be asked, though not necessarily in the order in
which I have formulated them. However, the order I chose reflects a manner
in which policy-making problems can more easily be understood in all
their complexity.
People, however well-meaning, often get caught in a policy-making situa-
tion and argue merely about who has the right to what or, alternatively,
what will or will not work. In this manner, they lose perspective. Whenever
this happens, shifting people’s attention to such things as whether the
situation is conflictive or not, and whether it makes room for appeals to
reason and meaningful dialogue or not, helps their understanding of the
problem. This, in turn, puts them in a better position to appreciate the
various features of the problem and assess their relative weight from both a
policy-making and a moral standpoint.
No doubt, such an approach does not guarantee certainty. Nor will it
work in a society (fortunately only an imaginary society) where most people
are idiots, lunatics, crooks, or utterly callous. However, it has a good chance
106. A DELICATESBALANCE

of helping ordinary people in the various types of policy-making situations

that arise in societies as we know them.
The questions just formulated presuppose a taxonomy of policy and
decision problems whose main features are indicated in the flowchart located
on page 107. Each special type of policy-making situation can then be
subdivided into various subtypes. Consider, for example, those that are
nondestabilizing. They include, first, those that primarily involve violations
of individual rights, hence, disrupt individuals. Second, there are those that
primarily disrupt groups, that is, they have undesirable though not cata-
strophic consequences for groups but do not violate individual rights, such
as conflicts about the deficit. Third, there are those that both disrupt groups
and involve violations of individual rights. In a parallel manner, further
specifications are needed in dealing with destabilizing policy-making situa-
tions. For example, some situations destabilize groups that already violated
individual rights; others destabilize groups in which individual rights were
not previously violated and, in destabilizing the groups, they thus under-
mine the conditions for respecting individual rights in these groups. In any
case, a taxonomy such as that here developed suggests various policy-
making guidelines.

SOGIAL DEGISION PROGEDURES AND THE TAXONOMY

OF POLIGY-MAKING PROBLEMS
Those situations that are destabilizing at the macrosocietal level pose prob-
lems that require policy-making that is quite different from that required by
administrative policy or decision problems, such as how to print com-
memorative stamps most economically. In general, which procedures are
suited for dealing with which problems depends on the type of problem. For
example, the 1988 chlorofluorocarbons treaty, however inadequate its re-
quirements (given the extent of ozone-layer depletion disclosed by new
evidence), indicates that, when the threats are planetary, well-established,
and likely to be manageable, confrontations may be avoided. Indeed, discus-
sions of merits coupled with negotiations that focus on everyone’s interests
can lead to a sound policy beginning. This is further supported by recent
commitments by Europe and Japan to provide financial assistance so that
other countries can abide by the 1992 agreements signed by members of the
European Community, and by the weaker Rio de Janeiro Treaty.” Similarly,
negotiation seems to be the central procedure used in dealing with the
internationally disruptive controversy about acid rain between the United
States and Canada.*°
In other types of cases, different procedures may be suitable. An attempt
at insulation is exemplified in the National Institutes of Health’s initial
 A Delicate Balance 107

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108 A DELICATE BALANCE

directive to proceed with fetal research that does not offer incentives for
women to have abortions. This treats the controversy as disruptive of a
societal sector—a significant part of the scientific community —and tries to
circumscribe it. It also tries to contain its consequences for this sector, to
uphold the freedom of inquiry of individual scientists in the group, and to
take the lives of fetuses seriously. Hence, it is morally sensitive in that it pays
attention to the significant moral concerns involved. From a political stand-
point, it is still an open question whether it will succeed despite constraints
introduced by Bush administration officials.*!
In contrast, the Bhopal settlement points out the shortcomings of court
proceedings, negotiation and compromise, and the need for accompanying
emergency arrangements and funds to aid victims of industrial accidents.*?
At any rate, judging by the ongoing increases in litigiousness in the United
States and abroad (despite the recent increase in peaceful superpower rela-
tions), the above or related procedures are not used as often as desirable. The
taxonomy this essay sketched should facilitate their use. It should help keep
a balance—a delicate balance—between the exaggeration of abhorring all
social conflict and that of finding hope for social progress only in conflict,
however irrationally motivated, societally destabilizing, and undermining of
individual rights it might be.
 Dialogue

— I have no doubt that policy and decision problems can be

classified in the manner you describe. However, I am still uncon-
vinced of the utility of such classification.

— Your hesitation puzzles me. I have given a number of reasons

why the taxonomy I formulated would be of use to policymakers
from both a moral and a political standpoint. I have made clear the
policy-making and moral mistakes that can result from treating all
policy and decision problems as confrontational; from treating
them all as posed by controversies or, even worse, as merely admin-
istrative; from treating them all as microlevel problems; and so on.
What else do you think I should have done?

— I believe that, for example, you should have shown when and, if
ever, why macrosocietal consequences override individual rights
and, if so, which rights.

— I will do so in Essay 8. Please be patient. But even if what I say

in the eighth essay turns out to be mistaken, it should not under-
mine the entire taxonomy. The points I have made so far will still
hold. At most, moral evaluation criteria other than those I will
formulate will be needed.

— As I said before, however, your taxonomy tends to multiply

questions to the point of making one dizzy.

— No doubt, it prompts many questions. But what else should be

expected? Social life is not simple. It’s a virtue of my taxonomy that
it brings out the complexities of social life in a manner that helps us
deal with them with a sense of proportion. It’s neither simplistic nor
chaotic.

109
110 DIALOGUE

— You'll grant me, though, that it’s not nearly conceptually eco-
nomical and precise enough to be of use in applying highly abstract
theories.
— True, but as I said, what else should be expected? Neither
political life nor moral life is a simple and precise affair. In being
applicable to them, the taxonomy reflects this fact, which explains
its complexities and imprecisions. If these make it useless for ap-
plying highly abstract theories, too bad for the theories. As I argued
concerning rational choice, decision, game, and social choice
theories, their abstract simplicity and precision make them unrealis-
tic and undermining of morality.

— You realize, however, that many sophisticated philosophers and

social thinkers prefer those simple, precise theories.

— Yes. But what do they have to offer instead: the tyranny of order
at any cost, or the tyranny of disregarding this or that individual or
group in the rush to attain results? There are no morally redeeming
qualities in these approaches. Besides, in the not so long run, all
such approaches tend to lead to so much opposition that they undo
themselves. In contrast, an approach like the one I am proposing, in
which critical scrutiny and interaction are central, has a good chance
of working both morally and politically.

— Not so fast. You grant me, I suppose, that even such an

approach would yield objectionable results if those involved were
idiots, lunatics, crooks, or utterly callous.

— True. Yet, to stay with my line of argument, that case is not

realistic. Indeed, the very notion of a society with primarily such
members may be incoherent. My approach is meant to work in
actual societies, which characteristically involve a mixture of intelli-
gent individuals and idiots, reasonable people and lunatics, morally
good people and crooks, as well as caring and callous people. How
else could you explain the very existence of societies if this mixture
were absent and all or most of their members were unreasonable,
unintelligent, crooks, or callous?

— I see your point. The problem is that even with the mixture of
good and bad qualities you claim to be present in actual societies,
your approach may sometimes yield questionable results.
 Dialogue 111

— Granted. But in actual policy-making circumstances, these re-

sults are invariably open to (and, given the population’s makeup,
subjected to) further criticism and testing through social interaction.
This makes room for correcting them and, eventually, is likely to
lead to both politically sound and morally permissible policies and
decisions.

— Such corrections, however, cannot wait forever. As Lord

Keynes said, in the long run, we are all dead.

— True. As I indicated, my approach is meant to be sensitive to this

fact. However, it is not meant to eliminate all chances of human
error or wrongdoing. Such an aim would be foolish because it is
unrealistic.

— Still, I have no idea of how your approach would make room for
critical scrutiny and social interaction.

— I’m glad you asked. These questions bring us to the topic of my

next essay.
8 Practical Equity:
Dealing with the
Varieties of Policy
and Decision Problems

The excesses of social order always limit individual freedoms, if not well-
being. Those of social disorder always limit well-being, if not individual
freedoms. As a matter of both moral and political wisdom, policy-making is
invariably faced with finding a politically sound and morally permissible
way between these and any other excesses. Hence, the question I will
address in this essay arises: What criteria can help us establish which policies
and decisions are both politically sound and morally permissible in the
actual world of politics? My aim is to specify conditions under which
policies and policy-making decisions are permissible given existing time
constraints; political pressures; economic, technological, and other relevant
conditions; the people involved; the information they can be expected to have
at decision-making time; and the moral and political implications of the
policies or decisions. | am not concerned with specifying features that make
policies or policy-making decisions politically sound and morally permissi-
ble with hindsight. Nor do I specify what these features would be in ideal
conditions, independent of the said circumstances.
Although I am not concerned with specifying these features, this does not
mean that they cannot be specified. Nor does it mean that my account is
incompatible with any such specification, or that it makes it redundant. I am
simply addressing the entirely different problem of how to go about engag-
ing in making politically sound and morally permissible policy and decisions
in the actual political world.
In this world, ideal or nearly ideal conditions that are largely devoid of
scarcity, conflict, and irrationality sometimes develop. Frequently, however,
one or more conditions typically used to characterize ideal societies are
absent. First, scarcity is often worse than moderate. Second, conditions are
often so harsh that all policy-making alternatives are relatively undesirable

112
 Practical Equity 113
and, in some cases, tragically catastrophic. Third, people often do not
respect rights or comply with principles of justice or even with utilitarian
principles. Fourth, current social arrangements, whose change would cause
significant loss, harm, or serious general deprivation to some people, are
often the result of previous injustices to which the said people are not always
accomplices.’ As the discussions in previous essays indicate, the hypotheses
I formulate in answer to the above question are intended to help address
situations such as those just described in all their variety.
In doing so, the hypotheses will rely on the taxonomy formulated in
Essay 7, which made plain that sensitivity to the varieties of policy and
decision problems is crucial. For example, it matters whether a given prob-
lem is prompted by a societally destabilizing confrontation, as in Iraq’s
invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1990, or by a merely administrative,
nonconflictual matter, as in trying to establish how many commemorative
stamps to issue in a given year. Although the above question can be asked
regarding problems of each type, this essay focuses mainly, though not
exclusively, on policy and decision problems that arise at the macrosocietal
level. That is, I concentrate on problems that affect large social sectors (e.g.,
agribusiness or the scientific community) or entire societies.”
All but one of the hypotheses I formulate and propose as policy-making
guidelines apply to policies and decisions meant to address problems of
specific types. In addition, as an upshot of my discussion, I formulate and
provide reasons in support of an overall hypothesis, the principle of practical
equity. Together, these hypotheses are a main component of a satisficing
theory in the sense introduced by Herbert Simon and discussed in previous
essays. That is, they are not meant to characterize absolute rights. Nor do
they formulate, or serve as a basis for formulating, fixed, sub specie aeterni-
tatis moral rights, obligations, laws, or principles such as those of justice or
of utility. Nor, indeed, are the essay’s hypotheses presumed to be definitive
themselves. Rather, they are the main components of a theory according to
which the freedoms and well-being to be sought are not fixed, though they
normally involve meeting a minimum standard of provisions. The main
purpose of the said hypotheses is to help us, at least temporarily, deal with
those matters that are not fixed in a politically sound and morally permissi-
ble way.’ A crucial way in which they help is by suggesting the appropriate
moral questions to ask in specific policy-making situations. I formulate
some of these questions (which build on those formulated in Essay 7) in the
remainder of the essay. More detailed questions are suggested by the
hypotheses themselves.
Though I am primarily concerned with the moral and political assessment
of policies and decisions for dealing with macrosocietal problems, I do not
entirely disregard problems affecting only individuals or small groups such
114 PRACTICAL EQUITY

as towns or localities. After all, the policies and decisions addressing these
microsocietal problems are neither politically nor morally irrelevant or
insignificant. Hence, the hypotheses I formulate are meant to be sensitive to
how policies and decisions affect individuals; the relations between them;
those between individuals and the small groups, societal sectors, or societies
affected; and those between the social groups, societal sectors, and societies
themselves.
These relations characteristically involve matters of fairness, desert, and
well-being, which are covered by the various senses, both moral and legal, of
the term equity.* This is why equity is used in the overall hypothesis I
formulate. As for the use of practical, it reflects the recognition that eco-
nomic, technological, political, and moral reality sets constraints on which
policies and decisions are likely to be both feasible and effective. As indi-
cated, I am concerned with assessing policies and decisions that fall within
the scope of these constraints, for if they do not, they have little chance of
being applicable or doing any good in the real world.

LIMITING GONDITIONS VS. SINGLE-SOLUTION GRITERIA

In accordance with the purposes just discussed, the hypotheses I formulate
are intended to describe limiting conditions for assessing policies and deci-
sions. In other words, they are meant to work as filters through which any
politically sound and morally permissible policy and decisions to which they
apply must pass. Of course, more than one alternative policy or decision
may satisfy such limiting conditions. In this case, according to the hypoth-
eses, each is permissible.
One might, however, insist on establishing which alternative is the only
permissible one. The hypotheses I formulate may, but need not, meet this
demand. Whether they do depends on the facts of the case. It may turn out
that for a given policy problem, only one policy solution satisfies the criteria
the relevant hypothesis formulates. But there is no logical, political, or moral
reason why this should be so. Indeed, single-solution requirements amount
to policy-making simplicity and, ethically, to a lack of realism and intoler-
ance if not to self-defeating perfectionism.
I should add that single-solution requirements often go hand in hand with
the requirement that freedoms, well-being, or some combination of these be
maximized. Such a requirement, however, has the effect of turning the best
that can be done into a duty. But if it is a duty, then nothing can be done that
is beyond the call of duty. This flies in the face of ordinary moral thinking as
well as political and moral wisdom. First, people ordinarily think that some
decisions, including policy-making decisions, are admirable because they go
beyond what is required. For example, a person without dependents to look
 Practical Equity 115
after might leave a very successful and well-remunerated career at a financial
institution in order to become director of a nonprofit housing-related orga-
nization where the pay is much less and the hours worse, simply because he
or she wants to help improve housing options for those in need.
Second, the single-solution requirement goes against political and moral
wisdom, for it entails that any policy and decision that falls short of opti-
mization is both politically unsound and morally wrong. But most, if not all,
actual policies and decisions will fail to be optimizing. As a result, the said
requirement can only increase cynicism about the prospects for politics and
morals, thereby undermining both. And since, presumably, it is meant to
improve both politics and morality, it is but another instance of self-
defeating perfectionism. Hence, in order to remain sensitive to the turns and
twists of policy-making reality, and the scope and flexibility of the morally
permissible, the hypotheses I formulate in this essay are of the limiting
conditions (not the single-solution, let alone optimization) type.

THE ROLE OF GRITIGAL SGRUTINY AND OTHER

DECISION PROGEDURES IN POLICY-MAKING
PRIMARILY ADMINISTRATIVE SITUATIONS
Consider the policy and decision problems formulated by the following
questions: What yearly deadlines should exist for deciding what com-
memorative stamps to issue? What commemorative stamps should there be?
Should foreigners visiting our country be allowed free entrance to its nation-
al parks? These problems arise at the macrosocietal level, in situations
involving little or no societal disruption, and are typically addressed through
meaningful dialogue and appeal to reasons.
Ordinarily, dealing with such policy problems as these in a sound manner
need not limit the freedoms or well-being of those likely to be affected. In
fact, the situation is primarily administrative. If any controversy arises
concerning policies for dealing with the problems, it typically concerns the
most effective way of using available means for purposes that are hardly
questioned. It infrequently, if ever, centers on a person’s or group’s forgone,
perhaps desirable, but clearly unneeded extravagant advantages such as the
luxury of being able to buy one of those $40,000 bracelets or one of those
$30,000 watches advertised in the New York Times.
At this primarily administrative end of the spectrum of policy and deci-
sion problems, critical scrutiny and therefore judgment by those likely to be
affected are, as always, relevant. However, critical scrutiny about the pur-
poses of the policies or decisions envisioned is generally unnecessary, be-
cause it is generally known what judgments it will yield. These judgments
will acknowledge that there is a desire for the ends involved, but they will
116 PRACTICA EQUITY

not ordinarily describe the attainment of such ends as crucial. Indeed, the
ends are extravagant, and if anyone expressed a different view on the matter,
it would be an eccentricity and require further argument in its support.
CONTROVERSIES AND EGGENTRIG WANTS AND NEEDS
To take the position just taken is not to deny, however, that within limits,
people are entitled to their extravagances and eccentricities. And, no doubt,
they sometimes have eccentric or even embarrassing wants or even needs.” In
such a situation, even if there is general agreement, consensus, or conformity
about a certain matter, critical scrutiny may nonetheless be necessary. It may
still have to be established in what regard, and to what extent, policies and
decisions should make room for satisfying the wants or needs of the eccen-
tric, the nonconformist, the weird, and even those who, from the standpoint
of personal morality, are morally objectionable. The possibility of satisfying
these wants or needs deserves consideration, at a minimum.
Considering the possibility of satisfying such wants or needs, however,
does not mean that they ought to be satisfied. Nor does it mean that
policy-making measures ought to be taken so that they can be satisfied. My
point is simply that, in the type of situation described, critical scrutiny
involving those likely to be affected or their representatives is both morally
and politically crucial. It is morally crucial because, otherwise, those out of
power (e.g., those who, though living in a democracy, are in the minority)
could simply be disregarded and railroaded into acceptance. It is politically
crucial because of two combined factors. First, though railroading unusual
people into acceptance may seem effective in the short run, it is likely to
breed instability and conflict. After all, the unusual of today have a way of
becoming the commonplace of tomorrow. Second, in the type of situation
described, there is time to seek alternative arrangements that are sufficiently
tolerable to all who are likely to be affected.
Let us consider an example. Among U.S. suburbanites, wearing a medi-
eval helmet while mowing one’s front lawn in full view of neighbors and
passersby would normally be considered eccentric. Suppose someone does
this simply for kicks, or to shock or puzzle the neighbors. It harms no one.
But suppose that the neighbors, bothered by the odd sight, press for a local
ordinance outlawing the eccentric behavior. The eccentric neighbor might
not consider wearing the helmet crucial, but he or she might consider the
freedom to wear the helmet crucial and find it intolerable not to be able to enjoy
such a freedom, however frivolous it might be. So it deserves consideration.
From the standpoint of arguing the merits of the case, the neighbors or
their representatives must try to show that the eccentric’s reason for desiring
such a freedom is not as strong as their reason for finding his wearing of the
helmet intolerable. In other words, they need to show that their finding it
 Practical Equity 117
intolerable is justified and that their reason is stronger than the eccentric’s
reason for wanting the freedom to wear the helmet. To establish this, they
might try such things as showing that the neighbor’s behavior decreased the
value of their homes or scared their young children. Yet these considerations
would be unconvincing.
Of course, the matter would not thereby be definitely settled. Critical
scrutiny would still be relevant in dealing with the conformist neighbors’
intolerance, if not with the eccentric neighbor’s silly preferences. In addi-
tion, such social decision procedures as negotiation, bargaining, and com-
promise would be of use in working out a modus vivendi that all those
affected would find tolerable enough, however ideally dissatisfying.
The example just discussed is not isolated or unreal. Instead of wearing a
medieval helmet while mowing the front lawn, someone might want to cover
the front lawn with red and black signs or other paraphernalia praising the
Church of Universal Anarchy (as I saw someone had done in Madison,
Wisconsin, in the late 1970s and early 1980s). Here again, negotiation,
bargaining, and compromise, when not sheer coping, are good candidates
for dealing with neighborhood conflicts.
Not all cases of eccentric ends, however, are alike. For example, on a more
dangerous note, someone might want to keep a pet lion chained to a large
tree in his or her yard (as I saw someone had done in Plano, Texas, in the
mid-1970s). Suppose the neighbors complain, or an official of the state
considers it a public risk. Regardless of whether there is an ordinance
outlawing the presence of the lion in the yard, a basic policy question is:
Should there be such an ordinance? In this case, critical scrutiny concerning
the merits of the case is likely to suffice. What could the lion’s owner
possibly say to establish that having the lion in the yard is more crucial than
the safety of the neighbors, their dependents, their visitors, or people who
simply happen to pass by? The case for keeping the lion in the yard would be
extremely weak.
THE FALSE SEGURITY OF STRONG VIEWS
The approach just outlined may elicit distrust on the grounds that, given
the appropriate conditions, people will make the wrong choice. For exam-
ple, suppose the lion’s owner is wealthy and extravagant enough to promise
an Olympic swimming pool for the town in exchange for permission to keep
the lion in the backyard. Many might find it appealing, even if public or
personal safety would be jeopardized. As a result, stronger views that, in
general, appeal to inflexible or absolute moral rights, obligations, laws, or
principles (whether of a strictly deontological or of a strictly teleological
nature) may seem more promising. But do they constitute an alternative?
Not by themselves. Let us see why not.
118 PRACTICAL EQUITY

For the purposes of our argument, let us consider a stronger view that,
though widely different from many others, shares with them a strong
character. That is, it involves an appeal to moral rights, obligations, laws, or
principles that, in some regard, are inflexible if not absolute. Since we are not
concerned merely with this aspect of the view, nor with any specifics that
make it different from other such views, nothing in our argument depends
on its peculiarities. That is, our conclusions apply to all strong views.
In accordance with the methodological remarks just made, let us consider
the following view: There is at least prima facie reason for satisfying any
wants and needs that are attainable when those who have the wants or needs
would find the policies or decisions that keep them unattainable intolerable,
and their satisfaction would not seriously deprive others.® Even assuming that
this view is valid, it may not always be obvious that it applies to a particular
situation. Or it may be obvious to some, but quite controversial to others.
Or it may be controversial that, given pressures to address other matters,
there is enough time to address this one.
In cases of this type, controversy frequently develops about the applica-
bility of the said view, even when there is agreement on the view itself.
Accordingly, the view is of little, if any, help in assessing policies and
decisions. At best, it is an abstract guideline whose applicability and, occa-
sionally, validity is to be established in the process. This is also the case for
all other views like it.
In contrast, various social decision procedures can help settle the above-
mentioned applicability matters. For example, regarding the view just dis-
cussed, social decision procedures besides discussion of merits and the
narrow type of critical scrutiny it involves are crucial. Hence, they are
politically sound and morally permissible in dealing with the said matter.
However, the fact that decision procedures other than discussion of merits
are crucial does not open the door to the use of just any procedure. For
example, discussion of merits, negotiation, compromise, or coping are less
appropriate now than before because, by manipulating the town with the
promise of a swimming pool, the eccentric neighbor has given the conflict
more of a nonrational character. Hence, those seeking to get the lion out of
the yard are faced with having to use more drastic procedures, including
organized action involving a publicity campaign, demonstrations, boycotts
(the lion’s owner presumably has business interests), and appeals to higher
authorities. These procedures are likely to be both politically feasible and
effective and morally permissible in the circumstances.
How does this alternative help? Though it does not provide definitive
closure, it helps by creating presumptions. So long as those likely to be
affected are represented in the process and, directly or through their repre-
sentatives, consent to it, there is good reason to presume that the resulting
policies and decisions are permissible.
 Practical Equity 119
GONTROVERSIES AND NONEGGENTRIC WANTS AND NEEDS
Cases like those just discussed can no doubt prompt controversy. More
often than not, however, controversies center on individuals’ or group’s
noneccentric disadvantages. For example, they may center on current dis-
advantages that prompt the proposal of a new tax, versus the disadvantages
that would be created if the proposed tax were introduced. Controversies
such as this often become heated and involve public demonstrations and,
sometimes, acts of violence. More often than not, however, conflicts about
taxes are predominantly addressed through meaningful dialogue, reliance on
reason, and such options offered by the political process as negotiation,
bargaining, compromise, and voting.
As we previously saw, this situation is still a controversy, not a confronta-
tion. Nor is it a matter of consensus, let alone one leading to societal
disruption or destabilization. An example of a societally disruptive consen-
sus would be a country’s consensus on pursuing agricultural deep tillage and
related practices that lead to widespread soil erosion and thus slowly under-
mine the country’s agricultural system in a manner likely to acquire crisis
proportions in a few decades.
As for the appropriate way of dealing with such a situation, there is
ordinarily no good moral or political reason to bring about serious societal
disruption now for the sake of later improvements. If the society needing
policy-making about the controversy is not so objectionable as to deserve
being dismantled, it would be unjustified to disrupt it, let alone destabilize it.
Here again, the role of judgment on the part of those likely to be affected is
crucial, but reaching it may take a great deal of critical scrutiny. Often it is
not obvious who may be deprived, or in what respects and to what extent
the deprivation may take place. Indeed, as before, decisions may have to be
reached through social decision procedures that go beyond critical scrutiny.
In many cases, negotiation, bargaining, compromise, and voting are both
politically feasible and effective, and morally permissible. However, as
argued in previous essays and further exemplified by the latter example, the
more nonrational a situation becomes—that is, the more appeals to reason
and meaningful dialogue lose predominance in it—the more appropriate
drastic procedures become.
GONFLIGTS IN OBJEGTIONABLE SOGIETIES
Suppose that the society in which the soil erosion policy and decision
problem arises is objectionable because its citizens are oppressed, maybe to
the point of being victims of state terrorism. That is, suppose that the
situation is confrontational in nature, or nearly so. Even here, attempts at
destabilizing it through policy-making about its agricultural practices would
normally have little, if any, chance of success. Indeed, they might have the
unintended but often predictable consequence of making things even more
120 PRACTICAMEQUITY

oppressive. Bungled attempts at disrupting oppressive regimes are often

followed by greater oppression and even terror.
But the situation may be unusual. That is, if the situation is desperate
enough and the indirect destabilization attempt is sufficiently likely to work
(as may have been the—presumably unintended—case in the Soviet Union
during the late 1980s), such disruptive attempts may be worth considering.
Are they, however, politically sound and morally permissible? To answer
such a question, the judgment of those likely to be affected is more crucial
than ever. And the greater the likelihood that those who will be affected will
be harmed or seriously deprived by such attempts, the more crucial it is.
Unfortunately, in this type of situation, the evidence for establishing what
this judgment would be is scarce or hard to obtain, partly as a result of
public fears about reprisals. When this occurs, decisions about such things as
who should be deprived, in what regard, and how much may have to be
made before settling the disagreements about the subject matter at issue.

MAKING POLIGY AND DEGISIONS IN RELATIVE IGNORANGE

The fact that decisions may have to be made and policies introduced with
relative lack of information does not mean that the decisions are arbitrary or
the policies based on no judgment whatsoever. Judgments, however rushed,
are often present. But they sometimes concern only the need to make a
decision or introduce a policy, given the pressing political, economic, or
technological circumstances. In such circumstances, those making policy or
decisions can usually rely on little more than a rough-and-ready evaluation
of the likely needs, wants, and life plans of those likely to be affected.
One might want to make additional information a requirement for sound
and morally permissible policy-making in these circumstances, but this
would be a mistake. If more information were necessary for politically
sound and morally permissible policy-making in such circumstances, then
no policy-making would be sound or permissible, because no such informa-
tion would be realistically attainable. This is a preposterous and unrealistic
argument for paralysis. Hence, some policy-making (this essay will specify
what kind) is sound and permissible in these circumstances, and the current-
ly attainable information is as much as can be required for policy and
decision assessment purposes.
Despite the fact that judgment by those likely to be affected or their
representatives is significantly needed in these cases, political, economic,
technological, and other pressures make it even more crucial to engage in
social decision procedures that sidestep some uses of these judgments. That
is, policymakers must do such things as negotiate, bargain, compromise,
vote, or engage in more drastic methods such as political insulation or
manipulation. The question, of course, is: What sort of arrangements and
 Practical Equity 121
social decision procedures are permissible in the circumstances? One of the
problems raised by this question concerns the preemptive consequences of
policies and decisions.
THE PROBLEM OF PREEMPTION
As indicated, the likely crucial wants, needs, interests, life plans, and
accompanying rights claims of those affected are the reasons people may find
given policies and decisions intolerable. However, in the cases just de-
scribed, this information is significantly missing. All one can do is make
certain general assumptions about what those affected are likely to need or to
have as crucial wants or interests. They will generally want to stay alive and
have adequate food and shelter, but beyond this, predictions become a bit
shaky. For example, there is no telling what life style will be crucial to their
life plans. This problem becomes more pronounced the more future genera-
tions are likely to be affected by current policies and decisions.
The net effect of all this is that, at policy-making time, it is not known
which specific wants, presumed derivative needs, interests, and rights claims
will be crucial to whom, let alone take precedence. Yet policy-making must
go on and, as a result, may lead to situations that are partly or totally
intolerable to those they eventually affect. Hence, there is good reason not to
go overboard and to make room for future corrections. The problem 1s that,
once certain policies and decisions are in place and remain in place for a
sufficiently long period of time, not just any correction is possible, and
many are quite difficult. Think, for example, of the enormous compli-
cations involved in shifting from a war-time to a peace-time economy in the
United States and the ex-Soviet Union. What conditions could be used to
assess policies and decisions regarding their preemptive effects? One might
be the following: Those policies and decisions are permissible that address the
current policy-making situation feasibly and effectively, while being unlikely
to preempt future corrections, whose difficulty or impossibility people are
likely to deem intolerable.
This condition should be of help in assessing a variety of policies and
decisions. For example, it would rule out policies and decisions that empha-
size nuclear energy use beyond what is needed to meet a certain level of
expected energy demand (e.g., because conservation measures could be used
to meet the rest). The reason for ruling them out is that such an emphasis is
likely to undermine a shift to other energy sources (e.g., solar energy) were
they to become viable in the future. Of course, as stated, beyond the basic
general concerns about such things as life, food, and shelter, predictions
about what people will find intolerable in the future are hard to make. Let us
go back to one of our previous examples. Who would have thought at the
beginning of the twentieth century that people would find the highway
carnage caused by automobile use in the United States tolerable? I return to
122 PRACTICAL EQUITY

matters of preemption in Essay 11. Here, however, let us consider some

objections to the role of ordinary people’s judgment and critical scrutiny in
policy-making.
THE LACK-OF-GOOD-JUDGMENT OBJECTION
Various problems arise concerning the reliance on people’s judgments to
assess policies and decisions. One is that even when the evidence is available
and there is time to gather it, how does one go about establishing what this
judgment is? No doubt, statistical studies would be helpful, and the exis-
tence of generally supported precedents for the measures contemplated
would help infer what the judgment of those affected might be.” Inded,
such information would serve as a test when the judgments are available and
as an alternative when they are absent or hard to interpret. But should the
judgments of everyone affected count as data for such studies?
No doubt, not just anyone’s judgment should count. Some of those
affected are incompetent, either because they are children or because they are
insane. Others, though sane, are carried away by passion or emotion, like
fanatics, to the point that their judgment is unreliable. Still others, though
cool-minded, are so uninformed or misinformed that their judgment is likely
to be ill-grounded if at all relevant. And there are cool-minded, sane, and
informed adults whose judgment is unreliable because they are subjected to
coercion or manipulation (as when third parties that depend on them—their
employees, for example—are kidnaped for ransom).
However, there are also ordinary people who are of sound and cool mind,
free from the influence of coercion and manipulation, and well informed.
These are the best sources of evidence. In addition, since they are ordinary
people, the suggested constraints are realistic. Indeed, they are very much
like those used in selecting people for certain social positions, such as that of
a jury.
THE INCOMPETENCE OBJECTION
One might argue that these people’s judgments do not take the interest of
the incompetent into account. This difficulty can be met by relying on
trustees or representatives of the incompetent, so long as they are of sound
and cool mind, free from the influence of coercion and manipulation, well
informed, and act in accordance with the requirements of their job of trustee
or representative.
This raises the question: What are the requirements attached to the job of
trustee or representative? In general, they amount to acting in a manner that
accords with the interest or well-being of those entrusted to or represented
by them. So, when it comes to conveying their judgment of policy assess-
ment and policy-making purposes, the trustees and representatives should,
first, have sought to acquire adequate information. Second, in light of this
 Practical Equity 123

information and the interest or well-being of those entrusted to or repre-

sented by them, they should carefully and reflectively formulate the judg-
ments they convey. As for what is in the interest of those entrusted to or
represented by them, the previous discussion covered that topic to some
extent, and it is discussed in more detail later.
THE FAGTS VS. VALUES OBJECTION
Another objection to the suggested reliance on people’s judgments might
be that people’s judgments, even when constrained as just described, estab-
lish nothing. People’s value judgments on given policies or decisions or
matters relevant to them are not evidence of their actual value.®
To say that the judgment of those affected is crucial in soundly assessing
policy and decision is not to say that politically sound and morally permissi-
ble policies and decisions deductively follow from the policies and decisions
people prefer. Nor is it to say that, on the basis of a representative sample of
people’s preferences on a given type of policy or decision, we can inductive-
ly infer a generalization of the type of policies or decisions that are political-
ly sound and morally permissible. None of these things follows. What we
can do, however, is use what is often called “hypothetical reasoning” or
“argument to the best explanation,” and what Peirce called “abduction,” in
contrast with deduction and induction. In other words, we start with the
observed fact that, under conditions that make their judgments reliable,
people judge certain policies and decisions politically sound and morally
permissible. If no better explanation is available, we conclude on this basis
that people’s judgments are explained by the fact that the policies and
decisions are indeed politically sound and morally permissible.? The same
type of argument can be soundly used in support of moral rights, obliga-
tions, laws, and principles, one function of which is to explain people’s
judgments. Of course, such reliance on people’s judgments raises the ques-
tion we already addressed: Whose judgment is supposed to count? Let us see
how the constraints of our approach apply in discussing various procedural
principles or criteria that constitute alternatives to this book’s approach.

THE LIMITS OF PURE DEMOGRAGY

AND PURELY PROGEDURAL PRINGIPLES
Schumpeter’s argument about democracy is well known. Envision a demo-
cratic community that reaches the decision to persecute religious dissent. Or
imagine a country that, in a democratic way, introduces policies that insti-
tute the persecution of Christians, the burning of witches, and the slaughter-
ing of Jews. These are plausible situations. After all, the democratic republic
of Geneva burned heretics during Calvin’s time, and democratic Mas-
sachusetts persecuted them in a morally repulsive manner during colonial
124. PRACTICAL EQUITY

times. We should certainly not approve of these policies on the grounds that
they have been introduced according to the rules of democratic procedure.
Schumpeter concludes that though democracy has instrumental value, it
cannot be an end in itself independent of the results it will produce under
given historical conditions.'°
In his Tyranny and Legitimacy, James S. Fishkin generalizes this argu-
ment to all purely procedural principles, that is, principles that specify
decision rules but do not specify anything about the content of the decisions,
other than that the rule never be changed. The generalization is meant to
apply only in ideal society situations, that is, whenever scarcity is moderate
and the current situation is not primarily the result of past violations of the
principle.
Fishkin distinguishes procedural principles requiring unanimity from
those that do not require it. In an ideal society, he argues, the latter could
lead to impermissible policies or decisions. Such a thing would happen
whenever they imposed severe deprivations on those whose agreement,
consent, or conformity is not required by the procedure, when other policies
and decisions would impose no severe deprivations on anyone. As for
procedural principles requiring unanimity, they could lead to impermissible
policies and decisions by omission, that is, by the continuation of existing
policies. He says:
Imagine only that some group requires food to avoid starvation (perhaps
there has been famine) or some group requires emergency assistance or
medical care (perhaps there has been a flood or some other natural
disaster) and that such events pose a new policy problem. If there is not an
already existing policy, the veto of any new policy could have conse-
quences as dreadful (for all those apart from the blocking coalition) as any
acts of commission. Or suppose the issue is not a new one but merely an
old one about which agreement has never been reached. Perhaps there is
mass poverty and a small wealthy elite who are just sufficiently numerous
to block any redistribution. The continuing absence of any redistribution
measures (unemployment compensation, medical care, food assistance)
could deny the satisfaction of basic human needs of the bulk of the
population.”
As stated, Fishkin’s position is meant to apply to ideal society conditions.
In contrast, the present book’s approach is meant to help make permissible
policies and decisions in the actual, often far from ideal world. Does that
entail that purely procedural procedures can do a better job in the actual
world? Not at all. First, as argued in previous essays, unanimity may not be
workable in the actual world, and the tyranny of the majority is a common
occurrence. Consider, for example, a situation of serious scarcity in a
 Practical Equity 125
democratic country in which famine affects groups excluded from the
coalition in power but does not affect the coalition in power. In such a
situation, the coalition in power could make policy or decisions that channel
available resources to further improve its own well-being. This would
involve a serious and avoidable deprivation to those excluded from the
coalition in power. Accordingly, they and other ordinary people who are of
sound and cool mind, free from the influence of coercion or manipulation,
and not carried away by passion or emotion would think it intolerable.
Hence, it is morally questionable if not impermissible. But nothing in the
process itself could prevent it.
Second, suppose that unanimity were attainable and the process required
it. Suppose, further, that famine or the consequences of a natural disaster
affect the population of an out-of-the-way region whose representatives are
a minority in government. Or suppose that inveterate poverty is widespread
in the land, but a small elite is free from it. The veto of any policies or
decisions aimed at providing assistance in these cases is a possible omission
in such a process.
One might argue that providing such assistance would not be justified
until it is established who, among the needy, should get it. But under time
pressures and other constraints, this position in effect amounts to saying that
it is better to let all die from famine or lack of medical attention than to help
anyone who might turn out not to have needed help as much as others. Such
passive siding with the status quo would hardly be morally justified. And
those likely to be affected, as well as other ordinary people who are of sound
and cool mind, free from the influence of coercion or manipulation, and not
carried away by passion or emotion, would think it intolerable.
Situations such as those discussed provide reasons for specifying con-
straints on purely procedural policy-making approaches. However, as al-
ready argued, for the approach to be applicable to actual policy-making,
these constraints should be such that they make room for the participation
of ordinary people in relatively common ways. For example, the excesses of
political and legal procedure are a good reason to set constraints. However,
they are not a good reason to sever the political and legal process from the
moral assessment of policies and decisions. As argued in previous essays,
doing such a thing would be both politically and morally irrelevant and a
sure recipe for disaster. The constraints this book’s approach introduces are
simply those ordinarily used to select people for certain social positions,
such as that of a jury. They are supposed to work so long as there are enough
ordinary people with a modicum of intelligence and moral sensitivity.
126° PRACTICAL EQUITY

APPLYING MORAL PRINGIPLES, LAWS, AND OTHER

GONGEPTS IN THE POLIGY-MAKING PROGESS
A SHORT REVIEW OF SOME DIFFICULTIES
To say that critical scrutiny and judgment by ordinary people should be
part and parcel of policy-making is not to say that abstract principles of
morality (e.g., Kant’s categorical imperative) have no role in the process.’*
Nor is it to say that such other moral concepts as rights and individual and
collective consequences are irrelevant. They are not. But, as we saw, various
problems arise: How should the principles be applied? Should given prob-
lems be addressed at the level of moral rules, moral laws, or overall moral
principles? We also saw some of the difficulties involved in applying general
criteria that specify rights or obligations to particular situations, and how
such applications required the employment of various procedures.’* As
already argued, the approach I have been outlining, which includes a wide
variety of social decision procedures, is meant to be helpful in dealing
realistically with these and related application problems. However, there are
other procedural approaches being proposed that should be evaluated.
GONTRAGTUAL, EMPATHETIG,
AND ARGUMENTATIVE TESTING GRITERIA
The application problems just mentioned are sometimes addressed by
means of mixed procedural accounts that rely on procedures but specify
conditions under which people’s judgment and critical scrutiny provide
answers to the questions just asked. Three types of procedural accounts are
predominant. Perhaps the most commonly used is contractual. In one of its
versions, moral reasoning aims at working out principles that others who are
looking for principles would not reject.'* A second account is empathetic. In
one of its versions, people identify moral norms by putting themselves in the
position of all those who would be affected if the norms were followed.!> A
third is the argumentative testing account, in which only the force of the
better argument prevails.
Each of these accounts has shortcomings. As Jiirgen Habermas has
argued, the contractual account assimilates judgments to rational choice
decisions. In addition, contractual and empathetic accounts have other, more
serious, problems involving the use of the notion of rational choice for
policy-making purposes. However, these can be corrected, and the approach
in this book suggests how.
As for the empathetic account, Habermas has soundly argued that it
assimilates judgments to empathetic acts of understanding. As in the case of
contractual accounts, such assimilation is exaggerated. If the approach I am
proposing turns out to be better, such exaggeration is avoidable. In addition,
the empathetic understanding account has other shortcomings.
 Practical Equity 127

To characterize these shortcomings, let us begin by pointing out four

facts. First, many ordinary people can understand claims, regardless of how
eccentric or questionable the ends sought in claiming them. For example,
one can understand that someone claims a right to wear a medieval helmet
while mowing the lawn, however eccentric this might be. Similarly, one can
understand that someone claims the right to engage in sadomasochistic
practices with consenting adults, however far out on the social fringe such an
activity might be. Second, ordinary persons can understand what such
eccentric or fringe claims mean. Third, ordinary persons can engage in
critical scrutiny of policies affecting these claims and even make the judg-
ment that the policies to be introduced should grant the rights they claim.
Fourth, if such a person has a cool and sound mind, is free from the effects of
coercion and manipulation, and is not carried away by passion and emotion,
then his or her judgment (or that of his or her representatives), should not be
discounted in the policy-making process.
Yet there is no sense in which a number of such ordinary persons can
empathize with eccentric ends such as wearing a medieval helmet while
mowing the lawn, or socially fringe ends such as sadomasochistic activities.
They cannot in any way put themselves in the helmet user’s or sadomasoch-
ist’s shoes. Both experiences are completely and irretrievably alien to them.
One might argue that, in such a case, their judgment should not be used in
policy-making. But this undermines critical scrutiny, appeals to reason, and
meaningful dialogue by making room only for dialogue among given
interest-group members. The only policy-making approach available under
such conditions would be the expediency approach criticized in previous
essays, which would be politically unwise and would undermine morality.
As for the argumentative testing approach, it is closer to that in this book,
but too simplistic. Consider Habermas’s account: A policy or decision
would pass the test of argumentative testing if it were so judged by people,
assuming that “all those possibly affected could participate, freely and
equally, in a cooperative search for truth in which only the force of the
better argument appears.”’® Although this approach does not have the
problems the others face, it has another: It is quite unlikely that actual
people’s judgments will be somehow connected with the highly detached
judgments the approach involves.
Given the shortcomings of the accounts just discussed, in what follows I
formulate hypotheses that involve a combined approach. That is, they
significantly appeal to argumentative testing but also make room for con-
tractual decisions based on mere preferences or, sometimes, on sympathetic
understanding, in a manner that attempts to correct the exaggerations in the
more simplistic accounts discussed. In particular, first, it involves pro-
cedures that include discussion of merits but go well beyond its limits, into
128 PRACTICADEQUITY

procedures involving a greater predominance of decisions. Second, it relies

on the judgment of people who are relatively well-informed (but not per-
fectly informed) about the matters at issue. Third, their judgments count—
much as they are supposed to in ordinary societies—if these people are
competent, not carried away by passion or emotion, and free from the
influences of coercion and manipulation.
The position I am taking, of course, does not in any way entail that
politically sound and morally permissible policies and decisions must result
from a process in which only people meeting the said conditions take part.
The process can include anyone, even the crazy and the evil. However, as
discussed in this and previous essays, the condition under which the result-
ing policies and decisions will be politically sound and morally permissible is
that, at policy-making time, those likely to be affected by the policies or
decisions (or their representatives) who meet the said constraints on judg-
ment are likely to find the policies and decisions tolerable. Let us proceed to
formulate the corresponding hypotheses and place them in context.

