National Identity

A volume in
Cross National Research
Richard R. Verdugo, Series Editor
This page intentionally left blank.
National Identity
Theory and Research

edited by

Richard R. Verdugo
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Andrew Milne
Sciences Po Toulouse

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 CONTENTS

Introduction: National Identity: Theory and Practice........................ 1

Richard R. Verdugo and Andrew Milne

PA RT I
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1 Identities in Europe: Past and Present................................................ 25

Aladin Larguèche

2 The Crisis of Western Democracies and National Identity:

Citizenship, Immigration, and Constitutional Patriotism................ 55
Francis Luong

PA RT I I
NATIONAL IDENTITY: CASE STUDIES

3 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity............................... 83

Nathalie Duclos

 v
vi  Contents

4 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic

of Ireland in the 21st Century?.......................................................... 113
Julien Guillaumond

5 Russian National Identity.................................................................. 147

Oxana Karnaukhova and Richard R. Verdugo

6 The Impossible State: National Identities in Bosnia

and Herzegovina................................................................................ 187
Djordje Vukovic, Aleksandar Savanovic, and Aleksandar Vranjes

7 The Mental Wall: Identity in a United Germany............................. 213

Dana Martin and Richard R. Verdugo

8 National Identity in France: Immigration and the Validity

of Civil Tests........................................................................................ 245
Andrew Milne

PA RT I I I
NATIONAL IDENTITY: THE IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE

9 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”:

Ethnic Boundary Perception and National Identity Among
Turkish Belgians................................................................................. 273
Klaartje Van Kerckem

10 British Muslims’ Discourses of National Identity..............................311

Saliha Anjum, Andrew McKinlay, and Chris McVittie
 INTRODUCTION

NATIONAL IDENTITY
Theory and Practice

Richard R. Verdugo and Andrew Milne

In 1958, 36 year old Thomas Kuhn accepted an invitation to spend a year at

the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavior Sciences. Within a short
period of time, Kuhn discovered something fascinating that would eventu-
ally lead to the writing of his classic, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Kuhn was taken aback by the degree to which social scientists at the Center
disagreed over fundamentals. In his words:

I was struck by the number and extent of the overt disagreements between social
scientists about the nature of legitimate scientific problems and methods. Both
history and acquaintance made me doubt that practitioners of the natural sci-
ences possess firmer or more permanent answers to such questions than their
colleagues in social science. Yet, somehow, the practice of astronomy, physics,
chemistry, or biology normally fails to evoke the controversies over fundamentals
that today often seem endemic among, say, psychologists or sociologists.

It is not unusual, then, that the research surrounding national identity

is also clouded in debate and disagreement. Indeed, national identity is

National Identity, pages 1–21

Copyright © 2016 by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 1
2  Introduction

such a slippery concept that some scholars have called for abandoning the
concept entirely (Brubaker & Cooper 2000, p. 5). The complexities are the
outcome of three significant issues. First, the definition itself is viewed from
three angles. Second, there are competing forms of identity, such as social
class, race/ethnicity, gender, and so on. Finally, there appears to be debate
about differences between identity, nationalism, and patriotism.
It is, or should be, clear that as a concept, national identity is an “ideal
type” to be used for analytic purposes; it would be a mistake to think of it
otherwise. Max Weber viewed such concepts as Gedankenbilder, or thought-
ful pictures. They are meant to help scholars make sense of a chaotic world,
not to completely represent reality.

We have in abstract economic theory an illustration of those synthetic con-

structs which have been designated as “ideas” of historical phenomena. . . . This
conceptual pattern brings together certain relationships and events of histori-
cal life into a complex, which is conceived as an internally consistent system.
Substantively, this construct in itself is like a utopia which has been arrived at
by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality. Its relationship
to the empirical data consists solely in the fact that where market-conditioned
relationships of the type referred to by the abstract construct are discovered
or suspected to exist in reality to some extent, we can make the characteristic
features of this relationship pragmatically clear and understandable by refer-
ence to an ideal-type. This procedure can be indispensable for heuristic as well
as expository purposes. The ideal typical concept will help to develop our skill
in imputation in research: it is no “hypothesis” but it offers guidance to the
construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give
unambiguous means of expression to such a description. (Weber, 1949, p. 89)

Nevertheless, scholars do agree on a few points about national identity.

Scholars tend to agree that national identity is a sense of “belonging” to a
nation or state, something we will refer to as a geopolitical entity in order
to avoid confusion. Moreover, many would agree that this sense of belong-
ing is affected by many factors, including relational, normative, contextual,
kinship, and historical factors. There are many elements within these two
sets that affect national identity. Thus, we may represent national identity as
a function of many subsets, and each subset having its own elements:

NI = {·}

The definition to be used in this introductory chapter, is that national

identity is a sense of belonging to a geopolitical entity.
In looking at the literature on national identity, and aside from definitional
issues, a few analytical/theoretical problems exist. For example, one theoreti-
cal issue is whether national identity is fixed and based on blood or ancestry; if
 Introduction  3

national identity is malleable, mutable, imagined, or invented for political rea-

sons; or whether the concept should be dropped completely. Moreover, there
are others who argue that epistemological work needs to be conducted prior
to engaging in national identity empirical research (Checkel, 2006). The pur-
pose of this introductory chapter is twofold. First, we introduce our views about
national identity, based on our own assessment of the research, including the
chapters in the present volume. Second, we summarize and place the findings
from the chapters in this volume within the national identity literature.

BACKGROUND

Theories of National Identity

Definitions
National Identity should not be confused with two related concepts—na-
tionalism and patriotism. Nationalism is a strong attachments to one’s country
and the sense that one’s country, and that it is, is superior to all others. Pa-
triotism is a strong devotion to one’s country and one’s behavior in support
of its decisions and practices. National identity is a sense of belonging to and
being a member of a geopolitical entity.
A Nation is a geopolitical construct where belonging is mainly driven by an
Essentialist/Primordialist viewpoint. That is, belonging and being a member of
a nation is based on blood, ethnicity, history, ancestry, common values, kinship,
and language. In a nation, the focus of national organization is its people.
A State is a geopolitical construct where membership and belonging is
based on shared civic values about citizenship. Membership is constructed
and based on a constructivist/postmodern viewpoint of identification. The
focus is a State’s institutions and the values that legitimate its authority.
Nation-State is an imbrication of a Nation and a State. It is a system of
political governance that derives its legitimacy from its people in governing
and serving as a sovereign nation.

Dominant Views of National Identity: Essentialists, Constructivists,

and Civic Theories
Three views dominate the national identity research. The earliest na-
tional identity theories were originally part of debates about ethnicity—Es-
sentialist and Constructivist. In later years, a third national identity research
has been added, though it has a long history in political thought—Civic
identity. An extensive review of these theories is beyond the scope of our
chapter, so we provide a brief summary. The categories are: Essentialist/
Primordialist, Constructivist/Postmodernist, and Civic Citizenship.
4  Introduction

Essentialist/primordialist. Essentialist scholars of national identity view

national identity as fixed, based on ancestry, a common language, history,
ethnicity,1 and world views. Some noted scholars include Huntington (1997),
Smith (1986; 1991), Geertz (1973), Van den Berghe (1981), Armstrong
(1982), and Connor (1994).
Though Anthony D. Smith (1991) has generally been aligned with Es-
sentialist views, his views are a middle-of-the-range theory2 about national
identity. Such a distinction is marked by his linking constructivism to es-
sentialism—national identity is a hybrid of both “natural” continuity and
conscious manipulation. Smith’s position is interesting and, it seems to us,
quite reasonable. In fact, what Smith seems to be arguing is that the Essen-
tialist and Constructivist views lie on a scale as depicted below:

E C

Identity involves both E (Essentialist) and C (Constructivist), and social

systems vary in the proportion a social system assigns to each.
At its core, the Essentialist argument is based on culture and history. Other
markers for the Essentialist framework are language, ancestry, and blood.
Constructivist/postmodernist. Constructivism posits that dominant groups
create, manipulate, and dismantle identities for their specific gains (Beaune,
1991; Berezin, 1997; Brubaker, 1992; Corse, 1996; Fine, 1996; Gillis, 1994;
Griswold, 1992; Hobsbawm, 1992; Hobsbawm, & Ranger, 1983; Kubik, 1994;
Lane, 1981; Schudson, 1992; Schwartz, 1987, 1991; Spillman, 1997; Wagner-
Pacifici, & Schwartz 1991; Zerubavel, 1995). Within this paradigm, there are
two very interesting viewpoints, with the characteristics of paradigm shifts.3
The first viewpoint is embodied in the work of Anderson (1991) who
posits that identity is an imagined construct. It is imagined because indi-
viduals in a given geopolitical entity do not and cannot interact with one
another—there are simply too many people to allow for such activity. So
symbols, rituals, and other ceremonials are used as means for bonding, and
individuals thus imagine they have a community with other members of so-
ciety. In Anderson’s model, print Capitalism was crucial for building this
imaginary identity. People in different parts of a nation were able to read
the same documents in the same language that maximized sales and cir-
culation. Readers began to understand one another and thus formed the
basis for an imagined community. Anderson argues that the first European
nation-states were founded around their national print languages.
The second viewpoint is advanced in the work by Hobsbawm and Ranger
(1983)—national identity is invented for political reasons. Invented traditions
are created in order to ensure continuity with the past. Indeed, a sure sign that
 Introduction  5

there has been a break with the past or where existing modern norms and
values are not effective in maintaining stability and order, is the utilization of
traditions toward this end. Such instability may be brought on by rapid social
change or other axial events, such a wars or economic crises. There are several
instances where the invented traditions paradigm has been used in research.
Sievers (2007), for example, uses invented traditions in studying the Highland
Myth in Scotland as a reaction to Scotland’s union with England in 1707; Vlas-
tos (1998) uses the concept to study the tradition of martial arts in Japan; also
studying Japan using an “invented community” paradigm is Fujitani’s (1996)
superb study about pageantry in modern Japan. Despite these interesting stud-
ies, it appears to us that one of the earliest uses of the concept was conducted in
1912 by Basil Hall Chamberlain. In his little essay, Chamberlain (1912) looked
at the role of “Mikado-worship” in Japan. In point of fact, Chamberlain suc-
cinctly captures an important reason for the invention of tradition.

But the twentieth-century Japanese religion of loyalty and patriotism is quite

new, for in it pre-existing ideas have been sifted, altered, freshly compounded,
turned to new uses, and have found a new centre of gravity. Not only is it new, it
is not yet completed; it is still in process of being consciously or semi-conscious-
ly put together by the official class, in order to serve the interests of that class,
and, incidentally, the interests of the nation at large. (Chamberlain, 1912, p. 4)4

Not all is well within the Constructivist camp. While Postmodernists

support the Constructivist model, they have serious problems with its ap-
proach. To begin with, they argue that Constructivism seems to be a simple
cataloguing of identity construction processes, devoid of content. Second-
ly, they argue that the paradigm underestimates the central role of power
(Connell, 1987; Gilman, 1985), and that such an error leads them to incor-
rectly suggest that influence and agency are “a multidirectional” (Calhoun,
1995, p. 199). Power for Postmodernists is the crucial concept.
At its core, Constructivism/Postmodernism is based on politics and the
use of power by dominant groups in order to gain and maintain their privi-
leged status in society.
Civic identity. Civic identity is a form of identity where membership in a
geopolitical entity is unfettered by ethnicity or culture. Instead, it is based on
a set of shared values about rights and the legitimacy of State institutions to
govern. The State’s political legitimacy is derived from citizens’ participation
in many social institutions, such as politics, voluntary associations, unions,
and so on. The notion of civic citizenship is closely aligned with Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s The Social Contract (1762).5 Others who espouse a civic approach
6  Introduction

to national identity include Habermas (1994), Miller (1995), Tamir (1993),

Greenfeld (1992), Canovan (1996), and Marshall (1949).

Challenges to National Identity: A Model for Analysis

Factors Affecting National Identity

Guibernau (2007) proposes a number of dimensions about national
identity. There are, according to Guibernau, at least seven dimensions to
national identity: psychological, cultural, antiquity, original, historical, ter-
ritorial, and political. To be sure, these dimensions are related to national
identity as Guibernau argues. However, the list is not complete because
there are at least two other factors that appear to affect national identity:
Economics and social demography. Scholars can debate what other factors
might influence national identity, however the chapters included in this
volume highlight the following factors: Social demography, economics, na-
tional hegemony related to a specific governance regime, and politics.
Social demography. Demography affects national identity. Whatever the
causes might be for demographic changes, emigration and immigration
appear to be exerting pressure on national identity in many Western countries.
Demographic factors affect population size and composition and thus
cultural content in a geopolitical entity. As the size of the immigrant popu-
lation increases, natives appear to have serious questions about their cul-
ture and what it means to be a member of their society. In essence, there
are concerns about the sustainability of native culture and its way of life.
Economics. Generally, the better the economic situation, the more positive
is national identity. Loss of work, economic depressions, and other negative
economic factors lowers identity. Keep in mind that identity is a sense of
belonging to a geopolitical entity, and citizens expect their leaders to protect
their basic rights and needs. Failing to do so leads a citizenry to question their
government, their leaders, and the meaning of membership in their society.
National hegemony. By hegemony, we mean a framework of governance
or dominance. A change in hegemony creates confusion, and depresses
national identity. If change is drastic, it changes roles and statuses in a social
system. For example, going from Communism and a planned economy to
a form of Democracy and Capitalism is a major change if the cultural and
structural apparatus are not in place to support such a change. Another
example would be changing from an absolute Monarchy toward greater
freedom for a population. Changes in hegemony challenges national
identity. A related issue is constant hegemonic change. A social system that
is in relatively frequent hegemonic change also taxes national identity. In
 Introduction  7

fact, it may be that the more frequent hegemonic changes occur, the more
likely invented traditions are used in stabilizing a social system.
Politics. Politics are a broad concept, and our use of it refers to the acquisition
and maintenance of power. Some examples include wars, conquests,
imperialism, colonialism, and other forms of aggression where a geopolitical
entity is involved in some conflict. State policies are another marker.
The effects on the nation are significant. Politics influence the social demog-
raphy, composition, and distribution of achieved and ascribed statuses, such as
ethnicity, race, social class, or religious groups. The ability of a host society in
integrating immigrants or a conquered people challenges national identity. If a
country has been conquered or colonized, it is a complex problem as to wheth-
er its population will develop a sense of belonging with the conquering country.
Each chapter in the present volume is driven by an historical view and de-
velops its analyses around many of the issues briefly raised in the preceding
sections, and more in some cases. In doing so, they not only add to national
identity research, but raise questions for additional research. Table I.1 formal-
izes our thinking about these factors, national identity, and the level of analysis
affected by these factors: national and individual.

TABLE I.1 Theoretical Model of Factors Affecting National Identity:

National and Individual Levels
Factor/Finding Country Effects
Social Demography: The Ireland Mass emigration and later immigration led
primary Demographic Level: National to concerns about the Irish culture.
factors related to France Mass immigration, especially from former
national identity are Level: Individual colonies led to questions about the
immigration and meaning and continued existence of
emigration. Significant French culture.
emigration reduces the
native population and Belgium The increased presence of immigrants and
greater immigration Level: Individual their children in Belgium has led to Turks
increases the presence being treated as outsiders. Such a status
of immigrants in a opens them up for discrimination and other
nation and diversity. forms of ostracism. Consequently, such
treatment affects their identifying as Belgium.
UK Immigrants are raise issues about their not
Level: Individual being accepted by their British acquaintances
based on their own appearance and their
ability to speak English.
Russia Imperialism and later conquests led to
Level: National greater diversity and questions arose about
what it meant to be Russian.
BH Various ethnic and religious groups within
Level: National BH have led to much discord.
(continued)
8  Introduction

TABLE I.1 Theoretical Model of Factors Affecting National Identity:

National and Individual Levels (continued)
Factor/Finding Country Effects
Economics: The economic Ireland Poor economy led to mass emigration and a
status of a nation is Level: National distrust of national leaders and an inferior
positively related to national identity. In contrast, prosperity
national identity. The during the Celtic Miracle led to positive
better the economy, national identity, returning migrants and
the more favorable important immigration. The presence of
views a population has immigrants led to questions about Irish
about its leaders and culture.
nation, and the better Russia Economic stagnation during Gorbachev’s
the national identity. Level: National liberalizing led to questions about
leadership, and poor national identity. After
the fall of the USSR, and the open market
(Capitalism) approach, national identity fell
as did a distrust of Russian leadership. In
any event, economics and national identity
are positively related.
Hegemony: denotes Russia Continual change in the governing
leadership and Level: National hegemony has been followed by confusion
the power of about what it means to be Russian—a
superordinates to member of a monarchy, a Communist, a
impose their views member of a Democracy, a Federation
and world views on BH Conflict over an imposed or attempted
subordinates. We use Level: National imposition of a hegemony by Serbian
a version of hegemony leaders has caused much discord in the BH
that focuses on world region.
view characterizing a
governance regime, France Hegemony has influence social policy
e.g., Communism, Level: Individual regarding tests for citizenship and also has
Democracy, Monarchy raised questions about what it means to be
Welfare State French
Germany After re-unification and the movement of
Level: National Eastern Germans into Western Germany
has caused problems about expectations
for both groups of Germans. The confusion
is succinctly captured in the following
comment by an East German—“we
expected justice, but got the rule of law.”
Scotland National identity is based on making
Level: National “British” the “Other.” Scotland has its own
hegemony and has no desire to be under
the world view of Britain.
Politics: Events and Scotland In Scotland, politics and political party
strategies followed Level: National membership has no effects on national
for acquiring and
maintaining power.
(continued)
 Introduction  9

TABLE I.1 Theoretical Model of Factors Affecting National Identity:

National and Individual Levels (continued)
Factor/Finding Country Effects
Included are wars, identity. For example, while the Scottish
colonialism, state people have their own unique identity
policies, etc. based on history and culture, they have no
desire to break away from British.
Ireland State policies in Ireland have affected the
Level: National perception of identity. In this case, the
state has included a forced choice question
in asking respondents how they identify
ethnically. The “White” and “Other”
choices lump together different White
ethnics, such as Polish, and gives the
impression of more Irish in the country
than there actually are.
Russia Politics has played an important part of
Level: National Russian identity, in one form or another. Its
imperialism increased diversity and adversely
affected the country’s ability to form one
unified national identity; its constant
change in governance regimes challenged
national identity; and its war time exploits
also challenged national identity. It debacle
in the Sino-Russian War caused much
consternation among the population and
questioned whether Russia was as great at
most had assumed.
BH The attempted power grabs by Serbs, and
Level: National other factors, such as a history of ethnic
and religious discord, and increased
nationalism/identity, led to civil war in the
BH region.
Germany Reunification has caused some discord
National between East and West Germans. It is
equivalent to the merging of two cultures.
There does not appear to be a unified
version of being “German.”
France/ France’s colonial past has affected current
Individual national identity issues. Specifically, a large
proportion of its immigrant population
originated from its former colonies. In
addition, given this growing diversity, issues
among the native French population and
its leaders have begun to ask what it means
to be “French.” One result has been to test
“Frenchness” among those applying for
citizenship.
10  Introduction

NATIONAL IDENTITY: NATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL LEVELS

Theoretical Overviews of National Identity

Chapters 1 and 2 provide theoretical overviews about the state of national

identity research. In Chapter 1, Largueche presents a broad review of major
theories, issues, and summaries of some examples of how selected social sys-
tems are addressing the issues surrounding national identity. In addition, the
author raises some difficult topics surrounding national identity, such as ris-
ing nationalism, populism, and multiculturalism. These are important issues
and need careful and thoughtful attention by decision makers.
In Chapter 2, Luong focuses on State policies and how these attempt
to integrate its immigrant populations. The chapter reviews and critiques
theories about identity and strategies for integrating immigrants, and con-
cludes that none is satisfactory. The proposed solution is Constitutional Pa-
triotism, a program that decouples national identity from citizenship. The
focus is for immigrants to respect and obey their host country’s Constitu-
tional laws, yet they are not obligated to accept these laws on an ethical or
moral basis. As the author indicates, one cannot legislate national identity.

National Level

Economics
Economics play a significant role in developing and maintaining nation-
al identity among a population. Economic downturns lead a population to
mistrust its leaders and call into question the pride they have for their coun-
try. The more prosperous a country, the greater is national identity. Several
countries in the present volume have witnessed the rise and fall in national
identity depending on the status of their economies.
Trust and meeting basic needs. During its economic downturns, thousands
left Ireland. It was during this period that the Irish population held many
negative views of their leadership and their country. Their negative views
were aimed at the ability of their leaders to provide economic safety.
The economy rebounded during the Celtic Tiger years, and Ireland wel-
comed back many who had emigrated and it was also a period when Irish
national pride rose to pitch levels. However, with the global recession of
2008, Irish pride once again declined (Guillaumond, Chapter 4).
Russia also experienced some significant economic downturns prior to
the breakup of the USSR and after its leaders pursued an open market
economy. Unfortunately, the latter strategy failed and Russia seems to have
morphed into a semi-planned economy. Nonetheless, during the economic
 Introduction  11

downturn, Russian national identity seems to have suffered (Karnaukhova

& Verdugo, Chapter 5).
Lifestyle differences. Economics played a different role in Germany. Prior
to reunification, East and West Germans lived in two diametrically opposed
systems—Social Democracy in the West, and Communism in the East. In the
West, the economy was Capitalistic and open; in the East the economy was
planned and centralized. The West eventually enjoyed prosperity, whereas in
the East, though staples were available at fairly reasonable prices, other items
were scarce. East Germans learned the art of bartering and getting by with
little; West Germans expected more. With reunification, both populations
experienced their new situation differently: West Germans were disdainful
of their Eastern counterparts and viewed them as lower class, whereas East
Germans viewed their Western counterparts as conspicuous consumers and
greedy. A unified national identity was going to be a challenge (Martin &
Verdugo, Chapter 7).
Corruption and basic needs. Economics may also lead to corruption, and
not only challenge the trust a population has with its leadership, but also
have the population question their own national identity. This appears
to have been the case in Russia. When Gorbachev took power, he began
liberalizing the Russian empire, but soon realized that the country could
not survive under its existing social structure. He eventually dissolved the
USSR and introduced Capitalism in Russia. Upon the introduction of a
Capitalist system and the breakup of the USSR, leadership began selling off
large portions of government held assets. Unfortunately, they were sold to
existing Oligarchs at bargain basement prices. The level of social inequality,
corruption, poverty, unemployment, and underemployment in the USSR
challenged national identity and protests were frequent (Chapter 5).

Social Demography
Demographic changes, mostly by increasing a society’s ethnic/racial
makeup, raise challenges about one’s national identity, and leads to signifi-
cant concerns among the native population about the fate of their society.
Indeed, ethnic/racial diversity as expressed in the presence of immigrants
in a nation is arguably the single most important factor affecting national
identity.
Ethnicity and culture clash. An increase in the number of immigrants
(especially from Turkey) in Germany has raised issues about national
identity, citizenship, and German culture (for a discussion see Verdugo &
Mueller, 2008). In Chapter 7 the authors focus on another issue regarding
lifestyles. Basically, reunification merged two different cultural groups, if
we view culture as a way of life among a people. The merging of East and
West created significant discord between both populations. East Germans
12  Introduction

developed skills at bartering and the ability to get by with little, whereas
West Germans grew accustomed to a given level of prosperity and expected
and demanded such a lifestyle. Such cultural differences challenged the
ability of forging a united Germany.
The same may be said of Russia (Chapter 5) and the Bosnia Herzegovina
region (Vukovic, Savanovic, & Vranjes, Chapter 6). Demographic diversity
brought on by Russian imperialism created significant diversity and chal-
lenged a unified Russian identity. In fact, a united Russian national identity
never occurred because most frontier societies had their own unique cul-
tures, social systems, and identities. In the BH region, the attempt to create
one nation was doomed from the beginning, not only because of politics,
but because each country within the region also had its own cultural and
historical backgrounds that were fiercely protected.
Migration and labor shortages. Demography is related to migration—both
emigration and immigration—and to labor shortages. This seems to have
been the case in Ireland. During economic downturns, thousands of Irish
citizens left the nation for jobs in other countries. In contrast, during
economic prosperity, not only did Ireland attempt to lure some emigrants
back to the island, it also witnessed significant immigration because of
its increasing labor shortages resulting from its economic prosperity.
Predictably, the presence of large numbers of immigrants from other
nations created national identity issues (Chapter 4).

Politics
Politics are a broad concept, and our use refers to seeking and maintain-
ing power. Several types of political activities are noted in this volume that
affect national identity: attempts at gaining power, changing governance
regimes, merging two populations from different governance regimes, and
our use of politics also refers to State policies concerning the current and
future organization of society and its relations with other nations. Finally,
politics, as used here, refer to the dominant hegemony used in organizing
a Nation/State, such as Communism, Social Welfare State, or Democracy.
The effects of politics on a social system are significant. Political activi-
ties raised in the present volume touch on three topics: attempts at gaining
power, change in governance regimes, and the attempt in merging two dif-
ferent governance regimes.
Attempts at gaining power. National identity may be affected by one nation
attempting to force its regime on another. In the Bosnia Herzegovina
region, this seems to have been the case. There was an attempt by Bosnia/
Serbia to bring Croatia into a BH regime. In contrast, Croatia seems to have
been receptive to such a union if it could maintain its autonomy, and if such
a union was equitable. Unfortunately, Croatia did not feel it would be fairly
 Introduction  13

represented in such a union and sought independence. Serbia moved first

and civil war ensued (Chapter 6).
Interestingly, as research has suggested, the war created strong national
identity feelings among the combatants. It was an extreme form of “Them
versus Us” feelings.
Changing governance regimes and various forms of aggression. Russia has
experienced many changes in its governance regime, and such changes
affect national identity. Russia has moved from a Duchy, Tsarist, Socialist/
Communist, and eventually to a Federation. These were not smooth
changes and were often violent as competing groups sought dominance.
These frequent changes, historically speaking, affected national identity,
and various generational leaders took control and imposed its view of
Russia (Chapter 5).
Merging populations from two different governance regimes. Individuals
residing a specific governance regime are raised under unique world views
and a set of roles they are expected to fulfill (Chapters 5 and 7).
In Communist regimes, the community takes priority; the government
controls politics, the economy, and other social institutions; and social
structure is, theoretically, flat. In Communist systems, there is the danger of
totalitarianism and rule by an elite. In Democracies, in contrast, the priority
is on individual freedom within limits. Property may be owned by individu-
als, the economy is generally open, and there tends to be less government
intervention in the lives of citizens. However, there are the dangers of rule
by the majority, or tyranny of the majority, and significant social inequality
(Piketty, 2013).
In Germany, reunification merged two populations raised in two differ-
ent political regimes: Communism and Social Democracy. Differences in
world views, roles, and expectations about quality of life were major points
of contention. These differences are captured in a comment by one East
German: “We expected justice, we got the rule of law.”
In Scotland (Duclos, Chapter 3), the population distinguishes the “Oth-
er” as the British. Scots have their own unique history and culture, and
have no desire to become British. Interestingly, the majority of Scots have
no desire to completely break away from Britain. There are certain benefits
from continuing the alliance.

State Policy
State laws and other policies that regulate the behavior of persons resid-
ing in a country affect national identity. Four State policies are good exam-
ples: (a) policies about immigration, (b) policy about annexing/colonizing
another country, (c) policies about citizenship, and (d) policies that seem
to define a population.
14  Introduction

Immigration and immigrants. Many western nations that are or have

been experiencing significant inflows of immigrants have taken steps to
reduce the number entering their borders. Once immigrants are residing
within their borders, additional immigration integration policies have
been enacted. The focus of immigrant integration policy has been either
acculturation or assimilation. The former strategy is to accept immigrants
and their culture yet also with the proviso that immigrants live amicably in
both worlds. The latter strategy, in contrast, expects immigrants to shed
their native culture and blend into their host culture. Needless to say, the
latter has caused much controversy.
A strategy in assimilationist policy restricts or limits the practice of im-
migrant culture. In France, the State decided that it was against French
law for Muslim women to wear the Hijab in public schools. The Hijab is a
scarf worn by Muslim women as a symbol of modesty and privacy and part
of the Muslim faith. The rationale behind the ban was France’s adamant
conviction of the separation between Church and State, and the banning of
all religious symbols and signs from public schools. The specific laws were
enacted by then President Jacques Chirac on March 15, 2004.6
Annexing a nation. In the BH region, the role of Bosnia in attempting
to maintain a unified area enacted State policies and pursued strategies
that created discord and raised national identities in the camps of all
combatants. Indeed, conflict between nations is a major factor in raising
national identity and nationalism (Conway, 2001; Kreisberg, 2003) (See
Chapter 6).
Policy about citizenship. State policies regarding citizenship also affect
national identity among immigrants. The approaches taken by some
countries may be viewed as Essentialist because the content of many
national citizen exams are heavily weighted toward historical events and
symbols, rather than civic issues such as laws and policies. The French
citizenship examination is a prime example as described in this volume
(Milne, Chapter 8). Not only does Milne show how the exam is Essentialist,
but he goes on to show that French university students and a sample of
the general public are unable to pass the exam. French citizenship exams
create boundaries for immigrant inclusion and are a source of “Othering”
immigrants.
Defining a population. In Chapter 4, we see how Irish State policy has a
hand in defining national identity or the perception of such an identity.
The State has used its authority in creating a forced choice question about
ethnicity in its Census. As a result, the data suggest that the size of the native
population has been stable for years. What the data hide is that included
in the “White” population are Polish and other respondents who indicated
their race as “White.” The result is that it presents a picture of Ireland as
 Introduction  15

a country with a stable Irish population, which is good for business and
brings to mind the famous Thomas Theorem: “If men define their situation
as real, it is real in its consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, p. 572).

Individual Level

Two chapters examine some important issues about social acceptance

and the national identity among immigrants. These studies demonstrate
is how the native host population creates “Them vs. Us” distinctions by
not fully accepting immigrants and thus challenging immigrants’ ability at
identifying with their host country. To be fair, the data are all from an im-
migrant’s perspective, yet if they are to develop positive national identities
with their host country, their assessments are valid.
In chapters about immigrants in Belgium (Van Kerckem, Chapter 9) and
in the United Kingdom (Anjum, McKinlay, & McVittie, Chapter 10), the
authors discuss how immigrants in each country perceive their being the
“Other” and how this affects their sense of identity. In Belgium, the Turkish
population faces considerable discrimination and is relegated to the status
of the “Other.” The “Othering” of the Turkish population is based on two
objective factors: language and physical appearance. Both factors tend to
identify Turks as non-Belgians, and places them in the precarious position
of the “Other.”
Muslim immigrants in the United Kingdom are the focus of Chapter 10.
The authors use a semi-structured interview methodology in gathering data
on the views from first and second generation Muslim respondents. Among
first generation Muslims the authors find that, while they are able to bal-
ance their British-Muslim-Pakistani identities, they tend to reveal two traits
not found in the second generation. First, their Pakistani identity is the
strongest among the three identities. This makes sense not only because
it is their place of birth, but also because to acknowledge otherwise would
place them in an awkward position of not honoring their place of birth.
Secondly, the first generation tends to care about what British citizens think
about them and their status as immigrants in Britain. Being the “Other” is
a negative for them. The situation is different for the second generation.
Second generation respondents also balance their British-Muslim-Pak-
istani identities, but their strongest identity is British. Interestingly, their
British identity works as a facilitator for the other two. Their British identity
creates a level of confidence that helps them balance all their three identi-
ties, while also being indifferent to what other British citizens think or say
about them. Being the “Other” is irrelevant to the second generation.
Both studies tend to confirm Hoetink’s (1967) theory about somatic
distance. In a segmented social system the dominant group develops and
16  Introduction

maintains an idea about the somatic norm—their own somatic appearance.

The greater a specific group’s somatic distance from this norm, the greater
will be its social distance. Social distance is reflected in a dominant group
failing to accept groups not reflecting this somatic norm. It would be worth-
while to study social distance issues among these populations using such
measures as the Bogardus Social Distance Scale.7

CONCLUSIONS

National identity research has been a much debated topic. On one side
of the debate are those who argue that national identity is traditional and
based on ethnicity, blood, a common history, and other cultural markers
such as language. In contrast, another group posits that national identity is
constructed, imaged, or invented for political reasons. These debates have
not only frustrated scholars, but have stalled research from moving forward.
The chapters included in the present volume are both theoretical and
research case studies about national identity. To begin with, two levels of
analyses are pursued. One level is national, where a nation’s identity is
viewed historically. Questions and issues raised include discussions about
the roles conflicts, imperialism, State policies, and changes in national gov-
ernance regimes have in a population’s national identity.
At an individual level the focus is on immigrants’ views of their status in
a host society. Results from two studies indicate that immigrants struggle in
balancing three identities: their host country, their religious identities, and
identifying with their sending country, or the country of their ancestors. In
addition, these studies indicate that the behavior of the native population
is important as to how much immigrants feel accepted and their sense of
identifying with their host country. Generation plays a key role: the first gen-
eration is sensitive to the views of the native population. The second gen-
eration could care less. In addition, it appears that national identity among
immigrants facilitates the identity of both religion and the homeland of
their ancestors. There is a strong correlation among all three identities.
A third contribution is that this research contributes to theory develop-
ment. Pursuing testable hypotheses or theories contributes to a research
field and to its major theory(s). The chapters in this volume make the fol-
lowing contributions: national identity is based on both Essentialist and
Constructivist ideas, many factors contribute to national identity—both
macro and micro, and one should consider differences between macro is-
sues and micro issues of national identity. The next step, in our view, is
to synthesize factors affecting national identity into one general model—if
that is at all possible.
 Introduction  17

There are at least three conclusions that we can draw from the stud-
ies included in this volume. First, the old dichotomy of Essentialism-Con-
structivism is not productive. National identities are based on both, and
the strength of one over another depends on a State’s history, culture, and
governing ideology.
Second, the level of identity is significant. In the present volume two
levels of identity research are presented: national and individual. Factors
affecting identity at the national level, to be sure, may affect an individual’s
sense of belonging, but those affecting immigrants’ identity varied by Gen-
erational status and feelings of being accepted by members of the host so-
ciety. Important markers for immigrants are their physical appearance and
their ability to speak the language of their host society. But this is only one
strand of research at the individual level, another would be to study the
views and factors affecting national identity among native populations and
how this process differs by immigrant status.
Third, of course, we believe there is more research to be done. We have
several suggestions for future research.

• Research among non-immigrants and immigrants and how factors

affecting each differ.
• Research about how societal transitions affect national identity.
Max Weber noted the three types of authority that fit well into how
societies have changed over time: from charismatic (familial and
religiously based) to traditional (patriarchal, patrimonial, feudal) to
legal/rational (legal and bureaucratic) social systems.8
• Recall that we suggested that factors affecting national identity
may be viewed as a set with many subsets, NI = {·}. Chapters in this
volume have introduced factors that may comprise subsets of NI,
and for further theoretical development we suggest grouping these
factors into broader concepts for analysis. For example, Hegemony
may logically be included in politics. Further theoretical develop-
ment would greatly enhance research on national identity.

NOTES

1. Note that ethnicity has different definitions: in America, ethnicity is associ-

ated with a minority group, or some other ethnic group. In Europe, especially
in Eastern Europe, ethnicity refers to a people or peoplehood. It has greater
community or group connotations.
2. Though we identify Smith’s strategy as middle of the range, it is not to be
confused with Merton’s (1957) definition of middle of the range theories,
which contrast Talcott Parson’s Grand Theorizing or Minor theories. Merton
defines middle of the range theory as “ . . . theories that lie between the mi-
18  Introduction

nor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during the
day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a uni-
fied theory of social behavior, social organization, and social change” Merton
(1957, p. 39).
3. Paradigm shifts are associated with T. S. Kuhn’s masterwork, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions. (1970) The shift refers to a revolutionary change in how
scientific problems are viewed and framed. Kuhn’s work was heavily influ-
enced by the earlier work of Ludwik Fleck (1935[1979]). Fleck argued that
scientific truth was situational to a specific scientific community, and that
truths and falsehoods could never truly be established. Fleck’s notion of a
scientific community predated Kuhn, and is an especially important concept
that led to the emergence of the Sociology of Science discipline, in which
scientists are studied much like other communities.
4. The page number is different from the original document because it was
downloaded into Microsoft Word document. The download was from http://
www.gutenberg.org/files/2510/2510-h/2510-h.htm
5. Rousseau’s vision of identity is in contrast to J. G. Fichte’s, which is based on
ethnicity, blood, and social traits such as language. See Fichte (2013/1808).
Reden an die deutsche Nation. The German version may be downloaded
from www.gutenberg.or, or in English from www.ghi-dc.org.
6. The official name of the law is “loi no 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant,
en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une
appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics” (literally “Law
#2004-228 of March 15, 2004, concerning, as an application of the principle
of the separation of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb which
show religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools”).
7. The Bogardus Social Scale was created by Emory S. Bogardus as a Guttman
Scale (a logically ranked ordered scale) that asks respondents about how like-
ly they would accept a group based on the following questions: As close rela-
tives by marriage, as close personal friends, as neighbors on the same street,
as co-workers in the same occupation, as citizens in my country, as non-citizen
visitors to my country, would they exclude a group from entry into my country.
See Bogardus (1926).
8. See Mommsen (1992) for a discussion and description.

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 PART I
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
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 CHAPTER 1

IDENTITIES IN EUROPE
Past and Present

Aladin Larguèche

In the aftermath of terrorist attacks in Norway perpetrated by the right-

wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik on July 22nd 2011, his 1,518-page
manifesto entitled 2083: A European Declaration of Independence was broadly
distributed through the Internet and generously quoted by most of the
media worldwide in order to describe and understand the ideological and
personal motives of its author.
Beyond the brutality and unexpectedness of a tragedy that struck a
small, peaceful, and wealthy land, the violence of the pamphlet actually
crystallizes several trends in today’s Europe. One of the most important
trends has been the rise of right-winged populism in the last decade. Many
exclusionary ideas in Breivik’s pamphlet are not his own; some have been
presented and discussed by other political militants and leaders through-
out Europe, especially since the 9/11 attacks in America. Former French
president Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012), for example, attempted to create a
Ministry for Immigration and National Identity, while German Chancellor
Angela Merkel firmly declared in October of 2010 that multiculturalism

National Identity, pages 25–54

Copyright © 2016 by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 25
26  A. LARGUÉCHE

was a failure. Of course, this growing populism has not taken place in ev-
ery European country with the same form or intensity. The most common
form is a “low-level populism,” expressing itself diffusely in traditional po-
litical parties, through Internet, mass media, public debate, and private
conversations.
I have two objectives in this chapter. First, I wish to underline the simi-
larities in the national identity problem in Europe; though I do see that
there are also differences. My questions are: Who are we? How do we live
together and how do we deal with increasing cultural differences when we
have to cope with the long-lasting presence of foreigners and newly natural-
ized fellow citizens, many who come from the far ends of former European
empires in Africa, Asia, and America? A second objective is to point out an
historical irony: the quite unexpected growth of nationalistic, and some-
times radical, views in 21st century Europe, a continent which has been the
epicenter of two world wars, as well as a continent that has committed it-
self into an innovative, attractive process of supranational integration since
1949. Indeed, Ernest Gellner has written about the weakness of national-
ism, pointing out that failed nationalist movements are far more numerous
than those that actually managed to supplant other ideologies and establish
the almost unquestionable legitimacy of a Nation-State (Gellner, 1983). To
illustrate his argument, he remarks that there may be around 8,000 lan-
guages in the world, but only 200 States.

THE IMAGINED COMMUNITY IN EUROPE:

POLITICS, TRADITION, AND GROUP IDENTITY

National Identity: A Brief Overview

Breivik’s manifesto shows that challenges around national identity in

the 21st century can be perceived as a European concern with a European
identity; “an imagined community,” to use the expression by social scientist
Benedict Anderson.1
National identity is commonly seen as a fundamental frame for any
forms of political participation. It is the unavoidable ground for the gen-
eral organization of human communities and it has mostly proven to be a
remarkably effective way for creating a sense of being a “we” through mod-
ern times. The modern era is a time when personal or social differences
between individuals and citizens have widened, and when economic global-
ization and technological improvements have neutralized geographical dis-
tances and traditional frontiers. In spite of all the simplifications, identities
are not inevitably “criminal identities.”2 They are of valuable, ethical, and
 Identities in Europe  27

psychological significance in the processes of individuation and identifica-

tion. But there also appears to be a paradox.
The effectiveness of national identity has created a paradox. On the one
hand, national identity pretends to create a Self and consequently refers to
several archetypes, intending to define “the ancestral spirit” of European
nations, as many intellectuals did in the 19th century. From that point of
view, identities are essences, a kind of metaphysical bond between humans,
or the virtual and mysterious nucleus of origins, ideals, behaviors and hopes
that give meaning to the environing world. On the other hand, far from
actually being immutable, identities are also historical constructions in con-
stant evolution, interacting within a complex set of events or phenomena.
Historian Anne-Marie Thiesse is one among the very few to approach these
matters from a genuinely European point of view:

Nothing is more international than the formation of national identities. This

paradox is huge since the irreducible singularity of each national identity
has been a pretext for bloody confrontations. Yet, these identities really stem
from the same model, which has been implemented within the frame of in-
tense international exchanges. (Thiesse, 1999, p. 11)3

The cult of tradition and the celebration of an ancestral patrimony have

been effective counterweights for making the radical economic, techno-
logical, and social mutations of European countries since the 19th century
more acceptable. A nation opens the doors of a secular brotherhood and
formal solidarity between the members of the same community, who are
the heirs of a specific cultural legacy, and thereby share a common interest
(ibid.). This is by no means a peculiarity of European nations—a similar
pattern is at work in other communities, such as the United States, where
the mythology of “the Frontier” and the New World, or the idea of being
a promised land for immigrants have had a powerful effect in creating a
“we.”4 In other words, it is necessary to explore this fundamental opposi-
tion between simplistic discourses about identity. One needs to examine its
actual features, practices, and social realities, past or present, that may have
fostered or contradicted modern forms of political allegiance. Such a strat-
egy is necessary in order to disclose the rhetorical, symbolic, and strategic
part of these discourses. Indeed, creating or asserting a “we” seems to be
a necessary step toward ensuring political allegiance and participation in a
political unit.
Nonetheless, the task seems extremely difficult for one reason: human
action may ultimately be described as a conscious quest for identity. Identi-
ties reflect the contradictions of the human mind and its multiple world
experiences; they are both static essences and evolving constructions. They
can lead to a destructive narcissism, a blind self-contentment, a fierce ha-
tred of difference, and an inability to act reasonably in the world. National
28  A. LARGUÉCHE

identities can also be a source of self-confidence or a pre-condition for sur-

vival in a hostile or complex environment. Extrapolating Dr. Stockmann’s
declaration in An Enemy of the People (1882) by Henrik Ibsen (1828–1901),
one can perhaps say that, morally speaking, “the compact majority” is al-
ways wrong, and it may be tempting to sort out righteous minority identities
from potentially threatening majority identities by distinguishing between
the oppressors and the victims. It may be that strong may always be wrong,
and the weak may always be right, but in many cases, one may say that rest-
less, unsatisfied identities have a natural tendency to victimize themselves.
Research on national identities has been structured around two elemen-
tary and common perceptions: identity as essence (essentialism); identity
as construction (constructivism). Perhaps the right path is somewhere in
the middle.
Sociologists, philosophers, ethnologists, and historians have often as-
sumed that the easiest way to create a Self is to find the image of the Other.
Let me quote the French historian Lucien Febvre and his discerning observa-
tion about “civilization”: the issue of the frontier is somehow put at the center
of his superb lecture delivered at the Collège de France in 1944–1945:

In each civilization, there are two kinds of elements: sedentary peoples and
travelers. And their proportion shifts singularly from a civilization to another.
Poor, primitive, back-ward civilizations are not only those where elements of
civilization are small and where the inventory of the material and the spiritual
creations is quickly made; it is also the civilizations where the sedentary ele-
ments dominate from afar, that are unable of provoking desire and envy from
the neighboring civilizations, and consequently that do not travel [ . . . ] Rich
civilizations, on the contrary, brilliant civilizations, great civilizations are those
where there are plenty of traveling elements and where spiritual and material
elements are able to provoke desire and to be borrowed from the outside.
(Febvre, 1999, p. 68)5

This can be the first step in defining a European identity: the EU’s motto
of “Unity in diversity.” However, it is insufficient to depict European iden-
tity and Europe’s national identities with this statement alone. The Old
World is a place of impressive diversity, a genuine Babel tower, “a mosaic
of cultural micro-spaces of great variety. National territories have become
small cultural reserves, with different contents and styles. Within these terri-
tories, some ethnic cultures survive, among which some like Brittany, Cata-
lonia, Euskadi, Scotland could have become nation-states, notwithstanding
History’s hazards” (Morin, 1987, p. 171).6 So, if ethnicity is not going to be
the factor that binds Europe, what is the alternative?
 Identities in Europe  29

From Ethnicity to Citizenship

Social scientists tend to consider national identities as a product of late-

modern time. Many historians continually underline that the modern defi-
nition of the nation was created in the aftermath of the Enlightenment,
the French Revolution in 1789, and the Napoleonic Wars. These are seen
as structural events that deeply changed the fate of Europe by shifting the
aristocratic legitimacy through a new national sovereignty. Nationalism is
the crystallization of new political units. Nationalism arises from new social
conditions and occurs through the public use of legacy of religion, history,
and culture which stem from earlier historical periods. Nationalists wanted
people to believe that nations were part of a natural order given by God to
human communities.
Nationalism appears to be a modern phenomenon, transforming pre-
existing cultures into nations, sometimes inventing them. In fact, nation-
states are not the natural and ultimate destiny of ancient ethnic groups
(Gellner, 1983). Historian Miroslav Hroch made a similar observation by us-
ing a comparative method to analyze the birth of nationalist movements in
smaller European nations like Bohemia (the main region of today’s Czech
Republic), Norway, and Flanders. Hroch was able to distinguish three perti-
nent stages in the formation of national identities (Hroch, 1985).

• In the first stage, the people have no national identity, but intellec-
tual and cultural elites unveil a forgotten nation. Founding myths of
a supposed former ethnic community are created or rediscovered.
History and philology become important as academic fields, and
most of the artistic or scientific artifacts contribute to this national
revival. There is not yet any political claim related to the emergence
of a new identity.
• In the second stage, national self-conscience rises among educated
and active minorities that organize themselves through associations
and patriotic groups. They are pioneers with an explicit political
agenda, where a sense of nation is ranked the highest.
• In the third stage, nationalist programs and propagandas man-
age to gain mass support and to establish a Nation-State, through
institutions like the school and the army. As British historian Eric
Hobsbawm stated, the crucial point here is to understand the transi-
tion from stage 2 (identity as politics) to stage 3 (establishment of
Nation-State), because it can virtually include any kind of situation.

At the end of the 18th century, Nationalism was a new idea, best reflected
by the French Revolution, an essentially non-ethnic idea—language or re-
ligion were not explicitly considered markers of national citizenship. The
30  A. LARGUÉCHE

common good and welfare were the most important interests of the na-
tion. Such views were in accordance with the liberal view of the world held
among the educated elite and the bourgeoisie, especially in France and in
the United Kingdom (Hobsbawm, 1992).
However, asserting the novelty of nation and nationalism does not mean
that nations have no real continuous bonds with earlier times. After all, one
also has to consider that most historians study late-modern periods rather
than ancient, medieval, or early-modern societies. Such a focus blinds them
to those factors leading to the emergence of nations. What is the relation-
ship between old ethnic identities and modern nations? Is there a causal
link between ethnicity and the formation of nations?
“Historical nations” in the Middle Ages became, during the 19th cen-
tury, the most effective way to legitimize various political rights for liberal/
nationalist minorities in Germany, Norway, Italy, Ireland, Bohemia, and
Hungary. The same is true of the many countries that had to bear foreign
domination, national division, or both, such as Poland and Italy; this was
especially the case in the European periphery. However, is this fact alone
enough to foster the emergence of new Nation-States? Probably not.
One should not neglect the importance of ethnicity as a major com-
ponent of national identities. These are some of the questions raised in
1986 by historian Anthony D. Smith, who wished to modify the “modernist”
idea that European national identities are mostly late-modern creations. It
Smith’s strategy in distancing himself from the “perennial” school of think-
ing which claimed that modern nations were merely updated versions of
ancient, natural kinships:

Nationalism, as an ideology and movement, is a phenomenon that dates

from the later 18th century, while a specifically national sentiment can be dis-
cerned little earlier than the late 15th or 16th centuries in Western Europe.
The nation-state, too, as a political norm is quite modern. If the system of
European states came into being at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648,7 it was
not until the 19th century that these states began to be converted into nation-
states, and hence a system of nation-states came into being. Even the nation
and its national character would appear to be modern: certainly, it was not
until the early modern period in Europe (the late 17th century), that the idea
of populations being divided by national character and possessing a common
identity became widespread among European educated classes. Yet, there are
also difficulties with this view. For we find in pre-modern eras, even in the
ancient world, striking parallels with the modern idea of national identity and
character, in the way Greeks and Romans looked on people who did not share
their cultures or come from their city-States. (Smith, 1994, p. 11)

What can we learn from these discussions around the idea of nation-
al identity? Modern nations can be seen as the result of fusions between
 Identities in Europe  31

pre-modern, ethnic identities, and civic elements translated into law and
citizenship, or nationality. Ethnicity has been transmitted through histori-
cal records and has contributed to shaping individual and collective ex-
periences. According to Smith, ethnicity is mainly constituted by myths,
memories, values, and symbols, and it has proved particularly important in
generating a sense of solidarity and purpose among members of a national
community (Smith, 1994, p. 16).

The Ethno-Cultural Nation

The debate between Modernist scholars and Perennialists reflects an inner

tension that tears apart two facets of national identities: ethnicity versus
citizenship, or to put it otherwise, jus sanguinis versus jus soli.
In Eastern Prussia, linguist and Lutheran clergyman Johann Gottfried
Herder8 contested the superiority of reason and the moral domination of
rational philosophy. The rediscovery of Europe’s ancestral roots began at
the end of the 18th century. It was an aesthetic and philosophical rebellion
against the cultural hegemony of France, the stronghold of classical mod-
els, inspired by Greek and Roman antiquity, as well as the most influential
countries in European aristocratic courts from Spain to Russia. Herder was
not alone.
Swiss writer Paul-Henri Mallet (1730–1807), and Scottish poet and poli-
tician James Macpherson (1736–1796) had already collected fragments of
poetry in the 1750s–1760s that strongly enhanced European cultural plural-
ity (Thiesse, 1999). Later, historians, clergymen, and linguists from the Ger-
man countries, Scandinavia, and the British Isles began taking a genuine in-
terest in Norse mythology and medieval literature. Yet, Herder was the first
to explicitly discredit the universal for the sake of the particular, enhancing
culture and knowledge in a specific national legacy with a language of its
own. Herder depicted societies as the natural state of mankind, as organic,
objective, and primordial units put on Earth by Providence. Each society
developed its own features and customs through history and, most of all,
language (Hermet, 1996). An ethno-cultural nation (or Kulturnation) had
the highest political legitimacy: nation transcends the state. This assertion
has to be understood in the peculiar German context of that time: a broad
linguistic community in the heart of Europe, although divided into 300 in-
dependent States!9 For Herder and for his followers,10 the goal of their work
was to restore the self-awareness of the German nation.
The prevalence of ethnic bonds in human communities may be rooted
in ancient times, yet it is a modern phenomenon fostered by intellectuals
like Herder. Any ethnic community that aspires to nationhood must be-
come politicized and assert its claims if it wishes to influence international
32  A. LARGUÉCHE

affairs (Smith, 1994). National identity is a matter of resistance, dignity, and

an affair of empowerment.
Nationhood involves a philosophical base. Herder’s ethno-cultural vi-
sion had a deep influence elsewhere on the continent. In 19th century East-
ern Europe, several communities had retained a sense of uniqueness and
staked out claims for autonomy from the old continental empires of Aus-
tria, Russia, and Turkey. For example, there were national liberation move-
ments in Finland, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania, and
Romania, but this vision also legitimated xenophobia in 20th century Eu-
rope. Herder did not advocate of any sort of race hierarchy, he considered
all nations as equal in dignity due to their uniqueness. Herder spoke of the
Volksgeist, or “Spirit of the People.”
Nevertheless, after having been combined with later statements like so-
cial Darwinism, the Kulturnation would open the way to the conviction of
an Aryan superiority, an idea which became popular in Germany11 from the
1890s on and gave rise to Nazism. Here again, we find the permanent con-
tradiction inherent to identity-oriented movements (Hermet, 1996).

