Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?

Author(s): Shem Migot-Adholla, Peter Hazell, Benoît Blarel and Frank Place
Source: The World Bank Economic Review , Jan., 1991, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), pp.
155-175
Published by: Oxford University Press

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THE WO RLD BANK ECON OM IC REV I E W, VOL. 5 , NO. 1: 1 55- 1 75

Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan

Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?

Shem Migot-Adholla, Peter Hazell, Benoit Blarel, and Frank Place

This article uses cross-sectional evidencefrom Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda in 1987-88
to examine the question, Are indigenous land rights systems in Sub-Sabaran Africa a
constraint on productivity? The evidence supports the hypothesis suggested by histori-
cal studies, that African indigenous land rights systems have spontaneously evolved
from systems of communal control towards individualized rights in response to in-
creases in commercialization and population pressure. Cross-sectional data on the
incidence of land improvements and on land yields provide little support for the view
that limitations under indigenous law on the right to transfer land are a constraint on
productivity.

Within the context of Africa's rapid population growth and the need for in-
creased productivity of land, there is a growing debate about whether the indige-
nous land tenure systems are a constraint on agricultural transformation. Some
authors, such as Domer (1972), World Bank (1974), and Harrison (1987), see
the indigenous tenure systems as static constraints on agricultural developme
providing insufficient tenure security to induce farmers to make necessary la
improving investments. Others, however, such as Cohen (1980), Boserup
(1981), Noronha (1985), and Bruce (1988), have countered that the indigenous
tenure arrangements are dynamic in nature and evolve in response to changes in
factor prices. In particular, it is argued that there is a spontaneous individualiza-
tion of land rights over time, whereby farm households acquire a broader and
more powerful set of transfer and exclusion rights over their land as population
pressure and agricultural commercialization proceed.
The issue is far from academic, because it brings into question the very need
for expensive land registration and titling programs at this stage in the economic
development of Sub-Saharan Africa. If the indigenous tenure systems are dy-
namic, then it is relevant to ask if there are more useful things that govemments
can do to facilitate the process of adaptation.
Up to now, the debate has been carried out without benefit of empirical tests
of the performance of indigenous land tenure systems or of the effect of land

The authors, except for Benolt Blarel, are in the Agriculture and Rural Development Department of the
World Bank. Blarel is in the Bank's Africa-South Central and Indian Ocean Department.

? 1991 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK.

155

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156 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 5. NO. I

titling on agricultural output. This article takes a first step in providing empiri-
cal testing of the relationship between indigenous tenure arrangements and agri-
cultural productivity. New data are presented from a recently completed study
of land rights systems in Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda. We use the results from
that study, together with historical evidence, to argue that, at least in rainfed
cropping areas, indigenous African tenure systems have so far been flexible and
responsive to changing economic circumstances. Where population pressure and
commercialization have increased, the indigenous tenure systems have autono-
mously evolved from a system of communal property rights towards one of
individualized rights. Controlling for differences in land quality and farmer
characteristics, there is at best a weak relationship between individualization of
land rights and land yields in the regions surveyed.
The article is organized as follows. The next two sections describe the charac-
teristics and evolution of indigenous land rights systems in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Section III presents results from our cross-sectional study in Kenya, Ghana and
Rwanda. Section IV discusses government interventions in land tenure systems,
and section V concludes with directions for policy.

I. THE NATURE OF INDIGENOUS TENURE

Africa has a wide variety of ecological conditions, cultural systems, and politi
cal structures. It is therefore somewhat dangerous to make general assertions
about the nature of indigenous land rights systems. But some common features
may still be discerned. Several interrelated themes have influenced the standard
conceptualization of African land tenure systems and will be summarized here.
.Until recently, indigenous African land rights systems have been incorrectly
presented by most foreign anthropologists, colonial administrators, and nation-
alist idealists as static polar contrasts to Western property rights systems. It is
asserted that indigenous tenure systems assign land rights to the community, and
that communal control discourages long-term investment in land improvements.
The argument is that individual farmers, not having secure private rights to the
land, may not be able to claim fully the returns on their investment. To the
extent that investments are required for conservation purposes, indigenous ten
ure arrangements will also potentially promote land degradation.
Further, it is asserted that because land is an integral part of the social system
and legitimate use is determined by birth, affinity, common residence, and social
status or some combination of these, transactions are limited to the members of
the lineage. This encumbers the emergence of market transactions in land in
which access would be determined by supply and demand factors and entrepre-
neurial ability. Contrasted to this picture is the idea that "modern" (implicitly
"Western") property rights systems should be founded on principles of contrac-
tual law and economic efficiency.
But often ignored is the fact that, except in very isolated cases, communal
control over land under indigenous tenure systems today occurs mainly in areas

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 Migot-Adholla and others 157

characterized by relative land abundance and low intensification; but even then,
farmers typically have secure use and inheritance rights. Historical records sug-
gest that indigenous tenure had demonstrated remarkable flexibility in adapting
to new farming technology or methods of exchange long before the colonial
period (Morgan 1969; Hill 1963; Jones 1980; Bates 1986).
The contrast between indigenous African tenure and Western property rights
systems should be perceived not in terms of polar extremes but as points along a
continuum, the particular location of which is determined by population pres-
sure, and the degree of commercialization of agriculture. Evidence from differ-
ent locations in Africa confirms instances of autonomous intensification and
privatization of rights in land since the beginning of the century (Netting 1968;
Lagemann 1977; Ruthenberg 1985). Section III of this article presents new
cross-sectional evidence of evolution of indigenous land rights systems in
Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda.