PRIMARILY ADMINISTRATIVE SITUATIONS

As previously indicated, some policy and decision problems are administra-
tive. They arise in nondisruptive, predominantly rational situations. Let us
initially concentrate on societies in which no radical change is needed,
because they make significant room for individual freedoms and well-being
and for reforms when improvements are needed. The preceding discussion
suggests the following hypothesis for policy and decision assessment in this
type of situation:

HYPOTHESIS I: THE ADMINISTRATIVE SITUATION HYPOTHESIS

If, first, a policy-making problem or set of problems arises in a largely

nonconflictive, nondisruptive, nonoppressive situation (that 1s, the situ-
ation involves no controversy or confrontation, no likely social disrup-
tion, and no serious limitations on individual’s freedoms and well-being);
second, the differences of opinion or opposing demands, if any,
involved in the situation are predominantly addressed through reliance
on reason and meaningful dialogue, not through consensus or consensus
building based on such things as indifference and blind faith;
third, a policy, decision, or combination of these is likely to be both
feasible and effective in dealing with these problem(s) (that is, there are
clear precedents or reliable studies that evidence it—for example, they
evidence that, in the available time and with the available resources, a
combination of raising taxes and cutting spending will effectively deal
 Practical Equity 129
with the problem of reducing the national deficit); but
fourth, the policy, decision, or their combination is also likely to lead
to societal disruption or to limit the freedoms or well-being of those
likely to be affected (in the society or abroad), roughly as much as, or
more than, alternative policies, decisions, or combinations of these
(including that of not making any policy or decision about the prob-
lem(s) at least for the time being);
and fifth, at least some of the people affected, or their trustees or
representatives, when of sound and cool mind, free from the influence
of coercion and manipulation, and as informed as circumstances permit,
are likely to find the disruption or limitations intolerable (because, for
example, there are clear precedents or other evidence strongly indicat-
ing that they will do so—for example, in the past, some of these people
may have strongly objected when they experienced the hardships that
both raising taxes and cutting spending brought about for them),
then it is not permissible simply to make the decision or contribute to
introducing or retaining the policy or combination ofpolicies. But in order
to settle on alternatives within the available time, some combination of
only nonconfrontational social decision procedures such as discussion of
merits, negotiation, rational consensus building, bargaining, mediation,
and arbitration, accompanied by coping and waiting, may be used.
On the other hand, if the first three conditions are satisfied, but the
fourth and fifth conditions are not (that is, the policy, decision, or
combination of these 1s likely to lead to less social disruption or to less
limitations of freedom or well-being than the alternatives—(for ex-
ample, because waiting would precipitate a societal crisis, and the said
people are likely to find the resulting situation tolerable, once they
experience it),
then it is permissible to make the decision and contribute to introducing
or retaining the policy or combination of these, despite the misgivings,
reservations, or protests that may occur at policy-making time.

THE NEOGLASSIGAL OBJECTION

One objection that might be raised against this hypothesis is that ordinary
people of sound mind, free from the influence of coercion and manipulation,
and well-informed would object to amy limitations on their freedoms and
well-being. But would they? Let us recall that the situation envisioned here
is largely nonconflictive. Any limitations are perceived as comparatively
minor. Otherwise, there would be conflict, if not disruption. Hence, the said
150: -PRACTICALZEQUITY

objections could come only from people concerned with comparatively

minute advantages or disadvantages to themselves and lacking sympathy for
others. Given this, let us examine the force of the objection.
First, some of the objection’s psychological and political assumptions are
mistaken. People such as those it describes are few. Indeed, despite claims to
the contrary made under the umbrella of the neoclassical model in econom-
ics and other social sciences, there is overwhelming evidence that ordinary
people are not cold calculators each out to maximize his or her own
well-being.’”
Second, morally speaking, the people envisioned by the objection are not
just self-interested —that is, interested in themselves, as presumably every-
one is—but selfish. This view of people undermines morality because (1) it
is unrealistic, and (2) it undermines a crucial element of morality: the
reliance on meaningful dialogue and appeals to reason in addressing prob-
lems. Hence, there is good reason for excluding such a position through the
above hypothesis.
THE UNJUSTIFIED GONTENTMENT OBJECTION
Another objection grants that some individuals might be content with a
policy or decision and not object to the limitations it puts on their freedom
or well-being. But it maintains that they ought to find them intolerable.
However, suppose that some individuals meet the hypothesis’s conditions.
Since they are ordinary people, they will, in the aggregate, possess a
modicum of care, imagination, moral sensitivity, and political savvy. And all
this would be exercised in the critical scrutiny process, leading them to find a
certain policy arrangement tolerable or not. If they find it tolerable in the
type of situation considered, no better evidence could realistically be ex-
pected to establish that it is permissible for them to do so. Their finding it
tolerable establishes that, in the situation described and based on the best
available information, it zs tolerable. And that it is tolerable is the best
available explanation for their finding it tolerable in the circumstances.
Those who argue otherwise may point to rights or to abstract principles of
obligation in support of their claims. But, as I also argued, there exists no
better way of establishing what rights, obligations, and even moral rules,
laws, and principles are relevant in given circumstances and how much
weight they have (for example, whether, in the circumstances, given collec-
tive consequences take precedence over given individual rights or vice versa)
than connecting them to people’s judgments. The hypothesis formulated
above articulates precisely such a connection.
THE IDEAL WORLDS OBJECTION
One might object by appealing to situations in which the policy-making
circumstances would be different, the individuals more reflective, better
 Practical Equity 131
informed, or endowed with greater sensitivity. However, this is to step into
the never-never land of excessive idealization and utopia and to abandon the
constrained and not always ideal, but reliable and improvable, actual world
of policy-making. I have already argued that, from both a political and a
moral standpoint, one should remain in the latter world because, among
other reasons, corrections are always possible in it. That is, further critical
scrutiny and experience may uncover or work out reasons why what was
found tolerable at one time ought not to be found tolerable anymore. As for
what happens in the meantime, the above hypothesis sets clear constraints,
for example, by ruling out certain policies and decisions and, if no better
ones are available, permitting the use of a range of social decision procedures
to settle the existing differences instead.'®
THE PERFECTIONIST OBJECTION
The objection might also be raised that one can never be certain whether
individuals who do not object are indeed completely informed and free from
the influence of coercion and manipulation. No doubt, there is an element of
judgment that comes into play here. But this judgment is open to critical
scrutiny by those involved. And a variety of political actions conducive to
such scrutiny —from congressional inquiries to public debates—are possi-
ble so long as there is time left before policies are to be formally introduced.
Hence, if there is time, policy-making decisions should not be rushed to the
point of precluding viable objections. (In fact, in predominantly rational,
nondisruptive situations such as the hypothesis envisions, there is often
enough time for the purpose at hand.) However, delays should not reach the
point of no return, where neglect takes over and the only policy is no policy,
or no effective policy.
In asking for certainty, the objection leads precisely to policy-making
failures of neglect. It is but another example of the policy-making paradox of
perfectionism: In trying to optimize outcomes by attempting to perfect
policies, the outcomes thus brought about are worse than they would have
been, had one not attempted to perfect the policies.
THE IDEALISM OBJECTION
It might be objected that the hypothesis proposed is itself overly idealistic,
since people are never sufficiently cool or sound of mind, free from the
influence of coercion or manipulation, and well-informed. This objection,
however, exaggerates people’s weaknesses. In fact, many individuals have a
sound mind—that is, they are not insane or mentally incompetent—and
also have a cool mind quite frequently. That is, they are not normally carried
away by passion or emotion; they are not carried away by fear, greed, the
will to power, the libido, or fanaticism about a cause, nation, social class,
abstract principle, or, as in the case of egoists, themselves.
132 -PRACTIGAL‘EQUITY

In addition, these very same people are often free, if not from coercion
and manipulation (these are recurrent facts of social life), at least from their
influence. For example, some judges ruling on cases involving organized
crime in the United States, Italy, or Colombia, have enough courage,
presence of mind, and ability to remain above the coercive threats or
manipulation exercised by organized crime members or their associates.
As for being well-informed, some individuals (e.g., technology, health
care, economic, or legal experts) are well-informed and, with the help of
their services, others can become well-informed on matters relevant to
policy and decision. This is what members of the U.S. Congress do through
such sources as the Office of Technology Assessment and the testimony
gathered at committee hearings.
To say that people can be well-informed about a matter of concern to
policy and decision is not to say that they can know all there is to know
about it. Rather, it is to say that they can learn what can be learned about it
at the time and, most importantly, that they can learn about the limits of
current knowledge. Hard cases arise when, because of time constraints, not
even this much can be learned before policy-making time. But even in this
situation, people can be well-informed about the fact that they support or
oppose certain policies or decisions, given the existing limited information
or uncertainty. In such circumstances, as previously argued and as the
previously formulated hypothesis implies, it is wise to opt for cautious policy-
making. That is, one should make room for future corrections whenever it is
feasible and those who are likely to be affected would find the impossibility
‘or extraordinary difficulty of making such corrections intolerable.

MAGROSOGIETAL POLIGY AND DECISION PROBLEMS

IN SOGIALLY DISRUPTIVE SITUATIONS
Consider policy and decision problems about such technology develop-
ments as genetic engineering, nuclear energy, fetal research, the development
of RU-486 (the “abortion pill’’), the green revolution, and industrial pro-
cesses leading to the release of chlorofluorocarbons into the atmosphere.
They are significantly posed by conflicts of opinion (when not merely of
demands) about a variety of these developments and the perceived risks and
practices associated with them.
These conflicts are often socially disruptive. In an innocuous sense, it is
obvious that the protests involved inconvenience a lot of people. In a
non-innocuous sense, it is not always obvious that the conflicts can have a
tendency to destabilize one or more large societal sectors, or even entire
societies, economically or politically. Examples of these sectors are the
biotechnology industry in conflicts about genetic engineering; the utilities
 Practical Equity 133

and related industries in conflicts about nuclear energy; scientific re-

search—with an impact on health care, its related industrial and educational
activities, and the thousands who will contract Alzheimer’s and other
diseases—in conflicts about fetal research; about half the Earth’s adult
population— women—in conflicts about the development and marketing of
RU-486 and cognate drugs; and much if not all of the Earth’s population in
conflicts about the green revolution and the release of chlorofluorocarbons
as a by-product of various industrial processes.
One thing is clear: These conflicts pose societal problems in and of
_ themselves, calling for policy-making that is quite different from that called
for by administrative problems like those previously discussed. At any rate,
as already argued mainly in Essays 1 and 6, the second-order question arises:
What ought to be done about the conflicts?
GONTROVERSY OR GONFRONTATION?
The specific type of policy-making called for by problems involving
societal conflict differs depending on the type of conflicts involved. Accord-
ingly, hypotheses meant to help assess policy and decisions about such
problems should reflect this fact. Consider discussions about matters of
health care costs. In the United States, they affect at least patients, doctors,
corporations, the government, and the insurance industry, and are quite
heated. They frequently involve sharp oppositions of opinions or demands
on the part of members of the various groups affected, coupled with
disputes, debates, or contentions aimed at establishing the validity of the
opinions or demands. However, they do not primarily involve attempts at
mere persuasion through such things as sheer manipulation, sabotage, or the
threat or use of force. Thus they amount to controversies that involve a
strong element of dialogue, however heated.
Certainly, controversy can and often does turn into outright confronta-
tion. Things can go awry, with conflicting demands, the use of force,
sabotage, threats, or manipulation being the main or only elements involved.
Meaningful dialogue loses its predominance, overpowered by a conflict of
wills. Controversies about research on nonhuman animals and research on
human fetuses, for example, have moved in the direction of confrontations,
with bombings and threats becoming quite frequent.
When social conflicts such as those just discussed are significantly disrup-
tive, policy-making is in order, and the policy question arises: Is the conflict
a controversy or a confrontation? And since the degree of societal disruption
matters, questions such as the following also arise: Does the conflict pose a
clear and immediate threat to the existence or well-being of the societal
sectors or societies affected, or does it endanger them to a lesser degree? If
the latter, to what degree does it endanger them?
134 PRACTICAL EQUITY

Danger to society or societal sectors is not necessarily overriding. Some

societies, and some societal sectors, are so sick to the root that little can be
said in their defense. In other cases, they may be in need of change, but their
demise would be unwarranted if not disastrous. In still other cases, they may
be worthier of being preserved than any other aspect of the subject matter of
the conflict. Hence, a higher-order policy question, one that deals with
priorities, arises: How significant is the societal disruption associated with
the conflict when weighed against the matters at issue in the conflict? The
poignancy of this question, however, will vary depending on what social
decision procedures are feasible at a given time.

GONFRONTATIONS, GONTROVERSIES, GONSENSUS,

AND TYPES OF SOCIAL DECISION PROGEDURES
The questions just formulated are not the only, or first, policy questions
to ask. One must also ask: What policies and policy-making procedures are
both viable and morally permissible, given the existing time and budgetary
constraints, degree of uncertainty about the procedures’ consequences, and
probability of public support for the policies and procedures or acquiescence
to them? How much time, money, and energy are there? How much should
be devoted to answering these questions? If the conflict is a confrontation,
through what social decision procedure or combination of procedures is it
permissible to address it? Which ones are appropriate if it is a controversy?
In dealing with confrontations and their characteristic breakdown of
dialogue, a variety of procedures suggest themselves: outflanking, strikes
and demonstrations, threats, war. None of these procedures relies on mean-
ingful dialogue and appeals to reason, though they may be applied by using
reasons. Yet they may be politically sound. And they may be morally
permissible if the conflict is a confrontation and they are accompanied by
requests or demands to reestablish the dialogue. Indeed, the less reliant on
meaningful dialogue the situation posing the problem, the more these
procedures are permissible—at least so long as they are accompanied by
efforts to bring reliance on meaningful dialogue back into the picture. For
example, Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 was met
with nearly unanimously supported U.N. sanctions while negotiations were
still being sought.'? Whatever the weaknesses of the particular sanctions, as I
discuss in Essay 12, there was little or no disagreement throughout the world
community that they were politically and morally unobjectionable, so long
as they were applied in the search for peace, not for strategic advantages or
political or economic gain.”°
If the conflict is a controversy, however, none of these procedures appears
permissible, if at all relevant. Instead, such things as political insulation,
arbitration, voting, negotiation, mediation, consensus building, and discus-
sion of merits—which make room for meaningful dialogue—take center
 Practical Equity 135

stage. And these procedures are also different from those called for by
societally disruptive situations in which nonrational or mistaken consensus
is predominant. In that case, such things as demonstrations, sit-ins, boy-
cotts, and other consciousness-raising procedures appear most suitable.
At any rate, though the specific policies and decisions that are acceptable
vary according to type of case, the same features serve to assess them.
Among them, it is most crucial to determine the type of problem being
addressed, what the social circumstances are, and what those involved would
think if they were of sound and cool mind, free from the influence of
coercion and manipulation, and well-informed. This leads to a series of
additional hypotheses for assessing the policies and decisions in different
types of social situations.
HYPOTHESIS II: THE RATIONAL DISRUPTION,
No RADICAL CHANGE HYPOTHESIS
If, first, a policy-making problem or set of problems arises in a situation
that 1s socially disruptive or involves significantly contested limitata-
tions on individual freedoms or well-being;
second, the differences of opinion or conflicts of demands involved in
the situation are predominantly addressed through reliance on reason
and meaningful dialogue, however heated, not through confrontation
or, alternatively, through consensus or consensus building based on such
things as unreflective indifference or blind faith;
third, a policy, decision, or combination of these is likely to be both
feasible and effective in dealing with the problem(s) (that 1s, there are
clear precedents or studies that evidence it—for example, they evidence
that, within the time available, a combination of raising taxes and
cutting spending will effectively deal with the problem of reducing the
national deficit); but
fourth, it ts also likely to lead to societal disruption, or to limit the
freedoms or well-being of those likely to be affected (in the society or
abroad) roughly as much as, or more than, alternative policies, deci-
sions, or combinations of these (including that of not making any policy
or decision about the problem(s), at least for the time being);
and fifth, at least some of the people affected, or their trustees or
representatives, when of sound and cool mind, free from the influence
of coercion and manipulation, and as informed as circumstances permit,
are likely to find it intolerable (because, for example, there are clear
precedents or other evidence strongly indicating that they will do
so—for instance, in the past, some of these people may have strongly
objected when they experienced the hardships that both raising taxes
136 PRACTICAL EQUITY

and cutting spending for social programs brought about for them),
then it is not permissible simply to make the decision or contribute to
introducing or retaining the policy or combination ofpolicies. But in order
to settle on alternatives within the available time, some combination of
social decision procedures may be used in the following order of priority:
First, such nonconfrontational social decision procedures as discussion
of merits, negotiation, rational consensus building, bargaining, media-
tion, arbitration, and simply coping while waiting may be used if they
are feasible and likely to be effective.
Second, if the latter are not feasible or likely to be effective, then
nonconfrontational procedures involving pressure tactics such as public-
ity campaigns, letter writing, demonstrations, and appeals to higher
authorities may be used.
If none of the previous procedures ts feasible or likely to be effective,
then the situation is probably of a different type, perhaps a confronta-
tion, or one that primarily involves irrational consensus, and it will fall
under one of the remaining hypotheses.
On the other hand, if the first three conditions are satisfied, but the
fourth and fifth conditions are not (that is, the policy, decision, or combi-
nation of these 1s likely to lead to less social disruption or to less limita-
tions of freedom or well-being than the alternatives—for example,
because waiting would precipitate a societal crisis, and the said people
are likely to find the new situation tolerable once they experience it),
then it 1s permissible to make the decision and contribute to introducing
or retaining the policy or combination of these, despite the heated
arguments and opposition that may occur at policy-making time.

HYPOTHESIS III: THE NONRATIONAL DISRUPTION,

No RADIGAL GHANGE HYPOTHESIS

If, first, a policy-making problem or set of problems arises in a situation

that 1s socially disruptive or involves significantly contested limitations
on individual freedoms or well-being;
second, the differences of opinion or conflicts of demands involved in
the situation are not predominantly addressed through reliance on
reason and meaningful dialogue, but instead are predominantly ad-
dressed through confrontation or, alternatively, through consensus or
consensus building based on such things as unreflective indifference or
blind faith;
third, a policy, decision, or combination of these is likely to be both
 Practical Equity 137

feasible and effective in dealing with the problem(s) (that is, there are
clear precedents or reliable studies that evidence it—for example, they
evidence that, within the time available, a combination of raising taxes
and cutting spending will effectively deal with the problem of reducing
the national deficit); but
fourth, the policy, decision, or their combination is also likely to lead
to societal disruption, or to limit the freedoms or well-being of those
likely to be affected (in the society or abroad) roughly as much as, or
more than, alternative policies, decisions, or combinations of these
(including that of not making any policy or decision about the prob-
lem/(s), at least for the time being);
and fifth, at least some of the people affected, or their trustees or
representatives, when of sound and cool mind, free from the influence
of coercion and manipulation, and as informed as circumstances permit,
are likely to find it intolerable (because there are clear precedents or
other evidence strongly indicating that they will do so—for example, in
the past, some of these people strongly objected when they experienced
the hardships that both raising taxes and cutting spending for social
programs brought about for them),
then it is not permissible simply to make the decision or contribute to
introducing or retaining the policy or combination of policies. But in
order to settle on alternatives within the available time, some combina-
tion of social decision procedures may be used in the following order of
priority:
First, such nonconfrontational social decision procedures as discussion
of merits, negotiation, rational consensus building, bargaining, medi-
ation, arbitration, and simply coping while waiting may be used if they
are at all feasible and likely to be effective (as they may be in situations
where irrational consensus predominates).
Second, ifthe latter are not feasible or likely to be effective, then such
nonconfrontational procedures involving pressure tactics such as public-
ity campaigns, letter writing, demonstrations, and appeals to higher
authorities may be used.
Third, if none of the previous procedures is feasible or likely to be
effective, then confrontational but still nonviolent methods such as civil
disobedience, outflanking or bypassing, political insulation, and various
forms of manipulation may be used.
If none of the previous procedures is feasible or likely to be effective,
then the situation is probably of a different type, perhaps one requiring
138 PRACTICAL EQUITY

radical change, and falls under Hypothesis IV.

On the other hand, if the first three conditions are satisfied, but the
fourth and fifth conditions are not satisfied (that is, the policy, decision,
or combination of these is likely to lead to less social disruption or less
limitations of freedom or well-being than the alternatives—for ex-
ample, because waiting would precipitate a societal crisis—and the said
people are not likely to find the new situation intolerable once they
experience it),
then it is permissible to make the decision and contribute to introducing
or retaining the policy or combination of these, despite the heated
arguments, opposition, and confrontational activities that may occur at
policy-making time (for, given the previous conditions, these could not
amount to social disruption or limitations of freedom and well-being
that are equal to or greater than those of the alternatives).
THE DISSATISFACTION OBJECTION
The previously discussed objections could be raised here too. However,
they would be mistaken for the reasons already given. A new objection,
however, might also be raised. It says that the hypotheses just formulated
would permit policies, procedures, and policy decisions that some, perhaps
all, ordinary persons would find unsatisfactory. But one should realize that,
in politics as in life generally, one cannot always, if ever, entirely satisfy
everybody. Indeed, sometimes, one cannot entirely satisfy anybody. This is
only a matter of common sense and realism. Accordingly, the hypotheses
formulated above aim at ruling out those policies, procedures, and decisions
that would be intolerable to anyone, but not those that, though tolerable,
might fail to entirely satisfy one or more persons.

MAGROSOGIETALLY DISRUPTIVE SOGIAL SITUATIONS

THAT WARRANT DESTABILIZATION
The macrosocietally disruptive social situation warranting destabilization is
a rather difficult and often too simplistically understood type of policy-
making situation. It may have conflictive origins (e.g., a revolution or war)
or predominantly consensual ones (e.g., generalized acquiescence to spend-
ing policies that bankrupt a country). In any case, it involves the serious
disruption of one or more societies or large societal sectors, or serious
limitations on the freedoms and well-being of their members. Now there is
little doubt that certain societal sectors or societies are so objectionable,
cause people such utter misery, disregard their dignity as persons to such an
extent, and engage in such rampant and arbitrary oppression that their
demise would be highly welcome, perhaps even needed for the flourishing of
 Practical Equity 139

humanity among those societies or sectors. Indeed, such sectors or societies

often face resistance, prompt liberation movements and wars, and are caught
up in more or less societally disruptive conflicts with sectors of their own
societies or with other societies. But such reactions may not occur and, for
whatever reason, people may be largely acquiescent to the situation. The
policy question then arises: What ought to be done about situations that
involve such disruption or limitations on individual freedoms and well-
being? This leads to the next hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS IV: THE RADIGAL GHANGE HYPOTHESIS

If, first, a policy-making problem or set of problems arises in a largely

disruptive or oppressive situation (e.g., the problem of how to free an
invaded country, how to introduce basic freedoms or a minimum of
well-being for a country’s oppressed citizens, or how to prevent a
country’s economy from collapsing);
second, the differences of opinion or conflicts of demands involved in
the situation are not predominantly addressed through reliance on reason
and meaningful dialogue, but instead are predominantly addressed
through confrontation (e.g., armed resistance in the invasion case and
armed insurrection in the oppression case) or, alternatively, through
irrational consensus (e.g., acquiescence based on unreflective indiffer-
ence or blind faith in the oppression or the collapsing economy case);
third, a policy, decision, or combination of these is likely to be both
feasible and effective in dealing with the problem(s) through radical
changes in one or more of the societies involved (e.g., within the time
available, a foreign country’s policy of supplying weapons or even
troops to the resistance 1s likely to defeat the aggressors and subject them
to international controls; or a foreign country’s policy of supplying
weapons or even military advisers to the armed insurrection forces 1s
likely to help overthrow the oppressors and institute a new, nonoppress-
ive power structure; or policies aimed at immediately discontinuing the
economic practices leading to the country’s likely economic collapse are
likely to prevent this collapse while radically redistributing and perhaps
increasing the population’s burdens); but
fourth, the policy decision, or combination of these is also likely to
lead to societal disruption or limit the freedoms or well-being of those
affected in at least one of the societies involved or abroad, and at least in
the short run, the disruption and limitations are as great or (quite likely
much) greater than those of alternative, nonradical policies, decisions,
140 PRACTICAL EQUITY

or combinations of these (e.g., use of foreign embargoes in the aggres-

sion and the oppression cases, and incrementally discontinuing the said
spending policies in the economic collapse case);
fifth, at least some members of the society(ies) likely to be affected by
the contemplated radical changes, or their trustees or representatives
(who, in cases of war and armed insurrection, may be third parties such
as the U.N. Secretary General or its appointees), when of cool and
sound mind, free from the influence of coercion and manipulation, and
well-informed, are likely to find the policy, decision, or combination of
these intolerable, even if they also believe that radical change 1s needed,
then it is not permissible to make the decision or contribute to introduc-
ing the policy or combination of policies. But in order to settle on
alternatives within the time available, some combination of social
decision procedures may be used in the following order of priority:
First, if they are at all feasible and likely to be effective (as they may
be whenever irrational consensus predominates), such nonconfronta-
tional social decision procedures as discussion of merits, negotiation,
consensus building, bargaining, mediation, arbitration, and simply
coping while waiting may be used.
Second, if the latter are not feasible or likely to be effective (e.g.,
because time is of the essence), then nonconfrontational procedures
involving pressure tactics such as publicity campaigns, letterwriting,
demonstrations, and appeals to higher authorities (including the inter-
national community) may be used.
Third, if none of the previous methods is feasible or likely to be
effective (e.g., because time is of the essence), then confrontational but
still nonviolent procedures such as, depending on the case, civil disobe-
dience, outflanking or bypassing, political insulation, and various forms
of manipulation (perhaps involving traditional allies of the country
reluctant to comply or meaningfully negotiate) may be used.
Fourth, if none of the previous procedures is feasible or likely to be
effective (e.g., because time is of the essence), then more confrontational
procedures such as economic embargoes, freezing of a country’s foreign
investments, undermining or preventing the delivery of goods and
services other than those needed to meet basic survival and health needs
to crucial social sectors or entire societies, blockades, threats of force,
and, in crisis situations, even combat may be used, so long as they are
accompanied by reasonable mediatory or other nonconfrontational
efforts aimed at stopping and diminishing the degree of confrontation
and increasing the use of procedures that primarily involve appeals to
 Practical Equity 141

reason and meaningful dialogue. If none of the previous procedures is

feasible or likely to be effective, then coping and waiting may still be
used (as the United States did concerning Cuba after the Bay of Pigs
and economic embargo failures).
On the other hand, if the first three conditions are satisfied, but the
fourth and fifth conditions are not (that is, the policy, decision or
combination of these is likely to lead to less social disruption or to less
limitations of freedom or well-being than the alternatives or, even if it
does not, the said people are likely to find the new situation tolerable,
once they experience it),
then it is permissible to make the decision and contribute to introducing
or retaining the policy or combination of these and to employ more
drastic social decision procedures, including such confrontational ones as
economic embargoes and combat, but never beyond what 1s likely to be
required in implementing the policies, decisions, or their combination,
and always so as to bring about a situation in which people primarily
use procedures that appeal to reason and meaningful dialogue.
PLAGING HYPOTHESIS IV IN THE APPROPRIATE PERSPECTIVE
The latter hypothesis rules out, first, all attempts at revolution or radical
change that are likely to be unfeasible or ineffective. Of course, for policy-
making purposes, this likelihood must be assessed in advance, not after the
fact. Afterwards, no matter how instructive it might be, it would be of no
use in guiding policy-making that already occurred. Given this, the 1989
Chinese students’ uprising, though in retrospect a failure, would not be
ruled out. At the time, it appeared likely to undermine the oppressive Deng
Xiaoping and Li Peng regime and promote democracy in China.
Second, the hypothesis rules out attempts that involve or lead to situations
that the victims of the objectionable sector or society would find intolerable.
For example, it rules out foreign groups’ protesting a country’s government-
al terror when this is only likely to increase and hasten executions.”
Third, the hypothesis rules out attempts that would require sacrifices on
the part of ordinary people in societies or sectors other than the one with the
objectionable features if, when meeting the conditions of the hypothesis,
they would find it intolerable. Examples of this would be the policy of
hijacking or bombing airplanes carrying passengers who have nothing to do
with the conflict other than happening to be on an airplane that belongs to
an airline from an involved country. In fact, some of these passengers may
sympathize with the cause of the culprit. However, what is crucial is that
many, of not all, of them would not be willing to lose their lives, liberty, or
well-being for it.
Fourth, in an analogous manner, the hypothesis rules out the policy of
142 PRACTICAL BOUITY

instituting or retaining slavery, genocide, governmental terror, or economic

exploitation. It also rules out attempts at taking advantage of grand opportu-
nities at costs that, under the said conditions, those affected would find
intolerable. Most importantly, it rules out bringing about radical change in
one society at the cost of destabilizing another, so long as individuals likely
to be affected in the latter, or their trustees or representatives, when of sound
and cool mind, free from the influence of coercion and manipulation, and
well-informed would find it intolerable.
This applies to reasonably good as well as to significantly objectionable
societies (including those that engage in aggression or involve oppression),
however distasteful our idealism may find them. First, suppose they have
been defeated. Victory does not grant just any rights, but only redress rights,
and these do not involve radically changing the vanquished societies.
Second, as previously argued, it is both morally and politically crucial and,
indeed, democratic, to rely on the judgment of those likely to be affected
(including the vanquished) or, if these are unreliable, on that of their trustees
or representatives. This is what the hypothesis does. Not surprisingly, in
doing so, it rules out sacrificing individuals for the sake of a cause, however
appealing and ideally just the latter might be.

AN OVERALL PRINGIPLE
The preceding hypotheses and main types of policy-making situations are
covered by a principle that, as previously mentioned, serves to compare
these types, thus making it clear that they are morally relevant. It can be
formulated as follows:

HYPOTHESIS V: THE PRINCIPLE OF PRACTICAL EQUITY

If, first, a policy-making problem or set of problems arises in one or

more societies;
second, a policy, decision, or combination of these is likely to be both
feasible and effective in dealing with the problem(s);
third, it is also likely to lead to undesirable consequences for the
society or, ifmore than one society is involved, for at least one of them,
or to limit the freedoms and well-being of individuals; as much as, or
more than, alternative policies, decisions, or combinations of these;
and fourth, the individuals likely to be affected, or their trustees or
representatives, when of sound and cool mind, free from the influence
of coercion and manipulation, and well-informed, are likely to find the
said societal consequences or limitations on their freedoms and well-
being intolerable,
 Practical Equity 143

then it is not permissible to make that decision or contribute to intro-

ducing or retaining the policy or combination of policies. But in order to
settle on alternatives within the available time, social decision proce-
dures may be used in the following order of priorities:
First, only nonconfrontational procedures, iffeasible and likely to be
effective, may be employed.
Second, among confrontational procedures, only those that are non-
violent, if likely to be feasible and effective, may be used.
Third, if only violent procedures are feasible and likely to be effec-
tive, then only the least violent of these may be employed and no more
than to the extent they are necessary (an extreme case under this
category is that in which only combat and war are feasible and likely to
be effective).
Fourth, if none of the preceding procedures is feasible or likely to be
effective, then coping and waiting, perhaps accompanied by discussion
of merits, consensus building, and other feasible procedures (e.g., eco-
nomic embargoes) that may be marginally effective in the long run may
be used until the circumstances change.
Otherwise, if the policy, decision, or combination of these 1s likely to be
both feasible and effective in dealing with an existent policy-making
problem or set of problems, and the third and fourth conditions are not
satisfied,
then it is permissible to make the decision and contribute to introducing
or retaining the policy or combination of these.
A PRAGMATIG APPROACH TO REASONABLE
DISAGREEMENTS AMONG REASONABLE PEOPLE

One might object to this principle on the grounds that, sometimes,

ordinary people who are of sound and cool mind, free from the influence of
coercion and manipulation, and well-informed simply do not know what to
think about given policies and decisions. For example, they may not know
what to think about policies and decisions concerning a new technology
such as personal computers in the 1980s or the automobile in the early 1900s,
even if they have all the information available to decision makers at the time.
Yet, in cases such as these, although they are uncertain about the manner
in which a new technology’s expansion might affect them in the future, and
partly because of this uncertainty, ordinary people are not without ideas.
They are likely to think that policies, procedures, and decisions are less
tolerable the more they preempt the possibility of future corrections. Hence,
though lacking a definitive answer about the technologies, they are likely to
144 PRACTICALEQUITY

have a clear and defensible answer about policy-making concerning such

technologies. This answer is often likely to be: Keep options as open as
circumstances permit.”
The same applies to those situations in which well-informed, rational
people in a rational frame of mind disagree. It is in cases such as these that
negotiation, social interaction accompanied by discussion of merits, and
other social decision procedures are appropriate for pragmatically working
out the differences. The more future options are preempted, the more this
process is undermined. Hence, if public participation is, as previously
argued, crucial for politically wise and morally acceptable policy-making,
options should be kept as open as circumstances permit. Indeed, whatever
other disagreements ordinary people have, they are often likely to agree
on this.
The outcomes of such a process may not completely satisfy anyone, but a
minimum standard of provisions is likely to be met. This is often all that can
be accomplished in political and moral life. In faithfully reflecting this fact,
the hypotheses I have proposed are central components of a satisfactory
theory in the sense of this term explained at the outset.?> With its help, one
can strike a sound balance between the excesses of social order and those of
social disorder. Realistically speaking, individual freedoms and well-being
would be the better for it.
 Dialogue

— Your hypotheses appear to involve some difficulties. For exam-

ple, suppose that there is a policy-making problem and some policy,
decision, or combination of these, though feasible and likely to be
ee would lead to roughly at least as much disruption or
limitations on people’s freedoms or well-being as the alternatives.
Suppose also that those likely to be affected would find it intoler-
able. According to your hypotheses, the policy, decision, or com-
bination is not permissible. However, it is permissible to engage in
certain social decision procedures—at the very least, in coping,
discussion of merits, and negotiation. But, in pursuing decision
procedures, some decisions are involved—namely, those to engage
in the social decision procedures. Do your hypotheses entail that
these latter decisions are also impermissible?

— Notat all. The fact that some decisions are not permissible in the
situation does not mean that no decisions are permissible in it.
Indeed, the policies and decisions that are not permissible in the case
you described are those that address the entire policy-making prob-
lem(s) in question. The decisions to engage in such things as discus-
sion of merits and negotiation address a special aspect of the
problem(s)— the differences of opinion or existing objections —and
are permissible.

— But suppose that the procedures themselves would lead to at

least as much social disruption or limitation on people’s freedoms or
well-being as the impermissible policies and decisions. In such a
case, nothing would be permissible, not even coping, which is
absurd.

— So far, you have formulated conditions under which, if the

hypotheses were applicable, the said results would appear to follow.
But you have offered no actual or plausible case in which such a

145
146 DIALOGUE

situation would arise. Until you present such a case, your objection
has no force. It is merely an abstract possibility.

— The following case should do. Suppose that there has been an
earthquake in a remote region of the country, and you are in charge
of a first-aid contingent sent to the area. Upon arrival, you realize
that those in need of help are scattered in two separate valleys. You
can reach one as easily as the other and, given the reports you have
received, one group needs as much help as the other. But the needed
help cannot be provided to any group if you split your contingent
and resources. You must make a policy decision. If you do nothing,
no one gets help. If you split your contingent, no one gets help. If
you and your contingent go to one valley, no one in the other valley
gets help. And it is quite unlikely that a new contingent will arrive
with additional help early enough to make a difference. Now,
according to your hypotheses, it is not permissible to do nothing or
split your contingent, because these alternatives would limit the
well-being, if not the freedoms, of those affected—in this case, the
earthquake victims. Relative to these alternatives, it is permissible to
go to one valley or the other. But the decision to go to one valley
would limit the well-being, if not freedoms, of the victims in the
other valley, and vice versa. So, relative to each other, none of these
decisions is permissible. Further, any permissible procedure you use
must be nonconfrontational. Coping or discussion of merits,
however, will amount to doing nothing for the victims, hence are
not permissible. Negotiation or bargaining is irrelevant, because no
one is in a position to negotiate with you about the matter. So is
mediation, for there is no happy or even unhappy medium to be
reached. So is arbitration, unless you appoint yourself the situa-
tion’s arbiter. But on what grounds would you base your arbitra-
tion?

— I can see the point of your case, but not its force. Though it is
morally significant, it is not a policy-making case, because no policy
is being made. Nor is the decision a policy-making decision. It is
just an episodic decision made while simply carrying out policies
already in existence and not questioned in the context. Besides, I
don’t think your case is realistic. Usually, in a situation like the one
you described, it is feasible to send advance scouting parties to the
affected areas in order to determine whether their needs for help are
indeed roughly the same. Alternatively, it is often feasible for a
helicopter crew to scout the areas and radio reports to the aid
 Dialogue 147

contingent. I bet you ten to one that, normally, they will report
significant differences. Indeed, the helicopters might start delivering
help, thus giving your contingent time to help the victims in one
valley and then those in the other.

—— But suppose that, in the case I am describing, the reports you

receive indicate that the need for help is roughly the same in both
valleys, and that the help the helicopters could provide is too little
to make a difference.

— I must admit that your efforts at imagining a real dilemma are

quite fashionable. Yet, the closer you get to attaining your purpose,
the less realistic and more unusual your case becomes. Hence, its
force diminishes. Besides, even if your case were a real dilemma, as
well as realistic and frequent, it would not show a flaw in my
hypotheses. There is one, however unsatisfactory, nonconfronta-
tional procedure you have not mentioned: flipping a coin or some-
thing to that purpose.

— Isn’t that heartless, though?

— It need not be. One might flip the coin, decide accordingly, and
then be haunted by the misery and maybe death of those one did
not help.

— Maybe so, but it still trivializes a morally significant decision.

— I don’t see how. Unnecessarily flipping a coin to make decisions

would do that. But given your description of the case, it or a
procedure like it was necessary. If the type of case you described
were common, however, the decision might be trivialized by the
fact that flipping a coin to make moral decisions was an everyday
affair. But the case is quite rare, if at all actual or plausible.

— However this may be, another problem with your hypotheses is

that they are redundant. According to them, policies or decisions
that are feasible and likely to be effective are permissible only when,
in addition, they are likely to lead to less societal disruption or
limitations of freedom and well-being than the alternatives and
those likely to be affected would find it tolerable. How could they
find it intolerable in such a case?
148 DIALOGUE

— Very simply. Though the policies and decisions may lead to less
societal disruption, they may limit freedoms or well-being in a
manner that those likely to be affected (or at least some of them)
would find intolerable. Alternatively, the policies and decisions
might lead to greater freedoms (e.g., free international trade) and
well-being (e.g., extra goods or services bought with a $1,000 check
from the government to each citizen) while increasing social disrup-
tion (e.g., by increasing the national deficit too much). In this case,
the people might find such costly extra freedoms and well-being
intolerable, for example, because their children and grandchildren,
or simply future generations, would suffer as a consequence.

