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A N A LY Z I N G
INTELLIGENCE
 Additional Praise for Analyzing Intelligence
‘‘At last . . . a comprehensive compendium of thought and insights on the pro-
fession of analysis! A must read for anyone interested in intelligence reform,
analytic transformation, and for the fifty percent of intelligence community ana-
lysts with less than five years experience.’’
—Timothy R. Sample, president, Intelligence and National Security Alliance
and former staff director, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

‘‘The most wide-ranging introduction to the vital craft of American intelligence

analysis that has ever been published for the general audience of peers, scholars,
and students. As editors, George and Bruce both exemplify and advance the
professional standards they preach. Readers will find plenty of healthy self-
criticism and recognition of problems. Yet readers may end up questioning some
preconceptions of their own as they encounter essays that knock down some
caricatures and corrosive myths that too often dominate contemporary discus-
sion of intelligence issues.’’
—Philip Zelikow, White Burkett Miller Professor of History, University of
Virginia, and executive director of the 9/11 Commission.

‘‘Analyzing Intelligence offers a sophisticated overview of the history, perform-

ance, and practice of intelligence analysis. The contributors explore why good
analysis is extraordinarily difficult and how changing threats, technologies, and
expectations are shaping the intelligence profession.’’
—James J. Wirtz, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
 A N A LY Z I N G
INTELLIGENCE
ORIGINS, OBSTACLES, AND INNOVATIONS

ROGER Z. GEORGE
JAMES B. BRUCE
Editors

In cooperation with the Center for Peace and Security Studies

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

Georgetown University Press

Washington, D.C.
Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. www.press.georgetown.edu  2008 by
Georgetown University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and
recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Analyzing intelligence : origins, obstacles, and innovations / Roger Z. George, James B.
Bruce, editors ; in cooperation with the Center for Peace and Security Studies, Edmund A.
Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-1-58901-201-1 (alk. paper)
1. Intelligence service—United States—Methodology. 2. Military intelligence—United
States. 3. National security—United States. I. George, Roger Z., 1949– II. Bruce,
James B. III. Georgetown University. Center for Peace and Security Studies.
JK468.I6.A843 2008
327.1273—dc22
2007031706


⬁ This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American National
Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials.

15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
First printing

Printed in the United States of America

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the authors and do not
reflect the official positions or views of the CIA or any other U.S. government agency. Nothing
in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication
of information or agency endorsement of the authors’ views. Where appropriate, this material
has been reviewed by the CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
To three pathfinders for the profession of intelligence analysis

Sherman Kent
Richards J. Heuer, Jr.
Jack Davis
Contents

Preface ix
Introduction: Intelligence Analysis—The Emergence of a Discipline 1
James B. Bruce and Roger Z. George

Part One: The Analytic Tradition

1 The Evolution of Intelligence Analysis 19
John H. Hedley
2 The Track Record: CIA Analysis from 1950 to 2000 35
Richard J. Kerr
3 Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline? 55
Rebecca Fisher and Rob Johnston

Part Two: The Policy–Analyst Relationship

4 Serving the National Policymaker 71
John McLaughlin
5 The Policymaker’s Perspective: Transparency and Partnership 82
James B. Steinberg
6 Intelligence Analysis: Between ‘‘Politicization’’ and Irrelevance 91
Gregory F. Treverton

Part Three: Enduring Challenges

7 The Art of Strategy and Intelligence 107
Roger Z. George
8 Foreign Denial and Deception: Analytical Imperatives 122
James B. Bruce and Michael Bennett
9 U.S. Military Intelligence Analysis: Old and New Challenges 138
David Thomas

vii
viii 兩 Contents

Part Four: Diagnosis and Prescription

10 Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts 157
Jack Davis
11 Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to
Intelligence 171
James B. Bruce
12 The Missing Link: The Analyst–Collector Relationship 191
James B. Bruce

Part Five: Leading Analytic Change

13 Managing Analysis in the Information Age 213
John C. Gannon
14 Intelligence in Transition: Analysis after September 11 and Iraq 226
Mark M. Lowenthal
15 The New Analysis 238
Carmen A. Medina

Part Six: New Frontiers of Analysis

16 Computer-Aided Analysis of Competing Hypotheses 251
Richards J. Heuer Jr.
17 Predictive Warning: Teams, Networks, and Scientific Method 266
Timothy J. Smith
18 Homeland Security Intelligence: Rationale, Requirements, and
Current Status 281
Bruce Berkowitz

Conclusion: The Age of Analysis 295

Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce

Glossary of Analysis Terms 309

Contributors 321
Index 325
Preface

THIS BOOK PRESENTS an exposition and critique of U.S. intelli-

gence analysis. A single author could not have written it as authoritatively or
completely. When we decided to produce this kind of volume on intelligence
analysis, we made two critical decisions at the outset: first, to commission new
chapters, because what we were seeking was simply not available in the current
literature; and second, to recruit the most qualified experts to write these origi-
nal contributions. We also sought to bring these fresh perspectives together in a
way that would yield a whole that is truly greater than the sum of its parts. We
hope we have succeeded in these daunting collaborative tasks.
Collaboration is more than cooperation toward a common goal. For this proj-
ect it has been a career-long sharing of ideas on how to make intelligence analy-
sis a true profession. In a sense, it took more than two decades of contact
between the editors to produce this volume, as we constantly crossed paths in
our professional lives. Both of us studied international relations theory and
political science before joining the intelligence community. Our analytic careers
both began at the National Intelligence Council and converged again at the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) Directorate of Intelligence, Office of European
Analysis. In these rather different organizations, we became well acquainted
with how intelligence analysis is conducted at both the intelligence community
and agency levels. Here we were first exposed to the talents of such phenomenal
analysts as Hal Ford, a vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council and
mentor of national intelligence estimates writers like ourselves. And we also
encountered Jack Davis, at the time a national intelligence officer and later a
career-long developer and teacher of tradecraft. Later, we were again privileged
to serve at the National Intelligence Council, drafting and managing national
intelligence estimates, where we were able to see the impressive skills of some of
the best analysts in the U.S. government—and some of the frailties of the esti-
mating process.
In these assignments and others, we had our share of triumphs and setbacks,
along the way observing how intelligence analysis works in practice and how it
might be made to work better. Seasoned by firsthand contact with intelligence
at both its best and worst, we could not avoid developing ideas regarding how
to improve analysis.
These combined experiences have taught us to be humble but also to be more
demanding of intelligence. We came to believe that ‘‘lessons learned’’ must be
shared with others; otherwise, changes in the analytic habits of others will not