II. AGRICULTURAL INTENSIFICATION AND THE EVOLUTION

OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS SYSTEMS

Reduced to its bare essentials, agricultural intensification entails a multi-

dimensional process of response to increasing population density, technological
change, and commercialization, or to any combination of these. It is charac-
terized by substitution of labor for land in the initial stages and a shift from
forest fallow through bush and grassland fallow. This is followed by more
continuous cropping and systems of crop rotation and soil improvement (includ-
ing green and animal manures, and compost), followed by additional modern
yield-enhancing inputs such as chemical fertilizers, insecticides, and high-
yielding seed varieties (Boserup 1965; Geertz 1963; Netting 1968; Waddell
1972; Pingali and Binswanger 1986).
Agricultural intensification has often occurred in response to the creation of
new markets following the separation of consumption and reproductive objec-
tives from those relating to production. In the context of African development,
this process, which was described in Great Transformations by Polanyi (1944),
may be identified with the transformation of land, labor, and capital into com-
mercial commodities, particularly after the introduction of colonial rule. Al-
though the onset of these transformations may have predated formal colonial
rule in some parts of Africa and were probably autonomous, later changes
during the colonial and post-colonial periods were either directly or indirectly
the outcome of state intervention.
Historically, African agrarian systems have been characterized by relative
abundance of land and critical seasonal scarcities of labor. The relative abun-
dance of land, and the need to shift the location of farm plots in order to
regenerate soil fertility naturally, implied less concern at the collective level with
guaranteeing rights over specific pieces of land and instead emphasis upon con-
trol over large unutilized areas. It is still true of many areas today that individ-

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 158 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 5, NO. 1

uals gain use rights by initial clearing or inheritance and maintain such rig
through continuous exploitation, making allowance for suitable fallow perio
Thus, households and individuals are able to claim perpetual interests in far
ing land and improvements in which they have invested labor or capital. Th
interests are inheritable and may be bequeathed to the next generation. Prov
farmland is not under crops, it is also subject to secondary use (for example,
grazing) by members of the social group even though it is clearly not perceiv
belong in the same category of common property as uncultivatable pasture
forests, or fisheries. Although investment of labor or capital in land is oft
necessary to exclude others, the secondary right of exclusion is generally c
tioned by the seasonality of farming operations. Agricultural intensificatio
which typically involves more continuous use of land, thus enhances the pr
of privatization of rights over land.
One implication of social determination of rights to land is that, even dur
long periods of absence, eligible individuals retain claims to land within
territorial areas occupied by their kinship or residential groups. The ability
African urban labor migrants to fall back on the kinship network as a sour
security may have contributed to relatively low formal sector wages and po
job security for many urban workers, which in turn perpetuate the nee
maintain claims over rural land. So long as land is abundant and the technol
of production remains land extensive, claims of rights to rural land by abse
migrant workers need not result in production inefficiencies. But as land b
comes scarce and absentee daimants seek to assert their rights through interm
tent cultivation, it is likely that their plots would be farmed less intensively
others. However, this may not always be the case. By investing cash remitta
from household members engaged in urban employment into agriculture, hou
holds with nonfarm income sources can experience higher levels of productiv
The earliest individualization of a broad range of transfer and exclusion rig
over land in Africa arose largely in response to the cultivation of commerci
crops, primarily oil palm, cocoa, groundnuts, cotton and coffee (Hill 1
Jones 1980; Moore 1986). After initial hesitation concerning the suitability o
plantation farming, the colonial powers did not undertake any direct interv
tion to restructure indigenous land tenure arrangements in order to accomm
date these developments, except where there was significant white settlement
Angola, Kenya, Mozambique, eastern Zaire, and Zimbabwe, for instance,
tenure legislation was enacted to provide freehold rights to individual Europ
farmers and corporations involved in plantation agriculture. In addition, as
the case in Kenya until the mid-19SOs, cultivation of certain profitable crop
Africans was prohibited or severely restricted. This, combined with other pol
instruments such as forced labor or the imposition of a head tax payable in ca
helped to guarantee cheap labor to white farmers.
Elsewhere, the most important policy support to agricultural commerciali
tion, and unintentionally to the individualization of land rights, was the con
struction of communications and transportation infrastructure. Later, other