— Even if the policies are not redundant, they are too restrictive.
Suppose that given policies or decisions would lead to societal
disruption and limit the freedoms and well-being of those likely to
be affected more than the alternatives; but all those likely to be
affected would, nonetheless, find them tolerable. Why should they
be impermissible?

— I’m afraid I find your case unconvincing, since the people we are
talking about are supposed to be of cool and sound mind, free from
the influences of coercion and manipulation, and well-informed. It
is unlikely that they would tolerate being shortchanged when the
policies or decisions that do it are avoidable. But even if they would
tolerate the worse situation, why let it come about if one could do
better? One thing is sure: They would not find improvements
intolerable. No doubt, if those likely to be affected by a policy,
decision, or combination of these are likely to find it intolerable,
policymakers should not institute it, even if it appears likely to
bring about improvements. But the situation described is not one in
which people find intolerable what policymakers think to be better,
but one in which people find tolerable what policymakers think to
be a worse alternative; they would also find tolerable and welcome a
better alternative. Surely policymakers would not be doing their
jobs well if they stopped engaging in policy-making likely to bring
about improvements just because people are content with a worse
situation.

— Given your answer, I must still conclude that your hypotheses

are too restrictive. They place an undue burden on policymakers by
requiring them to engage in self-sacrifice for the sake of the public
good.
 Dialogue 149

— That is not true, because policymakers are also included among

those likely to be affected by policies or decisions, including those
that apply to policy-making concerning new policies or decisions
and those that apply to their future implementation. Hence, if,
when thinking freely, coolly, and reflectively, policymakers judged
the policies or decisions intolerable (e.g., because they required
severe self-sacrifice), the policies would not be permissible. Of
course, appropriate social decision procedures could be used to
work out alternatives.

— On another matter, rather than too restrictive, your hypotheses

appear incomplete, or involve practical contradictions, or lead to an
infinite regress. How are policymakers supposed to go about decid-
ing what social decision procedure to use in order to settle differ-
ences? Would you expect them to negotiate or not? Such a thing
would involve a practical contradiction, wouldn’t it?

— If they negotiated whether to engage in any negotiation what-

soever, a practical contradiction would appear to be involved. They
would go along with one negotiation while, in negotiating whether
to engage in any, they would presumably be committed not to go
along with any yet. But this is not how things actually happen.
Typically, people use one procedure, such as mediation, to institute
another procedure, such as negotiation, in order to settle differ-
ences. And if they use negotiation, they use it simply to settle
whether to use negotiation to settle differences affecting the permis-
sibility or effectiveness of policies or decisions about a certain
subject, (e.g., about nuclear energy). There is no contradiction here,
because there are two logically and chronologically separate nego-
tiations about two different matters.

— But it leads to an infinite regress. What procedure could people

use to make the decision to use mediation, in order to agree to use
negotiation, in order to settle differences that affect the permissibility
of, say, a given nuclear energy policy? Whatever procedure consti-
tutes the answer, the question arises: What procedure may they use
to decide to use that one? This situation recurs forever.

— It may recur in the never-never land of mere logical possibilities

and possible worlds, but not in the actual world. In the latter, things
start with people trying to use a variety of different social decision
procedures and, as a result, they go along with some of them. My
150 DIALOGUE

hypotheses, however, are not incomplete. They imply that this is

permissible. The only constraints are on what procedures may be
used given the type of policy and decision problems being faced.
For example, it is impermissible to use combat in dealing with a
problem primarily addressed through reliance on reason and
meaningful dialogue.

— A policy-making area in which your hypotheses still strike me as

too permissive or vague involves people’s self-esteem and human
dignity. For example, what guidance, if any, do they give us con-
cerning policies about people’s ability to undergo ten or eighteen
plastic surgery procedures simply to look better, not to correct
disfigurements caused by illness or accidents?

— I am glad you asked, because this case belongs in a large class

that includes genetic engineering techniques used to improve an
individual’s features, ranging from height to memory; the ability to
sell one’s own organs for transplant into other people; the ability of
a woman to serve as a surrogate mother for a price; and the more
puzzling case of the consequences, if any, of computer develop-
ments on people’s self-esteem. I discuss primarily this latter case in
the next essay, but my conclusions have implications for the others.
9 Between Triviality
and Worth: Computers,
Education,
and Self-Esteem

When I was a teenager, a musician of my acquaintance once said, upon being

told that machines could create music: “That does not worry me in the least.
I will worry the day they can appreciate music.” I then thought that the
ability to appreciate music or, for that matter, other forms of art or a piece of
reasoning was not enough. I believed that something else, which we de-
veloped through our education in addition to appreciation skills, made us
worthy in a manner that machines were not. Like many people, I used to feel
secure in the thought that building design, music making, painting, financial
advising, and learning and reasoning skills were strongholds of human
creativity and incapable of computer emulation.
However, judging by what some artificial intelligence experts tell us, these
examples are unlikely to fill the bill. They are increasingly becoming skills
that machines also have or can have in the foreseeable future.' All are
technically possible, though some may not become technical realities be-
cause of lack of money or will. Some ethically and politically significant
questions nonetheless arise: Does the ever-expanding technological feasibil-
ity of computers to have skills traditionally associated with people’s educa-
tion jeopardize people’s self-esteem? If so, what policies and decisions are
permissible concerning such computer developments? Should they aim at
promoting any such developments, at stopping them, or at striking some
balance between them and people’s self-esteem? How should this balance be
determined?
These are the questions I address in this essay. In doing so, I argue for
eight theses. First, there is reason to believe that the said computer develop-
ments undermine one current conception of self-esteem, namely, that associ-
ated with skills and, in particular, with those a person acquires through
education. Second, however, the fears that this situation prompts appear

151
152 BETWEEN TRIVIALITY AND WORTH

exaggerated. Third, at any rate, the skills acquired through education do not
suffice as grounds of a person’s worth. Fourth, a better alternative bases
self-esteem on character traits such as honesty, kindness, and fairness. That
is, traditional virtues are crucial and, arguably, basic grounds for self-esteem.
Fifth, the problem posed by computer developments’ undermining of self-
esteem associated with the said skills needs to be addressed. Sixth, in general,
there appears to be consensus among the public at large that computer
technologies that facilitate work, including the work that goes into acquiring
an education, are a good thing. Seventh, arguably, this consensus is based
more on faith (whether in machines or in experts) than on fact. Eighth, in
accordance with the hypotheses stated in Essay 8, policies concerning com-
puter and related technological developments are permissible so long as they
balance four things: people’s current notions of self-esteem, their economic
needs, those of their society, and the need to facilitate their adaptation to the
wider and more basic conception of self-esteem based on good traits.

AN EDUGATION TO BE PROUD OF
One often hears people say, ““You should be proud. It isn’t easy to get the
education you got. These days, it’s unusual to find someone with the
breadth and depth of education you have. That’s something to be proud of.”
These statements indicate that a person’s education is often thought to
involve sound grounds for self-pride, self-respect, or self-esteem. And in
talking of self-pride, self-respect, or self-esteem, people typically mean a
sense of pleasure or satisfaction taken in something done, produced, or
acquired by oneself, which is supposed to be to one’s credit. On what
grounds is acquiring an education thought to be to one’s credit?
A context significantly related to that of acquiring an education is that of
work done in producing goods, typically in jobs. The education one acquires
partly involves acquiring the knowledge and ability needed to perform this
or that job. Hence, the conditions regarded as grounds for self-esteem in
acquiring an education are likely to be analogous to those regarded as
grounds for self-esteem in job-related work. David Braybrooke offers a
characterization of the latter, which he calls “conditions for relatively
highest esteem’’:
(1) Doing the work, people produce goods that serve other people by
meeting their needs. (2) That people should do this work and that these
goods should be produced are both indispensable in this connection. (3)
Doing the work, people use skills that are exacting (both in acquisition
and in performance) in ways that other people respect. (4) The work is in
some sense arduous for the people doing it, and necessarily so; there is no
easier way of doing it in current technology.”
 Between Triviality and Worth 153

Other conditions might be added. Braybrooke mentions a measure of actual

recognition, variety, a degree of autonomy, and a chance to leave some
personally distinctive impression on the good produced. One could also add
the mere sense of having acquired an unusual breadth and depth of knowl-
edge or an outstanding ability to do a variety of complex jobs. At any rate,
Braybrooke does not focus on these additional conditions because he is
concerned with giving “‘sustained attention”? to needs.
In what follows, I do not focus primarily on needs, though the capacity to
meet needs is a crucial way in which people and their products are valuable.
Nor do I focus primarily on the listed additional conditions. Instead, I focus
primarily on the second, third, and fourth conditions Braybrooke mentions
and investigate their role as grounds for self-esteem in having acquired
an education.
There are at least three frequently recognized grounds for having self-
esteem concerning one’s education. First, the person’s education is thought
to be and to make the person unique, nearly unique, or somehow unsubsti-
tutable. Second, the education thus acquired is generally presumed valuable
to oneself or others. Third, acquiring the education is difficult. These condi-
tions are analogous to Braybrooke’s last three conditions. One difference is
that although one’s education or the skills it involves may be exacting in
ways other people respect, this is not required by the conditions I just listed.
They require only that it be generally presumed valuable to oneself or
others. I argue later that policy-making must be sensitive to the fact that
people’s self-esteem is often based on these conditions. However, this is not
incompatible with arguing that basing self-esteem exclusively or primarily
on these conditions is a mistake. Before arguing for these theses, however,
let us turn to the effects of computers on education.

GOMPUTERS AND EDUGATIONAL PRIDE

The previously discussed computer developments appear to undermine peo-
ple’s educational self-esteem to the extent that it is exclusively or primarily
based on grounds of difficulty and unsubstitutability. Given such develop-
ments, eliminating such difficulty and unsubstitutability is already technical-
ly possible or is likely to be so in the near future.
One might be tempted to object that there is no harm in the fact that
certain things would be learned more easily if the learning environment had
plenty of computers and printers at the students’ disposal. This might make
it easier to write better looking papers or to study. What could be wrong
with it? It would certainly not do away with all difficulty in learning,
because there would still be many other difficult learning tasks to perform.
Some would be new, such as the task of using word-processing programs.
154 BETWEEN TRIVIALITY AND WORTH

Other tasks would be traditional ones. One would still have to spell words
right, write well, think well, and use one’s imagination to solve design
problems or prove logical theorems.
However, as previously mentioned, computer developments are likely to
make it technically possible for computers to facilitate and even perform any
of the tasks just listed. Eventually, they might be capable of performing any
tasks.> That is, first, computers increasingly do away with the difficulty
traditionally associated with learning and displaying task-oriented skills.
And second, computers are increasingly capable of taking the place of such
skills. These developments are merely contingent on financial or social
constraints, not on technical ones. Hence, current computer developments
undermine people’s self-esteem, so long as it is exclusively or primarily
based on the difficulty and unsubstitutability of skills acquired through
education. And they are likely to undermine it even more in the foreseeable
future.*
As stated, this phenomenon is not peculiar to education. For example, in
the context of the ideal of work and technological (not just computer)
development, David Braybrooke envisions the situation as follows:
One should not necessarily expect widespread despair, or even wide-
spread boredom. People may well contrive to amuse themselves, and to
lead congenial lives together, when they have little work to do and no
opportunity to win esteem by achieving high cultural ambitions. .. . What
will have been lost, with the loss of opportunities to help other people in
urgent, morally primary matters, will have been so many opportunities to
demonstrate sympathy, compassion, gratitude. A large part of the field of
application for moral sentiments and ethics will have gone. One may
anticipate, even if despair and boredom are avoided, an impoverishment of
sentiments, a growth of egoism, a certain moral emptiness.°
I sympathize with the concern that appears to guide Braybrooke in
envisioning this situation. It would indeed be a sorry success if “the elimina-
tion of work and trouble—success, supersuccess, according to the ethics of
welfare—will have helped to make our situation trivial.”® However, how
likely is the trivialization of human lives he envisions? I must confess a
certain skepticism about the matter and pursue it in some detail.

HABITS AND VALUES

There are at least two reasons for being skeptical of Braybrooke’s vision of a
generalized technological takeover. First, it is much more thorough than the
current or foreseeable technical possibilities I previously described. And
second, there is evidence that economic and other constraints tend to pre-
vent technical possibilities from becoming realities.’
 Between Triviality and Worth 155
However, Braybrooke’s concerns should not be taken lightly. People
cannot change their ideas or attitudes overnight. This fact leads to a crucial
policy-making question: What policy-making is permissible about the fact
that current developments in computer technology may jeopardize people’s
skill-based self-esteem, given that those who thus ground their self-esteem
are not likely to abandon these grounds overnight? In this regard, the role
that Braybrooke assigns to meeting needs in this vision is significant. So is
the role of satisfying crucial wants that may be simply based on customary
habits. Given these factors, how defensible are the inferences Braybrooke
draws?
One might think that at least one of these inferences is exaggerated.
Suppose that, under highly advanced technology, one could not demonstrate
sympathy or compassion by performing health care or analogous tasks
because computer-guided machines performed them. One could still dem-
onstrate sympathy or compassion concerning the circumstances that called
for such care. At the very least, one could do such things as visiting people in
the hospital and keeping them company. The same opportunities for doing
these things today would be present then. To be sure, some ways in which
one could demonstrate sympathy or compassion (e.g., a nurse’s supervising the
intravenous administration of a certain medicine to a patient and making the
appropriate changes) would be gone. But this in no way entails that a large part
of the field of application for moral sentiments and ethics would be gone.
Nurses and others could still be there to offer support and reassurance.
Concerning gratitude, Braybrooke’s scenario involves difficulties of a
different sort. It is not clear how highly advanced technology could meet all
needs or desires so that no one could demonstrate gratitude. Unless
machines themselves became persons—a highly improbable, if not impossi-
ble, development—they could hardly meet people’s need or desire for
attention, companionship, and loyalty. And, as I have just argued, people
could always provide attention and companionship, be loyal, and demon-
strate gratitude for the attention and companionship others provided to
them by doing the same things in return. Hence, concerning gratitude, the
field of application for moral sentiments and ethics also appears significantly
intact though, to be certain, changed.
Habits, however, have a way of creating values. The mere fact that people
are accustomed to and expect the old, traditional ways of demonstrating
sympathy and compassion makes those ways valuable. Indeed, some of them
can arguably be said to be the most poignant and satisfying ways in which
people demonstrate and expect sympathy and compassion. Hence, even if
many other ways of demonstrating them remain available, and new ways
develop, the loss of those crucial old ways will be experienced by many
ordinary people as an intolerable trivialization of life.
156 BETWEEN TRIVIALITY AND WORTH

It might be argued that these people would be carried away by sheer

sentimentality and nostalgia. No doubt, this characterization may be true of
some of them. There are always people given to weak emotionalism or
excessive indulgence in sentiment. Others, however, would be simply giving
due weight to various attachments they reasonably formed throughout their
lives and judging it intolerable to have to cope with the loss. There is no
denying that sentimental values would be involved in coming to this judg-
ment. But there is no reason to dismiss them, so long as people find them
crucial when judging with a cool and sound mind, free from the influences of
coercion and manipulation, and on the basis of adequate information.
One might grant that those who would find the changes intolerable are
not carried away by sheer sentimentality and nostalgia, but still argue that,
for the sake of progress, all sentimental values should be put aside. But this
reply involves a big leap of faith, besides being both morally insensitive and
politically unwise. First, it involves a big leap of faith because progress is a
vague term whose application in this case is highly controversial. And so is
saying that all sentimental values should be put aside for the sake of prog-
ress. Second, the response is morally insensitive because it unjustifiably
plays down the fact that the people described would find the situation
intolerable. Third, the said reply is politically unwise; the prospect that
many people are likely to be affected by computer developments in ways
they find intolerable is not something that, from a political standpoint, one
can simply disregard. They may not simply grin and bear it but, as many
workers have done, seriously resist the change.®
In response, it might be objected that the preceding remarks presuppose
that people will not adapt. But there is evidence that they will. Consider the
United States between 1950 and 1990. In a few decades, people adapted to a
great deal of technology and much loss of human contact and support. For
example, in many places, impersonal supermarkets and department stores
have replaced small local stores and the more personal local life that sur-
rounded them. Indeed, catalog buying is doing away with the need to go to
the store at all. Also, banking by computer is becoming increasingly com-
mon. In health care, many computerized devices have done away with the
need for frequent human exchanges. Yet people do not seem to mind. Some
rather welcome not having to talk to people they did not always, if ever, like.
This response, however, misses part of the point. The problem is twofold:
Technology development may make life unjustifiably intolerable for some
because it may make it easy to the point of triviality for all. First, in doing
away with the need to have as many exchanges with people as before,
computer technology and related developments may undermine people’s
ability to relate to one another. It becomes harder to demonstrate sympathy
or compassion, for example, when we have increasingly less contact with one
 Between Triviality and Worth 157

another. Second, the envisioned situation may do away with the need to
make an effort to attain things that used to be hard to attain. Computers
could help us attain the same things (e.g., designing buildings, making music,
producing paintings, and giving financial advice) almost effortlessly.
By the way, other technologies could help do away with effort in other
areas of life. Is your body looking out of shape? Why exercise to fix it? If
you can afford it, have some aesthetic surgery instead! It takes less effort and,
often, less pain. And when the surgery’s results begin to go away, have more
surgery (like car tune-ups). And if it is fine to use aesthetic surgery this way,
why not get genetically engineered products implanted in our bodies so that
we can grow a bit taller or improve our memory?
No doubt, aesthetic surgery is of great help in reconstructing the features
of victims of accidents or fires. And some genetically engineered products
may be of great help in treating growth defects or the effects of illness on
memory. These applications, however, meet needs and crucial wants. In
contrast, the previously mentioned applications are frivolous and trivial.
They are further evidence that the technological developments just discussed
may trivialize life. Indeed, they may make it so easy, boring, and shallow
that people may not merely lose their self-esteem. They may begin to fight
simply to escape from boredom, as they were doing in the South Seas when
Captain Cook came upon the circumstances of paradise.
As indicated, however, the said computer and other technology develop-
ments are unlikely to make everyone, or even most people, lose their
self-esteem by making them inessential. Nor are these developments likely
to lead all, or even most people, to become so bored with life as to be
driven into despair or violence. Nor are they likely to make most people, let
alone everyone, shallow to the point of becoming unable to conceive that
thrills do not exhaust what is valuable. Nonetheless, current computer and
other technology developments may affect many people in one of these
ways. Hence, as I have argued, policy-making about the said developments
should be morally sensitive to these not unlikely consequences.
The consequences just described largely concern matters of character,
which raise a number of questions: What is the significance of character in
dealing with the matters we are discussing? Does it constitute an alternative
to the difficulty and unsubstitutability of task-oriented skills used as exclu-
sive grounds for self-esteem? Is it better? I address these questions next by
focusing again on computer developments.

A MATTER OF GHARAGCTER
The conception of self-esteem associated exclusively or primarily with the
difficulty and unsubstitutability of task-oriented skills is not uncommon.
158 BETWEEN TRIVIALITY AND WORTH

Yet, in this extreme version, it is unsound. Instead of leading to self-esteem,

it leads to the loss of self-esteem in the contemporary world. After all, if
people had not based their self-esteem exclusively or primarily on these
features, current computer developments would not undermine it. Such a
conception is accordingly self-frustrating, and any self-frustrating concep-
tion of self-esteem should be abandoned.
It might be objected, however, that the conclusion. that it should be
abandoned is too facile. One needs to deal with the objection that current
computer developments, not the said notion of self-esteem, ought to be
abandoned. This objection, however, is merely ad hoc. First, why make it,
other than because one is caught up in a conception of self-esteem based
exclusively or primarily on difficulty and unsubstitutability? And second,
the objection is unrealistic. Computer developments, including those that
replace people such as building designers and airplane pilots, are here to stay.
Why insist on making people feel hopelessly unworthy for the sake of a
moral tradition? After all, it is not the only one.
Even people who base their self-esteem on the difficulty or unsubstitut-
ability of their accomplishments often do not exclusively or primarily base
their self-esteem on them. They also base it on character traits. Indeed, there
are good reasons for connecting one’s self-esteem to the value of one’s
character or character traits. Before proceeding, let us briefly characterize
some notions central to this conception.
In this alternative conception, character traits are those among a person’s
characteristics that are to the person’s credit or discredit and make the
person good, bad, or objectionable. A person’s character is made up of his or
her character traits, and the manifestation of these is not exhausted in
specific tasks.” The motives for performing these tasks are crucial. Among
these traits are fairness, benevolence, and a sense of duty. Another, courage,
was highly valued by the ancient Greeks, but it appears to have lost its moral
preeminence in the largely impersonally organized twentieth-century
societies. I have elsewhere argued for adding to the list a sense of humor,
understood not merely as wit but also as not taking oneself too seriously.'°
This character-based conception of self-esteem is much more impervious
to the ill effects of computer developments than that based on skills. Indeed,
current developments in computer technology may prove to be a blessing in
disguise, for they bring out the preeminence of good character and character
traits in giving worth to our lives. These character traits and the act of
nurturing them through education—both in and outside school—are cru-
cial for preserving the field of application for moral sentiments and ethics.
They are also crucial for preventing our lives from becoming trivial.
These features of tlie character-based conception of self-esteem strengthen
the view that character and character traits are sound grounds of self-esteem,
and task-oriented skills by themselves are not. As previously stated, how-
 Between Triviality and Worth 159
ever, Braybrooke’s concern should not be taken lightly. Granted that the
strictly skill-based conception of self-esteem should be abandoned in favor
of the character-based conception, nagging policy questions remain. What
policy-making is permissible about the fact that current developments in
computer technology jeopardize people’s skill-based self-esteem, given that
those who thus ground their self-esteem are not likely to abandon these
grounds overnight?
There is already some controversy about this policy problem. Some
academics, for example, resist computers in their offices and courses at all
costs; others promote them with equal fervor. However, such controversy is
largely circumscribed to academic circles and does not appear to have
significantly disrupted the educational sector, let alone society at large.
Indeed, the members of the public who have an opinion about it appear to
want or, at the very least, not object to the further development and
introduction of computers in education. Various reasons are offered in
support of this attitude. Let us next discuss some that are relevant to the
policy problem under consideration.

GOMPUTERS, EDUGATION, AND JOBS

It is said in the controversy that although self-esteem is certainly a concern,
so are jobs. Along these lines, discussions tend to focus exclusively on
arguments in favor of rushing to introduce computers in education. It is
argued, for example, that the job market is bad, the competition is tough,
and the jobs will go to those who have the new computer skills already
required in the market. Hence, the argument goes, since an education should
put students in a position to compete in this market and to get jobs in it,
computers should be used in education as widely as possible. This way,
students will develop the necessary skills and therefore have a good chance
of getting jobs.
There is no doubt a lot of truth and common sense in this position. It
should be noted, however, that the notion of an education emphasized in it
is different from the one previously discussed. Based on this conception, a
student’s acquisition of computer skills is primarily a ground for temporary
relief from anxiety about the job market. It is not primarily a ground for
self-esteem. One’s supposed accomplishment, if any, is that one has acquired
certain computer skills well enough and fast enough to beat the competition
to a job. It goes without saying that one may lose the job to another
competitor, possibly to a machine, in the foreseeable future. Although the
difficulty in acquiring the skills is not yet gone, one’s unsubstitutability is.
And those opposing the unrestricted introduction of computers in education
are unlikely to miss the opportunity to mention it.
Of course, such substitutability as a result of computers’ irruption in
160 BETWEEN TRIVIALITY AND WORTH

education is no reason to disregard job competitiveness. Indeed, it would be

foolish to do so. However, policymakers faced with the conflictive demands
of education and jobs must face the following social fact: Giving absolute
priority to market survival and the avoidance of all market risk tends to
focus on the ever-present need to develop new marketable skills to the
detriment of all the above discussed grounds for self-esteem. Hence, if
market survival and the avoidance of all market risk are given absolute
priority, such grounds for self-esteem as skill difficulty and unsubstitutabil-
ity are further weakened. But, in addition, character and character traits are
brushed aside. That is, all grounds for self-esteem are gone. This is a reason
not to give market survival and the avoidance of all market risks absolute
priority. Besides, bad job markets and tough competition do not usually rule
out considerations other than market survival."
The weakening of self-esteem based exclusively or primarily on difficulty
and unsubstitutability might be welcomed. One might believe, as I previous-
ly argued, that they are insufficient grounds for self-esteem. Indeed, along
these lines, one could hail task-oriented computer developments as a means
of dramatizing the inadequacy of task-oriented skills as a ground for self-
esteem and as a reason to support the character-based notion of self-esteem.
Yet, as we also saw, none of the above is sufficient for disregarding the
policy-making and morally significant fact that many people still base their
self-esteem on the difficulty and unsubstitutability of the tasks they can
perform. The policy-making question still remains. Rephrased in a more
specific manner, it is this: What policies are permissible concerning this
situation, given that people are not likely to abandon the said conception of
self-esteem overnight?

IN SEARGH OF BALANGE
The preceding discussion points to four main concerns that should be
addressed in dealing with the policy question: (1) people’s current notions of
self-esteem, (2) their economic needs, (3) the economic needs of their soci-
ety, and (4) the need to facilitate people’s adaptation to a sound conception of
self-esteem, which is, as I argued, the character-based conception. Policies
are permissible so long as they are sensitive to all these concerns. In particu-
lar, policymakers should not simply brush the first and fourth concerns
aside. In other words, policies of neglect are unjustified, as are those that
focus only on market concerns. Such policies reflect the conception that
everything and everyone has a price, and the value of character does not
matter. This conception is in conflict with the defensible and widely held
notion of character-hased self-esteem.
Also, though the strictly skill-based conception of self-esteem is flawed,
 Between Triviality and Worth 161

the suffering and alienation people would undergo if such a conception were
brashly undermined are morally significant. Hence, policies that disregard
this skill-based conception for the sake of prompt computer development
are unjustified. This points to the remaining concerns. Extreme economic
exigencies of society would justify undermining the flawed, though not the
character-based, conception of self-esteem. Fortunately, such economic ex-
igencies are not as common as some make them out to be. However,
individual economic needs are often at stake, and policies concerning com-
puter development must take them into account.
One might be tempted simply to poll people about their opinions on the
matter and pass policy accordingly, but this would be overly simplistic.
Public opinion about current and foreseeable computer developments in the
late twentieth century may be significantly affected by lack of information
about the developments and their consequences. But suppose those polled
are given the available information about these things. If asked whether they
favor these developments, they might say that they are in favor of them, that
they are not, or that they do not know. Some might add that they favor
policy-making that keeps their options open as much as circumstances
permit. After all, many people want to see whether they can adapt to the
new situation.
For purposes of comparison, let us return to the case of the automobile
discussed at the book’s beginning. Imagine people being asked at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century whether they favored the development and
introduction of the automobile. This was supposed to be a means of trans-
portation faster than the horse and carriage and, unlike the train, capable of
being used as private transportation. Some claimed that it might significantly
increase injuries and deaths from traffic-related accidents, but the technolo-
gy had not been tested. What would people have said? Some might have
favored it (many did). Others might have opposed it (some did). Still others
might not have known what to say. And many in each group might have
wanted to keep their options open.
With hindsight, we know what happened. Individually, people adapted to
the automobile and the enormous number of injuries and deaths associated
with it in the late twentieth century. Collectively, however, society found
itself ill-adapted to the air pollution, resource depletion, energy dependency,
and other consequences of using the automobile for private transportation.
Yet alternatives to it have been significantly preempted by both practice and
policy. None of this, however, was known at the beginning of the century.
This situation is analogous to that concerning computer development today.
Hence, it provides reasons to conclude that policies concerning computer
development are permissible so long as they do not unjustifiably preempt
viable and defensible options.
162 BETWEEN TRIVIALITY AND WORTH

Throughout the process, research and public education concerning com-

puters and their consequences for society and individuals are crucial. Other-
wise, those involved in the policy-making process or affected by it will
develop little appreciation of computers, people, and their mutual relations.
In the United States, some of this has been done. There are currently fifty to
sixty science, technology, and society programs in U.S. colleges and univer-
sities whose aim in part is to develop such appreciation. More of them would
be of help.'? Maybe appreciation dispositions (which are crucial to a well-
balanced character, and whose display is not exhausted in narrowly specified
tasks) have something to do with what makes us worthy of self-esteem after
all. Maybe the musician of my acquaintance had a point.
At any rate, the consequences of new computer technologies for self-
esteem cannot be soundly or easily disregarded by simply discounting
self-esteem, whatever its grounds, as a thing of the past—a sort of ethical
dinosaur. As Joan Didion put it in her Slouching Towards Bethlehem, “To
protest that some fairly improbable people, some people who could not
possibly respect themselves, seem to sleep easily enough is to miss the point
entirely, as surely as those people miss it who think that self-respect has
necessarily to do with not having safety pins in one’s underwear.”?
 Dialogue

— Granted that basing one’s self-esteem exclusively or primarily

on uniqueness or difficulty is not sufficient, the alternative you
suggest does not seem much better. As Braybrooke argues, compu-
ter developments undermine the manifestation of such good charac-
ter traits as sympathy and compassion.

— They would undermine such traits if the developments were

extensive. But extensive developments appear unlikely. As for cur-
rent and foreseeable developments, they are not likely to undermine
the manifestation of good character traits as much as they under-
mine the uniqueness or difficulty involved in acquiring or em-
ploying the abilities acquired through an education.

— Be that as it may, I’m unclear about the application of your

hypotheses. On the one hand, you state that there is some con-
troversy, primarily in academic circles, concerning computer de-
velopments and their social effects. On the other hand, you state
that there is general consensus among the public that these develop-
ments are a good thing. How should one classify this case: as a
controversy or as a case of predominant consensus?

— First, you must be clear about the scope of the policies or

decisions you envision. Are they supposed to be merely local, say,
confined to one academic institution? Or are they supposed to be
national, say, applicable to computer developments in the United
States? If the former, and if there is controversy about the matter in
the academic institution in question, then you are dealing with a
controversy. If the scope of the envisioned policies or decisions is
national, and there is general consensus about the matter among the
public, then you have good reason to classify the case as one that
primarily involves consensus, not conflict. Of course, you will also
have to get additional information. For example, you would need to

163
164 DIALOGUE

establish whether the situation is disruptive at the macrolevel of

society. Equally important would be to establish whether the free-
doms and well-being of individuals are currently limited more than
they would be in the situation that the envisioned policies and
decisions would bring about.

— And what about the procedures to use in the policy-making

process? Which ones should be used?

— My hypotheses are meant to tell you what types of procedures

are permissible, and what types are not, in given types of situations.
They are not, however, meant to tell you what particular procedure
to use in the situation you face. To establish the latter, one needs to
examine the evidence indicating what is likely to work in given
circumstances. For example, if the policy-making situation
involves—as it appears to involve in one of the cases just
described—a controversy, then mere discussion of merits, though
partly useful, will probably be insufficient. If, however, it primarily
involves consensus—but this consensus is a bit thoughtless or
shortsighted—then discussion of merits and education are per-
missible and may be crucial.

— I can see what you are saying, because the situations we are
discussing point to no impending crisis. But what about nastier
situations? I am still waiting to see a full-fledged case exemplifying
how your hypotheses apply.

— You won’t have to wait any longer. Let us move on to the

next essay.
b|O Like the Phoenix:
Ethics, Policy-Making,
and the U.S. Nuclear
Energy Controversy

The U.S. nuclear energy controversy, like the phoenix, keeps on being
reborn from its own ashes. Since 1945, when it all began, up to the present,
the controversy has arisen in a new form each time it was thought to be
buried. Why is the controversy recurrent? What are the political and ethical
implications of its recurrence for technology policy-making? What specific
ways of dealing with the controversy are both politically sound and morally
permissible? Are science courts and technology tribunals among them? Is
the legislative process a better alternative? How promising are any of these
when assessed in light of the fact of issue-overload discussed at the book’s
outset? These are the main questions I address.
I argue for various interrelated theses. First, the recurrence of the U.S.
nuclear energy controversy shows various trends. Among these, secrecy and
lack of public influence on nuclear policy-making have increasingly become
concerns among wide sectors of the public. Second, the fact that these and
related concerns were not squarely addressed in the past by largely tech-
nocratic policy-making partly explains the recurrence of the controversy.
Third, the growing public concern about secrecy and lack of public influence
highlights technocratic policy-making’s lack of political realism and ethical
sensitivity about nuclear energy and, in fact, any socially significant tech-
nology. In other words, it makes plain the political wisdom and ethical
soundness of participatory policy-making about nuclear energy and other
technology matters. Fourth, along participatory lines, the science court
proposal is inadequate. Fifth, the technology tribunal, though promising for
some purposes, does not make enough room for the range of social decision
procedures useful for dealing with technology controversies and is liable
to be bogged down by issue-overload. Sixth, technology policy-making
through the legislative branch of government is much more open than the

165
166 LIKE THE PHOENIX

technology tribunal to such procedures as bargaining and negotiation and,

therefore, would be better attuned to many political realities and ethical
concerns. Yet, seventh, though the legislative process is less liable to yield
issue-overload than the technology tribunal, it is not impervious to such an
eventuality. Eighth, for technology policy-making to be successful, it needs
to proceed in the spirit of compromise and diplomacy. Ninth, disjoint
technology policy-making, in which a variety of channels (e.g., legislative
and court-like) are tried —often independently of each other—is most likely
to avoid the ever-present risk of promoting further proliferation of opinions
and controversy and getting bogged down by issue-overload.

A POINT OF METHOD
In arguing for the theses, I outline the history of the controversy in the
United States, especially up to 1954. In that year, with the passing of the
Atomic Energy Act, the basic legal stage for the controversy in its present
form was largely set.’ This will suffice for my main purpose, which is not
historical but sirnply to provide a developed case useful for discussing this
essay’s theses and clarifying the application of this book’s hypotheses. In
this latter regard, the said historical outline helps bring out the nuances of
nuclear energy policy-making. This is the only way that the applicability of the
book’s hypotheses to technology policy-making, and the value of ideas such as
the science court and the technology tribunal, can be realistically tested.

THE MGMAHON ACT AND ITS AFTERMATH

In the beginning, everything was in the hands of the military.? As soon as
World War II ended, however, people came to see this military monopoly as
undesirable for a variety of reasons. One was that it emphasized bomb
making rather than peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Another reason
was that, by means of secrecy, the military monopoly restricted the freedom
of inquiry necessary for vigorous research progress. Still another reason was
that the military monopoly led to administrative inefficiency. Committees
for Civilian Control of Atomic Energy were formed in various U.S. cities,
and the nuclear energy controversy was on its way.
After one year of postwar atomic politicking, on August 1, 1946, President
Truman signed the McMahon Bill into law. It placed all policy decisions,
including those concerning the production and custody of atomic weapons, in
the hands of a civilian Atomic Energy Commission. If people believed that the
controversy had come to an end, however, they were mistaken.
The controversy reappeared, Hydra style. It was now about two monopo-
lies rather than one. Concerning world policy, some criticized the McMahon
Act on the grounds that it was meant to fit a U.S. program that would put all
 Like the Phoenix 167

fissionable materials in the hands of an international agency. But, the argu-

ment went on, the program was bound to fail because the Soviet Union flatly
rejected any international control of fissionable materials. Concerning nu-
clear energy control in the United States, others criticized the McMahon Act
on the grounds that it legalized a monopoly in the United States and hence
ran counter to free enterprise.°
Centralization of U.S. energy production in the hands of government,
though not without supporters, had become the target of criticism. The
critics held that although private ownership of raw materials, fissionable
materials, patents, and production plants certainly should be controlled, it
should be permitted by the government. Otherwise, they argued, industry
would find no incentive in atomic development.* Advocates of such central-
ization, President Truman included, pointed to U.S. security, or to the
people’s interest in general, as a fundamental interest that such centralization
served to satisfy.
One might think that the government’s monopoly was opposed because
the power companies were eager to produce electricity from privately owned
nuclear fuels and power plants, but they were not. As Philip Sporn, presi-
dent of the Advisory Committee on Cooperation between the Electric
Power Industry and the Atomic Energy Commission said as late as Decem-
ber 28, 1950, the utilities were reluctant to use atomic energy. First, there
were the technical obstacles involved. Second, at the time, the prospects of
conventional power production were bright. And third, they thought that
the operation and maintenance of a nuclear reactor would be more expensive
than that of a conventional plant. This was a prophetic expectation borne out
by the economic difficulties faced by the U.S. nuclear industry during the
1970s and 1980s.°
Today, it is almost an article of faith that only the government was
interested in the development of industrial applications of nuclear energy,
not industry.” However, though the utilities were reluctant, they were not
entirely uninterested; nuclear development would have provided what they
thought was a convenient and cheap fuel. Nor was the government as eager
to develop nuclear power plants as it was made out to be. This is evidenced
by the fact that six months after Monsanto Chemical Company made a
proposal for the design, construction, and operation of an atomic power
plant built by industry with its own funds, the government had allowed
Monsanto to study its existing reactor projects but had not yet supported
Monsanto’s reactor development.*
Feasibility studies jointly conducted by government and industry, howev-
er, were soon to become a reality. In January 1951, the Atomic Energy
Commission announced the Industrial Participation Program, under which
the commission would accept “limited proposals to surveys of existing
168 LIKE THE PHOENIX

reactor data.”? On May 16, 1951, the Atomic Energy Commission an-
nounced that it would accept four proposals submitted by eight corpora-
tions working in pairs, with each pair including at least one utility company:
1. Monsanto Chemical Company and Union Electric Company of Mis-
souri
2. Dow Chemical Company and Detroit Edison Company
3. Commonwealth Edison Company and Public Service Company of
Northern Illinois
4. Pacific Gas and Electric Company and Bechtel Corporation
This arrangement was soon to be called “the biggest monopoly in America.’’'®
Talk of monopoly is strong talk. Was any interested industrial sector
excluded from the Industrial Participation Program, leading it to talk of
monopoly? The utilities themselves, as indicated, were only mildly in-
terested, but the chemical companies were quite interested. In addition, the
newly developed possibility of profitably collaborating with chemical com-
panies made participation very appealing to still other companies. Monsan-
to’s secretary, Edwin J. Putzell, Jr., explained the chemical companies’
interest: They especially wanted to sell the plutonium resulting from nuclear
production of electricity to the government, which needed it for military
purposes. Charging for it would allow them to bring down the price of
electricity, which they consumed in high quantities, and maybe make a
profit on the sale of plutonium itself.'’ A lot of money was at stake. Hence,
it is no wonder that those excluded from the Industrial Participation Pro-
gram and technologically able to engage in the profitable arrangements it
involved would talk bitterly of monopoly.
Whenever a lot of money is at stake, a big risk is involved. The arrange-
ment between the government and the corporations was likely to work as
long as the government needed to buy plutonium—a weapons material.
Some government officials raised questions about this way of making the
nuclear energy industry profitable.’? The dependence of nuclear energy’s
peaceful applications on its military applications thus became a new element
in the nuclear energy controversy.
U.S. nuclear energy development, however, went on despite the con-
troversy and the warnings of prominent physicists. Among these were Maria
Telkes of the Department of Metallurgy at MIT and Hans Thirring, Director
of the Institute for Theoretical Physics at the University of Vienna. In
addition, warnings were heard from members of President Truman’s Mate-
rials Policy Commission itself. All these scientists and policymakers sup-
ported the development of solar rather than nuclear energy.'? As for the
public, according to a 1951 University of Michigan Survey Research Center
study, it did not care. The general attitude was that the experts knew what
they were doing.'*
 Like the Phoenix 169
THE 1951 AMENDMENT

Governmental decisions are often inscrutable and perplexing. Why did the
U.S. government pursue the development of nuclear reactors for electricity
production despite the experts’ advice to the contrary? The October 30,
1951 amendment to the 1946 Atomic Energy Act may provide an answer. It
authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to release large amounts of
restricted information to any friendly nation, not just to war partners, as had
been the case. It also permitted private participation in the production of
fissionable materials outside the United States.
Byron S. Miller, who had been counsel to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, hypothesized that the U.S. need for fissionable materials and any
technical information it could get might have motivated the amendment."®
Keep in mind that the amendment was passed four months after the Korean
War started, when the arms race and the competition for fissionable mate-
rials throughout the world were escalating. In the United States, however,
access to nuclear information and private participation were still ruled out as
before. Why? The rationale was kept a secret and is hard to imagine. At any
rate, a long-standing aspect of the controversy became even more controver-
sial than before: the matter of secrecy.
To complicate things, the policy matters that concerned nuclear energy
could not be squarely addressed. Secrecy about nuclear energy kept even
important government officials ignorant of basic facts of nuclear life. Thom-
as E. Murray, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, criticized this
situation about half a year after the Korean War ended.'® Secrecy was now
being criticized from a political, not merely a research or business, stand-
point. A new aspect of the controversy was emerging: The public, and
certainly government officials, should be informed about matters concerning
the peaceful development of nuclear energy. These should not—indeed,
could not—be kept out of the ordinary world of politics.
A group of conflicting concerns was beginning to be publicly recognized.
Some corporations and a few government officials were concerned with
keeping nuclear energy matters out of the ordinary world of politics by
means of secrecy. This concern was openly in conflict with various others,
such as the public’s concern with national security and enlightened publicity
about nuclear matters. In fact, though not explicitly in the public’s percep-
tions, it was also in conflict with the public’s concern with safety (which
would become a source of public anxiety in the mid- and late 1950s).’” In
addition, it was in conflict with the concern of policymakers who repre-
sented the public and who, together with the public, were kept in the dark
about nuclear energy. This made it impossible for them to determine when
USS. security, or the safety or freedoms of U.S. inhabitants, would be en-
dangered by nuclear policies. The generalized recognition of these conflicts,
170 LIKE THE PHOENIX

especially at the level of governmental policymakers, marked the beginning

of an aspect of the nuclear energy controversy with which we are often faced
today: the conflict between technocracy and democracy in nuclear policy-
making.

