2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 1 of 146

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION

VICKY STOKES, RODNEY BARNETT, )

AND MICHAEL BARNETT, AS THE ) Civil Action No.: 2:25-cv-02110-BHH
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF )
THE ESTATE OF JOHN M. BARNETT, )
)
PLAINTIFFS, ) COMPLAINT
) (Jury Trial Demanded)
vs. )
)
THE BOEING COMPANY, )
)
DEFENDANT. )
___________________________________ )

COMES NOW Plaintiffs Vicky Stokes, Rodney Barnett, and Michael Barnett (collectively,

, as the Personal Representatives of the Estate of John M. Barnett, complaining of the

Defendant, The Boeing , and who allege and aver before this Honorable

Court upon personal knowledge and upon information and belief as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This is a civil action for wrongful death and abuse of process brought by Plaintiffs Vicky

Stokes, Rodney Barnett, and Michael Barnett, as the Personal Representatives of the Estate of John

M. Barnett, a long-term Boeing Quality Manager.

2. The failure of quality control at Boeing over the last decade is well known and well

documented, as are the consequences of that failure, which include planes crashing and coming

apart in the air.

3. The causes of the dangerous decline in Boeing quality control are also well

documented, which include:

and production at the expense of quality and

safety;

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the failure to follow F AA standards,

procedures, and regulations, including the failure to properly document and remedy

defects and the failure to properly document the aircraft build record, especially

since some of these failures constitute felonies and all of which threaten the safety

of the flying public; and

a deep-rooted culture of concealing defects and safety violations, and of harassing,

4.

legal obligations but pressured other personnel to ignore and conceal defects and to not properly

document aircraft build records.

5. John M. Barnett

plant in North Charleston, South Carolina, known as Boeing South Carolina . John

believed in his calling and believed in Boeing. He was proud of his job and was initially proud of

Boeing. He took his role seriously in protecting the flying public, and he believed that he had a

personal, legal, and moral obligation to ensure, to the best of his ability, that every possible defect

was identified, documented, and remedied.

6. When John tried to do his job, Boeing Management pressured him to not document

defects or to not properly document the aircraft build record in order to avoid production delays.

When John persisted, Management embarked on a concerted campaign of harassment, abuse, and

intimidation intended to discourage, discredit, and humiliate him until he would either give up or

be discredited.

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7. In addition, John was given was socially

isolated and separated from his team, was moved to other areas in the plant, was blocked from

transferring to more favorable shifts, and was blacklisted from other Boeing divisions.

8. John did his best to stay positive and persevere. However, eventually the concerted

harassment and abuse were too much.

9. In early 2017, John him with post-traumatic stress disorder

, depression, panic attacks, and anxiety stemming from

work environment, and John was forced out of Boeing.

10. One example of the retaliation and abuse John suffered for reporting safety issues at

Boeing was highlighted by the Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate

Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs

Broken Safety Culture on June 18, 2024. One of John s called John 19 times

within an 8-hour period in late October 2016, and then 21 times within 8 hours a few days later. The

senior manager told John,

as John

11. In January 2017, John filed a complaint

Safety and against Boeing for unlawfully retaliating against him

in violation of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century1

AIR21 , 49 U.S.C. § 42121. See Exhibit A, AIR21 Amended Complaint (Redacted). The

AIR21 case is still pending as of the filing of this Complaint.

discrimination against employees of [the] U.S. air carrier industry and U.S. manufacturers who
AIR21 Whistleblower Protection Program, FAA,
https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/whistleblower (July 24, 2024).

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12. During the pendency of the AIR21 case, Boeing engaged in a scorched-earth series of

repeated abuses of process, including failing to comply with three court orders to produce

documents, some of which

how the serious safety concerns he raised were handled. The court in the AIR21 case sanctioned

Boeing for its discovery abuse.

13. After leaving Boeing, John repeatedly tried to move on with his life. However, on

March 9, 2024, the weight of years of harassment, abuse, and humiliation became too

much for John to bear, and he took his own life on what was to be the third day of his deposition

in the AIR21 case. Boeing had threatened to break John and break him it did.

14. The police report regarding John John sent on February

28, 2021, that provides an insight into is quoted

in the Police Report, which is attached as Exhibit B at pages 41-42, and states:

I m trying to figure out what it would take to make me whole again . I really don t
know where to start answering that question. Looking at the definition, I found
where it states To restore (someone) to a sound, healthy, or otherwise favorable
condition. To repair or restore (something). I fully understand the direct costs that
we can establish, i.e. lost pay, lost bonuses, etc. What I am struggling with is, how
do you repair or restore a person s overall outlook on life? I used to be a very happy
go lucky guy that loved his job, his Company and the products they built. I had a
very positive outlook on life. Boeing has absolutely destroyed my outlook on life.
I often sit here and think, the use, what s the point of life? A person works
hard all their life, trying to do the right thing, treating others with respect, just to
have their entire professional life destroyed because they were doing as they were
trained and expected to do...follow the rules. What is a person s outlook on life
worth? And looking at the mental toll it has had on me. I suffer from anxiety attacks,
depression, panic attacks, PTSD... I ve got an anger inside me that I ve never
experienced before and I don t understand how to control... How do you put a price
on that? Sometimes I think...maybe if I go out and find a job, it will help. And then
the anxiety hits just thinking about having to report to someone that has control
over me and my performance ratings. I don t have the mental fortitude to put myself
in that position again...I just can t do it, not right now anyway. How do you put a
price on that? Each time I do an interview, deposition or other stressful discussion
on what happened with me and Boeing, I re-live those years all over again. It puts
me in a deep depression for a week or two, (depending on the intensity level of the

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discussion). I shut myself in, I don t want family or friends coming over, I am angry
at the world!...

15. As he was taking his life three years later, John left a note underscoring the depths to

. The note in its entirety follows:

16. Whether or not Boeing intended to drive John to his death or merely destroy his ability

to function, it was absolutely foreseeable that PTSD and

unbearable depression, panic attacks, and anxiety, which would in turn lead to an elevated risk of

suicide.

clear foreseeable .

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

17. This civil action for wrongful death and abuse of process arises under the common law

of South Carolina between citizens of Louisiana and a corporate citizen of Delaware, with its

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principal place of business in Virginia, in which damages exceed $75,000.00. Thus, this Court has

diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

18. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial

part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in this District.

III. PARTIES

19. Plaintiffs are the Personal Representatives of the Estate of John M. Barnett. Plaintiffs

are citizens of Louisiana, and John was also a citizen of Louisiana. See 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(2). John

was employed by Boeing for more than 32 years and worked as a First-Level Quality Manager at

BSC for approximately seven years until his constructive discharge in March 2017.

20. Defendant, The Boeing Company, is a corporation duly organized and operating under

the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business in Virginia. Boeing does business in South

Carolina, maintains offices and transacts business in Charleston County, South Carolina, and is listed

as active by the South Carolina Secretary of State.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE.

21. John worked for Boeing for 32 years, including 17 years as a Quality Manager

(approximately seven of which were at BSC).

22. Prior to his transfer to BSC, John worked at Boeing s Everett facilities in Everett,

Washington, where he worked as an electrician on the 747 program.

23. John also worked as an inspector, planner, auditor, Quality Inspector, and First-Level

Quality Manager in a number of programs (including the 747, 767, 777 and 787 programs).

24. John worked as a Quality Manager for the Everett Receiving Inspection Organization,

which had a $10 million annual budget and supported the entire Boeing Everett site.

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25. He traveled to various countries as a Boeing Quality Representative developing,

implementing, and driving quality improvement plans with suppliers and assuring they met

Boeing s quality requirements and delivery schedules.

26. John also traveled around the United States representing Boeing Everett in high-level

executive meetings.

27. John took over 1,000 hours of specialized Boeing training in areas such as auditing,

production, inventory management, and communication across cultures. He had also taken college

courses at night working towards a b degree in production and inventory control systems

with an emphasis in management.

28. He was constantly and consistently recognized as a top performer regardless of the area

or organization. John was one of the most knowledgeable and respected Quality Managers at

Boeing, which is why he was recruited in 2010 by a Senior Quality Manager at BSC to help start

the Quality program for the new plant.

29. John began working as a First-Level Quality Manager at BSC in November 2010.

30. On or about January 23, 2017, John went on a medical leave of absence at the advice

of his medical provider because of the employment-related stress and emotional distress he

suffered as a result of and hostile work environment.

31. Although he had planned to work at Boeing for at least another ten years, John was

constructively discharged on March 1, 2017.

B. FAA SAFETY AND QUALITY STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS.

32. quality standards and regulations require aircraft manufacturers

to document all work performed, all defects detected, and all remedial work conducted. They also

require the tracing of every part installed on an aircraft.

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33. As a result, Boeing is required to document and trace every part of its aircraft. See 14

C.F.R. § 21.146. For the 787 program, Boeing accomplishes this through its proprietary software

system known as Velocity. The documentation contained in Velocity constitutes the build record

for each 787 aircraft.

34.

System.

35. Intentionally failing to document a defect in Velocity is a violation of

Production Certificate granted by the FAA under 14 C.F.R. § 21.146.

36. Intentionally falsifying an aircraft build record is a violation of 14 C.F.R. § 43.12.

37. Falsifying or concealing a material fact or making a materially false writing is a crime

under 18 U.S.C. § 38.

38. As a Quality Manager, John

quality standards and regulations. John also had an ethical obligation to the flying public to ensure

the legal obligations set forth above were properly fulfilled.

39. To comply with the law and to ensure the safety of the flying public, it is essential for

Quality Managers at Boeing to require (1) FAA safety and quality standards be strictly followed,

(2) be strictly followed, (3) all violations and defects be

documented, (4) all defects be corrected, and (5) all parts be properly traced and documented. To

do otherwise violates, among other things, It is also important to ensure

that corners are not cut and that work is not performed in ey areas i.e., outside of

processes and procedures.

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C. EMPLOYEE CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

ENCOURAGE AND PERPETUATE FRAUD AND ILLEGAL CONDUCT AND
FACILITATE AND ENCOURAGE A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT.

40. Boeing has Employee Corrective Action Process Requirements ) designed

corrective action (ECA) per the requirements set forth in

2

41. goal of ECA is to correct unacceptable conduct and to avoid

42. The ECAPR defines various forms of corrective actions for various violations. Far from

acting to deter serious misconduct, these procedural guidelines impose light sanctions, such as

time off or verbal/written warnings for misconduct, which should require immediate discharge and

referral to the appropriate criminal authorities because such misconduct violates the law.

43. In the ECAPR, Boeing lays out

This report[ing] information

accurately, honestly, and properly; build[ing] and maintain[ing] a safe and healthy environment

for our employees, customers, suppliers, and local communities; adher[ing] to company

agreements, policies, and procedures; abid[ing] by applicable laws and regulations A

violation of these expected being

44. However, the real effect of the ECAPR is to provide Boeing with power to coercively

demand its employees, through the implicit creation of a hostile work environment, to place profits

over safety, and to violate the law by informing employees that they will receive little more than

2
The ECAPR is publicly available at: https://www.speea.org/Member_Tools/Council_Rep_
Information/Training_Manual/ECAPR_04_14.pdf

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a slap on the wrist if they bow to pressure to violate safety rules. For instance, for agreeing to

45. The following chart, based on the ECAPR, illustrates the disconnect and disparity

broken system [s] [itself] to the highest standards of

3
safety, quality, and integrity.

OFFENSE ECAPR MANDATED RESPONSE SOURCE

Harassment that creates a hostile work Time off p. 7
environment
Touching or physical contact Time off and sexual harassment p. 8
4
of a sexual training required
Intimidation or coercion5 Written warning p. 10
Physical confrontation Time off p. 10
Threats Time off p. 11
Foreign object debris/damage Written warning p. 17
False statements Written warning p. 20
Falsification of records6 Time off p. 20
Inaccurate or improper processing or Written warning p. 20
reporting of information7
Weapons or explosives Time off p. 23
Ethical misconduct Time off p. 28
Government classified material Verbal or written warning p. 30
Insider trading Time off p. 31

3
See Boeing, Boeing 2019 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, YouTube (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zzDk4dVHo4k (videotape at 2:01 2:09).
4
Most, if not all, states would consider physical contact of a sexual to be a
crime (e.g., assault and battery) and result in arrest and criminal charges.
5
Defined as an action or behavior that reasonably causes a person to be fearful for his or her well-
being, personal safety, or condition of employment and ressuring or influencing others
against their
6
Defined as [p]roviding false information or omitting pertinent information on records or
documents submitted to or on behalf of the company, customers, or (emphasis added).
This is a crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 38.
7
Defined as [f]ailure to properly and accurately complete, process, or report information,
including compliance violations. (emphasis added).

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46. Other conduct, seemingly less serious and certainly no more serious, resulted in

discharge:

OFFENSE ECAPR MANDATED RESPONSE SOURCE

Sabotage Discharge p. 14
Theft Discharge p. 14
Insubordination Discharge p. 17
Concealing defective work Discharge p. 20

47. facilitates the continued existence of a hostile work environment that

has been allowed to thrive within the company.

48. When employees can sexually harass others, push or shove others, engage in insider

trading, threaten others, intimidate or coerce others, carry weapons or explosives, leak government

classified material, and falsify the build record and not get arrested or immediately discharged,

there is not just an implicit but an explicit culture of concealment.

49. self-instituted policies and procedures for the falsification of the build record

of an aircraft, at the time of complaints, called for time off even though the falsification of

the build record is a direct violation of federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 38; 14 C.F.R. § 43.12.

50. By not seriously penalizing the falsification of the build record, as well as the

intimidation or coercion of employees, Boeing opened the door for the criminal and fraudulent

conduct discussed throughout this Complaint.

51. Therefore, Boeing helped create a hostile work environment by establishing lenient

corrective actions for conduct that constitutes a criminal violation under federal law while levying

harsh penalties for problematic (but less serious) conduct such as insubordination, which was

punished by immediate discharge.

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D. JOHN WAS SUBJECTED TO A RETALIATORY CAMPAIGN THAT

AMOUNTED TO A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT.

52. During his employment at Boeing, John engaged in protected activity:

He repeatedly objected to creating and maintaining the Multi-Function Process

Program, which was not approved by the FAA and which

allowed mechanics to inspect and approve their own work.

He repeatedly insisted, orally and in writing, that processes and procedures

be followed and that defects be properly documented in the face of management

pressure to deviate from the rules to allow Production to meet deadlines.

He sent emails in 2012 to the BSC Director of Quality complaining about Senior

Manager 2.

In 2014, he filed an internal ethics complaint against Senior Manager 3.

8
He refused to pencil whip lost non-conforming parts.

He complained of Foreign Object in the form of titanium

slivers from e-nuts located within various areas of the aircraft with potentially

catastrophic consequences.

He began to investigate defective oxygen squibs and insisted that the investigation

be completed.

He was removed from an investigation after he found that missing and incorrect

serial numbers were entered in the build records for parts installed on aircraft, and

after he insisted that the build records on all delivered aircraft be corrected.

that is not actually performed.

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In 2016, he filed another internal ethics complaint against Senior Manager 4 for

retaliation, for creating a hostile work environment, and for blacklisting him from

transferring to another Boeing division outside of BSC.

53. Boeing retaliated against John and discriminated against him in several ways because

of his ethics complaints and his refusal to compromise on safety and quality standards including,

but not limited to, the following intentional and malicious conduct:

Senior Quality Managers continually harassed, denigrated, and humiliated

him, and treated John with scorn and contempt alone and in front of others.

His Senior Quality Managers started and promulgated a rumor that John did not get

along with his peers.

Senior Quality Managers downgraded PM scores.

One of Senior Quality Managers issued a 60-Day Corrective Action Plan

against John without cause and without notifying him of the CAP until

almost a month after it issued.

John was removed from multiple investigations into defects because of his insistence

that problems be fully investigated and remedied, including investigations into the

defective e-nuts causing titanium slivers to litter the tops of flight control wires and

equipment, defective oxygen squibs, and missing and incorrect serial numbers.

John was blacklisted from transferring to other Quality Manager positions, including

a position on third shift in Final Assembly at BSC, a position at

Division in New Orleans, Louisiana, and a position at the Propulsion Division in

North Charleston, South Carolina.

54.

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1. FROM THE START, BSC UPPER MANAGEMENT UNLAWFULLY

PRODUCTION TO MEET DEADLINES.

55. John was recruited in 2010 by a Senior Second-Level Quality Manager

at BSC to help start the Quality program for the new plant.

56. Senior Manager 1 pushed the Quality Managers under his supervision to strictly follow

FAA safety and quality standards and regulations

procedures.

57. However, upper management pushed the Quality Managers to deviate from the

rules to allow Production to meet deadlines. and

its own company values.

58. In particular, BSC upper management implemented the Multi-Function Process

, where mechanics were given authority to inspect and approve their

own work.

59. The MFPP Program was executed without FAA approval and violated

Production Certificate granted by the FAA under 14 C.F.R. § 21.146.

60. When Senior Manager 1 objected to implementation of the MFPP Program and insisted

that Boeing not deviate from the rules, he was threatened with termination. So, in 2012, Senior

Manager 1 transferred back to Washington with a demotion to avoid termination.

61. John vocally supported position that the MFPP Program was

unlawful and that FAA safety and quality standards and regulations

processes and procedures, should be strictly followed.

62. Throughout tenure at BSC, he refused to deviate from the

quality standards and regulations and own processes and procedures.

63. As a result, upper management retaliated against John.

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2. JOHN WAS MOVED TO SECOND SHIFT IN RETALIATION FOR HIS

COMPLAINTS AGAINST SENIOR MANAGER 2.

64. In 2012, was appointed as his second Senior

Second-Level Quality Manager ) to replace Senior Manager 1, and he began

pushing John to violate processes and procedures.

65. That same year, John emailed the BSC Director of Quality twice, complaining that

Senior Manager 2 was pushing him and his inspectors to deviate from processes and procedures.

The BSC Director of Quality told John that he did not believe him, so no investigation was

conducted.

66. John continued to insist the proper procedures be followed.

67. John then learned about numerous instances where parts were taken from one airplane

and installed on another airplane without any documentation, traceability, or engineering review.

John took steps to stop this practice.

68. pper management ignored this problem and insisted that John stop

documenting the issue in emails and on corrective action EPDs .

All corrective action EPDs for transferred parts were cancelled per

direction without any investigation or corrective action.

69. In October 2012, Senior Manager 2 publicly denigrated John in front of his team and

moved him to second shift in retaliation for insisting that proper procedures be followed.

70. In response, team submitted an internal ethics complaint against Senior Manager

2 for his conduct.

71. In June 2013, Senior Manager 2 was demoted and removed from management for his

72. Nothing was done to remedy the retaliatory action taken against John.

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3. JOHN WAS SUBJECTED TO A HUMILIATING PATTERN OF

RETALIATORY ACTION BY ANOTHER MANAGER.

73. In or around July 2013, a new manager was appointed as third Senior Second-

Level Quality Manager , and he immediately separated and reassigned the

members of Quality team in retaliation for the ethics complaint against Senior Manager 2.

74. Following in footsteps, Senior Manager 3 continued to subject

John to a gaslighting9 campaign in retaliation for refusal to violate the safety and quality

standards, regulations, processes, and procedures.

75. John was continually harassed, denigrated, humiliated, and treated with scorn and

contempt by BSC upper management.

76. For example, Quality team had weekly meetings. During these meetings, Senior

Manager 3 announced several times that John was responsible for a production delay or for the

team having to work overtime away from their families.

77. When John questioned decisions that violated safety and quality standards, regulations,

processes and procedures, Senior Manager 3 raised his hands and waved them around in an

animated manner to imitate John and mockingly stated

the air or do you have an idea.

78. These comments were the result of documentation of process and procedure

violations, documentation of defects, and his refusal to conceal problems. The comments were

disrespectful, denigrating, sarcastic, degrading, humiliating, mean, and unprofessional.

9
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines Gaslighting
of a person usually over an extended period of time that causes the victim to question the validity
of their own thoughts, perception of reality, or memories and typically leads to confusion, loss of
confidence and self-esteem, uncertainty of one s emotional or mental stability, and a dependency
Gaslighting, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/gaslighting (last visited Mar. 18, 2025).

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79. These retaliatory attacks continued throughout time at BSC.

80. John never saw this type of behavior displayed towards other managers or employees.

81. This campaign against John was to punish him for identifying problems, insisting on

compliance with the rules, and documenting all process and procedure violations and defects. It

was also done publicly to discourage John from continuing to report and document defects and to

discourage others from supporting him or following his example.

82. The denigrating comments caused John enormous stress, making it difficult for him to

concentrate and perform his job.

4. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SCORES WERE

DOWNGRADED IN RETALIATION.

83. PM scores determine yearly raises, bonuses, eligibility for transfer to other Boeing

divisions, participation in special leadership teams, and other perks for top performing managers.

84. After John vocally supported Senior Manager 1 regarding the MFPP Program and

demanded that Boeing adhere to FAA safety standards and regulations and

processes and procedures, Boeing retaliated against John by giving him lower PM scores, which

continued throughout the remainder of his tenure at BSC.