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 Migot-Adholla and others 159

struments such as price support, credit, and extension were used with fairly
significant results in promoting agricultural commercialization.
Based on the simplified sketch of the process of intensification as a result of
the interplay between population pressure, technological changes, and agri-
cultural commercialization outlined above, three broad categories of tenure
regimes may be identified. At the earliest stage, characterized by the predomi-
nance of pastoral and sylvan economies, all land is communally owned, the
group of authorized users is clearly defined, and there are rules specifying their
rights and obligations with respect to the land and its resources. Following Feder
and Feeny in this issue, we identify such regimes as common property and
distinguish them from open-access, a regime of unrestricted privilege but no
duties. The latter appears to represent the breakdown of rules governing group
management of common property resources.
As population pressure increases, the period of fallow shortens and shifting
cultivation is replaced by systems of rotation and soil improvement. These
changes may also be precipitated by the introduction of commercial tree crop
production, which tends to enhance rights of exclusion of individuals even
though the basic control over outsiders' access to the land continues to be
exercised by the community. Voluntary transfers of land to nonmembers are
virtually nonexistent. It is prescribed that transfers are only to members of the
landowning group and may be made only by bequests, gifts, or rent. But the
latter two remain relatively rare, becoming significant mainly in areas of ex-
treme land shortage or where there is high demand for land of particular types.
Even then, prior approval may be required from leaders of the lineage or
community.
As increased intensification leads to virtual exclusion by farmers of other
individuals, there may be localized exchanges in productive factors leading to
land or labor tenancies and credit markets. But only rarely do individuals ac-
quire the untrammeled right of disposal of land. This partly relates to the
significance of land as a source of security for all members of the lineage, even
for those who spend extended periods working away. The distinguishing feature
of different tenure regimes may thus be said to revolve around restrictions on the
individual holder's ability to transfer land (only among family members, within
the lineage or community, or to outsiders; and with or without approval from
other lineage or community members), which also tends to coincide with the
mode of transmittal (inheritance, gifts or bequests, and sale).

III. LAND RIGHTS, POPULATION PRESSURE, COMMERCIALIZATION,

AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

The historical overview above suggests two key hypotheses that need to be
tested. The first is that land rights do evolve toward full privatization in the
presence of increasing commercialization and population pressure. The second
is that as long as the evolution of land rights remains unrestricted, then, except

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160 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 5, NO. I

in short-run situations of dramatic economic or social change, indigenous land

tenure systems are not likely to be a constraint on agricultural productivity.

Survey Profile

To test these hypotheses, we undertook farm surveys in 1987-88 in a total of

ten regions in Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda. Ghana was chosen to represent a
situation of relative land abundance, whereas Rwanda represents a case of land
scarcity. Within Ghana, we have chosen a highly commercialized shallot grow-
ing region with a dense, homogeneous population (Anloga), a land-abundant,
cocoa-growing area with a significant migrant population (Wassa), and a land-
abundant, food-growing area with a significant migrant population (Ejura). All
three Rwandan regions are densely populated, and each produces a similar mix
of crops (predominantly coffee, sorghum, and sweet potatoes). However, the
commercial activity of farmers is noticeably greater in Ruhengeri than in either
Butare or Gitarama.
We included Kenya in the survey because it is the only Sub-Saharan African
country with more than thirty years of experience of a national land registration
program and thus provides a test case for land tenure reform. Within Kenya,
two traditional and densely populated African areas were chosen, the maize-
producing region of Madzu and the commercialized area of Kianjogu (coffee).
Two post-independence resettlement areas (where farmers received about five
hectares of land) were also selected. Lumakanda exhibits more commercial
activity than does the other resettlement area of Mweiga. Each of the ten reg
is dominated by agriculture, and few off-farm income-earning opportunities
exist.
More than 100 households were surveyed in each of the Ghanaian and Ken-
yan regions and about 80 in each of the Rwandan areas. Among the variables
measured were characteristics of the household (for example, number, age,
education, and occupation of all individuals, number of regular workers, non-
farm income, wealth, use of credit, and so on), characteristics of the household
head (for example, farming experience, place of birth, office holding in local
organizations), characteristics of the farm (for example, farm size and number
of parcels), and characteristics of the parcels (mode of acquisition, soil fertility,
parcel size, rights of transfer and use, land improvements made, type of docu-
ment held, incidence of dispute, and, in the last season, the crops grown, inputs
used, and output).
To provide an overview of tenure regimes predominant in our study regions,
table 1 displays the percentage of parcels acquired under various methods. In the
Rwandan regions and in Wassa and Ejura, numerous methods of acquisition are
common. In Anloga and the Kenyan regions, nearly all parcels are acquired by
three or fewer methods. The majority of parcels in all regions are acquired
through nonmarket channels such as inheritance, gift, government allocation,
and appropriation (initial clearing and use of part of the pool of communal
land). Inheritance is by far the most common, whereas appropriation is becom-

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 Migot-Adholla and others 161

ing rare as unused land disappears. Purchases of land are much less common b
account for at least 17 percent of operated -parcels in Madzu, Lumakanda,
Wassa, and Ruhengeri. Markets for leaseholds (fixed rentals, sharecropping
arrangements, and pledges1) are relatively rare in all regions except the Anloga
region of Ghana. Although one would perhaps expect more land transactions,
especially given that in many of the regions commercial crops are produced and
land is relatively scarce, the lack of off-farm income opportunities greatly re-
duces the willingness of households to alienate land.