THE NEW ATOMIG ENERGY ACT:

THE BEGINNING OF OUR TIME
A mere decision sometimes resolves a long-standing controversy, making
the preceding controversy irrelevant. This seemed to have happened to the
nuclear energy controversy in 1954, when President Eisenhower signed the
new Atomic Energy Act. It had one main effect: The development of
peaceful uses of nuclear energy was no longer kept out of the normal world
of business. The Act shifted the emphasis from government research to
government aid to permitted private research. It also permitted private
ownership of patents, fissionable materials, and nuclear facilities under the
regulation of the Atomic Energy Commission. But there was a catch: The
Act gave the Commission a great deal of leeway to determine what patents,
fissionable materials, and nuclear facilities could be privately owned. It also
gave the Commission absolute power to decide what nuclear information
could be declassified and disseminated. The only requirement was that the
Commission maintain a continuous review of nuclear data in an effort to
make public all those that would not endanger U.S. security. Nuclear energy
was no longer left to the experts. It was now left to committees. With the
enactment of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act—which, with only relatively
minor modifications, is still in force—the basic legal stage for the con-
troversy in its present form was set.'®

FAILURES OF TEGHNOGRAGY
The history of the U.S. nuclear energy controversy is a history of slowly
recognized conflicting concerns. These are not restricted to economic con-
cerns; they also involve concerns about safety and security. Nor are they
reduced to material concerns alone, because they also involve concerns
about research and publicity. In any case, all the conflicts involve matters of
secrecy, which more and more has become a crucial concern about nuclear
energy policy-making.
This is a significant trend in the nuclear energy controversy, and it reached
its peak not long ago. The public outcry about the Three Mile Island
accident and the secretive way in which it was initially handled by the
industrial groups involved and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission marked
the peak of the controversy. This public outcry was repeated following the
Chernobyl accident and the secretive way in which it was initially handled
 Like the Phoenix 171

by Soviet bureaucrats.'? It has finally dawned on people that experts and

committee members may not know what they are doing after all, or may not
be as trustworthy as they were supposed to be. The reliability, if not the
good faith, of the U.S. nuclear industry and of the government officials in
charge of overseeing it has become increasingly questioned.
This growth in public skepticism has resulted from technocratic policy-
making and one of such policy-making’s main concerns: preserving national
security and keeping nuclear energy matters out of politics through secrecy.
This concern conflicts with various public concerns, such as the need for
safety, enlightened publicity about nuclear matters, and national security
that is preserved through public participation, not mystery—through
democracy, not technocracy. The feeling among wide sectors of the public
has gone beyond merely wanting to be informed. Significant numbers of
people now want to have influence on both nuclear and technology policy-
making in general.
These conflicting concerns in the U.S. nuclear energy controversy have
underlain the controversy through the years. Yet, as the preceding sections
indicate, they have never been squarely addressed through participatory
channels. That these conflicts are still with us explains the recurrence and
intermittent virulence of the controversy. That they have never been square-
ly addressed through participatory channels explains why they are still with
us. And they are likely to keep on leading people to engage in the con-
troversy unless something is done about them in a more participatory, more
fully democratic way.

PUBLIG PARTIGIPATION IN TEGHNOLOGY POLIGY-MAKING

The nuclear energy controversy points to some basic practical implications
for policymakers. First, the fact that the controversy has so far been intrac-
table is an important reason for policymakers to address the societal fact of
this controversy fairly and squarely and do something about it. And second,
since a concern with secrecy and the traditional centralization and attempted
depoliticization of nuclear policy-making is at the core of the controversy,
nuclear policy-making about nuclear energy should be more participatory,
not technocratic.
There are at least three reasons for these theses. First, as the history of the
controversy makes plain, it is unrealistic to expect policy-making to succeed
without such participation. Instead, it is likely to lead to recurrences of the
controversy that are likely to be wider in scope and increasingly disruptive,
if not destabilizing, both politically and economically.
A second reason for more public participation is epistemological. Sound
technology policy-making requires policymakers to know as many of the
172. JEIKE-THEePHOENTX

concerns involved as circumstances permit them to know. This, of course, is

not to say that all concerns should always be taken into account before
making policy. As argued in previous essays, lack of time and means, as well
as political pressures, often make it necessary to decide before all the
information is in. But there is no good reason not to acquire information
that is attainable. As John Stuart Mill said:
The only way in which a human being can make some approach to
knowing the whole of a subject is by hearing what can be said about it by
persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can
be looked at by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his
wisdom in any mode than this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to
become wise in any other.*°
This points to a third, ethical reason for a participatory approach. Morally
speaking, policy-making should be sensitive to the various concerns in-
volved, but such sensitivity is impossible without adequate knowledge of
these concerns and the reasons prompting them. The previous outline of the
nuclear energy controversy’s history evidences that such knowledge and
sensitivity have been inadequate. Hence, greater public participation should
be brought to bear in the policy-making process.
Of course, what is to be done in the United States is not the same as what
should be done in other countries whose policy-making circumstances are
different (indeed, it must and ought to be quite different). In any case, unless
the various concerns about nuclear energy are addressed in a participatory
way, policy-making will disregard circumstances that are both morally and
politically central. Hence, it will be hopelessly and unjustifiably introducing
policy in a political and moral vacuum.
Concerns, like ideas, have histories that give them their political and moral
force. Those discussed above have the force gained through their long-
standing appeal since the 1940s. Policy-making that disregards such
concerns —for example, by seeking merely short-term solutions—is unlike-
ly to succeed in addressing the recurrent nature of the nuclear energy
controversy. The question is: What is likely to succeed?

ETHIGS, POLITIGS, AND NUGLEAR TEGHNOLOGY:

WHAT TYPE OF PUBLIG PARTIGIPATION?
The history of the U.S. nuclear energy controversy makes it plain that
policy-making about nuclear energy in this country has never been a de-
tached activity, taking place in a political and moral vacuum. Like much
policy-making about new technologies, it is subject to the demands of
interest groups, the constraints of law and implementation, and criticism of
the technology assessment efforts it involves. Indeed, not even technology
 Like the Phoenix 173

assessment is free from these demands, constraints, and criticisms. Yet

questions remain even after granting that technocratic approaches are politi-
cally unsound and morally impermissible, and that a more participatory
approach to technology policy-making should be adopted. For one: What
type of participation should this be?

THE SGIENGE GOURT PROPOSAL

One prominent proposal regarding public participation in technology
policy-making is that of the science court. It was made in “The Science
Court Experiment: An Interim Report,” authored by the Task Force of the
Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Tech-
nology. According to it, the court members would be competent, impartial
scientists from disciplines adjacent to the subject of a particular dispute—
that is, their discipline would not be involved in the dispute. The court
members would hear testimony on the various sides of an issue and would
report their findings on the scientific facts at issue. In addition, the court’s
proceedings would have three stages. First, the court would identify the
scientific and technological—not the ethical, political, and policy—
questions associated with an issue. Second, scientist-advocates would engage
in adversary proceedings, very much like those in a court trial, presided over
by the said impartial judges. Third, the judges would decide what the
scientific facts concerning the issue actually are.
The science court idea never went beyond the proposal stage. The Task
Force was dissolved when President Carter took office. But the idea has
elicited a great deal of discussion. One of the criticisms formulated against it
is that of Alex Michalos. He argues that the proposal involved the untenable
epistemological assumption that facts can be clearly separated from values.”
However, he believes that this assumption does not damage the proposal,
because the fact-value distinction is not crucial for the court’s purposes. That is,
he has no quarrel with the remaining features of the science court proposal.
K. S. Shrader-Frechette has criticized Michalos’s critique because, except
for the fact that it treats all findings as value laden, it leaves the basic
structure of the court intact.** This, she argues, would lead to overemphasis
on facts and domination by experts. To be sure, Michalos was aware of this
objection, and he addresses it by presenting two counterarguments. First,
regarding overemphasis on facts, he says that the court will not overempha-
size facts because it will deal with value-laden matters. Second, about
domination by experts, he says that ordinary citizens cannot be expected to
pass good judgment on purely technical considerations such as the court
deals with.
Shrader-Frechette questions the validity of this response on the grounds
that its counterarguments undercut each other. According to her, Michalos
174 LIKE THE-PHOENIX

cannot have it both ways: The considerations either are or are not purely
technical. Indeed, given Michalos’s view that the fact-value distinction is
untenable, he cannot consistently say that any considerations are purely
technical.2* This criticism is well taken only if characterizing considerations
as purely technical entails that they are purely factual. Michalos, however,
might respond that the considerations are purely technical in the sense that
they involve specialized knowledge, but this does not make them purely
factual. They are predicated on the (hardly questionable) evaluative presup-
position that public opinion is irrelevant for establishing such matters as
“whether or not saccharin is carcinogenic.”
Without a defense along the lines just indicated, Michalos must give up the
view that some considerations are purely technical. Yet, as Shrader-
Frechette correctly points out, he can still say, as he does, that the court,
though made up exclusively of scientists, will not overemphasize facts
because it will deal with value-laden matters. In fact, he adds, other societal
and governmental groups will also be dealing with the evaluative aspects of
the issues treated by the court.
This leads to Shrader-Frechette’s main criticism of Michalos’s position.
She criticizes it on the grounds that “the court likely would add merely to
the proliferation of opinion on an issue, rather than to a final conclusion
regarding it.”*° To avoid overemphasis on the factual aspects of issues
without opening the door to the mere proliferation of opinion, Shrader-
Frechette suggests a promising expansion of the court’s subject matter. It
would “‘address the major social-political-ethical-scientific facets of current
controversies over technology, and not just the scientific aspects.” The
“court could address questions like ‘how safe is safe enough?’ and not
merely questions like ‘how safe is this particular technology?’””’ In addi-
tion, she argues that if such an extension is reasonable, so is the inclusion of
ordinary citizens among the juries. Her label for this modified version of the
science court is the “technology tribunal.”?8
THE TEGHNOLOGY TRIBUNAL
Shrader-Frechette’s arguments in support of the technology tribunal are
largely arguments in support of participatory rather than technocratic
policy-making about technology. I sympathize with the participatory thrust
of her position and, as the arguments I have previously offered indicate, I
have no quarrel with most of them. But a question arises: Do her arguments
specifically support the technology tribunal proposal, or do they simply
support policy-making through the legislative branch of government?
One might object that the technology tribunal seems open to the same
objection Shrader-Frechette formulated against Michalos’s view. It “likely
would add merely to the proliferation of opinion on an issue, rather than to a
 Like the Phoenix 175

final conclusion regarding it.”?? Although the tribunal would expand the
court’s subject matter and membership, it would not diminish the occasions
for opinions to proliferate. At best, it would make it possible for them to
proliferate within the tribunal rather than in society at large.
In accordance with Shrader-Frechette’s concern for achieving closure on
issues, One might respond that, in any case, something would be gained from
the tribunal arrangement. So long as its proceedings would come to an end
through a jury’s vote, a decision would be reached. And the fact that it was
reached through a process that paid due attention to the views at issue would
make it democratic and lend some legitimacy to the decision reached. To be
sure, this does not cut down on opinion proliferation, but it shifts the
emphasis from opinions to decisions. The final conclusion to be reached
is a decision, not an opinion, since a decision procedure such as voting
is involved.
Of course, if a final conclusion concerning an issue is supposed to be a
well-established opinion shared by the tribunal members, the above sugges-
tion will not do. But one may defend such a suggestion on the grounds that
it is the decision’s legitimacy, not its being based on such an agreed-upon
opinion, that is politically and ethically crucial concerning technology
policy-making.
There is a great deal of truth in the position just stated. In addition, it
exemplifies a fact discussed in previous essays: that policy-making decisions
are not simply and univocally based on individual judgments. They are
reached through social decision procedures that, besides judgment and crit-
ical scrutiny, often involve a variety of social interactions, some of which
make little room for judgment. Yet none of this suffices to establish the
legitimacy of the technology tribunal, which is what is in question. Like the
court system, the technology tribunal would contribute to issue- and, spe-
cifically, court-overload, a development likely to undermine rather than
further democratic policy-making.

ISSUE-OVERLOAD AND DISJOINT POLIGY-MAKING

Issue-overload is a situation in which issues are so many, complex, or
intractable that they exceed, or nearly exceed, what ordinary individuals can
understand and ordinary societies can handle through the courts, legislation,
or executive or other institutional channels as traditionally set up. The social
fact of issue-overload results not only from the number of issues or the speed
with which new ones develop but also from addressing the issues through
inadequate and costly institutional channels. In democracies, where public
accountability is crucial, it may also result from addressing them through
institutional channels that make little, if any, room for this accountability.
76" SLIKE THE PHOENIX

In general, frequent mismatches between issues and the procedures used

for addressing the policy and decision problems they pose are indicators
of issue-overload. When, as a consequence of these mismatches, a crucial
social institution, sector, or entire society is politically undermined (e.g.,
through loss of public acquiescence) or economically destabilized (e.g.,
through costs the institution, sector, or society cannot afford), issue-
overload is present.
This essay has so far evidenced how science and technology have become
entangled in controversies in the United States. They have also become
entangled in issue-overload through court-overload that is caused partly by
the tendency to seek the resolution of scientific and technological matters
through the courts. This situation has contributed to increasing public
distrust of the court system. Therefore, approaches to science and technolo-
gy policy-making that are patterned primarily on the court system are a bad
idea. Adversarial, court-like approaches are unlikely to gain the trust of a
public that distrusts the court system, since they are too much alike.
Such a court-like institution would also undermine the legislative branch
of democratic governments. It would have some of the same functions this
branch exercises through such channels as congressional hearings and the
Office of Technology Assessment. In this regard, Shrader-Frechette points
to “the difficulty faced by administrative, regulatory, and legal procedures,
all of which are severely limited by the high cost of citizen participation.’*°
But this limitation does not apply to the legislative branch as much as to the
governmental channels involved in said procedures. Even if it did, it is a
reason to concentrate funds on proven policy-making channels to further
support citizen participation, not to further diffuse public funds by channel-
ing them into additional, let alone unproven, institutions. From this stand-
point, science courts and technology tribunals would be luxuries and, by
diffusing public funds, would undermine democratic policy-making.
Of course, private funds could be used to support such courts. But there
are additional, noneconomic reasons that the exclusive or primary use of
science courts and technology tribunals would undermine democratic
policy-making and, in particular, its legislative side. The reasons go back to
the notion that court-like proceedings should ‘“‘achieve closure on a particu-
lar controversy” and “be decisive.”*' It is questionable whether court-like
procedures are decisive enough to achieve closure on a controversy. And
even if they were, it is questionable that such closure would be a good thing.
It would leave little if any room for the ongoing nature of policy-making
dialogue from which better policies and reform develop.
This, of course, is not to say that no change in the controversies’ scope or
nature is possible or desirable. But changes for the better need not be, and
typically are not, definitive changes.
 Like the Phoenix 177

In defense of the technology tribunal, one could try to drop the closure
requirement in order to make room for the ongoing policy-making dialogue.
But how? Even if such a thing were possible, it would involve straining the
court-like institutions beyond or nearly beyond their capabilities. As indi-
cated, such a mismatch between social decision procedures and the policy
and decision problems they are made to address is likely to lead to issue-
overload and undermine democratic policy-making.
What is the alternative? Many policy-making channels for dealing with
science and technology issues are already in existence. They could be im-
proved and, with the previously mentioned qualifications, others could be
added. That is, disjoint policy-making—where the problems are addressed
through different policy-making channels, at different levels, and often
through mutually independent efforts—may work in many cases. Envi-
ronmental policy in the United States has largely been made in such a de-
centralized manner during the 1970s and 1980s.? And, by dividing the
policy-making labor, issue-overload may be diffused.
What is crucial, however, is to snap out of strictly adversarial thinking
without jumping to institute additional policy-making arrangements that
overload the system. The legislative process provides one viable alternative.
It makes room for a wide range of social decision procedures—from discus-
sion of merits and negotiation to bargaining and compromise. Still other
channels (currently used by unions and business firms) make room for
mediation, arbitration, and other social decision procedures. This largely
decentralized but parsimonious approach to policy-making can be more
sensitive than strict court-like approaches or, for that matter, than a simply
legislative approach to the varied and ongoing nature of technology
policy-making.
No doubt, the legislative process itself—or the described combination of
policy-making arrangements and procedures—could lead to issue-overload
and get bogged down by the sheer proliferation of opinions. This is where
the hypotheses formulated previously in this book can help. When issue-
overload is present or impending, time and policy-making simplification
become of the essence. In such a case, procedures that are moderately
confrontational but can cut through the maze (e.g., political insulation) are
permissible and may be crucial to address the prospect of issue-overload.
When issue-overload is not present or impending, policies, decisions, and
procedures that lead to issue-overload are neither politically sound nor
morally permissible. They would lead to more social disruption or limita-
tions on individual freedoms or well-being than more compromising
alternatives. For example, neither policy-making by referendum, which
has been increasingly fashionable in the United States since the 1970s,
nor policies and decisions that promote referendum politics are ordinarily
{78 LIKE THE PHOENIX

politically sound or morally permissible. Equally unsound and impermissi-

ble are those policies, decisions, and procedures that tend to turn legislatures
into mere brokerage houses for constituencies’ interests and legislators into
mere brokers for interest groups. In contrast, politically sound and morally
permissible policies, decisions, and procedures are those that are in accor-
‘dance with a more balanced, measured, diplomatic approach. Unless
policy-making proceeds along these lines, the nuclear energy controversy
and technology controversies in general will keep on being reborn from their
own ashes.
 Dialogue

— I'm not convinced that to approach policy-making through a

variety of policy-making channels avoids issue-overload any better
than the alternatives.

— I have my reservations about it too, but let us review the

situation. At least one of the court-like alternatives, the technology
tribunal, is promising in some cases. Yet, as I mentioned, it is too
inflexible and adversarial from a procedural standpoint. The legisla-
tive approach is more flexible, hence more likely to help us deal
with many policy-making cases calling for something other than
adversarial approaches while avoiding issue-overload. In addition, a
variety of other approaches can be used to deal with still other cases.
That is, in no way do I mean to say that participation should take
place through the legislative branch of government alone. My point
is only that other less flexible approaches should not be used to the
detriment of the legislative process. But there is no doubt that there
are many viable participatory approaches other than the legislative
process and that, within the said constraints, they at least deserve a
try. The question is which and when? The hypotheses formulated in
Essay 8 provide some guidelines to answer this question.

— But couldn’t we end up faced with issue-overload anyway?

— Of course. No procedural approach is foolproof against issue-

overload, but as I argued in the essay, the said hypotheses also have
implications about the manner in which issue-overload should be
avoided or curbed. Indeed, diversifying the participatory process
through various arrangements that amount to disjoint policy-
making may often help curb or prevent issue-overload.

— But not always?

179
180 DIPALOGUE

— Not always. There may be some matters, say, the space pro-
gram, that require more steady, long-range, and unified policy-
making than can be attained through a disjoint approach. Also, in
crisis situations, when time is of the essence and concerted action is
crucial (e.g., concerning the U.S. debt), disjoint policy-making is
unlikely to work.

— Isn’t that a reason in favor of technocratic rather than participa-

tory policy-making?

— Not at all. It is simply a reason for channeling public participa-

tion in a manner that accords with the long-run perspective or
urgent and coherent action the case requires, not for eliminating it.

— Even if the legislative branch is well-suited for concentrating

public participation, a different problem arises. It is an information
and communication problem. How can people sensibly participate
in policy-making about such things as the space program and the
genome project when they hardly have any idea of the technical
details involved? Besides, even those who have an idea (e.g., scien-
tists and technologists) often use concepts and methods that others
(e.g., legislators) never use and can hardly translate into their lan-
guage. What results could one expect from public participation by
such disparate groups?

— That is a problem with no simple or easy solution. Let us turn to

the next essay, which examines the problem by reference to the
various constituencies it involves and affects: scientists, technolo-
gists, philosophers, and nonacademicians in various walks of life.
5 1 Bridging Gaps in
Babel: Ethics,
Technology, and
Policy-Making

Controversies about new technologies are like discussions in more than one
language: Everybody mispronounces something and no one entirely masters
all meaning. Today, these communication failures are enhanced by the
unprecedented extent and increasing pace of worldwide technological de-
velopments and their likely double-edged consequences. Modern industrial,
agricultural, information, recombinant DNA, health care, nuclear, and
aerospace technologies promise a confusing mixture of benefits and harms
for humans and nonhumans at the individual, local, regional, national, and
even global level. These mixed prospects and the controversies—so sharp
and heated that they amount to issues— prompted by the technologies pose
difficult and urgent policy-making problems.
These problems cover a wide variety of topics. One is the coating of crops
with genetically engineered heat-producing substances to prevent the effects
of frost. Another is the extent, pace, and manner of workplace robotization.
Still others are the regulation of organ transplants and the placing of weather
satellites in geosynchronous orbits above equatorial countries. So new and
alien are these topics, and so unfamiliar and varied the languages in which
they are discussed by technologists, policymakers, and philosophers, that
the situation amounts to a contemporary Babel. Is ethics (the discipline, the
branch of inquiry that reflects on morals and mores and seeks to develop
theories for addressing problems of right and wrong, good and bad, jus-
tified and unjustified) suited for dealing with these technology policy-
making problems? In particular, are the scope, methods, concepts, practices,
and social organization of ethics suited for addressing such problems? What
changes, if any, would be for the better? These are the main questions I
address.
In addressing these questions, I argue for six interrelated theses. First, at

181
182 BRIDGING GAPS IN BABEL

present, ethics is not well-suited for dealing with technology policy prob-
lems. Second, this is so partly because its concepts, methods, and practices
are not sufficiently integrated with the concepts, methods, and practices of
the technology and policy-making communities and the public at large.
Third, developments toward greater integration call for changes in the
practices and scope—if not also the language, concepts, and methods—of
ethics, at least at the applied technology ethics level. Fourth, greater integra-
tion is desirable for all communities involved and society at large. Fifth,
there is some—though not much—evidence of change toward such integra-
tion among these communities. Sixth, multioccupational approaches to the
study and practice of ethics concerning technology offer promise of helping
attain greater integration. Before proceeding to argue for these theses, let us
clarify the notions of ethics, technology, and technology ethics that I use in
the ensuing discussion and have presupposed throughout the book.

ETHIGS, TEGHNOLOGY, AND TEGHNOLOGY ETHIGS

What is ethics? The question is loaded with ambiguities. The term ethics may
mean (1) personal ethics, or a person’s morals; (2) group or conventional
ethics; (3) a branch of inquiry, or moral philosophy—a critical inquiry
about morals and mores; (4) an ethical theory, or a generalized device for
formulating, clarifying, and dealing with problems addressed in ethics as a
branch of inquiry. When the inquiry seeks to deal soundly with problems
that concern matters of technology, it is technology ethics or the ethics of
technology. In this essay, I focus on ethics in the branch-of-inquiry sense,
especially at the applied level of technology ethics.’
As for the sense of technology in technology ethics, | leave the matter
open and discuss a variety of developments that have a claim to being in-
stances of technology. They have such claim if they are considered technological
developments by ordinary people, scientists (e.g., anthropologists), and
members of the technology community (¢.g., engineers). This is a realistic
approach, since if technology ethics is to be of any use in addressing
problems, it is crucial to develop a conception of technology that is sensitive
to the issues and the policy and decision problems they actually pose. Such a
conception is not likely to be reliably formulated until the task of addressing
the problems has been carried out far and comprehensively enough. As the
ensuing discussion makes plain, with regard to carrying out this task, we are
very much at the beginning.
With these clarifications in mind, let us first examine the predominant
concepts, methods, and practices used in dealing with technology policy
problems by the technology, policy-making, and philosophical communities
and members of the public at large. The degree of integration between these
 Bridging Gaps in Babel 183

concepts, methods, and practices will evidence the extent to which ethics can
(or cannot) currently help address the problems.

A FRAGMENTED WORLD
MORAL PHILOSOPHERS AND EXPERTS:
A GOMMUNICATION GAP
Sylvia Doughty Fries has studied the congressional testimony of 130
“expert” witnesses—most of them influential in the natural and social
sciences and engineering in academia and, to a lesser extent, in industry and
government—on a series of bills intended to create what eventually became
the Office of Technology Assessment. She interpreted the record of their
testimony as evidence that the witnesses conceived of technology as exper-
tise or intelligence whose societal predominance was imminent. Many wit-
nesses even saw technology as expertise with “exceptional authority over the
definition of ‘good’ government.”? This latter claim, Fries argues, jeopar-
dizes a basic presupposition of democratic politics: that a responsible
citizenry is a preeminent condition of a free society. My aim here, however,
is not to examine this thesis, which is, no doubt, significant. Rather, it is to
examine the usefulness of moral philosophy for addressing technology pol-
icy problems such as that posed by the said conflict between democracy and
technology as expertise. How unique, extensive, and useful are the concep-
tual and methodological contributions ethics can make?
Philosophers in applied ethics tend to believe that the contributions of
ethics can be unique or extensive and, in any case, useful. Ethics can
provide greater conceptual clarity, help avoid logical fallacies, convey a
better understanding of moral theories and concepts, and prompt critical
examination of alternative ethical arguments. And, presumably, these
things are likely to help nonphilosophers find better ways of addressing
technology topics and problems than they would by ignoring these ele-
ments of ethical evaluation.’
Now, it is true that ethics practitioners can make these contributions to
technology policy-making discussions. But the skills involved in making
them are not the prerogative of philosophers, as many technology assessors
would be quick to point out. In all fairness, it should be mentioned that
some philosophers, for example, Annette Baier and Kai Nielsen, have also
acknowledged this point.*
In response, one could argue that the point just made establishes only that
philosophers are not the only ones capable of making such contributions. It
does not establish that philosophers cannot make such contributions better
and more extensively than many or even most nonphilosophers. The unique-
ness of philosophy’s contributions may be gone, but not its usefulness.
184 BRIDGING GAPS IN BABEL

However, this usefulness may not be as clear as some might think. For
example, why would a better understanding of moral theories and concepts
be likely to help nonphilosophers find better ways of addressing technology
topics and problems? Whether it does will depend on both how good the
theories are and how extensive the understanding of the theories is among
assessors. If this understanding is limited, shared by only a few, and in-
fluences their analysis, the policy result may be worse, not better. Jon Elster
illustrates this type of situation with the following story:
Once upon a time, two boys found a cake. One of them said, “Splendid! I
will eat the cake.” The other one said, ‘No, that is not fair! We found the
cake together, and we should share and share alike, half for you and half
for me.” The first boy said, “No, I should have the whole cake!” Along
came an adult who said, “‘Gentlemen, you shouldn’t fight about this: you
should compromise. Give him three quarters of the cake.’
One could object that the particular solution suggested here, and therefore
the principle of compromise, is inadequate and the adult should learn more
ethical theory. However, by the very manner in which negotiations aimed at
issuing technology policy-making work, compromise is to be reached from
the positions advanced. Suppose that, as in the example, only a minority
advances a position partly based on crucial elements of moral evaluation,
such as taking the good of others into account for its own sake. Not merely
compromise but, indeed, arbitration, mediation, and other social decision
procedures may then lead to a worse situation than the one that would be
reached had all participants advanced less morally imbued positions.
In response, one could argue that the above situation would develop if, as
in the previous case, the theories used were simplistic or their users did not
understand them well enough. Sometimes, one might explain, adequate
ethical theories make it permissible to negotiate with the immediate overrid-
ing aim of maximizing the satisfaction of one’s own or one’s Own constit-
uencies’ or organizations’ interests. This is so when other negotiating parties
do it too. Ethical studies of state-of-nature situations characteristically argue
for this position.®
Such an objection, however, would miss the point. The point is not that
there are no theories of ethics better suited for dealing with ethical problems
concerning technology policy. After all, I have outlined one such theory in
the preceding essays. Rather, the point concerns sufficiently widespread
understanding and communication. If ethics is to help make better, rather
than worse, technology policy (and, indeed, any policy), the understanding
of ethical theories must be significantly deep or widespread among technolo-
gy practitioners and policymakers. Otherwise, as previously argued, there
may be situations in which a little knowledge is worse than none at all.
 Bridging Gaps in Babel 185

Situations of this type undermine ethics’ usefulness in the technology com-

munity. As I argue next, its usefulness is also undermined in the policy-
making community and among members of the public at large.
MORAL PHILOSOPHERS, POLIGYMAKERS, AND THE PUBLIG
Ethical theory illiteracy is widespread not merely in the technology and
policy-making communities but among members of the public. Indeed, it is
at least as widespread as technology illiteracy anong members of the public
and, to a lesser extent, the philosophy community.” This is not to place the
blame on members of these groups for not knowing such things. Illiteracy
concerning technology or ethical theory is partly a result of the high com-
plexity and specialization of certain subjects, which has become rampant in
the twentieth century. And this development is beyond any one individual’s
control.
Should one then turn one’s back on ethics? Not at all. But the question
arises: Is ethics now in a position to contribute enough knowledge of ethical
theories, concepts, and methods so that no ill comes from inadequate en-
lightenment? In addressing this question, I next examine predominant con-
ceptions of technology and attitudes about technological developments and
philosophical attempts at integration. They provide evidence for the claim
that ethics’ concepts, methods, and practices significantly lack integration
with the concepts, methods, and practices used in the everyday world in
which technology policy problems actually arise. Indeed, they provide
evidence for the lack of integration between all the groups involved—not
just the philosophical community on the one hand and the technological and
policy-making communities, as well as the general public, on the other.
The witnesses in the previously mentioned study do not exhaust the
conceptions of technology that have a bearing on the manner in which
technology policy problems are addressed. Public conceptions also matter.
Some were already common in the nineteenth century. Nonexperts, and even
some experts, reflect these conceptions when they think of technology as
inventions, devices, or gadgets. Others, more in accord with the seventeenth-
century conception, think of technology as the practical arts. Still others
think of it as applied science, a notion that has a family resemblance to
conceptions of the arts held by Plato, Aristotle, and some Hellenistic
writers.® This notion is seriously set in question by the current development
of superconductors, where technology is taking place before there is any
science available to explain it and apply it to the data.’ And all these
conceptions are different from, if not in conflict with, technology as exper-
tise, the notion predominant among the previously mentioned witnesses. To
this, one must add a frequent distrust and even fear of some new technolo-
gies and technology takeover (discussed in Essay 9) and the fact that workers
186 BRIDGING GAPS IN BABEL

and unions have a dislike, distrust, and sometimes fear of information

systems that they see as threatening their jobs, job status, job-related human
companionship, and self-image."°
These often conflicting conceptions of, and responses to, new technology
contribute to pose the policy and decision problems technology ethics is
meant to help address. There have been philosophical contributions toward
an approach that articulates ethical, political, and other aspects of
problems,'’ and the present book is meant to be a further contribution
toward such an approach. But the generalization of this approach has not yet
come about. Nor has this work been significantly integrated with discus-
sions in the technology or policy-making communities. It remains highly
specialized —however interdisciplinary —and significantly restricted to the
world of academia.
As previously indicated, this lack of integration partly results from the
degree of complexity and specialization of certain subjects. In turn, such
complexity and specialization simply reflect the increasing complexity of
technological developments, contemporary governments, and contemporary
individual and social life. This complexity is an obstacle to both the public’s
and the policymakers’ understanding of what is at issue—so much so that,
in the United States, it led to the creation of the congressional Office of
Technology Assessment.'* That such an office had to be created evidences
lack of conceptual and methodological integration not just between the
specialized communities involved but also between these and the policy-
making community. Today’s social world is fragmented—a contemporary
Babel.
Nielsen alludes to this fragmentation when he refers to the different
jargons of philosophers, lawyers, economists, and others.'* The fragmenta-
tion, however, does not amount simply, as Nielsen’s statement appears to
imply, to a linguistic or at most conceptual difference. It concerns practices
in accordance with which these concepts and methods are used and special-
ized languages developed. I have provided ample evidence for this sort of
fragmentation elsewhere.'* Here, the point I want to stress concerns fami-
liarity, which practices tend to enhance or hinder. Ethical theory considera-
tions are familiar primarily, if not exclusively, to academic philosophers.
They are not familiar to members of the technology or policy-making
communities or, for that matter, to the general public.

A MANY-WAY STREET

The sort of situation just described also concerns philosophers’ familiarity

with the problems as perceived in the technology community. As Carl
Mitcham put it, they “still have some way to go to deal with the world as the
technical community actually experiences it.”'® This lack of familiarity is not
just a matter of methods, such as cost-benefit analysis, or concepts, such as
 Bridging Gaps in Babel 187
technology management. It also includes matters of practice: what courses
of action are, as a rule, perceived as feasible; what economic, political, or
other constraints on action are perceived as significant; what considerations
are unreflectively perceived as irrelevant or secondary; and what hypotheses
are taken for granted in each group.
In addition, this situation is not peculiar to the relation between the
philosophy and technology communities. Think of the long-standing and
quite accurate objections by policymakers and members of the general
public concerning moral philosophers’ (or, for that matter, technology
practitioners’) lack of familiarity with the actual world of politics or
business.'® In short, different, significantly disjoint concepts, methods, and
practices are at work in the ways in which the technology, policy-making,
and philosophical communities and the general public address ethical prob-
lems concerning technology policy.
SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION AS A SOURCE
OF GURRENT LIMITATIONS IN ETHIGS
The preceding discussion supports this essay’s first two theses. For, first,
the previously described fragmentation makes it difficult to communicate
ethics’ contributions in a way that the technology and policy-making com-
munities and the public can readily understand and apply. Second, it is
questionable that technology ethics currently has much to offer beyond
what logic can offer. The previously described fragmentation hinders ethics
from using enough and sufficiently articulated knowledge of the manner in
which the technology and policy-making communities experience technolo-
gy policy and decision problems. This undermines ethics’ ability to make
substantial, hence significantly useful contributions for dealing with tech-
nology policy-making problems. Third, this difficulty in using sufficiently
articulated knowledge hinders the testing of ethical theories in actual policy-
making situations. All in all, under the previously discussed fragmentation,
ethics develops largely in a political and technological vacuum, which makes
it of little use of for addressing actual technology policy-making problems.
Can ethics change so as to overcome these limitations? There seem to be
no conceptual or methodological obstacles to such change. But the question
arises: Is ethics institutionally set up to work toward integration, to fill the
gaps between the groups caught in today’s Babel? Let us turn to this
question.

THE INSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY

OF TEGHNOLOGY ETHIGS: SOME NEEDED GHANGES
Some philosophers have argued for the need to test the applicability of moral
theories in the actual contexts in which ethical problems arise. Along these
lines, Annette Baier says:
188 BRIDGING GAPS IN BABEL

We philosophers, by having given thought, may have help to give, but

only if we are willing to investigate (or subcontract the investigation of)
the actual results of trying to live by the principles that commend them-
selves to us in our armchairs and debating halls.’7
This is true. Suppose, however, that the previously discussed conceptual,
methodological, and practical integration never comes to pass. It will then be
quite unlikely that such investigation can take place, that its results can be
effectively understood and communicated, and that the contributions of the
theories surviving the investigation can be put to work.
To be sure, moral philosophers could still play consulting or advisory
roles in other professions. Indeed, the very fact that they play these roles
now, when they did not a few decades ago, is evidence of change toward
greater practical, if not conceptual, and methodological integration between
the groups involved. However, the question is whether they play relevant or
necessary roles as philosophers. In this regard, Arthur Caplan describes one
of his contributions to hospital practice (he suggested that physicians mak-
ing rounds wait until patients have finished using a bedpan before they and
their attendants gaze upon the patients), and notes that a Ph.D. in philoso-
phy is hardly necessary to make this suggestion.'®
One could respond that moral philosophy would nonetheless benefit
from moral philosophers engaging in consulting or advisory activities out-
side academia. At least, as Annette Baier says, it “might help us to escape
from the arrogance of solitary intellect which has condemned much moral
theory to sustained self-delusions concerning its subject matter, its methods,
and its authority.”
I have no doubt that this would benefit moral philosophy. But why would
it benefit other communities involved, or society at large? One reason is
pragmatic. Most people, busy pursuing the pressing concerns of their every-
day lives, must often put complex, sometimes highly theoretical, ethical
problems aside. One of these problems is that of running society by appeal
to reliable theories that encompass and integrate technological, economic,
political, and ethical concepts and methods. Otherwise, technology policies
and decisions will be based only on such methods as muddling through,
poking in the dark, and trial and error. And in today’s complex and rapidly
evolving technological world, these methods are too ad hoc to deal with
technology policy problems effectively and sensitively. Traditionally, moral
philosophy, in contrast with other branches of inquiry such as economics
and political science, has formulated such comprehensive theories. This
makes it especially fit for contributing the needed theories, so long as it
bridges the testing gap by becoming empirical. If it does, the technological
and policy-making communities, and the general public, would benefit.
 Bridging Gaps in Babel 189

Bridging the testing gap in the manner suggested, however, requires (in
accordance with the essay’s third thesis) an expansion of the scope and
practices of technology ethics beyond not just the discipline but academia.
Otherwise, the theories—tested only by philosophers’ armchair appeals to
their individual thought experiments or arguments, or by their discussions
with other philosophers in the rarefied halls of academia—remain mere sets
of hypotheses. Some of the changes internal to philosophy that the preced-
ing discussion entails have been mentioned, for example, by Kai Nielsen. He
writes:
I want to suggest that there may be a way that philosophy might trans-
form itself in a way that would answer to our unschooled reflective hopes.
It would involve (a) giving up all pretensions to autonomy and instead
interlocking philosophy fully with the human sciences and (b) taking the
resolution of the problems of human life to be very centrally a part of
philosophy’s reasons for being.*°
As far as it goes, this is sound doctrine. Yet, given the preceding discus-
sion’s partial conclusions, it does not go far enough. If, as in Nielsen’s
vision, the problems of human life are to become central, the suggested
interlocking must involve not just the social sciences but the nonacademic
world as well. In addition, as I argue next, this interlocking that encompasses
the nonacademic world is unlikely (because the methodological and concep-
tual integration of the groups involved is unlikely), so long as the social
organization of moral philosophy—in particular, of technology ethics—
remains unchanged.