The Emergence of Liberal Citizenship

The notion of liberal citizenship represented another factor in Europe’s

national identities, as epitomized by the French Revolution. After the Dec-
laration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (August 1789), politics would
be built on the national sovereignty of citizens, defined by natural rights,
universal human rights, the right to political participation, and civil liberty
(Ellis, 2010). Religious freedom became a reality. During the 19th century,
“the question of the relationships of dependency between the various na-
tionals and their State (nationality in its present meaning) is not yet dis-
tinguished from the problem of political participation of citizens in public
life (citizenship). The abstract reality of a ‘national community’ (includ-
ing millions of individuals who are unacquainted with each other, and are
extremely diverse in regard to language, customs, resources etc.) has not
really been thought out” (Noiriel, 1997, pp. 25–54).
Ernest Renan summed up the philosophical principle of liberal citizen-
ship. Renan’s view was affected by the loss of Alsace and Northern Lorraine
to the newly founded German Empire in 1871. He delivered his conception
of the nation in a well-known lecture that contested the ethno-cultural vi-
sion of nationality. According to the ethno-cultural vision, the regions of
Alsace-Lorraine were actually of German descent, and belonged to Ger-
many. The same view was applied to Southern Denmark (Schleswig-Hol-
stein) or in some parts of Bohemia-Moravia or Silesia.12 Therefore, they
were meant to fall under German rule. Renan adamantly denied this idea
 Identities in Europe  33

and, instead, advanced the idea of choice and subjectivity against ethnic,
objective determinism:

Nation is consequently a great solidarity, constituted by the conscience of sac-

rifices that were made and those that will be made later. It implies a past; yet,
it is summed up in the present through a tangible idea: consent, a desire
clearly expressed to resume together the common life. The existence of a Na-
tion is . . . a daily plebiscite. (Renan, 1992, pp. 54–55)13

Though people from Alsace and Lorraine were Germans in the past,
they did not wish to belong to the new German Empire. According to Re-
nan, they preferred to live under French rule. This idea of liberal citizen-
ship implies the freedom of choosing one’s political allegiance according
to an identity that is not mainly determined by language or other ethnic
or cultural markers. Today it is possible to roughly divide European coun-
tries into two categories. In the first one, there are countries with an old
liberal tradition and relatively long-established democratic institutions (the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Scandinavia), as well
as some countries that have benefited of a broad diffusion of their language
throughout the world (Portugal, Spain). That is nationhood as a political
choice; a result of a will to act together for the common good through
democratic institutions, independently from language, regional belonging,
or religion, and under the condition that citizens are actually born in the
territory of the State (jus soli). In the second category, that is Central, Orien-
tal, and Southern Europe, states with a specific state-construction (Germa-
ny, Italy), or younger nations that emerged between 1830 and 1918 (from
former Yugoslavia to Greece), have had a tendency to enhance jus sangui-
nis. That is, nationhood based on an ethnic community using the same
language, or practicing the same religion and identifying itself through a
range of specific myths.
Jus Sanguinis and Jus Soli have influenced the translation of identity into
national laws. One example is the French Nationality Act of 1889, which
combined both an open conception of citizenship (jus soli) with restric-
tions against naturalized persons as well as most inhabitants of the French
Empire (jus sanguinis). French colonial subjects (very often Muslims) re-
mained generally excluded from the assimilationist statement of the newly
founded French Republic; though there were a few exceptions like Alge-
rian Jews, people from small-hold colonies, and people residing in four
Senegalese cities (Ellis, 2011). The balance between one principle and the
other has changed several times in the past century: the distance between
legal ideals and actual practices in daily life can be large because law is not
enough to define national identity.
34  A. LARGUÉCHE

Layers of Territorial Identities

It seems useful to give a short account of the different layers of territo-

rial identities and the idea of Europe. For some, the continent may, for
example, look like “An old garden Europe, wholly filled with disused erotic
and rapacious mad men.”14
In reality, there are striking similarities between European networks
of towns, as well as similar, authentically transnational urban experiences
from one country to another. For instance, the Roman and Gothic architec-
tures, the heritage of the Renaissance, public squares in old city centers that
manage to give a feeling of intimacy and openness, and train stations that
are surprisingly alike from Austria to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since the Middle
Ages, Europeans have developed the conscience of living in a shared, com-
mon space, and with much interdependency between regions and societies
(Berting, 2002).
Foreigners view Europe as a cultural unit with an identity of its own,
while Europeans view Europe as diverse, like a mosaic of cultures. Yet, there
is no real European identity; European identity exists only as an outcome of
national identities. Each European country has a particular perception of
Europe stemming from its own national identity. This is another paradox
of Europe: it refers to a defined geographical space and a historical unit,
more or less identical from one country to another. Naturally, these visions
have changed, and a question emerges: What does Europe represent for its
people today? To unveil some answers, one might give a brief look at the
contemporary situation for selected countries.

National Identity: Some Case Studies

France: Europe as a Global Power

The French territory is sited between the North Sea and the Mediterra-
nean coast, between the Atlantic coast and the Alps in the heart of the Con-
tinent. Historically, France has benefited from a high level of geopolitical
unity and stability since the Middle Ages, something which may explain its
unusually high level of centralization compared to other Western democra-
cies. France was the most influential continental power in this part of the
world, at least until the end of the 20th century. Economically, the country
has been substantially weakened in the last decade in contrast to the rise
of the new, reunited Germany. Moreover, Germany has been the economic
heart of Europe since the 1950s and is one reason why the European uni-
fication was largely based on a pact between France and West Germany.
These facts are essential in understanding how the French perceive Europe
today: the vision is ambivalent, and Europe is seen as a potential tool for
 Identities in Europe  35

regaining global influence, and as a possible threat against French identity;

an identity where the claim for universalism has often been implicit.
“Among nations, France had a particular vocation: she was great be-
cause of her glorious past, the continuity of her action and her influence
in the world. So great that when her glory seemed to vanish, the future and
peace in the world could seem to be threatened” (Olivi & Giacone, 2007,
p. 63).15 This self-image is at the core of France’s action within the EU. The
image explains the powerful and effective commitment of France in the
geopolitical reconfiguration of Europe after World War II. We can think of
several examples.
In 1952, the European Defense Community (EDC) was to establish an
integrated pan-European army, later combined with a European Political
Community. The idea was originally proposed by French Prime Minister
René Pleven (1901–1993), and the treaty was signed in Paris by five other
countries (Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and West Germa-
ny), but was rejected in 1954 by a French Parliament that feared an un-
acceptable loss of sovereignty (Olivi & Giacone, 2007, pp. 39–41). More
recently, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Rome, 2004) was
broadly written and negotiated within a European Convention chaired
by former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. It was also rejected
in France, and a few days later, in the Netherlands, after a referendum in
2005, while ratified in 18 other countries. German philosopher Jürgen
Habermas, who was writing before this referendum took place, expresses
his views about this rejection:

From the point of view of all other nations, a “no” coming from France will
have, if it happens, a specific significance. It is from France that came, with a
beautiful largesse, the initiative of reconciliation with Germany. It is hereby
France that put Europe’s unification on the tracks, a unification that she has
continuously stimulated by constantly renewed impulses. Should it occur that
France takes her distance from the path she has followed until now, while
we all are standing at the crossroads, it is certain that depression will fall on
Europe for a very long time. (Habermas, 2006, pp. 53–54)16

Belgium: The Split Heart of Europe

If France can be labeled as a geographical allegory for Europe, Belgium
is certainly a metaphor for the identity subtleties and uncertainties of the
European way. The Kingdom of Belgium was founded in 1830. During the
Middle Ages, this region was actually politically indistinguishable from the
Netherlands and was then known as the Low Countries, divided between
several mighty merchant cities of Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, Tournai, Antwerp,
and Namu, that made these lands one of the most industrious parts of
Europe. Feudalism had its consequences: fostering several principalities,
some counties and duchies looked successively towards the German area
36  A. LARGUÉCHE

or the Kingdom of France, and some areas fell into foreign dominion ei-
ther by war or heritage (Dumont, 2005). The Southern Low Countries
became sequentially Burgundian (1384–1482), Spanish (1482–1713), Aus-
trian (1713–1795), French (1795–1814), and Dutch (1815–1830). In 1830,
Belgium seceded from the United Kingdom of Netherlands, partly due to
religious differences: the North was mostly Protestant after the Reforma-
tion in the 16th century, but the South remained faithful to the Catholic
Church.17 The Belgian Revolution was acknowledged by the Great Powers
in London in 1831, and a new State was established upon a community
that was still to be built.
The aristocratic elite and the bourgeoisie spoke French, and the Dutch
language did not have any official status. Yet, the remainder of Belgian soci-
ety was segmented into several linguistic communities using various French
or Dutch dialects. This linguistic diversity was not a major issue at the begin-
ning of Belgium’s modern history. However, it became a problem, which
may have been the result of the country’s secularization in the 20th century,
but it may also have been the result of the economic weakening of the
French-speaking region, which had dominated the country from its inde-
pendence to the 1960’s. It is for these reasons that some refer to Belgium
as a “demos,” or a community of citizens, without an “ethnos,” a weak Belgian
identity (Castano and Tousignant, 1999).
The current institutional construction of Belgium has resulted from
negotiations and arduous compromises between three federative regions
(Wallonia, Flanders, Brussels) and three linguistic communities (the
French, the Flemish, the German), while the central government mainly re-
tains its core functions (defense, representation, justice, and social affairs).
Belgium is thus composed of four linguistic areas, Brussels being the only
bilingual one: a French-speaking island surrounded by the Dutch-speaking
Flanders (Dumont, 2002). It is not by chance that this city was chosen to
host the main institutions of the European Communities after 1958. In-
deed, Brussels is located on major trade roads in the industrial heart of
Western Europe, and is a country with a weak historical identity and at the
crossroads of major foreign influences. The city is crossed by an invisible,
transnational frontier between Latin and Germanic Europe and is at the
strategic center for European unification.

The United Kingdom “The Continent Is Just a Spot on the Sea”18

If there is one country in Western Europe whose bonds to “the Conti-
nent” have been ambiguous throughout history, it is the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and (Northern) Ireland. Geography has had a clear influ-
ence in this ambiguity. Great Britain is an island, and in spite of the very
short distance to the coasts of France and Belgium, insularity has helped to
foster the idea of a supposedly impenetrable, natural frontier: the English
 Identities in Europe  37

Channel. This idea is deeply rooted in the English national conscience,

whose mythology enhances the belief that Great Britain has been protected
from foreign invasions for several centuries. Some may proudly say that this
has been a fact since 1066, although historians will argue otherwise: point-
ing to foreign influences of political events (Doyle, 1999). After the loss of
Calais, the last possession of England on the continent, in 1558 England
turned her back on Europe and took to the seas of the world, fighting back
the maritime pretentions of Spain (1588), the Netherlands (1654–1674)
and France (1763–1805) between the 16th and the 19th centuries. In the
process, it built an extraordinary global supremacy that reached its apogee
with the crowning of Queen Victoria as Empress of India (1877) and the
establishment of the British Empire, “on which the sun never sets.” In the
same period, the United Kingdom tried to maintain a “balance of power”
on the Continent in attempting to prevent the resurgence of any hege-
monic state (successively Austria, France, Russia and Germany).
Great Britain’s persisting suspicion towards the European Union can
largely be understood as completely alien to Great Britain’s national politi-
cal habitus. Though Great Britain still wishes to maintain strong ties with
the Anglophone world, this does not mean that it is outside Europe. On
the contrary, London is inside the network of prosperous European cities
stretching from Northern Italy to South-East England, and it is one of the
main centers of power in the world.
British identity has other singularities. More than other languages in
Europe, English is a hybrid of Germanic, French, and Latin. In terms of
religion, one finds specific, national confessions, not really represented
elsewhere in Europe (Chassaigne, 1999, p. 227): Anglicanism and Presby-
terianism in Scotland.19 The noteworthy stability of British institutions is
another singularity. The UK is not only one of the oldest States in West-
ern Europe, but it has managed to integrate genuine liberal changes in
the course of its long history, without challenging the monarchy, which has
proved to be a powerful symbol of British identity. Yet, divisions between
Scotland, England, Wales, and Northern Ireland are real and it is therefore
tempting to compare these “would-be” nations to similar regional national-
isms elsewhere in Spain, Belgium, or Italy.

Ireland: The Small Island in the Shadow of the Big One

Insularity has had a tendency to enlarge the gap between Great Britain
and Europe. In the case of Ireland, its insularity and living in the shadow
of England have driven its attempts at getting closer to the continent. Its
future independence may be tied to its asserting a European identity. Thus,
Ireland played an important role in sending missionaries throughout “Bar-
barian” regions of the continent during the Middle Ages. The island also de-
veloped cultural and military relations with major Catholic countries in the
38  A. LARGUÉCHE

early-modern period: Spain, France, and Austria. Later, the influence of the
continental revolutions in Europe played a major role in fostering the mod-
ern Irish identity and shaping its nationalist movement (Jouannon, 1999).
The Irish singularity relies on a strong geographic and historical identity
in spite of the weakness of Gaelic, its original language. Faith has played
an even more important part in the creation of an Irish identity—Ireland
remains a Catholic stronghold in Northern Europe. At last, we can mention
the heavy weight of British colonialism on the Irish national conscience and
the long-lasting dominance of a rural society in the shaping of this identity.
The Republic of Ireland officially became independent in 1922, and re-
mained neutral during the Second World War Afterwards, the adhesion to
the EEC in 1973 was a clear opportunity to diminish the economic depen-
dency on England. Ireland became a fervent State-member of the EU and
implemented the euro in 1999, becoming henceforth the EU country with
the fastest growth, the so-called “Celtic Tiger.” It should also be noted that
Ireland became a land of immigration rather than a country of emigration,
as it was in the previous centuries.
Irish identity is no longer defined by a set of traditional normative system,
shaped by a rural, Catholic, and Gaelic-speaking people, that for so long op-
posed to all things British. During the Celtic Tiger years, the Irish were proud
of their identity, proud of their country’s economic achievement and success
story symbolized by the Spire in Dublin. Ireland was no longer an economic
laggard, and emigration, another element of the country’s history that had
shaped Irish character and identity, was a thing of the past. Instead, Ireland
experienced much immigration from returning Irish, but also many immi-
grants from Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe after 2004. The arrival of so
many immigrants lead to acts of racism and violence, and the State began
questioning its own definition of Irish identity in different terms, leading to
the use of expressions such as “cultural diversity.” However, it is not clear if
such a definition successfully changed the definition of Irish identity.
The arrival of the IMF and European experts, after the economic crisis
hit Ireland in 2008, was strongly resented by the Irish. Not only did it chal-
lenge Ireland’s world status and the ability of Irish politicians in shaping
economic policy, it also questioned the society the Irish population had col-
lectively agreed upon. The world economic slow-down and the later reces-
sion challenged the viability of the Celtic Tiger’s economic model. Ireland
was one of many nations facing hard economic times and challenges to
their national identities.

Russia: A European Empire or an Oriental Frontier?20

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and the swift progression of the
Ottoman Turks through Balkan Europe onto the gates of Vienna in 1529,
Russia became the heart of the Christian Orthodox world. Moscow became
 Identities in Europe  39

“the third Rome,” a conservatorium for the defunct Byzantium Empire.

These obvious links with Christianity’s fate at that time did not prevent the
Great Duchy of Muscovy from looking Eastward and gathering “all Russian
lands” under its dominion during the reign of Ivan III the Great (1462–
1505). There is a certain historical and geographical symmetry with Western
Europe: while Spanish conquistadores explored and colonized America,
Cossacks21 patiently pushed Russia’s frontiers to Siberia (from 1581–1584),
reaching the Kamchatka Peninsula in the 17th century and the passage to
Alaska in 1727 (Szùcs, 1985). If America was then the Western appendicle
of Europe, Asiatic Russia was its Oriental extension.
At that time, the Russian empire was almost as large as it is today. It was,
however, less impressive than states like the Polish-Lithuanian Republic or
the Kingdom of Sweden, that managed to contain Russian expansion in
Europe until the 1720s. To some Europeans, Russia was more barbarous
than the Ottoman Empire.
During the early-modern period, several Tsars were able to build an ef-
fective Absolutist State upon a society that never really renounced serfdom
before 1861. Ivan III, Ivan IV the Terrible (1533–1584) and Peter the Great
(1682–1725) had progressively implemented a bureaucratic revolution in
order to modernize the State, thus forming a mighty army. The reign of
Peter the Great, first Russian emperor, is considered the most important
because he implemented several reforms inspired by European counselors
(Riasanovsky, 1963). Russia became a European power to the detriment
of Sweden (1700–1721). As Szùcs noted: “Now we need Europe for some
decades in order to be able to even better turn our back on her” (Szùcs,
1985, p. 89).22
Among these reforms was the construction St-Petersburg in 1703, a new
capital city, on shores of the Baltic Sea. St-Petersburg represented an ex-
ceptional authoritarian will to Europeanize Russia.23 There was a paradox,
though: Peter maintained the “Oriental logic of power concentration”
(Hermet, 1996, p. 28). While serfdom was vanishing from Western Europe,
it was an institution in Oriental Europe at the end of 17th century, espe-
cially in Russia (Hernet, 1996). In spite of the opposition of the Orthodox
Church to many of Peter’s reforms, Russia remained on its European path,
getting its first Academy of Sciences (1725), its first university in Moscow
(1755), and a Russian Academy of its own, dedicated to national humani-
ties and founded in 1783 (Riasanovsky, 1963).
The reign of Catherine II the Great (1762–1796) marked an apogee in
forging a genuine European civilization in Russia. During the Napoleonic
Wars, the European fate of Russia was consecrated by military victories and
by renewed political influence in the pan-European Congress of Vienna
(1815). “If a mighty barbarian State like Russia generously decides to take
40  A. LARGUÉCHE

the lead of a league whose goal is the balance of power in Europe, this
country will save the world.”24
Yet, in the course of the 19th century, the inability of the Absolutist re-
gime to implement significant liberal reforms before 1905, combined with
brutal economic and social changes (and the shockwaves of the First World
War), led to the collapse of the autocracy and the establishment of a to-
talitarian despotism (1922). The frontier between the USSR and the rest
of Europe became sealed, and this Iron Curtain moved into the heart of
Europe after the Second World War and the subsequent Soviet expansion.
After the collapse of the USSR (1991), Russia experienced a small liberal
intermission in the 1990s, symbolized by the adhesion of the country to the
Council of Europe in 1996. However, recent political events show that Rus-
sia has largely remained an authoritarian State with the formal appearances
of a democracy, where the powerful Orthodox Church goes on sustaining
an official national-identity building, in a radically different manner than
elsewhere in Europe (Delsol & Mattéi, 2010). Meanwhile, massive national-
istic “Russian marches,” where Breivik is regarded as “a hero of our time,”
are organized in Moscow (Dyrnes, 2013).25

Bosnia and Herzegovina: The European Dream of Balkan Europe

The existence of one national identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
doubtful. The oriental frontier between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia is
one of the oldest in Europe, and it coincides with the demarcation between
the Western Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire that were operated
by the sons of emperor Theodosius in the year 395. During the Middle
Ages, this frontier symbolized the crossroads between two civilizations: the
Greek Orthodox world and the Roman Catholic World (Béhar, 1999).
As the Ottoman Turks moved into the heart of Europe in the 16th cen-
tury, politics were simplified, but religion and culture were complicated. A
massive portion of the local population converted to Islam—a unique oc-
currence in Europe. Though the Ottoman conquest led to religious conver-
sions, it did not threaten the territorial integrity of Bosnia nor its Slavonic
identity (Mudry, 1999). The conversions were not meaningful.
The western frontier of Bosnia became a major political and military stra-
tegic point between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Fol-
lowing the Austro-Ottoman Wars, the Turkish reflux of the 17th and 18th
centuries made the religious map of Balkan Europe all the more intricate,
and explains the extraordinary Bosnian religious mosaic, an intriguing “im-
perial vestige” in Europe (Béhar, 1999). It is no wonder that Bosnia and
Herzegovina did not experience any kind of common national awakening in
the course of late-modern history. The province remained under Ottoman
dominion until 1878, and its organizing system was based on the ‘millets,'
or legally protected confessional minorities, with much autonomy (Mudry,
 Identities in Europe  41

1999). These millets were not only examples of the acceptance of religious
pluralism; they also became the basis for a national awakening that relied
on religion in the broadest part of Balkan Europe. The integration of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina into the Habsburg Empire did not challenge religious
tolerance. However, the growing nationalism and instability at the borders
of both empires threw Europe into the First World War. On June 1914, the
Austrian Archduke Franz-Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo by a young
Serbian nationalist, and signaled the start of WWI.
The combination of elaborate layers of identities and global geopoliti-
cal change in these borderlands also had terrible consequences later in
the 20th century. Why do the three largest ethnic groups (defined under
the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina as “constituent peoples” and
identifying themselves as Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs) do not have Bosnian
national identity? A number of factors are at play. One factor is that there
are different interpretations of their own historical legacy. A second fac-
tor is the different attitudes these groups have towards the current State
and its future prospects. Moreover, there are such issues as the status of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the former SFRY, the civil war (1992–1995),
mass migrations of the population, and the creation of near mono-national
geographical units within the new established country. The demographic
configuration of the state changed, which further strengthened differences
in attitudes towards their own national identities. There is no one reason,
but a complex configuration of issues.
Currently, the Balkans are the last significant European region excluded
from the EU. The promise of joining the European Union has presumably
been a stabilizing factor, but political instability, linked to religion, may be
a major obstacle toward gaining EU membership. Bosnia and Herzegovina
is heavily assisted by the EU because it is concerned about the long-term vi-
ability of the State-building process in a country without any clear national
identity and a society where religion has been dominant.

Germany: Europe and the Price for Global Peace

Modern German identity is caught in an unavoidable relationship with
European identity, perhaps more than any other European country. There
are deep historical reasons. Germany has had a definite way of national
identity, based on a broad linguistic community (the largest in Europe)
with no unified State before 1871. The German Sonderweg (exceptional-
ism) is based on ethno-cultural nationalism (jus sanguinis) and has another
side to it: Nazism in a country with a rich cultural and spiritual heritage.
At the end of the 19th century, Germany proudly saw herself as one of the
most civilized, prosperous, and industrious nations in the world. And yet,
it became a symbol of criminal identity and barbarity, and threw Europe
into an era of doubt and long-lasting self-questioning that exists to this day.
42  A. LARGUÉCHE

Philosophers like Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) and Raymond Aron (1905–

1983), as well as many other intellectuals and writers from the continent,
have reflected and debated over the issues of Democracy, Totalitarianism,
and the decline of European civilization.
For German social scientists, the question has been particularly inescap-
able since 1945. Why 1933? Is National-Socialism a phenomenon that was
meant to happen in Germany, and nowhere else, even if similar tendencies
were at work in several European countries? Is 1933 a historical accident? Is
it possible to ask the question regarding the long-term historical continuity
in German history in explaining the emergence of Nazism and Hitlerism?
Some may underscore the permanency of an authoritarian and imperialis-
tic State since 1871, the predominance of willing militarist and nationalist
conservative elites, as well as the passivity of German “mandarins” in the
administration (Gauzy, 1999). It is thus no surprise that discussing current
German identity has proven to be particularly tricky, and this is clearly a
result of the division of the country between 1945 and 1990. Today, German
identity reflects the complex realities of the 21st century.
Discussing a European identity is a problem because of the complex
interaction between geography, history, and “the exhaustion of European
culture” (Mattéi, 2007). Some philosophers suggest that the great paradox
of today’s European identity would be precisely the rejection and negation
of identities as a response to its totalitarian past. National identity is a com-
plicated issue with both negatives and positives. Indeed, Levi-Strauss makes
an accurate observation: “Any utilization of the notion of identity begins
with the critic of this notion” (Lévi-Strauss, 1983, p. 331).26
For these reasons, The Federal Republic of Germany seems to be at the
heart of Europe more than ever, and not only in this symbolic manner.
“Germany’s new 0 year became ipso facto Europe’s 0 year, and both are
equally caught in a no man’s land between their past and their future, by
the very fact of getting back their own, outdated past and their still un-
known future” (Morin, 1987, p. 32).27
The European Union seems to serve chiefly German economic and politi-
cal interests. Recall that the foundation of the European Union in 1993, and
the subsequent implementation of a European currency, were the political
consequences of German reunification, and the desire by France to see Ger-
many abandon its national currency, as a gesture of a good will towards other
European nations. Historically, the German commitment in the EU is inex-
plicable if one does not keep in mind the peculiarities of German history and
the necessity for Germans constantly to define their self-being and identity in
a European context, in order to achieve peace in Europe.
 Identities in Europe  43

EUROPE AND THE WORLD: MIGRATIONS, RESISTANCES,

AND THE ORDEAL OF MULTICULTURALISM

Is it possible to talk about a single plural national identity in Europe? Cer-

tainly, it is preposterous to talk about one national European identity. In-
deed, the sense of being a “we” does not work well at the supranational
level because the “European way” is the result of unaccountable and chal-
lenging compromises between leaders of European States and EU institu-
tions. Saying that there is a European identity is more of a hope than a
reality. A European identity still needs to be constructed, and will probably
take two generations to do so. Europe has its flag, its anthem, its currency,
and even a formal citizenship, but its identity remains uncertain, while ter-
ritorial citizenship should be derived from an identity. Still, Europe has
several commonalities among its nations, and most nations within Europe
see immigration as national crises.

National Identity in Europe: A Common Experience

Since 1945?

Though national identity in Europe is complicated, it is possible to dis-

till common experiences from cultural and historical factors. Consider the
thoughts of the Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt (1818–1897) writing at a
time when European nations held high status and power:

Europe, the ancient and modern household of a multiform life, the original
place of the most magnificent creations, the fatherland of all contrasts resolv-
ing themselves into a single unity and giving to all the tendencies of the mind,
here and nowhere else, the possibility to express themselves. What is Euro-
pean is indeed the collective and individual manifestation of all human facul-
ties through monuments, paintings, words, institutions and parties, it is the
fullness of intellectual and moral life, from all sides and into every direction,
it is the ambition of the mind letting the testimony of everything inside itself,
as well as the ambition of not submitting itself silently to universal monarchies
or theocracies like the ones from the Orient. (Burckhardt, 1965, p. 142)28

Religious and Cultural Commonalities

More recently, the French philosopher Edgar Morin wrote that

the Jewish, Christian, Greek and Latin sources seem to have met and created
a harmonious synthesis which is simultaneously the specific substrate and
the common denominator of Europe. This is the base upon which Europe
has produced an original civilization influenced by spirituality, humanism,
rationality, democracy, that is to say values superior to anything comparable
44  A. LARGUÉCHE

in other civilizations. This is at least the myth that Europe believes. (Morin,
1987, p. 81)29

Historians and philosophers have tried to sketch out the characteristics

of Europe’s cultural legacy: the specificity of Christian religion, the subse-
quent tension between temporal authorities and spiritual powers, the cre-
ation of modern Nation-States, a rationalistic approach towards economy,
the rise of relativistic thought since the 16th century, the rise of modern ide-
ologies in the 19th century, and individualism as a common practice within
civil society. As a system of values, Europe is characterized by the respect for
individuals; their autonomy and liberty, the acceptance and tolerance of
lifestyles, minorities and religious beliefs, the recognized superiority of rea-
son, and social solidarity and political participation in public life. In spite
of the many unique national and intranational cultural traits, the European
heritage has a common frame based on legal and political history.

Group and Individual Rights

The Treaty of London, signed in 1949 by ten European nations, estab-
lished the Council of Europe. Today, it is the largest and the oldest pan-Eu-
ropean organization, with 47 member states, representing more than 800
million inhabitants. The Council was conceived as a direct answer to the
tragedies of the Second World War, namely an attempt to defend human
rights, democracy, and the Rechtsstaat (“Rule of Law”). To do so, a European
Convention on Human Rights was negotiated in 1950 and entered into force
in 1953. Its main innovation was a European Court of Human Rights, which
can be appealed to by individuals, something which is unique in the field of
international law where only sovereign States are given this opportunity. To
a large extent, the European Union stems from the same historical trend,
although it has been more politically ambitious.
The Copenhagen criteria were formulated in 1993. It was the EU’s first
official response to the necessity of defining a common political identity
beyond the formal and practical dispositions of citizenship that were writ-
ten into the Treaty of Maastricht. For the first time, it was stated that mem-
bership required the achievement of stable institutions that guarantee
democracy and the rule of law, respecting human rights and protection
of minorities. Some years later, a larger and more systematic process was
launched and achieved by the proclamation of a Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (December 2000). The Charter listed all civic
and social rights of European citizens or all inhabitants living on the EU’s
territory. It was implemented in 2009 and applied to all state members with
the exceptions of the UK, Poland, and the Czech Republic. This text is
based on several previous European protocols or decisions (among which
 Identities in Europe  45

is the European Convention of 195030) and divided into 6 sections: dignity,

liberty, equality, solidarity, citizenship, justice.
There is no need to delve into the details of these agreements. However,
there is a need to underline that the details constitute a framework for
defining a common experience of national identity based on humanistic
principles. Since 1945, there has been a pattern of putting human rights at
the core of rebuilding Europe. A key problem in this process has been mul-
ticulturalism, and at least two other issues. To begin with, these texts can be
seen as a legal pact imposing rules for the relationships between European
nations. Second, the texts pretend to defend multiple kinds of minorities:
linguistic, ethnical, religious, and sexual. Yet, it is uncertain if they are suf-
ficient to protect recent migrant minorities, and to answer the challenges
of identity crises and reemerging populism. In a specific historical context
there is a tendency of decoupling citizenship from nationality. That is, the
sense that allegiances and identities are now invested in communities larger
than the state (the European Union) or smaller than (or transversal to) the
state, such as ethnic groups, regions, and cities.

The Rise of Nationalism in Europe

However, this decoupling is losing its acceptance by the public and by
political elites throughout the continent. The reason of its losing its accep-
tance is the current crisis of the Nation-State. We are seeing the emergence
of re-nationalizing citizenship in the post-2001 period, the introduction of
language and integration tests as a condition for naturalization and citizen-
ship. But in present multicultural Europe, the only identity that newcomers
could legitimately be expected to adopt is a liberal identity consisting in
the general rules and principles of liberal democracy (e.g., the principles
of equal rights, democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms of the in-
dividual, and the rule of law). Such identity is a fortiori, devoid of any par-
ticular cultural content. National identity cannot be imputed on people
by liberal states. This is to say that identity belongs to the realm of feeling
and passion, whereas citizenship belongs to the domain of reason, law, and
enlightenment.

Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Crisis

of Nation States

Multiculturalism
Identity building in Europe must address immigration and multicultur-
alism. Multiculturalism is, however, a relativistic concept, having different
meanings according to the social, political, and historical characteristics of
each European nation. Recently, the term has been used to describe various
46  A. LARGUÉCHE

policies implemented in Canada and in the United Statess to protect and

enforce the human and civil rights of minorities. Similar policies have been
implemented in countries like the UK and the Netherlands, while in coun-
tries like France, the traditional assimilationist statement has prevailed in
the name of national unity and equality before the law. The underlying
premise of multiculturalism is that any culture is worthy of respect, because
all cultures fundamentally share the same values. Quite ironically, this ab-
stract and theoretical conception has also been very much criticized for its
inability to foster a genuine sense of community within European societies.
One criticism is that multiculturalism is an ideological concept. Multicul-
turalism may be inadequate in coping with the social and practical realities
of everyday life because it weakens the role of the State as the enforcer of
law and reason in society. The concept, as a social policy, also may weaken
the function of citizenship in a democratic system by giving to communities
(ethnic, religious, and so forth) collective rights that contradict or limit
unavoidably individual freedom, thus challenging the possibility of creating
authentic plural identities. There are valid criticisms of multiculturalism
when it leads to cultural differences, and hence deteriorates the conditions
of multiculturalism as a private freedom. Thus, one hermeneutic difficulty
is to distinguish the sometimes blurred frontier between the public sphere
and the private sphere.
A second criticism is the challenge of comprehending each particular soci-
ety and state construction, implementation, and enforcement of multicultur-
alism: public responsibility and management of multicultural societies have
extremely diverse implications whether one talks about France or Belgium.
It is impossible to ignore the impacts multiculturalism has on fragile state
constructions. In those contexts, multiculturalism may be the only adequate
solution to replace deficient citizenships and to obtain civil peace.

The Muslim Problem

Multiculturalism in Europe brings to mind the “Muslim” problem. Many
European countries are becoming increasingly diverse in terms of ethnic-
ity, but few—if any—embrace this growing ethnic diversity. These anti-im-
migrant sentiments have especially targeted Europe’s Muslim immigrants,
who are increasingly categorized by the native population as the “essential
other” that fails to integrate. There has always been some tension between
Oriental and Western societies, but this tension widened with the terrorist
attacks in America on 11th September 2001 by a group of persons claiming
to be Muslims. Thus, it often looks as though Islam is at the heart of identity
crises in Europe. However, Delsol and Mattei note that

Islam is not at the heart of Europe’s identity crisis. It is rather one of its symp-
toms. The crisis is actually more profound and more endogenous. Its’ a cri-
 Identities in Europe  47

sis of politics degenerated into ‘impolitics.’ It’s a crisis of the denationalized

Nation-State. It’s the crisis of a secularized Europe. It’s the crisis of a disin-
carnated Christianity. It’s the crisis of a perverted secularism. It’s the crisis
of a disoriented modernity. It’s the crisis of a dehumanized humanism, cut
off from any kind of divine transcendence. It’s the crisis of a hedonist and
self-centered globalization. It’s the crisis of a burnt-out consumerism. It’s the
crisis of an exhausted civilization. (Delsol & Mattéi, 2010, p. 119)31

The rise of Islam in Europe does not reflect a religious quest in societies
under profound spiritual crisis. Rather, it is an element of “belonging” as-
serting its distinctive identity against dominant national identities. Why so?
Tunisian theologian Mezri Haddad has conjectured an explanation: it is the
difference between Europe as a civilization and Islamic political practices
that separate temporal powers and spiritual authorities. Christianity is in-
deed supposed to be the religion of an ontological separation between “the
sacred and the profane” in politics, while Islam is a religion of a primitive
and impassable coalescence between these two instances (Delsol & Mattéi,
2010, p. 115). In other words, Christianity, as a theology, would naturally
open the doors of democracy and secularization, while Islam would be fun-
damentally theocratic. Any European identity cannot be solely founded on
religion, although Christianity has undeniably been the first solid ground
for the forging of a common civilization in Europe. In the West, the separa-
tion of Church and State is a fundamental principle.

The Discovery of Globalization

Europe’s discoveries of the wider world and Globalization have changed
national identity. It is crucial that we look into these issues. Consider the
status of White South African migrants in the UK. Following the end of
apartheid, there has been an increase in South African migration. South
Africans make up one of the largest foreign national groups in the UK
to date. However, it is noteworthy that in South Africa itself, White South
Africans make up only about 10% of the country’s population, while as
many as around 90% of the South African population who reside in the
UK are White. White South Africans have not only benefited from their
ancestral ties to the UK or other European countries, but also have success-
fully negotiated their legal access to the UK by drawing on their privileged
socio-economic status as a legacy of the racial inequalities during apartheid.
Nonetheless, we have recently seen the introduction of policy restrictions
imposed upon non-EEA immigrants, including some White South Africans.
In this context, it is argued that policy restrictions can have an impact upon
White South Africans’ access to the “British nation.”
There are clear British ancestral ties between English-speaking rather
than with Afrikaans-speaking White South Africans. It is also clear that even
the possession of ancestral ties might not be sufficient for membership in
48  A. LARGUÉCHE

the UK. In the current restrictive immigration position of the UK, even for
privileged and “White” migrants with ancestral ties, boundaries are erect-
ed. Some White South Africans argue that they are more “deserving” than
other immigrant groups, and eve that they “add more value” to British so-
ciety than certain groups in the UK. But this is mere rhetoric and a strategy
for coping with exclusionary boundaries in British society.

Other Barriers to European Integration

There are other, legal-administrative barriers to immigrant integration
in Europe. For example, there are civil tests that are used in order to de-
termine whether or not an immigrant has reached a sufficient level of in-
tegration within French society to acquire French citizenship. Civic tests
mainly focus on values and symbols of French culture and history. How-
ever, it is essential to have some sort of test to evaluate integration of those
who might wish to acquire citizenship. Current administration policies in
France are driven by a singular view integration. Integration or identity is,
I would argue, multi-facetted and double-hinged. Also, if the values and
symbols are important for integration, then it is essential that there be an
official manual that one can use to acquire such knowledge. Such a docu-
ment does not exist.
Creating normative/ideological boundaries affects national identity. It
has been argued that in Europe, religious boundaries function in the same
way as racial boundaries32 in the United States: in Europe, religion marks
Muslim immigrants and their descendants as “the others.” Such processes
of categorization and exclusion have a far-reaching impact on ethnic mi-
norities’ self-identification. Such categorization supports the notion that
there is a distinction between “being,” “feeling,” and “doing” when it con-
cerns national (as well as ethnic) identification. Secondly, a sense of exclu-
sion and being “the other” often coincide with a strong assertion of “being”
a member of a society, but a low or absent sense of “feeling” to be a member
of a society.
Muslims are an interesting case study of national identity. Muslim loy-
alties have demands placed upon them and are scrutinized by their host
societies. While first generation Muslims talk about their identity dilemma
of being an immigrant and a citizen of their host society, second generation
Muslims have a more balanced and valued identity as part of their life. They
are not confused; in fact, they present themselves as fully aware of all facets
of their identities, and seem to create a balance between their religious and
citizenship identities.
The ability of second generation Muslims to integrate and elaborate
their own balanced “multiple” identities can be seen as a success of the lib-
eral democratic systems in Europe. It seemingly shows that the experience
of national identity has proven positive in spite of the citizenship crisis.
 Identities in Europe  49

These silent successes are probably underestimated when one faces the re-
current noise of “integration’s failures” in the public debate.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, national identity appears to be an issue at several scales, im-

plying different challenges. At the individual level, the issue is formulated
differently if one is an immigrant or not, and it can be summed up as accep-
tance of implicit or explicit social rules and behaviors, language, national
policy, and somatic appearance. If one is a member of the native popula-
tion, the challenge is in the acceptance or the rejection of new citizens or
foreigners in the national community, depending on the perception that
one may have of national identity. This perception can be dynamic, accept-
ing the process of global cultural change, or it can be static and idealized,
especially in moments of moral crises. Indeed, populist movements in Eu-
rope have not only been the result of the economic crises since the 1970s,
they have deeper roots, as they are simultaneously a crisis of globalization,
and a crisis of the Nation-State. At this level, the issues around national
identity have been revealed by changes of political regimes and significant
axial events, such as wars and various ideological movements (the Enlight-
enment and the French Revolution, the rise of far-right regimes in the
1930s . . . ).
Today, the question of fighting against right-winged populisms in Europe
remains a challenge. As time goes by, Europeans’ relationship to recent his-
tory loosens, and political elites are ineffective in their fight against the rise of
intolerance. Indeed, if political decision makers do not cynically exploit these
feelings, they usually just rely on the worn out rhetoric about “democratic
and humanistic values” that has obviously little appeal, especially among the
younger generation. If the foundation of pan-European institutions was a
direct response to these potential disorders and has proven to be an effective
tool in promoting and protecting the rule of law and pluralism, recent his-
tory shows that international agreements about human rights are not always
sufficient to prevent European states and societies from drifting beyond this
legal and moral framework. Intolerant identities are never far away.

NOTES

1. Anderson has proposed an anthropological definition of the nation, as an

imagined political sovereign community, intrinsically limited by frontiers. See
Anderson, B. (1983), Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread
of nationalism.
50  A. LARGUÉCHE

2. This expression is the translation of a book by Amin Maalouf: Les identités

meutrières (Paris, 1998). The philosopher begins his argument by noticing
that the contemporary notion of identity may engender conflicts, especially
because identities, as “imagined communities,” can easily exclude each other,
while individual identities are much more complex and can combine ele-
ments from different human communities and individual histories. Against
the prevalence of such uniform collective identities, Maalouf defends Enlight-
enment ideals and humanism as a solution against simplistic categorization
of mankind. Identities are also put in perspective with globalization and re-
ligion. The book has been translated in English under the title In the name of
identity: Violence and the need to belong (2000).
3. “Rien de plus international que la formation des identités nationales. Le par-
adoxe est de taille puisque l’irréductible singularité de chaque identité na-
tionale a été le prétexte d’affrontements sanglants. Elles sont pourtant bien
issues du même modèle, dont la mise au point s’est effectuée dans le cadre
d’intenses échanges internationaux.” Translation by A. Larguèche.
4. American cultural critic and historian Richard Slotkin has written about the
forge of American identity since early-modern times. See for example Regen-
eration through violence: The mythology of the American frontier 1600–1860, (2000)
first published in 1973.
5. Translation by A. Larguèche.
6. Translation by A. Larguèche.
7. The Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) oppos-
ing two European coalitions: on one side, France, Sweden, Protestant Ger-
man princes, and the Dutch Republic; on the other side, Spain, the Habsburg
Emperor in Vienna, head of the Holy Empire, Catholic German princes,
and the Papal States. These treaties were meant to end wars of religion in
the Holy Empire between the Catholic Emperor and the Protestant princes.
The defeat of the Catholic coalition led to a considerable reduction of the
Austrian Emperor in Western Europe, while the idea of balance of power
between fully sovereign independent states was asserted like a fundamental
principle in what we can call European public law. At the same time, feudal
structures and the religious ambitions of the Catholic Church were politically
weakened. These treaties were concluded in the German cities of Munster
and Osnabruck, and they are sometimes regarded as the result of the first
pan-European peace congress: indeed, there was a genuine attempt to resolve
a multitude of conflicts, and the clear intention to formulate principles for
ensuring global peace. To that extent, historians and jurists often say that the
Peace of Westphalia inaugurated a new era in international relations.
8. The original title of the four volumes was Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der
Menschheit (1784–1791).
9. Many of these States were formerly gathered in a feudal confederation found-
ed in 962 and presided over by the Austrian House of Habsburg since the 15th
century: the Holy Roman Empire, which was not a genuine state, but rather a
political relic from the Middle Ages, was to be abolished under the pressure
of Napoleon in 1806. Covering the largest part of the German countries, this
powerless-institutional structure had already included many minorities in its
 Identities in Europe  51

marches and in throughout the course of its long history; for example in cities
and regions in Northern Italy, Eastern France, Flanders, Southern Denmark,
Switzerland or Bohemia-Moravia. After 1815, it was replaced by a similar struc-
ture called the German Confederation, with a simpler map of 39 States.
10. The most significant among them was the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fich-
te (1762–1814), author of the Addresses to the German Nation (original title:
Reden an die deutsche Nation, 1808), a series of speeches declaimed in Berlin
under the Napoleonic occupation.
11. The first theoretician of Aryan superiority was a French diplomat and essayist,
Count Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau (1816–1882). He published in 1853–1855
An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races, which is still labeled as one of
the first examples of scientific racism, and had a significant influence in the
United States and Germany, where it was translated and reedited several times
from the 1890’s on. Let us also note that this work was supposedly admired
by the prominent anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, although not for its
contents, but rather for its formal qualities.
12. In fact, a large part of Northern Lorraine was still majorly French-speaking,
like in the city of Metz. The same could be said about the region of Schleswig-
Holstein, where the Danes were far from being an insignificant minority at
the same period. Yet, both regions were integrated into the German Empire
after short, bloody wars against the Kingdom of Denmark (1864) and the
French Empire (1871).
13. Translation by A. Larguèche.
14. “Vieux jardin l’Europe, tout rempli de fous désuets, érotiques et rapaces.”
In Céline, L-F. (1990), Voyage au bout de la nuit, Paris: Gallimard, p. 273. First
published in 1932; translation by Aladin Larguèche.
15. Translation by A. Larguèche.
16. Translation by Christian Bouchindhomme, Alexandre Dupeyrix, and Aladin
Larguèche.
17. Between 1482 and 1648, both countries were under Spanish dominion and
were then known as the Imperial States of the Habsburg Netherlands, or the
Seventeen Provinces. Following the Reformation, the Republic of the Seven
United Netherlands was founded (1579) and recognized as an independent
Protestant State after the Eighty Years’ War and the Peace of Westphalia
(1568–1648), while the Southern provinces were recovered by Spain or had
remained Catholic. Thus, the “reunification” of the Low Countries under
Dutch rule in 1815 did not seem natural anymore, in spite of a long history
of political homogeneity in this region during the Middle Age. Consequently,
religion was certainly the most visible factor of the Belgian uprising in 1830,
but it is uncertain if it really was its main cause: since their separation in
the 17th century, both countries had become more and more estranged to
each other. In the early 19th century, this antagonism was also economical
and cultural, as given that the French-speaking bourgeoisie did not have any
influence in the affairs of the Dutch State. Finally, the Dutch king William I
(1815–1840) was an authoritarian sovereign that managed to gather liberals
and Catholics against his rule (Dumont, 2005). Let us note that the Belgian
52  A. LARGUÉCHE

uprising opened the way to one of the most liberal constitutions in Europe in
those years, inspired by the French Revolutions of 1789 and 1830.
18. “Le continent n’est qu’un point sur la mer.” These words are quoted from
a text by Benjamin Biolay, ”Les insulaires,” in Négatif (2003, Virgin Music).
Translation by Aladin Larguèche.
19. Both confessions stemmed from the Reformation. Anglicanism is often con-
sidered as a middle ground between Catholicism and Protestantism, or a sort
of non-Roman Catholic Church.
20. For detailed information on Russia and national identity see Karnaukhova
and Verdugo in the present volume.
21. Cossacks were originally East Slavonic communities, often employed as mer-
cenaries, border guards, or soldiers, acting quite independently from central
states until the 18th century. A military and rural class as well as a nation, they
played a major role in Russia’s history, especially regarding territorial expan-
sion. (Riasanovsky, 1963).
22. Translation by Ibolya Virag and Aladin Larguèche.
23. Other examples were clothing laws that were meant to Europeanize Russians
by taxing the wearing of beards in the years 1698–1700.
24. These words are pronounced by Abbot Morio, a fictional character created
by count Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) in the novel War and Peace (Война и миръ),
published in 1869. Translation by Boris de Schloezer and Aladin Larguèche.
25. See Steinar Dyrnes, “Breivik er vår tidshelt,” in Aftenposten, 5.11.2013. In http://
www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/—Breivik-er-var-tids-helt-7361968.html
26. Translation by Aladin Larguèche.
27. Translation by Aladin Larguèche.
28. Translation by A. Larguèche.
29. Translation by A. Larguèche.
30. Article 53, “Charte Européenne des droits fondamentaux,” in Journal Officiel
des Communautés européennes. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/
text_fr.pdf
31. Translation by A. Larguèche.
32. The issue of race-based boundaries is discussed in the racial stratification
literature. Essentially, racial stratification systems have two components: an
ideological system of norms and values, and a structural component that iso-
lates minorities, both physically (e.g., separate communities, jobs, schools)
and in the social consciousness. The ideological part is used as a rationale for
structural isolation/separation (see Verdugo, 1995; 2008).

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 CHAPTER 2

THE CRISIS OF WESTERN

DEMOCRACIES
AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
Citizenship, Immigration,
and Constitutional Patriotism

Francis Luong

The confluence of citizenship and national identity are complex issues, es-
pecially in this era of mass immigration. Citizenship has often been used
as a synonym for nationality, denoting legal membership in a nation-state.
However, since the end of World War II this specific meaning of citizen-
ship has faced many challenges. In the present context of universal hu-
man rights and anti-ethnic discrimination there is a tendency of separat-
ing citizenship from nationality. Membership, allegiances, and identities
are now invested in collectivities either larger or smaller than the state,
such as global citizenship, ethnic groups, and cities. Given several world-
wide events (immigration,1 a crisis of the nation-state, a crisis of national
identities in the post-2001 period, and the global economic crisis), Western

National Identity, pages 55–79

Copyright © 2016 by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 55
56  F. LUONG

liberal democracies are redefining the meaning of citizenship by institut-

ing passing State constructed tests as a pre-condition for citizenship. But a
paradox has emerged.
Western democracies find themselves in the “paradox of universalism”
(Joppke, 2010a). The paradox is based, on the one hand, on the localiza-
tion of identity and, on the other hand, the espousing of identity as a uni-
versal concept, and resembling the precepts of “political liberalism” (Rawls,
1993). The only particular identity that newcomers could logically adopt
is one based on the general principles of liberal democracy, such as equal
rights, democracy, individualism, and the rule of law. Such principles are
a fortiori, devoid of any cultural content. The purpose of my chapter is to
propose that national identity cannot be imposed on a population residing
in liberal states, and that nation-building should be founded on the con-
cept “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas, 1998), which separates citizen-
ship from national identity. In advancing my proposal, I have organized this
chapter in the following manner:

• I examine citizenship, its philosophical underpinnings, and how it

addresses multiculturalism.
• I then discuss the paradox currently facing liberal states, examine
the meaning of liberalism as identity, and compare it to a non-liber-
al viewpoint in discussing new criteria for citizenship.
• Finally, I introduce and suggest that constitutional patriotism is the
logical paradigm for citizenship and identity in Western democracies.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND:
CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITY, AND MULTICULTURALISM

What Is Citizenship?

Loading citizenship with the semantics of nationalism creates a frame-

work for merging integration and social cohesion. States aspire to mold
their populations into something more than mere congeries of individuals;
they attempt to create a homogeneous and cohesive population. Member-
ship is not just “state membership,” but “nation membership,” in which
“the political community should be simultaneously a cultural community,
a community of language, mores, or beliefs” (Brubaker, 1989, p. 4). Only
thus can a state be a nation’s state—the authentic expression and legitimate
representative of a nation.
In the early secular, modern state, there was a need to legitimate the
state in order to foster the loyalty of its members. However, the some-
what abstract notions of popular sovereignty and democracy, according to
 The Crisis of Western Democracies and National Identity  57

Habermas (1996), needed a catalyst and a mobilizing force in order to “ac-

tivate the people.” A national identity—that is, the awareness of belonging
to the same cultural community—was an important strategy that created
feelings of political responsibility; and it was national identity that “provid-
ed the socially integrating substrate of the political identity of the republic”
(Habermas, 1996, p. 130). But there was always a challenge; immigrants.
Immigrants have been a challenge in constructing a national identity.
Historically, the manner by which states incorporated immigrants varied
from country to country due to different “philosophies of integration”
(Favell, 2001). Such philosophies were “based on contrasting understand-
ings of core concepts such as citizenship, nationality, pluralism, autonomy,
equality, public order and tolerance” (Favell, 2001, p. 2). Consequently,
national debates about immigration and citizenship were informed by dif-
ferent “traditions of nationhood” (Brubaker, 1989) and distinctive views
about what constitutes a nation and its identity. In this section, I review
the theoretical underpinnings of discussions surrounding citizenship and
national identity. I also discuss how multiculturalism emerged as an impor-
tant factor in these discussions and how it represents challenges for those
wishing to build citizenship and national identity.

