Roadmap of Security threats between IPv4/IPv6.

Fadi Abusafat Tiago Pereira Henrique Santos

Information system Department- Information system Department- Information system Department-
Algorithm centre. Algorithm centre. Algorithm centre.
University of Minho. University of Minho. University of Minho
2021 IEEE International IOT, Electronics and Mechatronics Conference (IEMTRONICS) | 978-1-6654-4067-7/21/$31.00 ©2021 IEEE | DOI: 10.1109/IEMTRONICS52119.2021.9422653

Guimaraes, Portugal. Guimaraes, Portugal. Guimaraes, Portugal.

[0000-0001-8821-9549] [0000-0001-5075-6189] [0000-0001-5389-3285]

Abstract— The idea of the Internet of Things is to connect industrial fields. This association leads to massive financial
every physical device with internet. Each device should be gains. Several studies estimate the financial impact of IoT from
presented by a unique address of Internet Protocol. There are two 2018 to 2023 to have increased from 249.4 to 2,0030.1 Million
versions of IP known by IPv4 and IPv6. IPv4 assumed to cover Dollar respectively [2]. This massive impact came from massive
whole network interfaces. Since the appearance of IoT, number of numbers of newly connected devices that interact and share data
connected devices increased sharply and IPv4 could not afford this over internet. Studies suggest the estimated number of
enormous numbers. Therefore, the solution came by introduced connected devices over internet increased from 7 to 21.5 billion
IPv6 to afford this massive number in IoT environment. Despite
device from 2018 to 2025 [3]. However, devices need Internet
IPv4 provided interoperability with several types of protocols,
Protocol/Transmission Control Protocol IP/TCP to exchange
robust and easy implementation but it’s vulnerable for several
kinds of attacks. Therefore, IPv6 introduced while having security
data. The main advantage of IP/TCP is to allocate unique
protocols such as IPsec, neighbour discovery protocol and Secure addresses to recognise of each device. Since the introduction of
Neighbour Discovery Protocol. However, due to IPv4 still working IoT, IP has been changed sharply from version 4 (IPv4) to
as well as updated with security components, there is need to version 6 (IPv6). This amendment introduced several security
interact between both versions of protocol. Therefore, there is challenges for security mechanism as well as security attacks
need for interacting mechanism between both them. These due to IPv4 still working and there is need to interacts between
mechanisms made implantation of IPv6 complicated and both versions while these mechanisms have interoperability
consumed more resources. Besides, there are threats for attacks. challenges and vulnerable for network layer attacks [4]. In this
Therefore, security features in IPv6 are not enough and there is review paper, we are going to draw a roadmap of potential
need for a new defense line that can secure network services and security threats based on IPv4 and IPv6 in IoT/Smart City
IP from attacks. Intrusion Detection mechanism considered good environment. To achieve this purpose, I am going to use my
mechanism to provide protection due to it works based on two knowledge in Pentesting as well as most updated works toward
levels Host and Network. Besides, it uses several security it. Updated work will be collected from strong conference and
approaches such as signature-based and network-based. However, journals. Ideally, there are three main questions to be highlighted
considering this tool as it’s in IoT environment will not bring the through this study:
light of security in IoT. Therefore, it should be developed while
considering features of IoT devices to secure IoT environment. To A. What are differences between IPv4 and IPv6?
achieve this, we have to investigate every feature, component and
operation in network. This review paper aims to analyse difference B. What are security threats for IPv4 and IPv6?
between IPv4/IPv6 and point out security threats related to IP in C. What are specific threats for IPv6?
both versions. Also, identifying main security threats to IPv6.
II. IPV4 VS IPV6
Keywords— IPv4, IPv6, IP Security threats, ICMPv6, Network
Layer attacks. A. Open Source Interconnection model
The Open Source Interconnection (OSI) model is considered
I. INTRODUCTION. to be the updated model in communication and interacting data
The 21 century is considered the time of development of
st
between devices. It consists from seven layers known by
technology due to the appearance of Internet-Of-Things (IoT). Application, Presentation, Session, Transport, Network, Data
The main core of IoT is to associate physical devices in human Link and physical layer. Application layer is responsible for
life through connections over internet. This association provided providing access to applications that are in connection with an
several facilities for human activities. IoT has several internet. Presentation layer is responsible to present data into
application such as Smart City, Smart Home, Smart Grids and translated formats. Session layer is responsible for creating,
Smart Buildings [1]. Ideally, it should apply with every opening and closing sessions in order to share data between