Effect of Population Pressure, Commercialization, and Government

Intervention on the Individualization of Land Rights

Data were collected on whether a head of household could exercise numerous

rights over particular parcels of land and whether, to exercise some of these
rights, prior approval from another individual or institution was required.2 The
specific land rights enumerated for each parcel included use rights (rights to
grow annual crops, to grow perennial crops, to be buried, to make permanent
improvements, and to collect firewood, among others) and transfer rights (rights
to lend, rent, pledge, mortgage, give, bequeath, and sell). The first three rows of
table 2 categorize land parcels according to the breadth of accompanying trans-
fer rights. The first group, "limited transfer" land, includes those parcels for
which the farmer has no permanent transfer or alienation rights, but may have
some temporary transfer privileges. Second, the "preferential transfer" category
describes parcels that may be permanently transferred but only within the family
or lineage (that is, through gift or bequest). Third, "complete transfer" lands are
those that may be alienated outside the lineage through the right to sell.3 This
simple classification scheme produced mutually exclusive groups, each compris-
ing parcels which were very homogeneous with respect to the breadth of rights,
with more land rights found on "complete transfer" parcels.
The data in table 2 provide the basis for simple tests of the effect of population
pressure and agricultural commercialization on the individualization of land
rights. The effect of population pressure is best tested by comparing regions in
Ghana. Although each Ghanaian region is fairly commercialized (Anloga, shal-
lots; Wassa, cocoa; Ejura, large food crop farms), only Anloga experiences high
population pressure. From the sum of the fifth and sixth rows of table 2, we see
that for permanently held land, the percentage of "complete transfer" parcels is
82.5 percent in Ejura, 76.7 percent in Anloga, and 70.3 percent in Wassa. If the
necessity of approval is also taken into account, however, the results change

1. Pledges are possessory mortgages in which the lender of cash takes possession of the land for a
specified period and earns, as interest, the proceeds from the land.
2. Farmers' perceptions about who they must clear land transfers with often do not correspond with
legal requirements, but the data we report here are respondents' perceptions of their rights.
3. There may still be restrictions on transferring land to members from other tribes or cultural groups,
but these are much less constraining than restrictions on other transfers at the family or immediate lineage
level.

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Table 1. Methods of Acquisition of Operated Parcels in the Study Regions

Mode of acquisition Anloga Wassa lijura' Ruhengeri Butare Gitaram

Purchased 0.9 18.0 6.3 17.4 3.2 8.1
Inherited 57.5 6.3 22.1 46.6 43.4 49.5
Given 0.8 44.2 43.1 8.3 5.6 4.1
Appropriated 0.0 22.1 14.7 0.5 3.7
Allocated from
government 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.9 15.
Other permanent
acquisitions 0.0 1.7 0.4 6.3 4.1 0
Rented 21.5 7.0 9.6 7.4 15S.7 7.
Pledged 19.3 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Borrowed 0.0 0.1 0.0 9.5 19.4 13
Squatter land 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0 0.0 0
Source: World Bank data, available fo

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Table 2. The Prevalence of Land Rights across Study Regions
(percent)

Ghana Rwand

Land right Anloga Wassa Ejura Rubengeri Butare Gitarama

All parcels
Limited transfer 52.4 6.0 21.0 15.5 36.7 2
Preferential transfer 2.1 29.1 6.6 3.1 16.5
Complete transfer 45.4 64.9 72.4 81.5 46.7
Permanently held parcels
Noright to sell 23.3 29.7 17.5 2.4 28.2 22
Right to sell with
approval 14.0 55.6 73.5 19.7 37.3 10
Right to sell without
approval 62.7 14.7 9.0 77.8 34.5 67.0
Source: World Bank data, available for a nom

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 164 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 5, NO. I

considerably. The percentage of permanently held parcels which m

without approval is much higher in Anloga (62.7 percent) than in eith
(14.7 percent) or Ejura (9.0 percent). If the ability to transfer land
approval is indeed the paramount measure of the individualization
rights, then the Ghanaian data strongly support the notion that incre
lation pressure brings forth a higher degree of privatization of land rig
Our best basis for testing the effect of commercialization on the priv
of land rights is Rwanda. In Rwanda, each of the three regions is char
by high population density, but Ruhengeri is the most commercialized
tare is the least. In Ruhengeri, 97.5 percent of permanently held p
"complete transfer" lands as opposed to 77.6 percent in Gitarama
percent in Butare. If approval to sell is considered, the Butare region ex
far the lowest percentage of freely saleable parcels. These patterns pr
port for the argument that increased commercialization hastens the ind
ation of land rights.
Our Kenyan regions do not provide the basis for such controlled tes
and Kianjogu differ somewhat both in population density and in d
commercialization, with Madzu being denser and less commercialized.4
land rights are more individualized in Madzu, if all else were equal, it
that population pressure may have been more influential than commer
tion on land rights.
The Kenyan regions of Madzu and Kianjogu can also be used to te
effectiveness of government land policies, in this case a land registrat
titling program, on the individualization of land rights. Of the 97 par
land titles in the two regions, only 23 can be sold by the current oper
percent) and only 24.5 percent of 94 parcels which may be sold are als
The apparent persistence of indigenous control over land transfers dem
the difficulty in altering custom by government decree. Another exam
ineffectiveness of government intervention is in Rwanda, where despi
forbidding land sales without government authorization, farmers claim
of sale over most of the sampled parcels.

