The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese

Domestic Politics
Augustus Richard Norton

Hezbollah is the product of a quarter century of history.1 The organisation began

as a cat’s paw of Iran, a righteous, violently militant collection of young
revolutionaries who had no time for mundane politics. With time’s passage, and
the generosity of its Iranian patron, it has built an array of institutions, some
military, mostly to provide for the quotidian needs of a growing number of
constituents. Its ideology has evolved and adapted to the realities of Lebanon,
but it remains virulently anti-Israel and hostile to the American hegemony
which it sees as a fundamental threat to the future of the Middle East and its
cultural integrity. Hezbollah espouses a model of modernity and empowerment
that has attracted a broad following in Lebanon’s large Shia community, which
accounts for about 1.4 million of the county’s 4 million citizens. Many other
Lebanese see it as an existential threat and no doubt hoped for its defeat in the
2006 war. Although it was infamous for blatant acts of terrorism in the 1980s and
early 1990s, it fought an ultimately successful campaign of resistance against
Israel’s occupation of Lebanon while respecting non-combatant immunities and
other key norms of warfare. In short, this deeply embedded political party, which is
now very much an integral part of the political system, usually confounds simple
stereotypes and classifications.

Augustus Richard Norton is Professor of Anthropology and International Relations at Boston University;
Email: [email protected]
1
The most reliable sources on Hezbollah are: Alagha, Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology; Hamzeh, In the Path of
Hizbullah; Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face; Norton, Hezbollah: Short History, and Saad-Ghorayeb,
Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion. There are a variety of spellings of ‘‘Hezbollah’’ as reflected in these book
titles. While a standard spelling is used in the text, in referenced sources the original spelling is retained.

The International Spectator, Vol. 42, No. 4, December 2007, 475–491 ISSN 0393-2729 print/ISSN 1751-9721 online
ß 2007 Istituto Affari Internazionali DOI: 10.1080/03932720701722852
476 A. R. Norton

This article offers an overview of Hezbollah’s emergence, political evolution,

calculations in instigating the 2006 war, and its place in postwar Lebanon.

The crucible of invasion

In 1982, mid-way through Lebanon’s civil war, Israel invaded Lebanon with
the intention of destroying the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO),2 and
installing a friendly government in Beirut that would be ready to make peace
with Israel.3 Utterly preoccupied with the PLO when it invaded, Israel paid little
attention to the Lebanese Shia community, which predominates in southern
Lebanon, the northern Biqa valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs. Hezbollah
(the ‘‘Party of God’’), did not even exist before 1982. The group that was gaining
in popularity in the early eighties was Amal (literally meaning ‘‘Hope,’’ but also an
acronym for the ‘‘Lebanese Resistance Detachments’’). Amal was the progeny of
a dynamic reform movement created in 1974 by al-Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, an Iranian
cleric of Lebanese descent, who devoted two decades to raising the political and
religious consciousness and the quality of life of Lebanon’s long under-privileged
Shia community.4 Although al-Sadr had presumably been murdered in Libya in
1978, Amal was enjoying a resurgence in 1982 when it battled several Palestinian
guerrilla groups and insisted that Palestinian fighters stop their brutish treatment of
Lebanese civilians. Amal supporters had tired of living in the Israeli-Palestinian
crossfire, and tended to direct their blame at the Palestinians for provoking Israeli
attacks that victimised Lebanese civilians. Amal enjoyed substantial support from
Damascus, where the movement was seen as a check on the PLO, but after Syria’s
defeat by Israel in 1982 Amal momentarily embraced a pax americana and the
notion that Lebanon’s civil war had ended.
But the Israeli invasion only opened a new chapter in the civil war. As the
Israeli army streamed northward in 1982 to lay siege to Beirut, they ran into
stiff resistance not only around the Palestinian camps, but also on the southern
approaches to the capital where Lebanese Shia fighters put up stiff resistance.
Many of these fighters, inspired by the Iranian revolution that had toppled the
Shah three years before, would migrate away from Amal and eventually join
Hezbollah. The Israeli army would remain in Lebanon for eighteen more years,
although it withdrew to a border occupation ‘‘security’’ zone – accounting for more
than ten percent of Lebanese territory – in 1985. Israel finally withdrew unilaterally

2
After challenging the regime in Jordan in 1970, the PLO lost its footing in that country and established
itself as the dominant militia force in southern Lebanon where it found ready support, especially in the
Palestinian refugee camps that stemmed from the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948–49. Brynen’s Sanctuary and
Survival provides rich and informed detail on the PLO’s role in Lebanon.
3
The seminal account is by Schiff and Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War.
4
The primary reference on Amal is Norton, Amal and the Shi’a.
 The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics 477

in May 2000, but by then its occupation had had a profound impact on Lebanese
politics.