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devices. Transport layer is responsible for processing message introduced to deal with packet that have size bigger than this
delivery between senders and receivers. Network layer is range. Identification (ID) is a feature used to identify fragment
responsible for identifying addresses, destinations, and routes of of IP uniquely. Flags are used to control and identify fragment.
data through different networks. Data link layer is responsible There are three flags known by Bit 0, Bit 1 and Bit 2 which are
for error detection, corrections, link access, framing and reliable
delivery. While the physical layer is responsible to define used for reserved, do not fragment and more fragments
physical network. Since IP is located in network layer, we can respectively. Fragment Offset has a length of 13 bit and is used
assume rules for IP. Fig1, shows several protocols in each layer to specify the offset of a fragment relative to the beginning of
[5], [6] IP datagram. Time to live (TTL) has length 8 bit and used to
present maximum time of datagram will be live on the internet.
TTL is measured in seconds and it range between 0-255. In the
case TTL value is zero then datagram will be removed. Protocol
is used to present used Protocol in portion of datagram such as
6 present TCP and 17 present UDP. Checksum of header has
16 bit and is used to check errors in header. It is used to compare
Fig 1, OSI communication model.
values of header checksum at each hop and discards packets in
case of mismatch. Source Address has 32 bit and it present
sender of data. Destination Address has 32 bit and present
B. Length of Address. destination of sent packet Options it used for settings related for
The length/size of IPv4 is 32 bit while it is 128 bit in IPv6. security, route, time-stamp and usually used when value of IHL
Therefore, the number of available address in IPv4 and IPv6 are is set to more than 5 [7]–[9].
232 and 2128 respectively. The format of address used in IPv6 is
alphanumeric hexadecimal notation while it is numeric dot It is unlikely for IPv4, IPv6 has less than 8 fields. Starting by
decimal notation in IPv4. Prefix notation is 24 in IPv4 while it’s version and it represent the version of IP and has 4 bits. Traffic
48 in IPv6. Also, IPv6 is represented by four hexadecimal digits Class has 8 bits and is divided into two main parts. First one
in eight groups while in IPv4 is presented by three numeric dot consists of first six bits and is used to make router familiar with
decimal in four groups. Beside IPv6 supports auto configuration kind of services that should be provided. Secondly, last two bits
while in IPv4 support Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol and used for ECN. Flow label has 20 bits and designed for real-
(DHCP) or manual configuration. Table 1, shows comparison time media and streaming. Also, it used to maintain sequential
between IPv4 and IPv6 based on address features [7]. flow of packets. This help router to identify particular packet
Table 1 address features between IPv4 and IPv6. belonging to specific flow of information. Therefore, it helps to
IPv4 IPv6 avoid reordering of packets. Payload length has 16 bits and used
to inform router with size of information that packet have. The
Length: 32 bit Length : 128 bit
size can be up to 65535 bytes and it will set for zero in case the
Available address: 232 Available address : 2128 maximum size is exceeded. Next header has 8 bits and used to
indicate the type of extension header or Upper layer in case
Format: numeric dot decimal Format: Alphanumeric header is not present. Hop limit has 8 bits and used to stop
notation hexadecimal notation looping packet in network. It is the equivalent to TTL in IPv4.
Prefix notation : 24 Prefix notation : 48 Source address and destination address have 128 bits [7]–[9].

Represented by: Four Represented by: Three numeric dot

D. Quality of Service.
hexadecimal digits with decimal in four groups. Quality of Service (QoS) is a set of requirements that are
eight groups used to ensure proper delivery for packets. Ideally several
Supports: DHCP and Supports: Auto configuration. parameters are used to construct metrics of QoS such as
Manual configuration.
bandwidth, transmitted data, delay, lost data, received data and
other parameters. Therefore, to evaluate the QoS between IPv4
C. Header. and IPv6, will be based onto fields that indicate proper delivery.
Header in IPv4 consists of 14 fields. Firstly, the version In IPv4, the flow of packets will be based on source,
value is 4 bits. Internet Header Length (IHL) have varying sizes destination, ports and type of protocol in transport layer.
between 20 to 60 bytes and is used to avoid errors. The type of However, these parameters could be affected due to
services (ToS) used to provide quality of services such as Voice fragmentation and encryption process. While in IPv6, the flow
over IP (VoIP). Explicit Congestion notification (ECN) is of packets based on previous fields plus flow labelled which is
optional, and it used to notify senders or receivers network pre-defined in header. Flow labelled consists of 20 bits. The
updates. Total length size is 16 bits and is used to point out the field of 8 bits for traffic class and used to distinguish between
size of total datagram. The size can be ranged between 20 to classes or priorities of IPv6 packets. This distinction made by
65535 bytes. Since this, fragmentation process has been source node and router. Flow labelled provided several
advantages such as reduce average time for processing in router