Land Rights and Agricultural Productivity

Following Feder and others (1988), the relationship between land righ
productivity is hypothesized to proceed as follows. Increased individ
of rights improves farmers' abilities to reap returns from investment
This leads to a greater demand for land improvements as well as for com
tary inputs. Increased individualization of rights may also improve the
worthiness of the farmer and enhance his chances of receiving formal
Both of these demand- and supply-side mechanisms interact to increas
ments in land and input use, which in turn lead to greater land product

4. The Lumakanda and Mweiga regions are less useful for testing purposes because they
settled only since the 1960s, and thus sufficient time has not passed to evaluate the evolu
rights.

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 Migot-Adholla and others 165

Table 3. Aspects of Credit Markets in the Study Regions

Percentage of bouseholds
receiving: Formal sector loans
Percent secured
Country and region Any credit Formal credit Number with land

Ghana
Anloga 47.8 37.4 43 19.Sa
'Wassa 22.0 12.7 19 26.3
Ejura 5.7 4.4 7 0.0

Rwanda
Ruhengeri 41.0 0.0 0 n.a.
Butare 12.7 0.0 0 n.a.
Gitarama 13.8 8.8 12 41.7

Kenya
Madzu 4.0 5 50Q.a
Lumakanda 10.7 13 69.2
Kianjogu 8.7 9 0.0
Mweiga 1.0 1 100.0

- Not available.
n.a. Not applicable.
Note: The figures for Ghana are for 1987; for Rwanda and Kenya, they represent the 1987-88 period.
a. The type of collateral was not reported by the respondents for all loans.
Source: World Bank data, available for a nominal reproduction charge upon written request to the
author.

Credit. The use of formal credit is limited in the study regions, reflecting the
poor development of formal rural banking institutions. Table 3 shows that less
than 13 percent of the farms received formal credit during 1987-88 in nine of
the ten study regions. The Anloga region of Ghana was the only exception
37.4 percent of households received formal credit there. Furthermore, in Ghana
and Rwanda, all formal credit loans were short-term, none being extended for
more than one year. It is therefore not surprising to find a weak relationship
between land rights and the use of formal credit. For instance, we did not find
any significant relationships between the use of formal credit and the proportion
of land held with "complete transfer" rights.
Given the low incidence of formal borrowing, the absolute number of cases in
which land is used to secure loans is very low (see table 3), and in fact none were
reported in four of the regions. Group loans, where a group of borrowers is
jointly responsible for repayment in lieu of collateral, are common in obtaining
formal credit in Anloga. In each region, loan maturities averaged under one
year. Although this may be partly influenced by lack of formal collateral, it is
characteristic of banks not to favor long-term lending.
The case of Kenya differs considerably from that of Ghana or Rwanda in that
formal titles to land are held by many farmers and could be obtained by count-
less others. However, we did not find a significant relationship between the
possession of title and use of formal credit. The use of land titles also did not
imply an increase in loan maturity or loan size. For instance, among all formal

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 166 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 5, NO. I

sector loans, the average maturity of loans secured by land was 24.
but those secured by other means (cosignatory, group guaranty, and
produce) averaged 31.5 months in length (the difference is not stat
nificant). In light of these findings, we conclude that there is little relation
between land rights or land title and the use of formal credit. The low incidence
of formal credit in Kenya also suggests that land titles alone will not lead to the
development of active rural credit markets.

Land improvements. In terms of their effect on investment in land improve-

ments, land rights have mixed results.5 The ability to bequeath land is the
important distinguishing right in each Rwandan prefecture. Parcels which can-
not be bequeathed ("limited transfer" parcels) are much less likely to be im-
proved by farmers in any manner or with long-term investments.6 For example,
78.7 percent of parcels which may be bequeathed were improved as opposed to
26.7 percent for those which could not be bequeathed. Among permanently held
parcels, there is no difference in the incidence of land improvements between
"preferential transfer" and "complete transfer" land, nor does the requirement of
prior approval matter. In Anloga (only permanently held parcels were surveyed
for investments), 61.8 percent of "complete transfer" parcels were improved (by
drainage, mulching, or excavation) as opposed to only 5.4 percent of "limited
transfer" parcels. Moreover, the parcels which could be transferred freely were
more likely to have been improved than those requiring prior approval. In Ejura
and in Wassa, the incidence of investment was not related to land-rights. A lack
of relationship was also found for each Kenyan region. From these varied find-
ings, it is not possible to make any general assertions regarding the effect of land
rights on land improvements.7

Productivity. To test the relationship between land rights and land produc-
tivity, we estimated reduced-form yield equations using parcel level data for
selected crops.8
In general form, the equation is: Y = f(Xh, Xp, S) + e, where Y = yield,
measured as the gross value per hectare of all crops harvested on the parcel; X,
= a vector of household characteristics (to capture resource and skill levels); Xp