Hezbollah emerges
While the formation of Hezbollah began in 1982, it would be two more years
before it came into shape as a coherent organisation. For Iran, the creation of
Hezbollah represented the realisation of the revolutionary state’s zealous campaign
to spread the message of the self-styled ‘‘Islamic revolution’’, whereas for Syria the
Shia party was a fortuitous instrument for preserving its interests: Syria’s alliance
with Iran presented it with the means to strike indirectly at both Israel and the
United States, as well to keep Lebanese allies, including the Amal movement, in
line. Nonetheless, Syria viewed Hezbollah with considerable suspicion and there
were several celebrated clashes, including one in 1987 when Syria killed 23
Hezbollah members in retaliation for the killing of one of its soldiers.
From its first moments, Hezbollah defined itself in contrast to Amal. Whereas
Amal was decidedly reformist and secular, Hezbollah embraced Iran’s revolutionary
model of clerical rule and judged Lebanon’s bakshish (bribe)-lubricated political
system to be unreformable. In 1985, when Amal launched its ‘‘war of the camps’’,
with Syrian support, to prevent a resurgence of Palestinian forces, Hezbollah lent
key support to the Palestinians and thwarted Syria and Amal. Since then Hezbollah
has built a web of alliances with the Palestinians, and has often spoken on
behalf of expanding their rights and allowing them access to the economy, even
though the prevalent opinion in Lebanon opposes anything that smacks of tawtin
(naturalisation) of the refugees.
There are now over 400,000 Palestinian refugees registered in Lebanon, most of
whom live in twelve largely autonomous refugee camps. In the deprivation and
isolation of the camps, a myriad of militant and jihadist Sunni Islamist groups have
emerged, often drawing inspiration and anger from the chaos of Iraq. Most of these
groups are opposed to the Palestinian nationalist current of Fatah now led by
Mahmoud Abbas. As Bernard Rougier notes, they typically view Shias as apostates
(rafadis) and are therefore fundamentally contemptuous of Hezbollah, but this has
not prevented some alliances of convenience, especially against the US supported
Beirut government of Fouad Siniora.5
As the civil war in Lebanon was drawing to a close, Hezbollah established itself as
a force to be reckoned with. Hezbollah and Amal fought, in 1988–89, to contest
the Shia heartland in the south and the teeming southern suburbs of Beirut, where
fully half of the Shia population now resides. Divided by both ideology and
practice, Hezbollah was busy creating efficient institutions, including an array

5
Rougier, Everyday Jihad.
478 A. R. Norton

of public services, such as clinics and construction companies, while Amal offered
its members a familiar patronage system. In the southern suburbs Amal was badly
defeated and lost its foothold in the capital, but Hezbollah’s efforts to challenge
Amal in the south were less successful, and Amal remains an important force there.
Despite periodic minor clashes, the two groups have reached a political modus
vivendi, often under the diktat of Syria.

Exiting the security zone

Israel’s self-styled security zone provoked insecurity in Lebanon and served as an
impetus for recruitment of young Shias intent on liberating Jabal Amil, the region
of southern Lebanon that figures importantly in the early history of Shiism.6
Hezbollah’s reputation benefited from its central role in the resistance to the
occupation. In that sense former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s comment
in 2006 is apt: ‘‘When we entered Lebanon . . . there was no Hizbullah. We were
accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south. It was our
presence there that created Hezbollah.’’7
When Barak was elected prime minister in 1999, one of his campaign promises
was to withdraw from Lebanon within twelve months of assuming office, either in
conjunction with bilateral negotiations with Syria or unilaterally. After negotiations
with the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad failed in March 2000, Israel began
preparations for a unilateral withdrawal. In Beirut and Damascus, amidst much
confusion and dire warnings of widespread chaos, officials seemed to be actors
confused about their lines, and unsure even of their parts, so disconcerting was a
voluntary Israeli exit from Lebanon. In contrast, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hasan
Nasrallah revealed a cool demeanour. His statements stood out for the clarity of their
analysis and his calm assurances of Hezbollah’s careful preparations for the
aftermath. He insisted that there would not be retaliatory killings and
revenge attacks.8
The withdrawal finally came on 24 May 2000, inspiring an extraordinary
celebration in Lebanon, especially in the south. Tens of thousands of displaced
residents flooded in to take possession of their liberated homes and villages. There
was very little violence and Nasrallah was the star of day. Many of the militia allies of
Israel fled with their families. Those who remained were tried for collaboration by
the state, typically being given sentences of four or five years. Overall, this will go
down as a remarkably orderly period, especially when measured against the history of
internecine violence that has scarred Lebanon for much of the past few decades.

6
See Norton, ‘‘(In)security Zones’’.
7
Peraino, ‘‘Barak’s View’’.
8
Norton, ‘‘Hizballah and the Withdrawal from Lebanon’’, 32–3.
 The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics 479