TOWARD A MULTIOGGUPATIONAL APPROAGH

The interlocking between philosophy, the human sciences, and the public
requires changes in the social organization of ethics. It requires at least an
expansion of its activities outside of the discipline itself and, indeed, outside
of academia. This requirement, however, is in conflict with some of the
institutional constraints produced by the support systems of ethics (e.g.,
philosophy departments and ethics journals) and by the analogous support
systems of the other branches of inquiry involved. They sometimes seem to
boil down to mere conflicts of academic turf. Other times, they are a matter
of allocating resources on the basis of criteria developed from a traditional,
merely disciplinary, perhaps not even applied approach to academia. Still
other times, the conflicts appear to be also, or mainly, a matter of disciplin-
ary loyalties. And they may also result purely and simply from the difficulty
of conceiving of technology policy problems by means of concepts and
methods other than those of one’s own discipline. If the previously discussed
190 BRIDGING GAPS IN BABEL

integration is to be attained, and moral philosophy as envisioned by Annette

Baier or Kai Nielsen is to develop, all these things must change.
To argue for these changes is not to say that basic research in ethics and
the current organization of such research must change. Nor is it to say that
everyone doing applied ethics or, more narrowly, technology ethics must
start doing things differently. Rather, it is to say that technology ethics—
and, perhaps, applied ethics generally —must undergo some changes—at
least some extensions—as a collective enterprise. Indeed, the needed
changes are significantly theoretical and include a conceptually integrated
formulation, clarification, and evaluation of policy and decision alternatives
in dealing with technology policy problems. This must be a collective result
from a collective, multioccupational, activity —not the privileged subject of
any one philosophy researcher, technology practitioner, or policymaker.
Nor can it be the privileged subject of any one discipline, profession, or
occupation.
The fact that technology policy is not the privileged subject of any such
sector points to a second reason that the previously discussed integration is
unlikely unless the social organization of technology ethics changes. To
proceed toward such integration, it is necessary to combine in actual practice
the perspectives of academicians studying ethics and technology, policymak-
ers, practitioners of technology—from engineers to health care and agri-
cultural technologists—and the general public.
Granted, some if not all of the problems cannot even be formulated
without the methods of the disciplines involved. Think, for example, of
global environmental problems such as those posed by atmospheric carbon
dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons. In order to help make sound technology
policy, these methods cannot be applied only within the narrow scope of
each discipline or, indeed, within the mainstream of existing interdisciplin-
ary approaches, which combine disciplines but do not ordinarily include
nonacademic participants. Nor can only policymakers be included in addi-
tion to academics. Ethical problems concerning technology policy arise and
are directly felt outside the scope of academia and policy-making alone.
They are felt in hospitals, factories, technology-related firms, and society at
large. Hence, without somehow including all these constituencies, they are
unlikely to be addressed in a manner sensitive to all concerns involved. Some
of these concerns may fall through the conceptual and methodological
cracks reflected in the languages of ethics, or of some combination of
academic disciplines alone, or merely of politics, or of the technology
community, or of all these but not the general public.
If the problems are real, however, they will be addressed, well or not, by
people anyway, with or without the help of aloof academicians or busy
technologists. But there is good reason to believe that policymakers—
 Bridging Gaps in Babel 191

however involved in the process—or the general public—however literate

it may become about technology—will not have enough time or perhaps
sufficient wisdom to make all other contributions unnecessary. The essay’s
fourth thesis follows.
What forms should the multioccupational approach take? Some have been
tried on a limited basis in health care ethics, for example, through hospitals’
ethics committees (which supports the fifth thesis). Though still largely
under scrutiny, they can provide the beginnings of a model for addressing
ethical problems concerning technology in areas other than health care. The
multioccupational approach, however, need not be implemented through
technology ethics committees alone. For example, the technology tribunal
discussed in Essay 10 may be more appropriate in certain circumstances.
In any case, the development of such committees in health care offers
instructive evidence of likely conflicts as well as ways of dealing with them.
They concern the process of selecting participants; the perceived incompati-
bilities between disciplinary loyalties or personal styles; academicians’ fears
of being co-opted by representatives of government, industry, or labor; their
uneasiness about becoming entangled in conflicts between government,
industry, or labor factions; and the unwillingness on the part of practitioners
to subject their practices to academic or public judgment.”?
Such conflicts have occurred and should be expected. Ethical inquiry,
especially in the highly institutionalized environment in which it is pursued
today, is not an apolitical, let alone neutral, activity. In this politically
charged environment, squarely acknowledging and addressing such conflicts
is crucial if we are to have any chance of dealing sensitively and effectively
with the pressing problems posed by technological developments in our
turbulent times.
Another positive feature of the multioccupational approach is that, if
adopted, philosophers will not have to choose, as Annette Baier puts it,
“between being pretend accountants, pretend lawyers, pretend revolutionar-
ies, failed priests, and unsuccessful comics.”** This also goes for other
disciplines if their practitioners by and large lack live contact with the
business, political, technological, and, in general, social world. At any rate,
in accordance with the essay’s sixth thesis, multioccupational approaches
would help moral philosophy develop the earthiness that Hume recom-
mended for philosophers and tried to develop himself by becoming a real
diplomat and historian, and that Dewey attempted to develop in the twen-
tieth century.”
In the earthier multioccupational approach, philosophers join—partly as
philosophers and on an equal footing with academicians and nonacade-
micians—in policy- and decision-making outside academia. No doubt,
adopting such an approach will involve many changes, not the least of which
192 BRIDGING GAPS IN BABEL

is the development, by way of support systems, of multioccupational tech-

nology ethics committees, centers, and programs. In this area, almost every-
thing, including a thorough discussion of this very suggestion, is still to be
done. The science, technology, and society centers developed worldwide
constitute a precedent (although I must admit, a somewhat faltering one),
mostly at the merely interdisciplinary, largely academic level.** Would mov-
ing beyond this boundary, into the nonacademic word, jeopardize technolo-
gy ethics? The ensuing discussion addresses this question.

BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND IDEOLOGY

Some may think that multioccupational approaches will not work in many
technology-related environments or will compromise the disciplines or
academia. In response, one can say, first, that whether it will work is not ana
priori but an empirical matter. Second, one can point out that the reticence
and skepticism about moving beyond disciplinary, let alone academic,
boundaries have typically come from academia, not from nonacademic
environments. Third, one can offer a pragmatic argument: Though there is
no guarantee that the suggestion will work, if we believe that it will not
work, its chances of working are minimal or nil. In addition, the alternative
for technology ethics (and perhaps for many other applied ethics branches of
inquiry) is to fade away, ending perhaps in academic extinction and no
doubt in its failure to carry out one of its central functions: to help deal
soundly with ethical problems as they arise in the actual world.”
There are, of course, risks in taking this line, and it should not be taken
incautiously. Technology ethics could lead to the development of a social
elite, technology ethicists, who might come to be seen by themselves and
others as moral experts: individuals with special insight into right, wrong,
good, bad, justified, and unjustified on matters of technology. Such a de-
velopment would undermine morality. It would tend to disqualify necessary
persons from fully engaging in critical scrutiny concerning ethical problems
and issues. This, in addition, could compound the undermining of morality
if, as a result, some constituencies treated these professionals as high priests
of morality, or if the professionals became corporate or technocratic rubber-
stampers.
A related danger is that the theories developed in technology ethics and
moral philosophy in general would be mere ideologies of technology ethi-
cists and given societal sectors. However, the danger can be curtailed if
moral philosophy becomes interlocked with the social sciences and the
reflections of common life without exceptions or exclusions. This will provide
a scientific as well as ordinary basis for assessing the extent to which the
theories, and the explanations and descriptions they involve, are true rather
than mere ideological distortions.
 Bridging Gaps in Babel 193

No doubt, after all is said and done, multioccupational approaches to

technology ethics may have to be discarded. But at this point in the develop-
ment of ethics, they deserve a good try. They are promising, and the need to
bridge the gaps between crucial policy-making groups in our fragmented
world is urgent. If they are not bridged, technology ethics and, indeed,
human societies may not amount to more than the remains of Babel: ruins
witnessing humans’ failure to rise above their fragmented times.
 Dialogue

— I cannot but feel dizzy as a result of the multiple ways in which

policy-making problems could be addressed. I understand that this
goes along with your support of disjoint policy-making for certain
purposes. Yet I’m afraid that such an approach will lead to more,
not less, social fragmentation, which is one thing your multioccupa-
tional approach is supposed to help us curb. It will do so through
the sheer multiplication of ethics committees, science courts, tech-
nology tribunals, technology committees, and whatnot. People
involved in one of these groups are unlikely to be able to be
involved in many more. As a result, the languages, concepts,
methods, and practices shared by the members of one group may
well become quite different from those shared by members of other
groups. How would this be an improvement?

— First, if the groups’ members are from a wide variety of relevant

professions, jobs, political constituencies, and policy-making orga-
nizations, then each group is likely to receive roughly the same
overall input. Besides, I never said that members of one group
should not try to communicate with those of another. They could.

— Yes. But would they be more likely to succeed than under the
current circumstances?

— One should not minimize the fact that the people we are talking
about, given the multioccupational membership of each committee,
would share roughly the same input and would have engaged in
critical scrutiny about it within their groups. As a result, they would
be likely to communicate with members of other groups much more
easily than in the present circumstances, even if these other people
have different social backgrounds. Through the process, a common
ground is likely to have been found or, to some extent, created.

194
 Dialogue 195

— Yet how much of a common ground would have been pro-

duced? Would it be enough to have a common plan? If not, how
could policymakers mount a coherent attack on a problem?

— There is no certainty that, invariably, there will be enough

common ground to deal with a problem in such a manner. But, as I
argued previously, this is a virtue, not a defect of the proposed
approach, so long as there is no impending crisis and time does not
become of the essence. Remember that the disjoint approach I am
proposing need not— indeed, is unlikely to—work in such extreme
situations. But if there is time and no impending crisis, what would
be the advantage of policies or decisions that are coherent but fail to
preserve significant public insights and responses by disregarding
them for the sake of coherence? As I argued concerning rational
choice, social choice, and related theories at the book’s outset, such
approaches are both politically unwise and immoral.

— Is your position, then, that appeals to reason and meaningful

dialogue are required so long as there is no crisis, but as soon as
there is one, anything goes? In other words, do you agree that all is
fair in love and war?

— That is not my position at all. Even within crisis or near crisis

situations, there is a great deal that appeals to reason and meaningful
dialogue can accomplish. What happens is that, in such situations,
the scope of application of such appeals and dialogue is significantly
restricted.

— How does that work?

— I think it will be best for me to give you an example. It will be,

like some that I have already given you, an extended example. This
is the overall purpose of my next essay.
1 Between Negotiation
and Combat: Ethics,
Politics, and
Regional Wars in
a Fluid World Order

Against nearly all expectations, the cold war appears to have ended some-
time around 1990. Yet, despite initial optimism, world peace is not on the
horizon, as Iraq’s August 2, 1990, invasion and annexation of Kuwait made
plain.! The cold war world order is unraveling, facilitating a variety of
regional, nationalistically charged, and internationally significant conflicts.
Most dramatic among these are events in Eastern Europe: the rebellion of
Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Georgia against the ex-Soviet
Union; the generalized democratization of Eastern Europe; the advent of a
unified Germany; and the unraveling of Yugoslavia and consequent war in
the region.” What role should negotiation, bargaining, and other social
decision procedures, including combat, play in dealing with these conflicts?
This is the main question I address.
I focus on the changing international situation in the 1980s and 1990s and
the type of international conflicts that characterize it. One such conflict is
the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, which I use as a case exemplifying and
giving support to the four theses I present. First, from a historical and
political standpoint, the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis evidences not just the
unraveling of the cold war order or its effects on the ex-Soviet Union and its
client states (Iraq was, to some extent, one of them) but also the fluid state of
international order in the Western world. Second, from a moral standpoint,
a country or group of countries with the moral and political authority—and
the power—to redress the wrongs of international aggression by using
military force still has an obligation to seek meaningful negotiations aimed at
resolving the conflict, That is, the negotiations to be sought should address

196
 Between Negotiation and Combat 197

the interests and demands involved as fairly and comprehensively as cir-

cumstances (e.g., time, knowledge, and available resources) permit. Third,
this obligation is present throughout the entire conflict, though its discharge
does not invariably require that the country cease hostilities to seek meaning-
ful negotiations. Fourth, military responses to aggression are justified only
if, as far as circumstances permit, they are likely to avoid harming civilians of
any country, creating political or economic instability in nonaggressor coun-
tries, and bringing about any conditions that would further undermine
world peace.
The moral and political significance of all these theses in the latter part of
the twentieth century is a matter of political prudence and moral sensitivity.
From a political standpoint, the efforts made toward attaining a meaningful-
ly negotiated solution throughout a conflict—not just in the conflict’s
aftermath, but during the conflict as well—are crucial to whether or not
world peace is further undermined. And from a moral standpoint, the failure
to seek a meaningful negotiated solution is simply to be unduly nonchalant
and insensitive about the injuries and loss of lives combat involves.

A POST—GOLD WAR MANIFESTATION OF THE FLUID STATE

OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE WEST
The cold war world order was largely based on a balance of power between
the Western allies led by the United States and the Eastern bloc countries led
by the Soviet Union. In such a context, regional armed confrontations took
two main forms: those that directly involved a superpower, such as the
United States in Korea and Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan;
and those that involved only a superpower’s regional allies or groups. For
example, Iraq was a U.S. regional ally during the Iraq-Iran war; Cuba was a
Soviet ally in the armed conflict in Angola. These allies fought their wars
with the support of unweakened superpowers whose interests they
furthered.’
Given this characterization, at least four features of the 1990-91 Persian
Gulf crisis provide evidence of a different and quite fluid international order
in the Western world. First, the economically weakened condition of one of
the Western superpowers, the United States, facilitated it. Second, the Unit-
ed States’ policy inadequacies, largely developed in cold war circumstances,
also fueled the conflict. Third, the countries most prominently involved in
the conflict (the United States and Iraq) were recent allies. Fourth, a third
world country challenged one of the leading world powers on largely
nationalistic—not superpower— political grounds, raising the prospect of
radical changes in the Middle East balance of power and the Western world.
Let us see what evidence there is for saying that these features were present.
198 BETWEEN NEGOTIATION AND COMBAT

First, at the beginning of the crisis, the United States, however strong, was
economically weaker than in previous decades. Various facts evidenced this
weakness. Its national deficit had reached nearly inconceivable proportions.
Corporate profits had been declining since the fourth quarter of 1988.
Almost half of its states reported revenue collections equal to or below the
inflation rate. The auto and housing markets were depressed. In addition,
foreign oil was more crucial to the soundness of its economy than ever
before. Indeed, during the first six months of 1990, 49.9 percent of the oil
used in the United States was imported, in contrast with 36 percent in 1973
and 45 percent in 1979. To be sure, only 3 to 4 percent of this amount came
from Iraq. But 9 percent of worldwide oil production came from Iraq and
Kuwait together. And this amount was greater than the 7 percent supply
drop the International Energy Agency traditionally used as a trigger to
schedule a coordinated drawdown to curb skyrocketing international oil
prices and prevent serious shortages. In any case, to face up to such short-
ages, the United States now had a Strategic Petroleum Reserve created in
response to the 1973—74 oil embargo. This reserve was supposed to provide
supplies for up to ninety days in case of an emergency.*
Second, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, developed during the cold
war, had focused on the conflicts between Israel and the Arab countries
considered as a unit. This was totally inadequate for realistically addressing
the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. In addition, once the crisis erupted,
the United States’ traditional foreign policy in the region reasserted itself.
The United States refused to link Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait to the
promise of a conference on the Middle East that would address the Palestin-
ian question. It also refused to take the position that it might consider such a
conference if Iraq withdrew from Kuwait. In addition, as I discuss later, it
refused to take any favorable stand on promises from other countries—the
ex-Soviet Union for one—that they would make strong efforts toward
arranging such a conference if Iraq withdrew from Kuwait.°
Third, the central countries in conflict, Iraq and the United States, were
recent allies. In fact, in accordance with cold war rules, the United States had
supported and contributed to arm Iraq in its 1980s war against Iran.°
Fourth, a third world country challenged one of the leading world powers
on largely nationalistic grounds, raising the prospect of radical changes in
the Middle East balance of power and in the Western world. That
superpower politics was not significantly involved is confirmed by the
November 18, 1990, Paris Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe. It made plain that the cold war had ended and superpower politics
was nonexistent. Primarily mediatory behavior by the Soviets during the
conflict further confirmed it.”
Iraq’s grounds for engaging in the conflict were not prompted by super-
 Between Negotiation and Combat 199

power politics but were largely nationalistic. This does not rule out the
existence of other grounds, however. For one, Iraq charged that Kuwait had
stolen billions of dollars worth of oil from fields on the Iraq-Kuwait border
during the war with Iran. Also, just before its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq made
territorial claims on Bubyian and Warba, two islands in the Persian Gulf.
But despite all this, wider nationalistic grounds appeared to be involved.
After all, Saddam Hussein had campaigned to restore Babylon to its former
glory, and he continuously alluded to Nebuchadnezzar, the sixth-century
B.C. ruler whose empire stretched from India to Palestine. All this points to
an overall nationalistic attempt at making Baghdad the center of political and
cultural influence in the Arab world.®

THE POLITICS OF SELF-DEGEPTION

It is hardly questionable that Iraq’s policies aimed at cultural and political
hegemony belong with the politics of self-deception. No doubt, its eight-
year war against Iran and its eventual victory meant that the skill and
strength of its military were not to be discounted. But having developed one
of the most powerful military forces in the world was only a minor step
toward hegemony in the Arab world, given that Egypt and Syria were no
minor powers. At any rate, such hegemonic dreams are significant because
they affected Iraq’s ability and willingness to negotiate.
In a somewhat analogous manner, the United States’ approach to the crisis
had some signs of self-deception, partly based on the assumption that the old
world order had broken down only in the Eastern bloc. This is not to say
that a pax Americana was expected, but a new and better world order in
which the United States and other Western democracies would play a
leading role was thought to be just around the corner before the Persian Gulf
conflict. President Bush mentioned it in his August 8 address about the
conflict, and again during his January 16 announcement that the war had
begun.’ This self-delusion partly explains the United States’ increasingly and
narrowly aggressive stand.
This stand, however, is also partly explained by a psychological assump-
tion that it apparently involved. It appears to have been assumed that if
Saddam Hussein were faced with a sufficiently serious military threat, he
would back off. After all, he wanted to survive. Evidence that this assump-
tion was at work is provided by the recurrent explanation President Bush
gave of Hussein’s failure to comply with the various United Nations resolu-
tions: that Hussein had not got the message, or that he had not understood
the consequences of failing to comply. In fact, this assumption was
apparently shared by those who argued that economic sanctions should be
given more time to work. Both sides of the policy debate appeared to hold
200 BETWEEN NEGOTIATION AND COMBAT

the belief that, when faced with extreme hardship—whether military or

economic— Hussein would (1) give up so as not to suffer defeat and possibly
death, (2) give up so that his people would not have to suffer to the bitter end, or
(3) be ousted by powerful groups unwilling to undergo such suffering.
Expecting things to work out this way was also self-delusional. First, it
assumed that Saddam Hussein or some powerful group in Iraq would simply
want to avoid suffering, defeat, or death. But this had been declared a holy
war by Hussein himself, so he does not seem to have been all that concerned
with mere survival. A more plausible interpretation is that he wanted to
either survive in a manner that gave him a sense of dignity in the Arab world
or die with dignity. Many Iraqis who had the power to overthrow him
probably felt the same way: They would rather suffer, even die, with dignity
in the eyes of other Arabs than give up. As it was clearly stated by the P.L.O
representative to Great Britain on January 19, ideas cannot be killed; they
survive the destruction of institutions upholding them.’°
Second, the significance that Saddam Hussein attached to dealing with the
conflict in a manner that attained him dignity in the Arab world was
connected with strategic matters. To survive with such dignity, or at least
keep his version of the Arab cause alive, Saddam Hussein only needed to
stand up to the United States and its Persian Gulf coalition. As evidenced by
the aftermath of Arafat’s defeat in Lebanon, defeated leaders are unlikely to
lose their political power in Arab nations. Instead, they may gain stature in
the eyes of their people. Hence, even if defeated, Saddam Hussein would
have achieved his purpose had he survived and had his forces withstood the
attack for any length of time. If he died, his cause would have gained, not
lost, momentum among his followers.
It took very little for Saddam Hussein to enhance his ascendance and
promote his cause through martyrdom. He was likely to be able to with-
stand the attack for a while and survive it, hence achieving Arab dignity. In
other words, Saddam Hussein had the political upper hand. A sheer show of
force or economic sanctions aimed only at his early unconditional with-
drawal were bound to fail. In fact, they made meaningful negotiations aimed
at averting the war impossible. Was U.S. public opinion supportive of this
approach? What was the role of third countries in dealing with the crisis?

PUBLIG OPINION, A GHANGING WORLD ORDER,

AND THE 1990-91 PERSIAN GULF GRISIS
During the Persian Gulf crisis, such countries as France, other members of
the European Community, and the Soviet Union provided a moderating
influence, as did the United Nations. To be sure, soon after the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security Council unanimously condemned
 Between Negotiation and Combat 201

Iraq, calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its troops.
Soon afterwards, it approved mandatory sanctions under Chapter 7 of the
United Nations Charter, and it kept on passing various pressure-building
resolutions. The twelfth and most crucial of these resolutions authorized
member states to use all necessary means to implement the previous eleven
resolutions and restore peace and security in the area, unless Iraq complied
with the resolutions by midnight, January 15, 1991. In addition, it called for
the restoration of the Kuwait monarchy.
The resolution, however, said nothing about Iraq’s meeting these condi-
tions in exchange for nothing. This left the door open for a consideration of
the territorial and economic claims it made in connection with the invasion.
It also left the door open for a conference, the promise of a conference, or
the promise that some country, for example the Soviet Union, would make a
serious effort to arrange a conference about the Middle East conflicts,
including the Palestinian question."
As for the U.S. Congress, it was sensitive to public attitudes about the
conflict and played a crucial role in slowing down the momentum toward
war that had built up by November’s end. Indeed, January’s congressional
support for the president’s plan to use military force was hardly unanimous.
And the swing votes were largely predicated on the belief that such support
of military force would offer the best chance of avoiding war by leading
Saddam Hussein to negotiate.'*
Yet, until a few days after the war had begun, the strongest moderating
influence came from public opinion. Significant sectors of the public tended
to think of the conflict as a mere fight over oil. Although this was not the
whole truth, it led many to question the wisdom of attacking Iraq rather
than sticking to the original U.S. objective of simply defending Saudi Arabia
against Iraq’s threat of invasion. By January 13, 1991, the mood was ambiva-
lent, uncertain, and confused—not all-out in favor of war. This changed
when the war began. On January 16, polls indicated that about 73 percent of
the U.S. population supported it. On January 18, after the initial exhilaration
about the apparent success of the air bombardment, about 86 percent sup-
ported the war. In addition, 34 percent supported the further objective that
Saddam Hussein leave power altogether.’
Despite all this, comparing Saddam Hussein to Hitler or portraying Iraq
as a threat to the Western world simply did not work on the U.S. public.
People knew that the old world order was gone, and they did not quite trust
the executive’s application of cold war thinking to this new situation. Nor
was the public moved by references to a new world order. Though the cold
war world order was gone, no detectable new world order was in place or
clearly in the making. In this regard, the politics of self-deception may have
found more appeal among some U.S. policymakers than among the public.
202 BETWEEN NEGOTIATION AND COMBAT

This is puzzling, since policymakers were continuously faced with rapid

changes in the world order and the United States’ position in it.

UNEXPECTED INTERNATIONAL IMPLIGATIONS

The 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis brought about an unexpected rearrange-
ment of international forces. The United States became an ally of Syria and
an enemy of Iraq. Great Britain restored ties with Iran. The United States
brought the ex-Soviet Union into Middle East discussions. This rearrange-
ment of international forces made the Persian Gulf crisis sharply different
from the Korean War, when, after North Korea invaded South Korea, the
United Nations also authorized U.S. military intervention. Back then, the
United States was politically in control of the process that led to the said
authorization; in 1990, the United States was significantly led by the interna-
tional situation to seek UN support, and received it at great cost. This
contrast is evidence that the Persian Gulf crisis was a manifestation of the old
world order breakdown in the West.'* In addition, the specter of nuclear
war also loomed—though meekly—on the horizon.'? This completes the
evidence for my first thesis: From a historical and political standpoint, the
1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis evidences not just the unraveling of the cold war
order or its effects on the ex-Soviet Union, but also the fluid state of
international order in the Western world.
What the preceding discussion does not clarify is why policymakers, most
notably President Bush, were inclined to think of the situation as an in-
cipient new world order. Given that they have kept on mentioning it since
then, it does not appear to have been simply something they said to gather
public support against Saddam Hussein’s designs. Yet the evidence did
not—nor does it now—indicate a new world order, but simply a fluid
situation following the end of the cold war.
Arguably, however, the international situation was an opportunity, a
grand opportunity, to make an ideal world of peace a reality. Given this, the
perception of a new world order threatened by Saddam Hussein’s designs
may be best understood as an instance of what William James called “the
will to believe.” Some, perhaps many, in the U.S. leadership pragmatically
believed that a new world order—or at least Western world stability and the
United States’ and its allies’ position in it—was being defended. If they did
not believe that, such a new world order had no chance of becoming a
reality, and Western world stability would be more undermined than it
already was.'® Were they justified in holding such a belief ? Addressing this
question sets the stage for a discussion of the remaining theses.
 Between Negotiation and Combat 203

ESCALATION STAGES AND POLIGY-MAKING OPTIONS

THE DAMAGE GONTROL STAGE
The start of a war, at least of a contemporary war, does not ordinarily lead
to an immediate escalation of the war. For example, in discussing the 1982
South Atlantic war between Argentina and Great Britain (arguably an early
manifestation of the cold war order breakdown in the West), Virginia
Gamba describes this warfare stage as follows:
[A]fter crisis interaction between two states—and the failure of crisis
management—open warfare starts. Nevertheless, the early stages of a war
are fought with moderation and a desire to limit damage. There is still
room for negotiation, at least whilst the remnants of deterrence continue
to exist. This rationale places emphasis on the control of escalation so that
events in the battleground do not overtake any possibilities of a peaceful
settlement. At times, when credibility is exceptionally low, a period of
open albeit limited warfare tends to encourage rather than prevent a
negotiated settlement.
Both parties to a dispute tend to be as cautious about the use of force as
they were competitive about the risks they could take during the crisis
management.'”
Open warfare in the Persian Gulf began on January 16, 1991. The coali-
tion’s announced strategy was to cause such widespread damage to Iraq’s
forces that the very possibility of going through this first stage was minimal.
This, plus the planned continuous nature of the attack and its initial
success—only two coalition planes and their crews were lost, while Iraq’s
forces were largely paralyzed—made it practically impossible to slow down
to evaluate the effects of the initial armed engagements.'*
One can argue that the search for meaningful negotiations and mediation
is possible at any stage. The ex-Soviet Union pressed its own plan on Iraq
hours after the UN deadline had passed. It called for Iraq’s immediate
withdrawal from Kuwait in exchange for the promise that the Soviet Union
would make a serious effort to arrange a Middle East peace conference to
address regional stability and the Palestinian question. Iraq had apparently
been given evidence of international support for the Soviet effort, were it to
take place in exchange for Iraq’s withdrawal.'? Yet the successful opening
attack created a momemtum toward war that made negotiations unlikely. In
fact, on January 17 at around noon, various policymakers at the United
Nations announced that the current situation was not one for negotiations.*°
This, plus the war momentum, plus Iraq’s January 18 and 19 missile
attacks against Israel’s population centers in Tel Aviv and Haifa suggested
that, short of Iraqi capitulation, the war would quickly move into a second
stage. Such a development would have played into Saddam Hussein’s hands.
204. BETWEEN NEGOTIATION AND COMBAT

It would have achieved militarily what he had unsuccessfully tried to achieve

politically: a recognition by all participants that the Palestinian question and
conflicts with Israel were linked to the Persian Gulf crisis. Yet Israel decided
not to retaliate. This behavior was not simply due to the fact that Presi-
dent Bush and Prime Minister Major had urged Israel to show restraint
and statesmanship. It was also in Israel’s interest not to undermine the
coalition. To reduce the risk of further casualties, the United States sent
crews to Israel to manage the Patriot missiles capable of neutralizing further
attacks. Although Israel had received the missiles in September, its crews
were still being trained in Texas.*! These factors tended to undercut the
move toward the second stage. But the question was pressing itself: What
roles could negotiation and mediation have in it?
THE LOGAL WARFARE STAGE
The local warfare stage goes beyond damage control. All-out warfare
starts, and ground troops play a much more central role than at the opening
stage. (So far in the Persian Gulf crisis, however, ground forces were not
significantly, if at all, involved in combat.) But even at the local warfare
stage, despite the increasingly serious nature of the armed conflict, reason
and meaningful dialogue have some role to play through third parties. Such
third parties may be able to formulate policy-making options for ending the
war. If no such mediation effort is successful, it becomes difficult to avoid
the next stage, where the international community at large is affected.
Fears of serious effects on the international community were present early
in the Persian Gulf war. If attacked by the United States, Iraq was deter-
mined to attack Israel, which would in turn retaliate. If Israel retaliated,
Israeli planes might fly over Jordan, which had announced that it would
shoot them down. Another likely consequence of Israel’s entering the war
was that Syria would switch sides. Syria was supporting but was not part of
the coalition. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were unlikely to leave the coalition,
and Egypt’s President Mubarek vowed that Egypt would stay in it, as did
Egypt’s ambassador to the United Nations.” Yet if things were not con-
tained, there was no telling what other international rearrangements could
come about.
The initial crippling of Iraq’s offensive facilities put many of these fears at
least temporarily to rest, but other complications remained. For one, Soviet
military actions in Lithuania shortly before the United Nations’ January 15
deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait raised doubts about the integri-
ty of the United Nations’ anti-Iraq support.” This would have been clearly
jeopardized if the United States had pressed for sanctions against the ex-
Soviet Union. Such a development would have moved the war closer to the
next stage. The question arises: What could be achieved through mediation
and negotiation at such a stage?
 Between Negotiation and Combat 205

THE WORLD IMBALANGE STAGE

The developments just described make it plain that a crisis such as that in
the Persian Gulf can easily escalate in an internationally unsettling manner.
In fact, it is questionable whether, at this stage, further war can attain more
than negotiation can. For example, even if the fighting had been brought to
an end, the territorial and international power conflicts that led to the crisis
would not have been resolved. The balance of power in the area, which had
been destroyed by Iraq’s defeat of Iran, would not have been restored.
In addition, other problems were likely to be added to those posed by the
said conflicts. For example, once the war was over, what force should remain
in the area? Should it include mainly Arabs? Should it include U.S. forces?
For how long? And how should Iraq’s development after the war be reg-
ulated. Many regional and some world powers were likely to oppose the
slightest possibility that Iraq recover the way Egypt did after its late 1960s
defeat by Israel, and the way Syria did after its 1982 defeat by Israel.
These were sobering thoughts. Also sobering was the fact that the partici-
pants most directly involved in the crisis, Iraq and the United States, were
least likely to have the ability to bring it to an end through negotiation.
Here, more than at any of the previous crisis stages, the role of third
countries and the United Nations was crucial. And so was their role in the
postcrisis stages. Yet why should the United States and other coalition
members, or Iraq, have paid attention to them? This question involves the
essay’s remaining theses.

ETHIGAL AND PRUDENTIAL IMPLIGATIONS

OF THE GONFLIGT
The remaining theses are ethical and prudential. They focus on the role of
various social decision procedures—from negotiation to combat—in deal-
ing with international conflicts. In order to address the matter, I begin by
examining the procedures’ actual role in the conflict.
NEGOTIATION, THREATS OF GOMBAT,
AND ACTUAL GOMBAT: A BALANGING ACT

The tendency to seek a military solution has a way of preempting negoti-

ated options. This is what some perceived and feared concerning the Persian
Gulf crisis after November 8. At that time, President Bush announced that
he was nearly doubling the U.S. force in the gulf and took a more aggressive
posture. This move was considered questionable by those who thought that
economic sanctions were working, given that only four months had gone by,
and twelve to eighteen months were necessary for them to have their
supposed effect.** Being skeptical about the success of economic sanctions
alone, and concerned with bringing about a new world order, the Bush
206 BETWEEN NEGOTIATION AND COMBAT

administration sought a quick end to the conflict.

This tendency to seek and expect a rapid military solution often results
largely from short-term thinking. It may also be yet another instance of the
politics of self-deception, which has invariably led to predictions of rapid
victory in the United States or other societies with a higher reliance on
technology and faith in it than their opponents. In Korea, General Mac-
Arthur predicted (and soon corrected his prediction) that the troops would
be home by Christmas 1950. The war ended in 1953. President Johnson
predicted that the war in Vietnam would be over in late 1966. It took six
more years for U.S. troops to leave Vietnam.”? And though the first rounds
of the 1991 Persian Gulf war pointed to an early end of that conflict, only
faith could lead one to be sure of that outcome.
At any rate, the expectation of rapid victory, no doubt borne out by the
initial coalition success, had behavioral consequences. It led policymakers to
seek a rapid victory, especially when they were moved by the perceived
(arguably rightly perceived) justice of their cause. Such perceived just causes
have a tendency to desensitize policymakers to the lives lost and the suffer-
ing undergone by those who must fight the war for the cause. Whatever the
motivation driving toward a primarily military and rapid solution, the
crucial policy question was pertinent then and always remains: When, if at
all, is military action justified in dealing with the problem posed by a conflict
such as that in the Persian Gulf? To answer it, one must consider the
long-term as well as the short-term consequences, for the survivors will have
to live with the new situation a war invariably creates.
OLD THINKING IN NEW TIMES?
The cold war is over, but cold war thinking and institutions are not. This
discrepancy needs to be addressed. First, there is some evidence that the
United Nations’ mechanisms for collective security and peaceful change are
ineffective. This is so even though, in handling Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the
United States sought and was granted the authority by the United Nations
to use military force. Thus seeking UN approval was a step in the direction
of establishing a new world order, though not necessarily a peaceful one. It
did not address the tendency Anthony C. Arendt describes as “the legitima-
tion of force based on the ‘justice’ of the cause.””¢ In this regard, though
there seems to be no wholesale “retrogression to the pre-League of Nations
regime of self-help,” the very legal and moral principles to be used in the
new international situation are at issue.*” And judging by the position of the
United States and other nations concerning the Persian Gulf crisis, little trust
is placed on options other than the use of military force.
Second, it is crucial to address this aspect of cold war thinking and
institutions, especially when it comes to sovereignty claims. For, after all
 Between Negotiation and Combat 207

is said and done, conflicts such as that between Iraq and Kuwait are signif-
icantly, though not only, about sovereignty. And as long as military solu-
tions are more trusted than others, sovereignty conflicts can and will lead to
war, however much one postpones addressing the sovereignty questions.
Addressing this matter is crucial because a number of unsettled sovereign-
ty disputes concerning land boundaries exist. For example, there are such
disputes between China and members of the ex-Soviet Union, Chad and
Libya, Iran and Iraq, Sudan and Ethiopia, India and China, Vietnam and
China, Venezuela and Guyana, and Peru and Ecuador. There is also the
Falklands/Malvinas conflict, which led to the 1982 South Atlantic war
between Argentina and Great Britain (arguably, an early manifestation of
the cold war order breakdown in the West) and is still unsolved. Of particu-
lar relevance to this are the sovereignty disputes involving coastlines be-
tween Colombia and Nicaragua, the United Arab Emirates and Iran, Japan
and the ex-Soviet Union, and South Korea and Japan.”®
Third, as the previous discussion makes plain, there is always a risk of
superpower involvement in such disputes.” And this leads to a fourth
reason: The use of nuclear weapons is not unlikely in such confrontations;
indeed, smaller nations may be more likely to use nuclear weapons than
superpowers.°° Regarding this point, it has been claimed that, during the
1982 South Atlantic war, Great Britain had prepared for a nuclear attack if it
became necessary.*! To this, one should add that Argentina is reputed to
have some sort of nuclear capability and has neither signed the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty nor ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty, which establishes
a nuclear weapon free zone in Latin America.** At any rate, if a regional war
like those under discussion gets too drawn out and costly, there is no reason
to believe that none of the countries involved will use nuclear weapons.
Finally, a fifth reason is that even if nuclear weapons are not used, nearly as
devastating chemical, biological, and so-called conventional weapons are
likely to be used. They are so devastating that, during the Persian Gulf crisis,
about one million civilian casualties were expected during the first days of
the war.*?
THE OBLIGATION TO SEEK A NEGOTIATED PEAGE

Even if the situation just described provides good grounds for resolving
conflicts such as the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis through new principles,
what principles could be invoked? There is evidence that new principles may
be gaining force in the community of nations. One is that even though states
subject to foreign aggression have a right to defend themselves, they also
have an obligation to make a reasonable effort to find a peaceful resolution of
the conflict. Indeed, in the unlikely context of defending a country’s right
not to end hostilities, David C. Gompert suggests this view:
208 BETWEEN NEGOTIATION AND COMBAT

Provided that they are making a reasonable effort to find a peaceful

solution, countries that have been attacked must be spared the onus of
refusing to end hostilities.**

No doubt, one can disagree with Gompert’s wholesale defense of a

country’s refusal to end hostilities. His position is too simplistic. Of prime
importance is how continuing hostilities will affect world peace and the
peaceful resolution of the conflict. But it is hard to disagree with another
aspect of his view: that a country has an obligation to make a reasonable
effort to find a peaceful resolution of the conflict, no matter what stage the
conflict has reached.
To take the position just stated is not to deny that, in crises involving
aggression or the threat of aggression, responding through exclusive reliance
on negotiations is pointless. Rather, this position acknowledges the point-
lessness without falling into the trap of thinking that any reliance on
negotiations is pointless. This position is politically realistic, yet sensitive to
the requirements of morality. It is politically realistic because it makes it
possible to address situations, such as that in the Persian Gulf, in which
territorial and economic claims appear to be driven by hegemonic aims. The
implication of the position just advanced is that, at some stage, the use of
military force is permissible in trying to redress the wrongs of aggression.
Yet the position is sensitive to the requirements of morality because it says that
reasonable peace-seeking efforts are never pointless and always required.
Indeed, such is the view reflected by the November 29, 1990, United
Nations resolution. It authorized all member states to use “all necessary
means” to uphold previous United Nations resolutions condemning Iraq’s
invasion and calling for the restoration of the Kuwait government.**> However,
as many involved in passing the resolution rushed to indicate, the role of
negotiation was not ruled out by the moral and political authority to use
military force. This was further confirmed by last-minute attempts by then UN
Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and the French government.*°
The preceding discussion may lead some to ask the question that arose
during the Persian Gulf crisis: Are the efforts significant enough? This
question, however, is incomplete. The full question to ask is: Are the efforts
significant enough, given the nature of the conflict, the likely consequences of
war, and the feasible social decision procedures open to those involved? As
previously indicated, in addressing this question, moral concerns other than
the justice of a cause are relevant. Predominant among these are concerns
with the lives and suffering of those who would have to fight a war, as well as
the concern with world peace. Indeed, depending on the cause of war,
however just it may be, those other moral concerns may override it.
In addition, when it comes to world peace, prudential concerns often go
 Between Negotiation and Combat 209

hand in hand with moral concerns and give them political significance. At
any rate, as Haim Ramon, a Knesset member, said in 1988 about the various
Middle East armed confrontations: “Maybe each of the sides will be one
hundred percent right; but both of the sides will be one hundred percent
dead???
We are now in a position to infer theses two through four in this essay,
which are in accordance with the hypotheses formulated in Essay 8. They
are the following: Second, from a moral standpoint, a country or group of
countries with the moral and political authority—and the power—to re-
dress the wrongs of international aggression by using military force still has
an obligation to seek meaningful negotiations aimed at resolving the conflict.
That is, the negotiations to be sought should address the interests and
demands involved as fairly and comprehensively as circumstances (e.g., time,
knowledge, and available resources) permit. Third, this obligation is present
throughout the entire conflict, though its discharge does not invariably
require that the country cease hostilities to seek meaningful negotiations.
Fourth, military responses to aggression are justified only if, as far as
circumstances permit, they are likely to avoid harming civilians of any
country, creating political or economic instability in nonaggressor countries,
and bringing about any conditions that would further undermine world
peace.
As stated at this essay’s outset, the moral and political significance of all
these theses in the latter part of the twentieth century is a matter of political
prudence and moral sensitivity. From a political standpoint, the efforts made
to attain a meaningfully negotiated solution throughout a conflict are crucial
to whether or not world peace is further undermined. They are crucial not
just in the conflict’s aftermath, but during the conflict itself. And from a
moral standpoint, the failure to seek a meaningful negotiated solution is
simply to be unduly nonchalant and therefore insensitive about the injuries
and loss of lives that combat involves. In a nutshell, these reasons lead to the
conclusion that, in the latter part of the twentieth century, seeking negoti-
ated solutions to regional conflicts is a matter of political prudence and
moral sensitivity.

PROACTIVE POLITIGS
The preceding discussion indicates the need for a new type of thinking in
international affairs. It must be proactive, aimed at preventing crises rather
than simply reacting to them. And when crises start, in accordance with the
book’s hypotheses, it must aim at using as little force as necessary to bring
about a situation in which other, less confrontational social decision proce-
dures have a good chance of success. This applies to conflicts such as the
210 BETWEEN NEGOTIATION AND COMBAT

Persian Gulf war, and reasonable efforts along the lines just mentioned
should be made to find solutions to them. Some approaches suggest them-
selves. For example, precedents, if not models, for addressing the conflicts
peacefully can be found in the 1984 agreement between Great Britain and
China about Hong Kong, in the 1984 agreement between Argentina and
Chile about the Beagle Channel, and in agreements that have withstood the
test of time reasonably well, such as the Spitsbergen/Svalbard, Antarctic, and
Torres Strait treaties.°* The question arises, however: What do current
conditions permit in dealing with conflicts? The answer, I am afraid, calls for
caution and patience. Whatever the resolution of conflicts turns out to be,
there is reason to believe that it will not be reached easily or soon. The
simple fact of the matter is that, in contrast with light rays, policy-making,
especially in conflictive situations, does not proceed in a straight line.
 Dialogue

— You have paid no attention to the role of prior injustices in

dealing with confrontations. In fact, you pay little if any attention
to it throughout the book. This, I believe, is a weakness in your
approach.

—I have not talked directly about prior injustices, but the

approach I outline does not disregard them. It relies on what people
are likely to find intolerable when they are of sound mind, free from
the effects of coercion and manipulation, not carried away by pas-
sion and emotion, and well-informed. Now, normally, a policy’s or
a decision’s failure to take past injustices into account will be found
intolerable by those people. In the case of the Middle East conflicts,
for example, just as in many of the other regional conflicts I men-
tioned in the essay, questions of sovereignty are crucial and are
often tied to prior injustices. They may be tied to injustices pre-
viously committed by aggressor countries or colonial powers. These
injustices will be reflected in the judgments of people who meet the
said conditions.