Brubaker and Two Views About Nationality

There are, essentially, two views about nationality: universal and exclu-
sive. Brubaker (1992) explains how different national histories have gen-
erated both views: universal, expansive, and assimilationist among French
elites; and exclusive, particularistic, and ethno-culturally among Germans.
The author suggests that the politics of citizenship, and the boundaries that
limit access to citizenship, are better understood by examining national
traditions and ideals. These ideals and traditions form an “idiom of nation-
hood” (Brubaker, 1992)—that is, “a manner of thinking and talking about
cultural and political belonging at the level of the nation-state” (Brubaker,
1992, p. 162). Accordingly, the idiom of nationhood can be used as sym-
bolic capital in examining national identity.
Nation-state formation is key in understanding the different approaches
of integrating immigrants in France and Germany. Brubaker argues that
Germany’s view of nationhood is “an essentially ethno-cultural fact, prior
to and independent of the state” (Brubaker, 1992, p. 56). The formation
of the German nation-state is a history of searching for a common state:
a story of subnational entities that were territorially scattered, but ethno-
culturally bonded. It is this history that explains why German traditions of
cultural and national belonging were characterized by many conflicts in
fragmented nineteenth century central Europe.
It was different in France. The French Revolution established norms and
ideals of national citizenship before any conception of a nation emerged.
58  F. LUONG

While fragmentation characterized the formation of the German nation-

state, the path in France was marked by a unitary center, moving towards
the periphery. Republican ideologies stressed civic equality and general-
ized political rights, and were spread through universal military service and
secular education, the two main instruments of assimilating populations in
outlying areas. France’s successful practice of socializing immigrants and
peasants with French national and cultural ideals accounts for its assimila-
tionist tradition.
There are, thus, two views about citizenship laws: based on blood or terri-
tory. France’s penchant for jus soli, according to which citizenship is a func-
tion of the state’s territory into which one is born, is a civic conception of
nationhood. By contrast, Germany’s inclination for jus sanguinis, according
to which citizenship is inherited from one’s parents, is based on an ethnic
tradition of nationhood.
In explaining the debates in France and Germany, Brubaker concentrates
on the elites’ interpretations of their own cultural traditions in order to ex-
plain what constitutes the primary elements in debates on national identity.
He states that “the idiom of nationhood . . . [belongs to] the French politi-
cal and cultural elite, [who hold] . . . dominant positions in the institutions
and access to (as well as habits of using) the media of public expression”
(Brubaker, 1992, p. 161). Brubaker does not accept the idea that inertia
and tradition account for the resilience of the politics of citizenship. Like
Pierre Bourdieu, Brubaker considers tradition a form of symbolic capital:

To present a policy or practice as traditional can contribute to its preserva-

tion by investing it with normative dignity and thereby raising the political
cost of challenging it. Tradition is therefore a contested category. Policies
and practices are the object of representational struggles that seek to deem
them ‘traditional’ or to deny them this dignity—instances of general and per-
petual struggle over representation and characterization of the social world.
(Brubaker, 1992, p. 186)

Brubaker’s focus on elites is too rigid to account for conflicting con-

ceptions about the significance of culture and tradition. He admits to the
discordance between the meanings of symbols and representations, but he
fails to take this into account when describing broad consensus on national
self-understanding. Thus, this conceptualization of nationhood is mono-
lithic, homogeneous, and invariant in terms of economic interests, occupa-
tional fields, or geographical location. Further, the concept fails to explain
the social conditions that result in national immigrant policies.
The least convincing part of Brubaker’s argument is his claim about the
inertia in French and German citizenship policies. In fact, some impor-
tant changes occurred in German citizenship law: while immigration has
been strongly reduced since 1992, naturalization regulations have been
 The Crisis of Western Democracies and National Identity  59

liberalized and were put on an as-of-right basis in 1993. Another change

occurred in 1999, when jus soli for second-generation immigrants was im-
plemented. This liberalization of the politics of citizenship in Germany,
which actually follows a larger liberalizing tendency in Europe, is not cap-
tured in Brubaker’s “idiom of nationhood” analytical approach of citizen-
ship. Brubaker’s essentialist argument regarding Germany fails to explain
the change in historical events that have allowed Germany to re-think its
past positions and pursue change. Another paradigm was needed.

Yasemin Soysal: State Institutional Disposition and Immigrant

Integration
Yasemin Soysal (1994) challenges the idea that the cultural background
of immigrants drives their strategies of adapting to their host society. Soysal
claims that it is the institutional dispositions of the host state that determine
immigrants’ adaptation:

Migrant organisations . . . define their goals, strategies, functions, and level

of operation in relation to the existing policies and resources of the host
state. They advance demands and set agendas vis-à-vis state policy and dis-
courses in order to seize institutional opportunities and further their claims.
In that sense, the expression and organisation of migrant collective identity
are framed by the institutionalised forms of the state’s incorporation regime.
(Soysal, 1994, p. 86)

Examining the Netherlands, Germany, France, Switzerland, Sweden,

and the United Kingdom, Soysal distinguishes between nations that deal
with immigrants as individuals, or as cultural minorities. The latter strategy
tends to create a structure of immigrant organizations that are viewed as
representing the interests of immigrants. Soysal also distinguishes between
states that deal with immigrants through a centrally organized and formal
system, or through decentralized local voluntary or public agencies.
Soysal finds significant commonalities among many nations. Borrow-
ing liberally from the analytical framework developed by sociologist John
W. Meyer (see, e.g., Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997), Soysal finds a
worldwide convergence among the concepts of citizenship. Where citizen-
ship becomes “post-national,” peoples’ rights are not defined by the nation-
state, but are universal rights granted to citizens qua individuals. In this con-
text, European countries are facing substantial international pressure to
grant universal rights to their immigrant populations. These pressures are
epitomized by the development of an international corpus of fundamental
rights, reflected in the European Convention of Human Rights.
Soysal’s argument is illustrated by examining the rights that were granted
to “guest workers” in Europe during the post-war period. During the 1950s
and early 1970s, Northwestern European nations experienced significant
60  F. LUONG

economic growth and were in need of extra labor because of their high
dependency ratios, meaning the number of retired and elderly persons to
employed workers was high. A common strategy for addressing this prob-
lem, for assumed short periods of time, was to enter into bilateral agree-
ments with other countries for guest workers. However, many guest workers
decided to remain in their host countries and have progressively obtained
legal status, as well as gaining the civil and social rights that were equal to
those of native citizens. Soysal’s notion of citizenship closely resembles a
view by T. H. Marshall (1992)—citizenship is internally inclusive, and in-
volves having rights and making claims about these rights. In contrast to
Marshall, though, Soysal claims that civil and social rights are no longer
located at the national level, but rather invested in a concept of universal
“personhood,” and thus announcing the advent of a “post national model
of membership” (Soysal, 1994, p. 3).
Two “transnational” sources of post-national membership are found in
Soysal’s argument. First, there are “universalistic rules and conceptions re-
garding the rights of the individual” (Soysal, 1994, p. 145). Second, there
is a growing number of interdependence between international and trans-
national political structures which “constrain the host states from dispens-
ing with migrant population at will” (Soysal, 1994, p. 144). Though nation-
states are still responsible for “providing and implementing individual
rights” (Soysal, 1994, p. 143), their “legitimacy for these rights now lies in a
transnational order” (Soysal, 1994).
Also, Soysal argues that “rights” and “identity” are tenuously related,
because rights have become institutionalized as human rights on a global
level, and make citizenship a challenge. In contrast, identities remain spe-
cifically defined because national identity has to compete with other types
of identity. While rights are “defined and legitimated at the transnational
level” (Soysal, 1997, p. 512), identities are proliferating and challenging
the classical definition of national identity and “authorising ethnic nation-
alisms and non-ethnic subcultures of various sorts (youth, feminist, gay and
lesbian, and deaf culture)” (Soysal, 1997, p. 513). These are Soysal’s main
contributions.
Soysal’s argument leaves us at an impasse—where do we go from here in
describing citizenship and identity in a liberal society? If rights are univer-
sal, while identities are specific, what, exactly, is the meaning of integrating
immigrants?

Kymlicka: Diversity and Minority Rights

Kymlicka (1995) aims to reconcile citizenship with ethnic diversity by
supplementing the traditional notions of human rights with a theory of
minority rights. Kymlicka argues that modern democracies must ensure the
fair recognition of different cultures by reforming their institutions and
 The Crisis of Western Democracies and National Identity  61

providing individuals with the means of cultivating and transmitting their

cultural differences.
Kymlicka challenges the liberal concept of individualism by noting that
liberal values stress a non-individualistic concept—the management of cul-
tural minority groups. He questions the presumed neutrality of the liberal
state and argues that liberal Western democracies can never be completely
neutral. Indeed, state neutrality is a myth, and, in reality, it conceals the
state’s granting privileges to its majority group. For example, “the state can
(and should) replace religious oaths in courts with secular oaths, but it
cannot replace the use of English in courts with no language” (Kymlicka,
1995, p. 111). Not recognizing minority cultures leads directly to their dis-
crimination and exclusion within liberal democracies. As a result, Kymlicka
favors the promotion of collective rather than individual rights so that mi-
nority cultures may enjoy equal recognition.
Kymlicka’s multicultural citizenship is particularistic, stressing the defi-
ciencies of generalized citizenship rights for national and ethnic minority
groups. However, his argument is a liberal viewpoint because, in pursuing
a view of equality and freedom, it grants rights to “societal cultures” which
then frames the context for individual free choice; an important liberal
concept. A societal culture is defined as “synonymous with ‘a nation’ or
‘a people’—that is, as an intergenerational community, more or less in-
stitutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing
a distinct language and history” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 18). Accordingly, the
modern state, which tends to be multinational, must ensure access for all its
inhabitants to their societal culture.
In order to explain the complexities of cultural and ethnic pluralism,
Kymlicka distinguishes national minorities from immigrants. Immigrants
are generally expected to “participate within the public institutions of the
dominant culture” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 14) and are not supposed to be “ask-
ing for a parallel society” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 15). Immigrants’ demands for
accommodation and recognition of their religion and ethnicity are made
so they can better integrate into the host society. In Kymlicka’s terminol-
ogy, immigrants should be granted “polyethnic” rights—for example, ex-
emptions from the law, funding of ethnic minority associations, anti-dis-
crimination policies, and changes to the educational curricula. National
minorities and indigenous groups, however, usually put forward claims for
territorial and/or political autonomy and should be accorded “self-govern-
mental” rights and, in certain case[s] of historical exclusion of disadvan-
taged groups, special representation rights that are seen as “corollary to
self-government rights” (Kymlicka, 1995d, p. 32).
In the liberal paradigm, culture is paramount for the individual and not
for a given culture. Kymlicka argues that liberal democracies should pro-
mote “external protections” against discrimination for ethnic and religious
62  F. LUONG

minority cultures. Liberal states also should concomitantly reject “internal

restrictions” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 37) in order to ensure that the fundamen-
tal freedoms and basic liberties of individuals are not endangered at the
intragroup level.
To summarize, Kylmicka’s (1995) analysis is important for normative
theory because it espouses three key elements. To begin with, multicultural
citizenship promotes state recognition of many cultures. Second, multicul-
turalism is a contemporary invention specific to liberal democratic societies
that have witnessed the transformation of “cultural differences” into an
issue of “social justice.” Supporters of the multicultural ideal argue that
it is not enough to simply recognize the equality of individuals in their
similarity; one also must recognize the equality of their differences. Third,
multicultural citizenship implies institutional changes and an active role of
public authorities in providing individuals with the means for cultivating
and transmitting their cultural differences.

Criticisms of Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism has its critics. For opponents of multicultural citizen-

ship, it is this idea of giving collective rights to cultural groups that seems
to be problematic (see, e.g., Barry, 2002; Fourest, 2009; Ollier, 2004; Sar-
tori, 2003; Taguieff, 2005). Giving specific equal rights and privileges to
certain minorities does not guarantee civic equality between individuals,
but promotes equality between different ethnic groups. By recognizing the
legitimacy of collective cultural rights, multicultural policies may run the
risk of reinforcing communitarianism and restricting individual freedoms.
Also, there is the pessimistic view that such policies would drive citizens into
their different cultural identities and lead to an endless fragmentation of
society and eventually to its dissolution.
There are three criticisms of multicultural citizenship. First, giving col-
lective rights to cultural groups is a form of “cultural” bias. By considering
cultures as homogeneous, one can overestimate the stability and reproduc-
tion of cultures, while underestimating cultural evolution and its capacity to
adapt to different situations. Cultures actually become subjects of complex
processes of acculturation (Cuche, 2004, Chapter 4). Second, multicultural
theories also tend to ignore the individual. Individuals are never the pas-
sive reflection of culture, but, on the contrary, they are able to interpret
cultural legacies in new social contexts (Cuche, 2004, Chapter 6). Human
identity extends beyond the field of culture, which means that individual
identity is not primarily cultural, but takes shape at the intersection of dif-
ferent circles of belonging and socialization which vary on many criteria
such as age, sex, residency, education level, and professional activity. Finally,
 The Crisis of Western Democracies and National Identity  63

multiculturalism tends to essentialize cultures—that is, to assign them a

proper existence.
It is necessary to distinguish between cultural differences and social in-
equalities. The issue of identity tends to hide fundamental power relations.
What may matter most is not the need of belonging to a cultural commu-
nity, but rather the processes of social exclusion and domination. This view
is supported by Jean-François Bayart (1996), who asserts that global cultural
identification processes and identity claims do not result from any actual
increase in cultural diversity, but in fact hide social relations of inequality
and domination; and thus represent an “illusion of cultural identity.” In
contrast to Samuel Huntington (1996) and Benjamin Barber (1996), who
theorize about the development of civilizational consciousness and identity,
Bayart (1996) asserts that politics and power relations override cultural fac-
tors. In this sense, particular cultural affiliations are not primordial, but
rather reflect a social stratification system, while identity affirmation be-
comes a strategy to achieve prosperity and social prestige. Consequently,
if cultural diversity is not the problem, multicultural citizenship is not the
solution.
For a variety of reasons there has been a retreat from multicultural poli-
cies. A list, though not exhaustive, of these reasons includes the following—

• Many socioeconomic reasons, such economic crises

• The emergence of right-wing groups that fuel anti-Islamic hatred
• The threat to national identity
• The chronic lack of public support for multicultural policies
• A new assertiveness of the nation-state in implementing centrist
policies of civic integration with respect to immigrants

Moreover, many tend to denounce multicultural citizenship as a strategy

that has not only prevented the integration of minority groups, but also
which has led to “Islamization” of Western societies. Multiculturalism pre-
vents the emergence of a national identity and leads to a cultural relativism
that is harmful for social cohesion.

Re-Nationalizing Citizenship

Programs and Tests for Citizenship

Integration programs and tests have proliferated in Europe since the
beginning of the 21st century. Between 2002 and 2008, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
have introduced language and integration tests as a condition for natu-
ralization. In order to become citizens, candidates for naturalization must
64  F. LUONG

demonstrate sufficient language competences and knowledge of their host

state. These policies reflect an association between citizenship, national sov-
ereignty, and the cultural self-interpretation of a political community.
The legal counter-reactions to the cultural diversity brought on by im-
migrants may be interpreted as an attempt by much of Europe at defending
its cultures. Moreover, they appear to be indicators of much confusion and
anxiety in Western liberal democracies about the meaning of national iden-
tity in the wake of globalization and their own internal differentiation. Fur-
ther, they reflect the politics of turning citizenship into a tool for national
integration and represent a process of “culturalizing” immigration rules in
which culture increasingly becomes an essential factor for the selection of
immigrants. In Dora Kostakopoulou’s words:

Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition have been superseded by a

model of integration that shifts the attention away from issues such as equal
treatment, non-discrimination and social inclusion towards conditional socio-
political membership, the preservation of core national norms and values and
towards social cohesion. In the eyes of government elites, social cohesion,
national unity and belonging can be bolstered by requiring migrants to learn
to speak the language of the host state and by re-educating them so that they
embrace a country’s history and institutions, its values and the national way of
life. (Kostakopoulou, 2010, p. 1)

Social cohesion and national identity are important. Security concerns,

terrorist attacks, the introduction of obligatory civic integration courses,
and tests for newcomers all may be explained as attempts in promoting
social cohesion and national unity. The assumption is that a society with too
much diversity may lose its solidarity, whereas social stability is the result of
a culturally homogenous population (Macedo, 2007). Historically, the host
state adapted to immigrants and to support their settlement. Currently,
however, it is the responsibility of immigrants to acculturate or assimilate.

Thin and Thick Conceptions of Citizenship

One can see a shift from a “thin” liberal conception of citizenship, in
which citizenship is simply a legal status and where complete national iden-
tity is not required, to a “thicker” communitarian notion of citizenship with
a solid and coherent identity that has been established by the majority cul-
ture. In this communitarian model of citizenship, the state personifies the
national community and it has the responsibility of determining who may
enter and reside in its territory. Whereas in the liberal model naturalization
is seen as a right, and should be easily available to all long-term residents
(Bauböck, 1994, p. 102); in the communitarian model, naturalization is
complex and involves assimilating. In a communitarian society, not only
must immigrants adopt and share the behavior and rules of the host society,
 The Crisis of Western Democracies and National Identity  65

but they also must prove an adequate level of loyalty prior to becoming
citizens. Citizenship in a communitarian model is an “end point” of an
integration process (Entzinger, 2004).
In a communitarian model, language tests are legitimate because lan-
guage is a determining element of national identity (Neuman, 1994,
p. 264). In thinking about communitarian social systems, Kostakopoulou
remarked that “resident aliens must learn and appreciate the traditions
and values of the majority community, and must earn their membership by
showing commitment and working hard in order to familiarize themselves
with the constitutional history and the nation’s traditions” (Kostakopoulou,
2003, p. 102). The content of a citizenship test may thus include more than
simple questions about a national political system and its Constitution, but
also questions concerning history, values, and mores.
Since the end of the 1990s, citizenship and integration programs have
proliferated throughout Europe. For example, Germany introduced Inte-
grationskurse (which are partly based on the Dutch model), France launched
Contrats d’accueil et d’intégration, and Austria implemented Integrationverein-
barungen. Integration programs and tests are a necessary intermediary step,
not only for becoming a citizen, but also for obtaining long-term residence.
Undoubtedly, these efforts are partly the result from the 9/11 terrorist at-
tacks in America. Western liberal states fear that they have failed in ade-
quately integrating their immigrant populations. There is a feeling that im-
migrant integration is not simply the outcome of informal socialization and
long-term residence, but must be fostered, supervised, and—in the case of
integration failure—penalized by specific state policies.

THE PARADOX OF UNIVERSALISM

The Neo-Liberal Paradox

Attempts at creating identity and citizenship as universal concepts by

liberal nations have created a paradox. Christian Joppke (2010a) concedes
that in order to make citizens of immigrants, states require them to adopt
their host society’s national identity. Traditionally, national identity has
been rooted in a nation’s normative structure: language, mores, traditions,
and customs. However, Joppke’s argument is that by trying to “bind immi-
grants into a particular nation-state” (Joppke ,2010a, p. 33), Western de-
mocracies are getting caught in the paradox of universalism: national particu-
larisms that ethnic minorities and immigrants are being asked to adopt and
respect are local versions of the universalistic idiom of liberal democracy:
a universal identity rooted in the liberal-democratic creed. Their inability
to define a distinctively common identity is due to their inability at finding
66  F. LUONG

specific answers to the kind of identity expected from immigrants. “Citizen-

ship identity,” then, is a universalistic notion of political liberalism.
Why does this paradox of universalism exist? The answer lies in the lib-
eral character of the Western states. Political liberalism is founded on the
principles of individual autonomy and state neutrality. Such principles, in
Rawls’ words, distinguish between law and morals that lead to the compat-
ibility of many competing conceptions of the good life (“comprehensive
doctrines” in Rawls’ terminology) within the existence of a “well-ordered
society.” According to this ideal of a neutral state, “nation or nationalism”
cannot integrate a liberal society:

The hope of political community must indeed be abandoned, if by such com-

munity we mean a political society united in affirming a general and compre-
hensive doctrine. This possibility is excluded by the fact of pluralism together
with the rejection of the oppressive use of state power to overcome it. (Rawls,
1987, p. 10)

This is another way of saying that social unity in a liberal democracy can-
not be derived from a notion of the national “good,” but only through a
consensus on the “rights” that should accrue to each individual. The bonds
that tie people to the political community cannot be substantive and thick,
but only procedural and thin. Otherwise, individuals could not be free: “It
is precisely because we are free and independent selves, capable of choos-
ing our own end, that we need a framework of rights that is neutral among
ends” (Sandel, 1994, p. 1769). In a complex liberal society, characterized by
significant differentiation, and in which constitutional principles are para-
mount, it is impossible to define a distinctive sense of collective identity. Or,
if such a collective identity may be found, it is bound to be a shared con-
sensus on a minimal amount of rights. As Jonathan Sacks puts it, the liberal
state “is a system in which politics makes no claim to embody the true, the
beautiful and the good. Political involvement promises neither salvation
nor redemption; it claims merely to keep the peace between contending
parties” (Sacks, 2007, p. 221).
In the liberal state, there is a need for a common minimum consen-
sus (“overlapping consensus”) about a set of rights and freedoms that de-
termine the manner in which a society addresses its many conflicts. Thus,
within a liberal political regime, what is right must override what is good, and
the state must remain neutral towards the incommensurable moral choices
of each individual (Rawls, 1993).
Citizenship tests in Europe may assess future citizens’ cognitive knowl-
edge, but may not scrutinize their “inner dispositions.” In other words, citi-
zenship tests are liberal, in the Rawlsian sense, because they concentrate
on basic rights and freedoms, the political system, and factual knowledge
of “what is right.” However, it should not assess issues about “what is good.”
 The Crisis of Western Democracies and National Identity  67

Accordingly, being devoid of any particular cultural content, citizenship

tests in liberal democracies tend to converge towards a single universalistic
model. Some brief examples might help.
In Britain for example, this paradox of universalism is particularly visible
in the government statements of what it means to be British:

To be British seems to us to mean that we respect the laws, the elected par-
liamentary and democratic political structures, traditional values of mutual
tolerance, respect for equal rights and mutual concern; and that we give our
allegiance to the state (as commonly symbolised in the Crown) in return for
its protection. To be British is to respect those over-arching specific institu-
tions, values, beliefs and traditions that bind us all, the different nations and
cultures together in peace and in a legal order. (Home Office, 2004, p. 15)

Obviously, except for “the Crown,” this definition of the essence of “Brit-
ishness” is actually shared by most liberal democracies. Respecting the
democratic political structure and the rule of law is not a specific British
feature; it is British just as it is Dutch, French, or German. Consequently,
Joppke rightly argues that:

The British state, like all Western states trying to upgrade citizenship for the
purpose of more successful immigrant integration, is caught in the paradox
of universalism: it perceives the need to make immigrants and ethnic minori-
ties parts of this and not of any society, but it cannot name and enforce any
particulars that distinguish the “here” from “there.” (Joppke, 2010a, p. 130)

Another illustration of this paradox of universalism is the new Australian

citizenship test that was introduced in October 2007. In Australia the citi-
zenship test resembles the test of other Western European states: growing
security concerns about domestic Islamic terrorism, the need to reassure
Australian citizens about immigration, and a crisis of the multicultural ide-
ology. Surprisingly, a major factor that explains the use of the citizenship
test in Australia was the bombing of the London Underground in July 2005
(Cheng, 2009).
As is the case in Western Europe, citizenship in Australia is viewed “as
a privilege, not a right.” Accordingly, the acquisition of “English skills”
and “understanding the Australian way of life and our shared values” are
deemed essential elements for immigrants to acquire citizenship in Aus-
tralia (Australian Government, 2006, p. 5). However, the Australian citi-
zenship test exhibits the typical liberal inability of offering anything but
universalistic views about “Australian values” which newcomers are ex-
pected to adopt. Although obtaining Australian citizenship is defined as
“joining a distinct national community” (Australian Government, 2007,
p. 1), the main “Australian values” that have to be adopted by candidates
68  F. LUONG

for citizenship are “freedom of religion and secular government,” “respect

for the equal worth, dignity and freedom of the individual,” “freedom of
speech,” “equality under the law,” and “support for parliamentary democ-
racy and the rule of law” (Australian Government, 2007, p. 5). As Cheng
puts it, Australian national values are nothing but “the liberal values of de-
mocracy, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and the equality of men
and women” (Cheng, 2009, p. 62). These are values shared by all liberal
democracies.
In France, in contrast to Britain, there seems to be a clear sense of na-
tional identity. Such an identity is associated with the Republican civic ide-
ology, which stresses generalized political rights and civic equality. However,
Republicanism is framed in universalistic terms, and French symbols (such as
the flag, the national anthem, Marianne, etc.), are all symbols of human
rights. As Todd appropriately states, French Republican particularism is en-
abled (fortunately for France) by the specific circumstance that “our par-
ticularism is universalism” (Todd, 1994, p. 194).
The common solution to the problems of national identity and cultural
integration in Europe today seems to be the one pioneered by Republican
France; to be national is defined in universalistic principles of democracy,
liberty, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule
of law. Consequently, a worldwide “review of state pronouncements of what
it means to be ‘French,’ ‘British,’ or ‘Dutch’ reveals them all to be identi-
cal. In sum, citizenship identities . . . have become universalistic.” (Joppke,
2010a, p. 33)

Liberalism as Identity

Universalism can be particularistic and exclusive. William Galston

(1995) and John Gray (2000) remind us that liberalism has always had two
different sides: one that limits itself to noninterference and toleration, and
that allows many diverse ways of life to coexist peacefully without the pre-
sumption of overarching common values; and a second view that prescribes
reason and autonomy over faith and heteronomy, and thus enables the
achievement of the best way of life for all humankind.
Trapped in a paradox of a specific identity, which seems necessary for
integration and yet cannot be supplied because of the commitment to uni-
versalism, Western states call upon a certain idea of liberalism. While the
tolerant version of liberalism prevailed during the period of multicultural-
ism in the past few decades, episodes of Islamic terrorism are seen as rea-
sons for replacing a multicultural paradigm with a variant of liberalism. The
new liberalism prescribes a shared way of life, a potential identity that sepa-
rates illiberal from liberal people. By displaying aggressive integrationist
 The Crisis of Western Democracies and National Identity  69

policies, it resembles what Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos calls a “Schmittian”

liberalism that “aims to clarify the core values of liberal societies and use
coercive state power to protect them from illiberal and putatively danger-
ous groups” (Triadafilopoulos, 2011, p. 863).
In the Netherlands, the change from multiculturalism to assimilation
has expanded from an institutional modus vivendi (Gray, 2000) to a way of
life based on a “thick” liberal identity. Accordingly, the Dutch require that
newcomers adopt and share a “progressive” liberal attitude, which stresses
gender equality, the acceptance of homosexuality, and the marginalization
and privatization of religiosity. The message is that the Netherlands is a
progressive and liberal society.
A second illustration of liberal exclusion is the decision taken in June
2008 by the highest French administrative court, the Conseil d’État, which
confirmed the denial of citizenship to Faiza Silmi, a niqab-wearing wom-
an. The Conseil d’État recognized that Silmi “possessed a good mastery of
the French language,” and that she had a French husband as well as three
French-born children. Nonetheless, the denial of citizenship was based on
Silmi’s “insufficient assimilation”2 into the French Republic, and was legiti-
mated by the fact that she had adopted “a radical practice of her religion,
incompatible with the essential values of the French community, especially
the principle of the equality of sexes.”3 The Conseil d’État referred to a re-
cent modification in the French Civil Code which stipulates that “the gov-
ernment may, on grounds of indignity or lack of assimilation other than
linguistic, oppose the acquisition of French nationality by foreign spouse,”
and that “no one may be naturalized unless he proves his assimilation in the
French community.”4 This was the first time that the Conseil d’État refused to
grant citizenship on the basis of religious expression, and—paradoxically—
the court invoked a fundamental liberal principle, sex equality, in order to
undermine another core liberal norm, freedom of religion. Therefore, the
court took an illiberal decision in order to protect liberal identity.
In contrast with liberal multiculturalism, repressive liberalism sees “the
task of immigrant integration as part of a broader campaign to preserve
‘Western civilisation’ from illiberal threats, particularly those based on ‘fun-
damentalist Islam’” (Triadafilopoulos, 2011, p. 863). Echoing older strains
of liberalism, and associated with a colonialist vision that established the
superiority of Europeans and their way of life, this new “enlightened fun-
damentalism” (Fekete, 2006) views the preservation of liberal regimes as
sufficient ground for pursuing aggressive and coercive measures. Thus, na-
tions pursue illiberal policies in order to preserve what it perceives as an
endangered Western civilization.
70  F. LUONG

Liberal Versus Illiberal Citizenship Tests

As discussed above, liberalism can transmute into an identity and become

exclusive. It also can become repressive and illiberal. In order to avoid this
illiberal bias, citizenship tests in Western liberal democracies, which are
inspired by the logic of political liberalism, should be conceived in a way
so they are not intrusive. Liberal citizenship tests should abandon their fo-
cus on “moral obligations,” and focus on “legal commitments.” Such a test
should concentrate on the “external” respect for core constitutional prin-
ciples, such as democracy and human dignity, and not on the “internal”
perceptions of applicants. Immigrants seeking citizenship should demon-
strate knowledge and understanding of the state’s fundamental constitu-
tional principles and accept and respect them as the law of the land, but
they are not morally required to be in agreement with these laws. After all,
liberalism also includes the freedom to choose not to be liberal, as long as
one’s way of life is democratic and legal.
As an example of a repressive liberal policy, consider the Gesprächsleit-
faden, which were issued by the regional Land government of Baden-Würt-
temberg in September 2005. The test inquires about the “true” beliefs and
values of an applicant for citizenship, and inadmissible as a true liberal
policy. Even if it focuses on the fundamental rules and principles of liberal
democracy, by touching the intimate sphere of the person, it raises many
doubts about its compatibility with the principles of equality, freedom of
religion and expression, and especially of freedom of thought. As the legal
commentators Wolfrum and Röben put it, “the mere holding of an opin-
ion is no threat to the liberal democratic order, if it is not expressed in
concrete actions that are directed against this order” (Wolfrum & Röben,
2006, p. 15).
It is a fundamental principle of liberalism that public policy and law
may not regulate the “inner motivations” of people, but only their “ex-
ternal behavior.” The threshold of unacceptability is exceeded whenever
citizenship tests transgress “the thin line that separates the regulation
of behavior from the control of beliefs” ( Joppke, 2010b, p. 3). As David
Miller puts it:

Liberal states do not require their citizens to believe liberal principles, since
they tolerate communists, anarchists, fascists, and so forth. What they require
is that citizens should conform to liberal principles in practice and accept as
legitimate policies that are pursued in the name of such principles, while they
are left to advocate alternative arrangements. (Miller, 2004, p. 14)

The border between liberal and illiberal citizenship tests within West-
ern liberal democracies lies in the Kantian distinction between “legal-
ity” and “morality.” Legal commitments involve recognition, respect, and
 The Crisis of Western Democracies and National Identity  71

acceptance of a state’s constitutional principles, while moral obligations

imply adherence and identification with these principles. The former can
be required in the process of obtaining citizenship, while the latter are il-
liberal policies, since they convey the idea that the liberal democratic state
is only reserved for liberal people. Thus, we have a paradox of universalism.

CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM

Theoretical Foundations

Joppke (2010a) argues that contemporary nation-building is limited by

non-discriminatory norms and liberal equality, so national identity cannot
be imposed on people in liberal states. Consequently, the political will to
renationalize citizenship in Western liberal democracies has failed, while
liberal citizenship identities, which cannot be reproduced in nationally dis-
tinctive manners, have become “universalistic.”5 Nonetheless, liberal citi-
zenship identity can be exclusive, expressing the view that only liberal peo-
ple may enter and reside in the liberal community (which is a profoundly
illiberal idea).
In this potentially repressive liberal context, the paradox of universalism
has challenged Western liberal democracies seeking to reinvent national
identity. European states face the fact that renationalizing citizenship iden-
tity is impossible, and that decoupling national identity and citizenship is
the only viable solution for integrating immigrants. As Joppke puts it, “the
decoupling of citizenship and nationhood in plural societies is the incon-
trovertible exist position for contemporary state campaigns for unity and
integration, especially with respect to immigrants” (Joppke, 2010a, p. 143).
What other framework would be useful for Western liberal states? Consti-
tutional patriotism is a concept which argues that the association between
citizenship and national identity is the result of history and empirical con-
tingencies, and that it is possible for them to be separated.
Jürgen Habermas (1992) has developed a perspective that decouples
politics and culture; he argues that social bonds in a liberal society should
be political and juridical rather than historical and cultural. The motives
for becoming attached to a political community should be universalistic
and not particularistic.6 Accordingly, any blind identification with an inani-
mate object, such as a nation, becomes anathema; democratic citizenship
does not require a national identity, but only a shared political culture.
The relationship between citizenship and national identity gives rise to
a common sense of belonging and to the emergence of democratic citizen-
ship (Habermas, 1992). There is a “circular process” of mutual reinforce-
ment that unites these two elements: the common feeling of belonging has
72  F. LUONG

facilitated the establishment of democracy which, in turn, has strengthened

solidarity between citizens. In a democracy, it is political participation, and
the principles that justify this participation, that create the social bonds
between societal members rather than belonging to the same cultural en-
tity. Habermas stresses that these two dimensions of the nation-state may
be potentially contradictory: the political and legal dimension are based
on universal principles and reflected in the institutions of the democratic
state, while the national dimension is affective and particularistic (Haber-
mas, 1998).
These two dimensions explain the dual aspects of a nation-state. In a de-
mocracy, the rule of law and the welfare state are derived from universalistic
principles, and nationalism justifies invasions, exclusions, and oppressions.
It is because of the lucid understanding of the historical link between na-
tionalism and citizenship, that Habermas developed his theory of constitu-
tional patriotism. His theory refers to a sense of belonging that is no longer
based on a common cultural identity, but rather on universal constitutional
principles. Such allegiance is political rather than cultural, since it is based
on the ideals of democracy and the rule of law. Allegiance is rational rather
than primordial.
Western liberal states should abandon their efforts at promoting “na-
tional values,” which are culturally based, and should turn to constitutional
patriotism and its fundamental constitutional principles. This is the only
way for Western liberal democracies to be consistent with their liberal prin-
ciples, while also recognizing, accepting, and respecting their core consti-
tutional principles.

Constitutional Patriotism, Cultural Diversity,

and European Integration

Habermas has applied the concept of constitutional patriotism to the

growing cultural diversity within Western liberal societies. He deems it es-
sential to mobilize a citizenry around the state’s core constitutional prin-
ciples. His conceptualization of constitutional patriotism dissociates citi-
zenship and national identity, and allows for the coexistence of different
cultures while promoting shared feelings of belonging.
This universalistic approach of integration may be very useful in the
present context of rising xenophobia. Indeed, it would be beneficial to
clearly distinguish between identity and citizenship when approaching
the question of integrating different cultures. Contemporary liberal states
should only use the language of shared political values, without attempting
to complement them with communitarian references. There is no need to
promote a common national identity.
 The Crisis of Western Democracies and National Identity  73

Constitutional patriotism implies the full recognition of citizenship

rights (civic, political, and social) to cultural and religious minorities, but
not the recognition of collective rights. These collective rights are prob-
lematic in several respects: they reify cultural groups, they jeopardize and
endanger the internal evolution of cultures, and there may be a contradic-
tion between these collective rights and the fundamental freedom of the
individual (Habermas, 1998). Constitutional patriotism bypasses these is-
sues entirely.
By the end of the 1990s, Habermas believed that the process of econom-
ic globalization required the enhancement of post-national consciousness
and constitutional patriotism on a Europe-wide basis (Habermas, 2000).
In his view, a nation-state could not control economic globalization. It was
only at the European level that globalization could be contained.
A post-national perspective implies that it is possible and desirable to
develop social and democratic institutions at the European level. However,
the institutions should not be based on a common European identity, but
rather on political principles. Habermas denounces the opponents of build-
ing a Europe because they mobilize a “national-communitarian” rhetoric,
which establishes an intrinsic link between nation and citizenship. On the
contrary, he claims that the absence of a European nation is not in itself a
barrier to political European integration (Habermas, 2000). Instead, post-
national membership could lead to European constitutional patriotism
based on political, rather than cultural, principles.
Constitutional patriotism is supposed to prevent oppression and exclu-
sion by mobilizing citizens around democratic principles and the rule of
law. Nevertheless, according to Habermas, this perspective does not imply
the disappearance of national identities, but rather their reinterpretation,
which involves their constant submission to the criticism of constitutional
principles. Cultural aspects of social cohesion should be abandoned in fa-
vor of civic principles. National cultures would not disappear under this
model, but would function as interpretation grids for universalistic prin-
ciples. Moreover, cultural beliefs, mores, and values should be examined
on a consistent basis.
According to Habermas, European integration is readily open to the
development of this type of post-national membership. On the one hand,
European nation-states have begun to develop some predispositions for
post-national consciousness. The disastrous effects of nationalism dur-
ing the 20th century have led to much thought about the ambivalent and
dangerous aspects of “national tradition,” and a critical view of national
history (Habermas, 2006). On the other hand, the creation and develop-
ment of the European Community and the European Union have political,
rather than ethical, foundations. The European Union is already based on
74  F. LUONG

constitutional principles and not on a common national identity (Haber-

mas, 2006). This process was a step toward constitutional patriotism.

Constitutional Patriotism and Citizenship Tests

Every society has a specific ethical culture that influences the interpre-
tation of its prevailing political principles. Though ethical principles are
constantly evolving, an important factor in such change is the cultural/
demographic composition of the population. A society that has become
plural as a result of immigration should expect its structure of ethics and its
political principles to change (Habermas, 1992). However, even if this po-
litical community is open, changing, and democratic, a common political
identity, shared by all citizens, is deemed essential by Habermas.
Western liberal democracies are rooted in long-standing legal frame-
works and in broadly shared ideas of citizenship and national identity. Favell
(2001) points out that the same ideas have different legal interpretations
in different states. Universal concepts such as freedom, equality, pluralism,
autonomy, and tolerance have no standard universal meaning, and they
must be understood in the context of a state. In this sense, the nations’
political solutions to the problem of ethnic and cultural diversity, although
apparently similar in their formulation, must actually be read as distinct and
different applied versions of political liberalism.
As Liav Orgad states, “every state has a constitutional uniqueness reflect-
ing its history, developments, traditions, and contextual background” (Or-
gad, 2010, p. 99). This specific constitutional identity is not apparent if one
looks at the questions of citizenship tests. Rather, national culture appears
if one looks at the system as a whole. Orgad states, “what makes the Ger-
man Constitution German is not any single constitutional principle, but the
entire Constitution, the whole package, and the particular way Germans
express and implement these principles” (Orgad, 2010, p. 100).
Immigrants should accept and adopt a state’s fundamental constitution-
al principles before obtaining citizenship. Viewing constitutional patriotism
in this manner, when looking at citizenship tests, should allow each nation-
state the possibility of preserving its own history and constitutional iden-
tity. Constitutional exceptionalism, or “national constitutionalism” (Orgad,
2010), leaves room for constitutional particularity, while at the same time it
is being distinguished from cultural and ethnic conceptions of citizenship.
It is less universal than political liberalism (Rawls, 1993) because it does not
seek to formulate universalistic principles of justice, but rather to retain the
essential constitutional principles of a specific nation-state without requir-
ing cultural nor emotional allegiance. In Orgad’s words, “it is a necessary
 The Crisis of Western Democracies and National Identity  75

stipulation for a legal, non-emotional belonging in a particular political

body” (Orgad, 2010, p. 100).
Citizenship tests in Western liberal democracies should establish whether
applicants for citizenship are familiar with, and are accepting of, the essen-
tial constitutional principles of a specific nation-state. States can then for-
mulate questions in accordance with their unique constitutional contexts.
For example, one could imagine that the British citizenship test includes
questions about British constitutional history and documents, such as the
Glorious Revolution, the English Civil War, the Bill of Rights, the Petition
of Rights, and the Magna Carta. It might also include questions about great
jurists, such as William Blackstone or Edward Coke, who have had a large
influence as English Law commentators. However, it should not formulate
questions on issues that are not essential to British constitutional principles,
such as “where does Father Christmas come from?,” “what should people
do if they are involved in a car accident?,” or “suppose you spill someone’s
pint in the pub. What, according to the book, usually happens next?”7 As
Orgad puts it:

[The British citizenship test] should set down the threshold needed to become
British; this threshold needs to check whether migrants know and accept Brit-
ish national constitutionalism, and not whether they can spit back trivia about
the Grand National or the Notting Hill Carnival. (Orgad, 2010, p. 103)

Under constitutional patriotism, citizenship tests should eliminate fig-

ures, events, principles, or values that have no or only little relation to a
state’s Constitution. Therefore, if a specific knowledge is normative or fac-
tually significant to a state’s Constitution, it may be legitimate to require
such as a condition for obtaining citizenship. In Germany for example, re-
quiring the applicant for citizenship to have knowledge about Germany’s
path to democracy is legitimate because it transmits the message that ap-
plicants are seeking citizenship not of any community, but of the German
political community. Indeed, constitutional patriotism is, next to language
requirements, the single most important particularism that Western liberal
democracies may legitimately require for citizenship. As Joppke states:

With respect of the contents of the citizenship test, to ask for host-society
language competence and knowledge of the principles and procedures of lib-
eral democracies is an incontrovertibly legitimate core component of all citi-
zenship tests in Europe and other Western states. And few would doubt that
asking for knowledge of historical key events in a country’s road to becoming
a liberal democracy, along with knowledge of liberal democracy’s peculiar
institutional form in the respective country, is equally legitimate. (Joppke,
2010b, p. 1)
76  F. LUONG

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have discussed the kind of citizenship identities that Euro-
pean states currently promote in integrating their immigrant populations.
The recent proliferation of integration programs across Europe require
that immigrants follow native customs and mores, including native lan-
guage, as a prerequisite for acquiring citizenship status. By implementing
their programs, Western states are attempting to create a culturally homo-
geneous population that shares the same language and mores. The simple
message is that European states are dominated by one group, and it will be
that group’s culture that is the state’s culture.
Some object to such a program. Joppke, for example, points out that
such policies are narrowly limited, mainly by the principles of political lib-
eralism. Identity cannot be legislated, and the actual content of citizenship
identities fostered by states resemble the generic precepts of the universal-
istic idiom characterizing liberal democracy.
However, this is not to say that universalism cannot be exclusive. In fact,
particular universalism is the main form in which Western liberal democra-
cies practice exclusion. In this context, liberalism “thickens” from a proce-
dural framework of tolerance into a substantive way of life in which diversity
is accepted. This is an ethical way of life, to which immigrants are expected
to conform.
In the context of “repressive liberalism,” one needs to define the thresh-
old above which states’ policies become illiberal by raising cultural restric-
tions on immigrants and access to citizenship. I have argued that citizenship
tests in Western liberal democracies should not be intrusive—that is, that
public policy and law should not seek to regulate the “inner motivations”
of people, but only their “external behavior.”
If the liberal state wishes to remain liberal, it must admit, on one hand,
that national identity cannot be legislated and, on the other hand, that it
cannot force individuals to adhere and identify morally with a liberal way
of life. Therefore, I have suggested that one might turn to “constitutional
patriotism,” which decouples citizenship from national identity. Following
this logic, it is legitimate for citizenship applicants to recognize, respect,
and accept a state’s fundamental constitutional principles, though it is un-
acceptable to compel them to morally adhere with them. Furthermore, by
separating civic integration from ethical integration, constitutional patrio-
tism allows for the coexistence of diverse cultures while fostering a shared
feeling of belonging. Finally, focusing on the content of the Constitution
may provide a framework on how citizenship tests should be conceptual-
ized, and offer to Western liberal democracies the possibility of preserving
their own history and constitutional identity.
 The Crisis of Western Democracies and National Identity  77

NOTES

1. The United Nations (2013) reports that there were 230 million migrants
world-wide.
2. Interestingly, the Conseil d’État use the term “assimilation” rather than “ac-
culturation.” This clearly sends a signal that immigrants must become French
and lose the culture of their sending country.
3. See Conseil d’État, 27 June 2008, Mme Faiza M., req. no 286798.
4. See French Civil Code, book I, title I, Ch. III, Sec. I §3 Arts. 21–24.
5. Of course, citizenship identity has become universalistic only insofar as it falls
within the scope of state policy. This is an important reserve, since it is not
argued, for example, that common German people do not identify German-
ness with Christianity.
6. Of course, this universal attachment to the political community should not be
exclusive, but inclusive. In that sense, a citizenship test inspired by the logic of
constitutional patriotism should not be intrusive, as discussed in the previous
section.
7. These questions appear in the Life in the UK Test. Details on the test are avail-
able at http://lifeintheuktest.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/.

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 PART II
NATIONAL IDENTITY: CASE STUDIES
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 CHAPTER 3

THE IDIOSYNCRASIES
OF SCOTTISH NATIONAL
IDENTITY
Nathalie Duclos

“I’m a Scotsman!” replied Sean Connery when asked if he was Irish, so

strong is his Scottish identity. In Scotland and throughout the United King-
dom, it is a widely shared belief that Scotland is a nation with its own iden-
tity, an identity which even has its own name: “Scottishness.” Although Scot-
land is part of the United Kingdom, its status as a nation is not contested.
British recognition of the UK’s multinational nature makes relationships
between the different British nations rather different from other multina-
tional states, such as Spain or Belgium. As noted by Dodds and Seawright,
“the debate in Scotland is not over the existence of the Scottish nation. . . .
All the political parties assume that the Scottish nation exists and will play
the ‘Scottish card’ to varying degrees—although their readings of Scottish-
ness may vary” (Dodds & Seawright, 2004, p. 91). The aim of this chapter is
to explore the varied “readings of Scottishness,” through the idiosyncrasies
of Scottish national identity.
My central argument developed is that from a European point of view,
Scottish national identity and, by the same token, nationalism present some

National Identity, pages 83–112

Copyright © 2016 by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 83
84  N. DUCLOS

rather unorthodox characteristics. Firstly, while a national identity is gen-

erally defined in opposition to an “Other,” which is its rival for people’s
national loyalty, Scottishness is often characterized as being part of, or com-
plementary to, Scottish people’s other national identity: the British one.
Moreover, Scottishness is even described as shaping Britishness and being
shaped by it. Secondly, in Scotland there is no obvious correlation between
national identity, constitutional preferences, and party preferences. A
strong feeling of national identity does not indicate a desire to see Scotland
become an independent state.
All political parties in Scotland use a Scottish-national frame of refer-
ence, and Scottish national identity finds expression in both nationalism
and unionism, in both pro- and anti-independence movements. However,
one party has greatly contributed to the politicization of Scottish identity,
namely the Scottish National Party which is why this chapter will analyze
the SNP’s nationalism and its views on identity and citizenship. The SNP’s
nationalism can appear in some respects to be rather unusual, in that the
party does not present Scottish independence as signifying the end of a
common British national identity, nor does it argue that the aim of inde-
pendence is to give political recognition to Scottish national identity. More-
over, the SNP does not emphasize such commonly shared national features
as a common language or religion. So, a better understanding of Scottish
national identity one needs to grasp the SNP’s role on this topic. This chap-
ter of mine is a case study of these issues.

NATIONAL IDENTITY IN SCOTLAND:

IS IT UNPROBLEMATIC?

In answer to the question, “Is Scotland a country?” a geographical maga-

zine humorously noted that:

Scotland is as much of a country as England; more of a country than Wales,

which is a principality; far more of a country than Ulster, which is a province;
but less of a country than the United Kingdom, which is a sovereign state, and
hence, unlike Scotland, able to pass the final test and compete in the Eurovi-
sion Song Contest. (Geographical Magazine, 1993)

If Scotland can be called a country, it is not a state: It has not been an

independent state since 1707, when it was united with England to form the
United Kingdom of Great Britain. Nevertheless, inside the UK, Scotland is
almost unanimously considered to be a separate nation, as are England and
Wales. Scotland’s status as a nation is very uncontroversial in the UK.
Scotland’s status as a nation within a wider state is equally uncontro-
versial; rather it is the UK’s status that has been under question in recent
 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity  85

years.1 Several phrases have been coined to convey Scotland’s particular na-
ture as a nation within a state. The phrase “stateless nation” (Leruez, 1983),
first coined in 1983 by Jacques Leruez, was later popularized by leading
Scottish scholars, such as David McCrone (1992), Michael Keating (1996),
or T. M. Devine (2003). Scottish political thinker Tom Nairn prefers to de-
scribe Scotland as a “state-nation,” a phrase which allows him to stress that
Scotland was a state before becoming a nation: “Scotland itself had been
a state long before turning into a nation in [the] modern sense. It was (as
it remains today) a state-nation, not the other way round” (Nairn, 2000,
p. 121).2
Why is Scotland’s status as a nation viewed as unproblematic inside the
UK? It could be argued that there are three interlinked reasons for this. First
of all, Scotland has at its disposal many symbols that are internationally seen
as national identity markers. It has its own flag (the “Saltire”) or even two
flags, if one also counts the red and yellow Lion Rampant, a patron saint
(St Andrew), a national day (St Andrew’s Day), an emblem (the thistle),
national sports teams, and even unofficial national anthems that sports fans
sing during “international” matches. It also has a national capital, Edin-
burgh, where the National Library of Scotland, the National Museum of
Scotland, and the Scottish National Gallery are located. Last but not least,
Scotland’s borders are uncontested and have not changed in centuries.
Secondly, the idea that Scotland has been a nation since the Middle Ages
is very controversial, but it is a view which many historians have defended.
In 1969, H. J. Hanham claimed that “Scotland has possessed all the char-
acteristics of a distinct nation since the twelfth century” (Hanham, 1969,
p. 15). In his history of Scotland, Michael Lynch stated that “before there
was a kingdom, in the sense of a consolidated territory, there was a people
and an intensely felt pride in being Scots” (Lynch, 1999, p. xiii). Even more
clearly, he argued that a “sense of Scottish nationhood” was sharpened as
early as the late 13th century by England’s “attempt to erect an English
empire throughout the British Isles,” which “galvanise[d] the Scottish Kirk
into a church militant and force[d] its ‘multinational’ nobility to decide
where their first loyalties la[id]” (Lynch, 1999, p. xiv). In his Oxford Com-
panion to Scottish history, Michael Lynch, in the entry “national identity,”
starts with the following warning: “It is anachronistic to talk of national
identities in the early Middle Ages” (p. 437). However, he then goes on
to say that “[n]ational identities are often reformulations of older identi-
ties, so it is appropriate to ask when and how Scottish identity first came
into being, long before this became anything which may be recognized as
a national identity” (p. 437). The part of the same entry on early medieval
Scotland concludes on the idea that a “specifically and distinctly Scottish
identity for the kingship” could be found from the end of the 13th century
(p. 438). The part on late medieval Scotland notes that:
86  N. DUCLOS

[C]ollective self-awareness . . . is not necessarily the same as national con-

sciousness and identity. In so far as the latter presupposes, not just a shared
sense of the past, but also a community of language, culture, custom, and law,
late medieval Scotland was only just beginning to acquire the defining char-
acteristics of nationhood. (Lynch, 2001, p. 439)

Not all historians believe that Scottish national identity can be traced
back to the Middle Ages. Modernization theorists like Ernest Gellner argue
that nations are artificial, manufactured constructs that came into being in
the era of industrialization in the late 18th and the 19th centuries, and re-
jects both the idea that they are natural and timeless and the idea that they
are ancient and rooted in history. However, while recognizing the impor-
tance of factors linked to modernization other theorists, such as Anthony
D. Smith, believe that nations could not have been created out of nothing
in the 19th century, and argue that most European nations find their roots
in ethnies (or ethnic communities) which took shape in the Middle Ages.
Whatever Scotland’s status in the Middle Ages, most historians would
agree that it was a nation as well as an independent state by the time that
it united with England. The Treaty of Union which both kingdoms agreed
to in 1707 led to the creation of a new state called the United Kingdom of
Great Britain. This union saw the closure of the Scottish and English Par-
liaments and the birth of the British Parliament. It was also an economic
union which gave Scotland access to the English market and to the English
colonies. However, most historians argue that the terms of the Treaty al-
lowed Scotland to remain a separate society and therefore to keep its dis-
tinct national identity.
It is undeniable that the Scots retained crucial forms of institutional and
social identity, most notably their own Church (the Church of Scotland, or
“Kirk”) and religion (Presbyterianism), their own educational system (at all
levels), their own legal system, and their own banking system. In the views
of the vast majority of Scottish scholars, the survival of these autonomous
institutions, especially the so-called “holy trilogy” of religion, law, and edu-
cation, created an enduring sense of Scottish identity despite its integration
into the United Kingdom. In attempting to identify how Scotland was dis-
tinct from the rest of the UK, H. J. Hanham noted:

Today the Scots have their own national church, their own national education
system, their own national legal system, their own national banking system,
their own national system of central and local government, their own national
way of speaking English—even their own Scottish Trades Union Congress.
(Hanham, 1969, p. 15)

To Hanham, the breath of Scotland’s distinctiveness meant that Scotland

was more than a nation: It was a “state within the wider state of the United
 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity  87

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland” (p. 15). Most would dis-
agree with him on that point; however, his assertion illustrates the extent to
which it is generally believed that Scotland has remained different from the
rest of the UK. To illustrate Scotland’s distinctiveness today, modern schol-
ars mention the trinity of law, religion, and education, the system of admin-
istrative devolution that developed after the establishment of the Scottish
Office (in 1885), and those civil society institutions which, “although not
isolated from their counterparts elsewhere in the United Kingdom, operate
in a Scottish context” (Cameron, 2010, p. 354). Some also mention the fact
that Scotland has its own media (and in particular its own press) and its own
popular culture. It has sometimes been claimed that thanks to these visible
differences between Scotland and the rest of the UK, “Scottish identity is
well defined” (Brand & Mitchell, 1997, p. 41). However, it is argued here
that Scottish national identity is not as unproblematic and easy to define as
this claim suggests.
Just as Scotland’s status as a nation is largely uncontroversial in Britain,
so is the fact that Scotland has a national identity which, in the words of
leading Scottish academics (Paterson et al., 2001), is “part of the taken-for-
granted world” (p. 102). Nevertheless, some have warned against analyzing
Scottish identity through a purely national lens. First of all, a Scottish na-
tional identity is just one of the many identities that the people of Scotland
maintain. As noted by Colley (2008), “Identities are not like hats. Human
beings can and do put on several at a time” (p. 6). An analysis of Scottish
people’s identities is incomplete if it does not take into account class, gen-
der, and other factors that make up those identities. People stress different
forms of identities according to the context in which they find themselves:

What is on offer [today] is what we might call “pick ’n mix” identity, in

which we wear our identities lightly, and change them according to circum-
stance. . . . Hence, national identity does not take precedence over class or
gender identities (or, indeed, vice versa) except insofar as these are subjec-
tively ordered. (McCrone, 1992, p. 195)

Some scholars even call into question the very validity of national identity,
both as a concept and as an individual attribute. In the words of Bechhofer
and McCrone (who disagree with such a viewpoint):

To some . . . national identity is something of a con trick, worked by the state

and its institutions to make the citizenry malleable and willing to do its bid-
ding. . . . This has led some writers to be skeptical of national identity, seeing it
as a form of what Marxists call “false consciousness,” somehow not quite right
as identities go, and certainly less “real” than social class, gender, ethnicity,
because from these certain clear-cut life chances derive. (Bechhofer & Mc-
Crone, 2009, p. 3)
88  N. DUCLOS

Thirdly, even if one believes national identity to be one of the key identi-
ties among the Scottish people, it would be ahistorical to believe that this
has always been the case. In his preface to a recent history of Scotland since
1880, which is the final volume of the New Edinburgh History of Scotland, the
general editor of the series warned that:

[T]o talk of the Scots—or the Scottish nation—is often misleading. Local
loyalty and regional diversity have more frequently characterized Scotland
than any perceived sense of “national” solidarity. Scottish identity has seldom
been focused primarily, let alone exclusively, on the “nation.” The modern
discourse of nationhood offers what is often an inadequate and inappropriate
vocabulary in which to couch Scotland’s history. (Mason, 2010, p. xiii)

These caveats notwithstanding, analyzing Scotland through a national

prism is legitimate, if only because (arguably) “[b]eing national is the con-
dition of our times, even as the nation is buffeted by the subnational rise of
local, regional, and ethnic claims, and the transnational threats of global-
ization, hegemonic American culture, migration, diasporization, and new
forms of political community” (Eley & Suny, 1996, p. 32).
Despite all this research on Scottish national identity, my central argu-
ment is that “Scottishness” is an unorthodox, even paradoxical, form of
national identity. Why? To begin with, it is generally conceptualized as be-
ing both distinct from, and part of another national identity: Britishness.
Secondly, there is no obvious correlation between national identity and
constitutional preferences. Whether people in Scotland are nationalist or
Unionist, whether they support the independence of Scotland or its re-
maining within the UK, has no direct correlation with how strongly Scottish
they feel. Thus, debates on Scotland’s constitutional future have not been
debates about Scotland’s national identity. Both the debate on devolution
and the current debate on independence have focused on the governance
of Scotland and its social and economic health. Thirdly, even the Scottish
National Party, which to many is the political embodiment of Scottish na-
tional identity, does not consider Scottish independence in terms of iden-
tity politics.