ix
x 兩 Preface

occur. But we could not hope to provide a complete set of important lessons.
Thus, the other contributors to this book have multiplied our own insights expo-
nentially in understanding the origins, practices, problems, and prospects of the
craft—and aspiring profession—of intelligence analysis. Above all, we aim to
improve it.
Such ideas were also nurtured by our working on analytic tradecraft issues
while serving in different parts of the CIA. One of us worked on preparing some
of the early Alternative Analysis instructional materials for CIA analysts. The
other became a student of denial and deception as a factor degrading U.S. intelli-
gence and later served as a senior staff member on the President’s Commission
on the Capabilities of U.S. Intelligence Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
(the Silberman-Robb WMD Commission). Most recently, we spent time
together at the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, where we were
deeply involved in preparing new tradecraft primers and monographs to help
overcome some of the cognitive biases and other tradecraft errors that played
such a destructive role in the intelligence failure concerning Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction.
In pursuing this project, we have benefited tremendously from the insights
gained in many conversations over the years—not always consensual—with our
contributors as well as with other intelligence colleagues and critics. We cannot
give enough credit to Richards Heuer, whose ground-breaking book Psychology
of Intelligence Analysis set the standard for serious consideration of the impact
of the cognitive dimensions of intelligence analysis. Likewise, working for and
with many of the other contributors to this volume has enriched our professional
careers as well as inspired us to try to capture what we have collectively learned
about the art and science of analysis.
Both of us owe a debt of gratitude to a number of teaching institutions, two
of which especially helped encourage our interest in preparing a book of this
nature for future analysts. In particular, Georgetown University’s Security Stud-
ies Program, where we are currently adjunct professors, has been a leader in
graduate-level intelligence studies, both a source of eager and challenging stu-
dents and an ideal incubator for the ideas found in this book. Likewise, the
National War College, where each of us has taught at separate times, sets a high
standard for professional education—a model, really, that we believe should be
emulated in a future National Intelligence University.
This book would not have been possible without the generous support of
Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS), the
research arm of its Security Studies Program. Through its director, Daniel
Byman, and deputy director, Ellen McHugh, CPASS has provided indispensable
resources as well as enthusiasm, advice, and many other forms of steady encour-
agement throughout our project. Richard Brown of Georgetown University
Press has been especially understanding of deadlines along with the added bur-
dens of working with intelligence practitioners, including the inconvenient but
necessary ‘‘prepublication review’’ process at the CIA. In that regard, we
appreciate the CIA’s Publication Review Board’s timely review of our manu-
script as well as excellent guidance.
 Preface 兩 xi

We also must thank our wives, Cindy and Penny, for their understanding and
support, and also apologize to them for the many lost weekends, evenings, and
early mornings, when we were crafting or correcting text and sending copious
e-mails back and forth to coordinate research, rewriting, reformatting, and the
myriad details associated with our drafting and editing responsibilities. For that,
there is no way to repay our patient spouses but with love.
Last, but certainly not least, we thank Matthew Larssen, our able George-
town University research assistant, whose careful manuscript preparation, fact
checking, and mastery of style guides have made this book not only more
presentable but also more sound because of his attention to detail. Perhaps more
important, Matt was a sanity check on the themes and ideas contained in this
book. And it is for his generation of intelligence analysts that we have written it.
INTRODUCTION

Intelligence Analysis—The Emergence

of a Discipline
James B. Bruce and Roger Z. George

SLIGHTLY MORE than half a century ago, the American scholar and
pioneering intelligence analyst Sherman Kent lamented that the U.S. intelligence
community lacked a professional literature.1 Serving as the head of the Central
Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) Office of National Estimates, Kent hoped to define
and develop a professional intelligence analysis discipline, noting that academic
professions could not operate without an understanding of the field or a compa-
rable body of knowledge. Today, though there is surely a large body of general
writing on intelligence, most professional intelligence analysts still share Kent’s
complaint. Indeed, many writers have instead concentrated on the past and cur-
rent failings of intelligence and policy officials, putting the record ‘‘straight’’ as
they see it, or exposing sensational intelligence operations to excite or infuriate
the public. However, they have largely neglected defining the discipline of ‘‘intel-
ligence analysis’’ or adding to the collective knowledge on what constitutes good
analytic principles and practices.

Defining the Analytic Discipline

Is there a professional discipline known as ‘‘intelligence analysis?’’ Considerable

effort has been devoted to defining what is meant by the general term ‘‘intelli-
gence,’’ which surely encompasses analysis as one part of a multifaceted process
of gaining specific, often secret, information for government use.2 Analysis is the
thinking part of the intelligence process, or as the former career analyst and
senior official Douglas MacEachin has phrased it, ‘‘Intelligence is a profession
of cognition.’’3 It is all about monitoring important countries, trends, people,
events, and other phenomena and in identifying patterns or anomalies in behav-
ior and cause–effect relationships among key factors that explain past outcomes
and might point to future developments with policy implications for the United
States. Another key founder of CIA analytic practices and principles has phrased
it more succinctly: ‘‘The mission of intelligence analysts is to apply in-depth
substantive expertise, all-source information, and tough-minded tradecraft to
produce assessments that provide distinctive value-added to policy clients’
efforts to protect and advance U.S. security interests.’’4