— Yet, your saying “normally” suggests that some policies or

decisions may be permissible even though they disregard past injus-
tices altogether. In accordance with your hypotheses, policies that
are feasible and likely to be effective are permissible so long as
people who have the characteristics you mentioned are not likely to
mind and the policies and decisions are likely to limit freedoms and
well-being less than the alternatives. This is perfectly compatible
with disregarding past injustices. Being from a country where the
dirty war led to so many human-rights violations, you will be able
to understand the example I have in mind. Those violations in-
cluded many killings. The victims are dead. In some cases, their
children were adopted by the killers. Indeed, there appear to have
been cases in which, presumably for the sake of their grandchildren

211
212 DIALOGUE

and out of a desire to see them, the grandparents became friends

with their children’s killers rather than denouncing them. If you ask
these people, they will not object to policies that let the killers
literally get away with murder.

— First, the people you describe are unlikely to meet the character-
istics they must meet for their judgment to count. Aren’t they being
carried away by passion and emotion, at the very least, by the
desperate love for their grandchildren? In addition, they are not the
only ones likely to be affected by the policies or decisions. Normal-
ly, these will include victims who managed to survive, or relatives of
those killed who want justice done, or still other people who think
that the injustices should be addressed even if the victims are gone
and their descendants do not care.

— But couldn’t all these people fail to find certain policies and
decisions intolerable, despite the fact that some injustices would not
be redressed?

— Under extreme conditions, they could. For example, faced with

the prospect of their country falling apart in a bloody war driven by
the desire to redress those wrongs, they may, on balance, conclude
that they should regrettably put those matters aside and get on with
life. But bear in mind that they—the victims and those whose
concerns for the victims of past injustices would be affected by the
policies or decisions—would reach this judgment. And if they
reached such a judgment, who could reasonably claim to be in a
better position to judge the matter? It is a virtue of my approach
that it is sensitive to the nuances in the example you gave.

— Your approach may reasonably take into account past injustices,

but how can it be sensitive to future generations?

-— Just as I said it could be sensitive to children and nonhumans:

through third parties who act as their trustees.

— That’s an odd idea. How can anyone be the trustee of people

who do not yet exist?

— We know that, barring quite far-fetched unpredictables, there

will be future generations so long as we take care of the planet.
 Dialogue 213

— Granted, but that’s too general. What can your approach tell us,
for example, concerning population policies. Who is likely to be
affected by the policies?

— Those affected would be those born under the policies, plus

those living at policy-making time who would have their societies,
individual freedoms, or well-being affected by the policies.

— Do you mean to imply that those who, because of the policies,

would not be born would not be among those affected by the policies?

— Should they be included simply because the policies presumably

lead to their not being born? I must confess that I find your
suggestion quite unconvincing. For one: How can a totally and
irretrievably imaginary person (that is, one who, by assumption,
never existed and never will exist) be affected by an actual policy at
all? At most, the policy may affect people who could be, but never
will be, parents of such a person.

— I see your point. However, even if we can assess policies and

decisions only by reference to those likely to be affected by them,
how reliable are our predictions when we are dealing with future
generations?

— They become less reliable the further into the future those
generations are supposed to exist. However, we can still make some
reasonable generalizations about them. They will need at least such
things as clean, uncontaminated land, water, and air; fertile soils;
predictable weather patterns (hence, a preserved rain forest to reg-
ulate them); viable societies; a certain freedom of choice concerning
their own lives and future; and a modicum of human compan-
ionship. These are not minor things and, in connection with the
hypotheses I formulated, lead to a variety of practical injunctions.

— You seem quite sure that your hypotheses will do the job.

— I amas sure as the reasons I gave throughout the book permit.

Yet my approach entails that the hypotheses should be tested fur-
ther. In particular, they should go through a process of social
testing, that is, of critical scrutiny and limited interactions with the
hypotheses’ implications in actual social life. Like policy-making
214 DIALOGUE

itself, its study in ethics and sociopolitical philosophy is an ongoing

process in which a theory sometimes turns out to have unforeseen
or even unforeseeable practical implications. And after all, as the
saying goes, the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
 Notes
PREFACE
1. Lewis Anthony Dexter, “Intra-Agency Politics: Conflict and Contravention in
Administrative Entities.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 2: 151-72 (1990).
ae David Braybrooke, Meeting Needs (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,
1987).
3. David Braybrooke, Ethics in the World of Business (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman &
Allanheld, 1983), pp. 55-56, 480.

ESSAY 1. ISSUES AND ISSUE-OVERLOAD

Some of the ideas in this essay were included in a paper presented at the Philosophy
Colloquium, Department of Philosophy, Central Connecticut State University, on
April 18, 1990.
ile For recent characterizations of issues, see the discussion below, entitled Levels of
Policy and Decision Problems.
Ze Some of these procedures are described in Brian Barry, Political Argument
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 84-93. Manipulation in politics
is discussed in Robert E. Goodin, Manipulatory Politics (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1980). Policy insulation is discussed by Patrick
W. Hamlett, “A Typology of Technological Policymaking in the U.S. Con-
gress,” Technology and Human Values 8 (2): 33-40 (Spring 1983); also included
in my Contemporary Moral Controversies in Technology (New York and Lon-
don: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 313-22.
. This method, and its tradition in studies of social process, are described in the
Appendix to Lewis Anthony Dexter, “Intra-~Agency Politics: Conflict and Con-
travention in Administrative Entities,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 2: 151-72
(1990).
. Daniel C. Dennett, “The Moral First Aid Manual,” in Sterling M. McMurrin
(ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, VIII (Salt Lake City, Utah, and
Cambridge, England: University of Utah Press, Cambridge University Press,
1988), pp. 119-47.
. Eugene Kennedy, “The Looming 80’s,” New York Times Magazine, December
2, 1979. Quoted in Jethro K. Lieberman, The Litigious Society (New York:
Basic, 1981), p. vii.
. David L. Bazelon, “Governing Technology: Values, Choices, and Scientific
Progress,” Technology and Society 5: 17-18 (1983); also in my Contemporary
Moral Controversies in Technology, pp. 134-35.
. Dennett, “The Moral First Aid Manual,” p. 123. For a brief discussion of
Dennett’s position as it compares with related recent discussions in ethical
theory, see my review of Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures on
Human Values, VIII, in History of European Ideas 10 (4): 484-85 (1989).
. Dennett, “The Moral First Aid Manual,” p. 124.

215
216, INOTES

. Ibid., p. 138.
. Ibid., p. 144.
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
«Ibid. 123.
. For an additional discussion of this point, see my Contemporary Moral Con-
troversies in Technology and Contemporary Moral Controversies in Business
(New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1989).
. For the questions the taxonomy should help ask, see Frank Fischer, Politics,
Values, and Public Policy: The Problem of Methodology (Boulder, Colo.: West-
view Press, 1980), pp. 205-14.
16. Dennett, “The Moral First Aid Manual,” p. 131.
q7 See, for example, David Braybrooke, Traffic Congestion Goes through the Issue
Machine (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 1. See also
David Braybrooke, “Policy Formation with Issue-Processing and Transforma-
tion of Issues,” in C. A. Hooker, J. J. Leach, and E. F. McClennen (eds.),
Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel
Publishing Co., 1978); and David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A
Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963, 1970), pp. 84-86, 98-99,
194-97.
18. Marcus G. Singer, “Moral Issues and Social Problems: The Moral Relevance of
Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 60: 12-13 (1985). For the development of
Singer’s notion of moral issues and social problems, see also his Morals and
Values (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1977), pp. 5-6. This distinction
also appears in Singer’s “Is Ethics a Science? Ought It to Be?” Zygon 15 (1):
37-38 (March 1980), where it is characterized in almost the same terms as in
Morals and Values.
13: Singer, “Moral Issues and Social Problems,” pp. 12-13.
20: Jurgen Habermas, “Morality and the Law,” in Sterling M. McMurrin (ed.), The
Tanner Lectures on Human Values, VIII (Salt Lake City, Utah, and Cambridge,
England: University of Utah Press, Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 243.
Zhe Jon Elster, ““The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory,” in
Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland (eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 103.
. Ibid., p. 114.
. Ibid., pp. 114-20.
bid ap. 128.
. This is not to say that this type of theory applies only to cases of social conflict.
Nor is it to say that no other questions should be asked about issues. It is simply
to say what type of emphasis is needed in the case of issues. For policy and
decision questions to ask, see Fischer, Politics, Values, and Public Policy.
26. I have provided evidence in support of this hypothesis elsewhere. See Contem-
porary Moral Controversies in Technology, p. 6, and Contemporary
Moral Controversies in Business, p. 6. These books’ selections constitute and refer
to evidence that confirms the range hypothesis and disconfirms alternative,
more simplistic hypotheses. This evidence also serves to confirm the balance
hypothesis.
 Notes 217

ESSAY 2. SOCIAL TRAPS

This essay is based on an article of the same title that appeared in Epistemologia:
Italian Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1991).
1 . There is a wide literature on social traps. See, for example, J. Plall, “Social
Traps,” American Psychologist 28: 642-51 (1973); K. C. Brechner, “An Ex-
perimental Analysis of Social Traps,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
13: 552-64 (1977); J. G. Cross and M. J. Guyer, Social Traps (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1980); B. Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); D. A. Schroeder and D. E. John-
son, “Utilization of Information in a Social Trap,” Psychological Reports 50:
107-13 (1982); and Robert Costanza, ““The Nuclear Arms Race and the Theory
of Social Traps,” Journal of Peace Research 21: 79-86 (1984).
. For a somewhat different taxonomy of social traps, see Cross and Guyer, Social
Traps. For the elements of still another, see Jon Elster, The Cement of Society
(Cambridge, England, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
pp. 12-16.
. For a somewhat similar characterization of rational choice, see Jon Elster,
Rational Choice (New York: New York University Press, 1986), pp. 1, 4.
. See Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy
Process (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 13; and Mario
Bunge, “Game Theory Is Not a Useful Tool for the Political Scientist,” Episte-
mologia XII 1989: 195-212, and Cahiers d’épistémologie, No. 9015 (Montréal:
Université de Québec 4 Montréal, October 1990).
. Cited in Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), p. 22. This is not a fluke. Besides Charles J.
Hitch and Roland McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), see also Alain C. Enthoven
and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? (New York: Harper & Row,
1971), and E. S. Quade, Analysis for Public Decision (Amsterdam: North Hol-
land, 1982). For a current discussion of these developments, see Majone, Evi-
dence, Argument, and Persuasion.
. Judith Shklar, “Decisionism,” in C. J. Friedrich (ed.), Nomos, vol. 7, Rational
Decision (New York: Atherton, 1964), pp. 3-17.
. Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion, p. 15.
. Bunge, “Game Theory,” pp. 2, 17.
. Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures (Washington, D. C.:
World Priorities, Inc., 1985), pp. 20-21.
. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
. Molly Moore, “Iraq Amassing Biological Armaments,” The Hartford Courant,
September 29, 1990, pp. Al, A6. See also Douglas Frantz and Melissa Healy,
“Iraq Has Next Worst Thing to Nuclear Weapons, Pentagon Says,” from the
Los Angeles Times, reproduced in The Hartford Courant, October 5, 1990,
ALS.
ie. Tbid, There were overtones of this problem in Sen. Joseph. R. Biden Jr.’s heated
exchange with U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz about U.S. sanctions
against South Africa. See John F. Fitzgerald, “Sanctions Plan Stirs Discord,” The
Hartford Courant, July 24, 1986, pp. Al, A18.
13), Jackson Diehl, ““Gorbachev’s Visit to Germany Highlights East Bloc Contrasts,”
The Hartford Courant, April 23, 1986, p. A19.
218 ‘INO:EES

14: An example of this situation can be found in Rosemary Chalk, “Commentary on

the NAS Report,” Science, Technology and Human Values 8(1): 21-24 (Winter
1983). This article can also be found in my Contemporary Moral Controversies in
Technology, pp. 268-72; a discussion of the article is included on pp. 241-42.
iley, Combined Wire Services, “Iraq Replaces Kuwaiti Rulers,” The Hartford
Courant, August 3, 1990, pp. Al, A6, A7.
16. Moore, “Iraq Amassing Biological Armaments”; Frantz and Healy, “Iraq Has
Next Worst Thing.” See also Combined Wire Services, “Bush Warns Iraq May
Get Nuclear Weapons,” The Hartford Courant, November 23, 1990, pp. A1,
A8.
17. Jeff Sallot, “The Dreaded Mistake,’ Toronto Globe and Mail, August 8, 1987,
pp. D1, D8.
18. A careful discussion of this interpretation can be found in Allan Rosas. “The
Militarization of Space and International Law,” Journal of Peace Research 20 (4):
357-64 (1983). This article is also included in my Contemporary Moral Con-
troversies in Technology, pp. 183-90; a discussion of the article appears on
pp. 93-95.
. David Lauter and Norman Kempster, “Bush Urges Army Treaty for Europe,”
The Hartford Courant, May 4, 1990, pp. Al, A4.
. Sallot, “The Dreaded Mistake.”
. Bunge, “Game Theory,” p. 3. This is also the case if one uses the dollar auction
game model. See Costanza, “Nuclear Arms Race,” pp. 80-82.
. Elster, Rational Choice, p. 2.
. This was a central tension affecting U.S. citizens during the Vietnam War.
. Hannah Arendt, “What Was Authority?” in Carl Friedrich (ed.), Authority
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. x1.
. For a good discussion of this, see Joseph Margolis, ““The Peculiarities of Nuclear
Thinking,” in Avner Cohen and Steven Lee (eds.), Nuclear Weapons and the
Future of Humanity (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1986), pp. 153-68.
For nuclear thinking in the 1980s, see Colin $. Gray and Keith Payne, “Victory
is Possible,” Foreign Policy 59: 14-27 (1980), and Colin S. Gray, “Nuclear
Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory,” International Security 4 (1): 54-87
(1979). See also Ian Clark, Limited Nuclear War (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press, 1982). The peace movement in both the West and the East
provides evidence of the erosion of states’ authority on foreign policy.
26. Gorbachev’s policies have opened up new options in this regard, and now
intellectuals in the ex-Soviet republics and other members of the public are
beginning to take advantage of them. Only the future will tell what comes of it.
Jaf: Amartya K. Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 6: 317-344 (Summer 1977).
28. For a discussion of how the process of forming a political judgment undermines
decisionism, see Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion, p. 17.

ESSAY 3. SOCIAL GHOIGE THEORY

This essay is based on a paper of the same title published in Epistemologia: Italian
Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1992).
i Amartya Sen, “Foundations of Social Choice Theory: An Epilogue,” in Jon
Elster and Aanund Hylland (eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cam-
 Notes 219

bridge, England, and New York: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1989), p. 213.
. Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory,” in
Elster and Hylland, Foundations, pp. 103-32; Brian Barry, “Lady Chatterley’s
Lover and Doctor Fischer’s Bomb Party: Liberalism, Pareto Optimality, and the
Problem of Objectionable Preferences,” in Elster and Hylland, Foundations,
pp. 11-44.
. Sen, “Foundations of Social Choice Theory,” p. 236.
. Ibid., p. 216.
WwW
me . For a somewhat similar characterization of rational choice, see Jon Elster,
Rational Choice (New York: New York University Press, 1986), pp. 1, 4.
. Judith Shklar, “Decisionism,” in C. J. Friedrich (ed.), Nomos, vol. 7, Rational
Decision (New York: Atherton, 1964), pp. 3-17.
. Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Pro-
cess (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 15.
. Amartya K. Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 6: 317-44 (Summer 1977).
. Aanund Hylland, “The Purpose and Significance of Social Choice Theory: Some
General Remarks and an Application to the ‘Lady Chatterley Problem,’ in Elster
and Hylland, Foundations, p. 63.
. Ibid.
. For an insightful discussion of these processes, see Charles E. Lindblom and
David K. Cohen, Usable Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem Solving
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), especially Chapter 2, “The
Relation of Professional Social Inquiry to Other Inputs into Social Problem
Solving.”
pe For a discussion of how the process of forming a political judgment undermines
decisionism, see Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion, p.17. For a
parallel discussion concerning rational choice, decision, and game theories, see
Essay 2.
13: See, for example, “Gorbachev to Shuffle Leadership,” The Hartford Courant,
November 17, 1990, pp. Al, A8.
14: Ibid.
15: William Edward Hartpole Lecky, The Map of Life (London: Longmans, Green,
and Co., 1921), p. 191. See also Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion,
p- 17.
16. Herbert Simon, Models of Man (New York: Wiley, 1961), pp. 70-71, 253. See
also David Braybrooke, Meeting Needs (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University
Press, 1987), pp. 204-10, especially pp. 208-9.
. Elster, Rational Choice, p. 25.
. Ibid., p. 26.
. Ibid.
. See Pierre Moessinger, La psychologie morale (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1989); ‘Perfect Justice Procedures,” and “La théorie du choix rationnel:
critique d’une explication,” Information sur les sciences sociales 31 (1): 87-111
1992).
Heibe Thece isa great deal of empirical work being done. See, for example, A. Abbott,
“Professional Ethics,” American Journal of Sociology 88: 855-85 (1983);
P. Besnard, L’anomie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987); David W.
Brown, Cooperation among Strangers (Dayton, Ohio: Kettering Foundation,
1992); R. J. Edelman, The Psychology of Embarrassment (New York: Wiley,
220 NOTES

1987). See also the empirical studies included in my Contemporary Moral Con-
troversies in Business (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1989)
and, to a lesser extent, in my Contemporary Moral Controversies in Technology
(New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Essay 4. INFORMING THE PUBLIG

An initial version of this essay appeared in Philosophy in Context 20: 1-21 (1990).
1. This appeared in The Hartford Courant during the mid-1980s.
2: Herbert Brucker, “What’s Wrong with Objectivity,” Saturday Review, October
Opa.
3. J. L. Mackie, Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin, 1977), p. 236.
4. Ibid., p. 146.
5 . Brucker, ““What’s Wrong,” pp. 78-79.
6 . Ronald D. Milo, Immorality (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,
1984), p. 215.
Ue Virginia Held has discussed how moral theories are politically tested in “The
Political ‘Testing’ of Moral Theories,” in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling,
Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7: 343-63
(1982). However, her account is rather subjectivistic. The notion of objectivity as
social testing that I use includes, but is not reduced to, the political testing of
moral theories.
. Brucker, “What’s Wrong,” p. 77.
. Ibid. See also Gary Atkins, “In Search of New Objectivity,” in Leonard L.
Sellers and William L. Rivers (eds.), Mass Media Issues (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice Hall, 1977), p. 26.
. Conrad C. Fink, Media Ethics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), p. 20.
. Atkins, “In Search,” p. 34.
. Various TV programs, for example, “Nightline,” 5) carried discussions on this
topic. A very good discussion of it can be found in Alvin Rosenfeld, ““The Jewish
Reporter and the Code of Objectivity,” The National Jewish Monthly, June
1975, pp. 22-25. For parallel discussions concerning the 1982 South Atlantic war
between Argentina and Great Britain, see Valerie Adams, The Media and the
Falklands Campaign (New York: Macmillan, 1987). See also R. Neil Matheson’s
review of this book and of Daniel C. Hallin, The Uncensored Press: The Media
and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), in Toronto Globe and
Mail, April 11, 1987, p. C11. For coverage and discussions of the Munich
Olympic game massacre of Israeli athletes, see Serge Groussard, The Blood of
Israel, translated by Harold J. Salemson (New York: William Morrow and Co,
1975); Elie Wiesel’s review of this book in The New York Times Book Review,
June 8, 1975, pp. 4—5; and the exchange that followed between Paul Good and
Elie Wiesel in the letters to the editor section of a closely following issue of the
same publication.
. Arthur Edward Rose, Slanted News (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), pp. 1—2, 45.
. Ibid., pp. 3, 57, 123-24.
. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
. Fink, Media Ethics, p. 21.
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
 Notes 221

vilbid.ep: 22:
. Ibid.
. Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge, England, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1979), p. 206.
. For evidence of the linguistic, conceptual, methodological, and related forms of
fragmentation between these groups, as well as for an initial attempt at bridging
the gaps, see my Contemporary Moral Controversies in Technology (New York
and London: Oxford University Press, 1987), and Contemporary Moral Con-
troversies in Business (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1989).
23; Nagel, Mortal Questions, p. 213. Alasdair MacIntyre has advanced, perhaps
more poignantly and usefully than others, a similar view in After Virtue (Notre
Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1981). He also advanced it in a
modified, more defensible version, in “Relativism, Power, and Philosophy,” in
Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy (eds.), After Philoso-
phy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 385-411.
24. This and related arguments are discussed in Marcus G. Singer, Generalization in
Ethics (New York: Atheneum, 1961), pp. 321-22.
25% An analogous argument about the truth of ethical judgments is formulated in
Marcus G. Singer, “Some Preliminary Observations on Truth in Ethics,” Phi-
losophy in Context 16: 11-16 (1986).
26. For a discussion of social decision procedures and their ethical significance, see
Brian Barry, Political Argument (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976),
pp. 84-93.
27s This position has a precedent in the work of John Dewey, especially in “The
Construction of Good,” in The Quest for Certainty (New York: Capricorn,
1960), pp. 254-86. A seminal philosophical discussion of objectivity in this sense
can be found in Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘“The Fixation of Belief,” Popular Science
Monthly, November 1877, pp. 1-15. For a current edition including Peirce’s
later revisions and comments, see Philip P. Wiener (ed.), Charles Sanders Peirce:
Selected Writings (New York: Dover, 1958), pp. 91-112.
28. Elie Wiesel, review of The Blood of Israel, The New York Times Book Review,
July 8, 1975, p. 5.
29: Concerning this point, see W. K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,’ Contemporary
Review (January 1877), later reprinted in his Lectures and Essays and, more
recently, in Marcus G. Singer and Robert R. Ammerman (eds.), Introductory
Readings in Philosophy (New York: Scribner’s, 1974) pp. 115-21; E. D.
Klemke, A. David Kline, and Robert Hollinger, Philosophy: The Basic Issues
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), pp. 53-58; and my Through Time and
Culture (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1993). The classic criticism of
Clifford’s position is the work just mentioned in the paper’s main text: William
James, “The Will to Believe.” A recent publication of this piece can be found in
William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy
(New York: Dover, 1956), pp. 1-31.

ESSAY 5. GRITIGAL INTERACTION

This essay is based on an article of the same title published in Jnternational Journal of
Social and Moral Studies 6 (2) (Summer 1991).
1. An attempt to address this antinomy can be found in R. M. Hare’s work,
222 ‘NOTES

especially in Freedom and Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963),
p. 3. It is also discussed throughout the book.
. An incisive critique of Hare’s position is advanced by Marcus G. Singer in
“Freedom from Reason,” Philosophical Review 89:253-61 (April 1970).
. Virginia Held, in “The Political ‘Testing’ of Moral Theories,” Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 7:354 (1982).
. Ibid.
. Ibid., p. 344.
. Such reasons would point to various testing conditions, depending on the
circumstances and on what is under scrutiny. A list of such conditions appears in
Ibid., pp. 344-45. The argument just given holds even if Held’s expressions, “we
ought to shape the world in accordance with our choices” and “we ought to
impose our choices on what prescriptions and judgments to consider valid on the
world,” are not judgments but expressions of prescriptions advanced as a matter
of choice. Based on Held’s account, they are just as well based on an arbitrary
choice or a blind act of the will. This rules out critical scrutiny and so the testing
of moral theories.
. This accordance with actual moral thinking is one of the various criteria relevant
for assessing moral theories. For a fuller discussion of these criteria, see my
Contemporary Moral Controversies in Technology, Introduction to Part III.
. Random House Dictionary of the English Language (New York: Random
House, 1966), s.v. “approve.” This distinction is not peculiar to English. One
can also find it, for example, in Spanish. In this language, one can say, in the
judgment sense, “El aprueba de la politica gubernamental,” and in the decision
sense, one can say, “El Senado aprobé prontamente el proyecto de ley.”
For purposes of this inquiry, I do not dwell on the distinction between an
evaluation and a judgment of value. Let us keep in mind, however, that an
evaluation one reaches is treated here as identical to a judgment of value but
different from an evaluation undertaken, which is an activity aimed at reaching
such judgments. Of course, not all judgments of value are moral judgments: The
judgment that thick-crust pizza is better than thin-crust pizza is not. The present
account, however, does not deal only with moral judgments about actions. An
account that does is Marcus G. Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York:
Atheneum, 1961), pp. 34--35. Also, a discussion of political evaluation roughly
compatible with the account I am developing can be found in Brian Barry,
Political Argument (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 1-15. And
for a discussion of value judgments, see W. D. Lamont, The Value Judgment
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1955), pp. xi, xii, 295.
. Random House Dictionary, s.v. “approve.”
. Ibid., s.v. “disapprove.”
. Ibid.
. The judgment-decision distinction carries over from the verbs to their corres-
ponding nouns. See Ibid., s.v. “approval” and, though somewhat less clearly, s.v.
“disapproval.”
. Ibid., s.v. “assess,>
estimate.
6 2 »”»

. Ibid., s.v. “assess,

>
decision.”’ Even this term wavers between a creation and a
¢C¢

discovery sense.
ibe J. L. Mackie, Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin Books Ltd.,
1977), pp. 106, 123.
16. Ibid., p. 236.
 Notes 223

. Ibid., p. 106.
. Ibid., p. 146.
. Ibid., p. 148.
. Ibid.
. Ibid., p. 35.
. Ibid., p. 148.
. Ibid., p. 238.
. Ibid., p. 102.

ESSAY 6. PHILOSOPHY AS DIPLOMAGY

Parts of this essay were presented at the Philosophy Colloquium, Department of
Phil osophy, Central Connecticut State University, April 18, 1990.
1 . This characterization is attributed to Isaac Goldberg in Robert Andrews, ed.,
The Concise Columbia Dictionary of Quotations (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1989), p. 70.
. Sir Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, 3d ed. (London, Oxford, and New York:
Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 3-4.
. José Calvet De Magalhaes, The Pure Concept of Diplomacy (New York; West-
port, Conn., and London: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 4.
. Ibid., p. 59.
. Ibid.
. Ibid., p. 57
. James Der Derian, On Diplomacy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987), p. 203.
. For accounts of these and related events, see
DWM
CON F. F. Piven and R. A. Cloward, Poor
People’s Movements (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 238. See also W.
Brink and L. Harris, The Negro Revolution in America (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1964), p. 40.
. From a political science perspective, some of the points I am making have been
made by Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the
Policy Process (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), especially in
the chapters entitled “Policy Analysis and Public Deliberation” and “Analysis as
Argument.” See also Benjamin Barber, The Conquest of Politics (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), especially the last chapter, “Political
Judgment: Philosophy as Practice.”
10. For a discussion of this notion, see my Contemporary Moral Controversies in
Technology, pp. 3-4, and Contemporary Moral Controversies in Business pp.

Lie There are plenty of cases in which participants adopt this approach. For example,
see the following from The Hartford Courant: Associated Press, “U.N. to Meet
on Population; U.S. Criticized,” August 5, 1984, p. A5; “U.N. Conference Says
Population Remains Challenge, Proposes Policies to Control It,” August 15,
1984, p. D7; T. R. Reid, “Nuclear Wastes Prompt Uproar in Canyonlands,”
October 14, 1984, p. A13; “Toxic Dump Site Choices Challenged,” May 20,
1986, p. A10; Miranda S. Spivack, “Settlement Caps Bhopal Court Fight,”
February 15, 1989, pp. Al, A6; W. Joseph Campbell, “For Victims, the Ordeal
Still Goes On,” February 15, 1989, pp. A1, A6; “Bhopal Disaster Survivors Say
Union Carbide Settlement Too Small,” February 16, 1989, p. A28; and W.
Joseph Campbell, “Bhopal Blame Still Unclear,” February 19, 1989, pp. Al,
224 NOTES

A29. From the New Haven Register, see Virginia Morris, “Yale Researchers in
63 Virginia
Thick of Debate on Fetal Tissue Work,” September 16, 1988, pp. 3,
Morris, “Research Using Fetal Tissue Should Proceed, Panel Says,” September
17, 1988, p. 3; Virginia Morris, “Debate Over Fetal Tissue Could Become
Academic,’ September 20, 1988, pp. 3, 63 Paul Marx, “Political Decisions
p.
Shouldn’t Block the Use of Fetal Tissue to Treat Diseases,” October 17, 1988,
11; Associated Press, “Animal-R ights Activist Held in Bomb Attempt,”
November 12, 1988, p. 1; Beth Burrell, “Norwalk Bombing Attempt Dismays
Animal Activists,” November 16, 1988, p. 6; Associated Press, “Abortion Pill
May Return if Outcry Desists,” October 28, 1988; Virginia Morris, “Abortion
Pill Could Save Lives, Yale Doctor Says,”’ October 29, 1988, pp. 3-4; and Ellen
Goodman, “RU-486 Pill Signals End of Abortion Fight,” November 4, 1988,
p. 15. See also J. Dusheck, “Protesters Prompt Halt in Animal Research,”
Science News 128:53 (July 27, 1985).
_ Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, edited by Robert
Paul Wolff (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p. 36.
. Ibid., pp. 36-39.
. Philippa Foot, “Hypothetical Imperatives,” Philosophical Review 81:312 (1972).
_ Lawrence C. Becker, “The Finality of Moral Judgments,” Philosophical Review
82:366—67 (1973).
. Foot, “Hypothetical Imperatives,” p. 315.
. This position is analogous to that taken by Marcus G. Singer in “Moral Issues
and Social Problems: The Moral Relevance of Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy
60:10-16 (1985). For the development of Singer’s notion of moral issues and
social problems, see also his Morals and Values (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1977), pp. 5-6. This distinction also appears in Singer’s “Is Ethics a
Science? Ought It to Be?” Zygon 15(1):37—38 (March 1980).

Essay 7. A DELIGATE BALANCE

ile Auguste Comte, System of Positive Polity, vol. 2 (New York: Burt Franklin,
1968), pp. 244, 247.
es Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The German Ideology,” in Lewis S. Feuer
(ed.), Marx & Engels (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1959), p. 255.
oe This method, and its tradition in studies of social process, is described in the
Appendix to Lewis Anthony Dexter, “Intra-Agency Politics: Conflict and Con-
travention in Administrative Entities,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 2:151—72
(1990).
. Ralf Dahrendorf, “Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological
Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology, September 1958, pp. 126-27.
. Edward Shils, “The Calling of Society,” in Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils,
Kaspar D. Naegele, and Jesse R. Pitts (eds.), Theories of Society (New York: Free
Press, 1965), pp. 1405-8.
. Robin Williams, “Some Further Comments on Chronic Controversy,” Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology, May 1966, p. 722.
. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press,
1968), p. 176.
. Thomas J. Bernard, The Consensus-Conflict Debate (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1983), p. 2.
 Notes 225

. Dexter, “Intra-Agency Politics,” p. 151.

. Dahrendorf, “Out of Utopia,” pp. 126-27.
. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3d. ed. (New
York: Harper & Row, 1950), especially chs. 13, 22.
. Bernard, Consensus-Conflict Debate, p. 5.
. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
. See, for example, Laurence H. Meyer, Macroeconomics (Cincinnati: South-
Western Publishing, 1980), pp. 3-5.
. See Laird Addis, “The Individual and the Marxist Philosophy of History,”
Philosophy of Science 33:101—17 (1966).
. See A. Pablo Iannone, Contemporary Moral Controversies in Technology (New
York and London: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. vill.
. Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan,” in D. D. Raphael (ed.), British Moralists 1650-
1880, vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 34-38.
. Jon Elster, The Cement of Society (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University
Press,'1989)s pps 2—11:
. Hobbes, “Leviathan,” p. 37.
. From Associated Press, “U.N. to Meet on Population; U.S. Criticized,” The
Hartford Courant, August 5, 1984, p. A5.
. From the Los Angeles Times, “U.N. Conference Says Population Remains
Challenge, Proposes Policies to Control It,” The Hartford Courant, August 15,
1984, p. D7.
_T.R. Reid, “Nuclear Wastes Prompt Uproar in Canyonlands,” The Hartford
Courant, October 14, 1984, p. A13.
. The Hartford Courant, December 20, 1984, p. All, and, from Combined Wire
Services, “Toxic Dump Site Choices Challenged,” The Hartford Courant, May
20, 1986, p. A10. In 1990, the uproar was in Nevada. See Associated Press,
“Disposal Sites for Nuclear Waste Remain Elusive,” The Hartford Courant,
January 1, 1990, p. A4.
24. J. Dusheck, “Protesters Prompt Halt in Animal Research,”’ Science News 128:53
(July 27, 1985).
25: Associated Press, “Animal-Rights Activist Held in Bomb Attempt,” New
Haven Register, November 12, 1988, p. 1, and Beth Burrell, “Norwalk Bombing
Attempt Dismays Animal Activists,” New Haven Register, November 16, 1988,

26. The crisis, which occurred at the end of President Carter’s term, was widely
covered in all the media.
Mf See The Hartford Courant: Miranda S. Spivack, “Settlement Caps Bhopal Court
Fight,” February 15, 1989, pp. Al, Aé; W. Joseph Campbell, “For Victims, the
Ordeal Still Goes On,” February 15, 1989, pp. Al, A6; Associated Press,
“Bhopal Disaster Survivors Say Union Carbide Settlement Too Small,” Febru-
ary 16, 1989, p. A28; W. Joseph Campbell, “Bhopal Blame Still Unclear,”
February 19, 1989, pp. Al, A29; Associated Press, “Judge in Bhopal Case
Threatens to Quit,” March 4, 1989, p. A10; Associated Press, “Gas Victims
Attack Carbide Offices,” March 9, 1989, p. A17.
28. For an account of these developments, see Nunca Mas, by the Comisién Nacion-
al Sobre la Desaparicion de Personas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de
Buenos Aires, 1985). See also Anexos, by the Comisién Nacional Sobre la
Desaparicién de Personas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos
Aires, 1985).
226 NOTES

29: Concerning the ongoing political moves at the time the ozone-layer plan was
discussed, see Richard A. Kerr, “Arctic Ozone Is Poised for Fall,” Science,
February 24, 1989, pp. 1007-8; Jim Detjen, “Artic Ozone Threatened, Scientists
Say,” The Hartford Courant, February 18, 1989, pp. Al, A14; Michael
Weisskopf, “Bush Pushes Chemical Plan,” The Hartford Courant, March 4,
1989, pp. Al, A5; and, from the Chicago Tribune, “World Divided on Ozone-
Layer Plan,” The Hartford Courant, March 8, 1989, p. A9.
As for the politics involved in signing the Rio Treaty, see Eugene Robinson
and Michael Weisskopf, “Germans Take Lead in Global Warming Plan,” The
Hartford Courant, June 9, 1992, pp. Al, A5; Sam Dillon, “Europe Snubs U.S.
Views at Earth Summit,” The Hartford Courant, June 10, 1992, pp. Al, A5; and
Combined Wire Services, “Earth Summit Ends on Note of Optimism,” The
Hartford Courant, June 15, 1992, pp. Al, A5. For preceding discussions in the
U.S. scientific community of a greenhouse policy (a sticking point that isolated
the United States during the 1992 Rio meetings), see Claudine Schneider, “Pre-
venting Climate Change,” Issues in Science and Technology, Summer 1989, pp.
55-62; D. Allan Bromley, “The Making of a Greenhouse Policy,” Issues in
Science and Technology, Fall 1990, pp. 55-61; Charles N. Herrick, “Science and
Climate Policy: A History Lesson,” Issues in Science and Technology, Winter
1991-1992, pp. 56-57; and Rosina Bierbaum and Robert M. Friedman, ““The
Road to Reduced Carbon Emissions,” Issues in Science and Technology, Winter
1991-1992, pp. 58-65.
30. Owen Ullmann, “Modest Agreements Mask Differences,” The Hartford
Courant, July 12, 1990, pp. Al, A6; David Lightman, “U.S. Assumes Lesser
Role,” The Hartford Courant, July 12, 1990, pp. Al, A6.
31. Virginia Morris, “Yale Researchers in Thick of Debate on Fetal Tissue Work,”
New Haven Register, September 16, 1988, pp. 3, 6; Virginia Morris, “Research
Using Fetal Tissue Should Proceed, Panel Says,” New Haven Register, Septem-
ber 17, 1988, p. 3; Virginia Morris, “Debate Over Fetal Tissue Could Become
Academic,” New Haven Register, September 20, 1988, pp. 3, 6; Paul Marx,
“Political Decisions Shouldn’t Block the Use of Fetal Tissue to Treat Diseases,”
New Haven Register, October 17, 1988, p. 11. For later developments in the fetal
tissue research controversy, see Combined Wire Services, “House Backs Re-
search with Fetal Tissue,” The Hartford Courant, May 29, 1992, pp. Al, A10.
32; See note 27 above.

ESSAY 8. PRACTICAL EQUITY

Ale See, for example, James S. Fishkin’s use of these features to characterize ideal
society in his Tyranny and Legitimacy: A Critique of Political Theories
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 37.
. The terms macrosocietal and microsocietal are used here as they are used in
economics. See, for example, Laurence H. Meyer, Macroeconomics (Cincinnati:
South-Western Publishing, 1980), pp. 3-5.
. Herbert Simon, Models of Man (New York: Wiley, 1961), pp. 70-71, 253. See
also David Braybrooke, Meeting Needs (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1987), pp. 204-10, especially pp. 208-9.
. See The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1970), s.v. “equity.”
 Notes 227

- See David Braybrooke, Meeting Needs (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Universit

y
Press, 1987), pp. 264-76.
- For an account of severe deprivations, see James S. Fishkin, Tyranny and
Legitimacy: A Critique of Political Theories (Baltimore and London: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 26-43.
. For the relevance of precedents in issue processing, see David Braybrooke,
Traffic Congestion Goes through the Issue Machine (London and Boston:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 44-49.
. A seminal work leading to discussions of the connection, if any, between facts
and values is David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1967 [1888]), pp. 469-76.
. There is a suggestion of this type of argument in John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarian-
ism,” in Max Lerner (ed.), Essential Works of John Stuart Mill (New York and
London: Bantam Books, 1965), pp. 192, 220-26). For abduction, see Charles
Sanders Peirce, “Abduction and Induction,” in Justus Buchler (ed.), Philosophi-
cal Writings of Peirce (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), pp. 150-56.
. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3d. ed. (New
York: Harper & Row, 1950), pp. 240-42.
. Fishkin, Tyranny and Legitimacy, pp. 65-72. The quotation appears on pp.
68-69.
. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Robert Paul Wolff
(ed.) (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p. 44.
- For an analysis of moral rules, laws, and principles, see Marcus G. Singer,
Generalization in Ethics (New York: Atheneum, 1961), ch. 5.
. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1971). See also T. M. Scanlon, “The Significance of Choice,” in Sterling M.
McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, VIII (Salt Lake City,
Cambridge: University of Utah Press, Cambridge University Press, 1988),
p. 166.
. This is L. Kohlberg’s position in The Philosophy of Moral Development (San
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981).
. Jurgen Habermas, “Morality and the Law,” in McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner
Lectures, VIII, p. 243.
. For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Amitai Etzioni, The Moral Dimen-
sion: Toward a New Economics (New York: Free Press, 1988).
. I have discussed what this involves in my Contemporary Moral Controversies in
Technology (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1987) pp. 49-51.
. See Combined Wire Services, “U.N. Imposes Embargo on Iraq,” The Hartford
Courant, August 7, 1990, pp. Al, A4.
20. See Ellen Warren, “Bush, Gorbachev United Against Iraq.” The Hartford
Courant, August 7, 1990, pp. Al, A4.
Qi This may be what the Bush administration had in mind when the president
declined to comment on the initial executions in China after the 1989 student
uprising. See “Bush Avoids Criticizing China after Executions,” The Hartford
Courant, June 22, 1989. A similar point was made about the 1978 efforts by
Amnesty International, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and
those foreign governments considering a boycott of the 1978 World Cup unless
the then Argentine government either returned those people who had been taken
out of society or let their whereabouts be known. It was argued that this speeded
up executions rather than curbing them.
228 “NOTES

Ped For a discussion of this point, see my Contemporary Moral Controversies in

Technology, Introduction to Part II.
23% See note 3 above.