THE NATIONAL IDENTITY/IES OF SCOTTISH PEOPLE:

SCOTTISHNESS AND BRITISHNESS

Most people accept that Scotland and Britain are nations. This raises the
following question: Are Scottishness and Britishness two distinct forms of
national identity, or is Scottishness a specific form of Britishness? Most Brit-
ish scholars agree that a Scottish national identity existed before the cre-
ation of the British State in 1707, which itself led to the birth of a British
 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity  89

national identity. Where they disagree is on what national identity Scottish

people have had since 1707. Has Britishness absorbed the old Scottish iden-
tity, or have Scottishness and Britishness been two distinct identities? Linda
Colley (2008) has convincingly argued that:

Great Britain did not emerge by way of a “blending” of the different regional
or older national cultures contained within its boundaries as is sometimes
maintained, nor is its genesis to be explained primarily in terms of an English
“core” imposing its cultural and political hegemony on a helpless and de-
frauded Celtic periphery. (p. 6)

Rather, Colley sees Britishness as an overarching identity which was

“superimposed” on Scottishness and other national identities, as well as
regional identities within Scotland, Wales, or England (p. 6). Bechhofer
and McCrone (2009) share this belief, and define “being British” as “a sort
of umbrella identity sitting loosely upon the older territorial identities of
England, Scotland and Wales” (p. 1). To them, the result of this “superim-
position” of Britishness on Scottishness is that these may be seen as “nested
identities, complementary, not contradictory, although in practice people
sometimes see them as alternatives depending on context” (p. 1). Speaking
of 19th century Scotland, Graeme Morton (1999) also defines the popula-
tion’s British and Scottish identities as “complementary” (p. 200), but dis-
putes that Britishness is an overarching identity in which Scottishness is
nested. Instead, he argues that “the idea of Britishness is distinct in each
[of the British nations], built around a number of competing and inter-
mixed identities. There is much commonality in the British experience, but
it means something unique to each of the four nations” (p. 7). More than
just complementary identities, some see the British and Scottish identities
of the Scots as shaping each other. According to Neil Davidson:

[F]or the Scots, their British and Scottish identities do not merely exist in par-
allel, but interpenetrate each other at every point. In other words, Scottish-
ness as we know it today not only emerged at the same time as Britishness, but
is part of Britishness, and could not exist (at least in the same form) without
it. (Davidson, 2000, pp. 201–202)

However, even those who argue that British and Scottish identities are
complementary or intermixed do not always argue that they are comple-
mentary or intermixed national identities. Several commentators do not see
Britishness as a national identity at all. They envisage Scottishness, Eng-
lishness, and Welshness as properly “national” identities, and Britishness
as a “state identity” or “supranational identity.”3 In such accounts, British-
ness is nothing more than the sense of citizenship of the British State. Neal
Ascherson, for instance, noted in 1996 that “[f]or the past few decades, at
90  N. DUCLOS

least, Welsh and Scottish subjects of the UK have found it fairly easy to de-
fine themselves as Welsh or Scottish by nation, but British by citizenship (or
statehood)” (Ascherson, 1996, p. 85).
The peaceful coexistence and possible interpenetration of “local” na-
tional identities and of a state-wide British identity (whether this is a na-
tional identity too or just a sense of citizenship) is often considered to be
one of the things that make the United Kingdom “peculiar”:

The United Kingdom certainly has some peculiarities. From the start it was
a multinational state, dominated by the largest nation, the English. Yet there
were only sporadic attempts to obliterate the national cultures and national
allegiances of the four component nations, and create a new national cul-
ture in their place. . . . The kind of nation-building that was practiced in many
other countries, aimed at rooting out older allegiances and identities, and
constructing a single nation and a single national identity, did not succeed
and was only partially attempted in the United Kingdom. Part of the explana-
tion is that there was no need. Apart from the Irish, the other nations of the
United Kingdom were full and willing participants, and accepted the British
identity alongside their other national identity, seeing them as complemen-
tary rather than conflicting. (Gamble & Wright, 2009, pp. 1–2)

This “peculiar” history explains why, in the past decades, Scottish peo-
ple’s national identity has generally been conceptualized as a “dual” iden-
tity.4 Tom Nairn has criticized this conceptualization, arguing that it has
historically served a political purpose. After denouncing “dual identity” as
a “fulsome (and still popular) mythology,” Nairn goes on to say:

In one sense dual or multiple identity is merely a standard human condition,

more significant in modern or industrialized societies than previously. There
is nothing at all amazing about (say) being a Serb, a “Yugoslav,” a Commu-
nist, a football fan, an Orthodox Christian and an ardent philatelist all “at
the same time.” . . . But the ideological or heavy-duty sense of “duality” was
quite different: this decreed that two or more key (national) allegiances were
compatible, and that it was preferable to be thus enriched. This may be true,
but it is an abstract truth, which has had limited relevance in modern history.
Historically, such combinations have in practice been rare cultural balancing-
acts, mainly designed for the sustenance of inequality and empire. (Nairn,
2000, pp. 232–233)

T. M. Devine (2006) also avoids the phrase “dual identity,” and prefers
to speak of Scottish people’s “dual allegiance,” as he does not believe that
Britishness is a national identity. To him, after the 1707 Anglo-Scottish
Union, Scottish élites gradually developed “a political loyalty to Britain”
while maintaining a “continuing sense of identity with their native land”
(Devine, 2006, p. 30).
 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity  91

However that may be, British scholars promoting the notion of “dual”
identities have influenced the way feelings of national identity are mea-
sured in the UK. If we believe the latest population surveys, a significant
proportion of people in Britain see themselves as having (at least) two na-
tional identities: a British one and a Scottish, English, or Welsh one. Howev-
er, the respective degrees to which they feel British and Scottish, English, or
Welsh can vary. If we focus on the Scottish case, the British Social Attitudes
and Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys revealed the extent to which people
in Scotland have felt Scottish and British in the past twenty years. The ap-
proach taken in Table 3.1 is the so-called “Moreno” approach, designed
by Spanish sociologist Luis Moreno for an analysis of national identities in
the Spanish and British contexts. As a recent British Social Attitudes report
explains, instead of being asked to choose between a “Scottish” and a “Brit-
ish” identity, “[r]espondents are presented with a set of options that range
from exclusively Scottish at one end to exclusively British at the other, while
at the same time also offering various possible combinations of feeling both
Scottish and British” (British Social Attitudes, 2012). In other words, “[r]
espondents are not required to participate in a zero-sum exercise where
they must choose one identity over another, but can potentially express the
dual nature of national identity by expressing the latter in a comparative
rather than categorical manner” (Bond, 2000, p.16).
Four striking conclusions can be drawn from Figure 3.1. (Data for Fig-
ure 3.1 may be found in Appendix A.) The first is that almost everyone
in Scotland feels Scottish at some level: Never more than 6% of respon-
dents have denied having any sense of being Scottish. The second is that
the majority of Scots lean towards the Scottish end, as opposed to the Brit-
ish one. The total percentage of respondents who feel either more British
than Scottish, or British only, has never been higher than 11%, whereas
the total percentage of those who feel either more Scottish than British, or

TABLE 3.1 National Identity and Constitutional Preference,

Scotland, 2005 (%)
Scottish Equally British More
Scottish, More Than Scottish and Than/Not
Not British British British Scottish
Independence 51 34 20 19
Sc. Parliament with 26 40 49 38
tax powers
Sc. Parliament 4 6 8 8
without tax
powers
No parliament 7 14 16 32
Note: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2005 (as cited in Bechhofer & McCrone, 2007).
92  N. DUCLOS

Figure 3.1 National identity in Scotland, 1992–2012.

Scottish only, has oscillated between 53% and 68%. Interestingly, the low
of 53% was only reached in 2012 (the latest year for which data are avail-
able); until then, the proportion of Scots feeling more Scottish than British
or exclusively Scottish had never gone below 58%. The third conclusion is
that the category which people choose first is generally the “more Scottish
than British.”
There have been a few exceptions to this rule. On three occasions (in
2000, 2001 and 2006) more people chose the “Scottish only” category. In
addition, in 2012, the same proportion of people (30%) chose the “more
Scottish than British” and the “equally British” categories. However, the fact
that the “more Scottish than British” category is generally the most popular
points to the fourth conclusion which can be drawn from these surveys:
The majority of people in Scotland feel British to some extent, though not
in the same proportions as they feel Scottish. Those who do not feel British
at all have represented 37% of the total at the most, and the proportion has
not reached the 30% mark once since 2007. In summary, almost everyone
in Scotland feels Scottish, but a majority of Scots feel British too, although
a significant minority do not feel British at all.5
The theoretical debates over being Scottish, as well as the quantitative
studies carried out in the British and Scottish social attitudes surveys, dem-
onstrate that a discussion of national identity in Scotland needs to take
 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity  93

into account the complex interrelations between national identities in the

UK. This interpenetration explains why Scottish national identity does not
solely find its political expression in Scottish nationalism, but can also take
the form of unionism (or the defense of the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707).

SCOTTISH NATIONAL
IDENTITY, NATIONALISM, AND UNIONISM

Considering Scotland’s status as a nation within a wider state, and given the
existence of a structured, long established independence movement, one
might think that having a strong feeling of national identity would entail
supporting Scottish independence. In other words, there would be a strong
correlation between national identity and constitutional preferences. One
might also assume a strong correlation between national identity and elec-
toral behavior, or party support. Feeling strongly Scottish might lead to sup-
porting the pro-independence Scottish National Party. Let us now examine
these two hypotheses.
This snapshot in Table 3.1 of 2005 shows what constitutional settlement
Scottish people supported in 2005 according to their national identity (or
identities). It reveals several things. First, as expected, a majority of those
who feel exclusively Scottish support the independence of Scotland. How-
ever, it is a very short majority (51%) as slightly less than half of this category
of Scots do not support independence. Moreover, supporters of indepen-
dence can also be found in the “more British than Scottish” or “British
only” categories, which is rather counterintuitive. As for those who feel a
“dual” sense of national identity, most of them support a “Scottish Parlia-
ment with tax powers.” In other words, stronger devolution of powers to the
Scottish Parliament than is the case today. It is also notable that the more
strongly Scottish one feels, the more one is likely to support independence;
similarly, the more strongly British one feels, the more one is likely to op-
pose both independence and devolution. In conclusion, national identity is
undeniably a predictor of constitutional preference. However, this snapshot
of 2005 suggests that it is not as strong a predictor as one might imagine,
since independence supporters and people opposed to devolution were to
be found amongst all categories of Scots, whatever their feelings of national
identity, and since almost half of Scots who did not feel British at all did not
believe that Scotland should leave Britain.
Paterson et al. (2001) also conducted a study of the links between na-
tional identity and constitutional preference. In the Paterson et al. study, a
twenty-year period was covered, and preceded the creation of the Scottish
Parliament (from 1979 to 1999). They arrived at the same conclusions. The
94  N. DUCLOS

authors remarked that “knowing whether someone thinks of themselves as

Scottish or British is a poor predictor of their preferred constitutional op-
tion” (p. 212). A direct comparison between this study and the one carried
out in 2005 is difficult, as the latter used the Moreno question, when the
former used a “forced choice question” (where people had to choose be-
tween feeling Scottish and feeling British). However, both studies make the
same general point: One should not assume that there is a direct relationship
between how people perceive their national identity and their attitudes to
constitutional change. The latest Scottish social attitudes survey (conducted
in late 2012) confirms this finding. Of those who see themselves as in no way
British (29% of Scots), fewer than half (46%) wanted to leave Britain, a drop
from 53% the previous year (Gardham, January 25, 2013).
Why is there not a stronger link between feelings of national identity and
constitutional preferences in Scotland? A report analyzing the 2012 survey
suggested that constitutional preferences were determined by economic ar-
guments more than by identity politics (Gardham, January 12, 2013). Gen-
erally speaking, it has been argued that it is not whether one feels strongly
Scottish or not that has the greatest impact on constitutional preference,
but rather what meaning one gives to being Scot and what constitutional
settlement will best allow this version of being Scottish to flourish (Reicher,
Hopkins, & Harrison, 2009).
Or, as Kumar noted: “Scots can have an intense sense of Scottish iden-
tity but still feel that what they mean by Scottishness can best be served by
remaining within the Union rather than opting out of it” (Kumar, 2010,
p. 103). Hence the conclusion that whether Scotland becomes indepen-
dent or not will not cause the disappearance of either the Scottish or the
British dimensions to Scottish people’s national identity (Gamble & Wright,
2009). We will see further on in this chapter that the Scottish National Party
has recently been making the same point, presumably as a way of trying to
convince a greater number of people to support independence.
Let us now consider the relationship between national identity and party
support. I draw from data collected both in 1997 and in 2005, and instead
of being presented with the preferences of people according to their na-
tional identity, data are arrayed by people’s national identities according to
their party preference. See Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
The table concerning the year 1997 shows first and foremost that sup-
porters of each party, except the Conservative party, favored the “Scottish
more than British” category. This might not seem very surprising as both
parties were then campaigning for the creation of an autonomous Scottish
Parliament within the framework of the UK. It is more unexpected of SNP
supporters, who might be assumed to have exclusive feelings of “Scottish-
ness,” as the SNP favors Scottish independence. Yet, 44% of them chose to
describe themselves as “Scottish more than British,” with the “Scottish, not
 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity  95

TABLE 3.2 National Identity and Party Preference, Scotland, 1997 (%)
Scottish Equally British
Scottish, More Than Scottish More Than British, Not
Not British British and British Scottish Scottish
Conservative 10 23 47 7 6
Labor 24 41 26 4 3
Lib. Dem. 15 41 26 7 6
SNP 34 44 16 2 2
Note: Scottish Election Survey, 1997 (as cited in Bond, 2000, p. 19).

TABLE 3.3 National Identity and Party Preference, Scotland, 2005 (%)
Equally British More
Scottish Scottish More Scottish and Than/Not
Not British Than British British Scottish
Conservative 21 29 26 20
Labor 31 35 24 7
Lib. Dem. 22 34 22 13
SNP 51 36 9 2
Note: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2005 (as cited in Bechhofer & McCrone, 2007).

British” category only coming second (though a strong second at 34%).

At a time when the Conservative party was engaged in a strong campaign
against a Scottish Parliament (or “devolution”) and in favor of the consti-
tutional status quo, one might have expected its supporters to lean towards
the British end of the scale. However, the majority of them preferred the
“equally Scottish and British” tag. In summary, supporting one of the Brit-
ish-wide parties did not mean that one felt more British than Scottish, while
supporting the Scottish pro-independence party did not necessarily mean
feeling exclusively Scottish.
The table concerning the year 2005 generally confirms these findings.
However, some changes are notable. First of all, the general balance had
shifted towards the Scottish end of the scale. Whereas Labour and Liberal
Democrat supporters still chose the “Scottish more than British” category,
as did Conservatives. Moreover, SNP supporters now chose the “Scottish,
not British” category before the “Scottish more than British,” which still
attracted 36% of SNP supporters. As a consequence, whatever the party
they supported, Scottish people now mainly felt a strong Scottish national
identity.
In 1997, as in 2005, supporters of the three main British-wide parties
were less likely than SNP supporters to describe themselves as exclusive-
ly Scottish and more likely to describe themselves as exclusively British.
96  N. DUCLOS

However, the relationship between national identity and party support was
not straightforward. There were people who felt exclusively Scottish in each
group of party identifiers (more than 20% in each group).
The previously mentioned study of the 1979–1999 period shows that the
vast majority (84% to 94%) of SNP supporters chose a Scottish identity. Yet,
this was true of every group of party identifiers. In all years, party supporters
were more likely to identify as being Scottish than British, except for Conser-
vative supporters on one occasion in 1979. However, even then, the percent-
age of Conservative supporters who described themselves as British was only
slightly higher than the percentage describing themselves as Scottish (48% as
opposed to 46%). In the 1992 survey, the balance had largely tipped in favor
of being Scottish (58% as opposed to 38% for the British side).
There was an undeniable link between national identity and party pref-
erence. In 1999, 61% of Conservative supporters chose the Scottish identity,
as opposed to 70% of Liberal Democrat supporters, 77% of Labour support-
ers, and 93% of SNP supporters. The meaning of these figures is that sup-
porters of the Unionist parties were less likely than supporters of the Scot-
tish nationalist party to have a strong Scottish identity. However, there was a
“shift over time towards Scottishness among voters of all parties, including
Conservatives” (Paterson et al., 2001, p. 109).
Scottish people’s national identity, constitutional preferences, and party
preferences are “non-aligned” (Bond, 2000). This is only unorthodox if
we “conflat[e] ‘upper case’ and ‘lower case’ nationalism in Scotland,” or
nationalism as a political program and nationalism as a collective identity
(Bond, 2000, p. 31). The three major British parties are the Labour Party,
the Conservative Party, and the Liberal Democrats (previously the Liberal
Party). They systematically produce separate manifestos for Scotland dur-
ing “General Elections,” even though these are British-wide parliamentary
elections. Let us take the example of the 1997 General Election and ex-
amine the Scottish manifestos issued at the time by the four major parties
in Scotland. Of the four party manifestos, the SNP’s is the most clearly na-
tionalist. A chapter entitled “a nation once again” reminded people that
Scotland had remained distinct despite almost three centuries of Union
with England. However, despite retaining its distinctive national character-
istics, Scotland had not reached its full national potential, and only inde-
pendence would make it into a “real” nation.
The Scottish manifestos of the three major Unionist parties were not
nationalist. Yet, the Labor and Conservative manifestos demonstrated their
awareness of Scotland’s distinctiveness and even their patriotism. The La-
bour Party’s Scottish manifesto reminded Scots that “Scotland ha[d] its
own education system, its own legal system, its own structure of local gov-
ernment and a distinct and proud national identity” (Scottish Labour Party,
 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity  97

1997). The Scottish Conservative Party’s manifesto was even more openly
nationalist.
At the time, the Conservative Party was the only party opposed to devo-
lution. Labour supported devolution in a context of wider constitutional
reform, including reforming the House of Lords. Liberal Democrats sup-
ported devolution as the first step on the road to federalism, and the SNP
supported it as the first step on the road to Scottish independence. Yet, the
rhetoric used in the Scottish Conservatives’ manifesto, entitled “Fighting
for Scotland” (1997), was undeniably “lower-case nationalist.” The mani-
festo opened on a foreword by Prime Minister John Major describing the
Scots as “the World’s greatest instinctive entrepreneurs,” followed by a na-
tionalistic message by Michael Forsyth, the Secretary of State for Scotland.
The Conservative Party clearly wanted to demonstrate that constitutional
preference had nothing to do with feelings of national identity or with pa-
triotism. Only the Scottish Liberal Democrats refrained from using nation-
alist rhetoric, though they did refer to the existence of a “Scottish people.”
It is common occurrence for British parties to use a Scottish frame of refer-
ence when addressing the Scottish population, and even put forward an
openly nationalist viewpoint.
At times when constitutional issues do not dominate the political agen-
da, the tone of British parties’ General Election manifestos is not so openly
nationalistic. Let me now focus on the 2010 General Election. Naturally,
the SNP boasted that it was the only national party of Scotland and thus the
only one with Scotland’s best interests at heart.
The other parties also claimed to defend Scotland’s interests, but that
Scotland’s and Britain’s interests were intimately bound. Scottish Labour
had the following view, “[w]hile Britain brings strength to Scotland, Scot-
land brings breadth to Britain”; that is why both the British and the Scottish
Parliaments needed to “examine how best they can work together in the in-
terests of Scotland and the UK” (Scottish Labour Party, 2010). In the Scot-
tish Conservatives’ manifesto, Scots were reminded that this was “a British
General Election about UK issues like debt, jobs, welfare, energy, defense,
and our relationship with the wider world” (Scottish Conservatives, 2010).
In this view, Britain’s and Scotland’s interests were conflated. As a conse-
quence, defending the interests of Britain meant defending the interests of
Scotland. The Conservative manifesto, though not as stridently patriotic as
their 1997 Scottish manifesto, was still nationalist in that it was concerned
with the defense of Scottish interests, defined in unionist terms.
The manifesto of the Scottish Liberal Democrats was similarly concerned
with how best to defend Scottish interests, but it too conflated Britain’s and
Scotland’s interests: “Set your sights on the Britain—and the Scotland—
you want for your children and your grandchildren” (Scottish Liberal Dem-
ocrats, 2010).
98  N. DUCLOS

When constitutional issues are not at the forefront of the political

agenda, the unionist parties’ General Election manifestos are nationalist
in a limited manner—they argue that the defense of Scottish are distinct
from British interests. However, as the 1997 election campaign showed, the
unionist parties can be openly patriotic when they feel that being Scottish
is questioned.

THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY AND SCOTTISH

NATIONAL IDENTITY

Brand & Mitchell (1997) argue that “Scottish identity may take on a politi-
cal meaning only when there are features in the environment which make
that political meaning important” (p. 36). To them, a typical “trigger of po-
liticization” was “the existence of an institution—a party, perhaps—which
draws attention to the political dimension of Scottish identity” (p. 36).
McEwen (2003) makes the same argument.
Has the SNP acted as a “trigger of politicization” of Scottish identity?
It could be argued that until devolution was granted to Scotland in the
form of a Scottish Parliament, Scottish national identity had been politi-
cized in two phases (McEwen, 2003, pp. 13–16). The first phase, from the
mid-1960s to the failed 1979 referendum on devolution, saw the emergence
of the Scottish National Party as a significant political force in Scotland.
This emergence had economic as well as political roots. Scottish people
were dismayed by the UK’s economic decline and by Scotland’s relatively
steeper decline, as well as by the British government’s inability to address
these calamities. The discovery of oil in the North Sea off the Scottish coast
in the early 1970s reinforced the SNP’s credibility by allowing it to argue
that Scotland had the means to survive independently of England. With the
emergence of the SNP, Scottish national identity became politicized. All
parties, and not just the SNP, now acknowledged Scottish distinctiveness,
and both the Conservatives and the Labour Party supported Scotland’s po-
litical and administrative autonomy.
The second phrase in the politicization of Scottish identity started to-
wards the end of the Thatcher years, in the late 1980s, and continued until
the introduction of devolution in the late 1990s. There was opposition to
Thatcherite policies, introduced under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
in the 1980s and her successor John Major in the 1990s (McEwen, 2003).
A key reason for this opposition was Thatcher’s neo-liberal attacks on the
welfare state, which changed Scottish people’s feelings of national identity.
McEwen sums up the links between the welfare state and national iden-
tity by stating that the welfare state was a symbol of British solidarity, but
 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity  99

Thatcher introduced a neo-liberal ideology and policies that stressed indi-

vidualism, enterprise, and so on. Scots could not identify with this picture.
Scottish identity was politicized in those years because being Scottish was
redefined as being anti-Conservative and pro-Welfare State. In the 1990s, it
was also progressively redefined as being sympathetic to home rule. Thatch-
er’s government was felt to be a threat to Scottish identity, and devolution
“seemed to provide the potential for a barrier to what was seen as an alien
ideology” (Cameron, 2010, p. 338).
While collectivist values came to represent the core values of being Scot-
tish, political autonomy came to be seen as the best way to defend the wel-
fare state in Scotland. By the time a second referendum on devolution was
organized, in 1997, the primary motivation behind support for the creation
of a Scottish Parliament was a belief that it would improve the quality of
public welfare in Scotland (McEwen, 2003).
Scottish identity has been politicized since the 1970s, something to
which the SNP contributed, without being its only trigger. Since the birth of
the Scottish Parliament, the SNP has been elected to power twice, in 2007
and in 2011, meaning that it has been the government party in Scotland
since 2007. What has it had to say about national identity during its years
in power?
The SNP does not consider Scottish independence in terms of identity
politics. Firstly, it does not argue that the aim of independence is to give
political recognition to Scottish national identity. Secondly, it does not pres-
ent Scottish independence as ending a common British national identity.
Since its electoral rise in the late 1960s, the SNP has consistently claimed
that its nationalism is not one based on a desire for Scottish national iden-
tity to be recognized, for one simple reason: It believes that there is no need
for this, and that Scottish national identity is well established. Instead, inde-
pendence has been promoted as the best way to defend Scottish interests.
For instance, independence has been presented as the best way to achieve
economic growth and social justice. Nicola Sturgeon, the current leader of
the SNP has recently given several speeches and interviews in which she has
repeatedly made the same point: The Scottish independence debate is not
about identity politics.
Table 3.4 presents the aims of the SNP as stated in the different Constitu-
tions that the party adopted over time. Whatever the period, independence
(or “self-government”) has been associated with the concepts of democracy
and sovereignty, as well as with the defense of Scottish interests, but never
with the concept of identity. The SNP is not alone in stressing that indepen-
dence is not about giving political expression to Scottish national identity.
Most Scottish intellectuals who are sympathetic to independence make the
same case.
100  N. DUCLOS

TABLE 3.4 SNP Constitutions: Aims of the Party

1943 SNP Constitution (a) Self Government for Scotland
(b) The restoration of Scottish national sovereignty by the
establishment of a democratic Scottish government whose
authority will be limited only by such agreements as will
be freely entered into with other nations in order to
further international co-operation and world peace.
1967 SNP Constitution (a) Self-Government for Scotland—that is, the restoration of
Scottish National Sovereignty by the establishment of a
democratic Scottish Government within the Commonwealth,
freely elected by the Scottish people, and whose authority will
be limited only by such agreements as will be freely entered
into with other nations or states for the purpose of furthering
international co-operation and world peace.
(b) The furtherance of all Scottish interests.
2004 SNP Constitution (a) Independence for Scotland; that is the restoration of
Scottish national sovereignty by the restoration of full
powers to the Scottish Parliament, so that its authority
is limited only by the sovereign power of the Scottish
People to bind it with a written constitution and by such
agreements as it may freely enter into with other nations
or states or international organizations for the purpose of
furthering international cooperation, world peace and the
protection of the environment.
(b) The furtherance of all Scottish interests.

The relaxed attitude to identity that the SNP wishes to project has led its
previous leader, Alex Salmond, to make surprising comments about Brit-
ishness. In a recent interview with the New Statesman, Salmond, whom one
might expect to deny having a British identity, declared:

One of the great attractions of Scottish nationalism is that it’s very much a
multilayered identity. It’s never been sensible to tell people they have only
one to choose. . . . I’ve got a British aspect to my identity. Scottishness is my pri-
mary identity but I’ve got Britishness and a European identity. (Eaton, 2013)

Like most Scots, the former SNP leader claimed to have a dual Scot-
tish and British identity, despite being the embodiment of the policy of
Scottish independence in the eyes of most Scots (and Britons). The mes-
sage here was clear: If independence is not about recognizing Scottishness,
neither is it about rejecting Britishness. It should be noted that most SNP
members do not envisage their national identity in the same way as their
party leader. A recent study of SNP members (Mitchell, Bennie, & Johns,
2012) revealed that when asked the “Moreno question,” 80% of members
choose the “Scottish not British” option. This means that only 20% of SNP
members acknowledge having a British identity. Moreover, according to the
 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity  101

same study, “very few” of the senior members or office-holders were “will-
ing to acknowledge any British component to their identity and then only
when prompted. The majority view of these senior figures was a rejection of
Britishness in any shape or form” (Salmond, 2007 p. 104). It appears that
Salmond’s acknowledgment of his British identity goes against the feeling
of most members of his party. However, this acknowledgment is one of the
SNP’s key political strategies, and is consistent with the SNP’s claims that
the independence debate should not be viewed in terms of identity politics.
Claims that Britishness would survive in the event of Scottish indepen-
dence are reflected in the SNP’s recurring argument that what it has termed
the “social union” between Scotland and the rest of the UK would continue
too. The concept of a “social union” has been defended and defined as such:

Independence means running our own affairs in our own way. What it doesn’t
mean is losing our cherished links with the other nations of the United King-
dom. We’ve forged strong ties and built trust with our neighbours on these
islands in the 300-plus years since the Act of Union. That’s an important and
valued legacy, a social union, and it will continue. (SNP, 2011)

We see here that what lies behind the SNP’s concept of a “social union”
is the will to dissociate independence and identity politics.
The SNP’s position on Britishness is also reflected in what it says about
citizenship in an independent Scotland. It believes that citizenship should
be granted automatically for all Scottish residents at the time of indepen-
dence, but also that it should be open to nonresidents of Scottish birth
(SNP, 1995; 2005). Moreover, the SNP has suggested that having a dual
Scottish-British citizenship would be possible:

Citizenship in Scotland would be based on an inclusive model designed to

support economic growth, integration and promotion of diversity. Given
Scotland’s close ties to the other parts of the British Isles a positive approach
to dual citizenship would be essential; and given the existence of EU citizen-
ship consideration could also be given to the creation of enhanced citizen-
ship arrangements with the nations of the rUK (the remainder of the UK).
(Scottish Government, 2009)

As a nationalist party campaigning for the independence of the nation,

the SNP is rather unusual because it does not base its nationalism on iden-
tity politics. It can seem idiosyncratic for another reason: it avoids appeal-
ing to cultural identity markers such as language. We will now examine in
more detail what types of identity markers have appealed to the SNP, and
those that it avoids.
One of the distinctions made by scholars of nationalism is between civic
and ethnic nationalisms. The ethnic nation, organic (or natural), rooted in
102  N. DUCLOS

history, and based on such shared characteristics as language or religion,

is often opposed to the civic nation, which is contractual and defined by
people’s will to identify with it. Consequently, ethnic nationalism presents
membership of the national community as a given (one is a member by
birth or by blood), while civic nationalism is territorial and based on com-
mon values and institutions (one is a member by choice). This dichotomy
finds its historical origins in the conflict between France and Germany over
the Alsace and Lorraine regions (Dieckhoff, 2000). German historians ar-
gued that Alsatians’ German culture justified their incorporation into Ger-
many. French historians, in contrast, replied that Alsatians should remain
French if that was what they chose to be (Dieckhoff, 2000, p. 65). It was
popularized by German historian Friedrich Meinecke in the early twentieth
century and then by American philosopher Hans Kohn after the Second
World War. It is doubtful whether this distinction is analytically helpful be-
cause it could be argued that any nationalist movement may contain both
civic and ethnic elements. However, the SNP is a firm believer in this di-
chotomy, and it often points out its “civic” credentials.
Michael Keating (2009) has described the SNP’s ideology as “impeccably
civic” (p. 217), and in his book on what he termed the “minority national-
isms” of Scotland, Catalonia, and Quebec, he argued that Scottish national-
ism as a whole, just like Catalan and Québécois nationalisms, is civic and
“modernizing”:

Minority nationalisms are dismissed as archaic, narrow-minded and “ethnic.”

I have already sought to combat this prejudice in my work on minority nation-
alisms and the state where I argued that in many cases they represent mod-
ernising and democratising movements in the face of archaic states. (Keating,
1996, p. xii)

Even more straightforwardly, in an article disputing that a parallel can

be made between the successes of the Scottish National Party and the (lim-
ited) successes of the British National Party (a far right party), political
journalist Iain Macwhirter stated that the SNP “is a civic nationalist party
with strong social democratic leanings” (June 8, 2009).
Are such claims justified? Stephen Shulman has classified the “key com-
ponents” of national identity into three groups: civic, cultural, and ethnic,
as shown in Table 3.5.
An analysis of SNP literature reveals that the party appeals to all of the
civic components of national identity, but not to ethnicity, and rarely to
culture. Peter Lynch (1999) notes that two anti-English groups which
briefly existed in the 1990s, Scottish Watch and Settler Watch, were op-
posed by the SNP which expelled its members when they were also mem-
bers of these groups. In the same decade, “the SNP’s non-ethnic appeal
became more pronounced with the establishment of the groups New Scots
 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity  103

TABLE 3.5 Components of National Identity

Content of National Identity Key Components
Civic • Territory
• Citizenship
• Will and consent
• Political ideology
• Political institutions and rights
Cultural • Religion
• Language
• Traditions
Ethnic • Ancestry
• Race
Source: Stephen Schulman, “Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East
Dichotomies in the Study of Nationalism,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35,
p. 559, 2002 (as cited in Mitchell et al., p. 108).

for Independence and Asians for Independence” (pp. 4–5). The SNP also
prides itself on having provided the Scottish Parliament with its first and, to
this date, its only minority-ethnic MSP.
A recent survey of SNP membership (Mitchell et al., 2012) asked SNP
members how important were certain characteristics to be truly Scottish.
Results reveal that having Scottish ancestry and being born in Scotland, eth-
nic markers of belonging, were considered important by more than half of
SNP members. Yet, “few identified these as the only ways of being ‘truly Scot-
tish’” (Mitchell et al., 2012 p. 111), and living in Scotland was seen as more
important. The authors concluded that “very few of [SNP] members would
define Scottishness in exclusive ethnic terms” (Mitchell et al., 2012 p. 116).
That the SNP should define itself as a civic nationalist party is not surpris-
ing, and is consistent with an international trend that has seen “the ethnic
definition of the nation give way in nationalist discourse to a civic one”
(Keating, 2009, p. 215). However, the SNP’s relative lack of appeal to the
cultural components of national identity is unexpected given that at least
one cultural element has been a major factor in other nations’ national
identity: language.
What makes the SNP’s nationalism particularly unorthodox is that lan-
guage is not a key issue. Scottish nationalism is often compared to national-
isms in other Western “stateless nations.” Parallels have been drawn with
Catalonia (in Spain) and Quebec (in Canada), sometimes with Flanders (in
Belgium), and most often with Wales. However, in the Catalonian, Québé-
cois, Flemish, and Welsh cases, linguistic issues have been central, which
has never been the case in Scotland.
Scotland has three native languages: English, (Scottish) Gaelic, and
Scots. English is the majority language, spoken by the whole Scottish
104  N. DUCLOS

population; yet, probably because it is the language that Scotland shares

with the rest of the UK, it is not seen as a key part of Scotland’s national
identity. Gaelic is a Celtic language which, today, is only spoken by 58,000
people in Scotland, mainly concentrated in the Highlands and Hebrides.
While this figure was described by the Scottish Government as “encourag-
ing”—it only represented a 1.2% drop in the numbers of Gaelic speakers
since the previous population census (in 2001), as opposed to an 11% drop
between 1991 and 2001—Gaelic speakers only represent 1.1% of the total
Scottish population.6 Gaelic was never seen as a central component of Scot-
tish national identity, as opposed to regional Highland identity. That is why,
although the SNP has aimed at promoting and developing the Gaelic lan-
guage, in the SNP’s history it has never put the promotion of Gaelic at the
heart of its nationalist program.
As for the Scots language, its very status is contested, as it is alternatively
seen as either a fully-fledged language or as a group of dialects. The website
of the government-supported Scots Language Centre (http://www.scot-
slanguage.com) explains that Scots and English are sister tongues which
grew apart in the Middle Ages. Scots then became “the national language
of Scotland, spoken by Scottish kings, and was used to write the official
records of the country,” but it was “displaced as a national language” when
Scotland united with England. The Scots Language Centre (n.d.) notes
that in Scotland most people do not know exactly what the Scots language
corresponds to:

Many people have heard about the Scots language but aren’t sure what it is.
Scots has been spoken in Scotland for several centuries and is found today
throughout the Lowlands and Northern Isles. The name Scots is the national
name for Scottish dialects sometimes also known as “Doric,” “Lallans” and
“Scotch” or by more local names such as “Buchan,” “Dundonian,” “Glesca”
or “Shetland.” Taken altogether, Scottish dialects are known collectively as
the Scots language. . . . Scots is mainly a spoken language with a number of
local varieties, each with its own distinctive character. (n.p.)

Not only is Scots a language divided into local dialects, but most people
believe Scots to be “bad English” (as “the Scots language was for a long time
discouraged by officials and schools”). This has made it only marginally
a better candidate than Gaelic as a key component of Scotland’s modern
national identity. It is notable that the latest population census (2011) was
the first ever to ask Scottish people whether they could “understand, speak,
read and/or write Scots.” There was the pervasive belief that people would
find these questions difficult to answer, so the government sponsored a
campaign (known as “Aye Can”; http://www.ayecan.com) to help.
For these reasons, Scottish identity is not based on any one of Scotland’s
national languages, which explains why Scottish nationalism has never given
 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity  105

priority to linguistic issues. It is not to say that the SNP has not made any
language-related demands, or that it has not implemented any language-re-
lated policies when in power. Aside from its 2009 Gaelic plan, in 2005, when
the then Labour-Liberal Democrat Scottish Executive introduced a Gaelic
bill in the Scottish Parliament to give recognition to the Gaelic language “as
an official language of Scotland commanding equal respect to the English
language,” the SNP wanted to go a bit further than the government’s plan.
It proposed that Gaelic have “equal validity” with English. The proposal was
rejected by the Parliament, mainly for fear that “a court might rule that the
legislation conferred the right to demand the use of the language in a wider
range of circumstances than is intended”; in particular, it might be ruled
that “all public services should be made available in Gaelic in all places, to
anyone who request[ed] that” (Scottish Parliament, April 21, 2005). More-
over, the SNP government recently prided itself in having “taken a number
of important steps to support the Scots language,” including:

[A]n audit of Scots language provision, a national conference on the Scots

language, the funding of two Scots bodies, a survey of attitudes to Scots, the
introduction of a census question on Scots and the establishment of a ministe-
rial Scots language working group. (Scottish Parliament, 2010)

However, language has never provided Scottish nationalists with a key for
mobilizing and defending self-government.
The SNP’s lack of reliance on linguistic distinctiveness has been inter-
preted as a strength, as it means that one does not have to speak a specific
language to feel part of the national community, or to support indepen-
dence. McCrone (1992), for instance, has hypothesized that “[p]erhaps the
strength of nationalism in Scotland vis-à-vis that of Wales reflects the fact
that, despite (or because of) a lack of linguistic differentiation, national-
ism can present itself as more than protecting a cultural past under threat”
(p. 29). Generally speaking, he notes that “cultural concerns provide some
raw materials for [Scottish] nationalism, but are rarely its raison d’être. As a
consequence, the tariff for being a nationalist is much lower” (p. 212).
Rather than saying that the SNP does not emphasize cultural issues, it
would be more accurate to say that it does not place the emphasis on de-
fending a traditional culture or way of life. The SNP strives to “be post-
modernist in its cultural emphasis, valuing diversity, rather than modernist,
committed to unity” (Aughey, 2001, p. 111). This is in fact true of all parties
in Scotland. It became apparent in the Scottish Parliament’s debates over
the creation of a national day on St Andrew’s Day.7 Members of the Scot-
tish Parliament (MSP) almost unanimously wanted to promote a multicul-
tural vision of Scottishness, as opposed to a more traditional, past-oriented,
“tartan-and-shortbread-tin” version (Scottish Parliament, March 17, 2004).
106  N. DUCLOS

Dennis Canavan, an independent MSP and promoter of the bill, whose aim
was to make St Andrew’s Day into a bank holiday, declared that the bill
would make St Andrew’s Day into “a celebration of Scotland’s multicultural
and multiethnic traditions” (Scottish Parliament Consultation Paper, July
29, 2004). Before Canavan introduced his bill, Liberal Democrat MSP Don-
ald Gorrie had already introduced a parliamentary motion on the celebra-
tion of St Andrew’s Day. When that motion was debated in the chamber,
he pointed at the pluralistic nature of Scottishness, insisting that “we are a
mixed lot” and that “we have a varied history and culture.” SNP MSP Linda
Fabiani stated her belief that St Andrew’s Day should be a “day of celebra-
tion of Scotland’s cultural diversity” (Scottish Parliament, March 17, 2004).

CONCLUSION

The birth of a new Scottish Parliament in 1999, followed by the first ever
Scottish independence referendum organized on September 18, 2014,
have undoubtedly amplified the debate over national identity in Scotland.
When the people of Scotland were asked for the first time in their history
whether they believed Scotland “should be an independent country” in
September 2014, a majority of them (55%) voted against independence,
meaning that Scotland will remain part of the United Kingdom in the fore-
seeable future—although the planned organization of another referendum
in 2016 or 2017, this time on the UK’s membership of the European Union,
could possibly jeopardize Scotland’s future within the UK and provoke the
organization of a second Scottish independence referendum. Why did
Scottish people reject independence in 2014? Was the referendum result
partly based on national identity issues, or only on social and economic con-
cerns? In other terms, was it a sign of Scottish people’s belief that their dual
Scottish-British identity is best embodied in the UK multinational state, or
was it just the result of a fear of “going it alone”? It is too early to say, but
what is undeniable is that national identity issues were not a central part
of the independence debate that preceded the referendum. The indepen-
dence debate was centered not on the nature of Scottish identity, but on
economic and social issues such as what currency an independent Scotland
might adopt, or whether Scotland could avoid austerity measures by break-
ing away from a conservative- and liberal-dominated UK. What was under
debate were Scotland’s relations with London, the political and financial
center of the UK, rather than its relations with England, its neighboring na-
tion. In other words, Scottish people were asked by the pro-independence
camp to rethink the center-periphery relations within the UK, rather than
the relations between the different nations that make up the British State.
While national identity issues clearly matter in Scotland, in the sense that
 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity  107

there is an on-going debate about the nature of Scottishness and its link
with, or imbrication in, Britishness, they do not matter so much (or at least
not openly) to the SNP, the main pro-independence party in Scotland, or,
for that matter, to any of the major pro-independence organizations.
108  N. DUCLOS

APPENDIX A
TRENDS IN MORENO NATIONAL IDENTITY,
IN SCOTLAND, 1992–2012 (%)

92 97 99 00 01 03 05 06 07 09 10 11 12
Scottish not 19 23 32 37 36 31 32 33 27 27 28 29 23
British
More Scottish 40 38 35 31 30 34 32 32 30 31 30 33 30
than British
Equally Scottish 33 27 22 21 24 22 22 21 28 26 26 23 30
and British
More British 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 5
than Scottish
British not 3 4 4 4 3 4 5 5 6 4 4 5 6
Scottish
Note: British Scottish Attitudes Survey, 2013.
 The Idiosyncrasies of Scottish National Identity  109

NOTES

1. One could for instance quote Graeme Morton: “Scotland and England came
together in 1707, but commentators are becoming acutely aware this did not
result in a British civil society. Each of the four nations [Scotland, England,
Wales and Ireland] became united under a state, but there was no single British
nation as a result, despite the banner ‘United Kingdom.’” Morton, 1999, p. 6.
2. By defending the view that Scotland only became a nation in modern times,
Nairn confirms that he is a modernization theorist and disagrees with the view
that the Scottish nation finds its roots in the Middle Ages, a view which will be
described further on in the chapter.
3. For examples of both phrases, see for instance Brown, McCrone, & Patterson,
1998, pp. 214–215.
4. Many examples could be given. See for example Bond (2000), Keating
(1996), or Morton (1999).
5. While this chapter was being written (in September 2013), the results of the
2011 population census, the first to include a question on national identity,
were made public. This confirmed that the vast majority of Scots (83% accord-
ing to the census) feel some Scottish identity. Surprisingly, it also suggested
that a majority of Scots do not feel British (with 62% of Scots describing them-
selves as “Scottish only”). However, it should be noted that the census did not
offer Scots the same range of choices as the “Moreno question”: people could
only choose between “Scottish only,” “Scottish and British” and several UK
identities (or combinations of UK identities) excluding Scottish. This could
account for the differences in results obtained. See BBC News Scotland (Sep-
tember 26, 2013).
6. As shown by the results of the 2011 population census. See for example
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-highlands-islands-24281487.
7. To know more about those debates, read Duclos, 2013, pp. 169–185.

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 CHAPTER 4

IS A NEW DEFINITION
OF IRISH IDENTITY EMERGING
IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
IN THE 21ST CENTURY?
Julien Guillaumond

The world’s economic slow-down and its late downturn had severe impacts
on European economies. The social consequences of the financial crisis
have also pressed nations to question the meaning of membership in their
societies. Recently, many European states have been defining who does and
does not belong, and who is entitled to State benefits and rights. In fact,
many states have been implementing citizenship tests to gauge whether ap-
plicants have sufficient linguistic and other cultural knowledge of the host
society (van Oers, Ersbøll, & Kostakopoulou, 2010).
In this context, national identity has taken center stage within a con-
tradictory framework: on one side, the wall-building policies of numerous
European states, and on the other side, the European Union, promoting
diversity as a counter to ageing EU societies. National identity and the de-
bates it has spawned have been serious questions in Europe. Indeed, na-
tional identity is being challenged. As Guibernau has argued, the identity of

National Identity, pages 113–145

Copyright © 2016 by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 113
114  J. GUILLAUMOND

nations is being challenged from three major sources: a nation’s minorities,

supranational institutions, and a nation’s immigrant populations (Guiber-
nau, 2007, p. 189).
The Republic of Ireland1 represents an interesting case study of national
identity due to its economy, migration issues, and state policies. Ireland
experienced tremendous economic and social changes over the last two de-
cades triggered by an unprecedented economic boom from the mid-1990s
until the devastating economic crisis after 2008, leading the Irish State to
bankruptcy. Ireland also is known as a country of migration: emigration
and immigration. The label is the result of the economic difficulties Ire-
land faced during the 20th century. During economic hard time, many of
Ireland’s population left; and during its economic good times, some Irish
returned and immigrants from other countries entered to fill specific labor
market needs.2 The nation itself had little experience with immigration and
immigrants. Both factors have challenged Irish identity.
In light of these challenges, how has Irish identity fared over the last two
decades? Does Ireland have a new definition of its identity? To what extent is
multiculturalism acknowledged and promoted? Is the “State-created myth
of a culturally homogenous people living within its territory” (Guibernau,
2007, p. 26) being re-examined or re-assessed? The purpose of my chapter
is to examine several issues about national identity in Ireland. While many
factors affect national identity, economics, demography, and state policies
are included in such a list. I examine the effects each has on Irish identity.
Specifically, I examine the economic down turns and up turns in the Irish
economy, immigration, and State policies on Irish national identity.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

National Identity: A Brief Overview of the Literature

Nowadays, a wide consensus seems to exist on the main features of Na-

tional identity, such as that it is a modern, fluid, and dynamic phenomenon
(Guibernau, 2007) central to nation building and the organization of soci-
ety (Cole, 2010; Keating, 1997). Among the multiple identities human be-
ings may share (Puhle, 1994), it still represents the most “fundamental and
inclusive of all” (Smith, 1991, p. 143), and remains, even today, “widely at-
tractive and effective and is felt by many people to satisfy their needs for cul-
tural fulfilment, rootedness, security and fraternity” (Smith, 1995, p. 159).
What seems less definite, however, are its intrinsic dimensions and their
respective interactions. Indeed, though national identity very often invokes
the past to give the present meanings, its primary aim is towards the future,
such as the type of society citizens collectively aim at. As such it touches
 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland  115

more on “the process of becoming rather than being: not ‘who we are’ or
‘where we came from,’ so much as what we might become, how we have
been represented and how that bears on how we might represent our-
selves” (Hall, 1996, p. 4). If national identity as a question emerges when
societies experience rapid transformations and when “old traditions” are
being contested (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, pp. 4–5), it can very often
also operate as a “populist umbrella” term (Malešević, 2011, p. 272) for
many a State willing to imagine (Anderson, 2006) or re-invent their nation
(Gellner, 2006). Without a doubt, such a question does not have the same
weight in various countries as the French national identity debate and sub-
sequent sour demise can attest in comparison with the case studied here.
National identity is also deeply personal and subjective; it represents an
individual feeling of being part of a larger community. It contributes to an
individual’s social identity and has a positive effect on personal self-esteem
if the person’s nation is evaluated positively (Arts & Halman, 2006, p. 74).
Also, as a collective sentiment it makes a nation distinct from other nations
(Guibernau, 2007, p. 11). It does not imply complete similarity as “not all
citizens feel with the same intensity the emotional bond which connects
them to their nation-States” (Guibernau, 2007, p. 29). That “affective di-
mension” (Harttgen & Opfinger, 2014, p. 347), the intensity of one’s at-
tachment to a nation (Malešević, 2011, p. 274), has a true importance in
the value individuals give to it. The intensity of national identification can
thus be studied through “identity markers” (Kiely, Bechhofer, Stewart, &
McCrone, 2001) which are characteristics presented to others to support
a national identity claim, but also looked to in others when seeking to at-
tribute national identity (Kiely et al., 20016), but also through the ordinary
reminders of one’s membership to the nation (Prideaux, 2009) and the
interactions such membership offers on a daily basis (Déloye, 2013).