5. In Rwanda, numerous types of land improvements were classified as either boundary, short-term, or
long-term. In Kenya, only terracing, drainage, and tree crop improvements were examined. In Anloga,
the improvements were drainage, mulching, and excavation. In Wassa, the only improvements made by
farmers were tree crops. Finally, in Ejura, tree crops and destumping investments were analyzed.
6. The difference is most marked when the improvements made by the current operators are com-
pared. But land that cannot be bequeathed. by the current operators also has less accumulation of
improvements, irrespective of who made them.
7. For a more sophisticated analysis of these relationships, see Place, Hazell, and Lau (1990).
8. Yield regressions were confined to the more important crops in each region, and we tried to avoid
crops that were extensively intercropped. Production was physically measured at harvest in Rwanda but
was obtained by farmer recall elsewhere. Because the major crops were mostly cash crops (for example,
cocoa and shallots in Ghana), farmers also had less trouble recalling the amounts produced.

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 Migot-Adholla and others 167

- a vector of parcel characteristics (to capture size and land quality differences);
S = a set of dummy variables for the land rights categories; and e = an error
term.
In estimating this equation, we need to be sure that Xp and the land rights S
are not correlated with the error term; otherwise the estimated coefficients
would be biased and inconsistent. There are two possibilities to worry about.
The first is that the choice of land parcels (and hence Xp and S) are determined
simultaneously with yields. Given that most parcels were acquired many years
ago and that transfer rights, which are the basis of our land rights categories, are
virtually predetermined by the mode of acquisition,9 there is little argument for
a causal relationship from Y to S or Xp. It is more appropriate to view farmers'
decisions as recursive; first they select parcels and then they farm them.
A more worrying possibility is that there may be unobservable variables which
affect both the choice of parcels and current yields, even though decisions are
made at different points in time (this will lead to the collapse of the recursive
framework). These unobservables may be household effects (for example, man-
agerial skill) or parcel effects (for example, quality of soil).
Because we have several parcel observations for each household, we are able
to correct for unobservable household effects using either dummy variables
(fixed household effects) or an error components model. Unfortunately, we do
not have multiple observations on each parcel and cannot treat parcel effects in
the same way. But we are able to control for a number of parcel characteristics,
including soil fertility, which are included in- Xp. Given the numerous observable
parcel quality controls, it is doubtful that unobservable parcel quality is signifi-
cant in either the determination of yields or the choice of land rights and Xp."I
We found no relationship between land rights and parcel yields in Kenya and
Ghana (see table 4). This is true in both the fixed effects (where feasible) and
error component models. In additional regressions, we also found that the mode
of acquisition had no effect on parcel yields. But this is to be expected because
there are strong correlations between the mode of acquisition and the land rights
held.
In Gitarama and the pooled Rwandan sample, we found that 'short-term use
rights'"1 parcels were more productive than parcels in all other land rights
categories. This perverse result can be explained as a multicollinearity problem.
Land rights categories are highly related to the year of acquisition in Rwanda,
primarily because 'short-term use rights' parcels are almost always rented and

9. Although not reported here, cross-tabulations of land rights categories against mode of acquisition
show a high correlation. This is not to deny that land rights evolve over time, but the changes probably
occur when land changes hands. Moreover, evolutionary changes will not quickly lead to the reclassifica-
tion of parcels from one of our broad land rights categories to another.
10. We also find no evidence of any relationship between parcel quality variables and the land rights
categories.
11. "Short-term use rights" parcels are those "limited transfer" parcels whose use rights are restricted
to a specified number of seasons (mainly rented parcels).

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168 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 5, NO. I

Table 4. Summary of Parcel Yield Regression Results

Complete Complete
transfer transfer
Regional Preferential Complete with without
regression transfer transfer approval approval Other
Ghana
Error component
Anloga -0.348 -0.012
Wassa 0.211 -0.106
Ejura 0.441 -0.082
Fixed dummy
Ejura 0.302 -0.196
Long-term
Rwandaa use rights
Error component
Pooled Rwanda -0.210 -0.362** -0.234*
Ruhengeri -0.148
Butare -0.236 -0.319 -0.285
Gitarama 0.001 -0.683**
Fixed dummy
Pooled Rwanda -0.306 -0.527** -0.320*
Ruhengeri -0.122
Butare -0.327 -0.382 -0.344
Gitarama 0.156 -0.847**

Kenya Land titleb

Error component
Madzu 0.146 0.051 0.283
Lumakanda -0.134 -0.149 -0.142
Kianjogu 0.127 0.337 0.155
Mweiga 0.580 0.223 -0.167
'Significant at a 10 percent level
*Sipificant at a 5 percent level.
Note: The most limited land rig
regression and is the base against
Other explanatory variables inclu
tics: size, fertility, topographica
documents held, and cropping p
and farming experience of the h
wealth, size of household, and non
a. The Rwandan results are from
for a discussion of the results for
b. The land title coefficients are
Source: World Bank data, availa
author.

hence have been held fo

modes. Moreover, the tim
cantly related to yield, an
sion, the results show tha
significantly less product
but insignificant coefficie
in households who rent in

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 Migot-Adholla and others 169

dire need of land resources and apply greater amounts of labor in order to
provide subsistence for their families.
We also tested the effect of land title on productivity in Kenya by including it
alongside the land rights variables and by itself in separate regressions. In all
cases, the possession of land title was not significantly related to yields. This is
likely explained by the limited use of credit in the Kenyan study regions.