The Shebaa farms file

Though Israel’s withdrawal was certified by the United Nations, Syria was not at all
enchanted with losing Hezbollah’s role as a willing device to pressure Israel. A few
months before the Israeli withdrawal, pro-Syrian figures led by Amal’s Nabih Berri
began talking about the Shebaa farms. 9 The farms are a 25 square kilometre patch
of land owned by Lebanese but located in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights
(there are, in fact, about two dozen anomalies along the Lebanese-Syrian
border – areas in which the border is either ambiguous or unsettled). While the
prevailing international view has been that all of the Golan Heights are occupied
Syrian territory, Lebanon – with Syrian support – now underlined its claim that the
farms were, in fact, Lebanese territory. Unless Israel withdrew from the farms as
well, its withdrawal from Lebanon would be incomplete. Up to early May 2000,
senior officials in Hezbollah knew little about the area, but over the next six years
the Shebaa farms would become notorious as a locale for periodic Hezbollah
attacks on Israeli occupation forces. For Hezbollah, and for its ally Syria, the
purported occupation of the Shebaa farms was very convenient because, under
the banner of resistance, Hezbollah could periodically remind Israel that the
Golan Heights remained unfinished business.
In the summer of 2000, there was a serious debate within Hezbollah about
whether to turn their focus to the Lebanese political scene or to maintain their
resistance posture in both Lebanon and the Middle East. Urged on by Iranian
leader Ali Khamenei, Hezbollah’s official legal authority, the party declared that
the task of liberation was incomplete.10 But while many Lebanese Shias embraced
Hezbollah’s argument that its armed presence along the border was a deterrence to
Israeli aggression, many other Lebanese refused to buy the claim, especially as the
years passed.
From the Israeli withdrawal of May 2000 until the eruption of war in July 2006,
there was aggressive patrolling, heated rhetoric and periodic episodes of violence
by both sides. Most of the armed attacks were in the disputed Shebaa farms.
By historical standards, however, this was a relatively quiet period. In general,
clashes respected ‘‘rules of the game’’, which had been codified in writing in
1996 and specified that Israel would not attack civilians in Lebanon and
Hezbollah would not attack Israel. As Daniel Sobelman notes, the rules were so
well established that officials were sometimes quoted as saying that such and such
skirmish was ‘‘within the rules’’.11 The Hezbollah leadership was unanimously
persuaded, as were most of the supporters, that its demonstrated military prowess,

9
See Karam, ‘‘Internal and External Determinants of a Crisis’’, 63–4.
10
While Khamenei is the official legal authority for Hezbollah, most Lebanese Shias – including most of
the rank-and-file Hezbollah members – follow either Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq or Lebanon’s Ayatollah
Muhammad Husain Fadlallah.
11
Sobelman, New Rules of the Game, 67–82.
480 A. R. Norton

and its accumulating military arsenal provided by Iran and Syria, was successfully
deterring Israel from invading Lebanon again. In July 2006, this would be revealed
as wishful thinking.

Playing politics
Lebanon has a curious electoral system that is intended to accommodate its
mélange of confessional spirits, diverse regional interests and personal rivalries.
The Lebanese state is weak at the centre, which makes it exceptional in the
Middle East. Voters go to polls every four years (barring the years of the civil
war, 1975–90) to vote for members of parliament. As a result of the Taëf
Agreement of 1989, which marked the end of the civil war, seats are now divided
equally between Christians and Muslims, in contrast to the prior distribution
that favoured Christians by a six to five ratio. The 128 parliamentary seats are
subdivided along confessional lines (for example, twenty-seven seats each for the
three largest sects – Shias, Sunnis and Maronites), and most districts are
confessionally mixed.12 Voters cast ballots for each available seat in the district
regardless of the seat’s confessional label. Thus, a Maronite Christian living in
Baabda (near Beirut) votes in a district where there are also Shia and Druze
seats. Thus, when casting her ballot, she votes for every empty seat, including
those allocated to other sects. Since candidates have to appeal across confessional
lines, the system tends to promote local inter-sectarian electoral alliances.
In its early days, Hezbollah was contemptuous of Lebanese politics. The
coterie of young clerics who comprised Hezbollah’s cadre resented the non-clerical
leadership of Amal, and the movement’s accommodation with clientelism and
corruption. Unlike the Amal politicos, who aspired to becoming the new Shia
bourgeoisie, the cadre of Hezbollah – men in their twenties and thirties for the
most part – had been trained in al-Najaf and Karbala, in Iraq, or Qum, in Iran,
where they were ideologically inculcated by Ayatollahs Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr,
Muhsin al-Hakim, and Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini, among others, and taught
that there could be no accommodation with a corrupt political system.
The looming elections in 1992, the first since 1972, posed an intriguing
question for Hezbollah: should the party adhere to its declared ideological position
and reject participation in a confessional political system that it described as
corrupt and unreformable, or should it seize the moment and compete in the
election? Twelve leading members were deputised to take a decision. The debate,
blessed by Iran, turned on several key questions, including whether participation in
a ‘‘non-Islamic’’ government was legitimate, and where ideology should bend to
practical interests. The crucial question was whether by participating Hezbollah

12
Norton, ‘‘Lebanon after Al-Ta'if’’.
 The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics 481

would be co-opted and thereby desert its principles and its Islamic vision. In the
end, ten of the twelve men embraced competing in elections.13
Overall, the decision to play Lebanese politics was widely popular in the Shia
community where there is a deep-seated sense of political disenfranchisement.
Winning seats in parliament also offers greater access to government resources
(literally, allocations), which are typically distributed confessionally in Lebanon.
There were also strategic benefits to winning elected office. Hezbollah would gain
both official recognition as a political institution in Lebanon as well as a place at
the table to be able to head off problematic initiatives.
In 1992, Hezbollah and its non-Shia electoral allies captured twelve seats,
including eight Shia seats. With some modest variation from one election to
another, it has maintained that pattern, thereby holding around ten percent
of all parliamentary seats. As a result of local elections, Hezbollah controls about
two-thirds of predominantly Shia municipalities, including the massive Beirut
suburbs of Bourj al-Barajnah and Ghobeirre.14
In each election, the Hezbollah leadership has declared that its members are
legally required, as though commanded by Allah (taklif al-shari), to support the
party, leading its opponents to blast the party for exploiting religion. Lebanese
Ayatollah Fadlallah has levelled his own criticism at the party for a ‘‘perverse
practice’’ that might lead to the cheapening of religious principles, as the
Lebanese scholar Joseph Alagha reports.15 Despite this problematic use of
Islamic doctrine, what remains striking about Hezbollah’s political campaigns is
the extent to which non-religious themes are habitually emphasized, including
economic exploitation and underdevelopment, inequities in the political system,
personal freedom and opportunity, and, of course, security.