History and Diversity in Defining Irish National Identity

Guibernau has argued that national identity possesses five dimensions:

psychological, cultural, territorial, historical, and political (Guibernau,
2007, p. 11). Thus, any attempt at defining Irish identity becomes a strenu-
ous exercise, rendered all the more difficult by Partition, but also because
it seems that “what it means to be Irish and the discourse used to define
Irishness have never been neatly defined” (Crowley, Gilmartin, & Kitchin,
2006, p. 19).
Partition is the existence of two opposite versions of the nation. Each ver-
sion has its own definition of the Irish nation—a single nation in the Irish
nationalist tradition, a two-nation framework in the unionist perspective
(Gallagher, 1995). This difficulty gets more complex when the debate is
116  J. GUILLAUMOND

extended to a three-nation framework: an Irish nation, an Ulster Protestant

nation, and a part of the British nation (Gallagher, 1995).
The “imagined community” (Anderson, 2006) of the Irish nation, as
defined by the Irish nationalist tradition and adopted by the Republic of
Ireland, is all-encompassing, comprising the northern counties as part of
Irish nationalism. It is one view of Irishness (Sinha, 1998, p. 21): a fetishized
“Irishness” (Longley, 2001, p. 9), which was predominant until the end of
the 20th century. It is a contested view (Crowley et al., 2006, pp. 19–20)
because it tends to exclude travelers or Jews from both national imagined
space and narrative (Fanning, 2002; Garner, 2004).
A very restrictive version of the “imagined community” has a long history
(Crowley et al., 2006, p. 7). This version equates Irish identity with a com-
mon religion and a particular demographic profile. There are two interact-
ing reasons for the longevity of this narrow view: colonization (Sinha, 1998,
p. 21), and the role of Catholicism as a central element of resistance to
non-Catholic Britain (White, 2010, p. 23). A true Irish person was Catholic,
nationalist, a GAA member,3 and absolutely not British. At the core of Irish
identity in the Republic lay in a very rigid definition of “authenticity,” thus
negating any sense of diversity (Sinha, 1998, p. 21).
The same was true in the nationalist movement during the early part
of the 20th century. Sinn Féin members had to learn the Gaelic language,
write on paper made in Ireland, and demonstrate high moral qualities and
respect for the family (Goldring, 1975). In nationalist discourse, relative
homogeneity, whether in terms of religion or in skin color, is a goal (Loyal,
2011). Language had a similar function, and represented a commitment
to the nation by distancing oneself from Britain and the influence of the
English language.
Land was also part of Irish identity. Land demonstrated resilience in the
face of historical events, and the roots of the nation. It represented place,
a home, a geographic area where people could establish a community and
their sense of peoplehood.
Being Irish as a mono-cultural status was promoted by the Catholic
Church, Republican parties, and the GAA. Being Irish meant being against
most everything British (Crowley et al., 2006). Being Irish leaves no room
for non-white, non-Celtic peoples, or for those who are not part of Ire-
land’s history (Loyal, 2003). This restrictive version of being Irish was rein-
forced by the strength of community life and values and viewed “Other” as
a stranger to the community (McVeigh, quoted in Sinha, 1998, p. 21).
Finally, the historical dimension reinforces the perceived uniqueness of
Irish identity since a shared history is another central element of being
Irish (Davis, 2003). Such a view explains the negative reaction when the
“Other,” the foreigner, does not possess such a background (Sinha, 1998).
 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland  117

The Irish Economy: Boom and Bust

The Celtic Tiger Years

In the late 1980s, Ireland was in deep economic crisis. The unemploy-
ment rate was a major concern, emigration was a major problem, and it had
a serious public debt.
Leaving Ireland seemed to be one solution. Many Irish left the country
during economic hard times, and in 1989, the worst year on record for de-
cades, Ireland saw approximately 70,000 people leave the country (Fahey,
2007, p. 27). This figure represented approximately 2% of its population.
In the following decades, things changed.
The 1980s starkly contrast with the following decades when being Irish
became synonymous with economic success. In the space of just a few years,
the Republic of Ireland went from being bankrupt to a model of economic
development—a Celtic Tiger with impressive growth rates, becoming, by
the early 2000s, one of the most open economies in the world (Yester, 2002).
The Celtic Tiger era and positive Irish identity were synonymous. Ire-
land’s European neighbors were bewildered with the country’s “model of
economic development” and its outstanding growth rates. Irish Economists
were more than happy in presenting its recipes for success to their Euro-
pean colleagues (Sweeney, 1998; Barry, 1999). Unassailable statistical proof
of Irish economic success caused intense satisfaction, particularly while re-
cording how the Republic of Ireland was “economically more advanced
than the UK” and other EU States (Coulter, 2003, p. 15).
Ireland’s attractiveness is further demonstrated by migration statistics. A
greater number of people were clamoring to get into Ireland than rushing
to leave (Hughes, McGinnity, O’Connell, & Quinn, 2007)—net migration
(in-migration—out-migration) was positive. The economy had an average
growth rate oscillating between 8 and 10%, a huge surge in employment,
and a substantial workforce growth rate of more than 80% between 1991
and 2005 (Mac Éinrí, 2007, p. 237).
There was no questioning the Irish identity. The Irish were proud of
their country, and could collectively boast about the large growth in their
GDP growth and their rising standard of living. Life was good in Ireland,
but there were some concerns.
There were some concerns about the Celtic Tiger development model.
Kieran Allen pointed out the large increase in the consumption of luxu-
ry vehicles (Allen, 2000). Ann Marie Hourihane, in her book, She Moves
through the Boom, pointed out other dimensions of the boom and its impact
on Irish society (Hourihane, 2000). Nonetheless, economic success bred
Irish pride and positive national identity.
That particular confidence was confirmed by data collected in the 1990s,
which reported a surge in pride in Irish identity: 71% of Irish respondents
118  J. GUILLAUMOND

were “very proud” of their identity, a sharp increase from the 55% in the
late 1980s (Fahey et al., 2006, p. 65; Davis, 2003). Being Irish in the early
2000s was slightly different from previous decades (Logue, 2000). Even for-
mer British Prime Minister, T. Blair proudly praised his Irish roots while
reminiscing about his childhood summers in Donegal (Logue, 2000). But
change was in the air.

The Fallen Tiger: The Economic Crisis

The 2008 global economic crisis changed everything.4 The fall began
with an initial economic slow-down, but soon the Irish State realized that it
was more than that. The state realized it would be unable to face the eco-
nomic global crisis, and was forced to accept a bailout and the presence of
International Monetary Fund, EU, and Central Bank experts. The bailout
announcement represented a huge blow for Ireland and, correspondingly,
an even greater blow to Irish identity. The public perceived that they had
collectively lost their country’s economic and political independence. It was
a desperate time.
The media in Ireland echoed the people’s sentiments. There was com-
plete loss of trust and confidence in political representatives and State in-
stitutions. Despair set in, and emigration, once again, seemed to be the
only solution for many. Such low esteem in the country was captured in an
opinion letter to the Irish Times in early 2013, where the author referred to
a form of self-delusion in Ireland, was highly critical and disdainful of the
country (Fennell, 2013).

Irish Demography in Perspective

Migration and the Irish Identity: An Emerging Diversity

Over the past decade, immigration has challenged definitions of national
identity. In some ways, immigration has forced many European countries to
question and strengthen what they mean by national identity. One linger-
ing, and still contentious, issue in Europe is matching the free movement
of people from other parts of Europe, including those whose nations have
become EU members, and those from non-EU countries. Should these peo-
ple be granted the same political, economic, and social rights associated
with EU members?
Ireland has undergone significant demographic changes over the past
two decades. Originally Ireland was viewed as a country of emigration
(Mac Laughlin, 1994), but it has become a country of immigration. It is a
new member among those nations experiencing significant increases in their
immigrant populations (Segal, Elliott, & Mayadas, 2010). This fact is contrasted
with the Irish depopulation for the greater part of the 20th century.
 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland  119

Figure 4.1 Natural increase, net migration and population growth in Ireland at
different census years, 1926–1991 (in 000s).

Since the “Great Famine,” one characteristic of Irish demography has

been the continuous decline of its population. The effect of natural in-
crease, the traditional component of population growth, was completely
reversed by the sheer size of out-migration (see Figure 4.1).5
The Irish population reached an all-time low in the mid-1950s when
many left the country. In their official report on the phenomenon, the
members of the Commission on Emigration noted that the number of peo-
ple who emigrated was “still large enough to absorb the whole, or almost
the whole, of the natural increase and thus prevent population growth”
(O’Brien, 1954, p. 130). John O’Brien’s book, The Vanishing Irish, was pub-
lished in 1954 and reflected the thinking of the time—that the nation of
Ireland might become extinct as a result of emigration.
People had different views about emigration and immigration—though
most viewed these events negatively. However, to some emigration was a
positive (Delaney, 2000); it prevented all forms of social unrest and dis-
content in the young Republic. Throughout the 20th century, the popula-
tion of the Republic of Ireland closely mirrored the State’s economy: the
Irish population grew in the 1960s when the economic situation improved,
encouraging many men and women to return, while the situation was re-
versed when the economy worsened in the 1980s and emigration increased.
In the second half of the 20th century, emigration slowed, and immigra-
tion by non-Irish persons became relatively insignificant (Mac Éinrí, 2001).
120  J. GUILLAUMOND

In 1973, net in-migration occurred for the first time in Irish history, most
likely the result of Ireland joining the EEC. Immigration was led by return-
ing Irish migrants, many with their families, coming to fill jobs as Ireland was
experiencing labor shortages in an emerging economy (Mac Éinrí, 2001).
Up until the 1980s, immigrants6 to Ireland comprised four groups: re-
turning Irish, high-skills immigrants working for foreign companies, retir-
ees—especially from the United Kingdom, and “counter-cultural” immi-
gration from Britain and European States (Mac Éinrí, 2001, p. 52). Before
the mid-1990s, few non-Irish or non-British populations immigrated to Ire-
land (Mac Éinrí, 2001).
Since the 1990s there was a net increase in the Irish population, of which
in-migration was a major contributor. The year 1996 was a turning point in
Irish demography. It was the first year of net immigration to Ireland—an
increase of about 8,000 people (Gilmartin, 2012, p. 2). During this period,
Ireland became one of the last countries in the EU to display net immigra-
tion (Ruhs, 2009). Since then, net migration has contributed to Ireland’s
population growth (Hughes et al., 2007). In 2000, Ireland saw a net migra-
tion inflow of 26,000 persons (Tarantino, 2012, p. 5), and between 1999
and 2008 the population increased by 18%, the highest rate in the 27 EU
countries (CSO, 2008).
In 2006, Ireland’s population in 2006 was at its highest level since 1871,
at 4.04 million; the growth over the past few years owes as much to in-
migration as to natural increase (National Economic and Social Council,
2006, p. 12). Between April 2004 and April 2005 the country realized its
highest level of immigration (70,000 persons) and lowest level of emigra-
tion (16,600) since records began, thus giving a net migration rate of over
50,000 persons. After an increase following the 2004 EU enlargement
(Ruhs, 2009), inflows peaked in 2006–2007 at over 100,000 immigrants per
year. The situation has since been reversed as net migration plummeted
in 2007–2008 (see Figure 4.2), and by 2010 the levels of migration were at
their lowest since 1994 (Gilmartin, 2012, p. 2). If migration currently ap-
pears to be an issue, it is very different from the past decade when levels of
out-migration dramatically increased, from over 49,000 in 2008 to 87,000
in 2012.
Rapid economic growth created an unprecedented demand for labor
across a wide range of sectors including construction, finance, information
technology, and healthcare (Ruhs, 2009). Over the 1990s and early 2000s,
there was a huge inflow of people to Ireland. A brief summary of these mi-
gration patterns the composition of immigrants is as follows:

• Between 1995 and 2000, approximately a quarter of a million per-

sons migrated to Ireland, of whom about half were returning Irish
(Mac Éinrí, 2001, p. 53). There was a positive trend in migration as
 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland  121

Figure 4.2 Immigration, emigration, and net migration in Ireland, 1991–2013

(in 000s).

more people were coming to Ireland than leaving. By 2001, some

20,000 people were leaving the country each year, but more than
twice that number were arriving (NESC, 2006, p. 1).
• By the end of the 20th century, a change took place in the profile of
immigrants arriving in Ireland. Among those who came, first were
returning migrants, but soon thereafter people from other coun-
tries were arriving. Gradually, the number of returning migrants
was offset by the number of other immigrants coming to work to
Ireland. The increase in immigration has been accompanied by
a steady fall in emigration. Even though the number of returning
Irish migrants increased almost continuously between 1987 and
2002 (Ruhs, 2009); Irish people returning home represented about
two-thirds of immigrants in 1991. They accounted for less than half
of the gross inflow of 39,200 in 1996, and by 2005, they had fallen to
19,000 or about one quarter of the gross inflow of 70,000 (Hughes
et al., 2007, p. 218).
• While 2002 was a peak year, their share in total immigration fell
continuously from about 65% in the late 1980s to 44% from 2000 to
2002 (Ruhs, 2009). Between 2003 and 2005, their share fell again
to 27%, and from 2006 to 2008, it fell to 18%, even though their
number remained steady (Ruhs, 2009). As the share of returning
Irish migrants fell, non-EU migrants came to dominate the flows
122  J. GUILLAUMOND

between 2001 and 2004 when they represented more than half of
all non-Irish immigrants between 2001 and 2004 against one-third
from 1992 to 1995 (Ruhs, 2009). In 2006, the ratio of foreign-born
to the local population in Ireland was consequently deemed high
compared with other industrialized countries, especially when con-
sidering immigration as a recent phenomenon in Ireland (NESC,
2006, p. 21). Since the accession of 10 new EU Member States in
2004, EU nationals have not only dominated migratory inflows, they
have helped push flows to new heights. Between 2005 and 2008, an
average 44% of the immigration flow and 54% of the non-Irish im-
migration flow was made up of nationals of the 10 EU States that ac-
ceded in 2004, together with Romania and Bulgaria, which acceded
in 2007 (Ruhs, 2009).

One category of immigrants has challenged Irish national identity.

Ruhs found that among the various categories of non-EU nationals com-
ing to Ireland in the last decade, the great majority were workers (issued
with work permits), followed by asylum seekers, students, and dependents
(Ruhs, 2009). Asylum seekers have caused much trouble to the Irish State,
and have definitely challenged past conceptions of Irish identity. The num-
ber of persons seeking asylum increased greatly between the mid-1990s and
the early years of 2000, from 362 in 1994 to 11,364 in 2002, before fall-
ing off in 2003 and down to around 3,866 in 2008, and less than 1,000 in
2012 (Figure 4.3). Most asylum seekers are from African countries, such as
Iraq and Nigeria, but also from Asia and Eastern Europe, such as Romania
(ORAC, several years). Since joining the EU, the number of applications
from Eastern Europe decreased since Ireland is not obligated to accept
asylum applications from other EU Member States (Ruhs, 2009). In 2008,
26.1% of applications came from Nigerian nationals, 6.1% from Pakistani
nationals, and 4.7% from Chinese and Georgian nationals.
As Ruhs has argued, “the increase and change in the composition of im-
migration to Ireland has significantly impacted the country’s population”
(Ruhs, 2009). Surveying the place of birth of its respondents, the Census of
Population has revealed that among those born outside Ireland, three cat-
egories have continued to increase: the EU, Africa, and Asia. Among those
residing in Ireland during the years 2002, 2006, and 2011, people born in
the EU represented more than 70% of all foreign residents, and those from
Africa between 6.6 and 7%. The most striking growth is among Asians, from
7.03% to 10.31% of all people born abroad. Moreover, the rate of growth of
the population born outside Ireland between 2002 and 2011 represented
half of the total population increase over the same period—55%.
Between 2006 and 2012 the Polish immigrant population grew the fast-
est. Their size increased from 63,090 to 115,193. Their average rate of
 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland  123

Figure 4.3 Number of applications for asylum received in Ireland, 1992–2012.

growth has been 1.6% per year (CSO, 2013, p. 1). In contrast, the number
of non-Irish nationals has grown by 30% since 2006, representing 199 dif-
ferent nations. Ireland is a diverse nation.
Since 2002, the Census of Population asked respondents to self-identify
their nationality. Though the data needs to be considered cautiously (Piola,
2007, p. 148), the findings show substantial growth of the “non-national”
population in Ireland. In 2002, 5.8% of the total population resident in Ire-
land had non-Irish nationality. That share increased to 10.1% in 2006, and
was 12% in 2011 (see Table 4.1).7
At the same time, the share of the population that are Irish nationals
decreased over time: 92.9% in 2002, 88.8% in 2006, and to 86.8% in 2011.
Their numbers did not decrease, but the increase in the non-Irish popula-
tion reduced the share of the population held by those identifying as Irish
nationals. The most significant increase (Ruhs, 2009) was seen in the EU
nationality category, whose share rose from 3.5% in 2002 to 6.6% in 2006,
and to 8.5% lately. Most EU nationals come from EU-10 countries:8 over
120,500 people or almost 3% of the population counted in the 2006 cen-
sus (Ruhs, 2009). Their number nearly doubled 5 years later, representing
8.5% of the Irish population.
According to the latest CSO statistics, the number of non-Irish nationals
grew by 143% in 9 years (2002–2011).9 In 2011, the largest group of non-
Irish nationals were Polish citizens (Table 4.2). Between 2006 and 2011 the
 124

TABLE 4.1 Persons Usually Resident and Present in Ireland by Nationality, 2002, 2006, and 201113
2002 2006 2011
Share in Total Share in Total Share in Total
Number Population Number Population Number Population
J. GUILLAUMOND

All Irish 3584975 92.9 3706683 88.8 3927143 86.8

UK 103476 2.7 112548 2.7 112259 2.5
EU15 excluding Irish and UK 29960 0.8 42693 1.0 48280 1.1
EU15 to EU25 States — — 120534 2.9 226225 5.0
Total EU 133436 3.5 275775 6.6 386764 8.5
Other European 23105 0.6 24425 0.6 16307 0.4
United States 11384 0.3 12475 0.3 11015 0.2
Africa 20981 0.5 35326 0.8 41642 0.9
Asia 21779 0.6 46952 1.1 65579 1.4
Other nationalities 11236 0.3 22422 0.5 22210 0.5
Multi/no nationality 3187 0.1 3676 0.1 2327 0.1
Not Stated 48412 1.3 44279 1.1 52294 1.2
Total non-Irish 224261 5.8 419733 10.1 544357 12.0
All nationalities: Total 3858495 100.0 4172013 100.0 4525281 100.0

Source: Census 2002, 2006 and 2011.

 TABLE 4.2 Top Ten Nationalities Among Non-Nationals at Each Census Since 2002
2002 2006 2011
Rank Country Number Country Number Country Number Rank
1 UK 103,476 UK 112,548 Poland 122,585 1
2 USA 11,384 Poland 63,276 UK 112,259 2
3 Nigeria 8,969 Lithuania 24,628 Lithuania 36,683 3
4 Germany 7,216 Nigeria 16,300 Latvia 20,593 4
5 France 6,363 Latvia 13,319 Nigeria 17,642 5
6 China 5,842 USA 12,475 Romania 17,304 6
7 Romania 4,978 China 11,161 India 16,986 7
8 Spain 4,436 Germany 10,289 Philippines 12,791 8
9 South Africa 4,185 Philippines 9,548 Germany 11,305 9
10 Philippines 3,900 France 9,046 USA 11,015 10
Total Non-Irish 224,261 419,733 544,357
Source: CSO, Census statistics.
Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland
125 
126  J. GUILLAUMOND

number of non-Irish nationals increased by 124,624 persons, or 29.7%. Pol-

ish nationals/residents increased by 93.7%: from 63,276 to 122,585, and
account for almost half of the total increase among non-Irish nations and
have overtaken UK nationals as the largest non-Irish group living in Ireland
(CSO, 2013, p. 5).
Non-Irish nationals are a visible group. In 2002 5.8% of residents were
non-Irish nationals, and by 2011 they accounted for 12% of the Irish
population. In the table shown above, a gradual increase of people from
Eastern Europe can also be observed (2006 Poland, Lithuania and Latvia,
101,323, or 24.1% of non-Irish nationals; 2011 Poland, Lithuania, Latvia,
Romania, i.e., 197,165, or 38.2% of non-Irish nationals, including Slova-
kia, not listed).
In 2011, a CSO publication entitled Migration and Diversity identified
199 nationalities residing in Ireland. The publication commented on the
“remarkable diversity” (CSO, 2011a, p. 8), and provided the names of the
top 12 nations with more than 10,000 nationals present in Ireland: China,
Germany, India, Latvia, Lithuania, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, UK, and USA. These 12 nations accounted for 74.4% of non-Irish
nationals living in Ireland. The largest group is Polish nationals (amongst
the biggest group of EU nationals living in another EU States) (Vasileva,
2011, p. 3), followed by UK nationals.
It has been argued that migration does have an impact on national iden-
tity. The number of immigrants received, the time-scale in which immigra-
tion occurs, immigrants’ ethnic identity, their skills and socio-economic
position within the host society are among the factors affecting national
identity (Guibernau, 2007). In this respect, because immigration took
place in so short a time in Ireland, it has had an impact on national identity.
The attitude and legislation of the host country regarding immigration, the
degree of difficulty in obtaining citizenship, and the level of willingness of
immigrants to integrate into the host culture (Guibernau, 2007) represent
a second set of factors influencing a nation’s identity.
In the context of these demographic changes, how has Irish identity
evolved? In 2007, Fanning and Mutwarasibo wrote that “a period of rapid
economic expansion over the last decade [ . . . ] has changed Irish society
into a visibly diverse one” (Fanning & Mutwarasibo, 2007, p. 440). So, how
has the new status of Ireland—a country of immigration—been acknowl-
edged, either in the actions of the state, or how has diversity been em-
braced? Has this newly discovered diversity been included in any definition
of Irish identity? Does Irishness in the 21st century possess a multicultural
dimension? How has Irish identity reacted to these challenges?
 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland  127

The State and Identity: The Irish Census, Irish National Identity,
and Homogenizing the Irish Population
Four elements will be considered in how Irish identity has evolved, dem-
onstrating that strategies at maintaining Irish identity are defensive, stress-
ing its history, and maintaining the main tenets of Irishness. First, how-
ever, let me point out the distinction between race and ethnicity. Race is a
methodological construct, and ideal type, used to differentiate populations
based on somatic and biological features, such as skin color, hair type, and
other physical features. In contrast, ethnicity is another theoretical con-
struct differentiating people based on culture. For example, Germans and
Italians are of the same White race, but are different ethnic groups.
The state defining identity. Since 2006, the Republic of Ireland has
included a question on race and cultural background (King-O’Riain,
2007). Officials argue that such questions are needed in order for the State
to create and implement more effective policies.10 But such data may also
be used for political reasons.
There are two problems with the ethnic question. While census data
provide a snapshot of the population at a given time, the same data help
to “crystalise identities” (Cadogan, 2008, p. 52). Similarly, while collecting
ethnic data, censuses “simultaneously help shape the emerging identities
they seek to objectively record and document” (Cadogan, 2008, p. 50). In
other words, not only do the census results provide the State’s definition of
national identity, but also logically contribute to the possible emergence or
demise of other identities. The State has engaged in defining and creating
national identity.
The 2011 census revealed that 94.3% of the population in Ireland had
ticked the White box, a slight decline from 94.8% in 2006 (see Table 4.3).
The two other main categories increased: “other background” and “not
stated.” These two categories declined from 2006 to 2011: 1.1% to 0.9% and
1.7 to 1.6%, respectively.
While such a question gives an official representation of Ireland’s popu-
lation, it also shows the Irish State’s attempt at showing that Irish identity
had not changed despite recent demographic trends. It thus gives the im-
pression that Irish identity remains unaltered while at the same time deny-
ing diversity.
With its race question, the census instills a definition of race. In that
sense, the “ethnic and cultural” question follows the trend which uses “eth-
nicity” to describe “race” (note that race is a concept based on physical
traits, while ethnicity is culturally based). Though there was some consulta-
tion for using the question in the 2006 census (within some organs of the
State, as well as within non-government and inter-government agencies),
there was little or no consultation with experts or with non-Irish communi-
ties (King-O’Riain, 2006,). The census erased some distinctions between
128  J. GUILLAUMOND

TABLE 4.3 Persons Usually Resident in the Republic of Ireland by

Ethnic or Cultural Background, 2006 and 2011
2006 2011
Category Numbers % Numbers %
White
Irish 3 645 200 87.4 3 822 000 84.5
Irish Traveller 22,400 0.5 29,500 0.7
Any other White background 289,000 6.9 413,000 9.1
Black or Black Irish
African 40,500 1 58,700 1.3
Any other Black background 3,800 0.1 6,400 0.1
Asian or Asian Irish
Chinese 16,500 0.4 17,800 0.4
Any other Asian background 35,800 0.9 66,900 1.5
Other Including Mixed Background 46,400 1.1 40,700 0.9
Not Stated 72,300 1.7 70,300 1.6
Total 4 172 000 100 4 525 300 100.0

Source: CSO, Statistical Yearbook of Ireland, 2011 and 2013

nationalities by putting people from different ethnic groups, such as those

from Eastern origins, with people of Irish origins and excluding others
based on skin color. In the census, one is either white, black/black Irish,
or Asian. Anderson stated that the “fiction of the census is that everyone
is in it, and that everyone has one—and only one—extremely clear place”
(Anderson, 2006, p. 166). It was a forced-choice question, and respondents
had to tick a box with options imposed by the State.
The “White” category reinforces Ireland’s traditional view, by putting
people from different origins into the same category. Consequently, results
indicate that approximately 94% of the Irish population is White, and gives
the false impression about the actual size of the Irish population. Moreover,
it incorrectly emphasizes the mono-cultural conception of Irish identity.
People of English, Polish, or Russian origin are very likely to be found in the
“White” category, thus leading to the notion of a large homogenous Irish
population (Cadogan, 2008, p. 58), and a false impression of immutability
(O’Keeffe-Vigneron, 2010).
The undifferentiated White category contributes to sustaining a myth
about cultural unity and ‘national integrity,’ underlining the unquestioned
centrality of Whites as the dominant identity group in Ireland (Cadogan,
2008, p. 59). At the same time, the use of other categories, such as Back
African, also merges people from different African nations that would not
 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland  129

be grouped based on ethnicity (Cadogan, 2008, p. 60). Such oversimplifica-

tion is misleading, reinforces the mono-cultural identity of the country, and
makes minority or ethnic groups less visible. Ultimately, it strongly implies
that no new identity can be acknowledged.
The different subcategories, the “weird subcategory, under each racial
group, of ‘Others’—who, nonetheless, are absolutely not to be confused with
other ‘Others’” (Anderson, 2006, p. 166) are all social constructs. “[W]hiteness
has become salient as an identity in the co-presence of non-white” (Cadogan,
2008, p. 57). This is also an important element when considering the “White”
category and the Polish people, for example, who are not fully Irish, but are
counted in the “White” category and not in the “Other” category. This is cor-
roborated by one participant in Yau’s study when the person asserts that “if you
don’t fit white Irish then you’re not really Irish” (Yau, 2007, p. 64).
By pigeon-holing people, the situation for those not part of the White
group, even immigrants from the second or third generation, leads to their
non-recognition. Indeed, the ethnicity question implies that ethnicity is
something one has, something inherited (Cadogan, 2008, p. 55). One is
either Irish or of Irish descent, or one is in the “Other” category. That posi-
tion is further strengthened by the ‘background’ element, which further
implies that what matters is the place where one or one’s ancestors were
born, leaving no space for other generations of immigrants, for instance,
to assert another identity. The Chinese community, one of the largest vis-
ible minority ethnic groups within Ireland, still remains pretty much invis-
ible in Irish society (Yau, 2007, p. 49). Members of that community, when
interviewed, equate White with Irishness, and anything else being other
(Yau, 2007, p. 58), providing new comers with a “restrictive” definition of
Irishness (Yau, 2007, p. 60). There appears to be a dual perception of im-
migrants or non-Irish nationals in Ireland. Even though second generation
Chinese respondents identified as Irish because they felt like it was their
national identity, they were racialized as the Other (Yau, 2007, p. 61).
The race question is a forced choice question, and does not leave much
room for other responses. This emphasis on the “White” category in the
Irish census contributes to a traditional conception of Irishness, and pre-
vents any questioning about cultural homogeneity in Ireland (Cadogan,
2008, p. 62), thus reinforcing a traditional conception of white Irishness. It
is an example of a constructivist’s strategy in creating national identity for
specific political purposes.
Citizenship and identity. Nationality laws and access to citizenship
constitute a second element of national identity. How has access to Irish
citizenship evolved, and to what extent does its evolution restrict Irish
identity?
Citizenship refers to “the particular legal bond between an individual and
his or her State” (Vasileva, 2011, p. 7). Over the past decades, immigration
130  J. GUILLAUMOND

policies have served as government policies on nationality (Symmons,

1999). This also seems to be the case in Ireland. Citizenship represents the
State’s prerogative of inclusion and exclusion: It covers passport, all rights
and privileges accruing to citizens such as the right to vote and many other
protections (Symmons, 1999).
From 1922 up to 2004, Irish citizenship was accorded either through
ancestry or through birth, ius soli (King-O’Riain, 2006, p. 283). Thus, the
children of immigrants were granted citizenship, and immigrants could be
naturalized relatively easily (Honohan, 2010). The ius sanguinis principle
applied to the children and grandchildren of Irish born citizens.
Access to Irish citizenship has been radically transformed. The transfor-
mation is due to Ireland changing from a nation of emigration to a nation
of immigration. The ius soli principle has been restricted and is no longer
unconditionally given to children born in Ireland. In contrast, ius sanguinis,
initially influenced by emigration, has remained unaltered.
There are three modes of acquiring citizenship in Ireland: acquisition
by ius sanguinis, by ius soli, and by naturalization. Each mode has its own
peculiarities.
The first mode, Ius Sanguinis Citizenship, known as “citizenship by de-
scent,” states that a person is an Irish citizen from birth if at the time of
birth, either parent was an Irish citizen or would, if alive, have been an Irish
citizen. It also applies to persons whose parent(s) is entitled to Irish citizen-
ship. “Irish nationality” can be acquired especially for children of the dias-
pora, provided there is an unbroken ancestry chain to Ireland.
The second mode, Ius Soli Citizenship, is limited to those who have, at the
time of birth, at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or is entitled to be
an Irish citizen (Handoll, 2012, 11). An important change in the granting
of Irish citizenship occurred as a direct consequence of the Belfast Agree-
ment in 1998. I will discuss this at some length.
In the 1937 Constitution, citizenship had a rather broad definition in
accordance with the aspiration of the Irish State for a united Ireland. In ad-
dition, there was a desire of protecting and including former generations
of Irish, who were either living on the other part of the island or had left
Ireland altogether. Therefore, all persons born on the island of Ireland and
those born of Irish parents and thus part of the diaspora had automatic citi-
zenship. The 1956 Nationality Act legally enshrined the ius soli principle to
all those born on the island of Ireland, and citizenship through descent was
possible if either parent was an Irish national (Loyal, 2011, p. 143). Other
generations could possess Irish citizenship on demand (Symmons, 1999).
Following the Good Friday Agreement, an Amendment to the Constitu-
tion declared that: “It is the entitlement and birthright of every person
born on the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part
of the Irish nation. That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise
 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland  131

qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the

Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living
abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage” (Constitution of Ire-
land). This amendment to the Irish Constitution was approved by a major-
ity (94%) in a referendum in June 1998, taking effect on December 2, 1999.
The amendment had two consequences: it put on an equal footing ac-
cess to citizenship for people from both parts of Ireland (Handoll, 2012).
At the same time, it also reasserted the diaspora dimension of Irish nation-
ality (Symmons, 1999). For some like Garner, the Irish State has used the
peace process as an opportunity to redraw the boundaries of being Irish
(Garner, 2007).
The amendment opened a “loophole,” as the Minister of the time had
labelled it, through which people tried to gain Irish citizenship. With the
Republic of Ireland becoming a country of in-migration, the new provisions
conferred entitlements on children born in Ireland to non-Irish parents
(Handoll, 2012). This was further reinforced by the interpretation of the
family clause, where the Supreme Court stipulating that non-national par-
ents had the right of residency because their children had been born in
Ireland.
The law was criticized in the early 2000s because if offered a form of
“carte blanche” of staying in the country for non-national parents who had
children in Ireland (Handoll, 2012). In 2001, the Irish government consid-
ered the possibility of a constitutional amendment to close that loophole
and remove the unconditional ius soli (Ryan, 2004). Though the Supreme
Court’s decision was reversed in January 2003 (with the Supreme Court de-
cision in the Lobe case) it was “a surprise” that the government proposed
restricting the constitutional provision of birthright citizenship to children
of non-nationals (Ryan, 2004).
Three reasons were presented by the then government to justify the pro-
posed referendum. First, there was a fear of people coming to have babies
in Ireland, practicing “citizenship tourism” (“Citizenship Tourists,” 2004)
because too many non-national women were giving birth in Dublin mater-
nity hospitals. It was shown later that the reactions of the heads of different
maternity hospitals had been used to defend this argument, whereas they
only meant to alert the government to the difficulties the health services
had coping with such large numbers of birth (Brandi, 2007).
A second reason was that the loophole meant that Ireland remained
open for immigrants, and this would cause relationship problems with
other European countries. These two elements have to be set against a
context of growing anti-immigrant attitudes in Ireland (King, 1998). The
last argument was that such a loophole questioned the “integrity” of Irish
citizenship, and led to the “common sense” citizenship campaign (Ryan,
2004, p. 17).
132  J. GUILLAUMOND

The campaign around the referendum exhibited the Irish State’s views
about immigration. There was government consensus, and with the main
opposition party, on restricting citizenship rights to the children of foreign-
ers (Brandi, 2007). The commonsense citizenship campaign and the per-
ception of immigrants “fixed and ‘essentialized’ Irishness, highlighting the
threatening ‘Other,’ constructing immigrants as suspect” (Crowley et al.,
2006, p. 2). There were issues surrounding the debate: important concepts
were simplified in order to evade the complex nature of the issues (Brandi,
2007; Breen & Devereux, 2003; Conway, 2008) and the timing was inappro-
priate, not allowing much time for questions (Ní Chiosáin, 2007).
After the Referendum, a person born in Ireland no longer had an auto-
matic constitutional right to be an Irish citizen (Becker & Cosgrave, 2013).
Some argued that the 2004 attempt was aimed at removing a constitution-
al problem that was created by previous constitutional reforms (Handoll,
2012). Ryan (2004) argued that Ireland is no exception as the abandon-
ment of unconditional ius soli is significant but not unusual in a compara-
tive perspective, in line with an increase in immigration. However, such a
change validates Honohan’s contention that the Irish nation is in complete
opposition with its citizenry, “being both more inclusive—of those who had
left Ireland, and more exclusive—of those who did not share a Catholic and
Gaelic background” (Honohan, 2010, p. 8).
While access to citizenship has been curtailed through the ius soli prin-
ciple, the last mode for acquiring Irish citizenship is being naturalized.
Naturalization entails obtaining a certificate from the Minister for Justice
and Equality. Lately, it has not been a strongly promoted program. Irish
authorities do not promote naturalization, whether through a full informa-
tive website or through information on benefits that may be obtained by
becoming an Irish citizen (Becker & Cosgrave, 2013). Moreover, there are
challenges for those applying to naturalized citizens. To begin with, the fee
for an application acts as a “deterrent for certain applicants” (Becker &
Cosgrave, 2013, p. 3). Furthermore, the process of providing documents
for application can be strenuous, and in the end, all applications remain at
the discretion of the Minister for Justice and Equality.
The labor market and identity. Compared to other European countries, the
Irish State did not attempt to protect its citizens by closing its borders in the
1990s to economic migrants. On the contrary, it sought additional workers
to fuel the boom during the Celtic Tiger period. Rapid economic growth
created significant labor shortages across many sectors of the Irish labor
market (Kuhling & Keohane, 2007). Consequently, there was an increased
demand for migrant labor, especially outside the EU. However, the economic
policies of the Irish State have been used as a de facto immigration policy
through the recruitment of extra labor. In the 1990s, the first part of the
strategy was to attract specific migrant workers: first, from the Irish diaspora,
 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland  133

second, returning Irish, and then labor from the European Economic Area
(EEA) and other countries. Throughout the two decades, economic necessity
drove migration policy (Boucher, 2008; Hughes et al., 2007).
In the first phase, the Irish State tried to attract members of the Irish
diaspora. The state was proactive in its drive to draw people to Ireland to
fill its labor shortages; there were many “globetrotting employment fairs”
sponsored by the state (Fanning, 2009). One example was the “Jobs Ire-
land” campaign targeted to a special diaspora between 1999 and 2002 with
roadshows and exhibitions in major cities throughout Europe and overseas.
These fairs looked for young skilled Irish expatriates. Some elements of the
campaign especially targeted people of Irish descent, taking into account
the elements of “primordial Irishness” (Hayward & Howard, 2007). The
underlying idea was that “members of the Irish diaspora, no matter how far
removed in terms of distance and time, will fit in better to life in Ireland
than those with no connection in the country” (Hayward & Howard, 2007,
p. 53). The policy of recruiting people abroad was to some extent a way of
creating a particular profile of the Irish population, and consequently to
Irish identity. Certain workers were targeted for their Irish identity rather
than their skills. In that sense, one cannot but agree with Hayward and
Howard when they write that the campaign “to recruit skilled Irish profes-
sionals abroad indicates a desire to control immigration and thus to control
the extent and nature of social change that it would engender” (Hayward
& Howard, 2007, p. 58).
The second element of the Irish State’s economic policy was granting work
permits. The program’s administrators assumed that permit holders would
leave Ireland when their skills were no longer required; it was supposed to
involve work for specific amount of time, and permits were linked to one
employer (Hughes et al., 2007). Access to Ireland for many migrants was
“shaped through formal recruitment programs set up by companies based
in Ireland, such as McDonalds or Tesco, who placed adverts in Lithuanian
newspapers as part of a strategy of acquiring labour” (Loyal, 2011, p. 34).
Until April 2003, Ireland’s labor migration policies were almost entirely
“employer-led” (NESC, 2006, p. xii). There were few restrictions imposed
on employers when recruiting workers from the non-European Economic
Area (EEA). There was one condition—“labour market test” to encourage
employers to make efforts at filling existing vacancies with EEA workers be-
fore looking to employ non-EEA workers.11 In other words, employers could
legally recruit as many non-EEA workers as they wished, from any country,
and to employ them in any job, regardless of the skill level required (Ruhs,
2009). The number of work permits issued to non-EEA nationals increased
dramatically between 1999 and 2003, by more than 650%. Most of these
permits were issued for low-skilled occupations in sectors such as catering,
agriculture, and other services (Ruhs, 2009). After EU enlargement, all
134  J. GUILLAUMOND

low-skilled labor had to be sourced from EEA countries, and certain cat-
egories became ineligible for work permits (Ruhs, 2009). The service sector
remained one of the main sources of recruitment post 2004 for non-EEA
nationals, mainly immigrants from India and the Philippines (Ruhs, 2009).
This policy was truly part of the official position. The National and Eco-
nomic Social Council (NESC) retrospectively praised the “flexibility of the
immigration system” and “its responsiveness to demands of employers for
migrant labour” (NESC, 2006, p. 41). These two elements helped generate
“benefits, both for individual employers and the Irish economy as a whole”
(NESC, 2006, p. 41). Immigration was seen as an essential factor for the
success of the Irish economy, present and future.12 “[With] the domestic
labour pool drying up, immigration has played a critical role in meeting sig-
nificant labour shortages at both the high and low-skill labour market seg-
ments. This has clearly helped maintain Ireland’s rapid economic growth
since the mid-1990s. Immigration is also considered a key requirement to
maintaining high levels of economic growth in the future” (NESC, 2006,
p. 41). In that sense, immigration was favorably presented as it had “in-
creased economic growth, eased labour market shortages, improved out-
put” and reduced earnings inequalities (NESC, 2006, p. xiii).
Paradoxically, in its appraisal of immigration over the 1990s, NESC only
mentions migration composed of “returning skilled Irish” or “Irish” immi-
grants is acknowledged as having “played a key role in expanding the pro-
ductive economy,” influencing growth, easing skill shortages, and helping
to reduce long-term unemployment (NESC, 2006, p. xiii).
Immigration did seem to have upgraded the Irish labor market with
the return of skilled Irish workers. Immigration also triggered population
growth and consumer demand: “increased the size of the domestic mar-
ket and resulted in increased demand for a variety of goods and services”
(NESC, 2006, p. xiv). It is also “reasonable to generalize that, in the major-
ity of cases, employment in Ireland leads to a financial gain for the individ-
ual migrant that may not have materialized had that worker stayed home.”
(NESC, 2006, p. xiv) Migration to Ireland had many positive results, but
only Irish migration was acknowledged. There was an untold assumption in
this praise of immigration: the focus was mostly on skilled people, prefer-
ably of Irish origin.
Diversity and national identity. Over the last decade, diversity has become
a fashionable topic in Europe (Guillaumond & Martin, 2013). Ireland
is no exception. To what extent has diversity been included in political
discourse? Has Irish identity been able to feed on such a newly discovered
and proclaimed diversity?
An important factor to consider is that the Irish government began ad-
dressing immigrant integration rather late. A Ministry for Integration was
created in 2007; its strategy for integration involved several institutions,
 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland  135

mainly the school and workplace. Prior to 2007, a series of official publica-
tions presented the vision of Irish society regarding the “Other.” In these
publications, economics established a code of good diversity practices, un-
doubtedly driven by the presence of several multinationals in Ireland. In
the mid-1990s, it was important to market Ireland abroad in a positive light
(Mac Laughlin, 1997).
The rhetoric of interculturalism is a key element to consider in those
documents. Such rhetoric gives the impression that the State and its insti-
tutions are responding to racism by fostering a “more inclusive Ireland.”
However, “its underlying logic of celebrating, embracing and respecting di-
versity reinforces power inequities” between majority group and ethnic mi-
nority groups (Bryan, 2010). One factor celebrates difference, while the lat-
ter defines how minorities benefit or enrich the host culture (Bryan, 2010).
In Integration: a Two-Way Process (DJELR, 1999), demographic diversity is
acknowledged, but the document in itself only deals with political refugees.
Integration refers to elements that improve refugees’ living conditions.
Interculturalism is a key element of integration in which the host and send-
ing cultures acknowledge and respect both cultures (Guillaumond & Mar-
tin, 2013). However, Interculturalism is a weak form of multiculturalism—
a focus on cultural coexistence rather than cultural exchange (Longley,
2001). In a second document, Planning for Diversity: The National Action Plan
Against Racism (DJELR, 2005), the position of the Irish State on integration
is ambiguous. The publication stresses cultural diversity that avoids a formal
recognition of diversity. Moreover, although diversity is presented as value
added for the host society, and should be celebrated, the primary focus is on
economics. In dealing with racism, Minister at the time, Michael McDowell,
stated that the success of the plan presented in the document “will be a key
factor for the continued economic and social prosperity of our country and
for the wellbeing of the society we pass on to future generations” (DJELR,
2005, p. 11). Again, interculturalism becomes the key word of the Irish State’s
policy regarding integration of its immigrant population. “Interculturalism
is essentially about creating the conditions for interaction, understanding,
equality of opportunity and respect” (DJELR, 2005, p. 42).
The rationale behind the National Action Plan Against Racism is about
promoting an intercultural society. The justifications for establishing the
EU recommended policies on anti-discrimination and integration policies
(Garner, 2009), two of the three reasons are oriented towards the well-be-
ing of the Irish economy. The strategy is threefold: for business, for social
cohesion, and for Ireland’s international reputation. In a globalized world,
“Ireland must continue to ensure it plays an important role in this process.
This requires greater understanding of the needs and greater interaction
with our existing and potential international trading partners.” (DJLER,
2005, p. 41)
136  J. GUILLAUMOND

The document singles an economic rationale for integration: the posi-

tive benefits that will accrue to economy, and that the promotion “an in-
tercultural workplace” will increase work effectiveness for multinationals
in Ireland (DJLER, 2005, p. 41). Social cohesion case is alluded to in one
sentence, and stresses that racism has the “potential to become a major
challenge to social cohesion and stability within a country or a region.”
Ireland’s international reputation is closely associated with it as a place
to invest and visit (IDA, 2010):

Ireland has an international reputation built on proactively supporting hu-

man rights and speaking out on human rights abuses at a global level. Ireland
has an international image of being a warm and welcoming place to visit and
to live. It is important that racism is not allowed to undermine or tarnish this
reputation. (DJLER, 2005, p. 41)

In that respect, migrants are defined in terms of how they economically

benefit the majority culture and the State, while non-economic benefits
take the form of vague pronouncements (Bryan, 2010). Moreover, the very
expression of acceptance of “the other” implies that it is conditional and
that it could be withdrawn, were migrants to be deemed undeserving (Bry-
an, 2010).
The last document articulating official State thinking on intercultural-
ism is Migration Nation (Office of the Minister for Integration, 2008). The
document celebrates and specifies interculturalism. For example, immigra-
tion laws are focused on welcoming “skilled migrants with a contribution to
make” (OMI, 2008, p. 9). “A clear commitment to Immigration Laws that
control and facilitate access to Ireland for skilled migrants with a contribu-
tion to make.” (OMI, 2008, p. 9). Migration Nation rests on the kinds of
immigrants the country is ready to welcome, skilled migrants mostly, hard-
working as well (Hughes et al., 2007). For Bryan (2010), such a position
has the effect of entrenching power relations between majority and minor-
ity groups and legitimizing negative responses towards those less skilled or
who do not have a contribution to make to society.
There are also roles attributed to the population—the host population
and the new communities. The former must respect cultural differences,
inform itself “about the new communities rather than accepting stereo-
typed and mythical views,” and encourage “integration in local communi-
ties” (OMI, 2008, pp. 17–18). The latter must respect cultural differences
and make “every effort to understand and learn core aspects of Irish society
and way of life,” maximize “the contribution to overall prosperity through
work and social engagement with the host community,” undertake “and
commit to the basic integration skills such as language acquisition and skills
development,” and encourage “integration in local communities” (OMI,
2008, p. 18).
 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland  137

One has to agree with Bryan that the above examples “reveal the extent
to which concerns about global competitiveness and productivity are cen-
tral to influencing the particular vision of interculturalism and anti-racism
promulgated by the Irish State” (Bryan, 2010, p. 259). The focal of these
documents and the marketing strategy of the State is to assure trading part-
ners and tourists that Ireland has a friendly environment and welcoming
nature. At the same time, it constructs the illegitimate and undeserving as
the “Other” within the Irish national space (Bryan, 2010). Moreover, for
Bryan, the Celtic Tiger period had some influence on the shaping of mul-
ticulturalism—a corporate-style multiculturalism that espouses the main
contributions of immigrants purely in terms of their labor (Bryan, 2010).
There is a discrepancy between Ireland’s international and the reality.
The multicultural image of Ireland is pure marketing, existing in the bro-
chure of the Industrial Development Authority to attract investors. The
word “multicultural” is also mentioned in tourist brochures but is soon
followed by the usual pictures and text describing an historical, unaltered
Ireland. Ireland looks to Britain as a model for addressing multicultural-
ism and drawing a parallel between contemporary Ireland and Britain in
the 1950s, when both countries required immigrants to fill labor shortages.
Hickman argues that the period was an occasion for reconfiguring the na-
tion as a White host (Hickman, 2007). Hickman’s contention is that current
discussions of diversity are predicated not on the acceptance of plurality
but on a notion of a ‘host’ that is being subjected to diversification (Hick-
man, 2007). While the discourse about interculturalism stresses a diverse
population, it leaves the social order intact.

CONCLUSION

Following the country’s changing status from a land of emigration to one of

immigration over the last decades, Irish identity has become more restric-
tive and less inclusive. Such a position, however, has not applied equally to
all migrants entering Ireland. Following constitutional reform after 2004,
returning migrants belonging to the Irish diaspora have been granted a
separate position regarding citizenship and, consequently, Irish identity,
compared to other migrants. While Ireland has become a more visible di-
verse society, the Irish State has also tried to play down and mitigate the
societal consequences of such diversity, implementing a weak multicultural-
ism principle or adopting a categorization of its population to taper off re-
cent demographic changes and offer a vision of stability. Indeed, the addi-
tion of an ethnicity question to the official census demonstrates the State’s
attempt to show that Irish identity has remained unaltered despite recent
demographic trends. It also shows that Irish identity is a social construct in
138  J. GUILLAUMOND

which the State actively develops a “mode of imagining” the Nation (An-
derson, 2006, p. 166). Ultimately, safeguarding Irish economic growth and
its capacity to attract investors has been, without contest, the State’s under-
lying motive against which these developments have unfolded.
At that stage, one cannot but wonder why Irish identity needs to remain
unaltered. Has the return from the 1990s onwards of so many “sons and
daughters” of Ireland triggered the need for an unchanging version of
Irishness since these homing pigeons were also coming back expecting to
find their roots? Have Ireland’s international economic imperatives annihi-
lated any collective endeavors to change the way Irishness was envisioned?
Can the apparent stability of Irish identity be explained by religious same-
ness where Polish people would be more easily accepted than other mi-
grants since the “romantic character of Christianity” to love thine neighbor
as yourself works better when the other (he/she) is a Christian (Kiberd,
2005, p. 309)? On that particular point, Census 2011 found that on a popu-
lation of 3.8 million Catholics, 92% were Irish while Poles and UK nationals
accounted for over half of all non-Irish Catholics (CSO, 2011). Or, do Irish
people as a whole fear some form of “hybridity” (Kiberd, 2005, p. 303) in
which several foreign identities could weaken their own identity and lead
to its subsequent demise?
Two challenges seem to arise from then on. The first one is to overcome
present resistance, building and maintaining a “real connection between
communities so that groups will not seek freedom from a secular society
so much as freedom in a multicultural endeavor” (Kiberd, 2005, p. 319,
emphasis in original). The second challenge is to overcome the founding
myth of Irishness, the country’s traditional self-portrayal, and promote a
new imagining for the Irish nation in the 21st century, while offering a re-
appraisal of the concept of diversity. These are two huge and pressing chal-
lenges, all the more so as the Republic of Ireland might also be tempted,
in some not so distant future, to adopt citizenship tests which offer for all
to see, in a less concealed form as an ethnicity question does in a Census, a
State’s conception of its national identity.

NOTES

1. Ireland refers to the Republic of Ireland or Éire in the Irish language. In the
following pages, the two terms will be used interchangeably.
2. See figure in appendix A for population data in Ireland from 1500 to 2009.
Data are from Angus Maddison’s Historical Statistics website: http://www.
ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm. For an excellent discussion of Ireland’s
economic situation see O’Grada (2011): https://ideas.repec.org/p/ucn/
wpaper/201112.html.
 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland  139

3. The Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) was created in 1884 for the promotion
of national pastimes such as Gaelic football and hurling.
4. To be sure, the global financial crisis hurt the Irish economy, but there were
issues that, in hindsight, could have been handled better. By 2007, the hous-
ing market had topped out. That year, tax revenues began to decline and
new home completions fell for the first time since 1988 (it should be noted
that the housing market was the major component of Ireland’s GDP), and in
2008, Ireland’s unemployment rate increased for the first time in 15 years.
Irish banks began reporting defaults and loans in arrears. With confidence
evaporating, banks were faced with customers withdrawing their funds. Also,
banks have been heavily reliant on short-term inter-bank loans for their fund-
ing, but in the new economic times, these became difficult to access.
  The Irish government responded issuing blanket guarantees of the banks’
liabilities and to re-capitalize banks with public funds. These large costs ex-
acerbated the budget deficit, which the collapse of the housing market had
revealed.
  Bank debt added to a significant budget deficit, and led international inves-
tors to question the ability of Ireland to manage its debt. In November 2010,
the Irish government debt reached 9%, an unsustainable%, and meant that
the government was locked out of international bond markets. The country
was unable to borrow money to fund the deficit. Ireland had to make devas-
tating and quick adjustments to public services because spending had to be
aligned with revenue immediately.
  On November 29, 2010, Ireland negotiated a package with the EU and the
IMF for €85 billion and €17.5 billion from its own resources. The funds were
to be used to re-align spending with revenues.
5. The famine has been listed as lasting from 1845 to 1852. By 1854, about 1.5
to 2.0 million Irish had left their country. Some also estimate that between
1845 and 1852 about 1 million died from disease or starvation, and another
1 million left Ireland. This loss amounts to about 20 to 25% decline in the
Irish population. For excellent histories of the Famine, see Daly (1986), Gray
(1995), Woodham-Smith (1968), O’Grada (2000), and Coogan (2012). See
also Bouvier and Gillissen (2014).
6. For a good discussion on indicators used by the Irish State to measure migra-
tion to Ireland, see Gilmartin, 2012.
7. In addition to these data, the following are indices of diversity based on Simp-
son’s Index. There are three indices: Simpson’s Index (S), Simpson’s Diversity
Index (D), and the Reciprocal of Simpson’s Index (R).
  Simpson’s Index was computed with the following formula and only among
the population that provided a national identity— S = ∑ (n/N)2. Where
n = number of a specific group, N = total population providing their national
identity; D = 1—S; R = 1/S.
  S varies from 0 to 1. When S = 0 there is infinite diversity, when it equals 1
it means no diversity. D ranges from 0 to 1, and the greater the D, the greater
the diversity. Finally, R starts from 1, and its maximum is the number of cat-
egories being examined. In our case, the number of categories is eight (8).
140  J. GUILLAUMOND

Index 2002 2006 2011

Simpson’s Index (S) .842 .771 .742
Diversity Index (D) .157 .229 .258
Reciprocal (R) of S 1.187 1.291 1.347

  Thus, while Ireland is not a terribly diverse society, it is becoming more

diverse, based on these indices.
  I would like to thank Richard R. Verdugo for making these calculations.
8. Until 2004, « EU » referred to the 15 member States (Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Neth-
erlands, Spain, Sweden, Portugal, and United Kingdom). From May 1, 2004,
the EU also includes the following 10 States: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. From Janu-
ary 1, 2007, the EU also includes Bulgaria and Romania. Therefore, from May
1, 2004, EU-15 is used to refer to the original 15 member States, EU-10 or
EU-12 to identify the new member States, EU-27 to refer to all of them.
9. Note that percent increase is different from percent age point increase. The
143% increase is based on the following formula: ((Yj—Yi)/Yi)*100. Where
Yj = most recent year, Yi = base year.
10. The 2011 Census is presented as such: “The census will give a comprehensive
picture of the social and living conditions of our people in 2011. Only a census
can provide such complete detail. The census is not, however, an end in itself!
Rather the results are essential tools for effective policy, planning and decision
making purposes.” In Your Questions, Census 2011 website, http://www.cen-
sus.ie/The-Census-and-You/Your-Questions.90.1.aspx (4 January 2014)
11. This policy changed in April 2003 when the Employment Permits Act made it
easier for nationals of the EU-10 accession countries to work in Ireland. After
May 1, 2004, EU-10 nationals could travel to Ireland and work without having
to rely on Irish employers to obtain work permits for them. (NESC, 2006, xii)
12. This assumption, as Gilmartin and Migge have argued, is not challenged in
recent academic work (Gilmartin & Migge, 2013, 4). Immigration remains
perceived as a variable of adjustment, and some argue that it can be seen as a
chance for Ireland as it releases pressure on the Irish labor market. Barret &
Kelly write that “if employment loss has indeed resulted in outflows, Ireland
can be said to have enjoyed a benefit to its economy from immigration. An
inflow allowed labor demand to be met in the boom and then for that labor
to be released in the downturn. In this way, Ireland’s openness to immigration
has been rewarded” (Barret & Kelly, 2012, p. 109).
13. Please note that figures have been rounded by the CSO. In some cases, per-
centages might not exactly match.