IV. IMPACT OF RECENT GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN LAND TENURE

Individual Tenure

Perhaps the most comprehensive case of land tenure change aimed at estab-
lishing alienable individual rights is that initiated in Kenya during the 1 950s and
continued to the present date with some modifications. Although there is agree-
ment that Kenya has enjoyed among the highest productivity increases in Africa
during this period, the causal relationships between individual tenure and in-
creased agricultural output have been seriously questioned. Many believe that
the removal of prohibitions against Africans to produce high value commodities
(tea, coffee, and dairy products), coupled with substantial investment in com-
munication and transport infrastructure during the 1950s and 1960s, improve-
ments in extension services, and establishment of credit institutions, have been
more important than changes in land tenure arrangements (Heyer, Maihta, and
Senga 1976; Anthony and others 1979; Migot-Adholla 1985). Indeed, this ap-
pears plausible when account is taken of the substantial increase in the produc-
tion of these crops (cocoa, coffee, tea, and oil palm) in countries such as Cam-
eroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana, which have not undertaken any fundamental
legal tenure change.
Critics of the Kenyan tenure reform have faulted it on grounds of increased
landlessness. It should be realized, though, that an important objective of the
program was concentration of land in the hands of the more efficient producers
(Swynnerton 1954). Given Kenya's failure to industrialize and its very limited
land resources, the current level of landlessness is as much a product of the
exceptionally high rates of population growth as it is a reflection of the existing
land tenure system.
Paradoxically, one consequence of the emergence of the nation-state in Africa,
and particularly colonial and post-colonial reinterpretations of tribal authority
and "indigenous" tenure, has been the freezing of ethnic boundaries, which has
restricted opportunities for expansion of extensive land use. Where marginal
land has already been utilized, output may be increased only by intensification.
In such situations, we have argued that individualized transferable rights of land
use will have evolved, even without introduction of formal registration.
But given the centrality of ethnicity in national politics, it is inconceivable that
a national land market would evolve merely as a result of the introduction of
privatized tenure system. Evidence from other studies of Kenya indicates that
although there is a weak market in land nationally, it is more severely restricted

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170 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 5, NO. 1

in the former African reserve (Non-Scheduled Areas), where it operates ma

among members of the same ethnic group. In contrast, a significant lev
transactions in land occurs in the former white setded (Scheduled) areas and
urban peripheries, where individuals are not bound by strong kinship ident
The consequence is that titles to agricultural land are perceived to have a grea
commercial value within the urban periphery and former scheduled areas, t
in the former African reserves, largely because of difficulties in enforcing c
tracts. For although some banks have accepted tided land as collateral and
auctioned it off in cases of default, in some cases purchasers were not able to
take occupation of the land for fear of reprisals. Thus, rather than stimulating a
land market in which more efficient farmers acquired land, this situation had
created a market in land titles which were often used to secure loans for non-
agricultural investment (Okoth-Ogendo 1986). But this development has been
complicated even further by recent legislative amendments which require that
disputes over land be referred to elders in the first instance-a condition which
underlines official ambivalence with respect to full implementation of the provi-
sions of the Registered Land Act for fear of promoting dispossession of poor and
indigent peasants by their richer neighbors.
More generally, our results on credit access and productivity, as well as those
from parallel studies undertaken by the Land Tenure Center of the University of
Wisconsin (1990), suggest that large-scale land registration and titling programs
are unlikely to be economically worthwhile for much of Sub-Saharan Africa at
this stage of its economic development. But there are circumstances when titling
might be worthwhile, for example:

* When the indigenous tenure systems are absent or very weak: this is fre-
quently the case in land settlement areas, but it can also arise elsewhere
following periods of major economic or political upheaval, particularly if
traditional lines of authority have been severed
* In areas where the incidence of land disputes is high: this may occur in areas
where large numbers of migrants or strangers have settled and established
rival claims to land owned by indigenous groups
* Where major project interventions are planned that either require full priva-
tization of land rights for their success, or are likely to weaken the land
rights of some vulnerable groups: some irrigation and tree crop projects
provide good examples.

Where tenure reform through land registration is to be undertaken, it is

important to recognize the possibly overlapping rights of different individuals on
the same piece of land. For example, herdsmen may have dry-season grazing
rights on land that is cropped by others. If some of these rights are lost without
adequate compensation, vulnerable groups may lose an important source of
livelihood. The rights of access to land by all lineage members, even when
working or resident elsewhere, has also been shown to provide an important
element of security, particularly in old age, as well as being an important factor

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 Migot-Adholla and others 171

in explaining the low incidence of landlessness in many heavily populated rural

areas of Sub-Saharan Africa. Again, loss of these rights without adequate com-
pensation could prove economically disastrous for some vulnerable groups.
Land registration programs that attempt to record and protect the full range of
customary rights run the risk of ossifying land tenure institutions and reducing
their ability to evolve with economic circumstances. Where titling is required, it
seems better to seek full privatization of land rights but within the context of an
adequate system of compensation for those who lose some or all of their rights
over land.