85. In July 2014 PM review, Senior Manager 3 explained that John was very

knowledgeable but that his knowledge got in the way because John liked to be correct and raised

concerns that had already been resolved.

86. As part of that review, Senior Manager 3 faulted John for not timely completing a

performance review for one of the employees under supervision, even though Senior

Manager 3 told the other supervisors (but not John) that the due date for the performance reviews

had been accelerated. Senior Manager 3 intentionally withheld information from John about the

new due date.

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87. One example of a concern that John insisted on correcting was about Manufacturing

push to use a spreadsheet in place of writing Emergent Removals ( ERs ) for products removed

from an aircraft after installation and inspection.

88. Per Boeing Process Instruction , ERs are required for each part removed

from an aircraft after its final quality inspection and approval. Quality must determine whether the

part removal would interfere with any FAA conformity inspections previously completed. If so,

Quality was required to contact the FAA prior to removing the part to put the FAA on notice and

to determine whether the part removal will void conformity inspection.

89. While a spreadsheet may be used to document build information in some

circumstances, there are specific procedures that must be followed under Boeing Procedures to

ensure that, in the event of a catastrophic failure, the build record is traceable and there

is accountability for all parts.

90. John was asked to approve the use of a spreadsheet for ERs for Line 172,10 and he was

told that a spreadsheet had been used in place of ERs on Line 168. John had been advised by

Manufacturing that at least 25 parts had been removed for Line 168. He discovered that the

spreadsheet for Line 168 was purposefully left blank and did not comply with the BPIs, nor did it

provide traceability of part removals.

91. John was pressured by Manufacturing to use a spreadsheet instead of ERs because that

was how it was done on Line 168. John warned that this was not the proper process. After being

urged by Senior Manager 3 to use the spreadsheet, John explained that he did not agree with using

the spreadsheet because it did not follow procedure. John then elevated the issue of Line 168

noncompliance, but no action was taken to correct the flawed documentation.

10
Boeing refers to each aircraft as a line number, so Line 172 is the 172nd 787 aircraft being built.

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92. PM score was downgraded because he continued to complain that build records

were not properly completed and maintained. John was also penalized on his PM reviews for

documentation of process and procedure violations in emails.

93. In June 2014, John submitted an internal complaint to Corporate Ethics against Senior

Manager 3

John to work in the John.

94. One month later, in retaliation for his complaint, Senior Manager 3 downgraded

PM score and penalized John for not working in grey areas of procedure, for documenting

process violations, and for not agreeing to allow Manufacturing to approve their own work even

though allowing them to do so would violate processes. The downgraded score was also based on

false rumors started by upper management that John did not have a good relationship with his

peers. When Senior Manager 3 learned that John

regarding his PM score, Senior Manager 3 threatened to pull and read emails.

95. In July 2014 PM review, he received a score of 2 out of 5 in a category about

improvement opportunities as a result of documenting problems. John was faulted for following

In particular, John was instructed to learn how to engage in face-to-

face communication when following up on concerns rather than through written emails.

96. In response to review, John inputted a comment to his review and

addressed the need for documentation of process violations and a lack of

processes.

97. On September 11, 2014, Senior Manager 3 once again chastised John for documenting

process issues and explained that using emails to discuss issues was one of the reasons his PM

score was lower.

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98. Senior Manager 3 and other Senior Quality Managers continued to pressure John to

work in grey areas and to avoid documenting process violations in writing.

99. As stated previously, Boeing upper management started rumors that John did not get

along with his peers and used this as a further basis for downgrading his PM scores.

100. John continued to be penalized, and his PM scores were wrongfully downgraded

throughout his time at BSC because of his refusal to compromise and work in the grey areas, his

insistence that defects be documented, and his adherence to FAA standards and regulations as well

as

5. JOHN WAS WRONGLY ISSUED A 60-DAY CORRECTIVE ACTION

PLAN IN RETALIATION.

101. On September 12, 2014, John was advised that Senior Manager 3 had issued a 60-

Day Corrective Action Plan11 against him for documenting process violations and was

told that his manager would provide John with a copy.

102. In fact, the CAP was issued about one month earlier on August 15, 2014, but John

was not made aware of it until September 12, 2014 a violation of , which

specifically require that any individual who is the subject of a CAP be notified immediately.

103. On September 13, 2014, John finally received a copy of the CAP from Senior

Manager 3.

104. Once again, John was criticized for not communicating via face-to-face or phone call

to resolve concerns and was instructed to stop using emails to emphasize concerns or discuss

quality requirements.

11
The 60-Day Corrective Action Plan is used to document deficiencies
performance and if those deficiencies are not corrected in 60 days, the employee, in almost all
cases is terminated, typically losing all retirement benefits, pensions and health insurance.

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105. On September 15, 2014, John wrote an email to himself about the CAP and noted the

untimely notice, calling it a H -mail

so they maintain plausible deniability. H

106. Additionally, the CAP referenced a discussion between John and Senior Manager 3

on September 9, 2014. But John was not made aware of the CAP until September 12, 2014.

Therefore, it was impossible for John and Senior Manager 3 to have discussed the CAP on

September 9, 2014.

107. John met with BSC Ethics Manager and complained about being placed on a 60-

Day CAP based on false information and misrepresentations and because he was not timely

notified. explained he could not do anything because it was an HR matter.

108. John emailed BSC Vice President of Quality asking for a short meeting to discuss

his concerns with his upper management. John never received a response or acknowledgement.

6. JOHN WAS REMOVED FROM INVESTIGATING FOREIGN OBJECT

109. It takes 20,000 fasteners to secure the passenger deck floorboards to the 787 aircraft

frame. These fasteners are composed of titanium bolts and e-nuts. In August 2014, John discovered

that when the fasteners were tightened, they produced razor sharp titanium slivers up to 3 inches

long, which dangled and fell onto bundles of thin-walled flight control wires, electrical boxes, and

electronic components located between the floor panels and cargo compartment ceiling panels, as

well as above the center fuel tank area containing wires and electronic equipment.

110. John was aware of a number of commercial aircraft disaster investigations in which

passenger planes crashed because of electrical shorts.

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One catastrophe that is well known to Boeing occurred on September 2, 1998, when

Swissair Flight 111, a McDonnell Douglas MD-11 bound for Geneva, Switzerland,

crashed off the coast of Nova Scotia, Canada. The investigation found that the most

likely cause was an entertainment wire above the cockpit that shorted out and caused

a fire. The pilots smelled smoke and called the closest air traffic control for

emergency clearance to land. The fire quickly spread, and the cockpit was engulfed

in flames when the plane crashed approximately five miles off the coast.

Another disaster well known to Boeing occurred on July 17, 1996, when TWA

Flight 800, a 747 bound for Paris and then Rome, crashed off the coast of Long

Island, New York. The investigation revealed that the explosion was most likely

caused by a short in the wires to a fuel sensor in an empty fuel tank.

111. John was concerned that the razor-sharp titanium slivers would work their way

between the bundles and or cause a fire.

112. Further, while the titanium slivers, referred to as FOD, could be cleaned under the

deck if done meticulously, there are areas of the plane that are inaccessible, such as above the

center fuel tank. Based on his concerns, John internally communicated that the problem needed to

be fixed and the FOD needed to be completely removed.

113. When John sought to have the FOD issue investigated, Senior Manager 3 ordered him

to stop because it would be too costly to remove and clean all the ceiling panels, and it would risk

damaging the ceiling panels during removal. John strongly disagreed and insisted that the panels

be removed and the electrical components be cleaned to eliminate the risks of electrical shorting.

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114. John was removed from the investigation, and another employee was put in charge.

BSC upper management let the FOD remain rather than removing the cargo ceiling panels or

cleaning the FOD.

115. John later filed a whistleblower complaint with the FAA, which inspected the titanium

slivers on surfaces below the passenger deck. The FAA ordered Boeing to clean the FOD from the

aircraft still at the factory, vindicating concerns. But it remains unclear whether the

inaccessible areas above the center fuel tanks were cleaned or what was done for the hundreds of

aircraft previously delivered.

116. John was deeply concerned and experienced nightmares that his complaints had been

ignored and that the titanium slivers remaining on previously delivered 787 aircraft posed a threat

to the flying public.

117. In the AIR21 litigation, John requested that Boeing produce records documenting

what action was taken, if any, to remedy the titanium slivers problem. Boeing refused to produce

these records despite the court ordering Boeing to do so on three occasions. Following

tragic death, the court sanctioned Boeing for its intentional failure to produce these records.

7. JOHN WAS ASSIGNED TO THE MATERIAL REVIEW SEGREGATION

118. In February 2015, John was reassigned to MRSA, which made him report to a new,

fourth Senior Second-Level Quality Manager .

119. As John packed his desk before relocating to MRSA, Senior Manager 3 told John that

he could not believe that John

be ashamed because it o

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120. At MRSA, John became responsible for handling lost non-conforming part Shop

Order Instance12 closures.

8. EVEN AFTER RETALIATION COMPLAINT WAS

SUBSTANTIATED
RETALIATE AGAINST HIM.

121. In April 2015, John received an email from stating they had

substantiated complaints from June 2014 and informed him they had opened a second

investigation against Senior Manager 3 related behaviors

122. John provided HR with emails and other documents to support his complaint about a

hostile work environment, the ambush of the 60-Day CAP, the misrepresentations and false

information in the 60-Day CAP, and his punitive reassignment by the person against whom John

filed a complaint.

123. upper management continued to set John up for failure. For example, in July

2015, John was informed that some of his team had been reassigned without his knowledge. This

left areas over which John had responsibility unsupported and without the necessary critical skills.

124. Multiple complaints were submitted by Manufacturing against John for a lack of

support.

9. JOHN WAS UNLAWFULLY ORDERED TO COVER UP LOST PARTS.

125. While at MRSA, John learned that Manufacturing Managers were provided keys to the

MRSA cage, which was where defective, scrapped, or non-conforming parts were kept. He also

learned that the managers and leaders were illegally taking the defective and scrapped parts without

12
SOIs are the instructions for the build process on the airplane. Each SOI contains everything one
needed to know to complete a specific operation. When the operation is bought off, or approved,
by both Manufacturing and Quality, the SOI is closed. If it is not bought off, work can be
transferred to an NCR. The electronic work instructions in Velocity are electronically stamped

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any documentation and installing them on aircraft. Non-conforming parts and defects were required

to be documented through Non-Confirming Reports ).

126. John had the locks to the MRSA cage changed as a result, but BSC Quality Management

had new keys made and distributed.

127. FAA regulations call for lost parts to be reported to the FAA. But for hundreds of parts

that somehow disappeared from the MRSA cage, the NCRs disappeared as well and were considered

lost.

128. When John was ordered to sign off on the NCRs without conducting a full investigation

and without disclosing the issue to the FAA, he refused.

129. Ultimately, Boeing found another Quality person to pencil whip the paperwork related

to these non-conforming parts.

10. JOHN FILED A SEPTEMBER 2016 ETHICS COMPLAINT AGAINST

SENIOR MANAGER 4 FOR PROCESS AND PROCEDURE VIOLATIONS.

130. John remained concerned that the defective and scrapped parts that were placed onto

new aircraft could result in a catastrophic event.

131. For example, in September 2016, Senior Manager 4 removed an oxygen tube from the

scrap bin and gave it to Manufacturing for installation on an aircraft without any documentation,

rework, or authority, which violated FAA requirements.

132. Not only did but

it also created a risk of a catastrophic event. Oxygen tubes come hermetically sealed to prevent them

from contamination, which could cause an explosion when oxygen flows through the tube. The

oxygen tube that Senior Manager 4 used was damaged and highly contaminated as a result of being

placed in the scrap bin.

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133. team tried to stop Senior Manager 4 and reported the violation to John, who then

made a complaint to HR. Ethics contacted John about his report to HR, and he provided information

and documentation of the incident.

134. In July 2016, John was given two -conforming

part SOIs without investigating them. John had discovered close to 200 SOIs that had already been

pencil whipped and closed out by another group without investigation.

135. John strongly objected and pressed upper management to report their investigations.

He was ordered to stop, which would have required him to violate FAA regulations regarding

documenting and reporting lost parts to the FAA. Moreover, the lost non-conforming parts

and procedures, when followed, do not allow parts to be lost.

136. As with the titanium slivers, John reported the lost parts to the FAA, which

corroborated his complaint.

11. JOHN WAS REMOVED FROM THE INVESTIGATION OF DEFECTIVE

OXYGEN SQUIBS IN RETALIATION.

137. As with all modern commercial aircraft that provide

safety and comfort to the passengers are installed above the passenger seats. The 787 PSUs include

emergency oxygen masks that are released in the event of a decompression event at high altitudes

and also emergency oxygen tanks with squibs that release the oxygen into the mask when activated.

138. In August 2016, MRSA was tasked with scrapping a number of PSUs, which required

the oxygen tanks to be emptied. During this project, John became aware that the squibs in the

oxygen tanks were defective and failed to activate and release oxygen as expected. John was

criticized for documenting this issue.

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139. In September 2016, after John had placed the defective squibs (that were removed

from the oxygen bottles) in quarantine and pushed upper management to have them analyzed, John

was removed from the investigation.

140. John subsequently learned that Boeing had done nothing to investigate further.

141. John had reported the defective oxygen tank squibs to the FAA. These squibs acted as

a firing mechanism to trigger the release of oxygen from the oxygen tank and into the masks.

142. Boeing misrepresented to the government investigators that complaint was that

the oxygen tanks installed on the 787s were empty.13

143. Because of he FAA checked whether empty oxygen

bottles had been installed on the aircraft and whether the empty bottles in the MRSA were marked as

scrap with red ink or paint.

144. The FAA determined the empty oxygen tanks should have been labeled with more

prominent markings identifying them as non-conforming products.

145. On December 13, 2017, John wrote to the FAA and explained the circumstances of

his complaint and why he remained concerned. In his letter, John stated:

It appears that the oxygen issue was not identified properly nor investigated. Next
is a quick history that explains my concern.
...
There were an additional 200 PSU panels and oxygen bottle assemblies quarantined
in MRSA [August 2016] for failure analysis and testing. I am aware the local FAA
located the 200 oxygen bottles and panels in MRSA due to my initial complaint,
but only wrote them up for not being marked correctly for scrap, they missed the
fact that they were the ones set aside for failure analysis. No action has been taken
to determine why the squibs are failing and no actions have been taken to insure
the flying public is safe.

My concern is that Boeing has had data for over a year that shows 25% of the
emergency oxygen bottles currently in service will not operate in the event of an

13
BSC Quality Management has provided various excuses as to why they have failed to perform
the failure analysis on the defective squibs.

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emergency. So far it has been ignored and gone unaddressed. I feel it is imperative
the defective squibs not go unaddressed any longer. I wanted to make you aware of
my concern in hopes that you can help drive the appropriate actions to assure the
aircraft being delivered and those that have already been delivered are safe.

146. In a January 13, 2017 email, John explained to Senior Manager 4 why he was so

concerned about the defective squibs:

I have a serious safety concern I feel needs to be addressed. As you know, last year,
we discovered that the oxygen bottles that were being removed from the airplanes
(due to the PSU panel damages) were showing a 25% failure rate when they were
being discharged for scrap. I had taken numerous steps to define root cause and
determine if the failure rate was indeed accurate or if there were other causes for
the failures. As you recall, the investigation was turned over to QAI for continuation
and root cause analysis. To date, I have not seen much action on this issue and the
investigation seems to have stalled. We still have over 200 oxy bottles in our area
that are slated for defect analysis, but as I said, the investigation seems to have
stalled. The oxygen bottles are still in our area. I believe it is imperative that the
proper resources are dedicated to this issue to determine if there is actually a failure
rate with the squibs on the bottles. These oxygen bottles are the ones that would
supply oxygen to the passengers in the event of decompression and or the pilots

of having functioning oxygen supply in the event it is needed. I urge you to please
take action to get the investigation moving forward, the root cause identified, and
if founded, we need to take the necessary actions to assure our fleet and the flying
public are safe.

I am more than willing to get re-involved to help drive the root cause and take the
necessary steps. Let me know how I can help.

147. John remained deeply concerned and experienced nightmares that his complaints had

not been adequately addressed and that the defective squibs posed a threat to the passengers flying

on the 787 aircraft.

148. In the AIR21 litigation, John requested that Boeing produce records documenting

what action was taken, if any, to remedy the problem with defective squibs. Boeing refused to

produce these records despite the court ordering Boeing to produce the records on three occasions.

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149. concerns, which were further

magnified when a door plug blew out of an Alaska Air 737 MAX, causing a decompression event

during which a number of oxygen masks failed to work.

150. Following death, the court sanctioned Boeing for its intentional failure to

produce these records.

12. JOHN WAS REMOVED FROM HIS INVESTIGATION INTO MISSING

AND INCORRECT SERIAL NUMBERS ENTERED IN BUILD RECORDS
FOR PARTS INSTALLED IN THE AIRCRAFT.

151. FAA regulations require that serial numbers for all parts installed on aircraft be

accurately recorded in the build record for each aircraft. In the event of a recall, this would allow

the recalled parts to be identified and replaced. In the event of a catastrophic failure, this

requirement would allow crash investigators to determine the cause of the failure by examining

manufacturing and installation history.

152. On August 18, 2016, John was assigned to lead a Serial Number FAA Audit Response

Team which was tasked with conducting a Serial Number Audit to determine whether serial

numbers were accurately entered into build records, and if not, to identify the cause and the actions

needed to correct the problem detailed problem-solving method.

153. In September 2016, after finding that serial numbers were not accurately entered into

the build records for all previously delivered aircraft built at BSC, John stated that the build records

on all delivered aircraft needed to be corrected and that BSC customers needed to be notified of

the problem so that they could address it.

154. In response, John was removed as the Serial Number FAA Audit Response Team

Leader.

155. John reported the serial number problem to the FAA.

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156. Boeing failed to notify its customers about the problem. In addition, Boeing

misrepresented to the FAA that no such problem existed. As a result, the build records for many,

if not all, 787 aircraft contain parts with incorrect part numbers in violation of FAA regulations.

13. SENIOR MANAGER TRIED TO PUSH HIM UNTIL HE BROKE.

157. One example of the retaliation and abuse John suffered for reporting safety issues at

Boeing was highlighted by the Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate

Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs in a hearing concerning

Broken Safety Culture on June 18, 2024. See supra ¶ 10. As Senator Blumenthal found, Senior

Manager 4 had called John 19 times within an 8-hour period in late October 2016, and then 21 times

within 8 hours a few days later because he intended to push [him] until [he] br[oke]

158. conduct, Senator Blumenthal stated to

John] broke

14. JOHN WAS BLACKLISTED AND BLOCKED FROM TRANSFERRING

TO OTHER DIVISIONS AND POSITIONS OUTSIDE OF BSC IN
RETALIATION.

a. QUALITY MANAGER POSITION ON THIRD SHIFT IN FINAL

ASSEMBLY

159. In September 2014, during a morning meeting with all first-line managers, a second-

level manager announced they had a third-shift Quality Manager position becoming available and

were looking for volunteers. The second-level manager stated they would select the individual

with the most experience in BSC Final Assembly, and in the event of a tie, they would select the

employee with the most time at Boeing.

160. John immediately volunteered for the position.

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161. Another manager spoke up and stated that John had the most time with Boeing and

had been in Final Assembly since day one, so he should have the job. The second-level manager

agreed.

162. John was then denied the position by a different Senior Quality Manager in retaliation

for his complaints. Instead, this manager gave the position to another employee who had been with

the company far less time than John.

b. QUALITY
DIVISION IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

163. In March 2016, John applied for a Quality Manager p

Division in New Orleans, Louisiana.

164. In August 2016, after a telephone call, John was notified that he had passed the first

phase and was one of two finalists for the position. He was invited by the hiring manager to New

Orleans for an in-person interview.

165. During the in-person interview, John spoke with the NASA Director, other Quality

Managers, and the Quality Team. During each conversation, John successfully addressed each

166. At the conclusion of the interview, the hiring manager informed John that his expertise

was a perfect fit for the needs of the position and that he would be a great asset to the team.

167. Despite this, John was later informed that he did not obtain the job.

168. John informed Senior Manager 4 about the results of his interview, and his reaction

implied to John that someone in upper management had yanked the job out from under him.

169. While the hiring manager later told John

had initially told John that he had precisely the skills they were looking for. And when

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the position was re-posted, the job description and qualifications were exactly the same as the

initial posting there was no change in the skills needed.

170. During an HR representative claimed that the job had to be

handled by someone with government c But as explained above, the job

description and qualifications did not change in the re-posting, which failed to state that

government contract experience was a requirement. In fact, the job postings were identical, except

for changing the position to second shift.

171. Boeing has disputed that John was retaliated against and has provided a slew of

contradictory reasons as to why John was not hired for the position in the Aerospace Division.

172. Boeing claimed that , but the hiring

manager neglected to place that qualification in the initial job posting. Whether a manager is first,

second, or third shift should not matter. John was ready, willing, and qualified to work on any

shift.

c. QUALITY MANAGER POSITION AT THE PROPULSION

DIVISION IN NORTH CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA

173. In January 2016, BSC internally circulated an email containing a job opening for a

Quality Manager position at the Propulsion Division in North Charleston, South Carolina.