REFERENCES

Allen, K. (2000). The Celtic tiger. The myth of social partnership in Ireland. Manchester,
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 Is a New Definition of Irish Identity Emerging in the Republic of Ireland  141

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 CHAPTER 5

RUSSIAN NATIONAL
IDENTITY
Oxana Karnaukhova and Richard R. Verdugo

To the Finland station.1 The young man had been exiled and was living in
Switzerland. On March 15, 1917, as he planned to go to the Altstadt library,
a fellow exile, Mieczyslav Bronski, burst in and exclaimed, “Haven’t you
heard the news? There’s a revolution in Russia!”
It was crucial that Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov return to Russia immediately.
But there was a war in progress, and Switzerland was surrounded by the
warring parties: France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. The seas were
controlled by Russia’s ally, Britain. Air travel was out of the question. What
to do?
On March 31st, Fritz Platten, a Swiss Communist, got permission from
the German Foreign Minister via Baron Gisbert von Romberg, ambassa-
dor to Germany from Switzerland, for Ulyanov and other Russian exiles
to travel through Germany into Russia in a sealed one-car train. Germany
financed the trip because they fully knew that Ulyanov would foment much
trouble in Russia. Their goal was to spread unrest in Russia so it would stop
Russian resistance during WWI.
Just before midnight on April 16, 1917, V. I. Ulyanov’s (otherwise known
as V. I. Lenin) train pulled into the Finland Station in Petrograd. He was

National Identity, pages 147–185

Copyright © 2016 by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 147
148  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

greeted to the sound of La Marseillaise and a crowd of workers, sailors, and

soldiers waving red flags. Once in Russia, Lenin and Trotsky began a revolu-
tion that shook the world.2 First, though, they had to get rid of Kerensky’s
provisional government.
The ensuing Communist regime, begun after the October Revolution,
redirected Russia, affecting all aspects of life in the country, and created a
problem about national identity. Yet, it was clear that the paradigm driv-
ing Communism in Russia was a monumental historical event that had
emerged much earlier—the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment is one
of three historical events which, arguably, have had profound effects on
Russian national identity. The other two are Russian Imperialism and the
breakup of the Soviet Union. But the Enlightenment was the force behind
these events. The Enlightenment altered world views about social organiza-
tion, the role individuals take in their own lives within social systems. The
Old World was in retreat and would soon be buried; the seeds of its demise
were the ideas to be found in the Enlightenment. The great German social
scientist, Max Weber, referred to this change as the “disenchantment of the
world.” The effect on Russia was to be significant.

* * *

In 2002, the international community was keenly interested in Russia’s

new configuration. The interest was expressed by The Telegraph in the fol-
lowing questions: For Russia’s ill-defined boundaries, open spaces and inde-
terminate, mid-continental geography are the source of much confusion.
Is Russia part of Europe or of Asia? Is the “real” Russian capital westward-
looking St Petersburg or inward-facing Moscow? Are the “real” Russians
the peasant inhabitants of the northern forests, the settlers of the Siberian
open spaces, or the cosmopolitan aristocrats who created Russian litera-
ture, music and painting (Applebaum, 2002)?
The questions posed by Applebaum are relevant, but hardly touch upon
the complexities involved in what is meant by national identity or how and
why government leaders seek to develop and maintain such an identity
among their constituencies. Scholars have examined these complexities,
and the results are contradictory and confusing. So, Applebaum’s questions
about national identity in general, and Russia in particular, are part of on-
going research and political debate.
The extant literature addresses some of these questions by focusing on
the meaning and status of national identity, and by attempting to identify
those factors affecting its development and maintenance. However, scholars
have different views about these issues. For example, one group of scholars
argue that national identity is fixed and based on ethnicity or culture. An-
other group argues that national identity is flexible, involves social agency,
 Russian National Identity  149

or is an imagined concept (because it is developed and manipulated by pol-

iticians for their own benefit), or the result of industrial Capitalism. There
appears to be little consensus in the field.
National identity, as used in our chapter, is a feeling of attachment to
one’s nation or State.3 It is a concept different from Patriotism (devotion
and attachment to one’s country), Ethnicity (a group of people who identify
with one another in terms of a common ancestry, culture, or national ex-
perience), or Nationalism (an ideology that a binds persons to their nation
and supports the belief that their nation is superior to all others). National
identity is about how citizens, especially generations, interpret the past and
contemporary events in developing and maintaining their feelings of at-
tachment to their nation (a group of people sharing a common language,
culture, ethnicity, descent, or history) or State (a political community living
under a government). In our theoretical model, generations are crucial
and the missing link that molds national identity into one coherent model.
The purpose of our chapter is to examine the role three events have had on
Russian national identity: the Enlightenment, Russian Imperialism, and the
breakup of the Soviet Union.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Theories of National Identity

National Identity: A Continuum

Existing theories of national identity may be placed on a scale from one
where the concept is fixed (one that is lodged in a common, ethnic group
history) to one where the concept is flexible (involves social agency, mal-
leable, and is imagined). The four dominant theories and their views about
national identity may be displayed in a National Identity Scale; they are Es-
sentialist/Primordialist vs. Postmodernists/Constructivists. See Figure 5.1.
Essentialists. Essentialists believe that national identity is fixed, and based
on ethnicity. Nations are defined by their heritage and history, which
include a common language, a common faith, and a common ethnicity.
A variation of the Essentialist view is the work of Primodialists. Among
Primorialists nations are ancient, natural phenomena, based on language
learned in the community. The implication is that the community is fixed

Figure 5.1 National identity scale: Fixed to constructed.

150  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

over time (Huntington 1991; Smith 1986; Armstrong 1982; Greenfeld 1992;
Geertz 1973).
Postmodernists. Identities are fragmented into a diverse set of competing
identities. Postmodernists reject absolute truth; what we believe to be true
is constructed or an interpretation of reality; an imagined identity or
community according to Anderson (1991).4a
Society is constantly changing, and so too are traditional social roles.
Changing roles creates confusion of who we are as a people and thus affects
national identity.
Postmodernism has removed any sense of objective reality, and with it the
notion of an objective self. Since there is no truth, there can be no true me,
only a version of me. Since there is no essential identity, I can be whatever
I construct myself to be. Constructivism is a variant of Postmodernist theory.
Identity for them is relative, stable, involves role specific understandings,
and understandings are expected from oneself as well. These then are the
general theories about national identity and belonging. As will be evident
in the next section, Russian discourse on national identity may be orga-
nized around these theoretical categories.

Russian Theories of National Identity

The debate among Russian scholars on national identity map nicely onto
our National Identity Scale.
Essentialist/primordialist theories: Western views about national identity.
Since the mid-XIX century among Russian scholars in this category, identity
is defined in terms of European identity. Their argument has its roots in Ger-
man intellectual traditions and legal practices, Christianity, and the legitimacy
of the Royal dynasty (Kavelin, 1989). The latter two were obsessed with the
uniqueness and great spiritual mission of Russia4b (Khomyakov, 1835/1994;
Dostoyevsky, 1876/1976).
National identity debates during the second half of the XIXth century
went hand in hand with the expansion of the Russian empire. At the thresh-
old of the XIX–XXth centuries, and facing stiff competition from European
nations,5 Russian intellectuals returned to the idea of the “Other.” There was
a push for returning Russia to its cultural and ethnic origins, and an identity
centered in the East against Western individualism, which can be traced to
the Enlightenment (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Mokyr, 2009). Russian intel-
lectuals, while compared Russia with European society, felt the postponed
social development of the country. At the same time in clash with the East
Russia was considered as the West. The highest level of the “Eastern mo-
tive” could be seen in the so called “Eurasian movement” in 1920s. The his-
tory of Russia, its social structure, governmentality, and traditions are prede-
termined by geography and specificity of Eurasia as a peculiar geopolitical
space. According to Nicolai Trubeczkoy (2000), “any state is alive only if it
 Russian National Identity  151

can fulfill those tasks, which are settled by the geographical nature of its ter-
ritory.”6 Coming from this statement, the basis and the source of the Russian
governmentality is seen not in the Kiev Rus’, but in the Mongolian Empire of
Genghis Khan. Later on, imperial ideas of Genghis Khan have been raised up
again in the form of Byzantium Christianity. As Leo Gumilev (2007) stated,
Russians must realize their traditional boundaries–temporal and spatial—of
their ethnic community, clearly understand where “we,” and where “strang-
ers,” are located. Otherwise, they cannot hope to maintain the ethno-social
integrity, which was created by ancestors.
Some liberal Russian scholars based their ideas of a civic-nation on the
American example, which was itself influenced by the European Enlighten-
ment. Some intellectuals, such as Petr Struve (2004), insisted on building a
unified imperial Russia on the foundation of the dominant ethnic Russian
population. At the same time he was against forcing Russian culture on
other nations and cultures. The role of Russian culture in the process of
building an imperial nation was to be through open competition.
Other intellectuals, such as Paul Milyoukov (1906), argued for cross-cul-
tural interactions and exchanges in the process of civic-identity building.
Such an identity would be a commonly held imperial consciousness. More-
over, a common language was to be the basis for such a nation.
Postmodernist/constructivist theories. The primordialist position was
the most wide-spread position during the Soviet period, fixed in classical
ethnographic works of Bromley (1983), while from the beginning of the
1990s, Western academic influence (Anderson, 1991) was demonstrated
in the process of academic self-identification and raising constructivism.
As Valery Tishkov (2008) supposes, identity is a sense of belonging or
connection with one or another community (nation, country, team,
nationality, race, language group, party, etc.), culture, tradition, or ideology
(religious belief, location, social movement, etc ). Such identity is formed
not only a historical basis, but also under influence of elites. Vladimir
Malakhov (1998) suggests separating individual and social levels of identity.
If at the individual level, we have a set of psychological reactions, or the
most stable modes of behavior; then at the social level, identity is structured
and intensively constructed, mostly through setting the direct linkage of
identification and a nation-state. In this case “national” is used as the
predicament. So the background of the construction process is political.

A Theory of National Identity: Merging Extant Theories

A Theoretical Model
Theories about national identity seem to agree on a set of factors that
influence national identity (see Rodney, 1999). Disagreement is about the
152  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

TABLE 5.1 Specific Historical and Cultural Factors Affecting

National Identity
Topic Specific Factors
History Political: wars, change in political regimes, mass movements/protests,
distrust of political leaders, imperialism/colonialism
Economic: Change dominant role of production, depression, high
poverty rates
Culture/ Change in mores, norms, values, challenge to myths, traditions,
Societal and icons; change in language or diverse language base, or the
eradication of a language

permanence of national identity. These factors may be organized around

two topics: history and culture/society, as displayed in Table 5.1. We do not
claim this to be a complete list.
Our theory of national identity is depicted in Figure 5.2. In this figure,
historical events affect society, which, in turn, affects national identity. How-
ever, note that we have added the concept “Generations” mediating the
effect of history on society. This is a crucial part of our theory, and we will
spend a little time providing a rationale as to why Generations account for
both societal stability and change.
Generations are an aggregate of persons born around the same time and
are viewed collectively. The term “Generations” has an interesting history.
In 1863, the French lexicographer, Emile Littre used the term generations
in the following manner: “all men living more or less at the same time”
(Wohl, 1979, p. 203).
But it was during the 19th century that the concept was expanded as a re-
sult of substantial social and economic changes that would affect the West:
modernization and industrialism. The Enlightenment proposed the idea
that society could be changed; and one of the change agents was youth.
Social and economic change meant that the young were not as dependent
on their parents or other adults as they were in traditional society. The skills
and wisdom of their fathers and other adults were less relevant in a mod-
ern, industrializing society. Also, during their youth, young men went off to
university or the military, and these experiences would shape their views.

Figure 5.2 A theoretical model of national identity.

 Russian National Identity  153

Moreover, the breakdown of traditional society and regional identifications

lead to nationalism and a broader view of belonging.
August Comte (2009) was the first to seriously undertake a study of gen-
erations. Comte argued that social change was brought about by genera-
tional change and generational conflict. Other important theorists at the
time were John Stuart Mill and Wilhelm Dilthey.
Karl Mannheim (1923/1952) is a seminal figure in studying generations.
Mannheim argued that there were two schools of thought about genera-
tions. First, there was Comte’s view about social change in the life span.
Mannheim thought such a view reduced history to a time table and was thus
not very productive. Romantics were a second school of thought as rep-
resented by Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger. Mannheim felt they
focused too much on individual experiences to the detriment of the social
structure. Mannheim then argued that the tempo of social change affected
the formation of generations. Thus, the more rapid the social change, the
greater the likelihood the formation of a generation.
People are shaped through lived experiences as a result of social change
(Mannheim, 1923), and society persists through what Ryder (1965) termed
“demographic metabolism”: mortality and fertility. Younger generations,
though somewhat internally differentiated, develop their own set of ideas net
of older generations. They threaten the existing social order because they
question and push against it (Grenier, 2007; Mannheim, 1923; Ryder, 1965).
This is not to say that younger generations are a homogeneous group,
but they have a point of view about themselves and society that is different,
for the most part, than their parents or other adults. Their tendency to
challenge the system and be innovative not only ensures the persistence
of society, but its transformation as well (Mannheim, 1923; Ryder, 1965). It
is the role of younger Generations in a social system that has eluded theo-
ries about national identity. Young generations are the purveyors of both
change and stability.
In our study, it will become evident that new generations, and key figures
within each generation, have significantly affected Russian history, and thus
national identity. For example, some key figures of younger cohort were
Peter the Great, Tsarina Catherine, V. I. Lenin, L. Trotsky, J. Stalin, M. Gor-
bachev, B. Yeltsin, and V. Putin.7 The moral character of these persons is not
an issue, only that they were/are key figures from specific generations, led
social change, and contributed to the persistence of Russian society.

Russia: History and Social Change

In its long history, many events have shaped Russian national culture. In
our study, we focus on three such events: the Enlightenment, Imperialism,
and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Table 5.2 describes these events along
with brief hypotheses about their effects on national identity.
154  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

TABLE 5.2 Significant Russian Historical Events and Their Effect

on National Identity: Conjectures
Historical Event Description
The Enlightenment Change in values, views about life, democratic, Republican. Lead,
eventually, to the end of Serfdom, and the end of a regime based
on an Aristocracy, and the rise of Communism. Those raised under
the shadow of a Monarchy, and the Oligarchs are now under a
regime of a different set of norms, values, and governance under
Peter the Great and then Catherine the Great. Such change throws
older Generations into confusion about their identity; younger
Generations are not so affected, and developed their own views.
Imperialism/ Created greater cultural diversity; not only were people in the
Colonialism Frontier different, but they had their own cultures, and it taxed
the Russian government to maintain control, which infuriated
ethnic Russians. In the Frontier, older Generations are not
pleased, younger Generations are the prime movers of rebellions.
Ethnic Russians wonder what such expansion will mean for a true
Russian identity; Younger Generations must reflect and form about
their own national identity.
Breakup of the The original social system was not working in the 20th century.
USSR There was a push for breaking up the USSR, and opening up
Russia to a Free Market ideology if Russia was to become a modern
society. By all accounts the Free Market framework was not working
for various reasons; such as corruption at the highest level of
government, the inability of old norms, values, traditions, etc.,
to work in a Free Market framework. Also, the wholesale of State
resources at very low prices to oligarchs led to much anger and
social protests.

The remainder of our chapter is an examination of each specific his-

torical event and how it might have affected Russian national identity. Our
hypotheses are as follows:

H1: The Enlightenment set in motion a set of ideas that challenged traditional
governance regimes and how one looked at the world. These ideas were brought
into Russia, slowly, by Peter the Great and then Catherine the Great. Under
Communism these ideas became radical, and when Communism as practiced
in Russia ended, Enlightenment ideas developed even more, especially under
Gorbachev and Yeltsin. How Putin handles these Enlightenment ideas will be
seen later. Thus, the Enlightenment issued in a new set of ideas about social
structure, which led to different types of governance regimes and how Russians
would identity with their system, such as faithful followers of the Monarchy,
as Russians, Communists, as Russian citizens in the Russian Federation, or
in other ways.
 Russian National Identity  155

H2: Russian Imperialism lead to greater diversity. In the Frontier, annexed

nations had their own traditions, cultures, and thus identities. Becoming Rus-
sian was not a simple question, nor was an idea of changing identity easily
accepted. This becomes clear when one examines the reasons for the many
uprisings and revolts in the Frontier. Moreover, after the breakup of the Soviet
Union, former states reverted to their own symbols, flags for instance, and
declared this autonomy from the former Soviet Union. Thus, imperialism chal-
lenged the notion of an all-Russian identity.

H3: The breakup of the former Soviet Union was followed by a system based on
some radical interpretations of modernist ideas, traced back in the Enlighten-
ment: the free market, autonomy, and privatization. In short, Russians were
now embedded in a Hobbesian8 Capitalist system and all that it entails. The
safety nets ended, Russians became private citizens as opposed to members of a
larger community, and corruption was rampant.9 Moreover, the breakup high-
lighted another important issue—the consistent instability of Russia’s gover-
nance regimes. The greater the instability of governance regimes, the greater
the challenge to national identity.

RUSSIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY: THE ENLIGHTENMENT,

IMPERIALISM, AND THE SOVIET BREAKUP

The Enlightenment: Reason, Individual Freedom,

Citizenship, and Russian National Identity

The Enlightenment: Overview

Victor Hugo once said something to the effect that, “Nothing can stand
in the way of an idea whose time has come.” The Age of Enlightenment was
an epic changing cultural and social movement that appears to have be-
gun in 17th-century Western Europe.10 The paradigm emphasized reason
and individualism over tradition and religion on many aspects of individual
and social life; it thus challenged existing paradigms that were grounded
in tradition and faith. Knowledge was to be based on the scientific method
and human reason. The Enlightenment was a revolutionary paradigm in
human thought, a new paradigm (see Kuhn, 1962 for a discussion of para-
digms). It rallied against superstition, tradition, and religion. Our basic ar-
gument, though, is that the Enlightenment had important effects on many
nations (see Jaeger, 1985; Wohl, 1979; Zafirovski, 2001).
The Enlightenment paradigm developed against traditional and reli-
gious views and was later used, selectively, as a rationale for political rea-
sons. Russell (1945), for example, borrows ideas of Max Weber (1930) and
argues that the Enlightenment was based on a Protestant backlash against
156  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

Catholicism. He further argues that many other philosophical views—

such as democracy against monarchy—started among Protestants in the
early 16th century as rationales for their breaking away from the Catholic
Church. Chartier (1991) proposes that the Enlightenment was created by
leaders of the French Revolution who used selected scholars in order to
legitimize their Republican political agenda.
Prior to the Enlightenment, the twin towers of tradition and religion
were used to maintain social order. Historian Jonathan Israel (2002, p. 3)
notes that, until the 1650s, Western civilization “was based on a largely
shared core of faith, tradition and authority.” Up until this date most in-
tellectual debates revolved around the “confessional”—that is Catholic,
Lutheran, Reformed (Calvinist), or Anglican issues, and the primary aim
of these debates was to establish which bloc of faith ought to have the “mo-
nopoly of truth and a God-given title to authority.”
This period also saw the shaping of two distinct lines of Enlightenment
thought: First, the radical enlightenment, largely inspired by the philosophy
of Baruch Spinoza, who believed in “democracy; racial and sexual equality;
individual liberty of lifestyle; full freedom of thought, expression, and the
press; eradication of religious authority from the legislative process and
education; and full separation of church and state.” A second strain of En-
lightenment thought was moderate enlightenment, which was reflected in a
number of different philosophical systems, like those in the writings of Des-
cartes, John Locke, Isaac Newton, or Christian Wolff; moderates supported
a critical review and renewal of the old modes of thought and sought to ac-
commodate the old systems of power and faith. Both views were met nega-
tively by conservatives who espoused a Counter-Enlightenment viewpoint
with traditional beliefs.
The Enlightenment changed views about governance and rights. These
views clashed with the old ways and eventually fomented revolutionary be-
havior by displacing monarchies and the dominance of religion in explain-
ing the world. The divine rule of monarchs or kings, and the privileges
of nobles, would cease. Reason was a tool that allowed individuals to find
explanations and take control of their lives.
Other relevant Enlightenment views were that government needed
checks and balances in order that one branch would not rise to domi-
nance,11 free speech, and freedom from religious persecution. These were
major changes in how the world should be interpreted and structured. The
Russian monarch would eventually feel the power of these ideas whose time
had come.

Peter the Great and Tsarina Catherine

The Grand Embassy. Peter the Great’s sweeping reforms were made in
order to modernize Russia and were greatly influenced by his Western
 Russian National Identity  157

European advisors. He faced considerable opposition to his policies, but he

would brutally suppress any and all rebellions against his authority.
In 1697, Peter undertook the Grand Embassy, traveling incognito to Eu-
rope on an 18 month journey in the hope of obtaining assistance against the
Ottman Empire. However, he was crushed upon learning that France was an
ally of the Ottoman Sultan, and that Austria sought peace in the east while
conducting its own wars in the west. The journey appeared to be for naught.
However, the “Grand Embassy” was not a complete failure, because Pe-
ter was to acquire a considerable amount of knowledge about life in West-
ern Europe. In Amsterdam, he studied shipbuilding in Zaandam, and vis-
ited many individuals who provided him with experiences and views that
would affect his rule in Russia. Nicolas Witsen, mayor of Amsterdam and an
expert on Russia, gave Peter four months of access to the largest shipyard
in the world, belonging to the Dutch East India Company. In the shipyard,
Peter helped with the construction of an East Indiaman, and gained skills
from workers such as builders of locks and fortresses, shipwrights, and sea-
men—including Cornelis Cruys, a vice-admiral who would later become
Peter’s advisor on maritime affairs. Later, the Tsar would put his knowledge
of shipbuilding to work in building the Russian navy. Peter visited Frederik
Ruysch, who taught him how to pull teeth and catch butterflies. Ludolf
Bakhuysen, a painter of seascapes, and Jan van der Heyden, the inventor of
the fire hose, also received Peter.
In England Peter met King William III, visited Greenwich and Oxford,
was painted by Sir Godfrey Kneller, and saw a Royal Navy Fleet Review at
Deptford. He travelled to Manchester where he learned the techniques of
city-building that he would later apply in building Saint Petersburg. The
Tsar’s visit proved fruitful after all. Peter, a member of a new generation,
saw Europe and its ways of life and would later attempt to implement some
of these ideas in Russia.
Tsarina Catherine. Catherine ruled Russia from July 9, 1762 until her
death in 1796 at the age of 67. She came to power following a coup d’état
and the assassination of her husband, Peter III, at the end of the Seven
Years’ War. Under Catherine’s rule, Russia grew larger and emerged as one
of the great powers in Europe. The Tsarina was also a member of a new
generation and introduced many reforms into Russia, especially reforms
she would lift from Enlightenment thinkers.
The Russian Empire rapidly expanded by conquest and diplomacy. In
the south, Russian forces crushed the Crimean Khanate following victories
in the Russo-Turkish wars; it also colonized the vast territories of Novoros-
siya along the coasts of the Black and Azov Seas. In the west, the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth was ruled by Catherine’s former lover, King
Stanisław August Poniatowski, and it was eventually partitioned, with Russia
158  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

obtaining the largest share. Also, Russia began colonizing and establishing
Russian America.
Catherine reformed the administration of Russia, and many new cities
and towns were founded. The Tsarina modernized Russia along Western
European lines. However, she failed to end serfdom, and the increasing
demands of the military, the economy, the state, and private landowners’
reliance on serfdom led to rebellions, including Russia’s largest peasant
rebellion: the Pugachev’s Rebellion.12
In Russia, Catherine, the ever present enlightened despot, backed the
arts and sciences. The era produced the first Russian university, library,
theatre, public museum, and independent press. Like other enlightened
despots, Tsarina Catherine played a key role in fostering the arts, sciences,
and education. She had her own interpretation of Enlightenment ideals,
communicated with notable scholars such as Voltaire, and had in residence
renowned scientists, such as Leonhard Euler, Peter Simon Pallas, and Fedor
Ivanovich Iankovich de Mirievo (also spelled Teodor Janković-Mirijevski).
While Enlightenment values in Russia focused on the individual rather
than on changing Russian social structure, there were attempts to change
some aspects of social structure, such as abolishing serfdom. But these were
met with heavy resistance from the powerful Russian oligarch community.
Never the less, the seeds of freedom, autonomy, science, and human rights
had been planted, and the sense of belonging became a starting point for
theorizing about what it meant to be Russian (Mezhuev & Gradirovsky, 2004).

Imperialism and the Expansion of the Russian Empire

As we noted, during the reign of Tsarina Catherine, the Russian empire

expanded significantly via imperialism and colonialism.13 Expansion created
several problems for building an all-Russian national identity (Hosking, 1997).

1. It created greater diversity.

2. People in the frontier had their own culture, and had no wishes to
be “Russian.”
3. It created “Them and Us” differences, which seemed to have led to
many rebellions.

Before continuing, we should define Imperialism, Colonialism, and post-

Colonialism. We define the concepts in the following manner. Imperialism is
a mode of annexing a territory by conquest or diplomacy purely for logisti-
cal or economic reasons. Imperialism is associated with Mercantilism, as an
economic paradigm based on the notion of protecting a nation’s economy
and acquiring territory in improving the economy (see Heckscher, 1955).
 Russian National Identity  159

The idea that economic progress could be achieved internally had not been
fully realized. Colonialism is a framework of conquest based on the idea of
exploiting a people, a territory’s resources, and the idea of assimilating peo-
ple by various methods, including erasing historical and institutional mem-
ory. Post-Colonialism is associated with several factors related to the results
of colonizing a nation. Among these factors are the migration of colonized
people to the host country and the colonized peoples’ views about citizen-
ship and their status. In short, Post-Colonial people become a challenge to
the colonizing nation.
Expansion of the Russian Empire created much diversity; and the citi-
zens of the Frontier were not exactly quick to become Russians and adhere
to a Russian identity.14 For example, the 1897 Imperial Russian Census lists
the following as the most dominant languages. See Table 5.3, below.

TABLE 5.3 Languages Spoken in Russian Empire

From 1897 Empire Census
Language Rank Percent of Total Number
Russian 44.78125 55,667,469
Ukraine 18.00385 22,380,551
Tukic-Tatar 10.7585 13,373,867
Polish 6.380276 7,931,307
Belarusian 4.734581 5,885,547
Yiddish 4.073015 5,063,156
Finnic languages 2.817274 3,502,147
German 1.440344 1,790,489
Latvian 1.155128 1,435,937
Kartvelian languages 1.088036 1,352,535
Lithuanian, ex Samogitian 0.973785 1,210,510
Armenian 0.943688 1,173,096
Moldavian/Romanian 0.902318 1,121,669
Dagestani languages 0.878275 1,091,782
Bulgarian 0.138894 172,659
Zhmud(Samogitian) 0.360408 448,022
Greek 0.15037 186,925
Ossetian 0.138136 171,716
Tajik 0.281874 350,397
Total 124,309,781
Source: www.demoscope.ru
Note: The total from the website is listed at 125,640,021. However, upon
summing, that number appears incorrect.
160  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

Expansion of the empire not only created diversity, but because the con-
quered people were not entirely willing to become Russian and be gov-
erned by Russia, there were constant rebellions and trouble in the Frontier.
The resistance to becoming Russian can be seen in the many rebellions in
the Frontier and the great effort made by Russia at controlling its vast em-
pire.15 We have already noted the largest of such rebellions, the Pugachev
Rebellion. There were three waves of Russian colonialism: the Colonization
of Siberia, the Colonization of Middle Asia, and a period of colonization
during the Socialist regime.

First Two Waves of Colonization: Siberia, the Caucasus, and Middle Asia
The first wave of colonization occurred in the 16th century; the coloniza-
tion of Siberia under the influence, and with the assistance, of pre-capitalist
clans of Stroganovs, Demidovs, and more. The second wave saw the colo-
nization of the Caucasus and Middle Asia in the XIX century. Today, these
colonized people are viewed as the “Oriental Other” in Russia. Russian co-
lonialism was a mixture of both Western and European models. Its Western
links are to its geopolitical and economic interests, whereas its European
character concerns modernity and a civilizing mission.
Russian colonialism had a religious tint. The Russian empire colonized
different regions with diverse faiths. Typically, modern colonial empires de-
veloped spaces in two ways. First, there was the conquest of distant colonies
and merging them into the metropolis. Second, there was the mission of
spreading Roman Christianity. In acquiring new territories, a State guard-
ed and diffused their notion of “civilization.” Interestingly, citizenship was
granted to those born inside imperial borders, and religious affiliation was
not a factor.
Maintaining control of annexed territories was a challenge, and new
ways of controlling the populace of the Frontier were developed. The idea
of loyalty to the State was raised by Nikolai Karamzin (Karamzin, 1989).
Karamzin described the State-building process as a feeling of usefulness; be-
longing to the royal dynasty, membership in the Russian empire meant “to
be a perfect citizen.” The idea of a civic nation in the early XIXth century
was a non-violent form of control; it basically called for colonized people
to assimilate. For instance, the general-governor of Turkestan Konstantin
Kaufman (1867–1882) felt that making both Orthodoxes and Muslims
equally useful citizens of Russia was a step toward belonging (Tolz, 2009).
Mosques were built close to Orthodox churches and the settlement of a
multicultural population began a custom of building neighborhoods and,
as a final task, of promoting assimilation into the dominant ethnic culture.
So structural allowances were made in order to ensure assimilation and a
sense of belonging.
 Russian National Identity  161

Yet, the Russian Empire lacked an overarching framework. Many Russian

intellectuals based their ideas on European definitions and categories, and
it was difficult to find words in order to express such ideas as “Translatio
Imperii.”16 The time was ripe for a new orthodoxy; and indeed, one such
framework surfaced. The new framework was reflected in the official slogan
“Orthodoxy-Autocracy-Peoplehood” (in some translations—Nationality),
which was developed, elaborated, and promoted by Count Sergey Uvarov
in 1830–40 in response to the Decembrist Uprising of 1825.17
In 1832, Count Uvarov gave his notes containing the formula to Tsar
Nicolay together with some suggestions. The formula begins with Orthodoxy.
A view of Human Reason, elaborated by the European Enlightenment, that
argued that governance should be based on reason and political liberalism.
Orthodoxy should be the basis for the “Russification” of the newly colo-
nized Western lands.
The second component in the formula was Autocracy. State guardianship
was necessary as a mechanism for guiding Russia toward enlightenment,
and only the State possessed the resources to successfully implement a sys-
tem of education and science in meeting Russia’s needs.
The final component, Peoplehood, appeared vague. Uvarov argued that
the core problem was linguistic. The concept was popular, though a bit
vague, and viewed as a valuable part of the formula.
The formula was a reaction to what many thought was irresponsible lib-
eralism in Europe, and directed the Russian Empire Eastward. Language
and knowledge became instruments in developing relations with the “Oth-
er” (Tolz, 2011; Tlostanova, 2008).

* * *

Russia began modernizing at the second half of the XIXth century.

Modernization had a specific imperial character. Liberal ideas about iden-
tification were implemented, and a major task for Russia was to synthesize
Western European ideas about the nation-state. There were issues about
modernizing Russia:

1. A large imperial State based on the principle of exclusion, such as

centre-periphery relations; centralizing government; and a policy
of Russification for the empire.
2. A poly-ethnic population. According to the first Russian Census of
1897, Russia was populated by 125.6 million people speaking in 130
languages (Census, 1905). Such plurality demanded a plan for how
best to organize relations between the centre and the periphery.
3. Increasing nationalism and separatism resulting from a State policy
of Russification.
162  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

* * *

A liberal model was prescribed for reconfiguring relationships between

the centre and peripheries within the Russian empire. In addition, the
model proposed equal rights among nations and extended equal opportu-
nities for all ethnic groups within the empire.
Equal rights and personal freedom are the foundation of liberal ideolo-
gy that were extracted from the Enlightenment. So Russian liberals argued
for Civic rights that would be equal for all nationalities within the Russian
empire. In the first issue of the journal, “Liberation,” an article entitled
“From Russian constitutionalists” listed a number of factors that were cru-
cial for a free, civic life in Russia: the abolishment of all national, social,
and religious exclusions; accepting full freedom of beliefs, eliminating all
barriers to personal and economic rights, especially those barriers erected
against Jews and Poles.18
On September 1905, during the City and Regional Summit, liberals pro-
posed discussing the problem of national self-determination and decen-
tralization,19 with the idea of keeping the unitary structure of the Russian
empire. For F. Kokoshkin (Kokoshkin, 2010), political self-determination
would fragment Russia. For people of different ethnic origin, he suggested
that cultural self-determination should be pursued as policy. Self-determi-
nation, though, must involve creating autonomous cultural entities within
the Russian State. Cultural autonomy is the ability for ethnic groups to solve
their own educational and cultural problems. Interestingly, this sort of au-
tonomy was only extended to Finland and Poland, while the Caucasus and
Middle Asia were excluded.

Third Wave of Colonization

The third wave of colonization occurred during the XX century as part
of the Socialist program. Since the XIX century, the logic of colonialism in-
volved a system of controlling non-Western, non-Christian territories (Cau-
casus, Middle Asia, some part of Siberia). The third wave of colonization
created a new form of domination. The new dominance involved reducing
illiteracy, creating a body of knowledge in socializing the colonized popu-
lation, implementing a push for belonging and citizenship, and erasing a
peoples’ historical memory (Arkturk, 2010).
Theoretically, such a plan might have worked were it not for the fact that
colonized people objected to being assimilated. There was much resistance
from the populations of colonized territories. Building an all-Russian iden-
tity was out of the question.
 Russian National Identity  163

Breakup of the USSR and Russian National Identity

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) ended on December

26, 1991. The official document ending the State was number 142-H of
the Soviet of the Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. The
document confirmed the independence of the twelve remaining republics
of the Soviet Union, and led to the creation of the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States (CIS). On the previous day, December 25, 1991, Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev resigned: he declared his office extinct, and
turned over the office to Boris Yeltsin.
That evening, at 7:32 p.m., the Soviet flag was lowered from the Kremlin
for the last time. In its place, the Russian tricolor was raised. In previous
months, 13 of the 15 republics withdrew from the USSR. The week before
the dissolution, 11 republics, except the Baltic States and Georgia, signed
the Alma-Ata Protocol and established the CIS, and declared the end of the
Soviet Union.

* * *

Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary by the Politburo on

March 11, 1985, approximately three hours after Konstantin Chernenko
died. Gorbachev’s primary goal was to improve a stagnant Soviet economy.
However, early in his tenure he realized that improving the flagging Soviet
economy would be impossible without changing the entire Communist so-
cial structure. His reforms began with personnel changes.
On April 23, 1985, Gorbachev brought two of his proteges into the Po-
litburo as full members: Yegor Ligachev and Nikolai Ryzhkov. He was also
able to maintain some peace by promoting KGB head Viktor Chebrikov
from a Politburo candidate to a full member, and appointing Sergei So-
kolov as Minister of Defense. But things got out of hand quickly, much
to everyone’s surprise. Gorbachev’s liberalizing policies created a rush for
more liberal reforms. The net result was, of course, complete freedom away
from the USSR.
The breakup of the USSR generated a number of issues affecting na-
tional identity. Among the most serious challenges were ethnic conflicts,
issues related to diversity and multiculturalism, the erosion of citizenship,
and the relationship of ethnicity to group solidarity.

Ethnic Conflicts
The collapse of the Soviet empire opened up ethnic conflicts. Conflict
situations on the territory of the former Soviet Union occur due to many
reasons: political (centralism and unitary authorities, victimization and
conquest of nations), economic (economic crisis, unemployment, poverty),
164  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

psychosocial (inter-ethnic communication barriers, negative forms of na-

tional assertiveness, open nationalism, ambitious national leaders), territo-
rial, and others. The weakening of the USSR in 1980–1990s exposed flaws
of the previous regime and national policy, which caused latent ethnic ten-
sions. Besides this, autonomization of the state with four unequal levels of
the national government and national administrative units (federal repub-
lic, an autonomous republic, national region, national district) laid “the
bomb” under the national question in the former USSR republics. Nation-
alists, striving for power and property groups in many autonomous repub-
lics, suddenly became national heroes, trying to explain all the troubles of
the people by the policy of exploitative internationalism.
The uneven modernization of the society, social and economic inequal-
ity, competition on the labour market were substituted by ethnic conflicts.
That is, the nature of conflicts of the late 1980s–early 1990s in Fergana, Du-
shanbe, and Osh (Middle Asian countries), as well as other similar events.
Movement towards democratization accompanied by a struggle of old and
new political elites in the society became a detonator. Such transformation
in a multiethnic society has led to the fight with “ethno-political color.”
Inept, incoherent steps of governments toward transformation into a real
federation exacerbated ethnic conflicts and attempts to grasp the disinte-
grative tendencies in the republics using direct force: events in Tbilisi in
1989, Baku in 1990 and Vilnius 1991 were the most feasible (Pustobaev,
1994; Coppieters, 1994).
Some researchers (Pain, 2007) offer a typology of internal ethno-terri-
torial conflicts:

1. Conflicts, which arise from claims of pre-existing national territo-

rial autonomy for the full state sovereignty (the Chechen conflict).
2. Conflicts that have developed in a consequence of proclamation of
the ethnic communities for new national-territorial autonomy or
unilateral increasing of their current status, but without a formal
claim to create an autonomy within Independent States (conflicts
in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Karachay-Cherkessia).
3. Conflicts between ethnic groups or neighboring republics, which
are seeking to gain control over the disputed border areas (con-
flicts between the ethnic communities of Dagestan, the dispute
between North Ossetia and Ingushetia).

Being based on the evaluation of events in the late 1980s–early 1990s,

the following types of inter-ethnic conflicts could be distinguished (Pain,
2007; Tishkov, 2008). The first type is based on psychological stereotypes.
This kind of conflict is characterized by a significant extent of spontaneity
and lack of control, coming from rumors or incorrect interpretations of
 Russian National Identity  165

real events. In these actions, hidden instigators of conflict usually stay in

the shadows, such as in Sumgait 1988, Ferghana 1989, New Uzen 1989, and
other similar events.
The second type is ethnic conflicts based on ideological concepts (or
doctrines). It contains some ideological (theoretical, conceptual) design,
which may include various complaints and their justification (the idea of a
“historical nation”; justificatory doctrine of “the great nation”). These and
similar constructions have nothing to do with scientific theories.
The third type is associated with the clash of political institutions (or-
ganizations). Political institutions include parties, civil movements, public
authorities, armed forces, and so on.
The fourth type is the selection of strategic goals of ethno-social movement
(autonomist, separatist, ethno-egalitarian, anti-immigrant, selectivist, etc.).
The Republic of Tatarstan has demonstrated peaceful options for han-
dling a complex constitutional conflict. The Constitution adopted in the
Republic in 1992 has recorded its independence and associate membership
in the Federation, but the Federal Treaty has not been signed in that time.
In February 1994, after a series of negotiations between government
bodies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, the treaty
was signed, whereby the basic contradictions were resolved. Since that time
relations based on the signed agreement became known as the “Model of
Tatarstan.”
Elements of institutional conflict occurred in Bashkortostan. This repub-
lic has signed a federal agreement, but under certain conditions. Conflict
has been removed after the signing of the Treaty, where power-sharing with
the federal center has been constituted.
Constitutional conflicts occurred in two republics–Sakha (Yakutia) and
Tuva. They were prompted in the early 1990s by active national associa-
tions, especially in Yakutia, which was seeking more autonomy within the
Federation.
In the beginning of the 1990s, Russia was very close to civil war based
on these conflicts. There are several reasons why a civil war did not occur.
To begin with, social activity was exceedingly low by the end of the XXth
century. Adapting to the new system of social, political, and economic re-
lations demanded significant efforts from Russian citizens. Social activity
was focused on adapting to the new system, and more precisely, individual
adaptation.
Second, there was little civic activity. Social protests of 1980s were of a
specific nature and disappeared quickly by the 1990s. Related to less civic
activity were the strategies of including activists into the decision making
process. Russian elites had a historical role in stabilizing the country. For
example, elites met informally on many occasions to discuss issues about
Russia; it was an exclusive club. In 1993, B. Yel’tsin began incorporating
166  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

leaders from the opposition, a younger generation, into the post-Soviet

elite. It was an important decision of engaging oppositional elites into the
decision making process. The decision was part of a new way of building
solidary, and part of overall integration plan. The effect was to stabilize the
system by reducing civil protest.
Third, there was an emergence of nationalism in Russian. Nationalism
posed a serious challenge to civic identity. These nationalist uprisings re-
flected a disappointment with Western democratic values and free market
reforms. Other sources of growing nationalism were Russia’s negative per-
sona in the world, social protest among immigrants from the former Soviet
republics and Northern Caucasus (a result of post-colonialism), and Rus-
sia’s “brain drain.” Ethnic nationalism seems to have been a response to
these tensions.20
National tensions raised yet another important question for Russia:
would it attempt to become a great Eurasian state (Eurasian in the geo-
graphical sense of the word), or a small country queuing up in line to join
the European Union. Russia is at an important crossroads regarding na-
tional identity: awareness of Russian “greatness,” which is an important
component of national identity.
The transition of cultural conditions, a sharply shortened territory, and
decreased world power and influence have been a tragedy for Russian na-
tional identity. To some extent, Russia today is at an awkward point in its his-
tory as its core of national identity is being tested. All attempts at artificially
creating a great Russia in the 1990s had no satisfying results. Russia is still at
the crossroads of developing its sense of greatness. The effect on national
identity is significant.

Russia and Multiculturalism

The confluence of the Enlightenment and Russia’s imperialism emerged
in Russian multiculturalism. Multiculturalism has become an important is-
sue in Russia, and a significant issue in politics and research (Galston, 2005).
By multicultural we mean a society composed of more than one cultural
group and social policies that promote such diversity. In order to stabilize
a manifold society the framework of multiculturalism suggests to accept, in-
clude, and respect all cultural groups through a specific policy and practice.
The framework has its critics (Goldberg, 1994).21 For example, some ar-
gue that multiculturalism reifies ethnicity, that it substitutes individual social
rights with group rights (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000). Also, there are some
specifically “Russian” objections toward multiculturalism—that it leads to
ethnocentrism and ethnic prejudices (see Malakhov, 2002; Nizamova, 2009;
Chebankova, 2012). Some general criticisms are listed below:

• There is a benign coexistence when cultural groups remain distinct.

 Russian National Identity  167

• Nation-states have a core identity, and this core is challenged when

enforcing multiculturalism (Nagel, 2009).
• There is less group trust, the greater the diversity (Putnam 2007).
• The greater the homogeneity, the greater the altruism (Salter 2006).

Later, other scholars noted their dissatisfaction with Western practices of

multiculturalism. Their main objection is that multiculturalism is an ideolo-
gy that blocks democratic pluralism and substitutes civic society for cultural
communities (Joppke, 2004). In some circles, multiculturalism is seen as
part of a democratic society. Wieviorka (2001) calls it integrative multicul-
turalism or discursive democratic multiculturalism (Benhabib, 2002). In
Russia, cultural pluralism is not important enough to pursue an assimila-
tion policy and negate group differences on behalf of common values, as it
is in the USA. Assimilation is a policy asking ethnic groups to change their
identity for the common good; where the common good refers to the cul-
ture of a dominant group (see Wieviorka, 2001).

* * *

Russian scholars tend to view multicultural policy as a threat and not

applicable in multinational Russia. In contrast, discourse on immigration
is based on citizenship, an ethos of the nation, justice, universal rights, and
identity. Moreover, this view is driven by a Eurocentric view of freedom, be-
longing, and democracy. The challenge posed by immigration is an excel-
lent topic for understanding multiculturalism in Russia (Mukomel, 2005;
Thakahov, 2009).
The State remains neutral on immigrant co-existence. The upshot of
State neutral policy is the decentralization of equality and tolerance and
thus any immigration policy is a local matter (Walzer, 1997). Such a strat-
egy is a major component of Neo-Liberal ideology (see Verdugo, 2013 for
a discussion of the Neo-Liberal paradigm), but does not mesh with Russian
hegemony and social structure. In reality, Russia is a political community
with a large ethnic-cultural majority of Russians (80% of the population
consider themselves Russians), and the State is controlled by this majority.
Neutrality has rendered Immigrants an invisible minority.22 By an “invis-
ible minority,” we mean they are not acknowledged and their needs do not
need to be met; such a group fails to exist in the national psyche. For in-
stance, media in Southern Russia demonstrates the unpopularity of provid-
ing immigrants with assistance in finding work—because they do not exist. In
a 2006 public opinion poll, respondents were asked, “Could ethnic quarters
(ghettoes) be founded in Moscow?” The vast majority answered “No.” Most
Russians believe that ethnic minorities are well “integrated” into the capital’s
life; thus, they are invisible as ethnic minorities.23 Yet, data indicate otherwise.
168  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

Russia has a significant immigrant population. The 2002 Russian Census

reported that there were 5.6 million immigrants in the nation.24 By 2007,
the number increased by about 43% to 8 million immigrants.25 Immigration
is a source of the new Russian multicultural identity, and yet at the same
time it is associated with poly-ethnicity. The two concepts are vastly differ-
ent—in the former, ethnicity is recognized, in the latter, ethnicity is not
recognized. According to the 2010 Russian Census, the total population in
Russia was 142.9 million, and of this number, 137.2 million provided their
ethnic origin. Of those providing an ethnic origin, 111 million identified
as Russian,26 and the remainder, about 26 million, defined their origin as
non-Russian (Tatar ethnic group is the largest among minorities). Approxi-
mately 40% of minority groups have their own administration, territory,
and quasi-state governments. Such diversity is a major challenge for devel-
oping a Russian national identity.
Wieviorka (2001) identifies three ways of developing collective identi-
ties—assimilation, tolerance, and multiculturalism. Where multicultural-
ism refers to the recognition and implementation of cultural rights for mi-
norities; of course, under the condition that minorities accept community
values and laws. Thus, multicultural practices in Russia are inconsistent and
selective. Russia ignores the benefits and rights claims from ethnic-cultural
minorities. The presence of the “Other” is acceptable, but their complaints
about collective rights fall on deaf ears.
Integration, then, means the unification of differences and formulating
a homogeneous community. The bases for a unified political communi-
ty are the principles of citizen’s equal rights, liberal rights, and personal
freedom. Negative results may surface when personal freedom is absent,
and where cultural differences and group rights have priority over individ-
ual rights. But Russian discourse on democratic multiculturalism does not
openly discuss such a problem, and it is clear that the priorities in a liberal
framework are the principles of individual rights and individual member-
ship in an equal co-citizenship.
Differences between Russia and the West about multiculturalism appear
to be between liberals and communitarians. For liberals, empowering citi-
zenship via law is paramount; for communitarians, citizenship is important
for developing “exclusiveness” in a political community (see Berry, 1991;
Barry, 2001; Bennet, 1998). Upon closer inspection, the debate is actu-
ally between these groups and postmodernists. The “narrow” conception
is close to liberals and communitarians, the “wide” conception associated
with a radical postmodernist perspective (Brubaker, 2004).
Both liberals and communitarians believe that law and citizenship are
necessary for social stability. However, there are differences between both
ideological groups. Liberals construct their paradigm by defining the “Oth-
er” as deviant (Balibar, 2009). The liberal conception of universal values
 Russian National Identity  169

contains an alienating component. And citizenship, despite its universal

claims, is an important instrument for settling and defending preferences
of identity. Communitarianism initially rose in their critical answer to the
passage of John Rawls (1971) about the principle task of a government to
secure and distribute fairly common goods among people with the need
of individualistic free life. Communitarians (Taylor, 1989; Walzer, 1994)
doubted the idea of a totally independent individual, emphasizing social
nature of self, the role of the social and cultural context and traditions, as
well as the influence of a community value system on life trajectory. In the
second half of 1990s, communitarians paid attention to social responsibili-
ties, political and cultural alienation, and erosion of communal life in the
epoch of the dispersed and atomized society. For this reason they shift the
focus from exclusiveness and personal fulfillment toward “family engage-
ment.” So the term “community” is exploited in discussions around citizen-
ship and the problem of status of the Other.
Liberals and communitarians base their ideas on the fact that citizenship
creates individuals who are equal political subjects. From the liberal point of
view, political integration is secured by the ideas and values shared among
all citizens. For communitarians, integration means social inclusion (com-
munity membership shared by all citizens). So, citizenship is simultaneously
a legal status, coordinated with personal identity, and social status, meaning
equal opportunities and societal acceptance. The most feasible extension of
citizenship and belonging is the right to social assistance: the State provides
social assistance in terms of disability, aging, or labour market changes.

Citizenship Erosion in Russian

Russia is not a State of ethnic nationalism. Indeed, the most important
social-political influence in Russia has always been the relations between
elites and the masses, and the perception of the State by elites.
There is a difference between State and civic self-consciousness. State
identity is easier than civic awareness. Political leaders, elites, and politi-
cal entrepreneurs provide definitions of “Stateness” as a form of territorial
unity. In recent years, this sense of “Stateness” has increased in Russia. For
instance, in 1992 a public opinion poll conducted in Moscow suggested
that no more than one in five respondents identified as Russian.27 Whereas,
at the beginning of the XXI century, 80% of the population in outlying ar-
eas identified as Russian; and about 65% throughout the nation identified
as Russian (Public Opinion, 2006).
Leokadia Drobizheva has undertaken a long-term research project about
the process of constructing civic identity among Russians.28 The ideas of a
strong State are epitomized in strong personal leadership, ideas of a great
State, maintaining a leading position in the world, and appeared as offi-
cial ideology at the beginning of the XXI century. For example, in 1999 a
170  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

Russian survey asked, “What Russia needs most of all?” 71% of respondents
answered “strong leader,” and 59% mentioned a “strong state.”29 An under-
standing of the strong State varied; most respondents believe that Russia
must be a State, which “merits [a] more acceptable position in the world.”30
In other data, respondents indicated that Russia should continue to be a
member of “the Great 8” (69% answered in 2001).31 The breakup of the
Soviet Union has been traumatic and a majority of Russians appear eager
to restore Russia’s past, vaunted, geopolitical world position.