1
2 兩 James B. Bruce and Roger Z. George

Analysis is but one part, but ultimately in our view the decisive part, of the
intelligence process that produces insight for policymaking. The typical diagram
of the intelligence cycle found in figure 1 exemplifies how many see the intelli-
gence process. It starts with identifying what the customer needs (requirements)
and ends with delivering the intelligence (dissemination) to satisfy those needs.5
Despite its simplification of what is a very complex process, this conceptualiza-
tion does underline the analyst’s pivotal role in transforming information pro-
vided by various collection systems into judgment and insight for the policy
customer. Whether that information is good, bad, or somewhere in between, the
analyst must put it into a context that is relevant and useful for the policymaker.
This analysis comes in a variety of forms. Traditionally, one thinks of prod-
ucts—so-called finished intelligence analysis—which is printed and distributed
to select government users. This definition of analysis conveys, however, a mech-
anistic and also somewhat linear process, which figure 1 represents. The ‘‘pro-
duction-line’’ metaphor conjures up an image of analysts writing, reviewing,
editing, and publishing an assessment, and then moving onto the next question
or task. In reality the cognitive part of analysis is more akin to a computer
model that has been collecting and interpreting incoming data and constantly
reassessing how new data might change not only the findings but also the com-
puter model being used to organize and interpret the data. The forms that analy-
sis can take, then, are not limited to the printed or even the electronic word or
graphic. As often, ‘‘analysis’’ occurs when analysts interact with policymakers
over the telephone, via the Internet, during a videoconference, or at a meeting.
This form of intelligence support has been referred to as ‘‘analytical transac-
tions.’’ Though impossible to quantify, perhaps tens of thousands of such trans-
actions occur yearly.6 Moreover, the sharing of data, hypotheses, interpretations,
and questions among analysts, and other nongovernment experts is possibly

FIGURE 1
The Intelligence Cycle

Analysis and
production

Types of Intelligence
Human intelligence Dissemination

Signals intelligence

Imagery and geospatial

intelligence Customers
The nation’s leaders,
Measurement and policymakers, armed forces,
signature intelligence Collection homeland defense, and
law enforcement
Open source
intelligence Requirements

Source: Adapted from a briefing, The Intelligence Community, available at the Director of National Intelli-
gence website (www.dni.gov).
 Intelligence Analysis—The Emergence of a Discipline 兩 3

where the most insightful cognition is occurring, rather than on the page of a
finished assessment or a PowerPoint slide.

The Complete Analyst

The analytic process, then, must be understood as demanding more than just a
well-educated individual who can write concisely. The complete intelligence ana-
lyst must combine the skills of historian, journalist, research methodologist, col-
lection manager, and professional skeptic. That is, at a minimum, he or she must
demonstrate a very unique skill set:

• mastery of the subject matter as well as related U.S. policies,

• understanding of research methods to organize and evaluate data,
• imagination and scientific rigor to generate as well as test hypotheses,
• understanding of unique intelligence collection methods,
• self-awareness of cognitive biases and other cognitive influences on analysis,
• open-mindedness to contrary views or alternative models that fit the data,
and
• self-confidence to admit and learn from analytic errors.

What distinguishes an intelligence analyst from an expert outside the intelli-

gence community, then, are not the first three characteristics, which are shared
with many international affairs specialists, although these attributes are espe-
cially important in intelligence. Many so-called subject matter experts are well
versed in the history, politics, culture, and language of many countries or are
technical experts in a wide variety of areas; they may also be very attuned
to U.S. policy deliberations and indeed be involved in advising a number of
government officials on the correct policies to adopt. And many foreign affairs
specialists may have methodological expertise. Where the intelligence analyst
distinguishes himself or herself is in having the other four characteristics. The
complete analyst must be an expert on how to use intelligence collection capa-
bilities; be both imaginative and rigorous in considering explanations for miss-
ing, confusing, and often contradictory data while at the same time being able
to be a self-critic of one’s own biases and expectations of what the data show;
and, most important, be open to changing one’s mind and consciously trying
to ask the question, ‘‘If I’m wrong, how might I need to modify the way I am
analyzing the problem?’’

Searching for a Literature

As of 2007, the body of scholarly writing on intelligence analysis remains—

nearly fifty years after Kent’s lament—surprisingly thin. It is true that academics
and intelligence professionals have seen a growing literature on intelligence in
recent years. Yet with some qualified exceptions, not a single book has exclu-
sively addressed intelligence analysis and nothing recent has treated it compre-
hensively.7 This is surprising given the importance of the subject and the
4 兩 James B. Bruce and Roger Z. George

thousands of professionals who practice the craft daily throughout the sixteen
agencies in the U.S. intelligence community. Moreover, the two most recent U.S.
intelligence failures—the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (failure to ‘‘con-
nect the dots’’) and Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (failure to accu-
rately estimate their amount or their complete absence)—are frequently cited,
correctly, as failures in analysis. A thorough survey over the past two decades of
the literature on U.S. intelligence analysis yields meager results. This book aims
to begin to fill that puzzling void.
In the past five years, the intelligence literature has been expanded by multiple
investigations into the U.S. intelligence community’s performance in the Septem-
ber 11 attacks and the Iraq war. Unfortunately, these reviews have provided us
with a rather incomplete picture on how to improve intelligence analysis. The
9/11 Commission Report provides a brilliant recounting of the hijackers’ plot
and copious recommendations on how to improve intragovernmental informa-
tion sharing and defensive measures against global terrorism. However, there is
scant attention at all devoted to understanding how analysis might have been
better and to laying out any game plan for improving intelligence analysis on
terrorism. The sound-bites that the U.S. intelligence community ‘‘lacked imagi-
nation’’ or ‘‘failed to connect the dots’’ are hardly sufficient insight on why
U.S. experts were unable to grasp the audacious nature of the threat.8 Sadly,
professionals learn little from this well-written report other than to acknowledge
that agencies should have done better at information sharing, should have been
writing more national estimates, and should have been thinking more
imaginatively.
The record is better in the reviews conducted on U.S. analysis covering Iraq’s
WMD programs. In addition to faulting collection efforts, fragmented intelli-
gence community operations, management, and other aspects of the intelligence
system, the Silberman-Robb WMD Commission was explicit in critiquing the
analytic record as well as the analytic process. The commission’s critique was
based on an in-depth examination of the analytical process involved in produc-
ing both current reporting as well as estimative intelligence on Iraq’s suspected
WMD programs, and on other cases including Libya, Afghanistan, Iran, North
Korea, and terrorism. Overall, from these cases the report found a ‘‘lack of
rigorous analysis.’’ In particular, it found ‘‘finished intelligence that was loosely
reasoned, ill-supported, and poorly communicated,’’ and ‘‘too many analytical
products that obscured how little the intelligence community actually knew
about an issue and how much their conclusions rested on inferences and
assumptions.’’9
Although the WMD Commission noted several analytical successes, such as
with some intelligence on Libya and the A. Q. Khan nuclear proliferation net-
work, it also found a preponderance of ‘‘serious analytical shortcomings.’’ These
included