174. This position did not go through the standard hiring and interviewing process, but

- , meaning there was no job requisition posted on the Boeing

Employment page. Instead, the hiring decision was handled via email with no interview process

and no documentation or other evidence to support the hiring decision. No-post jobs are handled

in secrecy, behind closed doors, and with no transparent oversight of how decisions are made.

175. John immediately replied expressing his interest in the position and attached his

resume.

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176. On or around October 2016, the hiring manager for this position asked two Propulsion

Quality Managers to select their top three candidates out of an extensive list of names. Both Quality

Managers selected John as the first applicant on the list, indicating their desire to work with him

because of his expertise and skill set. Their final decision was to hire John.

177. A ter requesting John through the Quality Skill Team, the hiring manager was told that

A Boeing employee in

Propulsion was also

178. Boeing claims that John was deemed ineligible from the Propulsion job because of

his low PM scores and other metrics. However, these low scores and metrics were punitively

procedures. In other words, but for John whistleblowing activities, he would not have been

excluded from the job.

15. JOHN MADE AN OCTOBER 2016 ETHICS COMPLAINT AGAINST

UPPER MANAGEMENT FOR RETALIATORY CONDUCT.

179. In October 2016, John filed an internal complaint against his upper management with

Boeing Corporate Ethics department at its headquarters in Chicago, Illinois for retaliation, a hostile

work environment, and the fact that he was blacklisted and blocked from other positions. He

requested that his complaint be investigated by personnel outside of BSC. After assurance that it

would be handled outside of BSC, the investigation was nonetheless carried out by local

HR.

180. Later that month, John emailed the Vice President of Boeing Corporate Ethics in

Washington D.C. and voiced his concerns about how his complaint was handled. The Vice

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President of Boeing Corporate Ethics assured John that his concerns would be properly

investigated. Even so, it was once again turned over to local HR for BSC.

181. BSC failed to conduct an adequate investigation.

182. On January 5, 2017, John was informed that his ethics complaint about being blocked

from the New Orleans and Propulsion jobs

complaints involving the hostile work environment and retaliation were not investigated.

183. On January 13, 2017, John was notified that his name was on a list of managers to be

laid off.

184. On January 16, 2017, John filed a complaint through the AIR21 program with OSHA

and also for maintaining a

hostile work environment and blacklisting and blocking him from transferring to other Boeing

divisions.

16. MENTAL STRESS CAUSED HIM TO GO ON MEDICAL LEAVE.

185. On January 17, 2017, John was seen by a board-certified physician assistant after visiting

the emergency room for chest pain. He reported high stress from work and worried that filing an

AIR21 action would end his career. His medical record shows that John had been taking prescription

medications for anxiety and depression since February 2016.

186. On January 23, 2017, John had a follow-up appointment with his physician assistant

because he was still experiencing high stress at work and an exacerbation of his medical conditions.

187. That same day, John went on a medical leave of absence at the advice of his medical

provider because of the severity of his stress-related conditions due to

188. From February 2, 2017 to February 16, 2017, John was seen by a mental health counselor

for symptoms of depression and severe anxiety. He reported feelings of sadness, hopelessness, sleep

disturbances with nightmares, and an overwhelming sense that something bad was going to happen.

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He feared further retaliation for reporting his complaints to OSHA and the FAA. He continued to fear

that people would die due to improper work on the assembly line at Boeing. His fears were heightened

as a result of the plane crashes and accidents that he already witnessed related to the same quality

issues he had identified. He expressed feelings of survivor guilt for being unable to convince Boeing

to prevent these tragedies. diagnosed him with PTSD.

17. JOHN WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED FROM BOEING.

189. Knowing he was going to be terminated, John took an early retirement on March 1, 2017,

due to his employment-related stress, as a result of being subjected to a retaliatory hostile work

environment.14

190. After leaving Boeing, John moved back to Louisiana to be near his family.

191. From 2017 until his death, John continued to suffer from PTSD, with symptoms of

depression, stress, anxiety and panic attacks, and nightmares about planes falling from the sky. He

spoke about these worries with his brothers and conducted media interviews.15 John feared that the

issues he had complained about while working at BSC had not been resolved and would someday

result in a catastrophic event. His fears were soon realized.

192. On October 29, 2018, a Lion Air 737 MAX crashed off the coast of Indonesia, killing

189 people.

14
John had planned to work at Boeing for at least another ten years.
15
John
2019, John was awarded The Joe A. Callaway Award for Civic Courage. See Mark Worth, Boeing
787 Whistleblower Mitch Barnett Honored by Ralph Nader, LinkedIn (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/test-mark-worth?trk=public_post_feed-article-content. John was
also post-humously awarded the Blueprint North America Whistleblowing Prize for 2024. See
2024 Blueprint North America Whistleblowing Prize, Blueprint for Free Speech,
https://www.blueprintforfreespeech.net/en/prize/recipients/2024/boeing-whistleblowers;
Blueprint for Free Speech Whistleblower Prizes 2024, Byline Times (Dec. 5, 2024),
https://byline.tv/video/blueprint-for-free-speech-whistleblower-prizes-2024/.

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193. On March 10, 2019, an Ethiopian Air 737 MAX crashed shortly after taking off from the

airport in Ethiopia, killing 157 people.

194. The U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure investigated the Boeing

737 MAX crashes, and it released a Final Report on September 15, 2020, wherein it enumerated five

central themes concerning the 737 MAX failures. Of these, the Committee noted that Boeing engaged

And the Committee noted

195. On January 5, 2024, a door plug blew off an Alaska Airlines 737 MAX while the plane

was at approximately 16,000 feet, causing a depressurization event that forced the pilots to make an

emergency landing. Immediately upon depressurization, the force ripped a shirt off and

sucked oxygen, debris, and cell phones out of the plane. Other interior parts of the plane were also

damaged. Some of the passengers suffered physical injury and all implicitly suffered emotional injury

and trauma.

196. Reports claim that the door plug blew out because of undocumented work, which

violated processes and procedures required by law, and that some of the emergency oxygen masks

did not work.16

197. Following this event, the FAA found that the door plug blowout resulted from

The FAA subsequently conducted a major

16
See David Shepardson, Boeing Unauthorized 737 Work Issue Should Have Been Caught Years
Earlier, NTSB Says, Reuters (Aug. 7, 2024, 7:27 PM), https://www.reuters.com/business/
aerospace-defense/us-safety-board-scrutinize-faa-oversight-boeing-2024-08-07/; Pete Syme,
Alaska Airlines Passengers Were Hit in the Face By Debris, Struggled with Oxygen Masks, and
One Had a Seizure After Landing, Lawsuit Says, Bus. Insider (Jan. 19, 2024, 7:58 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/alaska-airlines-passengers-hit-by-debris-faulty-oxygen-masks-
lawsuit-2024-1.

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that Boeing failed to comply with

manufacturing quality control requirements.

198. These incidents only increased stress because he was aware of the process and

procedure violations on the 787 aircraft and remained deeply concerned that the quality defects he

reported to the FAA, including the defective e-nuts that resulted in sharp titanium slivers falling on

wires below and the defective oxygen tank squibs, had not been adequately addressed.

199. Boeing knew that John remained deeply concerned. Despite being ordered by the AIR21

Administrative Law Judge on three occasions to produce all records that would have informed John

what action had been taken to remedy the defects he had documented, Boeing refused to produce

responsive documents.

200. Following the two 737 MAX crashes and the 737 MAX door plug blow out, and because

he knew that processes and procedures at BSC were ignored, that defects were not properly

documented, that serious defects had not been addressed, and as a result of Boeing preventing

co-worker friends from having any contact with him, PTSD symptoms were exacerbated after

the two 737 MAX crashes and the 737 MAX door plug blow out, because John knew that processes

and procedures at BSC were ignored, because defects were not properly documented, because serious

defects had not been addressed, and because Boeing prevented co-worker friends from having

any contact with him. As a result, he suffered additional depression, anxiety, and panic attacks.

201. While in Charleston for his deposition, John contacted two close friends who were still

working at Boeing because he was scheduled to get together with them during that time. The friends

cancelled and told John that Boeing advised them to have no contact with him. This was an example

with or

talking to John.

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202. On March 4, 2024, John was seen again by his same mental health counselor. He reported

ongoing nightmares involving people dying in airplanes. He continued to exhibit symptoms of PTSD:

anxiety, sadness, fear of impending deaths of others, and intrusive thoughts. In her notes, the mental

health counselor stated:

3/4/24 Client seen at request of attorney Robert Turkewitz. Client is in legal

procedures w/former employer (Boeing) and Mr Turkewitz is his attorney. Client
continues to take an antidepressant for his anxiety but reported anytime he must
engage with legal case he experiences increased anxiety. Has a call into PCP for
increase of meds. Had client briefly review life events since we last met before
focusing on current anxiety. Client reported ongoing nightmares involving people
dying in airplanes. He reporte
this. Reported these increased w/recent incident of door not being properly secured
and blowing off plane while in the air. Client discussed feelings of anticipatory grief
of loss of life due to poor adherence to production regulations of former employer.
Client continues to exhibit sxs of PTSD: anxiety, sadness, fear of impending death of
others and intrusive thoughts.

203. On March 7, 2024, and March 8, 2024, John gave deposition testimony in Charleston,

South Carolina for his AIR21 litigation.

204. On the morning of March 9, 2024, John was scheduled to finish his deposition testimony

but failed to show. John was later found dead in his truck in the parking lot of his hotel. John went

out to his truck at about 8:45pm on March 8. Exhibit B, at 37; Exhibit C , at 2.

d that John

spent the entire night in his truck and never left. Exhibit B, at 37; Exhibit C, at 2. The police and

-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. Exhibit

B, at 51; Exhibit C, at 2.

205. John left a note, which is above in this Complaint, that demonstrates the retaliation,

harassment, and maltreatment he experienced at the hands of Boeing caused his PTSD, which, in turn,

caused his suicide and untimely death.

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206. Boeing is responsible for wrongful death, as it was

hostile work environment and failure to address his quality concerns for seven years would cause

John to suffer from PTSD, severe stress, anxiety, and depression, which are all well known to be

associated with an increased risk of suicide.

207. Further, after constructive discharge, Boeing knew John was deeply concerned

about the defects he documented, some of which he reported to the FAA, and that he continued to

suffer from PTSD, severe stress, anxiety, and depression. It was foreseeable that by intentionally

withholding information about how these concerns that John raised were addressed and by preventing

friends from having any contact with him, it would cause John to suffer further mental distress

and exacerbate his PTSD.

208. The hostile work environment, retaliation, gaslighting, social isolation, devaluation of

his work, disrupted sense of purpose, bullying, and blocking potential for professional growth all

caused PTSD, anxiety, panic attacks, and depression, which in turn caused his suicide.

E. OTHER BOEING WHSTLEBLOWERS HAVE ALSO SUFFERED

RETALIATION.

209.

employees subjected to retaliation for engaging in protected activities.

210. Cynthia Kitchens worked at BSC as a Product Quality Manager K from

November 16, 2009, until June 30, 2016, when she was forced to resign due to a hostile work

environment. See Exhibit D, Kitchens Affidavit, at ¶ 2.

211. During her assignment to the 787 BSC-Mid Assembly Quality Department at BSC,

she observed numerous quality, development, and assembly issues, including:

39
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metal shavings (FOD) in the aircraft, including FOD on and inside wiring bundles,

which were being installed on aircraft, with knowledge that these bundles contained

FOD embedded within these and/or being routed improperly;

instructions from management to make repairs without the required documentation

and engineering dispositions;

the voiding of non-conformances in order to meet production schedule by senior

managers;

installing of damaged and/or non-conforming parts onto the aircraft at the direction

of senior managers;

individuals being told by upper management to not find or write non-conformances;

individuals being instructed to write pick-ups, instead of non-conformances, in order

to meet production deadlines; and

pick-ups were destroyed on a regular basis to prevent a paper trail for the build

record.

Exhibit D, at ¶ 4.

212. Kitchens also observed the failure to follow the ISO9001 building guidelines of the

aircraft certification; the failure of employees to log into Velocity to make an accurate build record

of the aircraft (employees were having other employees sign in to do the work on their behalf, in

violation of FAA regulations); and other serious safety issues, including the use of improper

lubricant on the jackscrew fittings on several 787 aircraft. Exhibit D, at ¶ 4.

213. She, along with several other colleagues, reported many of these observations in a

2011 written complaint, including photographs of substantial defects, submitted to the U.S.

Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General. See Exhibit D, at ¶ 4.

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214. ln 2011, Kitchens made an ethics complaint against a co-manager, where she

addressed several issues about him and his aggressive behavior towards employees and others.

Exhibit D, at ¶ 5. A week later, -manager physically assaulted and battered her on the

plant floor. Id. He charged at her on the plant floor and shoved and pinned her with his forearm

and elbow up against a metal railing. Id. He placed his face inches from hers, raised his other hand,

and shoved his pointed finger into her face and screamed that she needed to learn to get on the

good old boy system or she would go nowhere in the company. Id. -manager was

upset that Kitchens checked out Boeing-issued cameras that she was using to photograph and

document defective work approved by him and his crew, which she had complained about before.

See id.

215. Shortly thereafter, a witness of the assault on Kitchens complained to Corporate

Ethics about the incident. Exhibit D, at ¶ 6. Instead of Boeing immediately reporting

co- conduct to law enforcement, he was promoted just a few weeks later to Ki

direct supervisor. Id.

216. ln 2012, Ki Performance Management scores were reduced in

retaliation for reporting her supervisor for inappropriate remarks in the workplace and for reporting

unprofessional behavior of other senior managers. Exhibit D, at ¶ 8.

217. The following year, Kitchens was diagnosed with cancer. Exhibit D, at ¶ 9. She

underwent extensive treatment and was out of work. Id. Before this, she had a PM score of 19. Id.

While she was out of work receiving treatment, her supervisor reduced her PM score to l4. Id. She

was never informed that her PM score was being lowered. Id.

218. During 2015, Kitchens applied for 14 positions and, despite being qualified for them

all, she was not selected for any of the positions. Exhibit D, at ¶ 10.

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219. The hostile work environment at Boeing caused Kitchens to have a high level of

stress. Exhibit D, at ¶ 11. The daily stress that she had accumulated caused her doctor to put her

on medical leave for two weeks, and soon thereafter, she started seeing a cardiologist. Id.

220. Kitchens continually and repeatedly insisted that FAA regulations be followed.

Exhibit D, at ¶ 14. As a result, she faced a repetitive and systematic pattern of being requested to

violate or ignore the law or otherwise was threatened with unwanted discipline or placed on

performance watch. Id.

221. Several other current or former Boeing employees have claimed that Boeing retaliated
17
against them after they blew

V. CLAIMS

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(WRONGFUL DEATH)

222. Plaintiffs reallege and reiterate paragraphs 1 through 221 as if fully set forth in this

paragraph in its entirety.

223. Boeing had a duty to maintain a safe work environment for its employees, free from

pressure to cut corners and violate the law, as well as free from hostility and retaliation.

224. Boeing breached its duty of care by intentionally pressuring John to violate the law and

subjecting John, an employee, to a hostile workplace that not only inflicted severe emotional distress

but was also certain or substantially certain to cause such distress.

17
See Sayak Basu, The Curious Case of Boeing Whistleblowers Dying, Deccan Herald (May 3,
2024, 8:54 AM), https://www.deccanherald.com/business/companies/the-curious-case-of-boeing-
whistleblowers-dying-3006364; see also 2024 Blueprint North America Whistleblowing Prize,
Blueprint for Free Speech, https://www.blueprintforfreespeech.net/en/prize/recipients/2024/
boeing-whistleblowers; Blueprint for Free Speech Whistleblower Prizes 2024, Byline Times (Dec.
5, 2024), https://byline.tv/video/blueprint-for-free-speech-whistleblower-prizes-2024/.

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225. Boeing acted intentionally, with an intent to inflict harm on John and in

fact harmed John by driving him to suicide.

226. John to a hostile work

environment and preventing quality and safety processes and procedures from being followed would

cause John to suffer from PTSD, depression, anxiety, and panic attacks.

227. emotional distress was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to

endure it.

228. John to a hostile work

environment, were the proximate cause of mental injuries such as PTSD, depression, anxiety,

and panic attacks.

229. It is well known that individuals suffering from PTSD, depression, anxiety, and panic

attacks are at much greater risk of suicide, and accordingly, suicide was also foreseeable,

especially given the severity and prolonged nature of the hostile work environment he experienced at

Boeing.

230. PTSD, depression, anxiety, and panic attacks

conduct, caused him to take his own life, which he would not have done but for being subjected to

and its continuing retaliatory conduct.

231.

232. As a result of John met an untimely death. The beneficiaries of John

have endured and continue to endure: (1) pecuniary loss, (2) mental shock and suffering, (3) wounded

feelings, (4) grief and sorrow, and (5) deprivation of the use and comfort of the society,

the loss of his experience, knowledge, and judgment in managing the affairs of himself and of his

beneficiaries.

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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(ABUSE OF PROCESS)

233. Plaintiffs reallege and reiterate paragraphs 1 through 221 as if fully set forth in this

paragraph in its entirety.

234.

have been intentionally used in part for an improper ulterior purpose.

235. Boeing willfully engaged in conduct not proper in the regular course of the proceeding,

including its refusal to comply with three court orders to produce highly relevant documents in the

AIR21 case regarding serious safety and quality defects in the 787 aircraft failure to

adequately address those safety and quality defects, as well as documents reflecting

misrepresentations made by Boeing to the FAA and to OSHA in the AIR21 litigation.

236. was to withhold the production of key documents to prevent

John from further pursuing his whistleblower complaints with the FAA concerning serious safety and

quality defects on 787 aircraft, and to prevent the FAA, OSHA, Congress, and the public from

learning how Boeing violated safety regulations to save money.

237. the production of key documents was also to

weaponize the legal process and to push John to push him

to stop pursuing his complaint and to stop him from speaking out about Boeing.

238. Boeing intended to prevent disclosure of its misrepresentations to OSHA

and the FAA to prevent John from further pursuing his pending FAA whistleblower complaints and

the AIR21 case, and to keep him from demonstrating that Boeing had failed to adequately address

those complaints.

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239. Boeing abused the litigation process in withholding these key documents to gain a

collateral advantage by concealing its conduct from the government and from the public, and to

ratchet up the pressure on John

240. The U.S. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee found during its

reported that Boeing sought to conceal information even from the political leaders of our country. See

supra ¶ 194.

241. Boeing again recently sought to conceal documents from the Permanent Sub-

Committee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security &

Governmental Affairs regarding

18

242. Boeing was sanctioned by the court in the pending AIR21 case and had one of its

defenses struck for violating the court to produce the key documents referenced previously.

243. withhold evidence and documents in litigation under the

circumstances (i.e., to hinder John from further pursuing his FAA whistleblower complaint regarding

serious defects that were concealed from the FAA; to hide relevant and material information from the

FAA, OSHA, Congress, Department of Labor, and the public; and to further retaliate against John)

rise to the level of the tort of abuse of process.

244.

245. harmed John.

18
Bloomberg Quicktake, Sen. Blumenthal Calls Out Boeing's Gobbledygook Safety Data,
YouTube (June 18, 2024), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PhtY5igpvl0.

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246. As such, Plaintiffs are entitled to actual, special,

ongoing mental distress and avoidable

death.

VI. REQUEST FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for a judgment against the Defendant for (1) pecuniary loss,

(2) mental shock and suffering, (3) wounded feelings, (4) grief and sorrow, and (5) deprivation of the

use and comfort of the society, the loss of his experience, knowledge, and judgment in

managing the affairs of himself and of his beneficiaries, as well as funeral and burial expenses,

together with punitive damages in an appropriate amount, for the costs of this action, reasonable

is Court may deem just and proper.

VII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs hereby request a jury trial on all issues raised in this Complaint.

-Signature Page to Follow-

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Dated: March 19, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

s/ Robert M. Turkewitz
Robert M. Turkewitz (Fed ID No.: 4902)
LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT M. TURKEWITZ, LLC
768 St. Andrews Blvd.
Charleston, SC 29407
T: 843-628-7868
F: 843-277-1438
[email protected]

Brian M. Knowles (Fed ID No: 9694)

KNOWLES LAW FIRM, PC
768 St. Andrews Blvd.
Charleston, SC 29407
T: (843) 810-7596
F: (877) 408-1078
[email protected]
www.knowlesinternational.com

David Boies (pro hac vice forthcoming)

BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
333 Main Street
Armonk, NY 10504
T: (914) 749-8201
F: (914) 749-8300
[email protected]

Sigrid McCawley (pro hac vice forthcoming)

Carl Goldfarb (pro hac vice forthcoming)
Sara Murray (pro hac vice forthcoming)
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
401 East Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
T: (954) 356-0011
F: (954) 356-0022
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
www.bsfllp.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 49 of 146

IN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

JOHN M. BARNETT, ) CASE NO.: 2021-AIR-00007

)
Complainant, )
v. ) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
)
THE BOEING COMPANY, )
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________ )

Complainant John M. Barnett, by and through his counsel, Robert M. Turkewitz,

of the Law Office of Robert M. Turkewitz, LLC, and Brian M. Knowles of Knowles Law Firm,

PC, respectfully submits this First Amended Complaint alleging the following:

I. INTRODUCTION

1) This is an action for wrongful retaliation under Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and

Reform Act for the 21st Century AIR-21

a long-term Boeing Quality Manager, alleges that throughout his seven-year tenure at Boeing

made numerous ethics complaints about a deep-rooted and persistent

culture of concealment at BSC in which he and other quality personnel were pressured by Boeing

upper management to violate Federal Aviation Administration FAA Standards and

by not properly documenting and

remedying defects. Notably, failing to properly document and remedy defects results in an

incomplete build record, which constitutes a criminal felony offense and has the potential to

adversely impact the safety of the flying public. Barnett refused to bend to the pressure and

continually raised issues that needed to be properly documented and addressed. In retaliation for

his complaints and identifying issues that needed to be properly documented and addressed,

Barnett was given low Performance Management PM scores, he was separated from his team

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and moved to other areas in the plant, and blacklisted and blocked from transferring to other

Boeing divisions outside of BSC. In addition, he was subjected to a gaslighting campaign in which

he was harassed, denigrated, humiliated, and treated with scorn and contempt by upper

management, which was calculated to discourage him and others from raising such issues and

complying with the law. Based on the totality of the circumstances, such conduct amounted to a

hostile work environment and it led to s constructive discharge.1

II. FACT
BOEING

2) Barnett worked for Boeing for 32 years, 17 of which he worked as a Quality Manager.