ESSAY 9. BETWEEN TRIVIALITY AND WORTH

A previous version of this essay was read at the Central Connecticut State University
symposium, Visions of Computers in University Life: Effects and Assessments,
March 1, 1985.
ile Artificial intelligence developments are taking place at a very fast pace. These
often involve developments in mathematics that are part of the enterprise of
creating new forms of artificial intelligence. Sometimes, however, new forms of
artificial intelligence are made possible by developments in mathematics prompt-
ed by other concerns. For some introductory information about these matters,
see Ivars Peterson, “Send This Computer to Kindergarten,” Science News, July
7, 1984, pp. 10-11; Dietrick E. Thomson, “Making Music-Fractally,” Science
News, March 22, 1980, pp. 187, 190; Janet Raloff, “Computing for Art’s Sake,”
Science News, November 20, 1982, pp. 328-31, “Approaching the Age of
Reason,” Science News, May 26, 1984, pp. 330-32, “Swift Mechanical Logic,”
Science News, June 2, 1984, pp. 346-47, and “In Search of Gigalips
Architectures,” Science News, June 16, 1984, pp. 378-81; Margaret A. Boden,
“Impacts of Artificial Intelligence,” Futures, February 1984, pp. 60-69; Joel
Shurkin, “(Can Computers Speak and Understand Natural Languages?” The
Stanford Observer, January 1986, pp. 1, 9; and, concerning fractals, Benoit B.
Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature (New York and San Francisco: W.
H. Freeman, 1983).
. David Braybrooke, “Work: A Cultural Ideal Ever More in Jeopardy,” in Peter
A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) Midwest
Studies in Philosophy 7:322 (1982).
. Concerning these new tasks, Professor Maria C. Lugones mentioned during a
phone conversation with me that, at Carleton College, where she teaches, the
academic level of the philosophy papers written by students dropped as soon as
the papers began to look better with the help of personal computers. As far as I
know, there has been no systematic study of the extent of this effect, nor of
whether it is temporary.
. About educational effects, see Bertram Bruce, “Taking Control of Educational
Technology,” Science for the People, March/April 1985, pp. 37-40; Marcia
Boruta and Hugh Mehan, “Computers in the Classroom: Stratifier or Equaliz-
er?” Science for the People, March/April 1985, pp. 41-44; and M. A. Boden,
“Educational Implications of Artificial Intelligence,” in W. Maxwell (ed.),
Thinking: The New Frontier (Pittsburgh: Franklin Press, 1983).
. Braybrooke, “Work,” p. 335.
OU, Dud oo.
ND . See, for example, Richard E. Walton, “Social Choice in the Development of
Advanced Information Technology,” Technology in Society 1982:41—49. This
article also appeared in Human Relations, December 1982, pp. 1073-84, and was
reprinted in my Contemporary Moral Controversies in Technology (New York
and London: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 112-18.
. See, for example, Sar A. Levitan and Clifford M. Johnson, “The Future of Work:
 Notes 229

Does It Belong to Us or to the Robots?” Monthly Labor Review 105:10-14

(September 1982). For the concerns raised, see Thomas L. Weekley, “Workers,
Unions, and Industrial Robotics,” Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 470:146—51 (November 1983). These articles also appeared in
my Contemporary Moral Controversies in Technology, pp. 107-11.
. Much has been written on this subject. See, for example, A. Pablo Iannone,
“Character Traits,” Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975, pp.
313-22. See also Yves R. Simon, The Definition of Moral Virtue (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1986); Robert B. Krushwitz and Robert C. Roberts,
The Virtues (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1987).
10. Iannone, “‘Character Traits,” ch. 3.
. For a discussion of this point and evidence supporting it, see my Contemporary
Moral Controversies in Business (New York and London: Oxford University
Press, 1989), especially Part I.
12. A short but useful discussion of the reasons in favor of science, technology and
society programs, the nature of these programs, the obstacles they have met, and
the conditions for their sound development can be found in Rustum Roy,
“Technological Literacy: An Uphill Battle,” Technology Review, November-
December 1983, pp. 18-19, and reprinted in my Contemporary Moral Con-
troversies in Technology, pp. 323-25.
13: Joan Didion, “On Self-Respect,” in Slouching Towards Bethlehem (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968), p. 147.

ESSAY 10. LIKE THE PHOENIX

il No doubt, nuclear regulation went on after 1954, but it was largely focused on
working out the details of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. An important item in
this process was the 1962 Report to the President. See George T. Mazuzan and J.
Samuel Walker, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation,
1946-1962 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 407-26; Steven
L. DelSesto, Science, Politics, and Controversy: Civilian Nuclear Power in the
United States, 1946-1974 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 76-115.
. Editorial, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 1946, p. 1. See also DelSesto,
Science, Politics, and Controversy, pp. 9-17.
. For analyses of the Act and its effects, see DelSesto, Science, Politics, and Con-
troversy, pp. 17-31, and Mazuzan and Walker, Controlling the Atom, pp. 1-11.
. Karl Cohen, “A Re-Examination of the McMahon Act,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, January 1948, pp. 7, 9, 10. See also Thomas E. Dewey, “The Challenge
of the Atomic Age,” October 1948, pp. 296-97.
. Brian McMahon, “Author of Atomic Energy Act Comments on Governor
Dewey’s Speech,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1948, p. 298. See
also editorial, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1948, p. 64; President
Truman, ‘President Truman Answers Dewey,’ November 1948), p. 326;
DelSesto, Science, Politics, and Controversy, pp. 39-40; Mazuzan and Walker,
Controlling the Atom, pp. 13-19.
. Philip Sporn, “How Can Private Industry Best Participate in the Development
of Atomic Energy?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1951, p. 48. See
also note 18 below.
. See, for example, Ralph Nader and John Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy
230 YNOTES

(New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1979), pp. 26-27.

_ DelSesto, Science, Politics, and Controversy, pp. 50-51, and Mazuzan and
Walker, Controlling the Atom, pp. 18-19.
. Mazuzan and Walker, Controlling the Atom, p. 19.
. Editorial, “Atomic Power and Private Enterprise. A Summary of the Joint
Committee Report,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1953, pp. 135-36.
See also Abba P. Lerner, “Should We Break Our Biggest Monopoly?” Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, May 1953, p. 110, and Mazuzan and Walker, Controlling
the Atom, pp. 20-22.
. Edwin J. Putzell, Jr., “The Prospects for Industry,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, November 1952, p. 288.
. Eugene M. Zuckert, “Policy Problems in the Development of Civilian Nuclear
Power,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1952, p. 278.
. Maria Telkes, “Future Uses of Solar Energy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
August 1951, p. 219; Hans Thirring, “Is It Wise to Use Uranium for Power?”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 1952, p. 206; and Materials Policy
Commission, Resources for Freedom, vol. 4 (Washington, D.C., 1952), p. 220.
. Charles A. Metzner and Julia B. Kessler, ““What Are the People Thinking?”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1951, p. 341.
. Byron S. Miller, “Atomic Energy Act: Second Stage,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, January 1952, pp. 14-16.
. Thomas E. Murray, “Don’t Leave Atomic Energy to the Experts,” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, February 1954, pp. 48-50.
. Mazuzan and Walker, Controlling the Atom, p. 41.
. Adrian Kuyper, ““A Look at the New Atomic Energy Act,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, December 1954, pp. 390-92.
. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the successor of the Atomic Energy
Commission instituted under President Nixon’s administration. For a detailed
study of the U.S. nuclear energy controversy that extends up to the mid-1970s,
see DelSesto, Science, Politics, and Controversy. For a variety of documents
concerning nuclear power in the United States from early twentieth-century
visionary works to 1980s position papers, see Philip L. Cantelon, Richard G.
Hewlett, and Robert C. Williams, The American Atom (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1984). As regards the aftermath of the Three Mile Island
accident, see “The Three Mile Island Accident,” Science News 115:227-28
(April 7, 1979); “In the Wake of Three Mile Island,” Science News 115:292 (May
5, 1979); David F. Salisbury, ““Kemeny: A Nuclear ‘Reprieve’,” The Christian
Science Monitor, October 31, 1979, pp. Al, A6; “Why Kemeny Seeks Nuclear
Agency Reform,” Christian Science Monitor, November 1, 1979, pp. Al, A7;
and “‘Nuclear Probe’s Findings a Political Hot Potato,”’ Christian Science Moni-
tor, November 2, 1979, p. A5; editorial staff, “Carter Acts on TMI: A Flood of
Changes,” Science News 116:405—6 (December 15, 1979); and “‘Hot’ Water
Cleanup Begins at TMI,” Science News 120:247 (October 17, 1981). As regards
the Chernobyl accident, see, for example, Arthur H. Purcell, “Chernobyl—
Proof of Nuclear Pessimists’ Worst Fears,” The Hartford Courant, May 2, 1986,
p. B11. For worldwide developments, see Bertrand Goldschmidt, The Atomic
Complex, (La Grange Park, Ill.: American Nuclear Society, 1982). For European
developments, see Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak, The Atom Besieged
(Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1982); Dorothy Nelkin. The
Languages of Risk (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1985).
 Notes 231

20. John Stuart Mill, “Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion,” ch. 2 in On
Liberty in Essential Works ofJohn Stuart Mill, Max Lerner (ed.) (New York and
London: Bantam Books, 1965), p. 272. Quite appropriately, this passage was
cited by Barry M. Casper, “Technology Policy and Democracy,” Science 194:32
(October 1, 1976).
2A8 Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in
Science and Technology, ““The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report,”
Science 193:653—56 (August 20, 1976).
. Alex C. Michalos, “A Reconsideration of the Idea of a Science Court,” in P. T.
Durbin (ed.), Research in Philosophy and Technology, vol. 3 (Greenwich, Conn.:
JAI Press, 1980), pp. 14, 26.
. K. S. Shrader-Frechette, Science Policy, Ethics, and Economic Methodology
(Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel, 1985), p. 291.
. Ibid., pp. 291-92.
. Michalos, “A Reconsideration,” p. 26.
. Shrader-Frechette, Science Policy, p. 293.
. Ibid.
. Ibid., p. 294.
. Ibid.
. Ibid., p. 311.
. Ibid., pp. 291, 311.
. The seminal work for this strategy is David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lind-
blom, A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (New York:
Free Press, 1963). The social fragmentation or disjoint nature of policy analysis
and evaluation is discussed especially on pp. 104-6. The strategy they propose,
however, is incremental; the one I am proposing need not be so. For a more
recent discussion of decentralized policy-making and its forms as contrasted
with centralized policy-making and its forms, see Patrick W. Hamlett, “A
Typology of Decisionmaking in the U.S. Congress,” Technology and Human
Values 8(2):33—40 (Spring 1983). This article is also included in my Contempo-
rary Moral Controversies in Technology (New York and London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1987), pp. 313-22, and is discussed on pp. 305-8 of the same
book.

ESSAY 11. BRIDGING GAPS IN BABEL

This is a modified version of papers read at Central Connecticut State University as
part of the Every Monday series, on November 3, 1986, and at Dalhousie University
as part of the Department of Philosophy Summer Series, on July 10, 1987. I am
grateful for the intellectually stimulating questions asked and comments made during
the discussions that ensued after the readings.
1. A succinct discussion of the senses of the term ethics that draws distinctions akin
to those in this essay can be found in Marcus G. Singer, Morals and Values (New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1977), p. 11. Singer’s distinctions, however, rely
on the notion of a code of conduct, not on the idea of a person’s or group’s
beliefs and presuppositions about right and wrong, good and bad, justified and
unjustified—a wider perspective capable of explaining a code of conduct. A
more developed version of Singer’s distinction, this time in terms of rules,
principles, or standards of conduct involved in ideas of right and wrong, can be
292? NOWES

found in his presidential address delivered before the eighty-fourth annual

meeting of the Western (now Central) Division of the American Philosophical
Association, St. Louis, Missouri, May 2, 1986, entitled “The Ideal of a Rational
Morality” and published in the American Philosophical Association’s Proceed-
ings and Addresses 60(1):15—38 (September 1986), especially pp. 16-21.
. Sylvia Doughty Fries, “Expertise against Politics: Technology as Ideology on
Capitol Hill, 1966-1972,” Science, Technology, and Human Values 8(2):6—15
(Spring 1983).
. For example, Kristin $. Shrader-Frechette, to whose philosophical position I am
quite sympathetic, makes what I believe are overly optimistic remarks of this sort
in Science, Policy, Ethics, and Economic Methodology (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985),
p. 20.
. See Annette Baier, Postures of the Mind (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1985), p. 244, and Kai Nielsen, “Philosophy as Critical Theory,” Proceed-
ings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 61:96—97 (Septem-
ber 1987).
. Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory,” in
Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland (eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory
(Cambridge, England, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
p. 115.
. See, for example, Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View, abr. ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1965), ch. 6 passim, and Marcus G. Singer, Gener-
alization in Ethics (New York: Atheneum, 1961), pp. 190-92, 331-32. See also
Norman C. Gillespie, “The Business of Ethics,” University of Michigan Busi-
ness Review 26(6):1—4 (November 1975).
. For discussions of these topics, see Rustum Roy, ‘““Technological Literacy: An
Uphill Battle,” Technology Review, November-December 1983, pp. 18-19, and
“Science for Public Consumption: More than We Can Chew?” Technology
Review, April 1983, pp. 1-13.
. See, for example, Plato, Phaedo 90b; Aristotle, Rhetorica 1.1.2 and 1.2.4; Sextus
Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 11.40, and Pyrronian Questions 2.205,
247; Cicero, Letters to Atticus 4.46; Plutarch, Moralia 514a.
. For accounts of high-temperature superconductivity developments, see I.
Peterson, “New Heights in Superconductivity,” Science News, January 10, 1987,
p. 23; S. Weisburd, “Superconductive Barriers Surpassed,” Science News, Febru-
ary 21, 1987, p. 116; K. Hartley, “No Resistance to Superconductivity,” Science
News, August 8, 1987, pp. 84-85; K. Hartley, ““High-Temperature Supercon-
ductivity: What’s Here, What’s Near and What’s Unclear,” Science News,
August 15, 1987, pp. 106-7, 109; K. Hartley, “High-Powered Discussions on
High-Temperature Superconductivity,” Science News, December 5, 1987,
p. 359; and, for attempts at commercializing high-temperature superconductiv-
ity, Dorothy Robin, W. Wendell Fletcher, and John A. Alic, “Bringing Super-
conductivity to Market,” Issues in Science and Technology, Winter 1988-89, pp.
38—45.
10. Some of these points are discussed, for example, in Sar A. Levitan and Clifford
M. Johnson, “The Future of Work: Does It Belong to Us or to the Robots?”
Monthly Labor Review 105:10-14 (September 1982), and in Thomas L.
Weekley, ‘““Workers, Unions, and Industrial Robotics,” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 470:146-51 (November 1983).
Wil. David Braybrooke, Traffic Congestion Goes through the Issue Machine (London
 Notes 233

and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), and Meeting Needs (Princeton,
NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1987); Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear
Power and Public Policy (Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel, 1980), Science Policy,
Ethics, and Economic Methodology (Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel, 1985), and
Risk Analysis and Scientific Method (Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel, 1985);
Dorothy Nelkin, The Languages of Risk (Beverly Hills and London: Sage,
1985); Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, Foundations of Social Choice Theory
(Cambridge, England, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986);
Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth (Cambridge, England, and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988); Jon Elster, The Cement of Society
(Cambridge, England, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
. Fries, “Expertise against Politics.”
. Nielsen, “Philosophy as Critical Theory.”
. See Contemporary Moral Controversies in Technology and the review of this
book by Dana R. Flint, Ethics 99(1):215 (October 1988).
. This was stated in Carl Mitcham’s review of my Contemporary Moral Con-
troversies in Technology that appeared in Canadian Philosophical Reviews
7(8):312 (August 1987).
. For evidence attesting to the truth of this, see my Contemporary Moral Con-
troversies in Technology and Contemporary Moral Controversies in Business.
. A. Baier, Postures of Mind, pp. 243-44.
. Arthur L. Caplan, “Can Applied Ethics Be Effective in Health Care, and Should
It Strive to Be? Ethics 93:311-12 (1983).
. A. Baier, Postures of Mind, p. 244.
. Nielsen, “‘Philosophy as Critical Theory,” p. 98.
. The relevant literature is overflowing with evidence for the types of conflicts
described. Concerning health care ethics committees, see, for example, David
Hellerstein, “Overdosing on Medical Technology,” Technology Review,
August-September 1983, pp. 13-17. Concerning recombinant DNA technology,
see the arguments for full disclosure and public participation in the policy-
making process in David L. Bazelon, “Governing Technology: Values, Choices,
and Scientific Progress,’ Technology in Society 5:15—25 (1983). For whatever it
is worth, my modest experience in academia—in philosophy, interdisciplinary
studies, the development of interdisciplinary courses, curricula, and
workshops—and outside of academia—in various business environments in the
United States and abroad—corroborates the existence of the conflicts just men-
tioned, the viability of the multioccupational approach, and the central role that
negotiation and other social decision procedures must play.
22 A. Baier, Postures of Mind, p. 241.
23% David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H.
Hiddich (eds.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 262. For a discussion of this
point, see A. Baier, Postures of Mind, pp. 237-244. Dewey’s position in this
regard is formulated in each of his works. See, for example, John Dewey,
Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), The Quest for Cer-
tainty (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1960), and John Dewey and James H.
Tufts, Ethics (New York: Henry Holt, 1918), pt. IIL.
24. For a discussion of the difficulties some of these programs faced, see Roy,
“Technological Literacy.” A few years after Roy wrote this piece, MIT
announced a curriculum restructure that points in the direction I am suggesting,
at least within an academic setting. See “Sweeping Reform of Undergraduate
234 NOTES

Education, Changes in Admissions Are Presented at MIT,” The Chronicle of

Higher Education 33(8):1 (October 22, 1986).
25. For a related discussion concerning business ethics, see Robert Allan Cooke,
“Business Ethics at the Crossroads,” Journal of Business Ethics 5(3):260
(June 1986).

Essay 12. BETWEEN NEGOTIATION AND GOMBAT

ule Combined Wire Services, “Iraq Replaces Kuwaiti Rulers,” The Hartford
Courant, August 3, 1990, pp. Al, A6, A7.
2. For an early discussion of some of the forces at work in these developments, see
Willy Brandt et al., North-South (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980). For 1989
and 1990 reports, see Rudolf Walter Leonhart, “Regionalism Rising,” from Die
Zeit, in World Press Review, December 1990, p. 18. See also Combined Wire
Services, “300,000 Rally in Prague for Reforms,” The Hartford Courant,
November 24, 1989, pp. Al, A14; Conor Daly, “In Czechoslovakia, “Normalcy’
Continued Right to the End,” The Hartford Courant, November 28, 1989,
p. B13; Mike Leary, “Krenz Quits as President of East Germany,” The Hartford
Courant, December 7, 1989, pp. Al, A17; Combined Wire Services, “Ousted
Romanian Dictator Executed,” The Hartford Courant, December 26, 1989, pp.
A1, A12; Combined Wire Services, “Gorbachev Confronts Lithuanians,” The
Hartford Courant, January 12, 1990, pp. Al, A10; Michael Parks, “Soviet Strife
Nears Brink of Civil War,” The Hartford Courant, January 17, 1990, pp. Al,
A4; Ann Imse, “Soviet Party Cedes Monopoly,” The Hartford Courant, Febru-
ary 8, 1990, pp. Al, A14; Combined Wire Services, “Communists Embrace New
Principles,’ The Hartford Courant, February 13, 1990, pp. A1, A9; Combined
Wire Services, “Estonians Renounce Soviet Law,” The Hartford Courant,
March 31, 1990, pp. Al, A5; John Thor Dahlburg, “Lithuania Backtracks on
Independence.” The Hartford Courant, June 30, 1990, pp. Al, A9; and Peter
Slevin, “Germany Again One Nation,” The Hartford Courant, October 3, 1990,
pp. Al, Al6. For a sense of the unraveling of Yugoslavia and its aftermath, see
Associated Press, ‘12 Die in Shelling as Serbs Advance in Bosnia,” The Hartford
Courant, July 27, 1992, p. A8.
. Evidence of the nature of these military activities is commonplace. The perceived
implications of regional armed conflicts for the blocs engaged in the cold war
were made plain by U.S. Secretary of State Haig when, on BBC’s “Panorama” in
April 1984, he commented on the 1982 South Atlantic war between Argentina
and Great Britain: “Clearly, I think I shared the concern of the Prime Minister,
that this was more than simply a local dispute in the South Atlantic. We had just
experienced a decade of the consequences of Western passivity in Angola,
Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan.”’ Cited in Virginia Gamba, The
Falklands/Malvinas War (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 151.
. George F. Will, “The Real Principle behind U.S. Actions in Arabia,” The
Hartford Courant, August 10, 1990, p. C13; David Lightman, “Conflict May
Push Gasoline Prices Up,” The Hartford Courant, August 3, 1990, pp. Al, A7;
and Matt Yancey, “Higher Oil Production Might Not Stop Price Rise,” The
Hartford Courant, August 10, 1990, p. A12.
. John M. Goshko, “France Offers Gulf Peace Plan,” The Hartford Courant,
January 15, 1991, pp. A1l—A8.
 Notes 235

. Ruth Sinai, “U.S. Exports May Have Helped Iraq, Syria, Build Up Arsenals,”
The Hartford Courant, December 7, 1990, p. A8.
. Associated Press, “Threat of Fighting in Gulf Dampens Summit Celebrating End
of Cold War,” The Hartford Courant, November 18, 1990, p. A3.
- Juan O. Tamayo, “Iraq’s Ultimate Goal Remains a Mystery,” The Hartford
Courant, August 3, 1990, pp. Al, A6.
. President Bush’s Address on the Iraq Crisis, The Hartford Courant, August 9,
1990, p. B13; Jack Nelson, “U.S. Led Warplanes Bomb Iraqi Targets,” The
Hartford Courant, January 17, 1991, pp. Al, A6, A7.
. Said during a CBS noon report on January 19, 1991.
id; See, for example, Charles Green and David Hess, “Trip to Underline U.S.
Resolve in Gulf,” The Hartford Courant, December 1, 1990, pp. Al, A8.
12. Owen Ullman and Aaron Epstein, “Democrats Say War Would Need Consent,”
The Hartford Courant, December 5, 1990, pp. Al, A12; and John A. MacDon-
ald, “Baker Asks for Support on Iraq Policy,” The Hartford Courant, Decem-
ber 6, 1990, pp. Al, A12. See also David Hess and R. A. Zaldivar, “Bush Says
War Not Inevitable,” The Hartford Courant, January 13, 1991, pp. Al, A8;
David Lightman, “Debate over Crisis Somber,” The Hartford Courant, January
13, 1991, pp. Al, A9; and Lyle Denniston, “Bush Says Crucial Moment Reached
Iraq’s Decision,” The Hartford Courant, January 13, 1991, p. A8.
13. Charles Krauthammer, “In War Americans Want What Rational People Want:
The Impossible,” The Hartford Courant, January 13, 1991, p. B3.
14. Andrew Maykuth, “Vote Is Only Second Such in History,” The Hartford
Courant, November 30, 1990, pp. A1, A7; Michael Getler, “Decision Is Turning
Point in Gulf Crisis,” The Hartford Courant, November 30, 1990, pp. Al, A10.
As indicated by these reports, besides having difficulty marshaling UN support
for the resolution, the United States was not placed in command of all the forces.
15. Combined Wire Services, “Bush Warns Iraq May Get Nuclear Arms,” The
Hartford Courant, November 23, 1990, pp. Al, A8.
16. William James, “The Will to Believe,” in his The Will to Believe and Other
Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover, 1956), pp. 1-31.
17: Gamba, The Falklands, p. 165.
18. Mark Thomson, “Missiles Likely to Strike First,” The Hartford Courant,
January 13, 1990, pp. Al, Aé.
19) Announced on the Hartford-New Haven area ABC TV channel during a
January 16, 1991, crisis update, at 10 a.m.
20. Quoted during the ABC coverage of the war in the Hartford-New Haven area.
21; Martin Mertzer and John Donnelley, “Iraq Launches Missiles against Israeli
Targets,” The Hartford Courant, January 18, 1991, pp. Al, A18, and ABC
reports on January 19, 1990.
22. On ABC, Egypt’s ambassador said on January 18: “You just don’t have to
worry.”
Hap eondided Wire Services, “Bush Decries Attacks,” The Hartford Courant,
January 14, 1991, pp. Al, A7.
24. John A. MacDonald, “Baker Asks for Support on Iran Policy,” The Hartford
Courant, December 6, 1990, pp. Al, A12.
2D: David Jacobson, “Conflict May Not Be Short,” The Hartford Courant, January
16, 1991, pp. Al, A6. |
26. Anthony C. Arendt discusses this matter concerning another Western conflict,
the 1982 war between Argentina and Great Britain, in ““The Falklands War and
236 NOTES
Anthony
the Failure of the International Legal Order,” in Alberto R. Coll and
The Falkland s War (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 54
C. Arend (eds.),
(regarding collective security), 59 (regarding peaceful change mechani sm).
. Ibid., p. 61.
Bound-
" David A. Colson, “The Falkland Islands Crisis and the Management of
ary Disputes,” in Coll and Arend, The Falklands War, pp. 212-13.
The Falklands
_ Alberto L. Coll, “Lessons for the Future,” in Coll and Arend,
War, p. 241.
_ This is the topic of a research idea that Lewis A. Dexter developed in conversa-
in
tion with David Riesman at Harvard, soon after his April visit with us
from
Connecticut, and described in the June 10, 1989, correspondence I received
him.
Bile Associated Press, “British Nuclear Attack Plan Claimed,” The Hartford
Courant, August 23, 1984, p. A25.
32% Editorial comment, “Buenos Aires and the Bomb,” The Guardian, May 2, 1982,
p. 10; John R. Redick, “Latin America and the Bomb,” The Christian Science
Buy
Monitor, October 20, 1982, p. 23; Milton Benjamin, “U.S. Lets Argentina
Nuclear Matter,” The Hartford Courant, August 18, 1983, p. A7; and James
Brooke, “Argentine Accident Raises Questions about Third-World Nuclear
Standards,” The Hartford Courant, December 14, 1983, p. Ads
B32 Lucille Renwick and Kathleen Megan, “1 Million Civilians Could Die in War,
Doctor Says,” The Hartford Courant, January 14, 1991, pp. Cl, C7.
34. David C. Gompert, “American Diplomacy and the Haig Mission: An Insider’s
Perspective,” in Coll and Arend, The Falklands War, p. 114.
315). Andrew Maykuth, “Vote Is Only Second Such in Its History,” The Hartford
Courant, November 30, 1990, pp. Al, A7.
36. Daniel Williams, “U.N. Chief Ends Iraq Visit,” The Hartford Courant, January
14, 1991, pp. Al, A6.
S7e This statement was made by Mr. Ramon on June 1, 1988, on “Nightline,” a
program televised throughout the United States.
38. Colson, “Falkland Islands Crisis,” pp. 214-22. See also from the Los Angeles
Times, “Britain, China Prepare to Initial Agreement on 1997 Transfer of Hong
Kong,” The Hartford Courant, September 20, 1984, p. Al6; Courant’s Wire
Services, “Accord Reached on Hong Kong,” The Hartford Courant, September
19, 1984, p. A2; and Associated Press, “Argentina, Chile to Sign Channel Pact,”
The Hartford Courant, October 5, 1984, p. A21. An example of an attempt at
proactive diplomacy in a near crisis situation is the U.N.’s decision to send
troops to Macedonia in order to prevent it from being invaded by Serbia once
this country is finished with so-called “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia, See from the
Los Angeles Times, “U.N. Force to Go to Macedonia,” The Hartford Courant,
Saturday, December 12, 1992, p. A3.
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 Index

Abduction. See Hypothetical reasoning Agreement: and the ABM treaty’s

ABM treaty: interpretation of, 21 interpretation, 21; not necessary for
Abortion, xv, 1; policy and level of objectivity, 48-52; general, and
policy problems, 7-8; and Held’s eccentric wants and needs, 116-17
political testing of moral theories, Aims: in social traps, 15, 16; in social
57-58; and the expediency choice theory, 30; characteristically
conception of policy and decision at issue in policy and decision
problems, 62; discussed, 80-84; problems, 62, 82; and the criteria for
population control, and a policy evaluation, 112
nondestabilizing controversy, Alienation: and computer
99-100; pill, 132-33 developments, 160-61
Absolute rights: not characterized by Altruism: and the expediency
this book’s hypotheses, 113; and the conception of policy and decision
false security of strong views, problems, 77-78
117-19 Amendment: to the 1946 Atomic
Abstract guidelines: how evaluated and Energy Act, 169-70
applied, 118 Anxiety: in the high-tech weapons
Abstract ideas: and philosophy as racé, 19, 20
diplomacy, 74 Appeals to higher authorities: in
Abstract theories: and this book’s disruptive situations, 136-37; in
taxonomy, 109-10. See also radical change situations, 140
Theories; Moral theories Applicability: of strong views, 118
Acid rain: and negotiation, 106 Application problems: and procedures,
Acquiescence: in matters of foreign 126
policy, 23; and uncritical acceptance, Applied ethics, 3; its contributions,
94; and destabilization, 138-39 183; nature of the changes needed,
Actual societies: their members 190-92; and multioccupational
described, 110 approaches, 192
Ad hoc objection: to satisficing Appreciation: and human worth, 151,
theories, 35 162
Administrative Situation Hypothesis: Approach: in this book, 102; none
formulated, 128-29 works if people are idiots, lunatics,
Administrative situations, 115-16 crooks, or utterly callous, 110
Adversarial approaches: criticized, 176 Approval: and decisions, 56; its
Advocacy: not in this book, xiv; and ambiguities, 58—59
newspapers, 44; and objectivity, 44; Arbitration: compared with other
in new journalism, 46 methods, 1-2; and building common
Aesthetic surgery: and the trivialization ground, 51; as openended and crucial
of life, 157 in diplomacy, 71, 74; and
Afghanistan: and the Soviet Union, administrative situations, 129; and
197. See also Ex-Soviet Union controversies, 134; in controversies

261
 262 INDEX

and confrontations, 136-37; in and decision problems, 88

radical change situations, 140; and Balance hypothesis: formulated, 88;
disjoint policy-making, 177; and evidence for it presented elsewhere,
knowledge of ethics, 184 216n.26
Arendt, Anthony C. (quoted), 206 Bargaining, 9, 12; and the data at
Arendt, Hannah (quoted), 23 decision time, 24; and public
Argentina: and the dirty war conflict, adaptability to new technologies, 64;
103-4; and the South Atlantic war, as openended and crucial in
203, 207; nuclear capability, 207 diplomacy, 71; of use in working
Argument to the best explanation. See towards a modus vivendi, 117; in
Hypothetical reasoning conflicts about taxes, 119; in
Argumentative testing, 126-28 administrative situations, 129; in
Armed insurrection: and destabilization controversies and near
in an oppressive situation, 139 confrontations, 136-37; in radical
Armed resistance: and destabilization change situations, 140; the
during an invasion, 139-40 technology tribunal, and the
Arms race, 17; and Held’s political legislative branch of government,
testing of moral theories, 57; and the 165-66; and disjoint policy-making,
expediency conception of policy and 177
decision problems, 62 Barth, Alan (quoted), 42
Artificial intelligence: and creativity, Becker, Lawrence C. (quoted), 79
151; and developments in Behavioral: variable of the high-tech
mathematics, 228n.1 weapons race, 19; contrasted with
Assessment: of policy and Held’s the political variable, 23
political testing of moral theories, Benefits: and dangers of escalation at
57-58; ambiguities, 59; -time, 65 decision time, 20; of modern
Atomic Energy Act: and the nuclear technologies, 181. See also Harms
energy controversy in its present Bernard, Thomas J. (quoted), 96
form, 166 Bhopal: controversy, 103, 108
Atomic Energy Commission: and the Biases: evaluations, and objectivity,
Industrial Participation Program, 37-38
167-68; and the 1951 Atomic Biological weapons, 18, 207; and
Energy Act, 170 Held’s political testing of moral
Attention: and advanced technology theories, 57—58
situations, 155 Blockades: in radical change situations,
Authority of the State: eroded in the 140
high-tech weapons race, 25 Bombing: and the radical change
Automobile: at the beginning of the hypothesis, 141
twentieth century, and social choice Boycott: and philosophy as diplomacy,
theory, 32-33; compared with 118; and nonrational consensus, 135
computers at the end of the Braybrooke, David (quoted), 152, 154
twentieth century, 161 Bruckner, Herbert (quoted), 40
Babel: and technology policy making, Bunge, Mario (quoted), 22
181-93
Bypassing. See Outflanking
Backward looking approach: Care: in social testing, 66; among
predominant in studies of social ordinary people, 130
change, its history, and stages, xii, 89 Catalog buying: and the loss of
Baier, Annette (quoted), 187—88, 191 personal local life, 156
Balance: needed in describing policy Categorical conception: of moral
 Index 263

injunctions, 70 problems, 106; and macrosocietal

Categorical reasons, 78—80 problems, 132-33
Causal connections: in rational choice Closure: and issues, 175; not
theory, 16; in social choice theory, necessarily a good thing, 176-77
29—30 Coercion: and good judgment, 122;
Centralization: and the U.S. nuclear and the judgment of representatives
energy controversy, 167; and U.S. or trustees, 122. See also
disjoint policy-making, 177 Administrative Situation Hypothesis;
Certainty: as a questionable aim, 53 Rational disruption, no radical
Chaos theory: in the mathematization change hypothesis; Nonrational
of satisficing theories, 36 disruption, no radical change
Character: and this book’s approach, hypothesis; Radical change
xiv; as deserving more emphasis than hypothesis; Principle of Practical
judgment, 54; its development, and Equity
policy-making time, 54; as related to Cold war, 17, 196; declared ended,
advanced technology developments 198; and the South Atlantic war,
and self-esteem, 157-59; 203; thinking, 206-7
characterized, 158; as related to Collective choice: and social choice
market survival and risk avoidance, theory, 35-36
160; and price, 160 Collective conflict: social traps, and the
Character traits: and self-esteem, 152, high-tech weapons race, 20-21
157-59; characterized, 158; as Collective consequences: in state of
related to market survival and risk nature situations, 74
avoidance, 160 Collective decisions: and voluntarism,
Chemical companies: interested in 57
nuclear power development in the Collective traps, 16
1940s, 168 Colonial powers: and prior injustices,
Chemical weapons, 18; and Held’s 211
political testing of moral theories, Combat, 12; and philosophy as
57-58; in the U.S. market each year, diplomacy, 74; in radical change
65 situations, 140—41; and negotiation,
Chernobyl: and secrecy, 170-71 196-210; and the Persian Gulf war,
Choice: in social traps, 15-26; in social 205-6
choice theory, 26-36; in morality Common good, 46
according to Mackie, 60-61; closely Common ground: and
interconnected with reason in policy- incommensurables, 50; building,
making, 64 51-52
Choices: reasons for making them, Common sense: in the controversy
63-64 about computers and jobs, 159
Citizens: contrasted with subjects, 23 Communication: and policy-making,
Civil disobedience: as bypassing 180
meaningful dialogue, 88; when Companionship: and advanced
justified, 88, 105; in controversies technology, 155
and near confrontations, 136-137; in Competition: and optimal rules of
nonrational disruption situations, thumb, 35
137; in radical change situations, 140 Complexity: of modern technology,
Civil rights, xv; and philosophy as contemporary governments, and
diplomacy, 73 contemporary life, 185-86
Clorofluorocarbons: and the book’s Comprehensive theories: traditionally
taxonomy of policy-making associated with philosophy, 188
264 INDEX

Compromise, 9, 12, 184; useful in Congressional inquiries: and the

working out a modus vivendi, 117; perfectionist objection, 131
in conflicts about taxes, 119; and Consciousness raising procedures: and
technology policy-making, 166; and nonrational consensus, 135
disjoint policy-making, 177 Consensus, 10; and philosophy as
Computer developments: and self- diplomacy, 74; -conflict debate,
esteem, 151; and difficult tasks, 91-92; situations and the conflict
153-54 model, 92—94; situations and their
Computer technology: and social significance, 93-94; not always a
choice theory, 34 good thing, 94; and eccentric wants
Computers: and their effects on and needs, 116-17; and social
education, 153-54 disruption or destabilization, 119;
Comte, Auguste (quoted), 87 -building in administrative situations,
Concepts of ethics: as related to 129; -building in controversies, 134;
policy-making, 181-87; unfamiliar to and near confrontations, 136-37;
many, 186; and needed changes in and destabilization, 139; building in
ethics as a branch of inquiry, 189 radical change situations, 140
Concerns: conflicting in the objectivity Consequences: destabilizing vs.
controversy, 44-45; their nondestabilizing, 97-99; not
coincidence not total in social excluded by reliance on critical
testing, 66; relevant to policy making scrutiny and judgment, 126; of
and how to discover them, in modern technologies: double-edged,
making policy and decisions during 181; and the justification of war, 206
armed conflicts, 208 Consequentialist: features of this
Conflicting concerns: in the nuclear book’s approach, xiv, 2;
energy controversy, 169-70 considerations in the theory
Conflict government: and philosophy suggested, 11-12
as diplomacy, 84 Constituencies: in the objectivity
Conflict theories: their cynical controversy, 45; and needed changes
approach, 89 in ethical inquiry, 190
Conflict traps, 16 Constraints: economic, political, and
Conflicts: of demands contrasted with pragmatic, 3; of time, 2; of time and
differences of opinion, 8—9; and Elster’s views, 10; on policy making
Held’s political testing of moral and the significance of openness and
theories, 57—58; and reasons for freedom of thought, 6; in rational
dealing with them, 63; hidden and choice, 16; in the high-tech weapons
speculation, 93; and their kinds, 95; race, 19-24; and the book’s use of
and ideal conditions, 112; about “practical,” 114; of time and policy
taxes and the procedures used, 119; making information, 132; on nuclear
in objectionable societies, 119-20; energy policy-making, 172; and
their main types and policy-making, practices, 186-87; and ethics’
133-34; about ethics committees, institutional organization, 189-92
191 Contractual account, 126-28
Confrontation tendencies: as obstacles, Controversy: about objectivity, 41-43;
66 being caught up in the, 46; and
Confrontation: and controversy, 95 confrontation, 95; examples of,
Confrontations: and philosophy as 99-101, 103; and noneccentric wants
diplomacy, 74; examples of, 101-3; and needs, 119; contrasted with
contrasted with controversies, confrontation, 132-34; in health
133-34 eares 133
 Index 265

Cool mind. See Sound mind Damage control stage, 203-4

Cooperation: and traps, 16; as peace, Dangers: of escalation at decision time,
19; as fairness or equitability, 19; 20. See also Risk
Soviet Union’s notion, 19; United Data: in rational choice theory and its
States’ notion, 19; and security, 19; offspring, 24; worked out in the
and anxiety, 19; with the enemy and process of bargaining, negotiation,
the hawks’ position, 22; with the and dialogue, 24; in social choice
enemy and the doves’ position, 22 theory, 30; hard to find as a
Coping: of use in dealing with constraint on social testing, 65;
conflicts, 117; in administrative unsettled, 65
situations, 129; in controversies and Decision, xiv; to escalate, 20; unilateral
near confrontations, 136—37; in in the high-tech weapons race, 21;
radical change situations, 140-41 must be made in the midst of
Corrections: and preemption, 121-22, disagreement, 50; and social testing,
132 55-66; closely interconnected with
Courage: in the contemporary world, judgment in policy-making, 64;
158 procedures and diplomacy, 71;
Court: action in the Bhopal’s case, 103; -judgment distinction, 222n.12
-case overload, 3-4 Decisionism, 17; and social choice
Creativity: and human worth, 151 theory, 30
Crises: and states of nature situations, 102 Decisions: as conclusions of the
Crisis: in news reporting during technology tribunal, 175; their
MacCarthyism, 45; Iranian, 102-3; legitimacy as crucial to the
and disjoint policy-making, 194-95; technology tribunal, 175
and appeals to reason and meaningful Decision theory, xiv; and social traps,
dialogue, 195 14-26; its origins, 16-17; its
Criteria: said to be subjective and poverty, 21-22; and the political and
arbitrary, 59-60 moral evaluation process, 24; trap,
Critical iinteraction, 55—56; process, 24; and this book’s taxonomy, 110
64-66 Decree: when imprudent as a social
Critical scrutiny: and Dennett’s views, decision procedure, 101
2, 6; its process and the social De Magalhaes, José Calvet (quoted), 71
decision function, 27; and policy- Demands: and the objectivity
making, 32, 115-23; and automobile controversy, 45; and philosophy as
carnage’s acceptance, 32; and social diplomacy, 79-84; in controversies
testing, 48, 50, 65; and the testing of and confrontations, 95
moral theories and ideas, 56-57; and Democracies: and issue-overload, 4
philosophy as diplomacy, 75; Democracy: and alienation through
undermined by the expediency advocacy, 4; and purely procedural
conception of policy and decision principles, 123-25; vs. technocracy
problems, 82; and confirmation, 85; in nuclear policy-making, 170
and multioccupational approaches, Democratic politics: and a responsible
192; in disjoint policy-making, citizenry, 183. See also Politics
194-95; and the book’s hypotheses, Demonstrations: a permissible use, 118,
213-14 134; in controversies and near
Cuba: in Angola, 197 Sn tioneuens: 136-37; and radical
Cynicism: increased by policy-making change situations, 140
perfectionism, 115 Dennett, Daniel C. (quoted), 5-6
Deontological considerations: in the
Dahrendorf, Ralf (quoted), 91, 93 theory suggested, 11-12
266 INDEX