Syria’s electoral engineering

The central preoccupation of the Shia community was for many years the Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon. In its campaign slogans, Hezbollah capitalised on
its role in the resistance, as in 1996 when some of its posters read: ‘‘they resist with
their blood, resist with your vote’’. Particularly in 2000, the year of Israel’s unilateral
withdrawal, Hezbollah might have won four or five more seats at the expense of
Amal, had it not been for the saqf al-suri (‘‘Syrian ceiling’’), widely understood as
an upper limit set by Syria on the number of Hezbollah candidates permitted

13
Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem, who like many Hezbollah members began his involvement in
Lebanese politics as a member of Amal in the 1970s, offers the most detailed insider account of the ‘‘deep
internal debate’’ that preceded the elections. Qassem, Hizbullah, 187–200.
14
Ghobeirre, the largest town in the suburbs, has been singled out by the UN Habitat ‘‘best practices’’
program, designed to highlight development success stories, for its low income housing. It is one of only
three municipalities that have gained the same recognition in Lebanon.
15
Alagha, Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, 212; and Sankari, Fadlallah, 241–7.
482 A. R. Norton

to compete. The ceiling reflected Syria’s usual balancing game in Lebanese politics
with the result that in 2000 an Amal-Hezbollah alliance – the Resistance and
Development Bloc – won all 23 available seats in southern Lebanon and more
than a quarter of all seats in parliament.
Indeed, Syria played a persistently intrusive role in all of Lebanon’s elections from
1992 until 2005. Syrian manipulation included composing candidate lists and draw-
ing electoral districts with a view to isolating opposition voices and ensuring the
victory of allies. Syria’s ‘‘pro-consuls’’ in Lebanon, General Ghazi Kanaan and later
General Rustom Ghazzali, imposed periodic diktats, notably three-year extensions to
the presidential terms of Elias Hrawi in 1995 and Emile Lahoud in 2004. In each
case the Lebanese parliament compliantly approved the ‘‘one-time exceptions’’ to the
constitutional provision that limits presidents to a single six-year term.
In the case of Lahoud, there was significant and vocal opposition. The
most notable opponent was Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.16 The 2004 extension
provoked a firm response by the United Nations Security Council, which passed
Resolution 1559, which called for, among other things, the disarmament of militias
(that is, Hezbollah) and the withdrawal of foreign forces (the Syrian army). In
October 2004, after Lahoud’s extension was approved, Hariri resigned from office.
Four months later, on 14 February 2005, he was assassinated in a massive bomb
attack that claimed his life and the lives of ten colleagues. The assassination of
Hariri, widely attributed to Syria, prompted massive anti-Syrian demonstrations in
Beirut that helped to loosen Syria’s grip on the Lebanese political system. By April,
facing concerted international pressure and angry Lebanese demonstrators, the
Syrian army left Lebanon for the first time since it had intervened in the civil
war nearly three decades before. Simultaneously, Prime Minister Omar Karami,
known for his pro-Syrian loyalties, resigned from office as Lebanon prepared for
fresh parliamentary elections.
Under significant pressure, particularly from the United States, the elections
were held in May 2005. Calls for reform of the electoral law by opposition
groups, including Hezbollah and Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, were
spurned.17 The result was a resounding victory by the ‘‘Cedar Revolution’’,
a coalition of Sunni Muslims, Druze and some Christians, who captured a
robust majority in the parliament. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt took the initiative
to co-opt both Hezbollah and Amal as a device to prevent an electoral alignment

16
In Lebanon’s confessional political system, the top positions are allocated to the three largest sects, hence
the president is always a Maronite Christian, the prime minister always a Sunni and the speaker of
parliament a Shia Muslim. Hence, President Emile Lahoud is a Maronite, the late Rafic Hariri a Sunni
and Nabih Berri a Shia. Under this system, members of Lebanon’s remaining 15 sects, who account for less
than 30 percent of the total population, may never fill the three top offices, so long as the confessional
system persists.
17
The electoral law that had been imposed by Syria in 2000 was designed to fragment the Christian vote
and to isolate and disadvantage opposition figures.
 The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics 483

between the Shia and the most popular Christian politician, retired General
Michel Aoun, who had returned to Lebanon from exile in France to compete
in the elections.18 Hezbollah gained two ministerial posts in the new government
led by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, a long-time confidante of Rafic Hariri, and
in return received the government’s acknowledgement of its role as a national
resistance force.