Prior to his transfer to BSC, Barnett worked at Boeing's Everett facilities, where he worked as an

electrician on the 747 program, and as an inspector, planner, auditor, Quality Assurance Inspector

, and First Line Quality Assurance Manager in over dozens of programs (including 747,

767, 777 and 787, and included assignments in the Material Re MRSA .

He worked as a Second Level Manager over the Everett Receiving Inspection Organization with

a $10 Million annual budget, supporting the entire Everett, Washington site. He traveled to various

countries as a Boeing Quality Representative developing, implementing, and driving quality

improvement plans with suppliers and assuring they met Boeing's Quality requirements and

delivery schedules. Barnett also traveled around the U.S. representing Boeing Everett Quality in

High Level Executive meetings. He was constantly and consistently recognized as a top performer

regardless of the area or Organization he was in. Barnett took over 1000 hours of specialized off-

hour Boeing training in auditing, production, inventory management, management, and

See https://www.aerotime.aero/27357-boeing-costs-787-issues#google_vignette Barnett remains

concerned that the concealed issues will result in a catastrophic event.

2
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communicating across cultures. He has also taken College courses at night working towards a

Management.

3) Barnett began working as a Quality Multi-family Manager at BSC in November 2010. On

Jan, 16, 2017, he filed this AIR-21 wrongful retaliation action with OSHA/FAA. On January 23,

2017, Barnett went on a medical leave of absence at the advice of his treating physician because

of the stress a

conduct. Although he had planned to work at Boeing for at least another ten years, he took an early

retirement on March 1, 2017 due to the employment-related stress. As discussed below, Barnett

was subjected to a hostile work environment that led to his constructive discharge.

4) aircraft manufacturers to

document all work performed, all defects detected and remedial work conducted and trace every

part assembled on an aircraft. As a result, Boeing is required to document and trace every single

part of its aircraft. For the 787 program, Boeing accomplishes this with its proprietary software

system known as Velocity. The documentation contained in Velocity constitutes the build record

for each 787 aircraft.

5) The basic premise of quality is if it is not documented, it did not happen. Because of that,

Boeing , require that all

violations of such processes and procedures and defects be properly documented.

6) As a Quality Assurance manager, Barnett was legally obligated to follow the FAA

and quality standards, which includes the requirement that all inspections of work performed on

aircraft be properly conducted and documented, and that all defects be properly documented and

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remedied. As a QA manager, Barnett also had an ethical obligation to the flying public to ensure

that the legal obligations set forth above were properly fulfilled.

7) In order to comply with the law and to ensure the safety of the flying public, it is essential

for QA managers at Boeing to require FAA safety and quality standards, as well as Boeing

processes and procedures be strictly followed, that all process and procedure violations and defects

be documented in writing, that any defects be noted and corrected, and that all parts be properly

traced and documented. It is also important to ensure that corners are not cut and that work not be

8) Under FAA regulation 14 CFR §21.146, all Boeing employees who work on or inspect a

787 aircraft are required to log into Velocity and document all work and inspections performed.

city by Quality

document a defect in Velocity is a violation of

FAA pursuant to 14 CFR §21.146 (c) and (f).

Furthermore, intentionally falsifying an aircraft build record is a violation of 14 CFR §43.12

(Maintenance Records: Falsification, reproduction, or alteration). In addition, falsifying or

concealing a material fact or making a materially false writing is in violation of 18 U.S.C §38.2

2 18 U.S.C. §38. Fraud involving aircraft or space vehicle parts in interstate or foreign commerce
(a) Offenses. Whoever, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly and with the
intent to defraud
(1)
(A) falsifies or conceals a material fact concerning any aircraft or space vehicle
part;
(B) makes any materially fraudulent representation concerning any aircraft or
space vehicle part; or

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III. BARNETT

9) During his employment at Boeing, Barnett engaged in the following protected activity: a)

continually objected to Boeing creating and maintaining a program not approved by the FAA that

allowed mechanics to inspect and approve their own work, known as the Multi-function Process

Performer (MFPP); b) continually insisted verbally and in writing cesses and

procedures be followed and that defects be properly documented in the face of management

pressure to deviate from the rules in order to allow production to meet deadlines; c) sent emails in

2012 to BSC Quality Director complaining abo

Manager, ; d) filed a 2014 Ethics Complaint regarding manager ; d)

refused to pencil whip lost nonconforming parts3; e) objected to FOD

found in the form of titanium slivers from e-nuts not being fixed and cleaned up; f) objected to the

investigation of defective oxygen squibs being shut down; g) insisted that

missing/incomplete/incorrect serial number data and Aircraft Readiness Log/Serial Number

Control (ARL/SNC) data be corrected on all delivered aircraft; and h) filed an October 2016 Ethics

(C) makes or uses any materially false writing, entry, certification, document,
record, data plate, label, or electronic communication concerning any aircraft or
space vehicle part;
(2) exports from or imports or introduces into the United States, sells, trades, installs on
or in any aircraft or space vehicle any aircraft or space vehicle part using or by means of a
fraudulent representation, document, record, certification, depiction, data plate, label, or
electronic communication; or
(3) attempts or conspires to commit an offense described in paragraph (1) or (2),
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Penalties. The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) is as follows:
(1) Aviation quality. If the offense relates to the aviation quality of a part and the part is
installed in an aircraft or space vehicle, a fine of not more than $500,000, imprisonment for
not more than 15 years, or both.
3
Pencil whipping is a term used to describe the documentation of an inspection or other activity
that is not actually performed.

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Complaint regarding his manager, , and for retaliation, a hostile work environment

and for being blacklisted and blocked from other positions.

a) Barnett s continuing objections to the MFPP program and his continuing

insistence that B processes and procedures be followed and that
defects be properly documented in the face of management pressure to deviate
from the rules in order to allow production to meet deadlines.

10) Barnett first reported to Senior Quality Manager at BSC. pushed his

quality managers to insist that FAA safety and quality standards, as well as Boeing

and procedures be strictly followed, and that quality not be sacrificed, or corners cut. Notably,

Boeing management pushed for quality to deviate from the rules in order to allow production to

meet deadlines. In particular, BSC upper management implemented the MFPP program whereby

Boeing mechanics were given authority to inspect and approve their own work. Notably, the MFPP

program was implemented without FAA approval and was in violation of

Certificate granted by the FAA pursuant to 14 CFR §21.146 (c) and (f). When objected to

implementation of the MFPP program and insisted that Boeing not deviate from the rules, he was

threatened with termination. He utilized his contacts at Seattle and arranged to be transferred back

to Washington State with a down grade in 2012.

11)

processes and

procedures be strictly followed. Throughout Barnett was vocal in his refusal

to deviate from processes

and procedures.

b) SC Quality Director complaining about

Senior Second Level Quality Manager,

12) , who was appointed as Senior Second Level Quality Manager began pushing

Barnett to work outside the proper procedures. In 2012, Barnett emailed the BSC Director

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twice complaining about being pushed to work outside the proper procedures. told

Barnett orally that he did not believe him. No investigation was conducted.

13) Barnett continually insisted on the proper procedures being followed. Barnett complained

about countless instances where parts were being stolen from one airplane and installed on an

incomplete airplane without any documentation, traceability or engineering review. In most cases,

the mechanic would come to work to find that the parts s/he installed the day before were gone.

Upper Management ignored the stolen parts problem and insisted that Barnett stop documenting

them in e-mails

were cancelled per Leadership direction without any investigation or corrective action. (Ethics has

the records).

14) In October 2012, denigrated Barnett in front of his team and moved him to 2nd shift

in retaliation for insisting that the proper procedures be followed. Following up on Barnett

previous emails to the Quality Director , Barnett team submitted an ethics complaint

regarding . In June 2013, was demoted and removed from management

c) to FOD in the Form of Titanium Slivers from E-Nuts Not

Being Fixed and Cleaned up.

15) In August 2014, Barnett discovered that fasteners used to hold down the floorboards

allowing the titanium slivers to fall onto wire bundles, electrical boxes and electronic components

located between the floor panels and cargo compartment ceiling panels, as well as above the center

wing tank area and all of the electronic equipment located there. Slivers were found all over the

wiring, in electrical boxes and other places.

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16) When Barnett discovered the FOD, ordered him to let it go because it would cost

too much to remove all the ceiling panels to clean and they might get damaged during removal.

Barnett strongly disagreed at the time and insisted the panels be removed and the electrical

components cleaned to eliminate the risk of electrical shorting in service. Barnett was removed

from the project and another manager was put in charge of it. Leadership decided to let the FOD

remain instead of removing the cargo ceiling panels and cleaning the FOD.

d) Barnett

17) was appointed as Senior Quality Manager, and he immediately split up

Barnett quality inspection team in retaliation for them submitting the ethics complaint. Notably,

continued where left off on insisting that quality not document work performed

outside the proper procedures, that process violations be ignored, that parts being stolen from

completed aircraft be ignored, etc. In June 2014, Barnett submitted a complaint to Corporate Ethics

against for violating procedures, ignoring process violations, pushing Barnett

Barnett. Although Barnett

substantiated by Corporate Ethics, no action was taken to address the complaints. One month later,

in retaliation for his complaints, downgraded Barnett a 15, and

penalized Barnett ,

violations, for not agreeing to allow Manufacturing to violate processes. The downgraded rating

was also based on false rumors started by Leadership that Barnett did not get along with his peers.

18) When learned that Barnett was writing to HR regarding his rating,

threatened to pull his emails.

19) In September 2014, Barnett learned that had previously placed him on a 60-day

corrective action plan without even notifying Barnett. Barnett met with , the BSC Ethics

Manager, and complained about being placed on a 60-Day Corrective Action Plan without being

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pencil whipped and closed out by another group without investigating them. Barnett strongly

objected and pressed that they be reopened and investigated. He was ordered to let it go, which

would be a violation of FAA regulations which required that lost parts be documented and reported

to the FAA.4

f) Barnett the investigation of Defective Oxygen Squibs Being Shut

Down

24) In August 2016, Barnett became aware that the squibs in the emergency passenger oxygen

tanks in MRSA were defective and failed to activate and release oxygen as required. Out of a

sample size of 300 PSU emergency oxygen bottles, 75 of them did not fire properly when activated.

Barnett was criticized for documenting this issue and was immediately removed from any

responsibility for investigating this problem. In September 2016, after placing the 75 defective

squibs (that were removed from the oxygen bottles) in quarantine and pushing Leadership to have

them analyzed for defect analysis, Barnett was removed from the investigation. Upon information

and belief, no defect analysis has been performed on the squibs, no root cause has been positively

identified and no actions have been taken to address the defects. Evidence shows 25% of the

emergency passenger oxygen bottles in service on 787s will not operate when activated in an

emergency.5

4 The lost nonconforming parts themselves were evidence of processes and procedures not being
and procedures do not allow for parts being lost when those
instructions are followed.
5
BSC Quality Leadership has told 3 different stories in response to AIR-21 Complaint
on why they have failed to perform the failure analysis on the defective squibs. BSC first stated
that Barnett reported that the bottles were already empty, so there was no concern. BSC then

the failures. BSC later told the FAA there was a very large investigation ongoing with the squibs

date been conducted.

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g) rect Serial Number Data

and ARL data Be Corrected on All Delivered Aircraft

25) On August 18, 2016, Barnett was assigned to investigate the findings regarding a Serial

Number Control ( SNC ) FAA Audit Finding, and to identify root cause, actions needed to correct

the issues, Boeing Problem Solving

Method ) which is very detailed in all of its requirements.

26) In September 2016, after leading a cross functional team identifying root causes, actions

needed, etc., for the Serial Number FAA Audit Finding, Barnett noticed that all previously

delivered airplanes built at BSC had missing/incomplete/incorrect Serial number data and ARL

data. Barnett urged that they needed to investigate and correct all the records on all

delivered airplanes and notify BSC Customers, so they could address their fleets. Barnett was

removed as the SNC FAA Audit Response Team Leader.

h) Barnett September 2016 Ethics Complaint Against Manager

for Process and Procedure Violations.

27) In September 2016, Barnett Manager, took a defective part from the

MRSA scrap bin and gave it to Manufacturing for installation on an airplane without any

documentation, rework or authority, which is a violation of FAA requirements as well as

own procedures. Barnett Barnett, who

then made a complaint to HR.

28) Barnett was contacted by Ethics regarding his report to HR and he provided information

and documentation of the violation, which was substantiated. Barnett was subsequently blocked

from a 737 Propulsion Quality Manager position in North Charleston.

11
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 60 of 146

i) cs Complaint Against his Leadership for

Retaliatory Conduct, Including Maintaining a Hostile Work Environment and
for Blacklisting and Blocking Barnett from Other Positions.

29) In October 2016, Barnett filed an Ethics complaint in Chicago, Illinois against his

Leadership for retaliation, a hostile work environment and for being blacklisted and blocked from

other positions. He asked that his complaint be investigated by someone outside of BSC. After

being assured it would be handled outside of BSC, the investigation was turned over to local HR

in BSC.

30) Later that month, Barnett sent an e-mail to (VP of Boeing Corp. Ethics,

Washington, DC) and voiced his concerns about how his complaint was handled. assured

Barnett that his concerns would be properly investigated. However, it was again turned over to

local BSC.

31) BSC failed to conduct an adequate investigation. On January 5, 2017, Barnett was informed

that his and determined that the

complaint that he was unlawfully blacklisted and blocked from the propulsion job was found to be

. involving the hostile work environment were not even

investigated.

32) On January 13, 2017, Barnett was notified that his name was 1 of 49 listed in an e-mail on

Quality , en

33) On January 16, 2017, Barnett filed a complaint through the AIR21 with OSHA for

Boeing ngaging in protected conduct, including maintaining a hostile

work environment and blacklisting and blocking him from transferring to another division. Barnett

was informed that his complaint was left on a community printer for Boeing employees to see.

12
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IV. BOEING BARNETT IN RETALIATION FOR

THE PROTECTED ACTIVITIES

34) Because of his ethics complaints and his refusal to compromise on safety and quality (as

discussed previously and herein), Barnett was retaliated against and treated differently in a number

of ways, including, but not limited to the following: a)

and downgraded Barnett performance management

reviews; b) B upervising manager, issued a 60-Day Corrective Action Plan

against Barnett without cause and without placing him on notice; c) Barnett was removed from

investigations of defects in retaliation for his insistence that the problems be fully investigated and

remedied, including investigations into defective e-Nuts causing titanium slivers to litter the tops

of flight control and other wires and equipment, defective oxygen squibs, and incorrect serial

numbers; d) Barnett was blocked from transferring to QA manager positions, including the third

shift position in final assembly,

Quality Manager position at the Propulsion Division in North Charleston, South Carolina, and e)

Barnett including , , and

continually harassed, denigrated, humiliated, and treated Barnett with scorn and

contempt.6

a) Boeing downgraded Barnett Reviews.

35) Performance Management scores and ratings determine yearly raises, bonuses, and

eligibility for participation in special leadership teams, and other perks for top performing

managers. At BSC, scores/ratings of 18 or higher is the threshold for satisfactory work.

36) After vocally supporting regarding the illegality of the MFPP program,

demanding that Boeing adhere to FAA and Boeing safety standards and procedures, and for not

6
This type of retaliatory conduct is known as gaslighting.

13
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 62 of 146

approving certain processes and procedures that violated a mul

Instructions and Procedures, including the illegal removal of parts from one aircraft after being

installed and inspected to another aircraft without properly documenting the transfer, Barnett was

retaliated against with lower performance ratings. Barnett Barnett

continued to have his performance ratings downgraded throughout his tenure at BSC.

37) In Barnett

Quality Manager,

in the way at times when issues arise. John likes to be right and at times rechallenges issues that

38) The round table discussion referenced by was a situation where Manufacturing

was pushing to use a spreadsheet in place of writing Emergent Removals (ERs) for products

removed from an aircraft after it had been installed and inspected. Per Boeing Process Instruction

581, ERs are required for each part being removed from an aircraft after its final Quality

The ER has specific items that must be reviewed and approved

(known as buying it off) by Quality prior to removing a part.7 In particular, Quality is required to

review whether the part removal will interfere with any FAA conformity inspections that had been

previously completed. If it does, it is required to contact the FAA prior to removing the part so

they are aware and can decide if it will void their conformity inspection or not.

39) If a spreadsheet or form is used to document build information, it is required to be an

official Boeing form and must have: 1) a form number showing it is in the Boeing system and

7
In the past, Boeing referred to Quality as Quality Control, but stopped using this descriptive title
because it could not control quality. Boeing then referred to it as Quality Assurance, but again,
stopped using this descriptive title because it could not assure quality. As a result, Boeing now

14
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 63 of 146

approved; 2) detailed instructions on how the form is to be completed; and 3) a documented process

(See In the event of a catastrophic failure of

the aircraft, the build record must provide traceability and accountability for all parts.

40) Barnett was asked to approve the use of a spreadsheet for ERs for Line #172,8 and was told

that a spreadsheet had been used in place of ERs on Line #168. Barnett

records and discovered that manufacturing had failed to record any of the ERs for the parts

removed and that the spreadsheet that was supposedly used to record part removals was

purposefully left blank. Therefore, the build record did not comply with BPI-1581, nor did it

provide traceability of what parts were removed.9

41) In Barnett

Id. After being

urged by to make use of the spreadsheet, Barnett noted the problems with the data and

our procedural requirements. In addition, Line 168 had issues with the documentation used and

Id. Barnett elevated the issue of Line 168 documents being out of compliance, but no

action was taken to correct the documentation.

42) Barnett

build record was not being properly completed and maintained. Barnett was also penalized on his

PM for documenting the process and procedure violations in e-mails.

43) In Barnett Barnett received a score

In particular,

8
Boeing refers to each aircraft as a line number, so Line 168 is the 168th 787 aircraft being built.
9
Barnett had been advised by Manufacturing that at least 25 parts had been removed for Line 168.

15
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 64 of 146

Barnett

and follow up on issues instead of using e-mail to express process violation

44) Further, Barnett

the processes and procedures. In Barnett

e to find a way to work

(See Id., at 3).

45) In response to the Interim Manager Comments, Barnett explained the need for process

processes:

After a lengthy discussion regarding process violations, e-mail use

and communication, we agreed to disagree with the opinions and
assumptions made above. As we discussed, there are no grey areas
in our processes once a person fully understands them. As a Quality
Manager, it is my responsibility to assure our procedures are
followed, we maintain configuration control of the product and we
produce a safe conforming product.

Id. at 4.

46) On September 11, 2014, Senior Quality Manager, sent Barnett an e-mail

chastising him for documenting process issues in writing. In his e-

one of the i

47) continued to pressure Barnett to work in grey areas and to not document

process violations in writing. In addition, Barnett was pressured by other Boeing senior quality

managers to work in grey areas and not document process violations in writing. These managers

included , and .

48) In addition, Boeing management started rumors that Barnett did not get along with my

peers (which was untrue) and used this as a further basis for downgrading his performance

evaluations.

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49) Notably, Barnett continued to be penalized and his PMs wrongfully downgraded

throughout his time at BSC as a result of his refusal to compromise and work in the grey zone and

his insistence that defects be documented in writing as required by FAA Standards and

b) Boeing issued a 60-day corrective action plan against Barnett.

50) On September 12, 2014, Barnett was advised by that he issued a Corrective

Barnett, and would send it to him via email. The next day,

September 13, 2014, Barnett

documenting process violations in writing. In Item 4, it states ce-to-face) meetings

and phone calls to resolve issues and stop using e-mail to argue or stress a point or quality

51) Notably, the AP was issued on August 15, 2014 and Barnett was not made aware that the

AP was issued until September 12, 2014 when informed Barnett about it.

52) On September 15, 2014, Barnett submitted his comments and noted that the AP was

provided to him almost one month after being issued, and that it was a
10

53) In Barnett

e-

looking for items to criticize me on so I stop identifying issues. Id.