Ethnicity, Identity, and Group Solidarity

An important factor in forming a common State identity involves com-
bining State and ethnic identity. However, when asked about the meaning
of “We,” ethnicity was preferred over civic identity. In a 2006 national sur-
vey, a national (ethnic) unity was preferred by 85.6% of respondents; the
unity with all other citizens of Russia—65%; though only about 19.8% felt
this way “very often.”32 For ethnic Russians, a common Russian civic identity
is easily combined with ethnicity, but for Russians of other ethnic origins
such a combination was complex.
None the less, ethnicity may be losing its grip in Russia. According to
research conducted in 2006 in regions with dominant ethnic Russian popu-
lations, Russian civic identity has become greater than ethnic identity: 90–
95% of respondents living in the Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, and Voronezh regions;
and up to 77–82% of people living in Saratov, Kaliningrad regions felt they
were citizens of Russia. An affinity for people from one’s ethnic origin was
felt by 86% of respondents in Yekaterinburgh, 61–77% from Saratov, and
55–57% of respondents in Kaliningrad, Voronezh and other outlying re-
gions.33 Civic identity, in its unique Russian version, maybe the dominant
identity in the future. Such an event may have positive effects, because there
is strength in the weak ties to an ethnic community (Granovetter 1973).
Republican discourse gives priority to community over universal or indi-
vidual rights. Republicans have exploited the idea of responsibility toward
other members of society and in developing strong links with community
and nation. (Also, keep in mind that a focus on individual rights and free-
dom would be a challenge to the status and privileges of Russian oligarchs.)
In their discourse, responsibility is set in contrast to rights. Rights are noth-
ing without a strong presence of values, so their primary message is about
loyalty, civic literacy, and service to community and state, and all are con-
nected to civic responsibility. In this sense Russian discourse is very close to
the general Republican viewpoint in emphasizing individual rights in spite
of collective responsibility. Does such a view coincide with reality? We con-
clude our analyses with the following 2003 survey results. (See Table 5.4)
Among all respondents, slightly under one-third do not feel close to Rus-
sia. We can interpret this as not identifying with Russia. There is also variation
 Russian National Identity  171

TABLE 5.4 How Close Do You Feel to Your Country? (Russia)

Responses Regions
Panel A
Total Northwest Central North Volga-Vyatka
Very close 26.4 43.6 27.2 25.8 37.9
Close 40.6 38.5 41.9 25.8 37.1
Not very close 22.6 16.7 20.0 32.8 19.0
Not close at all 10.3 1.30 10.9 15.1 6.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Panel B
Black Earth Volga-Region N. Caucus Urals W. Siberia
Very close 25.9 26.7 22.0 20.7 28.4
Close 41.7 42.4 47.1 37.3 42.8
Not very close 25.0 18.0 21.5 30.1 17.9
Not close at all 7.4 12.9 9.4 12.0 10.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Panel C
E. Siberia Far East
Very close 22.1 23.2
Close 44.3 38.4
Not very close 26.2 29.5
Not close at all 7.4 8.9
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Original calculations derived from International Social Survey Programe. www.zacat.
gesis.org

by region. The highest percentage of respondents not identifying as Russian

are those in the North (48%). The lowest are those residing in the Northwest
(18%).34 Clearly, there is a significant identity problem in Russia.

CONCLUSION

The history of Russia begins with the Eastern Slavs and the Finno-Ugric
peoples. The state of Garðaríki (“the realm of towns”), which was centered
in Novgorod and included the entire areas inhabited by Ilmen Slavs, Veps,
and Votes, was established by the Varangian chieftain Rurik in 862. This
date is considered to be the beginning of Russian history. Kievan Rus’ was
founded by Oleg of Novgorod twenty years later in 882. Christianity was ad-
opted from the Byzantine Empire in 988 and led to a synthesis of Byzantine
172  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

and Slavic cultures that would characterize Russian culture for over 100
years. Mongol invasions in 1237–1240 eventually destroyed Kievan Rus’.
By the 18th century, Russia was a vast empire, stretching from the Pol-
ish–Lithuanian Commonwealth eastward to the Pacific Ocean. Western
expansion increased Russia’s sense of isolation, and would lead to greater
interaction with Europe and the assimilation of some of its values, espe-
cially those from the Enlightenment, which would eventually end the mon-
archy. Successive regimes during the 19th century responded to pressures
for social change; the responses were superficial and repressive. Serfdom
was abolished in 1861, though it proved to be unfavorable to the peasants.
Increased dissatisfaction in the populace eventually led to revolution. The
situation appeared to be changing after the abolition of serfdom and the
beginning of World War I in 1914. Other changes included Stolypin re-
forms, the constitution of 1906, and the State Duma’s attempts at liberal-
izing the economy and politics. But the Tsars were not much interested in
relinquishing their status and privileges.
The 1917 Russian Revolution was the result of several factors—an eco-
nomic breakdown, war weariness, and discontent among the populace with
autocratic rule. A coalition of liberals and moderate socialists rose to power,
but their program failed miserably, and power was seized by the Communist
Bolsheviks on October 25—The October Revolution.
Between 1922 and 1991, Russian history is about the Soviet Union; a
State linked with the Russian Empire prior to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.35
The approach at building Socialism varied during different periods of So-
viet history, from a mixed economy and a diverse society and culture of the
1920s, to a command economy and repressions during the Stalin regime,
and then the stagnation of the 1980s.
By the mid-1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev realized that the USSR could not
continue as it was then structured, so he embarked on major liberalizing re-
forms, which eventually, and unexpectedly, led to the fall of the Soviet Union.
The history of the Russian Federation (RF) officially starts in January
1992. The Federation was the legal successor to the Soviet Union, sans its
superpower status after facing serious challenges in its efforts at forging a
new post-Soviet political and economic system. Scrapping the socialist cen-
tral planning and state ownership of property, the RF implemented a pro-
gram of market capitalism in an attempt at building its flagging economy.
The attempt failed. Since the new millennium, Vladimir Putin has been its
dominant leader, and Russia continues to share many of the political and
social structures with its Tsarist and Soviet past. There is the sense that the
RF is a Kleptocracy, and, indeed, there is much corruption and inequality
(see Dawisha, 2014).36
Marx is reputed to have said that “people make history, but not as they
please.” It seems to us that there are at least two interesting parts to his
 Russian National Identity  173

comment. First, that history has a role in its own making by limiting what
people can and cannot do. Second, that history repeats itself. In the cur-
rent Russian Federation, the nation is facing a number of historical events
affecting national identity. First, there are remnants of the Enlightenment
and its core values, which challenges its current social structure. Second,
there is Russia’s colonial past where it not only increased its diversity, but
added significant administrative and economic costs. Also, people in the
Frontier were and are less likely to feel “Russian.” Third, Russia has shown
remarkable instability in its governance regimes. Such instability creates
challenges for creating national identity. Fourth, there is the issue of cor-
ruption which hurts the Russian economy, creates much social inequality,
and hurts ordinary Russian citizens. As someone once stated, “corruption
in Russia is not a problem, it is a business.” Each of these factors, in combi-
nation or separately, makes national identity among those living in Russia
complex.
For example, Tishkov argues that there is widespread ethnic and civic
identity (Tishkov, 2008). Civil identity is usually combined with the ethos
of responsibility, loyalty, a feeling of belonging, a shared vision of the past,
a unified system of education, a system of symbols, and memorable dates.
This type of identity is usually accompanied by ethnic (ethno-cultural) iden-
tity, embodying feelings of belonging to an ethnic community and being
different from others. Both types of identity may coexist within the same
nation-state. Being a mixture of ethnic communities, Russia provides a hy-
brid identity where its dominant Russian culture, religion, and language
construct a national framework.
There are several conclusions to be derived from our analyses. First, gen-
erations have played an important part in Russian national identity and in
fostering change, and yet maintaining the stability and continuance of the
State. Many members from younger generations have played key roles in
contributing to change and stability, such as Peter the Great, Tsarina Cath-
erine, Lenin and Trotsky, Stalin, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin.
Second, historical events have been crucial in Russian national identity.
Three of the more important were the Enlightenment, Russian imperial-
ism, and the breakup of the USSR. The Enlightenment was crucial because
it introduced new ideas about governance, social structure, and individual
freedom into Russia, which eventually ended the monarchy, led to Com-
munism and a free market economy, and later to a new autocratic system.
Enlightenment views fostered change, and its values continue to be a chal-
lenge to Russia.
Imperialism not only increased diversity, but also increased administra-
tive and economic costs of managing a large empire. Moreover, people in
the Frontier, not having any desire to be Russian, were constantly rebelling.
174  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

Finally, the breakup of the USSR has been affecting national identity.
Russia is currently struggling with a major factor in its national identity—
will it return to its former international power as a great nation?
In conclusion, national identity and its development and maintenance is
complex. It revolves around societal processes, structures, and social change.
 Russian National Identity  175

APPENDIX A
Additional Data Regarding National Identity

Data are original computations from the International Social Survey

Program (www.gesis.org). Data in percents. All distributions sum to 100%,
though there might be some discrepancy due to rounding.

1. P
 roud to be a native of Russia
Very proud, 37.9
Somewhat proud, 47.5
Not very proud, 11.3
Not proud, 3.3

2. R
 egional or national identity
Only regional, 12.0
More regional, 6.4
Equal, 40.9
Greater national, 13.3
Only national, 26.7
Other, 0.7
None, 0.0

3. I would rather be a citizen of Russia than any other country

Agree strongly, 44.3
Agree, 33.6
Neutral, 13.5
Disagree, 4.7
Disagree strongly, 3.8

4. There are some things about Russia that make me feel ashamed.
Agree strongly, 40.3
Agree, 41.8
Neutral, 11.2
Disagree, 4.9
Disagree strongly, 1.7

5. Are you willing to fight for Russia?

Yes, 75.3

6. Democracy causes a bad economy.

Strongly agree, 8.9
Agree, 39.4
176  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

Disagree, 46.6
Disagree strongly, 5.0

7. Democracy cannot maintain order.

Strongly agree, 14.4
Agree, 47.1
Disagree, 34.6
Disagree strongly, 3.9

8. Democracy is the best political system.

Strongly agree, 15.3
Agree, 54.2
Disagree, 25.8
Disagree strongly, 4.6
 Russian National Identity  177

APPENDIX B
Corruption Indices for Russia

Russian Corruption Indices and Rank per Number of Nations

in Survey
Year Index Score: Russia/Other* Rank/Number of Nations
2000 2.1/Finland, 10 82/90 = bottom 10%
2001 2.3/Finland, 9.9 79/91 = bottom 10%
2002 2.7/Finland, 9.7 71/102 = bottom 10%
2003 2.7/Finland, 9.7 86/133 = bottom 10%
2004 2.8/Finland, 9.7 90/145 = bottom 10%
2005 2.4/Iceland/9.7 126/158 = bottom 10%
2006 2.5/Finland, Iceland, 121/163 = bottom 10%
New Zealand, 9.6
2007 2,3/Denmark, Finland, 143/179 = bottom 10%
New Zealand, 9.4
2008 2.1/Denmark, Sweden, 147/180 = bottom 10%
New Zealand, 9.3
2009 2.2/New Zealand, 9.4 146/180 = bottom 10%
2010 2.1/Denmark, New Zealand, 154/178 = bottom 10%
Singapore, 9.3
2011 2.4/New Zealand, 9.5 143/182 = bottom 10%
2012 28* (2.8)/Denmark, Finland, 133/174 = bottom 10%
New Zealand, 90
2013 28* (2.8)/Denmark, 127/175 = bottom 10%
New Zealand, 91
2014 27* (2.7)/Denmark, 92 136/174 = bottom 10%
Source: Transparency International: www.transparency.org.
*
Transparency International changed its scoring, however, we can interpret these
larger scores by divided by 10. From 2000 to 2011, the maximum score is 10;
thereafter the maximum score is 100.

Russia has been and continues to be one of the most corrupt nations in the
world. Throughout the period covered, Russia is ranked in the bottom with
some of the most corrupt nations in the world. We also have posted the
number one ranked, and safest nations in the world.
178  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

NOTES

1. See Edmund Wilson. 1940. To the Finland Station: A Study in the Writing and
Acting of History. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
2. For a popular account of the Russian Revolution, see John Reed (1990). Ten
Days that Shook the World. New York, NY: Penguin Classics.
3. Note that national identity is highly related to such concepts as class con-
sciousness, a sense of community, etc. Some of the classic scholarship include
Marx and Engels’ work on class consciousness (Marx and Engels, 1919); Ton-
nies (2001) on Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association);
Weber (1978) who refined Tonnie’s work; Durkheim (1997) on mechanical
(based on the homogeneity of people) and orgqanic (based on the interde-
pendence of people due to the division of labor in modern society) solidarity;
and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) on invented tradition. See Verdugo and
Mueller (2008) for a quantitative application of some of Durkheim’s ideas.
4a. Note that Anderson’s “imagined identity” owes its origins from Hobsbawm’s
“invented tradition.”
4b. Alexey Khomyakov in his work “About the Old and the New” in 1839 has
expressed this in follows words: “Russian ancient life forms...were based
on the sanctity of family ties and unspoiled individuality of our tribe
life...”(Khomyakov, 1994).
5. There was a reaction at this time against the ideas of the Enlightenment; the
movement was called “Romanticism.” Martin Heidegger (2002) was arguably
the most famous of the Romantic writers. Romanticism basically argued that
reason had failed in organizing society, and that intuition and tradition were
better concepts and practices. They also argued that identity and community
should be based on blood and race/ethnicity.
  The feeling was that the Enlightenment and its ideas favored an emerging
Bourgeois class and threatened the peasant and aristocratic classes.
  Interestingly, Romanticism was largely based in Great Britain and Germany,
while the Enlightenment was centered in France.
6. See in: Trubeczkoy, N. “Herritage of Genghis Khan” Moscow: Agraph, 2000,
p. 224 (in Russian)
7. Leo Gumilev (2007) used the term “passionary” to describe a cohort of peo-
ple who are able to absorb energy and use it for transforming human and
natural environment.
8. In his masterpiece, Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes (2012) lays out a rationale for
why society needs a good, strong government. It is to guard against evil and
civil war. In one of the most important passages in political philosophy, he
describes what would occur without such a government:
  “In such condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof
is uncertain and, consequently, no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use
of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no
instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no
knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no
society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death;
 Russian National Identity  179

and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (Chapter 13, On the
Natural Condition of Mankind, The Incommodities of such a war.)”
9. In 2013, Russia’s Corruption Index was 28. Such a score ranked it 128 out
of 177 nations in the world. Thus, Russia ranked as one of the most corrupt
nations in the world. See Transparency International for data: www.transpar-
ency.org
10. Although there is reason to believe that its ideas can be traced to Greece dur-
ing the halcyon years of Greek dominance ( ).
11. While the Greeks discussed the topic of mixed government, Montesquieu
(1977) outlined the separation of powers in his book, The Spirit of the Laws.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
12. Pugachev’s Rebellion (or the Cossack Rebellion) of 1773–75 was one in a
series of rebellions that occurred after Catherine II seized power in 1762. The
rebellion began as an organized insurrection of Yaik Cossacks led by Yeme-
lyan Pugachev, a former officer of the Russian Imperial army. The motivation
for the rebellion was peasant unrest and war with the Ottoman Empire. After
an initial success, Pugachev became the leader of an alternative government
and ended serfdom.
  The rebellion consolidated support from many groups including the peas-
ants, the Cossacks, and Old Believers. It claimed to control most of the terri-
tory between the Volga River and the Urals.
  At first, government forces did not effectively respond to the insurrection,
mostly due to logistical difficulties and a failure to appreciate the revolts mag-
nitude. Nevertheless, the revolt was crushed near the end of 1774. Pugachev
was captured soon after and executed in Moscow in January 1775.
  The event has generated much literature, particularly notable is Pushkin’s
historical novel The Captain’s Daughter (1836). It was the largest peasant
revolt in Russia’s history.
13. At the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian Empire extended from the
Arctic Ocean in the north to the Black Sea on the south, from the Baltic Sea
on the west to the Pacific Ocean, and (until 1867) into Alaska in North Amer-
ica on the east. With 125.6 million subjects registered by the 1897 census, it
had the third largest population in the world at the time, after Qing China
and the British Empire. Like all empires, it was highly diverse in terms of eco-
nomics, ethnicity, and religion. There were numerous dissident elements who
launched numerous rebellions and assassination attempts; they were closely
watched by the secret police, with thousands exiled to Siberia.
14. By the end of the 19th century, the size of the empire was about 22,400,000
square kilometers (8,600,000 sq mi) or almost 1/6 of the Earth’s landmass; its
only rival in size at the time was the British Empire. However, at this time, the
majority of the population lived in European Russia. More than 100 different
ethnic groups lived in the Russian Empire, with ethnic Russians comprising
about 45% of the population (See Gilbert, 2007).
15. Russia spent time and money in safeguarding the frontier. Forts were built
and maintained in various strategic territories. However, they were aban-
doned once it was clear that in the event of assault by new, superior weapons,
they could not be maintained.
180  O. KARNAUKHOVA and R. R. VERDUGO

16. See: Svetlana Lourie, 2012, Imperium(Moscow: AIRO Press) (in Russian).
17. The Decembrist revolt or the Decembrist uprising took place in Imperial Rus-
sia on December 26, 1825. Russian army officers led about 3,000 soldiers in
a protest against Nicholas I’s assumption of the throne after his elder broth-
er Constantine removed himself from the line of succession. The uprising
occurred in the Senate Square in Saint Petersburg and was eventually sup-
pressed by the Tsar, Nicholas I.
  There are, we believe, four important results from the aftermath of the De-
cembrist Revolt. First, the revolt was driven by a dissatisfaction with the form
of governance regime in Russia and many leaders of the revolt were members
of the high Russian aristocracy. They were motivated by the many reforms
that were occurring throughout Europe.
  Second, it appears that the revolt was a precursor to revolts that would
shake Russia to its foundations, and would eventually lead to the Bolshevik
Revolution and Communism.
  Third, it forced Tsar Nicholas to look inward to Russia and introduce some
liberalizing policies. Though, he would later end such liberalizing and return
to his autocratic governance. But the seed had been planted.
  Finally, many of the leaders of the revolt were from the Russian high aris-
tocracy, and their exile into Siberia changed that section of Russia forever.
Exiles, founded schools, introduced new foods and farming into the area,
introduced medical care, and new ways of thinking.
  With the death of Nicholas, exiles were allowed to return home, but many
stayed because Siberia had become home. It is a fascinating piece of Russian
history.
18. See in: Osvobozhdenie (1902). Liberation V. 1. p. 9 (in Russian).
19. See in: Kokoshkin F. (2010). Regional autonomy and unity of Russia. Moscow,
p. 7 (in Russian).
20. See Bloor, K. (2010). The Definitive Guide to Political Ideologies. UK: Author
House.
21. See Nagel, J. (2009). Multiculturalism’s Double Bind: Creating Inclusivity,
Cosmopolitanism, and Differences. UK: Ashgate Ltd.
22. For an excellent literary treatment of being Invisible, see Ellison (2010). In
the prologue to his great novel, the protagonist begins with following com-
ment, which is appropriate for immigrants in Russia.
  “I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar
Allan Poe; nor am I one of your Hollywood-movie ectoplasms. I am a man of sub-
stance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids—and I might even be said to possess
a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me.”
23. See in: Vendina, O. (2004). Can ethnic quarter appear in Moscow?, Bulletin
of the public opinion. V. 3. pp. 52–64.
24. See: Report of the State Statistic Committee, available at www.gks.ru/
PEREPIS/report.htm (in Russian).
25. As pointed in the report of director of the Federal Migration Service of Rus-
sian Federation K. Romodanovsky at the meeting of the Federal Migration
Collegiums in January 31, 2008, available at www.fmsrf.ru (in Russian).
 Russian National Identity  181

26. This data is available at http://www.perepis-2010.ru/results_of_the_census/

results-inform.php.
27. These polls have been produced by the Department of ethnosociology of the
Institute of ethnology and anthropology of Russian Academy of Science.
28. See in: Drobizheva, L. (2009). Rossiiskaya identichnost’ v massovom soznanii,
Vestnik rossiaiskoi natsii. No. 1 (3).
29. Dataset of Russian Centre of Statistics and Monitoring, the date of public
opinion polls March, 2000, N=1595, available at: http://wciom.ru/database/.
30. Dataset of Russian Centre of Statistics and Monitoring, the date of public opin-
ion polls August, 2000, N=1574, available at: http://wciom.ru/database/.
31. Dataset of Russian Centre of Statistics and Monitoring, the date of public
opinion polls May, 2000, N=1600, available at: http://wciom.ru/database/.
32. Dataset of the Monitoring of economic positioning and health of population
(RLMS), 2006.
33. Dataset of the Project “Future of Russia: social sphere.” The project has been
implemented by CASEs ad sponsored by InoCentre. The Resource Centre
was the Institute of Sociology of Russian Academy of Science. The authors of
the project – L. Drobizheva, M. Chernysh, A. Chirikova.
34. Appendix A presents additional data on topics associated with national identity.
35. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a peace treaty signed on March 3, 1918 be-
tween the new Bolshevik government of Russia and the Central Powers
(Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey), that ended Russia’s par-
ticipation in World War I. The treaty was signed at Brest-Litovsk (now Brest,
Belarus), after two months of negotiations. The treaty was forced on the Bol-
shevik government by the threat of further advances by German and Austrian
forces. According to the treaty, Soviet Russia defaulted on all of Imperial Rus-
sia’s commitments to the Triple Entente alliance.
  In the treaty, Bolshevik Russia relinquished the Baltic States to Germany,
as well as its province of Kars Oblast in the south Caucasus to the Ottoman
Empire. It also recognized the independence of Ukraine. In addition, Rus-
sia agreed to pay six billion German gold marks in reparations. Under the
treaty, states in the Baltics were meant to become German vassal states under
German princelings. When Germans later complained that the Treaty of Ver-
sailles of 1919 was too harsh on them, the Allies responded that it was more
benign than Brest-Litovsk.
36. See appendix B for indices of corruption and human development in Russia.

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 CHAPTER 6

THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE

National Identities in Bosnia
and Herzegovina

Djordje Vukovic, Aleksandar Savanovic,

and Aleksandar Vranjes

INTRODUCTION

National identity does not exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH). The three
largest ethnic groups, defined under the Constitution of BH as “constituent
peoples,” are Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs. According to the 1991 census1
there were 4.37 million people living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of whom
43.5% were Muslims (in 1993 they declared themselves Bosniaks), 31.2%
were Orthodox Serbs, 17.4% Catholic Croats, 5.6% of citizens declared
themselves as Yugoslavs (mostly those in mixed marriages), and 2.3% as
“others” (Jews, Czechs, Ukrainians, etc.). Such diversity does not automati-
cally lead to national identity.
In this chapter we describe how certain factors have contributed to a
lack of a common identity in BH. Our main hypotheses are that external
and internal factors have created barriers toward a common group iden-
tity in BH. External factors are the policies by Western powers that created

National Identity, pages 187–211

Copyright © 2016 by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 187
188  D. VUKOVIC, A. SAVANOVIC, and A. VRANJES

severe economic, social, and political challenges dividing the states within
BH. Internal factors are those unique to BH. In examining our hypotheses
we begin with a historical overview of the BH area; we then discuss some
theoretical issues about national identity which helps us in understanding
the issues facing national identity in conducting an analysis of the conse-
quences of the civil war and discussing the current situation in BH, includ-
ing a discussion of recent survey data.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Historical Overview

Early History
The Great Migration, during the first centuries AD, brought Southern
Slavs to the Balkans territory, south of the Sava and Danube rivers, onto the
Pannonia Plain and the Eastern Alps. The first ten centuries in the history
of the area were characterized by significant antagonisms among the Slavic
tribes. The first Serbian state was established in the 9th century (Ćorović,
2001, p. 88) and, having being constituted as a kingdom and later as an
empire, it left a significant and long-term imprint in these regions.
Empires and religions clashed and laid the foundation for differences
between inhabitants of the area. Under the influence of the Byzantine Em-
pire, Serbs became Orthodox Christians, while Croats converted to Catholi-
cism as a result of significant proselytizing by delegates of the Holy See.
When the Ottoman Empire took control of the Balkans by the end of the
15th century (Ćorović, 2001, p. 365) it introduced Islam, a third major re-
ligion. Interestingly, Islam seemed to have been accepted by many Chris-
tians. Considerable diversity characterized the three largest nations of the
current Bosnia and Herzegovina region.
Antagonisms between the three nations began in the Middle-Ages. In
the period between the 16th and 18th centuries, the territory of the for-
mer Yugoslavia was ruled by three major powers: the Ottoman Empire,
the Habsburg Empire, and the Venetian Republic (Đurđev, Grafenauer, &
Tadić, 1959). Animosities between the Ottoman and Hapsburg regimes in-
fluenced the lives of the populations in the area. For example, the Ottoman
rule established both bureaucratic and feudal systems. To be sure, there
was well-developed trade, but there was no willingness on the part of the
Ottomans of developing the territory. Many view this time as the “dark pe-
riod” because Yugoslavia failed to experience the same social development
as did the rest of Western Europe (Đurđev et al., 1959). This period also
saw the end of the Ethnogenesis among Serbs and Croats; their ethnic affin-
ity and common Southern Slavic roots were never to be prominent again.
 The Impossible State  189

Moreover, further divisions occurred under the Ottoman Empire when

some members of these nations converted to Islam. The Middle Ages saw
the origins of antagonisms that would plague the area to the present day.
After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire took control of the Balkans. Until the First World War, the Habsburg
Empire exerted important social and political influences in the area. Ac-
cording to Mirjana Kasapovic (2005), there was not a comprehensive secu-
lar constitution and formation of the three major religious and ethnic com-
munities until the Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1878, at the same time
when the political and social modernization of Bosnia and Herzegovina
commenced (Kasapovic, 2005, p. 88). Moreover, Kasapovic argues that in
late 19th and early 20th centuries, profound religious and historical dis-
crepancies emerged, manifesting themselves in national communities. The
three major religious and ethnic communities began forming separate so-
cial and political institutions and organizations at all levels of social life—
separate schools, cultural institutions, publishing centers, business entities,
trade unions and, of course, political parties (Kasapovic, 2005).
For Bosnia and Herzegovina, the beginning of the 20th century marked
the national emancipation of Serbs and Croats (Kasapovic, 2005, p. 91).
Kasapovic points out that the same process was slower for Muslims because
Muslim deputies in the Parliament of the First Yugoslavia declared them-
selves as the Croats, rarely as Serbs (Kasapovic, 2005, p. 93). National eman-
cipation of Muslims remained limited to their political and social elite.
National emancipation during the Austro-Hungarian rule did not lead to
open animosities; that would ensue later.
During and after WWI animosities surfaced. Also, between the two world
wars this territory was part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
Later, it became part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and was dominated by
Serbs and the Serbian crown.

Modern History
During the Second World War, civil war broke out between the Com-
munists/Partisans and loyalists to the Serbian crown. Led by Josif Broz Tito,
the Communists had victories over the Nazis, and the former monarchy.
These victories laid the foundations for Communist rule, and later for So-
cialist Yugoslavia. The ideological model behind the new regime was that
of the USSR.
In the period between the end of the Second World War and the 1990s,
BH was a socialist republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (SFRY). During this period, regional identities were set aside, and in
their place Yugoslav identity was promoted. Leaders stated that a Yugoslav
identity was accepted by all the citizens of SFRY. Yet, when the Yugoslavian
190  D. VUKOVIC, A. SAVANOVIC, and A. VRANJES

state was dissolved, nationalistic fervor drove violence and the civil war. New
states emerged, including Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 established the three constituent
groups: Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. Muslims were renamed, and the Bos-
niak nation was created in the mid-1990s. The Bosniak nation then sought
to distinguish itself from the other two groups and created much discord.
In reality, there were only minor differences between the three groups be-
cause they spoke the same language and shared a common culture. Nev-
ertheless, these differences were blown out of proportion and viewed as
dogma that blocked the development of a Bosnia and Herzegovina state; it
has been called “an impossible state.”2

Civil War
The dramatic political and cultural events during the late 20th and early
21st centuries in Eurasia did not bypass the Balkans. The fall of the Berlin
War and the end of the Cold War had consequences for Yugoslavia: the
political defeat of the Yugoslav Unitarian power, the dissolution of the state
union which led again to the civil war, mass killings, material destruction,
including some other war repercussions such as ethnocentrism, populism,
corruption, crime, the disappearance of the middle class, and more. All this
encompassed nearly all newly established states of the former Yugoslavia.
When reflecting upon the civil war in the states of the former Yugoslavia,
one can identify the main factors causing the war: the collapse of social-
ism and the “Brotherhood and Unity” slogan of the Communist Party; po-
tential conflicts stemming from historical events; an increasing emphasis
on differences between the Roman Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims; the
emergence of the religious fundamentalism; rearmament; support from ex-
ternal forces; the absence of democratic procedures; and a struggle for new
ethnic borders, among other things. (Hantington, 2000). Consequently,
new independent states emerged: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia.
In 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina gained recognition as an independent
state, which ended the four-year civil war in 1995. Since then, BH has ex-
isted as a state with two entities, the Republic of Srpska, and the Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These entities are home to three ethnic
groups—Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats. The BH is a place of never-ending
conflict, a divided social system with an unstable state (Halpert & Kajdikel,
2002; Kasapović, 2005; Kecmanović, 2007). There are no efforts at unravel-
ing and reconciling the ideological differences and moving towards a “bet-
ter future” (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2011). At the same time, it is widely
believed that there is an overemphasis on pointing out small differences
between competing groups (Stojković, 2002). Such a view is supported by
the theses of “split,” “fabricated,” even “murderous.”3 Maalouf (2003) also
 The Impossible State  191

argues that cultural and historical group predispositions, which originally

shared a group identity, unraveled and led to conflict after separation. In
addition, tensions and the level of intolerance in the country are rationales
for ideological confrontations and further complicates reconciliation.
The question of identity becomes problematic during times of social and
political upheaval. Golubović (2006) warns that finding an identity is cur-
rently more challenging due to rapid social change. Identity crisis manifests
itself in the “form of various psychopathological disorders which narrow
the field of authentic individual identities, imposing pseudo-identities, by
escaping on the one hand into extreme individualism, and on the other
hand into extreme collectivism (racial, national/ethnic, confessional). At
the same time, both forms lead to isolation and exclusion of the ‘other’
and establish both individual and collective identities” (Golubović, 2006,
pp. 177–178).
After the dissolution of the SFRY, elites began constructing new national
identities. Their efforts occurred during a period of much chaos: brutal
warfare, political and media propaganda, and cultural terror. Burdened
by an ideology of creating states founded on ethno-nationalism, the newly
created entities were unsuccessful. Nationalism, as an expression of ethno-
cultural and pre-political unification, and drawing its strength from a ro-
manticized past, represents a foundation shaping the collective identity of
a political community. Contemporary BH does not rest on such a founda-
tion; it was not created by consensus among its three ethnic communities,
but through a unilateral declaration of independence (with Serbian Croa-
tian opposition), and under the strong influence of Western leaders.
Since independence, Bosnia and Herzegovina has experienced inter-
ethnic conflict. Bosniaks sought control of the entire territory, centraliz-
ing the power of the state and laying the foundation for Muslim-Bosniak
dominance. Both Serbs and Croats opposed such a strategy, and looked for
ways of expressing their concerns: the declaration of autonomous regions,
regionalization, consociation,4 secession, and peaceful dissolution. Their
proposals were rejected and civil war ensued.
The war lasted four years and caused major demographic changes. The
United Nations and the Hague Tribunal disclosed the final data on the
number of victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tabeau & Zwierzchowski,
2010). There were 68.1 thousand Bosniak victims, 22.8 thousand Serbian
victims, 8.8 thousand Croats, and 5 thousand “Others.” In addition, dur-
ing the war and postwar years there were massive numbers of refugees
and much internal migration. According to results from the 2013 Census,5
there are 3,791,621 BH citizens, and approximately 500,000 refugees cur-
rently living in approximately 40 countries throughout the world. The two
entities of the BH are inhabited by an ethnically homogeneous popula-
tion: 2,371,603 people live in the Federation of BH (75% Bosniaks, 20%
192  D. VUKOVIC, A. SAVANOVIC, and A. VRANJES

Croats, 4% Serbs, and 1% others) and 1,326,991 in the Republic of Srpska

(80% Serbs and 20% Bosniaks, Croats, and national minorities).6 One part
of the BH Federation (which consists of 10 cantons) is inhabited mostly by
Bosniaks (the exact percentage will be known following the final results of
the 2013 Census), while Croatians make up the majority in another part.
The territory of the Republic of Srpska has a majority Serbian population
(83.2%), with a significant number of displaced families from the territory
of the contemporary Federation of BH. Moreover, there are tens of thou-
sands of Serbs7 who were expelled from Croatia in the early 1990s.

National Identity: Theoretical Discussion and Research

Hypotheses

National identity is a slippery concept—hard to define, develop, and

maintain. In this section we attempt to define and create some boundaries
about national identity.

National Identity: Traditional and Modern Versions

National identity can be interpreted in at least two ways: traditional (in-
dividuals identify fully with the ethnic community), and modern (national
identity is primarily equated with citizenship).
Traditional versions. Ethnic identity is founded on the concept of “blood
and soil,” on a common language, religion, set of customs, and tradition.
Such a view was inspired by the original German idea of nation. The
concept of citizenship, in contrast, is associated with the Republican idea
of nationality and is associated with the French revolution; it is universal,
rational, and unifying. In short, between the two approaches of national
identity—one emphasizes cultural criteria and the other a social contract.
In the Bosnia and Herzegovina area, the ethnic model is clearly dominant,
and the question is whether such a model is relevant in the modern era,
especially in an area that is attempting unification with much ethnic
diversity.
National identity as a form of perceived group membership. Verba
(1965) emphasized that national identity is not only central to the political
integration of a people, but for the future stability of society. Thus, resolv-
ing this crisis of identity is crucial. Verba also adds that the problem of
national identity can never be solved completely because it is an open and
developing process. National and political identities are hardly ever expe-
rienced in the same way by all members of a community, both in terms of
meaning and of recognition. National identity is perceived strongly and
intensely by some, but others do not consider it important, some are indif-
ferent, and others deny it.
 The Impossible State  193

Modern versions. Most modern Constitutions guarantee certain rights to

its citizens, including the freedom to choose their political affiliation and
cultural identity. Mirjana Vasović (2007) points out that identification is
the basis of political identity, while the issue of national identity relies on
generally accepted political values, political tradition, and political culture.
Unlike ethnic identity, national identity in its broader sense implies the
organization of the “nation” within the political community.
National identity, via civic identity, is rational. Civic national identity im-
plies a political entity; a commitment to participating in shaping political
processes and in protecting and promoting the public interest. According
to Müller, Habermas proposes that the “principle of citizenship,” which
integrates the political community and legitimizes the political authority, is
not reached solely through institutional formulas, but also through “consti-
tutional patriotism” (Verfassungspatriotismus).8 Such patriotism is founded
on civic loyalty to the constitutional order and not to Essentialist traits such
as culture, history, or ethnic allegiances. Habermas points out that multicul-
tural societies, such as the USA or Switzerland, show that “political culture
in which constitutional principles can be rooted does not have to depend
on all its citizens speaking the same language or being of the same ethnic or
cultural origin. Liberal political culture is only a general denominator for
constitutional patriotism which reinforces the sense of differences as well
as the sense of integration of different forms of life coexisting in a multicul-
tural society” (Habermas, 1998, p. 550). Thus, the necessary conditions for
the existence of civic identity are agreements among citizens with societal
norms, state laws, rights of individuals, and the free will of citizens to exer-
cise their basic human and political rights—a Social Contract.

The Role of Two Key Institutions: Mass Media and Education

Each collective identification requires the proper functioning of at least
two societal institutions: the mass media, and the educational system. These
institutions transmit a common “ideology” containing myths, rites, and
rituals that contribute to the idealization, preservation, and expansion of
national identity and to homogenizing the population. At the same time,
these institutions encourage individuals to become politically involved in
processes for the protection and promotion of the “public interest.” Mass
media and education are strong influences in the BH.
Hate propaganda is a constant in the BH. Members of the political, me-
dia, and scientific institutions within BH put forward daily insults and ac-
cusations against others (“aggressors,” “fascists,” “primitives,” “genocidal
nation,” and similar), against individuals from their own or opposing social
groups (“traitor,” “foreign mercenary,” “political adventurer,” etc.), but
also against the State (“artificial construct,” “occupied territory,” “result of
ethnic cleansing,” etc.). State and national leaders also take part in this hate
194  D. VUKOVIC, A. SAVANOVIC, and A. VRANJES

propaganda, encouraging ethnic prejudices and political labeling. Such

propaganda confirms a main feature of non-democratic societies—a lack
of tolerance for dissent, the suppression of freedom of expression, stifling
personal political autonomy, engaging in authoritarianism, servility, pro-
moting fundamentalist religious beliefs, and political conflicts. BH is not a
balanced state in which different cultures, religions, and political orienta-
tions are viewed as assets.
After WWII, it was widely believed that multinational and multi-ethnic
societies would overcome national concepts and result in the disappear-
ance of localized identities. It has not happened. No less an entity than the
European Union has failed in its efforts at stopping the processes which
emphasize national interests. For example, the Chancellor of Germany, An-
gela Merkel, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cam-
eron, announced the death of “multiculturalism,” not because they hoped
for such epilogue, but simply as a way of admitting that cultural pluralism
failed in their countries. The question arises as to how the BH can make
cultural pluralism work when it has far less resources than either Germany
or the UK? If a state fails to create clear and meaningful collective identi-
ties, says Andrew Heywood (2005), the results are particularisms based on
ethnicity and religion. This is exactly what has happened in the former
Yugoslavia and BH.

National Identity Typology

Milošević-Đorđević (2003) has a few key indicators for determining na-
tional identity: significant social mobility, a specific social character, lan-
guage, set of customs, religion, collective memory, belief in common origin,
and so on. The author points out the difference between the phenomena
of nationalism and national identity—nationalism represents pronounced
national identity. “Nationalism emerges when, through the process of iden-
tification, a nation as a group becomes too important to an individual,
more important than any other form of identification” (Milošević-Đorđević,
2003). In the modern age, nationalism is the basis for a population’s hege-
mony connected by language and cultural values. But in the Balkans, na-
tionalism is based on blood and soil.
Milošević-Đorđević (2003) develops three categories of national identity:
(a) Nature of national identity—coercion or choice, (b) Key determinants
in defining national identity, and (c) Connecting political and economic
power to national identity. A Primordialistic approach represents the view
that national identity is given at birth and lasts throughout one’s life. Na-
tional feelings are not based on facts, objective relations, and needs, but are
shaped by irrational forces, emotions, and instincts which cannot be chosen
by individuals.
 The Impossible State  195

Criticisms of the Primordialistic view are widespread. Some of the criti-

cisms are:

• National identities are not given and fixed but arise and change
with life experiences of an individual and under the influences of
social environment.
• Individuals can actually deny national identities, perceive them dif-
ferently, and emphasize dual or multiple national identities.

Besides the Primordsialitic viewpoint, there are other approaches to nation-

al identity, such as instrumentalist, constructivist, situational, and function-
alist. In the instrumentalist view, national identity is variable; it depends on
circumstances since changes affect the intensity of identifications. The view-
point does not exclude the affective component or interlocking of interests
and irrational bonds, and it could serve as one of the possible explanations
for the appearance and disappearance of the Yugoslav identity. The function-
alist view of national identity is reflected in the territorial, economic, and
political unification on which states rely. A constructivist approach is a combi-
nation of the previous two views. In the constructionist view, national identity
is a matter of choice by individuals, and is developed and shaped throughout
one’s life. Also, its intensity is different for each individual, it ranges from very
weak to very strong, is constructed in interaction with others, and is reflected
in the fact that others see us as members of a specific national community.
The situational approach to social circumstances affect the development,
strength, and form of national identity. Intense national feelings are affected
by many factors: war, the perceived threat by other ethnic groups, and the
awareness that religious affiliation, name, and surname are key factors in
identifying “friends and enemies.” According to the functionalist approach,
when national identity overcomes all other identities, and when one’s own
identity is subordinated to the nation, there is a risk of extreme nationalism.
According to this view, the functions of national identity are the satisfaction
of fundamental human needs for collective belonging, a reference to com-
mon interests, and a demarcation with other groups.
Majstorović and Turjačanin (2011) point out that one can discuss many
types of national attachment. For example, exclusive national attachment
(national, chauvinism, ethno-nationalism), prominent national attachment
(patriotism and national identification, along with acceptance of other na-
tions), divided national attachment (sense of belonging to one’s nation,
along with striving for transnational cooperation), general human attach-
ment (cosmopolitism), and a-nationalism (lack of attachment to any nation,
along with belief that nationalism is harmful and unnecessary). According
to the results of an expert survey9 on the territory of BH, belonging to the
state is emphasized the most by Bosniaks; it is poorly represented among
196  D. VUKOVIC, A. SAVANOVIC, and A. VRANJES

Serbs and Croats, while belonging to the entity is most prominent for Serbs.
Religious affiliation is the most important to Croats, ethnicity to Serbs. All
three groups equally refrain from identifying with the broader European
framework, and with the possibility of having a multiple national identity—
that is, a national identity that includes Bosniaks, Serbian, or Croatian.
Similar results were obtained from surveys10 conducted in 2011 and in 2012
about the national orientations among young people in the Republic of Srp-
ska. These surveys show that young Serbs identify heavily with the Republic of
Srpska, with the Serbian Orthodox Church, and with the Serbian language and
tradition. In contrast, there is almost no sense of belonging to Bosnia and Her-
zegovina as a state. Moreover, 72% of respondents wanted the Republic of Srp-
ska to declare its independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though
the surveys show that the young population has no pronounced elements of
ethnocentrism towards members of other ethnic groups, they also expressed
no desire to live in the same state with other ethnic groups.
Thus, national identity represents a specific feeling and pronounced
awareness of belonging to a political community based on common ances-
try, language, culture, historical experience, same political values, and sym-
bols. National identity also represents loyalty to the territorially organized
government, a willingness to achieve social harmony, adherence to the laws
and procedures that ensure the protection of personal and collective prop-
erty, as well as affirming individuals and social groups. In addition, we theo-
rize that the formation of national identity has numerous conditions based
on social protection: the rights of its population, general protection, and
cultural differences.

CREATING DIFFERENCES IN BH:

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FACTORS

Traditionally, scholars have attributed antagonisms in the BH area to old

conflicts and to the recent policies and behaviors of its inhabitants.11 What is
not as well-known, however, is the influence of policies from Western nations
that exacerbated challenges and lead to conflict. In this section we discuss how
both internal and external factors have driven differences and conflict in BH.

Internal Factors: Power, Policy, and the Tyranny of the

Majority

Grabbing for Power

At the core of political struggles were different interpretations of the Day-
ton Agreement and the Constitution. Bosniak leaders worked against the
 The Impossible State  197

Dayton organization of the state, while the Serbian community developed

a protective attitude towards the existing Constitution. The divisiveness was
based on loyalty to the state, but as a result that the Constitution guarantees
the preservation of the Republic of Srpska. The Republic ensures the politi-
cal, national, ethnic, and cultural survival of the Serbian population west of
the Drina River. Thus, patriotism was based on ethnicity, not on the state.
Croats, as the third constituent population in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
manifest a contradictory attitude towards the constitutional order—a loyalty
to certain legal provisions, and an insistence on changing other provisions.
Ethnic differences persist about geographical boundaries. Bosniak rep-
resentatives sought to create a nation of “Bosnians” (such as the Americans,
Swiss, etc.). Serbs and Croats did not accept the state imposed borders as
boundaries of their national and political identities.
The media has had a hand in creating discord. The media in the Re-
public of Srpska have been promoting “entity patriotism,” Serbian state-
hood, and nurturing Serbian culture, art, and history. The media’s attitude
towards Bosnia and Herzegovina often led to conflict between members
of ethnic or political groups as old issues are rekindled. The result is that
everything is questioned, including the Dayton Agreement.

Interpreting Policy
Interpretations of the Dayton Agreement also led to discord. The spiritus
movens of the “Dayton” Constitution of BH is its attempt at finding a balance
between national identity and other forms of identity. The key articles in
the Dayton document are Article II and Article IV, as well as the Preamble, line
10. The basic thesis behind our presentation can be summed up as follows:

• The nationhood issues were, if not the primary, then surely the key
issues in dissolving the former SFRY.
–– BH, as the only republic within the former state which had a tri-na-
tional structure, was particularly exposed to the risk of dissolution.
–– The independence of BH through the “civil” referendum com-
pletely ignored the importance and power of national identifica-
tion. The referendum, then, was a direct cause of a crisis which
eventually led to civil war.
• The Dayton Peace Agreement is a peace treaty that emphasized the
resolution of inter-ethnic antagonisms in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
• Post-war transformation of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement moved towards a “civic” con-
cept, minimizing the importance of nationality in the Constitution.
–– In effect, the Agreement created a situation similar to that which
led to civil war.
198  D. VUKOVIC, A. SAVANOVIC, and A. VRANJES
.

The crisis in BH is driven by national versus civic identity.12 Unfortunate-

ly, leadership never quite understood this distinction during the dissolution
of the SFRY. The referendum on the independence of BH was carried out
as a “civil” issue, and a national view was ignored and thus failed to recog-
nize the potential power that national identification may have had in the re-
gion. The BH, as an independent country, emerged from a “tyranny of the
majority” framework as the Serbian population was outvoted by Bosniaks/
Muslims and Croats. Our hypothesis is that since BH emerged from a “tyranny of
the majority” framework, it created much discord among the minority Serbian popu-
lation. Data from the referendum voter turnout confirm our hypothesis.
About 64%13 (64.31%) of the population turned out for the vote. The
overwhelming majority of those (approximately 99.40%) voted for inde-
pendence. However, the problem was that the majority of voters were Mus-
lims and Croats, and Serbs boycotted the vote. On November 9–10, 1991,
the majority of Serbs voted to remain in Yugoslavia. In addition, the ethnic
structure is almost entirely consistent with the results of the referendum
(Savanović, 2013). According to the 1991 census, the ethnic structure of
the state was as follows: Bosniaks14 43.47%, Serbs 31.21%, Croats 17.38%, Yu-
goslavs 5.54%, and others 2.38%. It is obvious that these numbers support
the thesis that “non-Serbs” are the majority and would have dominated the
vote at the Referendum on Independence. Moreover, during the first demo-
cratic elections, the national/nationalistic parties SDA, SDS, and HDZ com-
pletely dominated the “reform forces,” led by the then prime minister Ante
Marković. The number of votes won by these national parties was consistent
with the ethnic structure of the population, and also with the Referendum
results: SDA won 35.85% of votes, SDS won 30%, and HDZ won 18.35%.

Tyranny of the Majority

The “tyranny of the majority,” regarding the referendum on indepen-
dence, was a key cause of the war. The “minority” simply did not have an
opportunity to protect its rights. It is common in such cases for the minor-
ity to undertake non-institutional and non-constitutional practices, termed
“abnormal political behavior” by Dahl (Dahl, 1956, p. 138). In this case,
the Serbian minority started practicing civil disobedience, and soon after
that, military resistance. In essence, the Civil war was the result of “tyranny
of majority.”
Clearly, political decision makers did not fully comprehend that a “civ-
il” or “majority” model of democracy does not function well in a highly
divided, stratified society. The experience of BH confirms the thesis that
pluralistic communities can be constituted in a Consociational governance
model, at least in the first phase of their existence.15 In order to understand
the situation in BH, it is important to note that consociation is not neces-
sarily conditioned by the existence of ethnically homogenous territories,
 The Impossible State  199

since it can also exist as trans-territorial consociation.16 This is particularly

evident in BH which is an “asymmetric” creation. It is based on the model
of “two entities and three constituent peoples,” meaning that in the bi-
national entity a FBH consociation would necessarily imply abstracting the
territorial criteria.17

External Factors: Disagreement Over the Dayton Peace

Agreement

The Agreement
Almost all of the key provisions of consociation are built into the Con-
stitution of BH.18 The most important involve institutional forms, which in-
clude issues of ethnic representation:

• The tripartite Presidency

• The bicameral Parliament
• The institution of vital national interests
• The election of delegates for the House of Peoples(Constitution of
BH, IV/1)
• The elections for the House of Representatives(Constitution of BH, IV/2)
• The election of members of the Presidency (Constitution of BH, V/1)
• The composition of the Council of Ministers(Constitution of BH, V/4b)
• Central Bank(Constitution of BH, VII/2)

Article IX/3 of the Constitution states that employees in state institutions

must be equally ethnically represented, “Officials appointed to positions in
the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be generally representative of the
peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Such importance was given to national
identity in the Preamble of the Constitution, line 10, which reads, “Bosniaks,
Croats and Serbs, as the constituent peoples (along with others), and citi-
zens of Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby establish the Constitution of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.”
The constituent peoples are defined as the source of the Constitution of
BH. It was this line19 that served as a basis for the well-known appeal 5/9820
to the Constitutional Court of BH, which was used by former BH president
Alija Izetbegović in challenging the constitutionality of Article 121 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Srpska and of Article I.1. The Constitution of the
Federation of BH defined constituent people as ethnic groups. Appeal 5/98
interpreted the “constituent” quality of the people as trans-territorial—that
is, it covers the entire state, without limit to one entity. A strong basis for this
appeal is that Bosnia and Herzegovina have never been ethno-territorially
divided throughout its history. A counter-argument was that the provision
200  D. VUKOVIC, A. SAVANOVIC, and A. VRANJES

of “being constituent” from line 10 does not mean that its requirement is
not being met if one people is “constituent” only in one particular part of
the territory. In case No. 4/05,22 the Constitutional Court of BH accepted the
appeal, and in referring to line 10, it proclaimed these articles of entity
unconstitutional. The conclusion was that the division into entities does
not imply the territorial division of the constituent peoples (5/98-III, item
69). Therefore, Serbs are a constituent people in the FBH with the same
status as Bosniaks and Croats in the RS. (Steiner & Ademović, 2010). This is
explicitly evident in the fact that “the electoral mechanisms do not reflect
the ethnic, but a federal division. For instance, Serbian member of the BH
Presidency is not elected by Serbs only, but by all citizens of the Republic of
Srpska” (5/98-III, item 67) (Steiner & Ademović, 2010, pp. 63–64).23
The facts were clear:

• First, the Constitutional Court of BH’s interpretation of the appeal

5/98-III was based on the principle of “being constituent” and led to
a de facto proposition of general ethnic representation at all levels.
• Second, the argument about “trans-entity constituent peoples” is
often used as an argument against the consociation perspective of
the BH Constitution. However, consociation is not necessarily terri-
torially based and it is possible that trans-territoriality is overlooked.
It depends on specific circumstances within each community—if
ethnic groups are territorially organized, consociation is by rule also
territorially organized; yet, if ethnic groups are “mixed,” consocia-
tion may reflect such a structure. In practice before the civil war,
consociation in BH was to take a trans-territorial form.