inadequate Intelligence Community collaboration and cooperation, analysts who

do not understand collection, too much focus on current intelligence, inadequate
systematic use of outside experts and open source information, . . . and poor capa-
bilities to exploit fully the available data. Perhaps most troubling, we found an
 Intelligence Analysis—The Emergence of a Discipline 兩 5

Intelligence Community in which analysts had a difficult time stating their assump-
tions up front, explicitly explaining their logic, and, in the end, identifying unam-
biguously for policymakers what they do not know. In sum, we found that many
of the most basic processes and functions for producing accurate and reliable intel-
ligence are broken and underutilized.10

The WMD Commission’s major recommendations on analysis focused on

improvements in
• management of analysts,
• utilization of nontraditional sources, including open sources,
• understanding of how foreign denial and deception can have an impact on
collection and analysis,
• long-term research and strategic thinking, and particularly
• tradecraft (or methodology) through much improved training, especially to
produce analysis that is more rigorous and transparent.11
We intend to give particular attention in this volume to these issues and to others
as well.
Having said all this about what has been written so far on the recent intelli-
gence failures, we believe there is still a notably thin professional literature on
intelligence analysis. Part of this glaring absence is the result of management
imperatives that are driven by current intelligence demands (as opposed to more
in-depth research and less time-pressured analysis) and do not permit sufficient
time to reflect on the intelligence community’s past performance or to record
the lessons learned, from which subsequent generations of analysts can benefit.
Another part is a justified sensitivity to focusing too exclusively on the intelli-
gence community’s past failings—which are easier to document than its many
successes.
Indeed, defining successful analysis is itself a complex question. When ana-
lysts convincingly warn of a possible threat and policymakers heed this advice,
disaster may be averted; then, policymakers may claim that intelligence analysts
exaggerated the threat in the first place. In other cases, good analysis helped to
shape a policymaker’s perspective on an issue early in the decision-making proc-
ess, leading to successful policy formulation and implementation. Accordingly,
the policy question seems relatively unimportant and the international repercus-
sions seem so unimportant that few outsiders can appreciate the counterfactual
consequences of flawed analysis that could have driven policy in a different
direction and dramatically changed the U.S. stakes in an issue. Little effort, of
course, has been made to record these routine ‘‘successes’’ where timely and
well-constructed analysis was part of a policy process that went smoothly or did
not result in a major crisis or controversy. This is an area where more work
remains to be done.

Putting Analysis in a Policy Context

To understand analysis and how to improve it, one must understand how it fits
into the actual policymaking process here in the United States. Certain realities
6 兩 James B. Bruce and Roger Z. George

must be recognized so that analysis can be better understood. First, policymak-

ers live in an information-rich environment. Second, intelligence provides an
important part of the information used to make decisions. Analysis tries to
bound the uncertainty inherent in complex international developments and tai-
lor understanding to fit specific government needs.

An Information-Rich Policy Environment

When U.S. national security decision makers deliberate over significant policy
issues, information that bears on those decisions is always important and often
vital. Whether deciding to negotiate with or coerce another country, whether
deciding to intercede in an ethnic conflict to halt genocide, or whether deciding
how to stem an insurgency using a mixture of policy tools, the policymaker is
relying on a multitude of information sources to determine what course of action
the government should take. National security policymakers enjoy access to a
broad range of information to help them deliberate such issues and support their
decisions. Some of that information will be reliable; some not. Some is biased,
calculated to influence. Some is irrelevant or useless. Often it can be controver-
sial. Some is secret or highly sensitive. But much of it comes from open sources
such as newspapers, media outlets, the Internet, and scholarly articles and
books. Some are opinion pieces in magazines and op-ed pages written mostly in
Washington and New York. Still other information comes from personal and
professional contacts, other interested U.S. policymakers and stakeholder gov-
ernment agencies, policy advocates, and opponents—or even from select foreign
officials or foreign plotters and power seekers, and additional knowledgeable
parties who may be interested or disinterested and whose involvement may
never be publicly known. And some information for policy decision making
comes from the intelligence community.

Using Intelligence Analysis to Bound Uncertainty

Intelligence officials cannot control which sources of information policymakers
will use or how they will use them—that is the sole prerogative of policymakers.
But intelligence officers do have a unique vantage point compared with those in
the policy world to weigh and assess the relative reliability and accuracy of many
sources of information available to decision makers. Notably, what intelligence
officials can control is the quality and quantity of the intelligence information
that will be provided to government officials. The better the quality and rele-
vance of the information, the higher the policy impact—or so intelligence offi-
cers hope.
The lion’s share of intelligence for these policymakers often comes in the form
of analysis.12 Such analytical products are referred to as ‘‘finished’’ intelligence
because analysts have synthesized raw information collected from multiple
sources and have interpreted the meaning of such information in the context of
the policymakers’ needs. That is analysis. These analytical products are almost
always classified ‘‘secret’’ or ‘‘top secret’’ to protect intelligence sources and
 Intelligence Analysis—The Emergence of a Discipline 兩 7

methods. They can be as short as a paragraph-length article found in the Presi-

dent’s Daily Brief or as long as hundred-page estimative or ‘‘forecasting’’ studies
such as National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). These analyses can also fall
somewhere in the middle in the form of periodic updates or specific ‘‘warning’’
documents designed to alert officials to emerging situations that may require
their urgent attention and action. Many times these products are the result of
analysts’ judgment that an issue needs to be brought to the attention of a policy-
maker. However, senior policymakers will often request ‘‘tailored’’ analysis for
a particular issue, typically quick but sometimes in depth, to help inform their
decisions or actions. These results of the analytic process are typically aimed at
explaining the facts of a situation, identifying key uncertainties, and projecting
a range of possible outcomes based on a rigorous review of the facts as well as
the knowable unknowns.