10

immediately.

17
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 66 of 146

54)

Since Barnett was not made aware of the AP until September 12, 2014, it was not possible for

and Barnett to have had a discussion regarding the AP on September 9, 2014. 11

55) Shortly after this surprise attack, Barnett began experiencing chest pains, shortness of

breath, nausea and vomiting, which his treating physician attributed to the stress caused by being

pressured to work in grey areas, to not document process and procedure violations, and from the

hostile work environment that was created.

c) Barnett was Removed from Investigations of Defects in Retaliation for his

Insistence That the Problems be Fully Investigated and Remedied.

56) In October 2016, without any explanation, Barnett was removed from the investigation of

the defects in the squibs (firing pins) for emergency oxygen bottles, the BPSM Team and all other

connections with the Corrective Action Plan for the FAA. Barnett was also removed as the

manager of the ARL Team.

needed him him

57) Barnett was removed from investigations of defects in retaliation for his insistence that the

problems be fully investigated and remedied.

58) At the time Barnett went out on Medical Leave, there had been no action taken to

investigate and/or correct the already delivered build records, which is a violation of FAA

regulations and Boeing

11

and procedures and is subject to corrective action, up to and including discharge. (See PRO-1909
and the ECA guidelines table, BPI-4332).

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 67 of 146

d) Barnett was Black Listed and Blocked from Transferring to Various Positions.

i) Quality Manager Position on Third Shift in Final Assembly

59) In September 2014, Barnett applied for a 3rd shift position for which he was determined to

be the most qualified by Senior Manager, . He was then denied the position by

in retaliation for his complaints.

60) During a morning meeting with all First Line Managers, Second Level Manager,

announced that they had a third shift Quality Manager position coming available soon and

were looking for volunteers. When asked how they would decide if more than one Manager

volunteered, stated they would select the individual with the most experience in BSC Final

Assembly and if that was a tie, they would select who had the most time with the Company. At

that time, Barnett immediately volunteered for the position. Another manager spoke up and stated

that Barnett had the most time with the Company and had been in Final Assembly since day one,

so he should have the job and agreed. Notably, gave the position to

, who had been with the company far less time than Barnett and had transferred to Final

Assembly the week before.

ii)
Louisiana

61) In March 2016, Barnett

Division in New Orleans, Louisiana. In August 2016, after a structured interview over the phone,

Barnett was notified that he had made it past the first phase and was one of two finalists for the

position, and he was invited by the hiring manager, , to New Orleans for an in-

person interview.

62) During the in-person interview, Barnett interacted with the NASA Director, other Quality

Managers, and the Quality Team. During each conversation, Barnett successfully addressed each

19
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 68 of 146

conclusion of the interview, the hiring manager, , informed Barnett that his

expertise was a perfect fit for the needs of the position and that he would be a great asset for the

team.

63) Despite the exceptional skill set Barnett presented to the hiring manager and the NASA

team, and despite the fact that the hiring manager indicated that he possessed the exact skill set

they were looking for, Barnett was informed that he did not obtain the job.

64) Barnett informed his manager, , about the results of Barnett

indicated that something was not right in the process. Barnett indicated that he believed someone

in Leadership yanked the job out from under him.

65) While told Barnett

previously told Barnett that he had precisely the skills they were looking for. Further, the re-post

for the job was exactly the same as the first post for the skills needed.

66) On October 20, 2016, Barnett filed a complaint with Boeing Ethics Department and asked

for it to be handled by an investigator from outside Charleston, South Carolina. Over

objection, it was turned over to Boeing local HRG. HR ( ) told Boeing that

67) This explanation was highly questionable since the re-post of the job description did not

change and it failed to state that Government Contract experience was a requirement. In fact, the

job postings were identical, with the exception of the re-posting mentioning that the job would be

for second shift.

68) In Boeing OSHA Position Statement, it gave a third reason than the ones provided by

and as to why Barnett was not hired. said they decided to hire

20
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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 70 of 146

out of an extensive list of candidates. The Quality Managers selected Barnett as the first applicant

on the list, indicating their desire to work with Barnett especially because of his expertise and skills

set. Their final decision was to hire Barnett.

74) A few hours later, stated that he was told that

12

e) Barnett was continuously denigrated, humiliated, and treated with scorn and
contempt.

75) In addition to the previously mentioned adverse actions taken by Boeing in retaliation for

procedures, Barnett was subjected to a gaslighting campaign in which he was continually harassed,

denigrated, humiliated, and treated with scorn and contempt by upper management.

76) For example, there were weekly quality meetings scheduled with Barnett

During these meetings, Barnett numerous occasions,

announced in front of the team that Barnett was responsible for a certain production delay, or that

Barnett was responsible for the entire team having to work over-time and being away from their

families. These comments were the result of Barnett

violations, and defects in writing, and Barnett

77) When Barnett questioned decisions that violated standards, regulations, processes, and

procedures, raised his hands in the air, waving them around in an animated manner

and loudly and aggressively stated,

Barnett never saw this type of reaction displayed towards any other Manager or

employee.

12
This took place after Barnett filed his most recent ethics complaint. Notably, one of the witnesses
in Propulsion was warned by

22
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78) These meetings were always very tense, and the comments made about Barnett were

disrespectful, denigrating, sarcastic, degrading, humiliating, mean, and unprofessional. Notably,

this gaslighting campaign against Barnett was done in order to punish Barnett for identifying

problems, insisting on the rules being followed, and documenting in writing all process and

procedure violations and defects. This gaslighting was also directed against Barnett publicly in

front of his team to discourage Barnett and others from complying with the law.

79) The denigrating comments caused Barnett a tremendous amount of stress, made it very

difficult for Barnett to concentrate and perform his job, and caused him emotional suffering to the

point of taking medical leave of absence and ultimately leaving Boeing, at the advice of Barnett

physician and mental health counselor.

80)

-21 complaint.

V. Elements Under AIR-21

81) Pursuant to AIR-

discharge an employee or otherwise discriminate against an employee with respect to

information rega

authorities. 49 U.S.C. §42121(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. §1979.104(b)(1).

82) In order to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under the AIR-21, one must allege

the existence of facts and evidence sufficient to show that: (i) the employee engaged in protected

activity; (ii) the employer knew or suspected that the employee engaged in protected activity; (iii)

the employee suffered an adverse action; and (iv) circumstances were sufficient to raise the

inference that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action. 29 C.F.R.

§1979.104(b)(1).

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 72 of 146

i) Mr. Barnett engaged in protected activity

83) Barnett Section III. In general, Barnett was continuously

pressured by senior quality management at Boeing to work in grey areas and to avoid documenting

process and procedure violations and defects. This was seen with various issues, including: 1) the

hundreds of defective parts that were missing and that Boeing s Quality Management insisted be

bought off without any investigation; 2) Boeing s failure to investigate the 25% failure rate with

emergency oxygen bottles; and 3) Boeing knowingly maintaining inaccurate and incomplete build

records. Barnett refused to work in grey areas, cut corners and white wash problems, and vocally

complained that to do so would be unethical and violate Boeing and FAA rules.13 In addition,

Barnett filed numerous ethics complaints against Boeing management for its violations and

retaliatory conduct.

ii) Mr. Barnett suffered adverse action.

84) Section IV.

action, Boeing created and maintained hostile work environment

constructive discharge.

iii) Boeing black listed and/or blocked

within Boeing.

85) As discussed in Section IV.d, Barnett sought to transfer to other Boeing divisions and was

blocked by Boeing management in retaliation for his protected conduct.

86) These positions offered numerous benefits in their conditions, terms and opportunities for

advancement.

13

humiliated, and treated with scorn and contempt by senior quality managers at Boeing.

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 73 of 146

iv) Boeing created and maintained a hostile work environment.

87) Boeing engaged in a pattern of conduct, which created and maintained a hostile work

d activities (discussed herein a Section III.)

88) The Supreme Court stated in National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536

U.S. 101, 103 (2002):

Hostile work environment claims are different in kind from discrete

acts. Because their very nature involves repeated conduct, the
"unlawful employment practice," § 2000e-5(e)(1), cannot be said to
occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps
years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of
harassment may not be actionable on its own. See Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21. Determining whether an actionable
hostile environment claim exists requires an examination of all the
circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Id.
at 23.

89) In Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 221 (4th Cir. 2016), 14 the Fourth

Circuit set forth the elements of a hostile work environment claim:

plaintiff's [protected characteristic]; (3) which is sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter the plaintiff's conditions of employment and to
create an abusive work environment; and (4) which is imputable to
Grant v.
City of Hagerstown, 630 F.3d 326, 334 (4th Cir. 2010) ).

90) Looking at the totality of the circumstances, including all of the adverse actions taken

against Barnett, the elements set forth by the Fourth Circuit (See Guessous) are satisfied and

14
In Guessous,

hostile work environment.

25
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 74 of 146

amounted to a hostile work environment. Barnett has made a prima facie showing that he engaged

in protected conduct and that he was subjected to a hostile work environment.

91) The circumstances also amounted to a hostile work environment per se. It is a criminal

felony offense to not properly document the build record of an aircraft. By pressuring Barnett to

not follow processes and procedures and to not properly document defects in the build records,

Boeing was ordering Barnett to commit a felony offense. Barnett faced a repetitive and systemic

pattern of being requested to violate, circumvent, and ignore the law, and to place profits over

safety and quality.

92)

For

example, public policy is violated when an employee is terminated for refusing to take unlawful

action. A myriad of cases exist that stand for the proposition (rightfully so) that an employer cannot

wrongfully discharge an employee for refusing to violate the law. For instance, as the District of

Columbia, Court of Appeals has stated:

It
an employee for the employee's refusal to violate a statute is a
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. An employer
cannot be allowed to require his or her employees to break the
law as a condition of continued employment.
engages in tortious conduct by affirmatively forcing the employee
to choose between breaking the law and keeping his job. The
wrongful discharge of an at-will employee in violation of public
policy is thus an intentional tort.

Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 32; 1991 D.C. App. LEXIS 258 (citations

omitted, and emphasis added). See e.g. Burton v. Zwicker & Assocs., PSC, 577 Fed. Appx. 555,

2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16358 (6th Cir., 2014).

93) As mentioned herein, Barnett was given responsibility for documenting lost defective parts

while assigned to the MRSA. Barnett knew that FAA regulations require manufacturers to track

26
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 75 of 146

all parts, document the disposition of parts deemed to be defective, and to notify the FAA when

the disposition of lost parts went unresolved. Boeing ordered Barnett to merely sign off on the lost

parts without conducting a full investigation to determine the disposition of the parts. Further,

Boeing forbade Barnett from disclosing to the FAA the fact that the disposition of numerous parts

went unresolved.

94) In fact, Boeing created an environment in which Barnett was being harassed, denigrated,

humiliated, and treated with scorn and contempt by quality management in the presence of his

team, all for insisting that regulations and laws be followed. Boeing certainly intended for Barnett

to disregard and violate the law, and Boeing was aware that Barnett had an obligation to fully

comply with the law. Boeing

a) Barnett was constructively discharged.

95) Barnett resigned because of the stress he experienced as a result of Boeing

he engage in illegal and unethical conduct. Further, such conditions as those imposed on Barnett

are intolerable and actually mandate resignation. Notably, others have resigned because they were

faced with the decision to either violate FAA rules and regulations and be rewarded, or follow the

law, be harassed, and have no future with the company. he

constructive discharge of Barnett.

b) complaint was timely filed.

96) Barnett anticipates that Boeing will claim that his hostile work environment and his

nd

place within 90-days of filing and the hostile work environment was continuous and systemic. The

law is clear that where such conduct is continuous and systemic, conduct outside the statute of

limitations may be considered.

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The question whether a court may, for purposes of determining

liability, review all such conduct, including those acts that occur
outside the filing period, turns on the statutory requirement that a
charge be filed within a certain number of days "after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred. Because such a claim is
composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute
one "unlawful employment practice," it does not matter that
some of the component acts fall outside the statutory time
period. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs
within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile
environment may be considered for the purposes of determining
liability. That act need not be the last act. Subsequent events
may still be part of the one claim, and a charge may be filed at
a later date and still encompass the whole.

National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 103 (S.Ct. 2002) (emphasis

added).

97) Further, the facts for this claim

arise out of the conduct, Air-21 complaint and to

the extent the claim is not included, it relates back to his filing. In that event, Barnett moves to

amend his complaint to add his claim for constructive discharge. See Feldman v. Law Enforcement

Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 346 (4th Cir. 2014)( Under Rule 15(c), an amended pleading relates

out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out or attempted to be set out in the original

i) Boeing Knew That Barnett Engaged In Protected Activities.

98) Boeing knew that Barnett engaged in protected activity.

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 77 of 146

ii) The Circumstances Are Sufficient To Raise The Inference That Barnett s
Protected Conduct And Activity Were A Contributing Factor To The
Unfavorable Action.

99) Barnett s protected conduct was a contributing factor in the unfavorable action taken

against him. First, Barnett's protected activity occurred at or shortly before the adverse action. 15

For example, it was in June 2016 that Barnett was assigned the missing parts in Buildings 88-19

and 88-20, and learned that 176 missing defective parts had been closed out without any

investigation. Barnett insisted that these missing parts be fully investigated. In the face of

opposition, in mid-October Barnett attended Boeing s Quality Special Attention Meeting (QSAM)

and argued that the parts needed to be fully investigated and that Boeing needed to self-disclose to

the FAA if parts are not located. It was at this meeting that Boeing s Quality Director stated that

Boeing would not disclose this information to the FAA

100) complaints regarding the 176 missing parts took place between

June and October 2016. As in the past, he was treated like he was a troublemaker and gaslighted

following his complaints. It was clear to Barnett that Boeing was isolating him. In addition to being

denigrated and treated with scorn and contempt, he was stripped of responsibilities, including

participation on the serial number ARL team and oxygen bottle investigation. As discussed below,

it was around this same time period that Boeing blocked him from transferring to other positions

in retaliation for his efforts to get the missing parts investigated and documented properly.

15 den is satisfied, for example, if the complaint shows that the adverse personnel
action took place shortly after the protected activity, giving rise to the inference that it was a factor
See also Dye v. Offic , 702
F.3d 286, 306 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing cases in which temporal proximity of three months between
protected conduct and retaliatory discharge was sufficient to show causation). Hochstadt v.
Worcester Found. For Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 318, 324-25 (D.Mass.) (holding
that discharge six months after EEOC settlement and a month after an informal complaint satisfies
st
Cir. 1976).

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 78 of 146

101) In addition, Barnett had become aware in September 2016 that his senior manager,

went into the MRSA, removed a scrapped part from the scrap bin and released it to the

production floor for installation on an aircraft without following proper procedures and in violation

of FAA Regulations and Boeing's own procedures. Barnett filed a complaint with HR on

September 17, 2016, and he submitted an ethics complaint against on October 20,

2016.16

102) The following facts and circumstances, when taken separately and together, are more than

sufficient to raise the inference that Barnett s protected activity was a contributing factor for the

adverse action taken against him:

1. Barnett's approach to Quality Assurance was to follow Boeing s procedures and

FAA regulations and standards and not compromise, work in grey areas, or cut
corners;
by each Boeing employee as a condition of continued employment states
Without exception, I will comply with all applicable laws, rules and
regulations . I will promptly report any illegal or unethical conduct
to management or other appropriate authorities (i.e., Ethics, Law, Security,
EEO);

2. Senior quality management at Boeing pressured Barnett to work in grey areas and
to avoid documenting in writing process and procedure violations and defects.
This was most recently seen with the issues involving missing defective parts,
incorrect build records and defective emergency oxygen bottles;

3. Barnett was subjected to a continuing pattern of retaliatory conduct directed against

him, including denigrating, humiliating, and treating him with scorn and
contempt;17

4. Barnett was denied job transfers for which he was qualified and under circumstances
where he had reason to believe that Boeing senior quality management prevented
him from being hired;

16
Once again, it was around this same time period (September and October 2016) that Boeing blocked
Barnett from transferring to other positions.
17

Frady v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 1992-ERA- Mandell v.

County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 383 (2nd

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 79 of 146

5. Barnett was denied the transfer positions at the same time he was pushing Boeing to
fully investigate the missing parts, incomplete build records and defective
oxygen bottle issues;

6. In its OSHA Position Statement, Boeing made numerous misrepresentations of the

facts 18 and

7. The FAA has found Barnett s complaints to be valid.19

VI. RELIF SOUGHT BY BARNETT

103) As a direct result of Boeing for protected activity, Barnett has incurred

damages including, but not limited to: 1) back pay; 2) front pay for a period of 10 years; 3) lost

bonuses, past and future; 4) lost health and life insurance benefits; 5) medical expenses; 6) loss of

401-K retirement and matching benefits, past and future; 7) emotional distress and mental anguish;

VII. STIPULATION OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND LEGAL ISSUES

104)

to identify uncontroverted facts and legal issues to which the parties can stipulate. Counsel have

agreed to continue discussions following co receipt of the filed Pleadings.

VIII. BARNETT
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

105) On January 16, 2017, Barnett filed an administrative complaint with the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration.

18
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108 (2000)
explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that it is
probative of intentional discrimination and it might be quite persuasive...in appropriate
circumstances, the trier of fact can infer from falsity of the explanation that the employer is
19

identified by the whistleblower is circumstantial evidence that the protected activity was a
contributing factor in the unfavorable action. See Seater v. Southern California Edison Co., 95-
ERA-13, D&O of Remand by ARB, at 4-6 (September 27, 1996).

31
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 80 of 146

LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT M. TURKEWITZ, LLC

/s/Robert M. Turkewitz
Robert M. Turkewitz

KNOWLES LAW FIRM, PC

Brian M. Knowles, Esquire ( )

Attorneys for Complainant

May 4, 2021
Charleston, South Carolina

32
2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 81 of 146
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 82 of 146
Agency Name INCIDENT/INVESTIGATION Case#
24-03740
Charleston Police Department REPORT Date / Time Reported
I ORI 03/09/2024 10:49 Sat
N SC0100100 Last Known Secure
C
Location of Incident Gang Relat Premise Type Beat/Tract 03/09/2024 09:24 Sat
I At Found
D 301 SAVANNAH HWY, Charleston SC 29407 NO Parking Lot/parking 425 03/09/2024 10:13 Sat
E Crime Incident(s) ( Com ) Weapon / Tools Activity
N #1
Death Investigation Entry Exit Security
T
947
D Crime Incident ( ) Weapon / Tools Activity
A #2
T Entry Exit Security
A
Crime Incident ( ) Weapon / Tools Activity
#3
Entry Exit Security

MO

# of Victims 1 Type: INDIVIDUAL/ NOT LAW Injury:

Victim/Business Name (Last, First, Middle) Victim of DOB Race Sex Relationship Resident Status Military
V V1 BARNETT, JOHN M Crime # To Offender Branch/Status
I 1, Age 62 W M
C Home Address Home Phone
T - -
I
, Pineville LA 71630-
Employer Name/Address Business Phone Mobile Phone
M
- -
VYR Make Model Style Color Li VIN
2015 DODG RAM PK ONG , LA
CODES: V- Victim (Denote V2, V3) O = Owner (if other than victim) R = Reporting Person (if other than victim)
Type: INDIVIDUAL/ NOT LAW ENFORCEMENT Injury:
O
T Code Name (Last, First, Middle) Victim of DOB Race Sex Relationship Resident Status Military
H Crime # To Offender Branch/Status
E
CO Age 42 B M
R Home Address Home Phone
S
Employer Name/Address Business Phone Mobile Phone
I
N Type: INDIVIDUAL/ NOT LAW ENFORCEMENT Injury:
V
O Code Name (Last, First, Middle) Victim of DOB Race Sex Relationship Resident Status Military
Crime # To Offender Branch/Status
L OT
V
Age 36 W F
E Home Address Home Phone
D
Employer Name/Address Business Phone Mobile Phone
Holiday Inn 301 SAVANNAH HWY (GENERAL MANAGER) 843-556-7100
1 = None 2 = Burned 3 = Counterfeit / Forged 4 = Damaged / Vandalized 5 = Recovered 6 = Seized 7 = Stolen 8 = Unknown
("OJ" = Recovered for Other Jurisdiction)
VI Status
# Code Frm/To Value OJ QTY Property Description Make/Model Serial Number
13 6 $600.00 1 FIREARMS 9/S&W/3913
1 12 EVID $0.00 1 2015 ONG , LA DODG Ram
P
R
O
P
E
R
T
Y

Officer/ID# WARD, T. N. (PTL, TM4P) (2834)

Invest ID# MALONE, D. R. (IDI, VCU) (2237) Supervisor FEETERS, R. J. (PTL, TM4P) (1423)
Status Complainant Signature Case Status Case Disposition:
Page 1
Pending Active 03/09/2024
R_CS1IBR Printed By: RUEMELINS, ruemelins Sys#: 306155 05/13/2024 09:42
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 83 of 146
Incident Report Additional Name List
Charleston Police Department OCA: 24-03740

Additional Name List

Victim of
Name Code/# Name (Last, First, Middle) Crime # DOB Age Race Sex

1 ) OT 2 POCKLINGTON, AMY M 52 W F
Address , H: - -
Empl/Addr Ogletree Deakins, Ogletree.com/people/ B: - -
Mobile #:

2 ) OT 3 63 W F
Address H:
Empl/Addr B: - -
Mobile #: - -

3 ) OT 4 TURKEWIZ, ROBERT 64 W M
Address 768 SAINT ANDREWS BLVD , CHARLESTON, SC 29407- H:
Empl/Addr B: - -
Mobile #: - -

4 ) OT 5 32 B M
Address H:
Empl/Addr Holiday Inn, 301 Savannah Hwy B: - -
Mobile #: - -

5 ) OT 6 28 B M
Address H:
Empl/Addr B: - -
Mobile #: - -

R_CS7NC Printed By: RUEMELINS, ruemelins 05/13/2024 09:42 Page 2

 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 84 of 146
INCIDENT/INVESTIGATION REPORT
Charleston Police Department Case # 24-03740
Status 1 = None 2 = Burned 3 = Counterfeit / Forged 4 = Damaged / Vandalized 5 = Recovered 6 = Seized 7 = Stolen 8 = Unknown
Codes

IBR Status Quantity Type Measure Suspected Type

D
R
U
G
S

Assisting Officers

Suspect Hate / Bias Motivated:

INCIDENT/INVESTIGATION REPORT
Narr. (cont.) OCA: 24-03740 Charleston Police Department
NARRATIVE
On 03/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours, Officer Ward responded to 301 Savannah Highway (Holiday Inn), located in the City of
Charleston, in reference to a welfare check.