The 2006 war

A ‘‘National Dialogue’’ bringing together top Shia, Sunni, Druze and Maronite
political leaders, including Nasrallah, Aoun, Berri, Geagea, Siniora, Saad al-Din
Hariri, the son of Rafic, and former president Amine Gemayel, began in March
2006 to address three issues, the UN-led enquiry into the assassination of Rafic
Hariri, Lebanon’s relations with Syria, and the implementation of UN Security
Council Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarming of militias.19 The dialogue
continued into June but it skirted the issue of disarming Hezbollah as increasing
numbers of Lebanese were demanding. Hezbollah’s argument continued to be that
in the absence of any other credible instrument for defending Lebanon from Israel
it would continue to protect the country. Moreover, there was the unfinished
business of the still-occupied Shebaa farms. Nasrallah had pointedly secured
Siniora’s agreement, when it joined the cabinet following the May 2005 elections,
that the group was a resistance movement (not a militia).
Finally, on 12 July 2006, despite Hezbollah’s public and repeated insistence that
it would do nothing to jeopardise the upcoming summer tourist season, it was to
deliver on al-wad al-sadiq (‘‘the faithful promise’’) to secure the release of the three
or four remaining Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails that Hezbollah launched its
operation20 – presumably to demonstrate its tenacity and ability to strike and deter
Israel. Hezbollah probably reckoned that Lebanese proponents of disarming the
militia would be silenced by a dramatic success. These calculations were premised
on measured and limited Israeli retaliation. As events would show, and as Nasrallah
and others would later admit, Hezbollah had made a major miscalculation.

18
Despite the defective electoral law, Aoun won 21 seats (the total would have been substantially larger
had it not been for the temporary alliance of convenience between the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and
Hezbollah), but was pointedly excluded from the government to deny him a platform for winning the
presidency in 2007. The Maronite militia leader and presidential aspirant Samir Geagea, whose Lebanese
Forces militia had fought bloody battles with the Aoun-led army in the late 1980s, was particularly
vehement in demanding Aoun’s exclusion. Nevertheless, the attempt to ostracize Aoun backfired and he
later became Hezbollah’s partner in the opposition.
19
See Karam, ‘‘Internal and External Determinants of a Crisis’’, 51–2.
20
A motorised Israeli patrol was ambushed in an unpopulated area of Israel bordering with Lebanon, three
Israeli soldiers were killed on the spot, and two others were initially captured. By the afternoon five Israeli
soldiers fell, and a top-of-the-line Merkava tank was destroyed on Lebanese soil as the IDF attempted to
pursue the captors.
484 A. R. Norton

Vowing to crush Hezbollah as a military force and to free its two captured
soldiers, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert confounded Hezbollah’s calculations
and responded massively to the incident. Israel and its US ally viewed the conflict
as a proxy war with Iran, and both countries were intent to see Hezbollah crushed.
Israel enjoyed broad international support, including widespread condemnation of
Hezbollah for violating Israel’s border and snatching the soldiers, especially since
Israel had unilaterally withdrawn from the country six years before. Key Arab states
were quick to voice their disapproval of Hezbollah’s action, including Saudi Arabia,
which within a day criticised ‘‘uncalculated adventures’’. Jordan, Egypt and the
United Arab Emirates followed suit.21
If Israel enjoyed international license for a relentless attack, which its Chief
of Staff General Dan Halutz vowed would set the Lebanese recovery back by
two decades,22 the license expired after a few weeks of mutual pummeling, and
particularly as civilian losses mounted. By the time a ceasefire was finally in place
by mid-August, Israel and the United States were forced to scale back their
demands dramatically. Indeed, a ‘‘7 point plan’’ promulgated by the Lebanese
government, and preserving the sovereign prerogatives of Lebanon would decisively
shape the ceasefire. The centrepiece for the ending of the war was Security Council
Resolution 1701 which provides for the enhancement of UNIFIL, deployed in
Lebanon since 1978. Especially with heavy European involvement, the UN force
would become stronger, or so it was hoped. In practice, the force would avoid
taking any action to disarm Hezbollah without (unlikely) government approval.
For its part, Hezbollah would avoid brandishing weapons in UNIFIL’s area of
operations.23
No doubt, the presence of 15,000 soldiers and sailors exhibiting impressive levels
of professionalism, and equipped with modern war machinery, such as main battle
tanks, not to mention a naval component, poses a complication for any belligerent
contemplating war. Nonetheless, even on steroids, UNIFIL is – like all UN peace-
keeping forces – a collection of national contingents, each under UN command but
also guided by the instructions of home governments. This characteristic was
illustrated after a roadside bomb killed four Spanish and two Columbian soldiers
in late June 2007. The perpetrators were linked with Fatah al-Islam, the al-Qaeda

21
Amidst the furies of war, Hasan Nasrallah was interviewed on al-Jazeera television on 21 July and
referred to Arab disapproval as a ‘‘surprise’’. In addition to implying his failure to anticipate the immensity
of the Israeli response, he said, ‘‘The Israeli reaction to the capture could have been harsh, but limited, if it
were not for the international and Arab cover.’’
22
Halutz is quoted as saying, ‘‘If the soldiers are not returned, we will turn Lebanon’s clock back 20
years.’’ CNN.com (online) ‘‘ Israel Authorizes 'Severe' Response to Abductions’’, 12 July 2006 http://
www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/12/mideast/
23
See Norton, ‘‘The Peacekeeping Challenge’’; Norton, ‘‘Misión Complicada’’; and Göksel, ‘‘Unifil–
Peacekeeping in the Line of Fire’’.
 The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics 485

linked Salafi group that battled the Lebanese army in northern Lebanon through-
out the summer of 2007.24 The attack, which was encouraged and then applauded
by al-Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahiri, prompted national contingents to
seek the cooperation of Hezbollah to help deter and detect further attacks despite
the fact that such contacts contradicted the orders of General Claudio Graziano,
the UNIFIL commander, and the intentions of the Security Council. Much
like its predecessors in UNIFIL, which was first deployed in 1978, many of the
contingents have also developed valuable ties with the local population, which can
be an important source of mission and security-related intelligence. So long
as UNIFIL sustains its neutral stance it will find a lot of support in the local
population, but that suggests that UNIFIL will function as a buffer not the assertive
force envisaged in some quarters in 2006.