Why Intelligence Matters: The Cuban Missile Crisis Example

In light of the vast array of information at their disposal, it is fair to ask: Why
should senior policymakers pay attention to intelligence? This is not a rhetorical
question. Given their extremely tight schedules, long hours, and heavy work-
loads, decision makers have to be quite selective in what they read and who
they see. For their part, intelligence analysts can never assume access to senior
policymakers or that their written products will even be read by the customer(s)
for whom they were expressly prepared. Why should policymakers bother with
intelligence?
The short answer is that intelligence, especially finished intelligence—the ana-
lytical products and the on-call expertise of the analysts who produce them—
bring value added to the national security policymaking process. Most policy
officials appreciate this. This is more true after September 11, 2001, than before
when skeptical policymakers began to grasp the idea that intelligence reporting,
for all its shortfalls, was typically as good as or better than the competition. In
general, the ability of intelligence analysts to command policymakers’ attention
is the result of the value added they bring to decision making: intelligence collec-
tion, analytical expertise, objectivity, and timeliness. We examine these four
aspects found in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis as an illustration of successful
intelligence performance.

Collection
Intelligence analysts enjoy a special advantage: Intelligence has special sources
of information that are unavailable elsewhere. This is a global and unique
resource of the intelligence community. Each year, the U.S. taxpayer spends bil-
lions of dollars on classified intelligence collection programs. These include a
variety of technical collection means and human sources that are tasked to pene-
trate adversary governments and organizations such as terrorist groups.13 Infor-
mation collected by human intelligence (HUMINT) or technical espionage can
be a priceless resource uniquely available to intelligence analysts and, through
them (and sometimes directly), to their senior customers in national security
Random documents with unrelated
content Scribd suggests to you:
 Some folks think little boys’ ears are made on purpose to be
boxed—my sisters do. If they knew what dark and desperate
thoughts come into little boys’ minds, they’d be more careful—it riles
’em up like pokin’ sticks into a mud puddel.

A PHOTOGRAPHIC PICTURE. (1853.)

Old Lady (who is not used to these new-fangled notions). Oh, sir!
please, sir! don’t, sir! Don’t for goodness’ sake fire; sir!

I laid low—but beware to-morrow!

They let me come down to breakfast this mornin’.
I’ve got those pictures all in my pockets, you bet your life.
“Wot makes your pockets stick out so?” ast Lily, when I was a
waiting a chance to slip out unbeknone.
“Oh, things,” sez I, an’ she laughed.
 “I thought mebbe you’d got your books and cloathes packed up
in ’em,” sez she, “to run away an’ be a Injun warryor.”
I didn’t let on anything, but ansered her:
“I’ll just go out in the backyard an’ play a spell.”
Well, I got to town, an’ had a lot of fun. I called on’ all the
aboriginals of them fotografs.
“Hello, Georgie! Well agen?” said the first feller I stopped to see.
Oh, my! when I get big enuff I’ll hope my mustaches won’t be
waxed like his’n! He’s in a store, an’ I got him to give me a nice
cravat, an’ he ast me “Was my sisters well?” so I fished out his
fotograf, and gave it to him.
It was the one that had “Conseated Fop!” writ on the back. The
girls had drawed his mustaches out twict as long with a pencil, an’
made him smile all acrost his face. He got as red as fire, an’ then he
skowled at me:
“Who did that, you little rascal!”
“I should say the spirits did it,” I said, as onest as a owl, an’ I
went away quick cause he looked mad.
The nex plaice I come to was a grocery store, where a nuther
young man lived. He had red hair an’ freckles, but he seemed to
think hisself a beauty. I said:
“Hello, Peters!”
He said:
“The same yourself, Master George. Do you like raisins? Help
yourself.”
Boys wot has three pretty sisters allers does get treted well, I
notiss. I took a big hanful of raisins an’ sot on the counter eating
’em, till all at oncest, as if I jest thought of it, I took out his fotograf
an’ squinted at it, an sez:
“I do declare it looks like you.”
“Let me see it,” sez he.
I wouldn’t for a long time, then I gave it to him. The girls had
made freckles all over it. This was the one they wrote on its back,
“He asked me, but I wouldn’t have him.” They’d painted his hair as
red as a rooster’s comb. He got quite pale when he seen it clost.

ENCOURAGEMENT OF ART.
First curled and powdered Darling (to photographer). You’d better take pains
with these ’ere carte de visites, as they’ll be a good deal shown about.
Second curled and powdered Darling (on the sofa). Yes—pertiklerly in the hupper
suckles. Get you customers, you know.

“It’s a burning shame,” sez I, “for them young ladies to make fun
of their bows.”
 “Clear out,” sez Peters.
I grabbed a nuther bunch o’ raisins an’ quietly disappeared. I tell
you he was rathy!
Mister Courtenay he was a lawyer, he’s got a offis on the square
by the cort-house. I knew him very well, ’cause he comes to our
house offen. He’s a awful queer-lookin’ chap, an’ so stuck up you’d
think he was tryin’ to see if the moon was made o’ green cheese,
like folks sez it is, the way he keeps it in the air. He’s got a depe,
depe voice way down in his boots. My harte beat wen I got in there,
I was that fritened; but I was bound to see the fun out, so I ast him:
“Is the What is It on exabishun to-day?”
“Wot do you mean?” sez he, a lookin’ down on me.
“Sue said if I would come to Mister Courtenay’s offis I would see
wot this is the picture of,” sez I, givin’ him his own fotograf
inskribed, “The Wonderful What is It.”
It’s awful funny to see their faces wen they look at their own
cards.
In about a minit he up with his foot, wich I dodged just in time. I
herd him muttering suthin’ ’bout “suing for scandal.” I think myself I
oughter arrest her for ’salt an’ battery, boxing my ears. I wisht he
would sue Sue, ’twould serve her right.
I’ll not get to bed fore midnight if I write enny more. I’m yawning
now like a dying fish. So, farewell my diry till the next time. I give
them cards all back fore dinner-time. There’ll be a row, I expect. I’ve
laughed myself almost to fits a thinkin’ of the feller wot I give “The
Portrait of a Donkey” to. He looked so cress fallen. I do believe he
cried. They were teazin’ ma to let ’em give a party nex’ week wen I
got home to dinner. I don’t believe one of them young gentlemen
will come to it; the girls have give ’em all away. I don’t care
tuppence. Wot for do they take such libertys with my ears if they
want me to be good to ’em.
P.S.—I bet their left ears are burning wuss’n ever mine did!