Officers on scene located an unresponsive male in a vehicle in the aforementioned parking lot. The victim was pronounced deceased
by Seth Croutcher (Delta3) at 1033 hours. CPD Central, Crime Scene, and the Coroner were advised and responded to the scene. This
incident was recorded on Officer`s CPD issued BWC.

The investigation is ongoing.

R_CS2IBR By: RUEMELINS, ruemelins 05/13/2024 09:42 Page 3

 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 85 of 146

Incident Report Related Vehicle List

Charleston Police Department OCA: 24-03740

VehYr/Make/Model Style Color Lic/Lis VIN

1 2015 DODG, Ram PK ONG LA 2024, 2024
IBR Status Date Location
Evidence (non Scibr) 03/09/2024 301 SAVANNAH HWY, CHARLESTON SC
Condition Value Offense Code Jurisdiction State # NIC #
$0.00 980 Locally
Name (Last, First, Middle) Also Known As Home Address

Barnett, John M
PINEVILLE, LA 71630
Business Address

DOB Age Race Sex Hgt Wgt Scars, Marks, Tattoos, or other distinguishing features
62 W M 511 215

Notes

R_CS9IBR Printed By: RUEMELINS, ruemelins 05/13/2024 09:42 Page 4

 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 86 of 146
Incident Report Related Property List
Charleston Police Department OCA: 24-03740

Property Description Make Model Caliber

1
FIREARMS S&W 3913 9
Color Serial No. Value Qty Unit Jurisdiction
Silver Or $600.00 1.000 Locally
Status Date NIC # State # Local # OAN
Seized 03/09/2024 G826212751
Name (Last, First, Middle) DOB Age Race Sex
* No name *
Notes

R_CS0IBR Printed By: RUEMELINS, ruemelins 05/13/2024 09:42 Page 5

 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 87 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: WARD, T. N. (2834) Date / Time: 03/09/2024 11:28:53, Saturday

Supervisor: FEETERS, R. J. (1423) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/09/2024 15:00:56, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Crime Scene Log

OCA#: 24-03740
Incident Type: Suicide
Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Victim: John M. Barnett

Crime Scene Log:

Personnel from Tower105:

James Wujcik
Eran McClary
Alex Wagers
Connor O`Rouke

Sgt. Feeters
CST Holly Bennett
Coroner Ella Butler
Seth Croutcher (Delta3)

Personnel from Rescue604:

Chief Mario Middleton
Chief Taylor Johnson
Brett Rahalewicz

Sgt. Brown
Det. Delucia

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

Page 6
2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 88 of 146
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 89 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: WARD, T. N. (2834) Date / Time: 03/09/2024 11:33:05, Saturday

Supervisor: FEETERS, R. J. (1423) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/09/2024 16:40:40, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

heard a "pop" sound near the vehicle at approximately 0924 hours when he was working on the exterior of the hotel, but
he did not think anything of it at the time.

An SCDMV search of John Barnett yielded a return for a white male matching the description of the victim. Officer
Ward ran the above name and date of birth provided by the SCDMV search through NCIC and discovered a "John M.
Barnett" (Louisiana DL# residing at the address previously provided by Officer Ward was able to
match these search results with the victim`s Louisiana DL that was found by CPD Central in his hotel room. The
Coroner confirmed the victim`s identity with the same Louisiana DL.

CPD Central Sgt. Brown and Det. Delucia, Crime Scene, and the Coroner were all advised and responded to the
scene, taking over the investigation. Officer Ward stood by and secured the crime scene. This incident was recorded on
Officer`s CPD issued BWC.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

Page 8
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 90 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: BROWN, Y. D. (1191) Date / Time: 03/09/2024 15:49:08, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/12/2024 18:32:33, Tuesday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident #: 24-03740
Incident Type: Death Investigation/Suicide
Incident Dater/Time: 3/9/2024 @ 1015hrs
Incident Location: 301 Savannah Hwy. Charleston, SC
Victim: John Barnett (W/M; DOB: )

On 3/9/2024 at approximately 1025hrs I, (Sgt. Y. Brown) was contacted by Sgt. R. Feeters in reference to a suicide that
had occurred sometime prior. Sgt. Feeters advised that upon the arrival of responding officers they observed the victim
located in the driver seat of a orange Dodge Ram pickup truck bearing Louisiana tags . Sgt. Feeters advised
that the truck doors were locked and the responding Fire Department had to assist with entry. He noted that they had to
strategically remove the firearm from the hand of the victim as it appeared he had his index finger still on the trigger.

Upon my arrival I observed a orange Dodge Ram backed into the parking spot located to the very rear of the hotel. The
victim was observed with what appeared to be a small entry hole from a projectile surrounded by blood on the right side
(temple area) of the victim`s head (his head was slightly shifted towards the right shoulder). The victim was located in
the driver`s seat of the truck wearing a red, white and dark colored plaid sleeveless shirt that was mostly unbuttoned and
open with his chest and stomach area exposed, dark jeans, no shoes (dark canvas material shoes were located on the
floor of the driver`s side).

It should be noted that a gray colored Smith and Wesson 9mm hand gun (bearing SN: ; Model 3913) was
located on the center arm rest with the magazine removed along with a single unfired bullet (CPD CSO advised 5 live
rounds in the magazine). In addition I observed a small journal type book (red leather covering) placed on top of black
leather jacket on the front passenger seat. The journal book was in the open position and from the outside of the truck
you could read what appeared to a be a note/writing presumably done by the victim. A page read " I pray the
motherfuckers that destroyed my life pay!!! I pray Boeing Pays!!! Bury me face down so Boeing and their lying ass
leaders can kiss my ass To My Family and Friends, I Found My Purposes! I`m at Peace! I Love You More John I Mitch
Barnett AKA Swampy Funcle Mitch" P.S. The Entire System For Whistlblower is Fucked up Too (a portion of this line
was scratched through but still legible). On the other open page I observed the following writings " I Can`t Do This Any
Longer!!! Enough!! Fuck Boeing!Trump 2024 Whislblowers Protection is Fucked Up Too!! America Come Together or
Die!! And I wasn`t Stoned when I wrote This... Really! Family and Friends I Love You All. It should be noted that the
above notation of writings is not documented in a sequence of order as the writings were all over the pages.

CPD Crime Scene Holly Saunders along with Deputy Coroner Ella Butler arrived on scene to for further process and
take photos. Deputy Coroner Butler assumed the custody of the victim`s body. She further advised that she will make us
aware of when the autopsy would be conducted.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

Page 9
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 91 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: BROWN, Y. D. (1191) Date / Time: 03/09/2024 15:49:08, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/12/2024 18:32:33, Tuesday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Additionally, it was learned from Holiday Inn General Manger, that a call came into the hotel from a
subject named Rob (Telephone #: ) requesting a welfare check on the victim. She noted that a check of
victim`s room was done and the subject wasn`t observed inside. stated that Rob called a 2nd time requesting
for staff to check the parking lot for a "Clemson orange" colored pickup truck (See Additional Supplementals) and this
was when the victim was located.

Nothing Further...

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

Page 10
2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 92 of 146
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 93 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: FEETERS, R. J. (1423) Date / Time: 03/10/2024 10:56:13, Sunday

Supervisor: FEETERS, R. J. (1423) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/10/2024 11:19:42, Sunday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Supplement- 24-03740
Incident - Suicide
Location- 301 Savananah Hwy
Date- 3/9/24
Victim- John Barnett

On 9 March 2024 at 1013 hrs, I (Sgt. Feeters) responded to the parking lot of 301 Savannah Hwy in reference to
suspicious person call. Prior to arrival a witness/employee advised he observed a male sitting in an orange pick up truck
at the rear of the hotel holding a gun in his lap.

I arrived a short time later and was directed towards an orange Dodge Ram pickup truck bearing LA tag- .I
along with officers Drayton and Ward visually scanned the interior of the vehicle from outside.

I observed a white male seated in the drivers seat holding a silver hand gun in his right hand. His head was tilted
upwards and what appeared to be a GSW was observed about his side of his head. I detected no movement in his chest
and summoned EMS and FD to assist. Due to all the door being locked I requested the FD to open the drivers side door
via a slim jim device.

Once inside the vehicle, for safety reasons I removed the handgun from his right hand due to his finger still being on the
trigger. I moved said handgun to the center console allowing EMS to check his status, after which point he was
pronounced deceased.

I when instructed Ofc. Drayton to secure the scene while Ofc. Ward began the field investigation. Central and CS were
requested and responded.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

Page 12
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 94 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: BENNETT, H. R. (2442) Date / Time: 03/10/2024 15:18:16, Sunday

Supervisor: SPRATT, L. F. (2311) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/12/2024 15:34:55, Tuesday
Contact: Reference: Crime Scene Log

Crime Scene Supplemental Report

Case Number: 2403740

Date/Time of Response: March 9, 2024/1106 hours
Location of Response: 301 Savannah Hwy.
Reporting CST: H. Bennett
Evidence Collected: Yes (4)
Evidence sent to Latent Recovery: No
Photos taken: Yes
Video taken: No
Fingerprint processing at scene: No
Number of latent lifts: 0
Weather: Light rain to overcast, Strong winds

On March 9, 2024, at approximately 1106 hours, reporting Crime Scene Investigator (R/CSI) responded to 301
Savannah Hwy (Holiday Inn), in the City of Charleston, in reference to a death investigation and met with Sergeants
Feeters and Y. Brown, Detective Delucia, Officer Ward, and Charleston County Deputy Coroner E. Butler.

R/CSI was informed that a welfare check had been called in for a male party staying at the hotel. Housekeeping checked
the room of the party and noted all of his belongings were still in the room. Officers then arrived on scene and located
the male, unresponsive, in his vehicle, with what appeared to be a wound to his head. Fire and EMS were called to the
scene to check the status of the individual. Sgt. Feeters noted a firearm in the individual`s right hand, removed it, and
placed it on the center console so EMS could check on the victim. EMS pronounced the victim deceased.

R/CSI photographed the scene for documentation. R/CSI noted that the victim`s vehicle, an orange Dodge Ram 1500
(tag: (LA) ), was backed into the last parking spot along the west side of the hotel. Due to heavy rain all
morning, the parking lot in front of and around the vehicle had standing water. The decedent, John Barnett (DOB:
, W/M), was seated in the driver`s seat of the vehicle. His shoes were off and placed on the driver`s
floorboard. His feet were bare and resting by the brake pedal. He was wearing blue jeans and a sleeveless red, plaid
button-up shirt. The shirt was unbuttoned, which appeared to be due to EMS since there was a small ECG electrode
sticker at the base of the stomach, as well as both upper arms. R/CSI noted a large tattoo on the left pectoral of an
alligator. The decedent`s left arm was bent at the elbow and resting on his thigh. The hand was in a loose fist. The right
arm was mostly straight out alongside his body and the fingers were curled, with the thumb sticking out. The head was
back, against the headrest, and tilted to the right. The eyes were closed, and the mouth was open. On the right side of
the head, at the temple, R/CSI noted a wound with apparent blood dripping from it onto the seat and floor below.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

Page 13
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 95 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: BENNETT, H. R. (2442) Date / Time: 03/10/2024 15:18:16, Sunday

Supervisor: SPRATT, L. F. (2311) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/12/2024 15:34:55, Tuesday
Contact: Reference: Crime Scene Log

On the center console, where it had been moved, was a Smith and Wesson model 3913 9mm handgun [S/N: ,
NIC #: G826212751] (item 101). R/CSI rendered the firearm safe by removing the magazine and locking back the slide.
R/CSI noted that the magazine had approximately five rounds in the eight-capacity magazine, and one round in the
chamber. Also visible on the firearm was blood and hair at the end of the barrel. R/CSI photographed it for
documentation. In the front passenger seat was a notebook. It was open to a page with several things written on it like "I
found my purpose! I`m at peace!" and "I can`t do this any longer!!!" R/CSI photographed the note for documentation,
which was collected by CCDC Butler.

CCDC Butler, along with R/CSI, began to search the vehicle. R/CSI photographed items located including two pill
bottles with plant-like material. One pill bottle was located inside a Crown Royal bag found on the front passenger
floorboard (item 102) and the other was located in the cup holder area of the center console (item 103). R/CSI collected
the pill bottles of plant-like material. Det. Delucia advised they could be entered into evidence to be destroyed.

R/CSI then located a single-fired cartridge casing (FCC) in the vehicle`s backseat. It was on a jacket that was lying on
the floorboard just behind the center console. R/CSI documented the FCC, a WIN 9mm luger (item 104), and collected
it as evidence.

At approximately 1210 hours, County Rescue 604 arrived on scene to help remove the decedent from the vehicle. Once
he was removed, R/CSI and CCDC Butler examined him in the back of the rescue van. R/CSI documented the wound
to the right temple with a scale. The wound was approximately one inch in length. R/CSI also noted a small area of
stippling around the wound, which is consistent with an entrance wound with close contact. R/CSI located similar
stippling on the decedent`s right hand. CCDC Butler searched the decedent`s pockets and located his car keys in the
front, right pocket, but nothing else. CCDC Butler collected the car keys. The decedent was then rolled over and his
back was examined. An exit wound was located at the back of the head. R/CSI photographed the exit wound with and
without scale. The exit wound was approximately half an inch long. No other trauma or injuries were observed at the
time. The decedent was secured in the body bag (tag # 0005227) and transported to the Coroner`s Office.

R/CSI then photographed the vehicle where the decedent had been sitting. R/CSI noted some red staining on the seat.
Above the seat, in the roof lining, was a small hole. R/CSI photographed the hole for documentation. R/CSI looked and
felt in and around the hole for any sign of a projectile, but nothing was located. R/CSI then looked on the exterior of the
roof of the vehcile to see if it had potentially passed through the roof, but there was no hole indicating that it had. R/CSI
then looked around the drivers area again, but no projectile was located.

R/CSI, along with Det. Delucia then went to room 511 where the decedent had been staying. R/CSI photographed the
room for documentation. R/CSI noted that the decedent`s belongings were still laid out in the bathroom and

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

Page 14
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 96 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: BENNETT, H. R. (2442) Date / Time: 03/10/2024 15:18:16, Sunday

Supervisor: SPRATT, L. F. (2311) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/12/2024 15:34:55, Tuesday
Contact: Reference: Crime Scene Log

the room, including clothing and a laptop with several USB drives. On the dresser in the room, the decedent`s wallet
was located. R/CSI photographed it for documentation. Det. Delucia collected it and transferred it to CCDC Butler. A
search of the room was done, but nothing of interest was located. Det. Delucia collected the laptop and USBs as
evidence since the decedent`s cell phone could not be located. R/CSI and Det. Delucia secured the hotel room before
leaving.

Nothing further was requested of crime scene.

No further information at this time.

________________________________________________________________________

EVIDENCE SUMMARY

Item # Description (sent to)

101 Smith & Wesson model 3913 9mm handgun (evidence)
(S/N: , NIC #: G826212751)
102 pill bottle with plant material (evidence)
103 pill bottle with loose plant material (evidence)
104 FCC: WIN 9mm luger (evidence)
END/ HB

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

Page 15
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2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 98 of 146
2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 99 of 146
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 100 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: DELUCIA, J. R. (2495) Date / Time: 03/10/2024 18:35:46, Sunday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/18/2024 16:32:34, Monday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

At this time, the victim`s identity was unconfirmed (although highly likely to be John Barnett) and there was an
investigative need to search the victim`s rented hotel room in an attempt to locate the victim`s wallet or cell phone.

CSI Bennett discovered a Holiday Inn room key inside the victim`s vehicle. I took the key to , and she scanned
the card into her system confirming that the keycard was registered to room 511. We requested to search the room and
she obliged & a staff member escorted CSI Bennett and I to room 511.

Upon viewing the room, the following was observed:

*****
-There was a plaque outside the door depicting "511".
-The room was comfortably cool.
-The room appeared to have clutter.
-There were no signs of a struggle/disturbance.
-Garbage/refuse was located inside & next to the garbage can near the room adjoining door.
-The adjoining room door was locked.
-Toiletries were observed on the bathroom counter/sink basin area.
-Two pill contains were located both prescribed to John "Barnette" (Pantoprazole 40 mg tab & Duloxetine 60 mg cap).
-Garbage/refuse was located in the garbage can inside the bathroom as well.
-On the bench near the room adjoining door were bags and above that on a ledge was a dopp kit.
-The room appeared to have been occupied by one person & there was only a single bed.
-A phone charger was observed in an outlet plugged into a nightstand.
-Clothing was hung in the closet.
-Personal items were observed throughout the main living area of the room.
-On the dresser in front of the TV a black in color wallet was located.
-Inside the wallet was a Louisiana ID (Name: John M Barnett, DOB: , Address: Pineville,
LA, 71360, LADL #: , Height 5`11", Weight 215). The photo observed in the driver`s license is consistent
with the victim`s appearance.
-On a table near the bed/chair in the corner of the room a laptop, laptop charger, mouse, and a sandwich bag containing
5 flash drives were located.
*****
The laptop, laptop charger, mouse, sandwich bag containing 5 flash drives, and wallet were seized from the hotel room.

Based on the totality of the circumstances the victim was able to be identified as John M Barnett.

I contacted Lt. Krasowski and requested a field transfer of the victim`s wallet to the deputy coroner. He approved the
transfer.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 101 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: DELUCIA, J. R. (2495) Date / Time: 03/10/2024 18:35:46, Sunday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/18/2024 16:32:34, Monday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

After searching the room, I met with the deputy coroner and provided her with the wallet. Additionally, she provided
me with the keys of the victim`s vehicle. Due to the victim`s phone not being located in the hotel room it is likely that
the phone is still inside his vehicle.

Of note: the wallet contained the victim`s LADL, several cards, a Red River Bank Account Identification slip (paper),
and $39.00 USD.

Prior to leaving the incident location I requested that download the needed footage from their surveillance
system (from approximately 1900 hours on 03/08 through 1015 hours on 03/09). She advised that she would contact me
when the footage is complete.

At approximately 1630 hours I followed up at Jennings Towing (2026 Meeting Street Rd. Charleston, SC, 29403) in an
effort to locate the victim`s phone. While wearing gloves, I searched the inside of the victim`s vehicle, and I located an
android phone (in a red case / screen or screen protector had minor cracks) underneath a plastic foldable flap in the rear
passenger compartment. Additionally, I located a nylon style holster and magazine (containing 8 rounds) on the front
passenger seat. The phone, holster, and magazine were seized.

At approximately 1710 hours I received communication from advising that the surveillance footage download
was complete, and the video was ready to be picked up at the hotel front desk.

All items I seized from the vehicle & hotel room were entered into CPD evidence.

My BWC footage was uploaded to the Getac Cloud.

Nothing further.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

Page 20
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 102 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: LANCASTER, H. D. (2687) Date / Time: 03/11/2024 06:18:33, Monday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/14/2024 16:25:16, Thursday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

OCA: 24-03740
Incident Date: 03/09/2024
Incident: Suicide
Incident Location: 301 Savannah Hwy. Charleston, SC, 29407
Victim: John Barnett

-On 03/10/2024 I conducted a follow up at the Holiday Inn during my shift. I retrieved the security camera footage from
the night shift clerk who was identified as (DOB: ). The footage was later downloaded to a
thumb drive and uploaded to the case file.

-I conducted a brief interview with the night shift clerk . stated that he works the front desk of the
Holiday Inn from 2300-0900. He was working the night prior to John Barnett being discovered deceased in his vehicle.
stated that he did not remember seeing John Barnett at any time during his shift and did not mention
noticing anything unusual.