Postwar Lebanon
Notwithstanding the celebration of Hezbollah’s ‘‘victory’’ in the war in the wider
Arab world, closer to home there was more questioning of the party’s motives and
the consequences, which included a reconstruction bill estimated at $4–5 billion
and a heavy toll in lives and personal property: 1,109 dead civilians, and 15,000
family homes destroyed. Much of the cross-confession solidarity that developed in
the final weeks of the war, as Lebanon was being pounded by Israel, quickly faded.
Just to facilitate internal transportation, 78 bridges would have to be rebuilt. The
complete repair of infrastructure will take at least until late 2008. Tourism is crucial
to the economy, and in 2006 alone about $2 billion in income was lost. It may
be years before the tourist sector recovers. Beirut is famous as a Mediterranean
banking centre, and much of that business has found safer harbours. In short, the
war was a disaster for Lebanon economically, especially considering that the
national debt was already $40 billion or twice the annual GDP, one of the highest
levels of relative debt in the world.
The war has, in fact, split Lebanon in two politically. The first Lebanon is
represented by a coalition of mainly Sunnis, Druze and Christians that coalesced
following the assassination of Rafic Hariri. This is the so-called March 14 group,
named after the extraordinary protest march of 14 March 2005, when as many as
one million demonstrators gathered in Beirut in response to Hariri’s murder to
demand a full investigation into the assassination and to call for an exit of Syrian
forces from Lebanon. This group, which won the parliamentary elections of May
2005 by capturing 72 of 128 seats, was in power during the 2006 war. It considers
Hezbollah’s provocative actions in the run-up to the war a coup d ’état and accuses

24
An-Nahar, 16 July 2007.
486 A. R. Norton

the organisation of being an agent of Syria and Iran with the ultimate aim of
installing a theocratic Islamic Republic on the shores of the Mediterranean.
The second Lebanon is also a coalition, consisting mostly of the southern
Lebanese Shia community (mainly Hezbollah and Amal) and large elements of
the Christian community – especially the many followers of the magnetic Maronite
politician and former General Michel Aoun. This group is somewhat confusingly
called the March 8 group, in commemoration of the large demonstration mounted
by Hezbollah and Amal on 8 March 2005 ostensibly to respect Hariri’s
memory but also to thank Syria for its supposed role in maintaining peace in
the country.25 The ‘‘Aounists’’ and Shia share a profound sense of victimisation
in the face of what they see as a corrupt and unresponsive political system. The slow
pace of government payments to those who lost their homes thanks to Israel’s
relentless bombing is widely viewed as an example of the latter, much in contrast
to Hezbollah’s speedy distribution of $12,000 payments to each family made
homeless by the war. The opposition alliance, formally sealed in a written compact
on February 2006, has proven remarkably durable.26 Most basically, the opposition
is trying to expand its share of power in significant measure especially at the
expense of the traditional Christian elite and the Sunni Muslims. It is the threat
of a decline in Sunni prerogatives and power in Lebanon that has prompted Saudi
Arabia to become key backers of the government.
Nasrallah rationalises the 2006 war by arguing that Israel was planning an attack
anyway for the autumn, and that Israel was ‘‘forced’’ by the 12 July capture
operation to launch its war earlier. Yet, in an hour-long, live interview on
Lebanon’s New TV on 27 August 2006, he argued: ‘‘if any of us [on the 15
member political-military council] had a one percent concern that Israel was
going to reply in this savage manner we wouldn’t have captured those soldiers’’.
There is a key logical inconsistency in his argument, namely the notion that it was
better to prompt the attack now, rather than later, since it was inevitable, but also
claiming that Hezbollah would not have launched its operation if it had known
what was coming. Another purpose of the interview, however, was to reassure his
fellow Lebanese that Hezbollah’s weapons were only for fighting the Israeli enemy
and not ‘‘pointed’’ at fellow Lebanese, but this reassurance was coupled with
a demand for a ‘‘national unity’’ government, including representatives of
Hezbollah-ally the Free Patriotic Movement of General Michel Aoun – an attempt
to pressure the current government out of power by insisting on a national unity
government that would rule by consensus.