Artist! (photographic). You’ve rather a florid complexion,

sir, but (producing a flour dredger, to the old gentleman’s
horror) if you’ll take a seat, we’ll obviate that immediately.
 ARTFUL!
Dodge of little Sperks, showing how parties below the middle height, by the use
of miniature background furniture, may gain a more imposing stature in the carte
de visite.
 SUBJECT FOR A PICTURE.
Photographer. Now, sir! ’ave yer cart de visit done?

PHOTOGRAPHIC BEAUTIES.
“I say, mister, here’s me and my mate wants our fotergruffs took; and mind, we
wants ’em ’ansom, cos they’re to give to two ladies.”
 WANDERING
MINSTRELS

CHRISTMAS WAITS.

MRS. BROWN AND THE GERMAN BAND

h, I don’t think as I ever did ’ave sich a ’ead-ache as that arter we’d been to
’Ampton Court, as I do believe a-settin’ on the grass ’ad struck to me,
and cold weal and ’am pie and cowcumber is wittles as along with
lobster salad and red currant tart you did ought to be cautious ’ow you
takes, and not ’urry thro’ it with all that confusion, and you don’t know
what you are a-takin’. And young ’Awkins as were attentive to me kep’
a-fillin’ up my plate and glass every time as I turned my ’ead away a
minit, as ’ave know’d ’im from a child, and what with the confusion at the train a-gettin’
back, I were that dizzy as I got into the wrong cab, as thro’ a mistake drove me werry
near to Nottin’-’ill afore I could make the stupid feller understand as I wanted South
Lambeth, and then to stand me out as I said Bayswater.
It was past one in the mornin’ when I got ’ome, and ’ad to knock Brown up, as were
that savage, and all his own fault thro’ not a-lookin’ arter me at the Waterloo Station, thro’
’avin’ got out at Wauxall, as is certingly nearest, thro’ bein’ not five minits from our door,
yet ’ow was I to know as we’d got parted a-gettin’ into the train, and me that dead beat
as to fall asleep the werry moment as I were in the train, and never opened my eyes till
the man come for the ticket, and a nice trouble I ’ad to find mine and every one in the
carriage a-goin’ on at me as is their larkin’ ways of a Sunday night.
Well, as I said afore never did I ’ave sich a ’eadache, as were downright splittin’, and
openin’ and a-shettin’ jest like water-works. I ’adn’t took no dinner, so was a-thinkin’ as I’d
’ave a early cup of tea, and was a-settin’ quiet in my front parlour with the blinds drawed
down, a-thinkin’ as I might get a nap and be fresh for my tea.
 THE DIVISION OF LABOUR.
How would it be if they changed instruments?

I’d put my feet up on the sofy, as isn’t a thing as I do one time in a thousand, and was
a-droppin’ off, when of all the ’owlin’, gruntin’ and squeakin’ noises as ever you ’eard it
broke out in our street. I says, “they must be lunatics broke loose, a-makin’ free with
them hinstruments, as wouldn’t never make that noise left to theirselves or used proper.”
I gets up and goes to the winder, and I see about four of them German boys a-playin’
away on trombones, like mad, and one on ’em a-tryin’ our gate.
So I knocks at the winder, and shakes my ’ead at ’im, he opens the gate and comes in
up to the winder as I opens, and says, “Go along. I don’t want no more of your noise.”
He goes on with ’is gibberish rubbish, and I only says to ’im, “Get out!” and shets
down the winder.
Well, them young waggerbones kep’ on a-blowin’ and ’owlin’, like any one in tortures
till I couldn’t stand it no longer, so I opens the winder ag’in, and ’olds up a jug of water,
as the gal ’ad brought me up for the plants, a-making believe to throw it over ’em, when
one of them ’Opwoods as lives next door, comes out and tells ’em to go on playin’ and
give ’em money.
The row as they kicked up, then, a-blowin’ right at me with them big ’orns of theirn did
so aggravate me that I took and chucked all the water slap among ’em, and if one of
them young wretches didn’t pick up a big stone and shiver a pane of glass in my front
parlour in a jiffey.
 CULTURE FOR THE MILLION; or, SOCIETY AS IT MAY BE.
New Chamber of Horrors at Madame Tussaud’s. (The right man in the right place.)
Don’t be afraid, you little goose! it’s only wax-work! Why, I recollect when people
like that were allowed to go loose about the streets!

I couldn’t stand that, so ketches up the fust thing as come to, and as proved to be the
’arth broom as ’angs with the kittle ’older, and out of the ’ouse I rushes.
Well, them boys took to their ’eels, when they see me comin’ out of the door, and run
a little way, and then stopped and picked up stones and sent a reg’lar wolley at me.
I ducked my ’ead in course, as they all went over right into old ’Opwood’s Green-’ouse,
as he jest ’ad put up ag’in ’is parlour.
I never ’eard sich a crash, nor yet sich a roar as old ’Opwood give like demented lions,
and out he come on the doorstep, jest as them boys sent a second wolley of stones, and
one ketched ’im slap in the mouth, and down he went like a dead un, and them young
scoundrels was off like the dust afore the wind as the sayin’ is.
If all them ’Opwoods didn’t come out on the doorstep, and give me their Billinsgate,
for the old feller’s got two reg’lar brimstones of daughters, besides ’is old wife as is a
reg’lar old dragon of Wantage.
They all yells at me “’ow dare you set them boys on to destroy our property.”
I says, “Me set the boys on? I was a-drivin’ them away with their beastly noise a-
distractin’ any one, as you’ve been encouragin’.”
“They was playin’ beautiful,” says one of them Miss ’Opwoods, “my favourite Waltz.”
I says, “So I should think jest the music fit for you to dance to,” for she’s forty-five,
and got a ’ump back, and as ugly as she’s wicious.
 NOTHING LIKE ADVERTISING
YOURSELF.