Deontological features: of this book’s and near confrontations, 136—37; in

approach, xiv, 2 radical change situations, 140; and
Department stores: and loss of personal preemption, 144; and disjoint policy-
local life, 156 making, 177
Deprivation: how established, 119; and Disjoint policy-making: issue-overload,
purely procedural principles, and the technology tribunal, 175-78;
124-25; and nonrational consensus, its limitations, 179—80; in times of
135 crisis, 194-95
Desert: and equity, 113 Disruption: the objectivity controversy,
Destabilization: and predictability, and policy-making, 45; types, 98;
97-98; and noncooperation, 98; and that warrants destabilization, 138; in
macrosocietal problems, 132-33; ethics and policy-making, 87-108; in
when warranted, 138-39 macrosocietal problems, 132-33; in
Detachment: and the objectivity policy making, 133-34; not
controversy, 41 necessarily overriding, 134
Dialogue: meaningful, 1; meaningful as Dissatisfaction objection, 138
related to policy-making and moral Doughty Fries, Sylvia (quoted), 183
philosophy, 11-12; meaningful as
related to consensus, 94; in Eccentric needs. See Eccentric wants
administrative situations, 115-16; Eccentric wants, 116-17
and crisis, 195; in the local warfare Eccentricity: in administrative
stage, 204 situations, 116
Dictatorship: military, 118 Economic constraints, 3, 11
Didion, Joan (quoted), 162 Economic exploitation: ruled out by
Differences: of opinion contrasted with the radical change hypothesis, 142
conflicts of demands, 8—9 Economic gain: and sanctions, 134
Difficulty: and self-esteem, 153-54; Economic needs: and policies about
self-esteem, markets, risks, and jobs, computer and related developments,
160 152, 159-62
Dignity: and destabilization, 138-39, Economic realities: and the objectivity
150; and Saddam Hussein’s position controversy, 44
in the Persian Gulf crisis, 200 Education: computers, and self-esteem,
Diplomacy, 67—84; as an analogue for 150-62
applications in philosophy, 67, 72; Egoism: and the expediency conception
how effective, 67; broad meaning of policy and decision problems,
used in this book, 71; and 77-78
recognition of mediators, 72; and Eisenhower, General Dwight (quoted),
technology policy-making, 166 43
Diplomatic approach: to policy- Electoral campaigns: and objectivity,
making, 70; contrasted with the 38, 43-45
uncompromising approach, 76-87; Elster, Jon (quoted), 10, 184
and permissible policies, decisions, Embargoes: and destabilization, 140; in
and procedures, 178 radical change situations, 140-41
Dirty war, 211-12 Empathetic account, 126-28
Discovery: closely interconnected with Empathy: and the objectivity
invention in policy-making, 64 controversy, 41
Discussion: of merits, 1, 12, 129; and Energy: technologies, xv; nuclear, 1;
philosophy as diplomacy, 74—75; in dependency and the automobile, 161;
contrasting controversies and nuclear, and the U.S. controversy,
confrontations, 95; in controversies 165-78
 Index 267

Engels, Friedrich (quoted), 87 the Persian Gulf crisis, 200

Engineering ethics: and macrosocietal Evaluation: and judgment of value,
problems, 97 222n.8
Environmental decay: and the Evidence: for rights, obligations, and
expediency conception of policy and moral laws and principles, 123, 130;
decision problems, 62 for what is permissible, 130
Environmental deterioration, xv, 1; and Exchange theory: too limited for this
Held’s political testing of moral book’s purposes, 102
theories, 57—58 Expected utility: in rational choice
Environmental policy: and disjoint theory, 17
policy-making in the United States, Expediency approach: and the
177: empathetic account, 127
Environmental problems: and the Expediency conception: of policy and
disciplines, 190 decision problems, 61-62; as
Epistemological variable: of the high- inaccurate, 62; as politically unwise
tech weapons race, 19 and morally objectionable, 62; and
Error: in assessment judgments, 59 the uncompromising approach to
Error theories, 69—66; and preference policy-making, 70; and policy and
change, 62—64; and the common decision problems, 82; and moral
opinion objection, 62—63; and problems of conduct, 83; and
reasons for changing preferences, political decision problems, 83
63-64 Expertise: and technology, 183
Equitability: as cooperation, 19. See Experts: in the nuclear energy
also Fairness controversy, 168—71; and the science
Equity: in this book, 114 court proposal, 175
Escalation: process, 20-21 Expert witness: conceptions of
Escalation stages, 203-5 technology, 183, 185-86
Ethical theories, 1, 2; and social Ex-Soviet Union, 18; national interest
constraints, 10. See also Moral and arsenal development, 20; and the
theories; Moral theory Persian Gulf war, 196; promises to
Ethical theory, 182; and compromise, Iraq, 198; peace plan during the
184. See also Moral theory Persian Gulf crisis, 203. See also
Ethics, xiv; and diplomacy, 68; and Soviet Union
advanced technology situations, 155; Extermination policies: in Argentina’s
as related to politics, nuclear dirty war, 104
technology, and public participation, Externality: political, and moral
172-75; as a branch of inquiry and theories, 5; traps, 16
technology policy-making, 181-93;
changes needed, 182; characterized, Facts and values: and the science court
182; and technology ethics, 182; proposal, 173-74
nature of the changes needed, Facts vs. values objection, 123
190-92; Marcus G. Singer’s Fairness: and equity, 114; as
conception of, 251—52n.1. See also cooperation, 19. See also Equitability
Applied ethics; Moral philosophy Familiarity: and today’s fragmented
Ethics committees: and world, 186—87
multioccupational approaches, 191 Fanaticism: and the idealism objection,
Ethnomethodology: too limited for this 131-32
book’s purposes, 102 Fanatics: not always involved in policy
Etiquette: and morals, 78—79 and decision-making, 37
European community: its role during Feasible: courses of action in rational
268 INDEX

course theory, 16; courses of action and the trivialization of life, 157;
in social choice theory, 29-30 crop-coating, and technology policy
Fetal research, xv, 1; and social problems, 181
decision procedures, 106, 108; and Genocide: ruled out by the radical
macrosocietal problems, 132-33 change hypothesis, 142
Fink, Conrad C. (quoted), 45, 46 Genome project: and policy-making
Fishkin, James S. (quoted), 124 information, 180
Foot, Philippa (quoted), 79 Goizueta, Roberto C. (quoted), 42
Force: when justified, 88, 105 Gompert, David C. (quoted), 208
Formalism: infatuation in social choice Good: common and the new
theory, 27-36; of social choice journalism, 46; sense and social
theory: sterile, 36 testing, 66
Forward-looking approach: and the Governmental terror: ruled out by the
book’s main concern, xii, 89 radical change hypothesis, 142
Fractals: in mathematizing satisficing Grand opportunities: and the radical
theories, 36 change hypothesis, 142
Fragmentation: of disciplines and Grand opportunity: and the Persian
institutions relevant to policy- Gulf crisis, 202
making, xi; between the technology, Gratitude: and advanced technology
business, policy-making, and situations, 155
philosophy communities, 50-51; in Great Britain: and the South Atlantic
today’s world, 186-87; as a source war, 203; and Hong Kong, 210
of limitations in ethics, 187 Green revolution: and macrosocietal
France: its role during the Persian Gulf problems, 132-33
crisis, 200
Freedom: of thought and ethics, 6; of Habermas, Jiirgen (quoted), 10, 127
speech encouraged to help objectivity Habits: and values, 154-57
as social testing flourish, 51; against Harms: hard to assess, 65; of modern
reason, 55; and social order, 112; and technologies, 181. See also Benefits
destabilization 138—39; and the Health care, xv; costs problem
nuclear energy controversy, 169—70; involving a controversy, 133; and
and issue-overload, 177—78 sympathy or compassion in advanced
Freedoms: to be sought, not fixed, 113; technology situations, 155; changes
in administrative situations, 115-16 and loss of personal relations, 156;
Free enterprise: and the U.S. nuclear and multioccupational approaches,
energy controversy, 167 191
Friedman, Milton (quoted), 25 Health care ethics: contrasted with
Future generations: and preemption, medical ethics, 97; and macrosocietal
121, 212-13 problems, 97
Held, Virginia (quoted), 55-56; her
Game: theory, xiv; theory and social account rules out critical scrutiny
traps, 14—26; strategic, see rational even if her statements are taken to be
choice; theory’s history, 17; theory’s expression of prescriptions, 222n.6
poverty, 21-22; theory and the Heuristic: value of rational choice
political and moral evaluation theory and its offspring, 22;
process, 24; theory trap, 24; theory uselessness of social choice theory,
and this book’s taxonomy, 110 28
Genetic engineering, xv, 1; and social High-tech weapons, xv; and social
choice theory, 34; and macrosocietal traps, 15—26; social traps, and policy
problems, 132-33; and dignity, 150; and decision problems, 15; escalation
 Index 269

and proliferation, 17—21; race and its Information: and policy-making, 180
variables, 19-20; politics, 22-24 Institutional objectivity, 41, 45-48
Hijacking: and the radical change Instrumental value: of democracy, 124
hypothesis, 141 Insulation, 12
Hitch, Charles J. (quoted), 17 Integration, 182-87
Hobbes, Thomas (quoted), 98 Intelligence: and technology, 183
Human contact: and adaptations to Interactions: and policy-making, 7; and
technological change, 156 public adaptability to new
Human flourishing: and destabilization, technologies, 65; and social testing,
138—39 65; types and selecting social
Human rights: and prior injustices, decision procedures, 88; and social
211-12 testing, 213-14
Hybrid types: of social traps, 16; of Interactive approach, 64-66
social traps and the high-tech Interdisciplinary approaches:
weapons race, 20-21 shortcomings of current ones, 190
Hylland, Aanund (quoted), 30 Interest group: approach and the
Hypotheses: how tested, 188-89 empathetic account, 127
Hypothesis: range, 11; balance, 11-12; Interest groups, 37; and brokering in
confirmation (disconfirmation) and policy making, 178
social testing, 65; in this book, 85, Interests: as concerns fueling the
113; their confirmation in moral objectivity controversy, 44; of the
philosophy, 90; administrative public and the objectivity
situation, 128—29; rational controversy, 45; and philosophy as
disruption, no radical change, diplomacy, 79-84; as reasons for
135-36; nonrational disruption, no judging of policies and decisions,
radical change, 136-38; radical 121; of the incompetent, 122-23
change, 139-41; principle of International debt, 1
practical equity, 142-43 International order, xv
Hypothetical reasoning: and the fact International war, 18
vs. values objection, 123 Interstate highway system: and the
cold war, 32
Ideal conditions: and the actual world, Intolerable situations: and this book’s
112-13 hypotheses, 138
Ideal society situations: and purely Investment freezing: and radical change
procedural principles, 124—25 situations, 140
Ideal worlds objection, 130-31 Iran: and the Iranian crisis, 102-3; and
Idealism objection, 131-32 Iraq, 197
Ideals: and the objectivity controversy, 52 Iranian crisis: a destabilizing
Ideas: as concerns fueling the confrontation, 102-3
objectivity controversy, 44; and Iraq, 18, 196-214; and high-tech
institutions, 200 weapons development, 20; its
Ideology: in conflict theories, 89; and invasion and annexation of Kuwait
multioccupational approaches, 195 and societally destabilizing
Illiteracy: concerning ethical theory, confrontations, 113; Kuwait, and
185; concerning technology, 185 U.N. sanctions, 134; and Iran, 197;
Imagination: in social testing, 66; and the Persian Gulf crisis, 196-210;
among ordinary people, 130 and Persian Gulf war negotiations,
Incompetence objection, 122—23 205. See also Iran; Kuwait
Industrial participation program, Israel: and U.S. foreign policy in the
167-68 Middle East, 198
270 INDEX

Issue-overload, 1, 3—5; and the Levels: of policy questions and

taxonomy of issues, 7—8; and ethical abortion, 7—8; of policy and decision
theories, 10; and the technology problems, 8-9. See also Policy-level
tribunal, 165; disjoint policy-making, Liberation movements: and
and the technology tribunal, 175-79; destabilization, 138-39
and policy insulation, 177 Liberty variable: in the high-tech
Issues: initially defined, 1; discussed, weapons race, 20
8—9; and pragmatic constraints, 3; Life: and hijackings, 141
taxonomy of, 7-8; and social Life plans: as reasons for judging of
conflicts, 9-10 policies and decisions, 121; and
hijackings, 141
Jobs: computers, and education, Limiting conditions: and this book’s
159-60 hypotheses, 114-15
Judgment, xiv; judicious, somewhat Local warfare stage, 204-5
comprehensive, and long term in Lottery, 12
policy-making, 33; closely connected Loyalty: and advanced technology
with decision in policy-making, 64; situations, 155
and social testing, 65; in primarily
administrative situations, 115-16; of MacCarthyism, 45-48
value and evaluation, 222n.8 Machines: and appreciation, 151; and
Judgments: contrasted with decisions in jobs, 159
the technology tribunal, 175 Mackie, J. L. (quoted), 40, 60, 61, 63,
Jury selection constraints: and this 64
book’s approach, 125 Macrosocietal level: significant in
Just causes: and moral sensitivity, 206 policy-making, 96; vs. microsocietal
level, 96-97; increasingly
Kant, Immanuel (quoted), 78 emphasized in engineering ethics,
Kantian theories, 13 technology ethics, and science and
Kennedy, Eugene (quoted), 4 society studies, 97; main focus of
Knowledge: and multioccupational this book, 113
approaches, 195 Macrosocietal problems: in disruptive
Kopkind, Andrew (quoted), 40 situations, 132-34; analogy with
Korea: and the United States, 197 economics, 226n.2
Kuwait: and Iraq, 196. See also Iraq Management science: and decision
theory, 17
Lack-of-good-judgment objection, 122 Manipulation, 12; and philosophy as
Language: foreign, and life, xi; in the diplomacy, 74; in controversies and
analogy with technology confrontations, 95; in radical change
controversies, 181; development and situations, 140; in good judgment,
associated practices in today’s 122; and the judgment of
fragmented world, 186 representatives or trustees, 122. See
Languages: of ethics, 182 also Administrative situation
Legislative process, 165; vs. adversarial hypothesis; Rational disruption, no
procedures, 176 radical change hypothesis;
Legitimacy: without agreed upon Nonrational disruption, no radical
opinions, 175 change hypothesis; Radical change
Letter writing: in disruptive situations, hypothesis; Principle of Practical
136-37; in radical change situations, Equity
140 Market survival: and self-esteem, 160
Level: shifts in policy-making, 2 Marx, Karl (quoted), 87
 Index 271

Materials: technologies, xv 13-14; and philosophy as

Maximization: and acting beyond the diplomacy, 79-84; in this book, 85;
call of duty, 114-15 not fixed or sub specie aeternitatis in
McKean, J. R. (quoted), 17 this book, 113
McMahon Act, 166—68 Moral obligations: not fixed or sub
Meaningful negotiations: and a sheer specie aeternitatis in this book, 113
show of force in the Persian Gulf Moral philosophy, 75; and diplomacy,
Crisis, 200 68—69; and its technology policy-
Mediation: compared with other making usefulness, 183
procedures, 1-2; and building Moral principles, xiv; and the ethical
common ground, 51; as openended theories best suited for dealing with
and crucial in diplomacy, 71, 74; and policy and decision problems,
controversies, 134; and near 13-14; and the objectivity
confrontations, 136—37; in radical controversy, 44; and philosophy as
change situations, 139; and disjoint diplomacy, 79-84; in this book, 85;
policy-making, 177; and knowledge not fixed or sub specie aeternitatis in
of ethics, 184; and war stages, 203; this book, 113
and the local warfare stage, 204 Moral problems: as not arbitrary,
Merton, R. (quoted), 92 63-64; of conduct, 79-81; of policy,
Method: primary in this book, xii; in 81-82
current social science and Moral rights: not fixed or sub specie
philosophy, xii—xiii, 90; in this aeternitatis in this book, 113
book: its justification, xiii, 90-91 Moral reasoning: undermined by the
Methods: of ethics as related to policy- expediency conception of policy and
making, 181-87; unfamiliar to many decision problems, 82
in today’s fragmented world, 186; Moral rules, xiv; in the ethical theories
and needed changes in ethics as a best suited for dealing with policy
branch of inquiry, 189 and decision problems, 13-14; and
Microeconomics: and decision theory, the objectivity controversy, 44
iW Moral sensitivity: in social testing, 66;
Microsocietal level: vs. macrosocietal among ordinary people, 183
level, 96-97; analogy with Moral sentiments: and advanced
economics, 226n.2 technology, 155
Mill, John Stuart (quoted), 172 Moral theories: have practical
Milo, Ronald (quoted), 40-41 consequences, 58; limitations of
Minimum standard: of provisions, 113, some of them, 102. See also Ethical
144 theories; Ethics
Mitcham, Carl (quoted), 186 Moral traps, 15
Monopoly: and U.S. nuclear energy in Morality: how invented according to
the 1940s, 167-68 Mackie, 60; undermined by the
Moral claims: and the objectivity expediency conception of policy and
controversy, 44 decision problems, 82
Moral hypotheses: confirmed or Motivation: in the arms race, 19-20;
disconfirmed through social testing, changes as insufficient in traps, 21
64 Moyers, Bill (quoted), 41—42
Moral issues: and problems on Marcus Muddling through: By itself too
G. Singer’s view, 8—9 unreliable, 188
Moral laws, xiv; and the ethical Multioccupational approaches, 182,
theories best suited for dealing with 189-92; my experience with them,
policy and decision problems, 253n.21
272, MINDEX

Mundt, Karl (quoted), 43 change hypothesis, 136-38

Norms: social and levels of satisfaction,
Nagel, Thomas (quoted), 49-50 35
National interest: in the high-tech Nostalgia. See Sentimentality
weapons race, 19-20; interpretations Nuclear energy: and macrosocietal
of its maximization, 22 problems, 132~-33; ethics, politics,
Nationalistic grounds: in the Persian and public participation, 172-75
Gulf crisis, 196-98 Nuclear policies: decisions, and
Needs: eccentric, 116-17; as reasons preemption, 123
for judging of policies and decisions, Nuclear war: options and the erosion
121; and computer developments, of state authority, 23; and philosophy
155, 160-62 as diplomacy, 74
Neglect: characterized, 131 Nuclear wastes: and destabilization,
Negotiation, 1, 9, 12; and the data at 100-101; controversy and individual
decision time, 32; and public rights, 100-101
adaptability to new technologies, 65; Nuclear weapons: capability, 18; and
and philosophy as diplomacy, 74; of surgical strikes, 19
use in working out a modus vivendi,
117; in conflicts about taxes, 119; Objectives: of this book, xi, xili-xiv
and controversies, 134; in Objectivity: in news reporting, xv,
controversies and near 40-52; and the world of politics, 37;
confrontations, 136—37; and and biases, 38; in heated political
preemption, 144; as related to the events and its implications, 38; and
technology tribunal and the policy and decision making, 39-52;
legislative branch of government, claimed to be a myth, 40; personal,
165—66; and disjoint policy-making, institutional, and social testing senses
177; and combat, 196-210; and war distinguished, 41; controversy,
stages, 203; and U.N. perceptions 41-43; detachment, and truth, 42;
during the Persian Gulf war, 203; and impartiality, 42; said to be a
and the local warfare stage, 204; how misfortune, 42; and self-
reliable in armed conflicts, 208 transcendence, 42; controversy in the
Negotiations: the obligation to seek United States and the Israeli-Arab
them, 196-97 confrontation, 43; politics of, 43-45;
Neo-classical objection, 129-30 and advocacy, 44; institutional,
New Atomic Energy Act, 170 45-48; and publicity, 47; despite
Newspapers: and slanting the news, 44; linguistic, conceptual,
alternative and news reporting, 44; methodological, and practical
mainstream and newsreporting, 44 fragmentation, 50-51; personal and
Newsreporting: during electoral institutional: how promoted, 51-52
campaigns, 38—52; and war related Obligations: how established, 123
events, 38; and objectivity, 40-52; Office of Technology Assessment: and
crisis during MacCarthyism, 45; and court-like approaches to science and
publicity, 47 technology, 176; views of technology
Nicolson, Sir Harold (quoted), 71 involved in its origin, 183; a reason
Nielsen, Kai, 189 for its creation, 186
Nirvana: not part of the world of Openness: of ethical discourse, 6; of
politics, 66 moral discourse undermined by the
Nonacademic world: and philosophy’s expediency conception of policy and
transcendence, 188—89 decision problems, 82
Nonrational disruption, no radical Opinions: not totally convergent in
 Index 273

social testing, 66; in controversies Perspective: how lost in policy-making,

and confrontations, 95; proliferation 105
and the science court and technology Phenomenology: how limited for this
tribunal, 174-75 book’s purposes, 102
Oppression: and destabilization, Philosophers: frequent view on
138-39 subjectivism, 40
Optimal rules of thumb objection, 35 Philosophical approach: and
Optimization. See Maximization philosophy as diplomacy, 73
Options: and social decision Philosophy: sociopolitical, xi, xiv
procedures, 32 Philosophy as diplomacy, xi—xii; how
Ordinary people: as sources of understood in this book, xii, 68-84;
evidence, 122; not cold calculators, in ethics and sociopolitical
130; their aggregate features, 130 philosophy, 70; as a philosophical
Ordinary rational agents: as sources of approach or family of philosophical
evidence, 6 theories, 73; initial characterization,
Organization: of ethics as related to 73; not simply consequentialist, 73;
policy-making, 181-82 not simply deontological, 74;
Organizational behavior studies: social realistic, 75; and moral rules, laws,
norms, and satisficing theories, 35 and principles, 74; a tentative
Outcome: typically used in characterization, 75-76; and conflict
decisionism, 30 government, 84
Outcome evaluation interpretation, 29 Plutonium: and the 1940s U.S.
Outflanking: and philosophy as chemical companies’ interest in
diplomacy, 74; in dealing with nuclear power development, 168; and
confrontations, 134; in controversies the dependance of nuclear energy
and confrontations, 136-37; in peaceful applications on military uses
radical change situations, 140 in the United States, 168
Ozone layer: and the 1988 and 1992 Policy: and decision problems, 1; and
treaties, 106 decision problems on Mackie’s view,
61-62; and decision problems are
Paradox: in Mackie’s account, 64; of not arbitrary, 63-64; problems and
perfectionism, 131 problems of conscience, 84
Parameter traps, 16 Policy-assessment: on Held’s account,
Pareto optimal situation, 28-29 a,
Participatory policy-making: and the Policy-level: shifts, 2
U.S. nuclear energy controversy, Policy-levels: and the expediency
165, 171-72 conception of policy and decision
Payoff matrix, 17 problems, 62; and the poignancy of
Peace: as cooperation, 19; movements, relevant questions, 134
23; perpetual: not part of the world Policy maker: consistent in decisionism
of politics, 66; and the use of and social choice theory, 30
sanctions, 134; and the obligation to Policy makers: and the fact of
seek negotiations, 196-97 societally disruptive conflicts, 62;
Perfectionism: and single solution their position’s usefulness to
criteria, 114; paradox, 131 conceptualize policy-making
Perfectionist objection, 131—32 problems, 81-82; and needed
changes in ethical inquiry, 190-91
Persian Gulf crisis, 196; its features,
196-99; contrasted with the Korean Policy-making: and the foreign
war, 202 language analogy, xi; and the book’s
Personal views. See Objectivity concern, xii; in current books, xiv;
274. INDEX

and philosophical language and weapons race, 23-24

categories, xili—xiv; dialogue, and Politics: and morals, 78—79; ethics,
technical information, 5; and rational nuclear technology, and public
choice, decision, and game theories, participation, 172—75; and needed
7; process and the changes in changes in ethical inquiry, 190; of
attitudes and jugdments it involves, self-deception, 199-200. See also
24; realities and social choice theory, Democratic politics, Democracy,
27-36; realities and formalism Participatory policy-making
infatuation, 27—36; how it is Pollution: and the automobile, 161
dynamic, 31; and preferences formed Poverty: of rational choice theory and
and transformed, 31; and social its offspring, 21, 22; of social choice
interaction, 31—32; and mutual theory, 34
adaptations, 32; as an ongoing Power companies: initial reluctance to
process, 32-33; as dynamic, 32-33; use nuclear energy, 167; interest in
and the working out of preferences, using nuclear energy
their relative weight, and political Power elites: in social conflicts, 103-4
purposes, 33; the sort of judgment it Practical equity: why equity, 113; why
involves, 33; no matter of practical, 113
continuously shuttling back and Practices: of ethics as related to policy-
forth between theory and practice, making, 181-82; and today’s
33; and objectivity, 39-52; and fragmented world, 186-93
disruption, 45; problems often Pragmatic approach: and this book’s
macrosocietal, 96; questions to ask, hypotheses, 143-44
105-6; in ignorance, 120-21; Pragmatic argument: for
ongoing process as opposed to multioccupational approaches, 192
closure, 176-77; does not proceed in Pragmatic considerations: in the theory
straight lines, 210 suggested, 112
Political activity: and the flourishing of Pragmatic constraints, 3; and
objectivity as social testing, 51 overloading factors, 5
Political advantage: and sanctions, 134 Pragmatic features: of philosophy as
Political campaigns: newsreporting, and diplomacy, 74—75
objectivity, 38-52 Pragmatic process: crucial for settling
Political constraints, 3, 11 public adaptability to new
Political evaluation process: moral technologies, 65
evaluation process, and rational Preemption, 121-22; what ordinary
choice theory and its offspring, 24 people are likely to think about it,
Political externality: and moral 143—44; in the automobile and
theories, 5 computer cases, 161
Political inaccuracy: of the expediency Preferences: revealed, and social
conception of policy and decision ranking interpretation, 29; unsettled,
problems, 62 31-34; unpredictable, 31-34; in
Political insulation: in policy-making, morality according to Mackie,
120; in nonrational disruption, no 60-61; change and error theories,
radical change situations, 137—40; 62—64; changes and reasons for
and issue-overload, 177 them, 63-64; in this book’s
Political positions: and the objectivity approach, 127
controversy, 44 Preferential treatment, xv, 1
Political savvy: in social testing, 66; Presumptions: created without closure,
among ordinary people, 130 118
Political variable: in the High-tech Price: and character, 160
 Index 275

Principle of Practical Equity: an overall the nuclear energy controversy,

hypothesis, 113; formulated, 142-43 169-70
Principles: in the high-tech weapons Publicity campaigns: a permissible use,
race, 19; said to be subjective and 118; in controversies and near
arbitrary, 59-60; and philosophy as confrontations, 136—37; and radical
diplomacy, 79-84; how established, change situations, 140
113; not excluded by reliance on Purely procedural principles: their
critical scrutiny and judgment, 126 inadequacies, 124-25
Prior injustices, 211-12
Proactive diplomacy: an example, Questions: to ask about newsreporting,
236n.38 47; in policy-making, 105-6, 134; to
Proactive politics, 209-10 be identified by science court
Problems of conscience: and members, 173
philosophy as diplomacy, 84;
contrasted with policy problems, 84 Race: arms, 17; catch up, 17; high-tech
Procedural approaches: how weapons, 19-24; relations and
constrained, 125 Held’s political testing of moral
Procedures: for social decision, and theories, 57-58
philosophy as diplomacy, xii; for Radical change hypothesis, 139-41
social decision, and the book’s main Ramon, Haim (quoted), 209
thesis, 1; for social decision in social Range hypothesis: formulated, 11;
choice theory’s interpretations of supported elsewhere, 216n.26
social ranking, 29; appropriate kinds Ranking: in rational choice theory, 16;
specified by the book’s hypotheses, social, 29; its interpretations in social
164 choice theory, 29
Progress: and leaps of faith, 156 Rational choice: decisions and
Proliferation: process, 20-21; of high- contractualism, 126
tech weapons and Held’s political Rational choice theory, xiv; and social
testing of moral theories, 57 traps, 14-26; and strategic games,
Propaganda: and newsreporting, 40 16-17; its poverty, 21-22; and the
Prudence: and morals, 78—79 political and moral evaluation
Psychology: and satisficing theories, 35 process, 24; trap, 24; and this book’s
Public: and needed changes in ethical taxonomy, 110
inquiry, 190-91 Rational disruption, no radical change
Public adaptability: to new hypothesis, 135-36
technologies, 65 Rational interactions: as involving
Public debate: and the perfectionist meaningful dialogue and critical
objection, 131 scrutiny, 88
Public influence: and the U.S. nuclear Rationality: as entailing a realistic
energy controversy, 165 attitude, hence one based on
Public interest: and the objectivity empirical data, 54
controversy, 45 Realistic features: of philosophy as
Public nature: of social testing, 48 diplomacy, 74—75
Public opinion: during the Persian Real politik: and cynicism, 93
Gulf crisis, 201-2 Reason: against freedom, 55; as related
Public participation: and preemption, to trust in newsreporting, 46; closely
interconnected with choice in policy-
144 making, 64; and consensus, 94; and
Public views: on nuclear energy in the
early 1950s, 167-68 crisis, 195
Publicity: in newsreporting, 47; and Reasons: readjusted through the critical
276 INDEX

scrutiny and social interaction Sanctions: as bypassing meaningful

process, 51; for changing dialogue, 88; when justified, 88, 105;
preferences, 63-64; how settled, 65; in the Persian Gulf crisis, 199
categorical vs. noncategorical, 78-84; Satisficing theories, 17; preferable to
and consensus, 94; in administrative social choice theory, 28; discussed,
situations, 115—16; in the local 34-36; their promise, 36; and the
warfare stage, 204 theory in this book, 113
Reasoning: in morality according to Saving face: in the high-tech weapons
Mackie, 60-61 Facey
Referendum politics: and issue- Scarcity: and ideal conditions, 112
overload, 177-78 Science: and society studies and
Regional conflicts: after the cold war, macrosocietal problems, 97;
196 technology and society programs,
Regional confrontations, 20; and 162; technology and society centers,
national interest, 20 192
Regional hegemony: and the political Science court, 165, 173-74
testing of moral theories, 57 Scope: in ethics and policy-making,
Representatives: and the incompetence 87-108; of social interaction, crucial
objection, 122-23 for selecting decision procedures, 88,
Research: on animals, and 97; of policies envisioned in
confrontation, 101-2, 133 determining the type of conflict
Resource depletion: and the faced, 163; of ethics as related to
automobile, 161 policy-making, 181-82
Resource exhaustion: an unlikely Secrecy: and the U.S. nuclear energy
means of ending the arms race, 21 controversy, 165, 166; and the 1951
Resources: and the high-tech weapons Amendment to the 1946 Atomic
race, 19 Energy Act, 169-70; in the Three
Revolution: and situations that warrant Mile Island and Chernoby] accidents,
destabilization, 138 170-71
Rights: in the theory suggested, 11; Security: national, 19; of the United
and new journalism, 46; in state of States and the nuclear energy
nature situations, 74; of individuals controversy, 167, 169; and nuclear
in the nuclear wastes controversy, data classification, 170
100-101; of animals and a Self-esteem: and technology
nondestabilizing confrontation, developments, 150-52; and character
101-2; how established, 123; not traits, 152; ordinary notion, 152; its
excluded by reliance on critical conditions and the essay’s focus, 153;
scrutiny and judgment, 126 and character, 157—59; market
Risk: assessment data, 65; avoidance survival and risk avoidance, 169
and self-esteem, 160. See also Dangers Self-pride. See Self-esteem
Robotization: and technology policy Self-respect. See Self-esteem
problems, 181 Sense of humor: contrasted with wit,
Rogers, A. K. (quoted), ix 158; as a character trait, 158
Rogers, Will (quoted), 40 Sentimental values: not to be dismissed
Romanticism: in ethics, 55—58; in without good reason, 156
newsreporting and ethics, 40 Sentimentality: and the loss of old
Russia: and the arms race, 18 values, 156
Shils, Edward (quoted), 92
Safety: and the nuclear energy Shrader-Frechette, Kristin (quoted),
controversy, 169 174-76
 Index 277

Side effects: and prediction difficulties, Social ranking, 29

65 Social testing, 41, 48; and critical
Simplicity: and theories, 25 scrutiny and interaction, 48; and the
Singer, Marcus G. (quoted), 8 role of judgment and decision,
Single solution: not provided by this 55-66; of moral hypotheses, 64-66;
book’s hypotheses, 114; not worth and the book’s hypotheses, 213-14;
seeking, 114-15; criteria and not reduced to political testing,
maximization, 114-15 220n.7
Sit-ins: and nonrational consensus, 135 Social welfare function, 28-29
Slavery: ruled out by the radical change Societal problem: and personal
hypothesis, 142 experience, 81-82
Sliding-reinforcer traps, 16; and the Sociopolitical philosophy: and
high-tech weapons race, 20-21 philosophy as diplomacy, 68
Social change, xii Solar energy: and preemption, 121
Social choice theory, xiv, 26; discussed, Sound mind: in good judgment, 122;
27-36; useless for sound policy- and the judgment of representatives
making, 28, 34; useless as a source of or trustees, 122. See also Judgment;
heuristic models, 28, 34; static, 28; Administrative Situation Hypothesis;
Arrow’s uninterpreted conception, Rational disruption, no radical
28-29; its history, 29-30; the static change hypothesis; Nonrational
theory objection; cut off from disruption, no radical change
politics, 31; its poverty, 34; and new hypothesis; Radical change
technologies, 34; its sterile hypothesis; Principle of Practical
formalism, 36; and this book’s Equity
taxonomy, 110; vs. disjoint policy- South Atlantic war, 104; and the cold
making, 195 war order, 203; and territorial
Social conflicts: in policy problems, conflicts, 207; and nuclear threats,
81-82 207. See also Argentina
Social decision procedures: and this Sovereignty: and conflicts, 206-7
book’s taxonomy, 106-8; in rational Soviet Union: its notion of peace, 19;
disruption, no radical change post-cold war disarmament proposals
situations, 136; in nonrational and U.S. reaction, 21; and public
disruption, no radical change opinion rapid change about the
situations, 137-38; and knowledge market economy, 33; nationalist
of ethics, 184; what types are support for Gorbachev in 1989, and
appropriate in what circumstances, backlash in 1990, 33; and its own
118; and the technology tribunal, 175 1980s agricultural policies, 120; and
Social fact: of the controversy about international controls of fissionable
newsreporting, 47 materials, 167; and the cold war
Social interaction: and automobile order, 197; and Afghanistan, 197;
carnage’s acceptance, 32; and and Cuba, 197; and the U.N.
philosophy as diplomacy, 75; and January 15, 1991 resolution, 201. See
confirmation, 85; not simply also Ex-Soviet Union
conflictive or consensual, 88; and Specialization: and illiteracy, 185-86
preemption, 144 Stalemate: in Hylland’s suggestion, 33
Social norms: and levels of satisfaction, State of nature situations: and
35 destabilization, 98; and ethical
Social order, 112 theory, 184
Social preference ordering, 28-29 State terrorism: and indirect
Social process studies, x11, 90 destabilization attempts, 119-20
278 INDEX

Stevenson, Adlai (quoted), 43, 44 book: true to the complexities of

Stockpiles, 19 social life, 109
Strategic games. See Rational choice Technical possibilities: of computer
Strategy: military, 17 development, 153-54
Strikes: and philosophy as diplomacy, Technocracy: vs. democracy in nuclear
74; in dealing with confrontations, policy-making, 170; failures
134 concerning nuclear energy, 170-71
Striking, 12 Technocratic policy-making: not
Strong views: their false security, required to deal with issue-overload
117-19; and absolute moral rights, or crises, 180
obligations, laws, and principles, 117 Technological constraints, 11-12
Subject: contrasted with citizen, 23 Technological developments, 182
Subjective element: in ethics according Technologies: new, and social choice
to Mackie, 60—61; trivial and theory, 34
harmless in preference and choice Technology: and ethics, 182; as
changes, 63-64 expertise or intelligence, 183;
Subjective ranking: in social choice conceptions of, 185-86
theory, 30; in rational choice theory, Technology community: and needed
161 inquiry changes, 190-91
Subjectivity: claimed to be the road to Technology ethicists: dangers involved,
freedom and rightness, 40; seen as 192
the road to arbitrariness and caprice Technology ethics: and macrosocietal
and away from freedom, 40; of problems, 97
ethics at a high-level, 60-66; in Technology tribunal, 165, 174-75; and
ethics: irretrievable for Mackie, 60 multioccupational approaches, 191
Substitutability: and self-esteem, 153; Terrorist groups: and high-tech
and computers, 153-54; and jobs, weapons, 19
159-60 Theoretical framework: in this book, xi
Supermarkets: and loss of personal, Theories: ethical, 1; and social
local life, 156 constraints, 10; moral, 1, 5; type
Superpower politics: and the end of the needed, 11-12, 13-14; simplify
cold war, 198 reality, 25; should reflect risks and
Superpowers: and the arms race, 17 uncertainties, 53; moral, have
Surgical strikes, 19 consequences, 5, 58; moral, and their
Sympathetic understanding: in this confirmation, 90
book’s approach, 127 Theory: any preferable to none in
Syria, 18; a new ally of the United policy-making?, 25-26, 34
States, 202 Threats: in dealing with confrontations >

134; of war in radical change

Tactics, 2 situations, 140
Tasks: of this book, xiv—xv; for moral Three Mile Island: and secrecy, 170
philosophy, 7-8 Time: constraints, 2, 5—6, 11;
Taxonomies: current in social science constraints, and Elster’s views, 10;
and philosophy, xiii delay traps, 16; delay traps, and the
Taxonomy: of issues and moral high-tech weapons race, 20-21;
guidelines, 7-8; purposes and constraints, and policy making
significance of that in this book, information, 132
88-90; in this book, 106-8; in this Total ignorance traps, 16
book and its utility, 109; in this Traps: social, 14; in rational choice,
 Index 279

decision, and game theory, 15-26; Gulf war, 197-99; and Hussein’s
social, typology, 15-16; sliding- aims during the Persian Gulf crisis,
reinforcer, 16; total ignorance, 16; 200; and negotiations to end the
overload, 16; externality, 16; Persian Gulf war, 205
parameter, 16; collective, 16; Universalization: and preference
noncooperation, 16; social, and the change, 64
high-tech weapons race, 20-21 Unjustified contentment objection,
Trivialization: and the loss of old 130-31
values, 155-56 Urgency: based on social scope and
Truman, President Harry (quoted), 44 consequences of interactions, 88;
Trust: building actions and the high- how to assess it, 98
tech weapons race, 21; as related to U.S. Congress: its role during the
newsreporting and societal policy- Persian Gulf crisis, 201
making, 46 U.S. Secretary of State Haig (quoted),
Trustees: and the incompetence 234n.3
objection, 122-23 Usefulness: of moral philosophy,
Truth: and abstract theories, 24; as 183-84
related to objectivity and Utilitarian theories: and Dennett’s
detachment, 42; in the controversy views, 13
about computers and jobs, 159 Utilities: worked out in the process of
Typology: of social traps, 15-16 negotiation, bargaining, and dialogue,
24
Uncompromising approach: to policy Utility: expected, 17; function, 17;
making, 70; contrasted with the maximization objection, 35
diplomatic approach, 76-84 Utopia: in the ideal worlds objection,
Unilateral actions: in the high-tech 131
weapons race, 21
Uniqueness: of moral philosophy, Values: in the high-tech weapons race,
183-84 19; and philosophy as diplomacy,
United Kingdom. See Great Britain 79-84; and habits, 154-57;
United Nations: role during the sentimental, 156
Persian Gulf crisis, 200, 205 Variables: in the high-tech weapons
United States: and the arms race, 18; race, 19-24
its notion of cooperation, 19; Victory: and rights, 142
national interest and arsenal Vietnam War: and newsreporting, 46
development, 20; and the Soviet Voting, 9; in conflicts about taxes, 119;
Union’s post cold war disarmament and controversies, 134; and the
proposals, 21; the objectivity technology tribunal, 175
controversy, and the Israeli-Arab
confrontation, 43; newsreporting, Wants: and the objectivity controversy,
and the objectivity controversy, 47; 45; eccentric, 116-17; as reasons for
and people’s adaptations to judging of policies and decisions,
technological change, 156; and the 121; and computer developments,
history of the nuclear energy 155, 160-62
controversy, 166—70; government War: post cold, xv; cold, 17; nuclear
lack of eagerness to develop nuclear options and the erosion of state
power plants, 167; and the cold war authority, 23; cold, and the interstate
order, 197; and Korea, 197; highway system, 32; and
condition at the outset of the Persian newsreporting, 38; of Vietnam and
280 INDEX

newsreporting, 46; in dealing with Wit: contrasted with a sense of humor,

confrontations, 134; and situations 158
that warrant destabilization, 138; and Workers: attitudes about new
negotiation, 196-210; and the technology, 156, 185-86
damage control stage, 203—4; and the World hunger: and the expediency
local warfare stage, 204-5 conception of policy and decision
Weather satellites: and technology problems, 62
policy problems, 181 World imbalance stage, 205
Well-being, 112; not fixed, 113; and World order: and the Persian Gulf
equity, 114; in administrative crisis, 199; breakdown in the West,
situations, 115—16; of the 202
incompetent, 122-23; and World peace: and military operations,
destabilization, 138-39; and 197
hijackings, 141; and issue-overload, Worth of persons: and computer
177-78; Western world, 196 developments, 157; and character
Wiesel, Elie (quoted), 52 traits, 158
Williams, Robin (quoted), 92
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