25
Actually, hundreds of thousands of Aounists participated in the 14 March 2005 demonstrations, but
when their leader General Aoun was shut out of the government after the elections in May, they moved to
the opposition. Since doing so, Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement has shown considerable strength in
university student elections, and in the important professional associations of lawyers, doctors and
engineers.
26
The full translated text may be found at yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/02/full_english_te.php
 The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics 487

In Western circles and in the March 14 group, Hezbollah and the Aounists are
perceived as trying to protect Syria by stifling efforts to authorise an international
tribunal to try those accused of responsibility for the killing of Hariri
and his associates (the Syrian regime is widely suspected of having directed the
assassination). There is some truth in the charge, since a weakening of Syria would
no doubt weaken its friends in Lebanon.
Yet, there are other games at play. The presidential term of the unpopular Emile
Lahoud, also an ally of Syria, ends in November 2007. Michel Aoun, by far the
most popular Maronite politician, has his eyes on the presidency, although
Hezbollah has been coy in declaring whether it would support his candidacy.
Aoun enjoys little support among Lebanon’s political elite, but he does have
a strong base of popular support in the Maronite community, as reflected in his
broad success in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Given the sharp polarisation in
Lebanese politics, the US and French commitment to support the government of
Fouad Siniora and the deep enmity in both Paris and Washington for Hezbollah,
Aoun’s candidacy has been weakened despite his residual popularity among
Lebanese Christians. Parliamentary speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri has
emphasized that a compromise candidate must prevail. Aoun is viewed as
divisive and his alliance with Hezbollah is sufficient to disqualify him in Beirut
pro-government circles as well as in leading Western capitals.

The opposition raises the ante

The autumn of 2006 was marked by an escalation of tension and demands, includ-
ing a blatant ultimatum by Nasrallah on October 31 demanding that the govern-
ment either agree to a national unity government, in which consensus prevails, or
face widespread demonstrations and other forms of organised pressure such as
blockades on the route to the national airport. In conjunction with these demands,
all five Shia members of the government resigned in November, leaving even the
legal status of the rump government in question. The opposition claimed that the
1989 Taëf Agreement requires that every major sect much be represented in gov-
ernment, prompting President Lahoud to assert that the government was no longer
legitimate (vis-à-vis the question of an international tribune, notably). To block a
vote on the tribunal, Speaker Nabih Berri refused to convene parliament, but in an
end-run around the opposition, Prime Minister Siniora requested action by the
UN Security Council to mandate an international tribunal. While Siniora’s request
is of doubtful legality, given the refusal of President Lahoud to agree to it, the
tribunal was approved by the Security Council in May 2007 under the terms of
Chapter Seven of the Charter, which permits the use of force to confront threats to
international peace and security. As a result, the tribunal now is a sword of
Damocles that swings over the heads of the opposition.
488 A. R. Norton

The postwar crisis took another turn on 21 November 2006 when 33-year old
Pierre Gemayel, a minister in the government, son of a former president and
namesake of the leader of the Phalange militia which led the ‘‘Christian’’ side in
the civil war, was killed. The victim was a frequent critic of both Hezbollah and
Syria, and is one of six prominent figures (and critics of Syria) assassinated since
2005. Many fingers understandably pointed at Syria.27 But there are also sugges-
tions that Gemayel was killed by Fatah al-Islam in retaliation for disparaging
remarks he made about Muslims.28
The stakes were raised even further on 1 December 2006, when opposition
supporters erected 1,000 tents in Beirut’s Riyadh al-Sulh and Martyr’s Square,
literally at the feet of the government, and announced that they would not
budge until the government succumbed. Tension rose more or less steadily and
dangerously throughout December and January, and in late January clashes broke
out between Sunni gunmen and Shia demonstrators. Four people were killed. At
that point, Hezbollah took a step back from the brink. On 25 January 2007,
Nasrallah appeared on al-Manar television and declared that ‘‘anyone using
a firearm against a Lebanese brother is working for Israeli’’ and the situation
cooled down. In addition, the Lebanese army performed with a combination of
admirable neutrality and firmness throughout this period. Since then neither side
has budged very much from their political positions.
While the stalemate has been enormously costly to Lebanon’s economy, and while
the risk of a new civil war is obvious, the demonstrations are now remarkably
restrained and peaceful. Initially tens of thousands of opposition supporters occu-
pied the tents, but after months of stalemate the tents often stand empty, quiet
canvas testaments to the frozen political situation. In all, ten deaths may be attrib-
uted to the demonstrations, which by the autumn of 2007 had lasted ten months.
The risks of catalytic violence come from outside the government-opposition
dyad. In northern Lebanon, from May to July 2007, the Lebanese army found itself
in fierce battle with Fatah al-Islam, a group that includes a number of Iraq-honed
jihadists as well as some homegrown Islamists inspired by al-Qaeda. For nearly
a decade, the Lebanese army has periodically confronted violent Sunni Islamists,
but Fatah al-Islam proved a much more formidable adversary and over 150
Lebanese soldiers perished subduing the group. In addition, 34,000 residents
of the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, where the fighting was concentrated,
lost their homes. It is unclear whether Syria played a hand in supporting Fatah
al-Islam, but the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General

27
Syria is suspected of assassinating a number of leading Lebanese political figures, including two
presidents – Bashir Gemayel in 1982 and Rene Mouawwad in 1989 – as well as the father of Walid
Jumblatt, Kamal Jumblatt, in 1977. See Petran, Struggle over Lebanon, 219–20.
28
‘‘Fatah al-Islam assassinated Lebanese minister Gemayel’’, yaLibnan (online), 6 July 2007,
http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2007/07/fatah_alislam_a.php
 The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics 489