-I began reviewing the security footage from the Holiday Inn. On 03/08/2024 at 19:26, John Barnett can be observed
entering through the front entrance and passing the front desk. He appears to be alone and is wearing the same clothing
that he was discovered in by responding officers (Red sleeveless flannel and blue jeans). According to the Hotel staff
maintaining room entry logs, the last time John Barnett`s key card was swiped to gain access to his room was at 19:28
on 03/08/2024 which is consistent with his entry to the hotel two minutes prior to this.

-I conducted an initial review of the other cameras, but noted that the victim`s vehicle is out of frame and not captured
on any of the exterior security cameras.

The investigation continues….

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 103 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: FEETERS, R. J. (1423) Date / Time: 03/11/2024 11:33:51, Monday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/15/2024 10:06:29, Friday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Supplement- 24-03740
Incident - Death Investigation
Location- 301 Savananah Hwy
Date- 3/9/24
Victim- John Barnett

***This supplement adds additional information that was not on the original supplemental report, of note that I was
wearing nitrile gloves when I removed the handgun from Mr. Barnett`s right hand. The title of the report should have
been death investigation as the coroner makes the determination of cause and manner of death.***

On 9 March 2024 at 1013 hrs, I (Sgt. Feeters) responded to the parking lot of 301 Savannah Hwy (Holiday Inn) in
reference to suspicious person call. Prior to arrival a witness/employee advised he observed a male sitting in an orange
pick up truck at the rear of the hotel holding a gun on his lap.

I arrived a short time later and was directed towards an orange Dodge Ram pickup truck bearing LA tag-
parked and not running. I along with officers Drayton and Ward visually scanned the interior of the vehicle from
outside.

Through closed windows, I observed a white male sitting in the drivers seat holding a silver hand gun on his lap,
pointing toward the driver door. The handgun was gripped tightly in his right hand with his finger still on the trigger.
The hammer on the handgun appeared to be cocked back. He did not appear conscious while his head was tilted
upward. What appeared to be a GSW was observed about the right side of his head. I detected no movement in his chest
and summoned EMS and FD to assist. Due to all the door being locked I requested the FD to open the drivers side door
via a slim jim device.

Once inside the vehicle, for safety reasons I (wearing gloves) removed the handgun from his right hand due to his finger
still being on the trigger. I moved said handgun to the center console allowing EMS to access him in a safe manner to
check his status, after which point he was pronounced deceased.

I then instructed Ofc. Drayton to secure the scene while Ofc. Ward began the field investigation. Central and CS were
requested, responded and were briefed.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 104 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: BROWN, Y. D. (1191) Date / Time: 03/12/2024 14:22:09, Tuesday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/20/2024 10:35:04, Wednesday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident #: 24-03740
Incident Type: Suicide
Incident Location: 301 Savannah Hwy. (Holiday Inn)
Incident Date: March 9, 2024

Interviewee: Attorney Robert Turkewiz (W/M; DOB: : Telephone #: ), Attorney Brian

Knowles (Telephone #: ), Paralegal Marina Knowles

On March 9 , 2024 I, Sgt. Y. Brown along with Charleston County Coroner, Ella Butler meet with the above listed legal
counsels in regarding their client/victim, Robert Barnett who was found deceased at the incident location (301 Savannah
Hwy.). The brief meeting was to advise the attorneys of what occurred as did arrive at the scene during the process of
the investigation. It was also to gain any information about Mr. Barnett that would be relevant to the investigation. The
interview was recorded by my CPD issued Body Worn Camera and summarized as the following:

It should be noted that Attorney Turkewiz was the person that contacted the Holiday Inn in regards to conducting a
welfare check on the victim. Mr. Turkewiz also advised that they represented John Barnett in a whistleblower lawsuit
against Boeing (started in 2017). He continued to state that Mr. Barnett had retired (previous job title was 1st Line
Quality Manager) from Boeing under a term he called a "constructive termination" and they were in the middle of
depositions (Mr. Barnett has been coming back and forth to Charleston for the past 3 weeks) and that the incident date
was going to be the last day (scheduled for 1000hrs) for the final hearing. They noted that Mr. Barnett`s job with
Boeing was to protect the safety of the air crafts and that he was very knowledgeable. They added that when Mr. Barnett
was employed by Boeing he would find and report defects but faced retaliation from higher management.

Most of the interview was led by Coroner Ella Butler and she began by asking if Mr. Barnett had reached out them in
2017 for representation in which Attorney Turkewiz confirmed. He stated that Mr. Barnett filed an AIR-21 which he
explained was an aviation statue for retaliation against employees for making complaints about safety issues. Attorney
Turkewiz and Knowles explained that Mr. Barnett made very serious safety complainants against Boeing. They
continued to explain that they were in the middle of Discovery (formal process of exchanging information between
parties about the witnesses and evidence that will presented at trial). He stated that this process was going to take place
over a one month time frame. He stated Mr. Barnett was the first of twenty depositions. They stated that the depositions
started on the previous Thursday with the opposing attorneys questioning Mr. Barnett for approximately 7-9 hours with
breaks in between. They stated that on the day prior, Friday, March 8, 2024, Mr. Barnett was in a deposition that lasted
approximately 4-5 hours. I questioned the time frame in which they ended on March 8, 2024 and they advised that it
was approx. 1800hrs.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

Page 23
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 105 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: BROWN, Y. D. (1191) Date / Time: 03/12/2024 14:22:09, Tuesday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/20/2024 10:35:04, Wednesday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Mr. Turkewiz expressed that Mr. Barnett was under lots of stress and his doctor/Clinical Social Worker, Debra Still had
diagnosed him with PTSD as a result of lawsuit and its proceedings. Mr. Turkewiz added that Mr. Barnett was seen by
Dr. Still on the previous Monday (March 4, 2024) while in Charleston (the attorneys noted that the diagnosis of PTSD
was in 2017). They stated that Mr. Barnett wanted to go back to Louisiana so he could get an increase of PTSD
medication (unknown if he was also seeing a physician while in his home state; possibly a place called Freeman Clinic).

Coroner Butler questioned if there was something in particular that could have occurred on the previous date that was
extremely hard or could have pushed Mr. Barnett to his limit and they stated Friday would have been easier than the
deposition that occurred on the previous Thursday. Attorney Knowles expressed that Mr. Barnett appeared comfortable
during the questioning timeframes (all of the hearings were recorded during the week).

Coroner Butler advised Mr. Knowles that she could not advise them of alot of information since they were not his next
of kin when they began questioning if any foul play was involved. She continued to state that at the current time it did
not appear that Mr. Barnett was hurt by anyone else. Coroner Butler continued to advised that her job is to asset the
victim and that the incident possibly occurred within the past few hours (not confirmed).

I reiterated with Attorney Turkewicz from our previous conversation about his first attempt to reach the victim via
telephone (#: ; email address of ) approximately 0907hrs. Mr. Knowles added
that he also attempted to reach the victim but the line would ring then go directly to voice mail. Mr. Turkewicz stated he
began to worry when the victim did not answer his phone from his first call. They noted that it was unlike the victim to
not answer their calls. I questioned about why would they get worried right at 0900hrs when the deposition wasn`t
slated to start until 1000hrs. He simply stated that the victim was always cooperative and would have answered the
phone knowing it was him.

They questioned about checking cameras to see if Mr. Barnett interacted with anyone because Mr. Barnett was going
against a very powerful company and had very "damaging information" about the company which was revealed during
this weeks hearing. He was advised that video footage would be viewed by Law Enforcement. They continued to ask
about foul play and I advised that currently it did not appear to be based on the current view of the crime scene. Coroner
Butler also advised that with time it would be something that could be ruled out but she could give a definite answer.

I questioned if Mr. Barnett mentioned anything this week about feeling low, having any extra stress, etc. Attorney
Turkewicz stated on the previous day Mr. Barnett just stated he needed to increase his PTSD medication because he was
stressed and wanted to return home so he could see his physician. They stated overall he was happy that this case was
coming to an end. They did advise that Mr. Barnett suffered from hypertension and coronary pulmonary issues (they
had his medical records). Attorney Knowles noted that on the day of the incident Mr. Barnett would

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

Page 24
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 106 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: BROWN, Y. D. (1191) Date / Time: 03/12/2024 14:22:09, Tuesday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/20/2024 10:35:04, Wednesday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

not have been under any added stress because the deposition on this day would have been more of him telling his story.
It should be noted that trial for this case was scheduled for the end of June 2024. Attorney Turkewicz stated that he felt
Mr. Barnett was feeling good about getting the opportunity to tell his side of the story. They stated that they were not
aware of any threats being made to Mr. Barnett but it could have been and he did not make them aware of it. They noted
that this case has received world wide coverage. They stated Mr. Barnett had a strong case it wasn`t a situation in which
he was going to be jailed. The described Mr. Barnett as a brave person so if he was in fear for his life he would not have
shown it. Mr. Barnett did acknowledge that Boeing was a powerful company and that lots of people were angry about
his coming forward with the claims.

The attorneys were questioned about having any knowledge of Mr. Barnett owning a firearm and they stated it was
unknown. When questioned about having any thoughts that Mr. Barnett could have commited suicide when there was
no phone response, the paralegal, Mrs./ Knowles stated she thought of it. The attorneys stated they did not believe Mr.
Barnett was a heavy drinker and did not have any knowledge of drug usage. They advised that they have known Mr.
Barnett for 7 years and he had become like a friend to them. They were advised about the investigation process from
Law Enforcement and the Coroner Office.

Coroner Butler stated she would handle the family being notified about the victim`s status. Business cards were
provided to everyone.

This interview was captured on my CPD issued BWC and can be viewed in its entirety.

Nothing Further

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

Page 25
2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 107 of 146
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 108 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: DELUCIA, J. R. (2495) Date / Time: 03/12/2024 16:24:56, Tuesday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/20/2024 10:23:44, Wednesday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

sometimes he will try to drive the whole way.

-I asked if the victim has ever expressed any suicidal ideations/attempts in the past and she said no.
-I asked her if he had any history of depression and she said that he takes medication for depression and has for a while.
advised that the victim went over to one of his friend`s place a few days before he came to Charleston. And told
her that if anything ever happens to him, to investigate it because he would never do anything to himself.
provided this friend`s information as:
-I asked if the victim had any medical conditions and she said that he takes medication, but she does not know
what they`re for.

*The above is a summary, review the recording for additional information. *

**********
The recorded interview was entered into CPD evidence.

Nothing further.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 109 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: DELUCIA, J. R. (2495) Date / Time: 03/13/2024 16:05:33, Wednesday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/21/2024 15:58:28, Thursday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

OCA: 24-03740
Incident Date: 03/09/2024
Incident: Suicide
Incident Location: 301 Savannah Hwy. Charleston, SC, 29407
Victim: John Barnett
_____________________________________________________________________________________
*03/13/2024*
-Follow up at the incident location.
-Follow up at Waffle House (325 Savannah Hwy.)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
On 03/13/2024 at approximately 0930 hours I (Det. DeLucia) followed up at the incident location. Upon arrival I met
with (manager / listed other). I asked about the entrances/exits of the hotel and if all locations were
covered/recorded by their surveillance footage and she responded in the affirmative. advised the following:
*****
CAM 5 - Lobby Entrance / Exit
CAM 2 - Entrance / Exit closest to SC 61 (near where the victim`s vehicle was located).
CAM 3 - Employee Entrance / Exit that lets out in the direction of Waffle house. If an individual leaves through this
door they will then be captured on CAM 8.
CAM 7 - Entrance / Exit to the smoking area. A guest cannot reenter through this door if they leave & close the door.
*****
Furthermore, I asked if she would provide me with the victim`s room rental records and she obliged. The
requested records were printed and provided to me. These records were entered into CPD evidence. The received
records can be summarized as follows:
*****
+ Record #1
1 Page
Name: John Barnett
Address listed: Picher OK 74360 United States
Folio #: 517629
Room No: 0511
Arrival: 02/26/24
Departure: 03/02/24
Conf No: 87422379

+ Record #2
2 Pages

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 110 of 146
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 111 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: SPRATT, L. F. (2311) Date / Time: 03/15/2024 13:17:36, Friday

Supervisor: BENNETT, H. R. (2442) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/16/2024 09:21:45, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Crime Scene Log

Crime Scene Supplemental Report

Case Number: 2403742

Date/Time of Response: March 13, 2024 / 1145 hrs.
Location of Response: Jennings Towing, 2026 Meeting Street Rd.
Rpt. Crime Scene Supervisor: L. Spratt
Evidence Collected: No
Evidence sent to Latent Recovery: No
Photos taken: Yes
Fingerprint processing at scene: No
Number of latent lifts: 0
Weather: Clear, Sunny, Warm

On March 13, 2024 at approximately 1145 hrs., reporting Crime Scene Supervisor (R/CSS) responded to Jennings
Towing at 2026 Meeting Street Rd., in the City of Charleston, SC, in reference to a follow-up in a death investigation

Scene Description: Jennings Tow Lot, secured with standard fencing.

R/CSS spoke with Detective Tuttle by phone. A discussion was had about any additional searching to be conducted on
the victim`s vehicle prior to its release. Based on the initial response and evidence it was determined a secondary search
for the projectile should be conducted to attempt to recover it presumably from the interior roof area where the apparent
hole was located.

R/CSS spoke with CSI Bennett about her initial search on scene. Details of this search can be read in her supplemental
report. This initial search did not include any destructive or invasive searching which is typical- based on the facts of
the case on scene. This type of search was now determined to be warranted and requested by Detective Tuttle.

Detective Galka was present on scene with keys for the vehicle. The keys were utilized to gain access to the vehicle.

Vehicle Information: Orange in color Dodge Ram 1500, LA tag:

R/CSS photographed the vehicle for documentation. It should be noted that a memory card issue occurred with R/CSS`s
issued Nikon camera preventing photographs from being taken on that device. Due to this, photographs were taken
utilizing R/CSS`s assigned department cell phone.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 112 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: SPRATT, L. F. (2311) Date / Time: 03/15/2024 13:17:36, Friday

Supervisor: BENNETT, H. R. (2442) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/16/2024 09:21:45, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Crime Scene Log

R/CSS observed an apparent bullet hole in the roof lining above the front driver seat. Photographs were taken as that
section of the roof lining was removed. A corresponding perforating hole was observed in a foam insulation piece above
the roof lining. This hole perforated (or continued through) the foam insulation piece. Above this perforating hole, on
the interior side of the metal roof of the vehicle was an apparent corresponding defect. No perforation through the metal
portion of the roof was observed. Based on the perforating holes in the roof lining and foam insulation piece, with a
defect (no perforation) of the interior side of the metal roof, the approximate trajectory of the projectile that caused this
damage would have had to travel in an upward vertical direction. Additionally, the perforating hole in the foam
insulation showed the projectile would have had to travel horizontally in a slightly right to left directionality.

A thorough search of the cavity between the roof lining and the interior side of the metal roof was conducted to attempt
to locate the projectile. Additionally, other accessible interior panels of the vehicle were removed in the search as well
as a search of the interior of the cab of the vehicle. This search led to negative results. It should be noted that there are
numerous inaccessible cavities of the interior cab of the vehicle where the projectile could have come to rest.
Additionally, the vehicle having been towed since the incident could have displaced the projectile within the vehicle
cavities.

Additional photographs with a scale were taken of the perforating holes and the defect in the roof for documentation.

R/CSS was contacted by Digital Analyst Maria Heffron who requested vehicle information on the vehicle`s
infotainment system to determine its compatibility with their extraction software. R/CSS accessed the vehicle`s
infotainment system to gain access to this information. Analyst Heffron advised that the vehicle was not compatible.

Photographs were submitted to VeriPic Digital Evidence Manager under the assigned case number.

No further information at this time.

________________________________________________________________________

END/ LFS

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 113 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Date / Time: 03/15/2024 15:21:43, Friday

Supervisor: MELLETTE, M. (1805) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/20/2024 12:34:14, Wednesday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

OCA: 2403740
Incident: Death Investigation

-Friday, March 15, 2024-

Amy Pocklington and Max Welsh of Ogletree Deakins law firm contacted me around 15:00 hours in reference to this
case. I, Detective Sergeant Eric Tuttle, conducted an audio recorded interview that may be summarized as follows:

Amy was one of the two attorneys for Ogletree representing Boeing during the deposition of the victim. She deposed
him on Thursday, March 7, 2024 for about seven hours while at their (Ogletree office), located at 211 King Street.
They completed their questioning on Thursday. The victim`s attorney began their questioning for the deposition around
11:00 hours. Friday lasted until around 17:00 hours, with a lunch break.

The victim appeared and expressed that he was tired and that he was eager to return to Louisiana. The attorneys met in
private and agreed to return the following day (Saturday, March 9, 2024) at 10:00 to complete the deposition of the
victim.

This deposition was the only time that Amy had met Mr. Barnett in person. She did not note anything unusual, aside
from his fatigue from the deposition and his yearning to return home. She was not aware of any suicidal ideations from
the victim or any threats against him.

She and Max were unable to comment on how the death would affect Boeing`s position with the case; however, she did
note that victim`s attorney notified Ogletree they intended to continue the suit on behalf of the victim`s estate.

-End- (Refer to audio recording for full interview)

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: GENNA, G. (2351) Date / Time: 03/15/2024 19:05:05, Friday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/21/2024 15:55:00, Thursday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

OCA: 2403740
Incident: Death Investigation
Incident Location: 301 Savannah Hwy., Charleston SC 29414 (Holiday Inn)
Incident Date: 3/9/2024
Victim: John Barnett

On 3/15/2024 at approximately 530pm, I (Det. Genna) made telephonic contact with in reference to
any possible knowledge she has in refence to Mr. Barnett`s death.

The phone conversation was recorded on my CPD issued body worn camera and has been uploaded to the CPD IRSA
Cloud. The conversation is summarized below.

Ms. and Mr. Barnett have known each other since the late 1970 when they were in high school. Mr. Barnett`s
mother and her mother are best friends.

Ms. stated that Barnett moved back to Louisiana in 2017 and she sees him roughly once a month.
The last time saw Mr. Barnett was on February 24 2024, when Mr. Barnett was a pal bearer for her father`s
funeral. When asked about any suicidal thoughts or ideations, she advised that Barnett was always upbeat and joking
around.

Ms. was asked to explain the context of the statement she made to the media in regard to her saying Barnett
told her "If I am found dead, it was not a suicide". stated that they were sitting around after her father`s funeral
joking around when they began to speak about the depositions. She advised that Barnett wasn`t worried about them and
just wanted to get over with them. She advised that they continue to make jokes and sarcastic comments about the
situation (depositions). She further stated that when Barnett made the comment, she added what are they going to
"Clinton" you.

was asked about how she came to talk to the media about the comment. stated that she told Barnett`s
mother about his statement who told Barnett`s attorney. She then stated that the attorney contacted her, asked her a
couple of questions then asked her if she would speak to Anna Emerson, who is a reporter for WCIV/ABC channel 4 in
Charleston. agreed to speak with her.

had no intimate knowledge of the death of have any additional information to provide.

Nothing further.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: BROWN, Y. D. (1191) Date / Time: 03/19/2024 15:58:08, Tuesday

Supervisor: BROWN, Y. D. (1191) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 03/19/2024 16:03:26, Tuesday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident #: 24-03740
Incident Type: Death Investigation

On March 9, 2024 I, Sgt. Y. Brown requested receipts from Holiday Inn Manger, in reference to seeing the
time frame in which the victim was a guest at the incident location. On March 18, 2024 I submitted those requested
receipts (2 sheets) into CPD Evidence.

Nothing Further......

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 116 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:15:23, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/06/2024 13:06:21, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident Type: Death Investigation

Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Incident Date and Time: 3/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours
OCA: 2403740

On March 11th, 2024 I (Detective Malone) made myself familiar with the facts of this investigation. At approximately
1030 hours, Detective Delucia and I made contact with the victim`s attorney (Rob Turkewitz,
@rmtlegal.com) via telephone and obtained the following information related to the victim:

- The deposition took place at 411 King Street, the offices of the Ogletree Law firm.
- Thursday, March 7th was the first day of the deposition, with the deposition continuing through Friday, March 8th
and into Saturday, March 9th. The victim drove with Turkewitz on Thursday and drove himself to the deposition on
Friday.
- The victim chose the Holiday Inn hotel himself and was not put up by his attorney`s office.
- The victim`s lawsuit, and subsequent depositions, were related to a whistleblower retaliation complaint from
when the victim worked at Boeing.
- The victim`s case is set for Trial in June of 2024. Per Turkewitz, the victim was in good spirits and was looking
forward to his day in court. Turkewitz also said that the deposition went well for the victim and a lot of damaging
information against Boeing was relayed.
- The victim`s phone number is

At approximately 1200 hours, I spoke with Deputy Coroner Butler via telephone. DC Butler notified me that the
autopsy was completed. The victim suffered from a single, close contact gunshot wound to the head. The victim did
not have any additional trauma to his body. This information, in addition to the note left behind in the victim`s vehicle,
is, at this point in the investigation, consistent with suicide.

I then began a review of Holiday Inn video footage which was gathered by Detective Delucia during the initial
investigation. During that review, I located the victim entering the hotel, by himself, at 19:26:18 hours on March 8th,
2024. Further review is needed to capture the victim exiting the hotel.

The investigation continues...