“Oh, you old cat,” she says to me, a-gnashin’ ’er teeth, “’ow I should like to tear your
old wig off.”
I says, “No doubt, for I’m sure you wants one bad enough.”
“Come in Julia,” says the old mother. “Don’t talk to that low old woman.”
“Yes,” I says, “Go in Julia, and ’elp your ma skin the cat.”
Down the steps come the old woman, and says, “You audacious falsehood; I’ll punish
you.”
I’d got to my gate by that time. So I says to ’er, “Stand off you wile filthy old wretch,
don’t dare cross my doorstep!” and ’olds up the ’arth broom at ’er.
Her two daughters, a-seein’ me threatenin’ ’er come up, and says, “Ma, dear, come in.”
“Yes,” I says, “Ma dear, do, or else the police may come by, and you may get give in
charge ag’in as you was the week afore last,” for the old man ’ad been ’ad up for cruelty
to animals twice.
They was all a-goin’ to fly out when a bobby come round the corner, and as soon as
they see ’im, they made faces at me, and was a-goin’ off.
I says, “Oh, pray don’t ’urry, here is the police.”
I says to the perliceman, “’Ave you ’ad any one up lately hereabouts for cruelty to
animals”; and in they goes and bangs their doors; and well they might, for that wicked old
wretch had been destroyin’ of cats brutally, and they’d fined ’im for it; and I do believe as
the old woman did use to skin cats, for she wore a fur tippet in the winter as was cats’
skins all over.
 But law, ’ow singler things do come ’ome to parties sometimes, to be sure; for it
wasn’t but the next Sunday evenin’ arter, as I were alone in the ’ouse, and went out in the
front jest to look at some stocks as Brown ’ad planted the night afore, when I thought as
I ’eard groans from next door, as is ’Opwood’s.

SKETCH FROM A STUDY WINDOW.

I listens, and says to myself, “That’s some one in pain or I’m a Dutchman.” So I goes
closer to their wall and ’ears them groans and smells burnin’.
So knowin’ as somethink were wrong I ’urries to their door and knocks, but no one a-
comin’, I says, “They’re all gone out,” and was a-goin’ away, for I didn’t ’ear no more
groans, but I smelt the burnin’; so I says, “No doubt I shall only get insults for my pains,
but I’ll try and go in and see what’s amiss.” So I makes my way round to their back door,
as were only on the latch, and in I goes, and the smell of burnin’ was downright sickenin’;
I goes straight into the front kitchen, and there was old ’Opwood a-layin’ in the fender a-
roastin’ as ’ad fell out of ’is chair in a fit.
I ’auls ’im up, and never did see sich a sight as one side of ’is face and all ’is neck and
shoulder. The boy jest then come round with the eight o’clock beer, so I ’ollers to ’im to
run for a doctor, and I got ’old ’Opwood some’ow into ’is chair, as was quite insensible.
 As luck would ’ave it, the doctor jest round the corner were at ’ome, and come at
once, and we got the old man’s burns dressed, as I considers there’s nothink finer than
whitin’, as the doctor agreed to.
If you’d seen that old Mother ’Opwood’s face and ’er daughters, when they come in
jest on ten and found me a-lookin’ arter that old man, as we’d got up on to a sofy in the
front parlour.
She begun to scream and holler at fust, and then said as I’d been and done it.
I wasn’t the least put out with ’er, but only says to ’er daughters, “Keep ’er quiet”;
which they did by draggin’ on ’er up-stairs, where they kep’ ’er, and I must say, as they
spoke werry ’andsome to me, as stopped along with the old man till jest on twelve.
I didn’t think as the old man would ’ave lived thro’ it, but he did, and ’ad his senses
back, and able for to talk by the end of the week, and told us as he remembered a-
pitchin’ forard ag’in the bars a-tryin’ to get a light for ’is pipe.
He never will be the same man as he were, but it’s been a lesson to ’im and to them,
too, not to leave him alone, nor yet to be that insultin’ to a neighbour as they have been
to me, a-doin’ everythink to annoy me, and turnin’ me into every redicule as the ’uman
’art can think on.
But they’ll never encourage them orgins and bands as they did use to, and ’ave them
inside their gardin’ to play when I’d sent them away, and no doubt we should get on
better for the future to come, but I’m glad as we’re a-goin’ to move away, and all as I
wants is to part friends, for as to livin’ friendly next door to them I never could.
Fun, 1868.
 STREET MUSICIANS

By Oliver Wendell Holmes.

You’re sitting on your window seat

Beneath a cloudless moon;
You hear a sound that seems to wear
The semblance of a tune,
As if a broken fife should strive
To drown a cracked bassoon.
And nearer, nearer still, the tide
Of music seems to come,
There’s something like a human voice
And something like a drum;
You sit in speechless agony,
Until your ear is numb.
Poor “Home, Sweet Home” would seem to be
A very dismal place;
Your “Auld Acquaintance,” all at once,
Is altered in the face;
Their discords sting thro’ Burns and Moore,
Like hedgehogs dressed in lace.
You think they are crusaders sent
From some infernal clime,
To pluck the eyes of Sentiment
And dock the tail of Rhyme,
To crack the voice of Melody
And break the legs of Time.
But, hark! the air again is still,
The music all is ground,
And silence like a poultice comes
To heal the blows of sound;
It cannot be—it is, it is—
A hat is going round!
No! pay the dentist when he leaves
A fracture in your jaw,
And pay the owner of the bear
That stunned you with his paw,
And buy the lobster that has had
Your knuckles in his claw.
But if you are a portly man,
Put on your fiercest frown,
And talk about a constable
To turn them out of town;
Then close your sentence with an oath,
Then shut the window down!
And if you are a slender man,
Not big enough for that,
Or if you cannot make a speech
Because you are a flat,
Go very quietly and drop
A button in the hat!
 THROUGH THE OPERA GLASSES