Command, a group aligned with Syria, allegedly did provide it with limited help.29
The Lebanese stared into the abyss, and across the confessional and
ideological spectrum voiced support for the army. Arguably, the army is the
only national institution that is functioning well in Lebanon today.
The urgency of the crisis was demonstrated in June when, as mentioned earlier,
six Spanish and Columbian soldiers serving in UNIFIL were killed in the south,
following two calls by al-Qaeda’s number two leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri for
Muslims to confront the ‘‘Crusaders’’, meaning the international soldiers.
Ironically, the attacks led to quiet security contacts between UNIFIL and
Hezbollah, prompting al-Zawahiri to pointedly criticise Hezbollah.30
Hezbollah’s rivals fear that its ultimate aim is to transform Lebanon into an
Islamic state in Lebanon and that the party is only feigning attachment to Lebanon
as a pluralist society. Nasrallah and his colleagues have claimed frequently that the
conditions for establishing a state based on Islamic rule will probably never exist in
Lebanon, since such a state could only be established on the basis of broad consent,
which is highly unlikely. Whatever dreams they might entertain, the conclusion
that widespread support for an Islamic state is infeasible is a sound one.
Much turns on how true Hezbollah is to the positions that it has frequently
espoused over the past decade and a half, particularly its commitment to the
survival of Lebanon as a diverse, multicultural society. As Nasrallah told the late
Rafic Hariri in 2000: ‘‘We don’t possess second citizenship. We were born here, we
will die here and we will be buried here. We starve here and satisfy our appetite
here, so nobody may outbid us on our patriotism or on [our right] to belong.’’31

Conclusion
Lebanon will not be able to totter endlessly on the cusp of the maelstrom. The
presidential elections, scheduled to be held in parliament by mid-November 2007,
may offer an escape hatch from the continuing crisis. According to the Lebanese
constitution (Article 49), the election of the president requires a quorum of two-
thirds of the members, although only a simple majority of the parliament is
required to elect a president. Obviously, without a dialogue between the govern-
ment and the opposition, there is little prospect that a quorum will assemble.
While some members of the government – notably Samir Geagea, the head of
the predominantly Maronite Lebanese Forces – have dismissed the two-thirds
quorum requirement, cooler heads on both sides understand that skirting the
established electoral process will only exacerbate the crisis.
Since the assassination of former prime minister Rafic Hariri in February 2005,
seven leading anti-Syrian figures have been murdered, including four

29
An-Nahar, 16 July 2007.
30
http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/07/26/10141939.html
31
Norton, Hezbollah: Short History, 158.
490 A. R. Norton

pro-government MPs, most recently the Sunni member of parliament Walid Eido
in June 2007 and Maronite Antoine Ghanem, who was felled along with nine
others by a massive bomb in September 2007. Between the killings and a few
defections, the government will barely be able to muster 50 percent for the vote.
It is doubtful that the government would retain its majority in parliament if new
elections were held. Many Lebanese view Fouad Siniora and his government as too
much of an extension of American influence in Lebanon. The split in political
sentiment was illustrated in early August 2007 in a by-election to fill the seat of the
assassinated Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel. The father of the victim and
former president of Lebanon, Amine Gemayel, was the pro-government candidate.
Despite considerable sympathy for his loss, and some erosion of Michel Aoun’s
support among Christians, the pro-Aoun opposition candidate still narrowly won
the seat.
Political crises are habitually resolved in Lebanon by following the dictum of
‘‘no victor, no vanquished’’. This suggests that there must be a dialogue between
pro-government and opposition forces, but outside players, notably the Arab
League, Saudi Arabia and France have at times worked energetically to undermine
a compromise solution. The US, in particular, has been intent on seeing the
opposition defeated, because it equates it with Iran-backed Hezbollah. Yet without
a dialogue the Lebanon crisis is likely to become more dangerous and more
explosive. Two decades ago, Lebanon failed to elect a president and two rival
governments emerged and gave rise to a period of intense violence. Should history
repeat itself, the situation would be even more dangerous this time around.
In the chaos of an unstable and partitioned Lebanon, there is no doubt that
al-Qaeda clones, such as Fatah al-Islam, would move into the vacuum. Israel also
might be tempted to exploit the opportunity to rebalance the books after its loss in
the 2006 war, and there is little doubt that Syria would savour a chance to reassert
its will in Beirut. In short, it is a potential invitation for mayhem to assume that
the current stalemate may continue indefinitely.
In September 2007, the opposition pointedly stepped back from its earlier demands
for a national unity government. Hezbollah, for its part, has signalled a readiness to
compromise, provided that a bargain does not require it to disarm, and no credible
compromise will require the disarming of Hezbollah in the immediate future.
Provided that a credible president is elected in November 2007 – and there is no
absence of qualified candidates capable of straddling the government-opposition
divide32 – the domestic political crisis will be attenuated, but it will not have

32
Three consensus candidates have been widely mentioned in Lebanon: Riyadh Salameh, the head of the
Central Bank and a respected economist; Jean Ubaydh, a former foreign minister; and General Michel
Sleiman, who has distinguished himself as the commander of the army. Sleiman is constitutionally
disqualified because ‘‘Class A’’ public servants, which includes senior generals, are supposed to wait
24 months before running for public office. However, the parliament might waive that clause.
 The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics 491

ended. Lebanon will remain a lightning rod for regional tensions and rivalries, and
that ensures that internal differences will not soon be reconciled.

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