Strengthening Indigenous Land Tenure

The indigenous land tenure systems appear to be adapting efficiently to

changes in relative factor scarcities. This is reflected in the emergence of markets
for the sale and rental of land, and in the trend toward increased privatization of
land rights. For this process to continue, it is important that governments not
impose unnecessary restrictions on the ownership or transfer of land. For exam-
ple, restrictions on land sales and rentals are often legislated in the belief that
this will prevent excessive concentration of land amongst the rich and the dis-
possession of the poor. In practice, this concern is rarely justified, and it might
anyway be more easily addressed through farm-size ceilings without inhibiting
land markets and preventing more efficient allocations of land between farmers
with different management skills or factor endowments. Some governments (for
example, those of Botswana, Nigeria, and Swaziland) are also unnecessarily
restricting land transactions through policies that seek to "retribalize" land in the
pursuit of rather nostalgic idealizations of African rural society (Cohen 1980;
Bruce 1988).
Rather than restricting land markets, governments should create an "en-
abling" legal and institutional environment for more efficient transactions. This
might entail establishing a voluntary system to simply record the details of land
transactions and the interests of the different parties, and providing or reinforc-
ing channels for the enforcement of all duly recorded contractual arrangements.
These kinds of interventions could go a long way toward resolving many of the
disputes that arise over land, particularly in areas where significant migrant or
stranger farmers have settled, yet would be much cheaper than formal registra-
tion and titling programs.

V. CONCLUSION

We have argued that the contrast between indigenous African tenure and
Western property rights systems should be perceived not in terms of opposite
extremes but as points along a continuum between communal rights systems and
privatized rights systems. In response to population pressure, agricultural com-
mercialization, and technological change, indigenous African tenure systems
have moved along that continuum in the direction of greater individualization of

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172 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 5, NO. I

land rights. This conclusion is supported not only by historical evid

also by our cross-sectional study of land rights in Ghana, Kenya, an
Controlling for differences in land quality and household charact
regression analysis indicates no relationship between cross-sectional variations
in land rights and productivity. Thus, it undermines the conventional view that
land rights are a constraint on productivity.
Our study also indicates that land titling is not sufficient to increase access to
formal credit; land as collateral is of little value in the study areas of Kenya,
primarily because land transfers to outsiders through sale (or foredosure) are
not always recognized as legitimate. Moreover, in the absence of better nonfarm
opportunities, farmers are reluctant to mortgage land.
We are unable to determine precisely the degree of efficiency with which
indigenous systems in our study regions have evolved. We do find some success
stories associated with indigenous tenure systems: multiple cropping and high
use of inputs in Anloga, adoption of cocoa production in Wassa, use of mecha-
nization in Ejura, and adoption of some high-yielding varieties and soil conser-
vation improvements in Rwanda. However, it is difficult to judge whether the
pace of these changes could have been hastened by government intervention in
land tenure arrangements. Eviaence from Boserup (1981) and Pingali and others
(1987) suggests that without accompanying improvements in infrastructure,
rural health and education, and price incentives, the rate of change in agri-
cultural intensification and technological change would be constrained under
any tenure regime.
Needless to say, our results are subject to some qualifications. The most
important is that our study regions are, like much of Sub-Saharan Africa, poorly
endowed with physical infrastructure and effective credit and marketing institu-
tions. Factor markets for land, labor, and capital are also poorly developed and
the available technologies have mostly been stagnant for quite some time.
Within this context, one should not expect to find much new investment in land
improvements or much use of modern inputs, even when full land rights are
assured. Not only will the demand for investments and modern inputs be muted,
but even where it exists, it may not be realized because of failures on the supply
side for credit and inputs. As new technologies become available, credit, input,
and product markets improve, and rural infrastructure is developed, then more
significant relationships between tenure security and land productivity may be-
gin to emerge.
A second limitation of the study is that we covered only areas of rainfed
agriculture. Questions remain about the suitability of indigenous land rights for
irrigated farming, extensive pastoral and livestock systems, and communal for-
estry areas.
A third, more subtle limitation of our argument is that it extrapolates from
past performance of indigenous land rights to future evolution. These systems
are predicated on the solidarity of small-scale social entities. These entitles may
cease to function if national institutions or national and international mobility

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 Migot-Adholla and others 173

of labor destroy their legitimacy, or if loyalties to lineage and communal group

become weak.
Given the wide variety of African rural economies and politics and differences
in resource endowments, a pragmatic approach that promotes the adaptability
of existing land tenure institutions appears preferable to radical reform either of
an individualist or collectivist type. But this is not to argue for the reinvention of
an idealized African past. Rather, it suggests intervrention only where demand
for change has been proved genuine. In the case of land registration, such a
demand should arise following increased commercial agricultural opportunities
and the acceptance of the legitimacy of impersonal forms of land transfers. In
the meantime, governments have much to do in providing rural infrastructure,
promoting market efficiency, and disseminating information about production
technology, which are the real constraints on agricultural productivity.

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