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in network, reduce delays of packet, reduce the use of resources network has many devices. IPv6 uses multicast which it sent
that caused by frequent change route [10]. packets for selected devices on network rather than all devices.
This reduce traffic on network [11]–[14].
E. Auto Configuration.
The main aim of this feature is to connect devices such as F. Mobility.
PC to internet automatically without need for manual The main idea behind Mobile IP protocol (MIP) is to keep
configuration or software. Also, it provides a unique IP address devices connected to the internet while device in continuous
to overcome scalability issues. This feature is an improvement mobility. In IPv4, mobility mechanism consists from three
of Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) which uses a set of functional units known by home agent (HA), forgiven agent
attributes to discover neighbour devices. The set of attributes (FA) and mobile node (MN). Every MN has permanent home
known by Type Length Value (TLV) which consists of type, address allocated from home network but when it moves out, it
length, and descriptions of value [11]–[14]. gets a temporary address (CoA) which is used to identify MN
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is used for in visited network. However, routing issue cause delays in
automatic configuration of devices in network. It is used mobility in IPv4. While IPv6 provide a great support for
elements in configurations such as IP, subnet mask, gateway, mobility due to its uses two IP address known by home address
and other information. Generally, this process consists of and CoA. However, routing has been improved in IPv6 [15].
discover, offer, request and Knowledge. There are some
similarities on functionality of DHCP in IPv4 and IPV6. Firstly, G. Security.
the components of DHCP are DHCP Client, DHCP Server and IPv6 loaded with IP security series (IPsec) for security,
DHCP Relay. These components are not changed in both IPv4 authentication and data integrity provides authentication on
and IPv6. DHCP client is a device on a network that utilise a header and encapsulating security payload extension (ESP).
DHCP protocol to get network configuration. DHCP server is a Also, it is designed based on end-to-end encryption and it
component that provides a network configuration to DHCP supports more-secure name resolution. Besides, the secure
client. This server is configured by a network administrator neighbour discover protocol (SEND) added extra security
with network parameters to meet client needs. DHCP relay also features to neighbour discovery protocol (NDP) which is
known by DHCP relay agent and it used to pass messages in responsible for discovering other node on local link. However,
DHCP client and DHCP server are in different network. NDP is not secure but SEND secure it with cryptographic
Secondly, scopes and leases. Scopes is a group if information method. Updated IPv4 include IPsec features. Therefore,
that are used to configure device on network while lease is security is different but not that big [4] [7].
determine how long device on network can use that
configuration. Finally, both use four messages to provide basic
configuration of device on network. These configurations are
discover message/solicit message, offer message/advertise III. SECURITY THREATS TOWARDS IPV4 AND IPV6.
message, request message/request message and In this section, we are going to investigate Cyber security
acknowledgment messages/ replay message [11]–[14]. attacks based on bothIP addresses. We would like to mention
There are differences between DHCP for IPv4 and IPv6. Firstly new sophisticated attacks are multi-use which means it will be
called a reservation. In IPv4, MAC address been used to obtain based on IP and other services. However, we are going to
IP address while in IPv6 used DHCP unique identifier (DUID) classify attacks based onto previous features and operations in
IPv4 and IPv6..
to allocated IP address. This mechanism is more sophisticated.
However, reservation always require updating, as IPv4 is based A. Fragmentation attacks
on MAC while in IPv6 is based on DUIDs. The second Fragmentation process is used when sent packet in more than
difference is stateful and stateless. IPv6 have these two methods maximum size therefore, attacks related for this process are:
to configure devices on the network. Stateful stores device
1) Ping of death.
configuration while stateless not. In stateful DHCP sever knows The main aim of this attack is to destroy services on destination
IP address for all devices on network while in stateless it does machine. Idyllically, this attack used ping feature to create a
not record any IP address and devices use router advertisement small fragment and when these fragments assemble at
message to configure itself with an IP. A part of this IP is destination, they exceed the max size of IP packet of 65535
configured by device itself. In IPv4, it’s not possible for a bytes. This attack belong for Denial of Service (DoS) but it
device to configure a part of IP for itself due to limitation on utilised connection features to be conducted [16].
number of usable addresses. Second difference is Broadcast and 2) Drop attack.
Multicast. IPv6 uses multicast rather than broadcast. Broadcast This attack based on reassemble rules of fragmentation. One of
packets goes to all devices on the network once the device is these rules is to indicate location of fragment to reassemble
loaded on a network. This consumes more resources if the successfully at destination. Hence, hackers utilise this rule