THROUGH THE OPERA

GLASSES

THE OPERA.
Box-Keeper. Stalls 216 and 217. This way, ma’am; last row, ma’am.
Won’t you like a book, ma’am?
 THE BOHEMIAN GIRL
ADAPTED TO THE MEANEST CAPACITY

Miss Rainforth, one day

Having gone out to play,
(Then a very young lady) was hurried,
By a shocking fierce man,
From a vagabond clan,
Away to the green-room, quite flurried!
This abduction, so free,
Was lamented in D,
With a pathos quite like Catalani,
By her father, Arnheim,
Who sung out in slow time;
(Count Arnheim was play’d by Borrani).
But, lo! after act one,
Without help of the “sun,”
Or (as Wordsworth has said) of the “shower,”
This damsel so nice,
With a very sweet voice,
Grew twelve inches in less than an hour!
And, having now seen,
Summers full seventeen,
Her heart could not wholly withstand
The very soft “sawder”
Of a dashing marauder
Named Harrison—one of the band.
So the maid, in reply,
After heaving a sigh,
Sang a song—now the darling of Fame,
Which, if not quite grammatical,
Was very poetical,
That Harrison “lov’d her the same.”
As we’ve all heard a few
Of the stories so new
About gipsies and children, I ween,
I need scarcely relate,
How a fortunate fate
Gave Borrani again his Arline.
Suffice it to say,
In a summary way,
That a chain, round her neck which she wore,
By a stern new policeman,
Accustomed to seize men,
Was carried a justice before:
That she knew not the theft;
That the chain was a gift
From her supposititious mamma;
And this damsel so nice,
(With a very sweet voice)
In the magistrate found her papa!
We have then, a third act;
A most curious fact;
Which none understood, till they knew
The author had thought,
That in justice he ought
A moral to add to the two.
So a lesson he gave
(This poet so grave,)
To singers and men; and the fall
Of Miss Betts, at the end,
By the hand of a friend,
Was felt as the moral by all.
Punch, 1844.
 “TURNED OUT”

t a Cosmopolitan Club they were discussing the relative position of various

countries as musical centres. Germany seemed to have the most votaries,
much to the evident displeasure of one excitable Italian. “Italy is turning out
the most musicians, and has always turned out the most,” he cried.
“Ach Gott!” exclaimed one of the Germans. “Can you blame her?”

WHAT INDEED?
Door-Keeper. Beg your pardon, sir—but you must, indeed,
sir, be in full dress!
Snob (excited). Full dress!! Why, what do yer call this?
 “FRENCH WITHOUT A MASTER.”
Matron in Stalls (reads from programme). “Overture to L’Ongfong Prod-eeg.”
What does that mean? The prodigious child, eh?
Accomplished Daughter (shocked). Mamma, dear! No—“L’Enfant Prodigue”—it
means the infant prodigy!!
RECOLLECTIONS OF THE OPERA
By W. M. Thackeray.

I’ve known a god on clouds of gauze

With patience hear a people’s prayer,
And, bending to the pit’s applause,
Wait while the priest repeats the air.
I’ve seen a black-wigg’d Jove hurl down
A thunderbolt along a wire,
To burn some distant canvas town,
Which—how vexatious!—won’t catch fire.
I’ve known a tyrant doom a maid
(With trills and roulades many a score)
To instant death. She, sore afraid,
Sings; and the audience cries encore.
I’ve seen two warriors in a rage
Draw glist’ning swords, and—awful sight!—
Meet face to face upon the stage
To sing a song, but not to fight!
I’ve heard a king exclaim “To arms”
Some twenty times, yet still remain;
I’ve known his army ’midst alarms,
Help by a bass their monarch’s strain.
I’ve known a hero wounded sore
With well-tuned voice his foes defy;
And warbling stoutly on the floor,
With the last flourish fall and die.
I’ve seen a mermaid dress’d in blue;
I’ve seen a Cupid burn a wing;
I’ve known a Neptune lose a shoe;
I’ve heard a guilty spectre sing.
I’ve seen, spectators of a dance,
Two Brahmins, Mahomet, the Cid,
Four Pagan kings, four knights of France,
Jove and the Muses—scene Madrid.
Punch, 1843.
 WE DON’T SING ENOUGH.
Sailors sing at their work. Why don’t clerks, lawyers, doctors,
brokers, and shopkeepers? It would add to the variety of life.
THE HIGH NOTE.
THE LOW NOTE.
A WOMAN’S THOUGHTS ABOUT WOMEN

I think Miss Juliet in the play

A forward little minx
(And Mrs. Grundy likes to say
What Mrs. Grundy thinks).
Her conduct with R. Montague
Seems perfectly absurd,
Such bold and brazen language, too,
I think I never heard.
I think Othello led a tame
And wretched kind of life,
With Desdemona What’s-her-name—
His namby-pamby wife.
To run away—at such an age—
And with a negro, too!
Such conduct even on the stage,
I think I never knew.
I think that, as to Beatrice,
Her husband was a flat
For looking for a life of peace
With such a wife as that.
Her conduct wasn’t over strict
For all her length of jaw;
And such a muff as Benedict
I think I never saw.
I think, when Portia’s lovers came
And played at pitch and toss,
The gentleman who won that dame
Contrived to gain a loss.
I think Emilia was a shrew,
And Rosalind ill-bred;
(But “As you Like It,” entre nous,
I think I never read).
I think Macbeth was led astray
By wicked Lady M.
And those three witches. By the way,
I don’t think much of them.
I think Ophelia—that’s a fact—
The best of all the set;
But anybody quite so crack’d
I think I never met.
Fun, 1865.
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