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 117 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:16:41, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/06/2024 13:05:15, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident Type: Death Investigation

Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Incident Date and Time: 3/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours
OCA: 2403740

On March 12th, 2024 I (Detective Malone) responded to the Charleston County Coroner`s Office and took possession
of the victim`s notebook (containing the suicide statements) as well as other autopsy evidence (pulled head hair, entry
wound shaved hair, tape lifts, fingernail clippings, hair found from L#5 tip). Upon returning to CPD headquarters I
logged these items into CPD evidence. I also requested that the notebook and note containing the suicide statements be
processed for fingerprints.

I also submitted a request that the firearm used in this incident be fully processed by CPD forensic lab to include test
firing and processing through the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network.

The investigation continues...

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 118 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:17:38, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/06/2024 13:07:24, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident Type: Death Investigation

Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Incident Date and Time: 3/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours
OCA: 2403740

On March 13th, 2024 I (Detective Malone) received information from Robert Turkewitz in reference to the individual
who sold the victim the Smith and Wesson firearm that was located in the victim`s hand during the initial investigation.
That individual identifies herself as ) and the email states that she sold the victim the
firearm sometime between 1999-2000.

I then drafted a search warrant for the victim`s CDR information (target # ) and presented the search
warrant to the Honorable Judge Gosnell. I swore to the facts contained within the search warrant and it was signed. No
other facts of the case were discussed. Upon returning to CPD headquarters, I submitted the search warrant to AT&T at
12:38 hours (ATT file code: 3880077).

I also submitted a request with the Charleston Police Department forensic services division requesting that the victim`s
notebook/suicide note be processed for fingerprints. I also requested that crime scene technicians photograph the pages
in the notebook prior to the fingerprint processing.

I then continued the review of the Holiday Inn camera footage. During this review, I observed the victim entering the
hotel, exiting the hotel and parking his vehicle in the parking spot where it was located. The exact time stamp of these
activities are as follows:

March 8th, 2024:

- 19:26:18 hours: Victim observed entering the hotel via the main entrance. The victim is wearing dark pants and a
plaid, cutoff shirt.
- 20:37:23 hours: Victim is observed exiting the hotel via the main entrance. The victim is wearing a dark jacket,
however his plaid shirt is observed protruding from the bottom of the jacket. Victim is also wearing the same dark
pants and same shoes.
- 20:45 hours: Vehicle backs into parking space where victim vehicle was located
- 21:17:56 hours: Brake lights are illuminated in the parking spot.
- 21:19:44 hours: Brake lights go out. Once these lights extinguish, the vehicle does not move until it is located by
law enforcement the next day.

Several hours later I received some of the victim`s medical records from Robert Turkewitz. These medical records
document that, since February of 2017, the victim has suffered from anxiety, depression, ongoing nightmares and often
wakes in a panicked state. Additionally, these medical records indicate that "anytime he must engage with legal case he
experience increased anxiety."

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 119 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:17:38, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/06/2024 13:07:24, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Per the provided medical records, the victim last reported these symptoms to Deborah Still, a Charleston based
psychotherapist, on March 4th, 2024. These medical records state, "Client continues to exhibit sxs of PTSD: anxiety,
sadness, fear of impending death of others and intrusive thoughts."

The investigation continues...

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

Page 38
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 120 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:21:42, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/06/2024 13:03:14, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident Type: Death Investigation

Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Incident Date and Time: 3/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours
OCA: 2403740

On March 14th, 2024 I (Detective Malone) received the eTrace on the firearm used by the victim during this incident
(Smith and Wesson 9mm handgun, SN: ). This eTrace report indicates that the firearm was purchased on
August 1st, 1996 from Oshman Sporting Goods located at 1101 Super Mall, Auburn, Washington. The firearm was
purchased by , who is the individual that informed Robert Turkewitz that she sold the firearm
to the victim between 1999-2000.

The investigation continues...

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 121 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:34:29, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/06/2024 13:02:41, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident Type: Death Investigation

Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Incident Date and Time: 3/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours
OCA: 2403740

On March 15th, 2024 I (Detective Malone) received a NIBIN lead notification indicating that the fired cartridge casing
(FCC) recovered from inside the victim`s vehicle matches the silver-in-color Smith and Wesson firearm located in the
victim`s hand.

The investigation continues...

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 122 of 146
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 123 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:35:24, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/06/2024 13:02:21, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

restore (something). I fully understand the direct costs that we can establish, i.e. lost pay, lost bonuses, etc. What I am
struggling with is, how do you repair or restore a person`s overall outlook on life? I used to be a very happy go lucky
guy that loved his job, his Company and the products they built. I had a very positive outlook on life. Boeing has
absolutely destroyed my outlook on life. I often sit here and think, what`s the use, what`s the point of life? A person
works hard all their life, trying to do the right thing, treating others with respect, just to have their entire professional
life destroyed because they were doing as they were trained and expected to do…follow the rules. What is a person`s
"outlook on life" worth? And looking at the mental toll it has had on me. I suffer from anxiety attacks, depression, panic
attacks, PTSD… I`ve got an anger inside me that I`ve never experienced before and I don`t understand how to control…
How do you put a price on that? Sometimes I think…maybe if I go out and find a job, it will help. And then the anxiety
hits just thinking about having to report to someone that has control over me and my performance ratings. I don`t have
the mental fortitude to put myself in that position again…I just can`t do it, not right now anyway. How do you put a
price on that? Each time I do an interview, deposition or other stressful discussion on what happened with me and
Boeing, I re-live those years all over again. It puts me in a deep depression for a week or two, (depending on the
intensity level of the discussion). I shut myself in, I don`t want family or friends coming over, I am angry at the
world!…"

There were multiple other emails documenting the victim`s legal case against Boeing, however I did not locate any
threats or other communication related to the victim`s lawsuit that occurred with anybody outside of his legal team. I
also did not observe any threats or harassment in any of the victim`s communication.

At approximately 1400 hours I received two fingerprint reports from the CPD forensics laboratory. Report number 2
states that no fingerprints were recovered from the firearm located in the victim`s possession. Report number 3 states
that 8 fingerprints were recovered from the red notebook recovered in the victim`s vehicle. Several of these fingerprints
were suitable for comparison via the AFIS system, however not matches were discovered.

The investigation continues...

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 124 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:37:26, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/06/2024 13:00:24, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident Type: Death Investigation

Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Incident Date and Time: 3/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours
OCA: 2403740

On March 21st, 2024 at approximately 0600 hours I (Detective Malone), received the victim`s CDR information from
the AT&T Global Legal Demand Center. I forwarded that CDR information to the Charleston Police Department Crime
Intelligence Unit for plotting and analysis.

Several hours later I received the plotted data from CIU Analyst Lalumia. The data plots were from midnight on March
8th, 2024 until the phone stopped communicating with the cell towers on March 8th, 2024 at 21:20:21 hours.

During this time frame, the victim`s cell phone is locating at the Holiday Inn located at 301 Savannah Highway. The
cell phone remains at that location until approximately 10:12:55 hours, when the victim heads onto the peninsula to
attend his deposition on King Street. The victim`s cell phone last communicates with the cell towers at 10:36:49 hours
before beginning to communicate once again at 18:04:37 hours. It should be noted that this time frame is the
approximate time that the victim was conducting his deposition on March 8th, 2024.

The victim`s cell phone then returns to 301 Savannah Highway where it remains until the cell phone stops
communicating with the tower (more than likely running out of battery power).

During this entire time frame, the victim`s cell phone does not locate anywhere outside of the 301 Savannah
Highway/downtown Charleston area.

The investigation continues...

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 125 of 146
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 126 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:47:59, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:59:17, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident Type: Death Investigation

Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Incident Date and Time: 3/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours
OCA: 2403740

On March 27th, 2024 I (Detective Malone) received a Record of Conversation from our FBI Task Force Officer
(Detective Mapp). This Record of Conversation was completed on March 19th, 2024 by Special Agent Ashley
Strickland with the US Department of Transportation Officer of Inspector General and documents a conversation that
took place between her and the victim`s attorneys (Rob Turkewitz and Brian Knowles). A portion of this Record of
Conversation indicates that a tow-truck driver for employed by Jenning`s Towing (identified as ,
spoke with Knowles and Turkewitz when the pair went to Jenning`s Towing to look at the victim`s
truck. Per the attorneys, stated that he towed the victim`s truck from the Holiday Inn.

While picking up the truck, Knowles and Turkewitz state that said that a Charleston Police Officer approached
him and stated that the victim "sliced his wrists in the hotel room and then went outside and shot himself. said
there had been a blanket on the body and that the police threw it into the back of the truck…" The report also states,
told Knowles and Turkewitz that it didn`t seem like a suicide to him."

I placed this Record of Conversation, along with several attached photographs of the victim`s truck (taken by the
attorneys) into the case file.

The investigation continues...

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 127 of 146
 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 128 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:51:26, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:56:52, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident Type: Death Investigation

Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Incident Date and Time: 3/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours
OCA: 2403740

On March 29th, 2024 at approximately 0830 hours I (Detective Malone) responded to the Charleston County Coroner`s
Office (4000 Salt Pointe Pkwy) and retrieved copies of the victim`s fingerprint cards. Upon returning to CPD
headquarters I logged these fingerprint cards into CPD evidence. I also submitted a request that these known
fingerprints be compared to the prints recovered from the notebook.

At approximately 0930 hours I responded to 62 Brigade Street (Charleston Police Department warehouse) to assist the
Charleston Police Department EDU team in conducting a x-ray inspection of the vehicle. I briefed the EDU team on the
facts of the case and they conducted their inspection. The EDU team took a radiograph of the roof of the vehicle
directly over the victim`s head and observed a projectile shaped anomaly near the top door jamb of the driver`s door,
just over where the victim`s left shoulder would have been.

Sergeant Haithcock conducted a physical search of the area and located the fired projectile lodged in the roof of the
vehicle exactly where the anomaly appeared on the radiograph.
Upon obtaining the fired projectile, the inspection of the vehicle was concluded. I called Jenning`s Towing and had the
vehicle towed back to the Jenning`s Towing yard.

I then returned to CPD headquarters and entered the fired projectile into CPD evidence. Of note, the projectile weighs
approximately 7.41 grams, which is consistent with the average weight of a 9mm projectile. The projectile was also full
metal jacket which is consistent with the other cartridges located in the victim`s handgun.

The investigation continues...

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 129 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:53:05, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:55:41, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident Type: Death Investigation

Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Incident Date and Time: 3/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours
OCA: 2403740

On April 2nd, 2024 at approximately 1145 hours I (Detective Malone) responded to the Charleston County Coroner`s
Office and retrieved the original copy of the victim`s fingerprint cards (the copies I obtained on March 29th were not
suitable for making a comparison).

I then transported the fingerprint cards to the Charleston Police Department Forensic Services Building and signed them
over to Nova Grilli, the Charleston Police Department Friction Ridge Manager. It should be noted that, due to this
evidence belonging to the Coroner`s office and not being entered into the CPD evidence module, it was assigned a bag
and item number (bag 30, item 1) that will not correspond to a number found in the CPD evidence module. Upon the
completion of the fingerprint comparison, the victim`s fingerprint card will be returned to the Coroner`s office.

At approximately 1415 hours I submitted a request to have the recovered firearm (bag 1, item 101), recovered FCC (bag
4, item 104) and recovered fired projectile (bag 22, item 1) sent to SLED for forensic analysis.

The investigation continues...

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 130 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:57:42, Saturday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/06/2024 12:59:28, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident Type: Death Investigation

Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Incident Date and Time: 3/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours
OCA: 2403740

On April 5th, 2024 at approximately 1100 hours, Detective Broadwater transported the recovered firearm, recovered
FCC and recovered projectile to SLED for further forensic analysis. The SLED lab number attached to this evidence is
L24-05753.

The investigation continues...

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 131 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: HAITHCOCK, J. L. (1625) Date / Time: 04/09/2024 12:00:45, Tuesday

Supervisor: WILSON, D. G. (1739) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/25/2024 14:03:10, Thursday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

On 03/29/2024, I, Sgt. Haithcock, met Sgt. Kursh, Det. A. King, Det. M. Bryan, and Det. D. Malone at 62 Brigade St.
(CPD Warehouse). It was in reference to locating a bullet that was used in the incident listed in the report. Once all
parties were on scene. Det. Malone gave us access to the vehicle. I used my flashlight to locate the trajectory of the
bullet. From a distance, it appeared as if the bullet had gone between the two pieces of sheet metal in the roof. Once you
got closer, you could see that it had not penetrated the lower piece of metal but had been diverted towards the curtain
airbag in the driver side rear seat. I had Sgt. Kursh place our X-ray panel on the top of the vehicle above the airbag. The
X-ray source was placed on the floor. We shot the X-ray with 20 pulses at 4 feet from a Golden 150 X-ray device. We
were able to locate the bullet inside of the curtain airbag. I cut the bullet out of the airbag with my knife. It fell to the
floor of the warehouse where it was recovered by Det. M. Bryan. It was wrapped in a glove, and handed to Det. D.
Malone. The bomb squad was done with the search and turned the vehicle back over to Det. Malone. We packed up and
left the warehouse.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 132 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/17/2024 13:27:59, Wednesday

Supervisor: WILSON, D. G. (1739) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/25/2024 10:43:55, Thursday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident Type: Death Investigation

Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Incident Date and Time: 3/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours
OCA: 2403740

On April 16th, 2024 at approximately 0900 hours I (Detective Malone) received the completed SLED ballistics report
(L24-05753) related to the victim`s firearm. That report, which was completed by Chad M. Smith, SLED forensic
scientist, states that both the Fired Cartridge Casing and fired projectile recovered from the victim`s vehicle were fired
by the firearm located in the victim`s hand (silver-in-color Smith and Wesson 9mm pistol).

The following facts have been obtained as a result of this investigation:

- The victim suffered from a single, close contact gunshot wound to the head.
- The incident occurred within the locked vehicle, which was owned and known to be operated by the victim. There
were no signs of struggle or forced entry into the vehicle prior to first responders arrival.
- The victim was observed to have a firearm (silver-in-color Smith and Wesson, SN: ) gripped tightly in
his right hand when located by officers.
- This firearm was confirmed to belong to the victim which was purchased around the year 2000 from
This was confirmed via the eTrace report conducted on the firearm.
- A single fired cartridge casing and single fired projectile were recovered from the victim`s vehicle. SLED
ballistic analysis (L24-05753) confirms the FCC and projectile were fired by the victim`s firearm.
-The trajectory of the projectile is consistent with the gunshot wound.
- A notebook containing what amounts to a suicide note was located, open, on the front, passenger seat of the
vehicle.
- Numerous fingerprints were recovered from this notebook and all of those recovered fingerprints (with the
exception of 3 prints being inconclusive due to the prints not containing enough ridges for a positive identification)
belong to the victim.
- Per medical records provided by the victim`s lawyer, and emails located during an examination of the victim`s
cell phone, the victim suffered from numerous mental health issues related to his whistleblower case. These mental
health issues are documented as being exacerbated. whenever the victim had to deal with the legal process related to his
case
- The victim`s call detail records (CDR) revealed no unusual travel or activity on the part of the victim and indicate
that the victim spent his time at the deposition site (on King Street) and back at the hotel.
- A forensic examination of the victim`s cell phone revealed no usual activity or conversations. The victim did not
receive any threats or usual phone calls/text messages during the time he was in Charleston.
- The victim was observed on Holiday Inn security video entering the hotel, alone, on March 8th, 2024 at 19:26:18
hours.
- The victim enters his room at 19:36 hours.
- The victim is observed on Holiday Inn security video exiting the hotel, alone, on March 8th, 2024 at

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 04/17/2024 13:27:59, Wednesday

Supervisor: WILSON, D. G. (1739) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/25/2024 10:43:55, Thursday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

20:37:23 hours.
- The victim`s vehicle is observed on Holiday Inn security video backing into the parking space (where it was
located the next morning) on March 8th, 2024 at 20:45 hours.

I am conferring with the Charleston County Coroner`s Office of the results of this investigation and await their official
ruling on the cause and manner of the victim`s death.

The investigation continues...

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: GLADWELL, S. N. (1809) Date / Time: 04/25/2024 09:16:00, Thursday

Supervisor: BENNETT, H. R. (2442) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 04/27/2024 13:51:31, Saturday
Contact: Reference: Crime Scene Log

Crime Scene Supplemental Report

Case Number: 2403740

Date/Time of Response: 03/14/2024 13:40
Location of Response: Forensic Services Division
Reporting CSI: S. Gladwell
Evidence Collected: No
Evidence sent to Latent Recovery: No
Photos taken: Yes
Video taken: No
Fingerprint processing at scene: No
Number of latent lifts: 0
Weather: Interior

Scene: Forensic Services Division

On the above date and time, R/I took additional photographs of a notebook that was collected by the Charleston
County Coroner`s Office at a death investigation.

R/I photographed an orange `Boeing` notebook, along with any pages where handwriting was present.

Nothing else was requested of Crime Scene at this time. Task completed.

END/SG

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 135 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 05/01/2024 12:16:06, Wednesday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 05/03/2024 12:32:59, Friday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident Type: Death Investigation

Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Incident Date and Time: 3/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours
OCA: 2403740

On April 29th, 2024 at 0930 hours I (Detective Malone) received the completed autopsy/toxicology report from the
Charleston County Coroner`s Office. That report, which was completed by JC Upshaw Downs, MD, lists the victim`s
cause of death as "gunshot wound of head" and the victim`s manner of death as "suicide."

Sergeant Tuttle and I spoke with Coroner Bobbi Jo O`neal and arranged to hold a meeting at her office with the family
(via Zoom) to present the findings of this investigation. Coroner O`neal informed us that the family has requested that
their attorneys (Rob Turkewitz and Brian Knowles) be in attendance for this meeting. She further informed us that the
family granted approval for a Netflix filmimg crew to be present during the hearing, however Coroner O`neal informed
us that she denied approval for Netflix to be present during the meeting with the family.

The meeting to discuss the findings with the victim`s family is set for May 3, 2024.

Due to all evidence in this case indicating suicide, and the final coroner`s report listing the victim`s manner of death as
suicide, I recommend that this case be reclassified as Pending Inactive.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 136 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Date / Time: 05/01/2024 12:48:52, Wednesday

Supervisor: MELLETTE, M. (1805) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 05/06/2024 14:31:31, Monday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

April 11, 2024

I, Detective Sergeant Eric Tuttle, contacted Waffle House in reference to obtaining their exterior video from 325
Savannah Hwy (Store # 411). They directed me to send a request via email to [email protected] and I did so. I
requested video from 20:45 hours on March 8, 2024 through March 9, 2024 at 10:17 hours.

The provided me with a screen shot of their two exterior camera angles which face the incident location. According to
Google Maps, the distance between the cameras and the parking lot of the incident location is more than 250 feet.
Additionally, there is dense vegetation between the cameras and the parking lot, which obstructs the majority of the
view of the parking lot.

April 26, 2024

Waffle House responded with a download link sent via email.

May 1, 2024

I downloaded the link which came in one zipped folder and contained three seperate folders. The folders contained a
proprietary software called VS Player. The player then automatically loads the footage. A brief initial review of the
footage did not show the victim`s vehicle.

The videos were added to the case folder.

Nothing further.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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 2:25-cv-02110-BHH Date Filed 03/19/25 Entry Number 1 Page 137 of 146
CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Printed: 05/13/2024 09:42

Charleston Police Department OCA: 2403740

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: PENDING ACTIVE Case Mng Status: PENDING ACTIVE Occurred: 03/09/2024

Offense: DEATH INVESTIGATION

Investigator: MALONE, D. R. (2237) Date / Time: 05/06/2024 15:39:08, Monday

Supervisor: TUTTLE, E. M. (1604) Supervisor Review Date / Time: 05/08/2024 23:23:43, Wednesday
Contact: Reference: Supplemental Report

Incident Type: Death Investigation

Incident Location: 301 Savannah Highway
Incident Date and Time: 3/09/2024 at approximately 1017 hours
OCA: 2403740

On May 3rd, 2024 at approximately 1000 hours I (Detective Malone), along with Sergeant Tuttle, arrived at the
Charleston County Coroner`s Office to provide the investigation results to the victim`s family. Upon arriving at the
office I was notified by Coroner O`neal that the family attorneys (Rob Turkewitz and Brian Knowles) hired an
investigative consultant, identified as Ray Nash, who would be sitting in on the meeting with the family in order to
review the investigation.

I then observed the family attorneys arrive at the office accompanied by several Netflix production vehicles. I observed
the Netflix production crew actively filming the attorneys and actively filming outside the front of the office, in direct
contradiction to what Coroner O`neal told us earlier in the week.

Based upon these developments, and upon consultation with Charleston Police Department command staff, it was
decided that we would not be participating in the meeting. Sergeant Tuttle and I then left the office and returned to
CPD headquarters.

At approximately 1500 hours I made telephone contact with the victim`s brother, . I explained the
reasons that we were unable to participate in the morning meeting, and informed Mr. Barnett that I would be more than
happy to brief the family on the findings of the CPD investigation should they wish. Mr. Barnett stated that the family
would like to speak with us regarding the investigation, and stated that he would notify me of a date and time that the
meeting could take place.

Investigator Signature Supervisor Signature

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