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through sending fragment with overlap in order to make Therefore, hackers can steal and see traffic. This attack
destination node unable to reassemble sent packet [16]. conducted by MiTM tools. Unlikely in IPv4, blocking messages
3) Overlapping. of ICMP is common development of secure features in IPv4
The main aim of this attack is to gain access based on TCP network [7].
flags. It sends first fragment with TCP flag in order to reach the
destination. The second fragment is sent with different value of 2) Fragmentation process.
TCP flag. This fragment is not blocked due to verification In IPv6, fragmentation processes are denied by an intermediate
conducted only at the first fragment and when both fragments node and it conducts only by source node. The minimum
reach the destination, flag of first fragment will be over written recommendation size for MTU is 1280 bytes. Some security
with value of second fragment [16]. features recommend discarding all fragment with less than that
4) UDP and ICMP attack. value except if it’s in the last round of flow. Using fragments,
The main aim of this attack is to consume resources through an attacker establishes that port numbers are not in the first
sending UDP or ICMP packets bigger than network MTU
fragment. This helps in overcoming security mechanisms and
[16].
in order to send massive numbers of small fragments which
B. Routing attacks. cause system crashes. Therefore, it is recommended to limit
Routing is a process to identify path of traffic inside or number of fragments [20].
outside the network. It works in both versions of IP. Therefore,
there is a threat for several attacks such as: 3) Transition mechanism.
1) Flood attack. IPv4 and IPv6 protocols still coexist. Therefore, there is a need
This attack is based on sending large amount of traffic that for compatible transmission in order to avoid risk of failure in
make the destination unable to process sent packets. This attack internet connection. Despite the core of IPv6 is to provide
improvements of IPv4 but different between both protocols
belong for DoS. This attack utilises several types of protocols
resulting in two completely different protocols. This case
such as TCP, UDP and ICMP [17]–[19].
compatibility problem means IPv4 hosts and routers will not be
2) Sniffing attack. in a position to directly manage IPv6 neither IPv6 will directly
This attack aims to capture traffic while being sent through a manage Ipv4. Therefore, there is a need for transition
network. It has many aims such as stealing confidential data or mechanisms such as tunnelling, and dual-stack configuration.
dropping some packet. The best example of this attack is Man Tunnelling is capable of dealing with address selection and
in the Middle (MiTM) which is based on fool router and source DNS resolution but it increases routing process and consumes
to make traffic passed through it [17]–[19]. more memory and CPU. Once it increased routing process, it
3) Fake attack. will be vulnerable for routing attacks. Translation is easy to
This attack is based on introducing a fake device or access point implement, works with private address and configured NAT
node but it shows administration challenges due to its
which is not authorised to be inside a network. Once this fake
complexity and requires extra configuration which causes slow
device is installed inside a network, it can pass traffic through packet flow. Finally, it poses security threats with NAT due to
it in order to steal data [17]–[19]. it keeping sessions to apply address and port transition for
inbound and outbound traffic. So, in case an injection of
4) ARP spoofing.
unknown packet came from inside network, a new session will
ARP protocol is used to enable network communication
be created. Tunnelling mechanism allows IPv6 packets to
between devices. It is used to map MAC and IP address and this
transport over IPv4 but it causes problems such as delay loaded
mapping information stored in ARP table. This attack is based
CPU to perform encapsulation [21]. To clarify these threats, we
on sending wrong ARP messages over local networks to
use NAT64 which used to translate between IPv6 and IPv4. It
connect hacker MAC addresses with legitimate devices. Hence,
consists from three main parts known by NAT64 prefix, DNS64
hacker devices will obtain IP address and start spoofing,
server and NAT64 router. Let’s presume, two networks A and
modifying and blocking communication. This attack belongs
B needs to communicate. Network A is a network IPv6-based
for MITM [17]–[19].
and Network B is a network IPv4-based. In network A, there is
a device need to communicate with a Website in network B.
IV. SECURITY THREATS TOWARDS IPV6. The first step is a device in network A communicate with
DNS64 server asking about IPv6 for website in network B.
There are some threats toward IPv6 such as:
Suppose, DNS64 server does not have record about this
1) ICMP Threat.
website. So, it will communicate IPv6 DNS server asking about
IPv6 networks use ICMP message to conduct some important it. IPv6 DNS server communicate with IPv4 DNS server about
mechanisms such as router discovery when router respond for address of website. IPv4 DNS server replies with address of
end node with router solicitation message (RS) with router website in Network B due to it is located at the same network.
advertisement (RA). This information saved for a time in Then IPv6 DNS server forward it to DNS64 which will do
routing tables. Therefore a threat here hackers could fool prefixing for it in hexadecimal. After that, it will forward it for
victims with RA messages to present itself as a router. a device which it used to communicate with NAT64 router

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which be the main components between both networks. NAT64 that consumed plenty of resource introduced challenges for
router made translation between IPv6 and IPv4 header. Finally, interoperability in IoT devices. Therefore, proposed solution
translated IPv4 packet will be forward it for website to conduct for adapting IPv6 in IoT network, should be lightweight.
communication. This whole process is very complicated and
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