Ethnic groups at that time were not organized into homogenous territo-
rial units. The following map (Figure 6.1) illustrates this:
The consociation mechanism of protecting constituent peoples at the
state level had to be trans-territorial.24 However, after the civil war, this situ-
ation changed and the ethnic map of BH took the following character as
shown in Figure 6.2.
This changed situation supports the territorial model of consociation.
The war led to migrations, which, in turn, led to ethnically homogenous
territories. For example, Serbs today, according to estimates, account for
the majority of approximately 90% (or even higher) of the population in
the RS (Nikolić, 2009).
The Constitutional Court of BH(5/98, item 86-98) defined ethnic based ter-
ritorial segregation as a conscious continuation of the peacetime politics of
ethnic cleansing. Item 88 states: “The conclusion drawn from these data is
supported by the comparison of figures referring to the total return of refu-
gees and displaced persons in the Republic of Srpska with those referring to
 The Impossible State  201

Figure 6.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic composition before the war (as of 1991).

the so-called ‘minority’ return. Before 31st January 1999 (UNHCR, statisti-
cal package of 1st March 1999), 97,966 refugees and displaced persons re-
turned to the Republic of Srpska. Analyses reveals that only 731 Croats and
9,212 Bosnians returned, as opposed to 88,003 Serbs. Hence, the so-called
return of ‘minority’ amounts to 10.17% . . . of those who have returned.” The
conclusion is given in item 90: “These figures, therefore, provide sufficient
evidence of a ‘discriminatory effect’ in terms of Article I/3.(a) of Annex VII,
which means that the results of the previous de jure discrimination by means
of ethnic cleansing were supported in the Republic of Srpska.”
Such a conclusion is reinforced by a range of verdicts from the Human
Rights Chamber regarding violations of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.25 Most appeals refer to Article
II of the Constitution of BH, as well as documents and conventions in the
202  D. VUKOVIC, A. SAVANOVIC, and A. VRANJES

Figure 6.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic composition from 2006.

field of human rights. Systematic discrimination against refugees, displaced

persons, and returnees continue to exist. The practice, both in municipal-
ity administrations and in courts, was discriminatory to such an extent that
the Human Rights Chamber(CH/98/756-D&M, paragraph 80; CH/97/77-
D&M, paragraph 58 and further) assumed that such practices were part
of the nation’s social structure (Steiner & Ademović, 2010, p. 450).26 One
typical case involved the returning to work of persons who, during the war,
were not fired for “security” reasons, but as a result of their ethnic affilia-
tion. The Human Rights Chamber determined that these individuals were de-
nied the rights prescribed in Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights(CH/97/67-D&M; CH/99/2696-D&M),
and were not corrected in the post-war period.
In case U 5/98, item 95 In conclusion, Article 1 of the Constitution of the
RS was proclaimed unconstitutional (U 5/98, item 98).The decision stated
 The Impossible State  203

“that the discriminatory pattern, which is proved by this circumstantial evi-

dence, can reasonably be linked to the institutional structures of the au-
thorities in the Republic of Srpska” (U 5/98, art. 91). This is an important
statement because it proclaims that ethnic discrimination stems from social
structure; the patterned routine forms of behavior and social organization.
Moreover, the Constitutional Court explicitly acknowledged that discrimina-
tion was reflected by a lack of other ethnic groups being represented in the
executive and judicial branches of the Republic of Srpska (U 5/98, item
92-94). While this consociation ethnic model was de facto recognized as
legitimate within the Constitution of BH, its political practice was disputed.

Post-Dayton Practice
Post-Dayton political practice was characterized by three factors:

• Attempts to Federalize the consociation ethno-territorial structure

of the state
• To eliminate the ethnic component of representation
• Eliminating the Federal units, though such a goal has no basis in
the Constitution, and the proposed Federal units would continue the
practice of ethnic-based differentiation.

The latter issue was widely discussed. The key factors in these discussions
were the constitutionality of Article 7 of the Constitution of the RS, which
defines the Serbian language as the official language of the Republic of
Srpska, and the Cyrillic alphabet as the official script. Given that the inter-
pretation of the constituent peoples was inclusive and not exclusive, the
provision was proclaimed contrary to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. The equality of the constituent peoples’ languages is taken as trans-
territorial (U 5/98-IV).
Since Annex 7 to the Dayton Peace Agreement stipulates accepting the re-
turn of refugees and displaced persons, segregation by ethnicity is consid-
ered anti-Dayton. On several occasions an argument was made that entity
voting is not really ethnic voting, but such an argument is related to the
failure of implementing Annex 7, which favors consociation.27 The problem
is that in this view of consociation, failing to protect Croatian people in the
FBH will continue (Savanović, 2013).
In better understanding this problem a few facts should be noted. To begin
with, the Constitutional Court of BH in its interpretation of appeal 5/98 used
Preamble 10 to derive certain normative and constitutional principles about
the political and legal order in Bosnia and Herzegovina.28 One such principle
is that a multinational state and multi-ethnic society are not be threatened by
the two-entity division of the state and the territorial division of the FBH. But
there are conditions—these divisions will not continue the ethnic cleansing
204  D. VUKOVIC, A. SAVANOVIC, and A. VRANJES

that began the war, and the ethnic-based homogenization of state institutions
also will be negated (U 5/98, item 53-61)(Steiner & Ademović, 2010). Line
10 in the Annex 7 of the Constitutional Court restored the multi-ethnic society
as a goal of the Dayton Peace Agreement (U 5/98, item 73).
The Dayton Peace Agreement does not imply that identity should be based
on territory and ethnicity, so the existing consensual mechanisms are not
limited solely to identity (U 5/98, item 64-67). It is not clear how this inter-
pretation can be compatible with the mechanisms of the constitution of the
House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly29 (Constitution of BH, IV/1.1),30
which directly establishes the contrasting principle of entity (territorial)
and ethnicity.
Moreover, “the principle of collective equality prohibits privileges to any
of the three constituent peoples”(U 5/98, item 60)(Steiner & Ademović,
2010). Although the Constitutional Court of BH accepts that the Dayton Peace
Agreement as a consociational model of the Constitution, it does not accept
the principle of collective equality which allows one of the constituent peo-
ples the veto right (U 5/98, items 55 and 116) (Steiner & Ademović, 2010).
Such an interpretation disputes the institution of Vital National Interest, and
is of crucial importance to the constitutional order in BH.
Collective equality is a principle that protects the interests of ethnic
groups. The Vital National Interests institution has the ability of raising
questions in the House of Peoples about the protection of ethnic groups (Con-
stitution of BH, 4/3, e). In the Presidency of BH, members are allowed to
block any decision referring to the Vital national interest. If the issue of Vital
national interest is raised by a member of the Presidency of BH from the Re-
public of Srpska, the decision is sent to the National Assembly of the RS that
must confirm it by a two-thirds majority. If this happens, the decision of the
Presidency of BH is null and void (Constitution of BH, 5/2, d). Although the
Constitutional Court of BH generally accepts the Dayton Peace Agreement as a
consociation Constitution (Steiner, 2010), it denies the implementation of
basic mechanisms of consociation embedded in the Constitution of BH.
The Constitutional Court of BH promotes political practices that change the
existing character of the BH Constitution. Such practices have led to serious
political tensions. Representatives of the Republic of Srpska often raise the
issue of the “pro-Bosnian” actions of the Constitutional Court. Their argument
is supported by how members in the Constitutional Court are selected. Accord-
ing to the Constitution of BH, membership selection in the Constitutional Court
has a specific process: two members selected by the National Assembly of the RS,
four members selected by the House of Representatives of the FBH, and three
members selected by the president of the European Court of Human Rights
who must not be BH citizens (Constitution of BH, VI/1(a)).
According to Article IV/1, 1(a) of the Constitution of BH, judges are not rep-
resentatives of the constituent peoples; in practice this means that each of the
 The Impossible State  205

three constituent peoples are given two judges,31 and the remaining three are
the so-called “foreign judges.” This enables one of the constituent peoples to
have the majority when its representatives are coupled with “foreign judges.”
During the negotiations under the auspices of the Contact Group in Dayton,
representatives of the Russian Federation expressed serious reservations re-
garding the existence of foreign judges at the Constitutional Court of BH, an-
ticipating certain problems which would surface at a later date.
The selection process for membership in the Constitutional Court has re-
peatedly served as a justification for challenging the legitimacy of its deci-
sions. Another claim that has generated controversy is the provision in Ar-
ticle IV/1, 1(d) of the Constitution of BH—the selection process as stipulated
in the Dayton Peace Agreement was to last five years. These challenges to the
highest BH court have caused much political instability.
The basic argument against the Constitutional Court of BH is that it fails to
protect collective rights, and that it is often opposed to the concept of hu-
man/individual rights. This point of view is strongly emphasized in debates
about Article II of the Constitution of BH. By formulating the problem in this
way, the Constitutional Court is seen as de facto challenging the consociation
“spirit of Dayton” in favor of a civil model.
The consociation nature of the Constitution of BH has gradually moved
to a majority model of governance. In interpreting appeal 5/98, the Con-
stitutional Court, in addition to concluding that the Constitution of BH does
approve the exclusivity of national entities, also drew a few unfounded con-
clusions. These conclusions clearly view democratic principles as majority-
democratic principles. For example, item 55 states that being a constituent
people must not be interpreted as the veto right of a minority group. Thus,
the Constitutional Court’s position was identical to the views held among Bos-
niak political representatives.32
The “tyranny of the majority” appears to be an important cause of con-
flict in BH. Vital national interest, as a de-facto veto institution, represents
the decisive mechanism that prevents discrimination. The latest attempt at
this type of intervention in the Constitution is the attempted implementa-
tion of the Sejdić-Finci Verdict. The verdict was aimed at the privileged posi-
tion of the “constituent” peoples in relation to “Others,” which is present
in many articles of the Constitution. Thus, for example, the “constituent”
peoples are given veto rights which are denied to “Others.” Also, discrimi-
natory provisions are promoted for the election of members of the Presi-
dency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which excludes the possibility of candidates
from “Others” (Constitution of BH, article V, 1). The verdict mandates the
elimination of all discriminatory provisions.
The solution proposed by the representatives of the Republic of Srpska
is for Article V.1 to be corrected—instead of “The Presidency of BH shall
consist of three Members: one Bosniak and one Croat, each directly elected
206  D. VUKOVIC, A. SAVANOVIC, and A. VRANJES

from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from
territory of the Republic of Srpska” in the part referring to the Republic
of Srpska it states: “and one member directly elected from territory of the
Republic of Srpska.” Taking into account the ethnic composition of the RS,
it is clear that this makes no de facto difference, but that it de jure involves the
elimination of the discriminatory provision in the Constitution. The verdict
is similar to a viewpoint put forward by the Venice Commission (2001, http://
www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-INF(2001)021-e),
claiming that using territory and ethnicity as a basis for representation is
discriminatory.
The problem of confounding territory and ethnicity stems from not im-
plementing Annex 7, and so the RS entity, “Serbian,” is defined in terms of
population. Consequently, the RS can insist on the ethno-territorial model
of consociation protection, simply because the Dayton Peace Agreement has
not been implemented, and if it had been implemented, the right to entity
veto would not be the same as the right to ethnic veto. At first glance, this
means that if Annex 7 were implemented, if Serbs wished to preserve the
mechanisms of protection of collective rights appearing in the Constitution
of BH, they would have to accept the replacement of the ethno-territorial
principle by an ethnic principle. Such a position is not sustainable. Serbs
occupy the vast majority of the territory in the Republic of Srpska. Hence,
due to the overlapping of entity borders with the ethnic map of the pre-war
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ethno-territorial principle and the trans-terri-
torial principle are in fact equal solutions for Serbs. It is crucial to maintain
a consociational model of the Constitution.
Still, such a solution is not applicable in the Federation—Bosniaks would al-
ways get to elect two representatives. Currently, Bosniaks may only select a Croat
as a third member of the Presidency (Savanović, 2013). However, as a result of
previous changes to the Constitution they would be allowed to select two Bosniak
members. Hence, this solution would imply a change to the Electoral Law, which
currently prevents such a possibility. Clearly a constitutional order based on the
model of “three peoples in two entities” is discriminatory against Croats, and
the “civil” model of elections in the Federation is less institutional oppressive.

CONCLUSION

Understanding history and culture is important in policy making. The

transformation of the consociation nature of the Constitution of BH towards
a majority model exhibits a profound lack of understanding of the histori-
cal emergence of BH as a state. A return to a “civil” model sends BH back
to its status that caused the civil war.
 The Impossible State  207

Civil identity cannot be a realistic option in BH. Such a strategy for devel-
oping national identity would ignore consociation mechanisms that protect
individual rights and guarantee equal representation among its competing
ethnic groups. For example, given the demographic distributions in the
three major nations in the Bosnia and Herzegovina region, it is possible that
Bosniaks/Muslims constitute a simple majority. As the “majority” in a “civil”
model of the Constitution, they would be allowed to impose their will on both
Serbs and Croats. It is clear that such a scenario would lead to a crisis.
The problem with the consociational mechanisms embedded in the Con-
stitution of BH is that they complicate and slow the decision-making process,
and create the potential for misuse. Still, consociation mechanisms should
not be abolished; it only means that more efficient models should sought.
Taking into account the strength of national identifications in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, consociation represents a model of constitutional order,
which would confirm the spirit of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

NOTES

1. Institute for statistics of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://

www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/NacPopE.htm, visited: 11/18/2013
2. Kecmanovic (2007), Savanovic (2011).
3. Amin Maalouf points out how one fabricates “butchers” because of the estab-
lished ways of thinking and expression so deeply ingrained in all of us, espe-
cially because of the narrow-minded, strict, simplistic understanding which
reduces the whole identity to a single affiliation, proclaimed with passion
(Maalouf, 2003, p. 8).
4. By consociation we mean a political system formed by the cooperation of dif-
ferent, especially antagonistic, social groups on the basis of shared power.
5. Preliminary results of the 2013 Census of Population, Households, and Dwell-
ings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.bhas.ba/obavjestenja/Prelimi-
narni_rezultati_bos.pdf, visited: 11/08/2013
6. The Simpson Diversity Indices for both entities are displayed below.

Simpsons Indices Federation of BH Republic of Srpska

D = (ni/N)2
.604 .680
1–D .396 .320
1/D 1.655 1.471

  Where ni = number in a category, N = total population in an entity. D rang-

es from 0 to 1; 0 equals infinite diversity, 1 = no diversity. This is not clear,
so the next index is more acceptable: 1 – D. This measure ranges from 0 to
1, where 0 is no diversity, and 1 is full diversity. Finally 1/D ranges from 1 to
k, where k is the number of categories or group in the analysis. 1 means no
diversity, and k is full diversity. In the Federation of BH, there are four groups
208  D. VUKOVIC, A. SAVANOVIC, and A. VRANJES

being evaluated, and in the Republic of Srpska there are two groups. In both
entities, there is little diversity, but especially in the Republic.
  We wish to thank Richard R. Verdugo for providing the calculations.
7. Matt Prodger (2005). Evicted Serbs remember Storm, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/4747379.stm, visited: 05/10/2013
8. Jan-Werner Müller. (2008). A general theory of constitutional patriotism,
http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/1/72.full, visited: 06/11/2013
9. This is a series of studies carried out during 2010 and 2011: focus groups of
students at universities in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and Mostar, as well as surveys
in several cities in the Republic of Srpska and Federation of BH, respondents
were pupils in the final year of secondary school and students. More details in
Majstorović & Turjačanin (2011). U okrilju nacije (Etnički i državni identet kod mla-
dih u BiH) /In the shelter of the nation (Ethnic and state identity among young
people in BH)/, Banja Luka: Centre for Culture and Social Improvement.
10. See: http://pressrs.ba/sr/vesti/vesti_dana/story/7121/BiH+%C4%87e+pr
opasti,+a+NATO+i+EU+nisu+po%C5%BEeljni!.html and http://pressrs.ba/
sr/vesti/vesti_dana/story/31612/Srpska+treba+da+se+otcepi+od+BiH!.html
11. For an interesting discussion and history of the area see Kaplan (1993).
12. From this it is clear that the war in BH was an ethnic “civil” war by its char-
acter. According to another two popular interpretations of the nature and
character of the war in BH between 1992 and 1995, this was a “dissolution”
war or “aggression” performed by Serbia and/or Croatia. The interpretation
of “aggression” relies on the well-known (but disputable) meeting between
Milošević and Tuđman in Karađorđevo, where they reportedly agreed on the
division of BH and creation of the “Great Serbia” and “Great Croatia.” How-
ever, regardless of this being true or not, our main diagnosis is that the key
element of the BH crisis was the relationship between the national and civil,
which is obvious from the constitutional solutions, and based on this the main
characteristic of the war is “civil.”
13. The Referendum on Independence was held between February 29th and March
1st 1992.
14. At the time, the “Bosniak” nation formally did not even exist; therefore, Bos-
niaks were declared as “Muslims” during the census.
15. Only when a community is consolidated and strengthened in terms of its in-
stitutions is it possible to begin a process of gradual, more or less intensive,
movement toward the “civil.”
16. In order to understand the situation in BH, it is important to note that con-
sociation is not necessarily conditioned by the existence of ethnically homo-
geneous territories (in case of BH, three different homogenous ethnic enti-
ties), since it can also exist as trans-territorial (which was possible before war,
because BH had ethnic structure shaped as a “leopard skin”).
17. However, in the Federation of BH the Croatian people do not have such strong
consociational mechanisms of protection, which produces permanent crisis
within the Federation. (Savanović, 2013, p. 542).
18. According to one of the most important works dealing with consociation: (Li-
jphart, 1999) the relationship between the majority and consociational model
 The Impossible State  209

can be “measured” in the ten key points. The Constitution of BH has all ten
of these points on the consociational side. See Savanović (2011).
19. A very lively debate ensued about the formal correctness of the appeal, given
that the members of the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska referred
to the H. Kelsen’s position stating that the preamble does not have a norma-
tive character and therefore cannot be a criterion. The Constitutional Court
of BH eventually rejected this objection, citing the fact that the Dayton Peace
Agreement was an international treaty, which is subject to the Vienna Conven-
tion, and that the Article 31.2 of that Convention clearly defined otherwise.
20. http://www.ccbh.ba/bos/odluke/index.php?src=2
21. “The Republic of Srpska . . . is a state of the Serbian People.”
22. http://www.ccbh.ba/bos/odluke/index.php?src=2
23. The verdict of the European Court of Human Rights in theSejdić-Finci case states
that this criteria must be extended to the right to stand for election: the pro-
vision stating that a member of the Presidency of BH from the RS must be a
Serb, and from the FBH members must be a Croat or a Bosniak, was declared
discriminatory.
24. Obviously, the term “trans-territorialism” here is used within the existing state.
25. The Human Rights Chamber is a judicial body established under Annex 6 to the
Dayton Peace Agreement. The Chamber had the mandate to consider alleged or
apparent violations of human rights as provided in the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Protocols
thereto, and alleged or apparent discrimination arising in the enjoyment of the
rights and freedoms provided in the Convention and 15 other international
agreements listed in the Appendix to Annex 6. (http://www.hrc.ba/bosnian/
home.htm).The mandate of the Chamber finished on December 31st, 2003.
26. Particularly widespread controversy was sparked by the debate about the
changed “ethnicized” names of towns, in which attitudes of the Human Rights
Chamber and Constitutional Court differed. In the appeal which referred to
the renaming of the city Foča to Srbinje, the Chamber dismissed the appeal
in strictly formal reasons, believing that it was not possible to sustain it, based
on the strict text of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights.
(CH/00/4244) Yet, the Constitutional Court had a dissenting opinion, basing
its decision on the claim that such a renaming discouraged the return, while
also being contradictory to the previously reasoned interpretation of “consti-
tutionality” (C 44/01-1, item 54-55).
27. It is often stated that the realization of Annex 7 would change the attitude of
Serbs towards the Dayton Agreement, because it would prevent the Republic
of Srpska from using the consociational-protection measures based on the
ethno-territorial principle to ensure its rights.
28. See: Comment by Joseph Mark, PhD, judge rapporteur in case No.U5/98
(10 item).
29. See also: Constitution of BH, Article.IX/3.
30. The Venice Commission has indicated that provision IV/1.1 in several aspects
represents a legally disputable solution. It denies all those who are not mem-
bers of the constituent peoples the “stand-for-election” right, since they are
210  D. VUKOVIC, A. SAVANOVIC, and A. VRANJES

not allowed to be nominated for the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary As-
sembly of BH (CDL-AD (2005) 004).
31. This is a logical consequence of the fact that the procedure of selection of
judges of the Constitutional Court is not within the competence of the state,
but of the entities (Steiner & Ademović, 2010).
32. For example: (Silajdžić, 2000, p. 112).

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 CHAPTER 7

THE MENTAL WALL

Identity in a United Germany

Dana Martin and Richard R. Verdugo

The concept of identity is both intricate and complex. Not only does na-
tional identity vary by individuals, but many factors affect a person’s sense
of belonging to a community. For example, immigration, out-migration,
demographic shifts, wars, revolutions, and so on; all affect national iden-
tity. In this chapter we examine national identity in Germany by employing
two concepts, which we refer to as Terminus and Axial. A Terminus concept
refers to limits or boundaries in which national identity takes place. In this
chapter, we use three Terminus elements in our analyses: thematic, chrono-
logical, and concentric.
A second concept we use refers to events that are pivotal for the emer-
gence of national identity. As a group, we refer to these as Axial events (see
Jaspers, 1953). Essentially, Axial events are events that change the course of
history at any given level, though scholars have used the term on a global
level (see Jaspers, 1953; Armstrong, 2006). We use two Axial elements in our
analyses: political and social.

National Identity, pages 213–244

Copyright © 2016 by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 213
214  D. MARTIN and R. R. VERDUGO

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Theories of National Identity: Essentialists,

Constructivists, and Civic Theories

Three views dominate national identity research. The earliest national

identity theories were originally part of debates about ethnicity—Essential-
ist and Constructivist. In later years, a third national identity research has
been added, though it has a long history in political thought—Civic identi-
ty. An extensive review of these theories is beyond the scope of our chapter,
so we provide a brief summary. The categories are Essentialist/Primordial-
ist, Constructivist/Postmodernist, and Civic Citizenship.

Essentialist/Primordialist
Essentialist scholars of national identity view national identity as fixed,
based on ancestry, a common language, history, ethnicity,1 and worldviews.
Some noted scholars include Huntington (1996), Smith (1986, 1991), Geertz
(1973), van den Berghe (1981), Armstrong (1982), and Connor (1994).
One Essentialist scholar, Anthony D. Smith (1991), proposes a middle of
the range theory2 about national identity. His view is marked by constructiv-
ism to essentialism—national identity is a hybrid of both “natural” continu-
ity and conscious manipulation. Smith’s position is interesting and, it seems
to us, quite reasonable.
At its core, the Essentialist argument is based on culture and history. Other
markers for the Essentialist framework are language, ancestry, and blood.

Constructivist/Postmodernist
Constructivism posits that dominant groups create, manipulate, and
dismantle identities for their specific gains (Beaune, 1991; Berezin, 1997;
Brubaker, 1992; Corse, 1996; Fine, 1996; Gillis, 1994; Griswold, 1992;
Hobsbawm, 1992; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Kubik, 1994; Lane, 1981;
Schudson, 1992; Schwartz, 1987, 1991; Spillman, 1997; Wagner-Pacifici &
Schwartz, 1991; Zerubavel, 1995). Within this paradigm, there are two very
interesting viewpoints, with the characteristics of paradigm shifts.3
The first viewpoint is embodied in the work of Anderson (1991) who
posits that identity is an imagined construct. It is imagined because indi-
viduals in a given geopolitical entity do not and cannot interact with one
another—there are simply too many people to allow for such activity. So
symbols, rituals, and other ceremonials are used as means for bonding,
and individuals thus imagine they have a community with other members
of society. In Anderson’s model, print Capitalism was crucial for building
this imaginary identity. People in different parts of a nation were able to
read the same documents in the same language that maximized sales and
 The Mental Wall  215

circulation. Readers began to understand one another and thus formed the
basis for an imagined community. Anderson argues that the first European
nation-states were founded around their national print languages.
The second viewpoint is advanced in the work by Hobsbawm and Ranger
(1983)—national identity is invented for political reasons. Invented tradi-
tions are created in order to ensure continuity with the past. Indeed, a sure
sign that there has been a break with the past or where existing modern
norms and values are not effective in maintaining stability and order, is the
utilization of traditions toward this end. Such instability may be brought on
by rapid social change or other axial events, such as wars or economic crises.
Not all is well within the Constructivist camp. While Postmodernists
support the Constructivist model, they have serious problems with its ap-
proach. To begin with, they argue that Constructivism seems to be a simple
cataloguing of identity construction processes, devoid of content. Second-
ly, they argue that the paradigm underestimates the central role of power
(Connell, 1987; Gilman, 1985), and that such an error leads them to incor-
rectly suggest that influence and agency are “multidirectional” (Calhoun,
1995, p. 199). Power for Postmodernists is the crucial concept.
At its core, Constructivism/Postmodernism is based on politics and the
use of power by dominant groups in order to gain and maintain their privi-
leged status in society.

Civic Identity
Civic identity is a form of identity where membership in a geopolitical
entity is unfettered by ethnicity or culture. Instead, it is based on a set of
shared values about rights and the legitimacy of State institutions to gov-
ern. The State’s political legitimacy is derived from citizens’ participation in
many social institutions, such as politics, voluntary associations, unions, and
so on. The notion of civic citizenship is closely aligned with Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s (1762) The Social Contract.4 Others who espouse a civic approach
to national identity include Habermas (1994), Miller (1995), Tamir (1993),
Greenfeld (1992), and Marshall (1964).

Theoretical Framework

In attempting to better understand the process of national identity for-

mation, we have merged two broad concepts, which we call Terminus and
Axial events.

Main Concepts: Terminus and Axial Events

Terminus events. By Terminus events we mean boundaries, either social
or structural, that shape the process of national identity. Each of the three
216  D. MARTIN and R. R. VERDUGO

Terminus elements embody this definition: thematic, chronological, and

concentric.
Thematic events are the structures and institutions that affect national
identity. In our case, we look at several domains that form German iden-
tity—economics, culture, history, politics, and social issues. A chronological
approach, as used in this chapter, refers to two decisive periods in the sec-
ond half of the 20th century: the post-war period (1945–1990) and post-
reunification period from 1990. Finally, the concentric approach explores
three levels at which identity can be analyzed: the nation, groups, and the
individual.
Axial events. A second concept we employ we refer to as Axial events.
By Axial events, we mean events that change the course of history or a
social system, at any given level of analysis ( Jaspers, 1953). These events
include such things as the emergence of a new way of thinking, a new
way of managing a social system, new norms and values, and more. We
have two elements attached to Axial events: political and social. Our
study focuses on the issue of Remembrance in German democratic and
dictatorial regimes, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany (West
Germany), and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The
political identity in a unified Germany involves managing identity for the
present and preparing it for the future. The most significant fractures
of German national identity have been the transitions from national-
socialist and communist dictatorships to a parliamentary democracy. The
evolution of social identity is marked by discontinuity. In both Germanys,
the transformation of lifestyles and attitudes was all the more profound
and irreversible as it was both top-down and bottom-up.

A Theoretical Model
Figure 7.1 depicts our views about the relationships between Axial events,
National Identity, and Terminus events.
The diagram makes the argument that the effects of Axial events on
National Identity are mediated by Terminus events. For example, an Axial
event, such as the Enlightenment change world history in the West, but its

Axial Events National Identity

Terminus Events

Figure 7.1
 The Mental Wall  217

effects, and the time for such effects to take hold, depended on a nation’s
culture and history. In Germany, the effects of the national Axial events of
separation and then reunification depended on the cultures and gover-
nance regimes of East and West Germany.

Research Hypotheses
We have three basic hypotheses based on the model depicted in Fig-
ure 7.1. The three hypotheses are driven by the Axial events of separation,
reunification, and the process of integration, which are mediated by Termi-
nus events.

H1: The separation, an Axial event of Germany divided into East and West,
led to two different governance regimes. Democratic Germany was character-
ized by freedom, autonomy, and the rule of law. Communist Germany was
based on a collective mentality, group norms, and a centralized, controlling
governance regime. National identities, thus, were quite different: autono-
mous in the West, collective in the East.

H2: Reunification led to some confusion and distrust among members from
both social systems. However, it was East Germans who were more likely to
feel anomie because they were moved into a Democratic system and culture of
which they knew little about. National identity was a challenge, impossible in
the early stages, and it was affected by Terminus factors.

H3: Integration, that is, merging both Germanys, was a challenge to do with
different cultures and experiences from different governance regimes. It would
take several generations for both Germanys to be fully integrated and form one
national identity. In fact, younger Germans are more likely to feel German
than their parents or grandparents.

ANALYSIS: NATIONAL IDENTITY IN GERMANY

Terminus Events

Thematic Issues
Studying identity requires giving equal importance to economics and
culture. Both domains are fundamental pillars of modern, contemporary
Germany. Germany is primarily a grouping of ethnic and linguistic com-
munities, built on two foundations: its craft, industrial, and commercial
expertise; and its artistic, intellectual, scientific, and cultural influence. In
this section, we examine the potential effects of the economy, culture, and
governance regime on German national identity. The latter is particularly
218  D. MARTIN and R. R. VERDUGO

important due to the separation of East and West, their development of

their unique social structures, and then reunification.
Economy. German political unification created a major economic chal-
lenge. In West Germany, the economy was based on a market paradigm,
while in the East, the paradigm was a planned economy. The two diametri-
cally opposed systems in both theory and practice. In a market/Capitalist
based economy, it is the supply and demand that drive the market in a free
priced environment, with limited or non-existent government intervention,
and the means of production are privately owned. Whereas in a planned/
command economy, the government or State organizes, plans, directs, and
controls the economy; the management of the economy is centralized or
decentralized (management is turned over to lower governing bodies). The
State may also nationalize a company—assume ownership.
The “German model” is a West German creation. Whereas West Ger-
many became a society of abundance and consumption, and its citizens be-
came experienced, demanding consumers, East Germany operated under
a Communist model. East Germans lived in an environment of shortages,
they became expert in bartering and living on the margin. Thus, success by
West Germany and failure in East Germany created an asymmetric power
relationship: West Germans took the role of decision-makers, while East
Germans, though having less power in this relationship, enjoyed the hith-
erto unobtainable benefits of living in a strong economy. For more than two
decades rescuing the East was a national goal.
East German collective identity was formed around two contrasting
poles: theory (that of a fair and efficient economic model), and reality (that
of undersupply, which became endemic after the boom of the sixties). Oth-
er than some small operations, such as craftwork and fine catering, a private
entrepreneurial sector did not exist. Heavily subsidized food staples were
cheap and widely available, but other consumer goods were in short supply.
In fact, these other goods were targeted for export, were very costly (such
as appliances and furniture), or rarely available (such as building materials
and cars, which had to be ordered more than ten years in advance). Life in
East Germany was modest, but also “sustainable.”
In West Germany, economic growth was swift and robust. The emergence
of a consumer society led to much prosperity. Compared to East Germany
and most other European nations, incomes in West Germany were higher,
houses and cars more impressive, travel more exotic, food more sophisticat-
ed, and leisure more costly. The economic success in the West was a source
of collective pride, but also of condescension towards the “poor cousins” of
the East. After the reunification, the latter complained about being treated
as second-class citizens—not without reason, though often aware that po-
litically and economically they had no real alternative. Culturally, however,
they have been more liable to criticize Western supremacy.5
 The Mental Wall  219

Culture. Over the Cold War period, East Germans and West Germans
grew apart, not knowing much about one another. Overregulation and
mismanagement characterized the daily lives of East Germans. The virtues
of patience, flexibility, and humility were necessary responses to these daily
contingencies. Planning was essential due to shortages of many consumer
goods. Planning was supplemented by taking advantage of opportunities
and by being creative. In a French blog, an East German remembers the
daily shortages:

If there was fresh milk in the morning it was gone by the afternoon. But
meanwhile, potatoes, not to be found in the morning, had arrived. We could
almost only get fruit and vegetables in season . . . which are sought after today
for ecological reasons. . . . Everything depended on who you knew. Get me
this and I’ll get you that . . . Many goods were available, but in much too short
supply. Many households had savings, but there was nothing to spend them
on. . . . We learned to improvise and help each other. That’s when do-it-your-
self skills were indispensable. . . . One positive side to the shortage economy
was that there was very little waste. Things were mended many times before
they became really worn out.6

Daily survival skills and strategies varied by sector. In East Germany, the
lack of resources led to stronger social ties and much individual initia-
tive. Survival—in the sense of reaching out for the best possible quality
of life—depended on mutual assistance, helping friends, and mobilizing
knowledge. These were vital skills in a world of bartering and do-it-yourself
mentality, which West Germans had no inkling about. In the West, custom-
ers could rely on the proficiency of political and economic agencies. Unlike
their East German counterparts, West Germans enjoyed full employment
and the social benefits that placed everyone on the same footing for educa-
tion, health, and leisure, though they also had to deal with inequality and
joblessness. Even so, the middle and working classes took full advantage of
their improved quality of life. Two important cultural traits that emerged
were an increasing self-confidence and positive outlook on life, and an in-
crease in being more demanding, both of which were inconceivable among
East Germans.
Culture is the lifestyle of a nation; a nation’s values, views, norms, and
traditions. In contrast to political, economic, and social history, cultural his-
tory is not constructed from events and cycles but formed by long processes
and slow transitions (Braudel, 1949).
A widely used concept in intercultural research is “place of remembrance”
or “realm of memory” (Nora, 1986/1992). It covers actual places and physi-
cal or abstract objects, events and persons, institutions or symbols. Its pur-
pose is to explore references to identity in commemoration and taboo, self-
image and image of others, social norms and values. Remembrance is the
220  D. MARTIN and R. R. VERDUGO

exclusion of events and things that do not fit preferred choices. Researchers
must keep a critical distance from dogma, taboos, fashions, and ideals, which
often prove fleeting and insubstantial (Rousso, 1987).
Governance regimes. In East Germany, the adoption of a Marxist-Leninist
model created a socialist system closely linking ideology and social structure.
The East German national identity was constructed and based on the
propaganda of a single political party, the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei
Deutschlands; Socialist Unity Party of Germany).
The spread of propaganda was intense. According to official doctrine,
socialist countries were united in striving for greater international solidarity
and understanding among solidarity of workers. Capitalist countries were
degraded at school and at work (see McCauley, 1979; Gibbs, 2000; Grothe,
1958; Childs, 1983). All sciences and humanities were enlisted in the cam-
paign against capitalist imperialism. The East German regime laid down
an official line of thinking, from which it tolerated no deviation (Yèche,
2013). Only the predominantly Protestant Church, some dissenting circles,
and some individuals managed to resist, provided they were discreet and
did not draw attention. A Christian from East Germany comments on State
atheism:

The dictum of Karl Marx “Religion is the opium of the people” suffused the
State system and the mental world of its leaders. . . . An antireligious way of
life was imposed by establishing a taboo on all contributions of religion to
public life . . . The Church was soon forced to limit its activity strictly to the
private sphere. Being a Christian in East Germany marginalised us. We could
practice our religion only in the parish setting. . . . So I refused to participate
in the Jugendweihe, which was compulsory for entrance to high school in East
Germany. . . . I was able to qualify later by going to night school. . . . One result
of this policy was to strengthen the common resolve of Christians in the face
of hostility from the State. In that sense we had a common adversary and we
were proud to offer what resistance we could, in the knowledge that we were
courting trouble.7

The situation in West Germany was completely different. On the one

hand, constitutionalism and the recognition of certain fundamental rights
were secured. On the other hand, opinions and activities deemed anti-con-
stitutional were not allowed. Even so, this young democracy did not tolerate
extremism, whether left- or right-wing. The communist party was dissolved
in 1956, and a 1972 law barred all anti-constitutional forces from public
offices, such as extreme radicals.8 The defense of constitutionalism, which
forms the core of the West German political system, has been a foremost
concern among all political leaders. All German citizens must abide by the
rules of the democratic game.
 The Mental Wall  221

Chronological Issues
“Historical identity” denotes two different but complementary mean-
ings. First it refers to the evolution and nature of a collective entity, to the
specific character of its members, and to a description of the processes and
historical issues involved in the evolution of German identity. Secondly, his-
torical identity includes the relation of a community to its past: its origins,
its path, its positive or negative references, and changes over time. To dis-
tinguish between the two, the first will be called “historical,” and the second
“historiographic” (Mittler, 2012).
Germany after the war. From 1945 to 1990, German unity and national
consciousness was not possible. The country’s destruction, occupation, and
division made it impossible to have such an identity. Under the management
of the Soviet Union and the United States, two Germanys were created in
1949; the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG) represented two attempts at nation-building. The
East took as its model communism—or socialism, while the West adopted
liberalism—or capitalism.
These hegemonic differences persisted throughout the Cold War. The
example of “official memory” demonstrates how the two nations set out in
opposite directions. For the East German leaders, there was no difference
between fascism and capitalism. East German leaders, claiming to be the
heirs of the communist resistance, refused to accept any responsibility for
the war crimes and sided with the victims. The burden of the past lay more
heavily on West Germany, where the indignation and political activity of the
new generation moved the country toward “Remembrance” and began a
process of catharsis.
After reunification, the idea of Remembrance underwent a semantic
shift.9 For national-socialists, the term “mastery of the past” or “coming
to terms with the past” (“Vergangenheitsbewältigung”; coping with the past)
still held. For Communism the past has been dealt with more neutrally and
descriptively, through a process of facing up to the East German past (“Auf-
arbeitung der DDR-Vergangenheit”; reclamation of the East German past).
This choice of terminology attests to a desire of separating the two systems
and proceeding efficiently and fairly. In both cases, official Remembrance
policy emphasizes the commemoration of the victims of totalitarianism.
Concerning Nazism, numerous debates, such as that on the Berlin Holo-
caust Memorial, have focused on how best to honor the memory of all the
persecuted groups, Jews but also non-Jews: political opponents, resistance
fighters, homosexuals, Roma, and handicapped persons (Droit, 2007).10
For the victims of the East German regime, discussions center on defining
specific parameters, including the choice of appropriate criteria, and on
the location and purpose of a commemoration.11
222  D. MARTIN and R. R. VERDUGO

What about the roles of the leaders and their followers in the two suc-
cessive dictatorships? This subject gives rise to fierce battles in the media.
These are often sparked by a cultural event such as the publication of a
book (Hitler’s Willing Executioners by Daniel Goldhagen in 1997), or the
organization of a touring exhibition (War crimes of the Wehrmacht by the
Hamburg Institute for Social Research, 1995–2004).12 In East Germany, the
legal and moral condemnation of past crimes and human rights violations
is a delicate topic because the facts are fairly recent and no clear judgment
is possible. Thus, the Nuremberg trials (1945/46) and the trial of Adolf
Eichmann in Jerusalem (1961) are not readily comparable to the legal ac-
tion taken against former Politbüro members and border guards who fired
on defectors. The broadest and most successful attempt to reconcile the
interests of the two groups was the creation of the Stasi archives in 1990.13
During the post-war years, the identity and collective memory of the
German people split into two strands. First, the German population was
divided, East and West. Gradual differentiation and estrangement seemed
inevitable, and yet a closer examination reveals numerous similarities. After
the horrors of the Holocaust, shame, silence, and repression existed on
both sides. Despite efforts to move away from Nazi ideology, former Nazi
officials remained in place and some held key positions in institutions and
firms in both Germanys.14
Over time, a feeling of moral duty led to the idea of examining the past
and making amends. The Cold War spawned pacifist movements in the
West. In the East, pacifist movements were small but highly symbolic. In
the West, the focus was on drawing lessons from the past, by opposing West
German re-armament: “No more war!” (“Nie wieder Krieg!”). In the East, a
more forward-looking stance emerged in Christian circles, which, cautious
by necessity, opted for biblical exhortations, turning “swords into plough-
shares” (“Schwerter zu Pflugscharen!”).
With reunification, the hope of building a better world and the fear
of a third world war faded. Pursuing an agenda of Remembrance has re-
mained a priority for some, while others demanded bringing closure to
the past (“Schlussstrichdebatte”). Since the West German historians’ quar-
rel in 1986/87, talk of closure and moving on has become highly sensi-
tive. Likewise, the debate on the qualification of East Germany as a State
“without the rule of law” (“Unrechtsstaat”) has generated much divisiveness
among former dissidents.15 In a noteworthy contribution, the West German
journalist Harald Martenstein derides those wishing to draw a line under
the Nazi and communist past. He states that in his experience, this wish
has been expressed mainly by those formerly in privileged positions, who
wearily point to the supposed complexity of the system, yet very rarely by
the disadvantaged, for whom the same system, with its pervading injustice,
seems to have been perfectly intelligible.16
 The Mental Wall  223

Individual identity. Individual identity is a complex issue. Several phases

have to be distinguished: reconstructing a devastated country, the slow
consolidation of the two States, and reunification. The memory of the
Germans who lived through the early post-war years is marked by traumatic
experiences: bombardments, expulsion or captivity, violence, spoliation,
and deprivation. Although official historiographers accurately write about
liberation, the complete collapse of Germany was widely experienced as
a catastrophic defeat, painful, and humiliating—1945 was a descent into
hell for most of the population, whose main concern focused on the barest
necessities of life in order to survive and ensure basic security.17 Having
lived through such ordeals and yet called upon to shoulder the collective
blame, they suffered a major psychological disjunction (Stark, 2011, p. 33).
Two founding myths enabled individuals to face up to the consequences
of the Nazi past. The East considered itself the legitimate heir of “popular
antifascist resistance,” a creed that exonerated and absolved those not in
the resistance, in other words almost everybody (Agethen, Eckhard, & Neu-
bert, 2002). The West postulated an image that implied a fresh start and
hopefully a peaceful and prosperous future.18 Essayist Wolfgang Büscher
has compared such a view to the two other turning points still to come,
namely 1968 and 1989. Given that these two dates have very different mean-
ings for the inhabitants of West Germany (student movement and inter-
German encounter) and those of East Germany (Prague Spring and fall of
the regime), this approach seems debatable (Büscher, 1998).
The two Germanys moved forward at different paces. In West Germany,
identity moved in a straight line; in East Germany identity has been severely
buffeted. The radical change of the political and socio-economic order pro-
duced a radical microscopic change in everyone’s private and occupational
lives. In the East, the merging of the two Germanys was perceived as an
opportunity, liberation, and a promise, but also as an invasion, an annexa-
tion, and liquidation. The invasive character of Western supervision caused
negative reactions. The best known manifestation of this negative feeling
was nostalgia for the East (“Ostalgie”), a demonstrative attachment to prod-
ucts and practices of a country viewed as a paradise lost.19
But such a feeling was not held by all former East Germans. Indeed, a
study of the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Federal Agency for Civic
Education) found two predominant motivations. First, idealization of a
private life “had nothing to do with the political system.” Secondly, there
was an attempt at recalling the advantages and strengths of an alternative
societal model that “also had its good points.” A minority wanted to go
back, but an appraisal of life in East Germany proved widely divergent in
the old and new Länder (regions). The West had a negative view, while the
East voiced many divergent views. Another poll provides some good expla-
nations. East Germans had to reconcile the improvement in their quality
224  D. MARTIN and R. R. VERDUGO

of life and the political system with a degraded social system that was, for
many, a major source of disappointment. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 below con-
firm such a statement. When East and West Germans were asked their views
about life in East Germany, there were differences in responses. Essentially,
East Germans more than West Germans had more favorable views about
life in East Germany. For example, if we sum the positive and somewhat
positive views about East Germany, more than half (57%) of East Germans
responded in this manner, while only 18% of West Germans did so.
In the same survey, respondents were asked to evaluate a selected num-
ber of domain related lives in East Germany. These data are displayed in
Table 7.2. There are two important stories displayed in Table 7.2. First,
only two domains were evaluated positively by a majority of respondents:
standard of living and the political system. Second, in contrast to positive

TABLE 7.1 Appraisal of Life in East Germany

Appraisal All West Germans East Germans
Rather negative perception 22.00% 26.00% 8.00%
More negative than positive aspects 48.00% 52.00% 32.00%
More positive than negative aspects 20.00% 13.00% 49.00%
Rather positive perception 5.00% 5.00% 8.00%
Other 5.00% 4.00% 3.00%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: Survey by Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (TNS Emnid, 2009), 2010,
URL: http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-einheit/lange-wege-der-deutschen-
einheit/47560/unrechtsstaat?p=all (trans. Dana Martin/Richard Ryan, retrieved 03/01/14).

TABLE 7.2 Feeling of Better or Worse Situation in Different

Domains in East Germany
Domain Improvement Deterioration
Standard of living 65.00% 15.00%
Recognition of individual performance 27.00% 37.00%
Political system 55.00% 16.00%
Social justice 19.00% 60.00%
Social protection 19.00% 64.00%
Child minding and day care 8.00% 75.00%
Health system 25.00% 59.00%
Source: Survey of 1000 inhabitants of the Saxony-Anhalt region, Sachsen-Anhalt Monitor
2007 – Politische Einstellungen zwischen Gegenwart und Vergangenheit (Political opinions
between past and present), Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2010, URL: http://
www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-einheit/lange-wege-der-deutschen-einheit/47560/
unrechtsstaat?p=all (trans. Dana Martin/Richard Ryan, retrieved 03/01/14).
 The Mental Wall  225

evaluations, four domains were rated negatively by a majority of respon-

dents: social justice, social protection, child care, and health care.

Concentric Issues
Views and feelings about identity vary by place. For a divided Germany,
this is especially important because terms such as democracy, peace, prog-
ress, and humanity have different meanings.
German national identity. Relations to authority say much about social
structure. State power and Party authority expanded into the public sphere
at the expense of the private sphere, and the two may have merged. East
Germany presented itself as a “State of Peace,” concerned with the defense
of the homeland and other Socialist countries. Censuring the aggressive
imperialism of West Germany served to justify the growing paramilitary
discourse and activity in East Germany.20
In contrast, since the 1970s West Germany was becoming less authoritari-
an. The growing “alternative” movements, especially pacifist, ecologist, and
feminist, ushered in a veritable democratization of social criticism. Feelings
of belonging were less determined by social origin and their intergenera-
tional transmission.21 Increasing social mobility and the fragmentation of
communities expanded the range of economic and social opportunities,
and confirmed Granovetter’s (1973) theory about the “strength of weak
ties.”22 Interestingly, East Germans had no precise idea of life and social
changes in West Germany.
For East Germans, reality set in with the “Fall of the Wall.” It was only
after the opening of the Iron Curtain that East Germans discovered their
new reality: being confronted with new standards, codes, practices, and
behavior patterns, both linguistic and cultural. East Germans had grown
accustomed to respect existing hierarchies, in particular the older genera-
tions. The central figure in the East German system was a senior official, a
veteran of the Communist resistance. A former exile or political prisoner,
his mission was to set an example and guide the young in breaking from the
past and build a better future. As in other Communist countries, seniority
was a fundamental, unchallenged, status of authority.23
The Western model did not work this way. Although paternalism was part
of social structure, authority was democratized. Persons with status, such
as public officials, managers, teachers, and parents had ceased to present
themselves as infallible and unassailable. Hence, everyone was encouraged
to express their opinions. After Nazism, and facing communism, question-
ing authority became a norm.
In sum, the identities in the two societies were different. In West Ger-
many, the importance of the individual outweighed the value of the col-
lectivity. Individualism, as a societal goal, was actively sought, practiced, and
226  D. MARTIN and R. R. VERDUGO

valued. Individual fulfilment, the main reference of the post-war genera-

tion, was a cornerstone of West German modernity.
Group identity in Germany. Complementing the rigid and structured
hierarchies in East Germany were two counterweights: the principles
of gender equality, and institutionalized comradeship. Both were based
on solidarity among peers but also on mutual surveillance (Giddens,
1994, pp. 125–126). Social relations in East Germany were ambiguous—
conviction and compromise, protection and betrayal, truth and falsehood
were interspersed and often hard to dissociate. East German citizens were
able to makes sense of all this complexity.
West Germany tended to be hierarchical, anti-authoritarian, and pre-
serving greater social distance between social strata, and between men and
women.
Power was not equality distributed. In East Germany, the power gap,
politically speaking, was based on political power, status, and prestige. So-
cio-economic inequalities were minimal. The upward social mobility and
integration of the masses were fully attained objectives. Women were au-
tonomous in every way: they had access to all occupations, and could enter
spheres previously reserved for men. Gender equality was supported by a
network of nurseries and childcare facilities, and the organization of leisure
time and State aid. For example, the monthly day off for household tasks
(“Haushaltstag”) was a given since 1952 and applied to all married women.24
After 1990, a cultural clash ensued between West German traditional-
ism and the expectations of East German women, and led to much incom-
prehension and bitterness. West German women, who struggle to combine
family and work, make a distinction between “career women” and “house-
wives,” which are felt to be incompatible life choices. Working mothers are
deprecated (“bad mothers”); a wife’s mission being to support her husband
and care for their children. For them, happiness in the home and successful
upbringing of children depends largely on the mother-child relationship,
which tends to be exclusive and overprotective. Sacrifice is encouraged for
all generations and social groups, even by feminists.
There is no balance between work and life outside of work. Instead, there
was freedom of choice (children or career), a separation of spheres (places
reserved for women), integration measures (quotas for women, equality
monitoring), and public awareness (feminization of the language). In West
Germany, parental status is not taken into account. The testimony of the
West German feminist Christina Thürmer-Rohr is pertinent:

We failed to communicate with a neighbouring society where the words femi-

nism and patriarchy seemed only to be terms of abuse used to sneer at the
decadence of Western capitalism. . . . We had the impression that our oppo-
sitional role was devalued, and by those who were supposed to become our
 The Mental Wall  227

allies. . . . In Universities, the detachment and disinterest shown by female stu-

dents from East Germany when feminist issues were addressed was quickly
palpable. . . . Of course, we could not pretend that our relation in its political
dimension was balanced or symmetrical.25

West Germans enjoyed much freedom. The principle of freedom of

conscience and choice were the guiding principles of a new set of ethics.
Moreover, despite diverging political opinions, there was much consensus
in West Germany. Buoyed by this newly acquired freedom and its protec-
tion, political and social protest emerged. Citizen initiatives, demonstra-
tions, petitions, and sit-ins were prevalent.
East German protest movements were different. Protests were much less
virulent, influential, and visible, especially before 1989. Still, in their own
way they were ethically and morally demanding. The German sociologist
Detlef Pollack identifies four protest movements accompanying the decline
of East Germany: “human rights supporters, communist reformers, par-
ticipants in mass demonstrations, and those opting for defection to West
Germany.”26 The protagonists formed alliances and counter-alliances with
aims that were sometimes compatible, sometimes conflicting, and at times
unrelated. Initially these protests were led by a minority of militants, but
soon they became more radical and more opportunistic than the protests
of first generation dissidents.

Axial Events

Political Events
The forty-year division of Germany had significant consequences for a
German national identity. The post-war years saw the emergence of two
Germanys; one a dictatorship, the other a social democracy. It was an odd
set of events. To begin with, both Germanys were under the supervision of
allies that ensured authority and protection. Reunification seemed remote,
yet it was defended by West German leaders, who referred to the “reuni-
fication clause” (“Wiedervereinigungsgebot”) in the preamble to the Basic
Law (“Grundgesetz”), the Constitution of the Federal Republic. However,
the refusal of neutrality in favor of Western integration stalled progress
towards unity. East German leaders, eager for international recognition,
determinedly ruled out any national reconstitution (Höfele, 2006; Reichel,
2005). West Germany’s membership in NATO and East Germany’s inclu-
sion in the Warsaw Pact (1955), together with the belated admission of both
German States as members of the United Nations Organization (1973),
helped to secure the division.27 Despite declarations of intent on both sides,
228  D. MARTIN and R. R. VERDUGO

in reality the destiny of the two Germanys depended on the intentions and
ambitions of the two superpowers, the USA and Russia.
Reunification became possible by the reforms launched by USSR leader
Mikhail Gorbachev.28 The terms “glasnost” (openness) and “perestroika”
(economic restructuring) soon became watchwords synonymous with trans-
parency and freedom. For the first time since the Second World War, move-
ments of protestation and opposition were not brutally quashed. The inter-
national community witnessed the disintegration, then the absorption, of
East Germany. From a strictly territorial point of view, Germany in 1990 no
longer had its pre-war borders. The partisans of a new Germany advanced
the principle of trust among partners;29 whereas opponents emphasized the
risk of a relapse into excess and a desire for hegemony.30
Collective identity has been largely shaped by regimes and how citizens
participate in the political process. Thus, the division of Germany brought
about two antagonistic modes of political regimes: Federalism in West Ger-
many and Centralism in East Germany (Felbick, 2002). Whereas Bonn
remained a provincial capital and the seat of a provisional government
(1949), East Berlin was made part of East Germany and permanently sev-
ered from its western part by the Berlin Wall (1961).31 Thereafter, the East
Germans lived in a country mapped out into 15 new districts (Bezirke).32
New governance systems affected Germans in each sector. In the East,
the transition to Socialism reflected a new reality: compliance with the dic-
tates of Moscow, which would not tolerate any form of dissidence. West
Germans lived with three occupying forces, which accepted a constitution
that granted a large degree of autonomy to the 11 regions (Länder) (Zippe-
lius, 2006). In the West, the historical diversity of the region was preserved,
along with certain traditions and attitudes, in particular Christianity and
paternalism. The importation of a parliamentary democracy was both an
opportunity and an unprecedented challenge. The outcome was far from
certain, as it meant starting from scratch with no precedents.

Social Events
The post-reunification years were a time of mixed feelings: high expecta-
tions, bitter disappointments, hope, disillusionment, recognition, and re-
proach. This was not only the case among West and East Germans, but also
within the old and new Länder. The most obvious and largely publicized
conflicts were those between the self-righteous “Besserwessis” (arrogant
West Germans) and the insecure “Jammerossis” (whining East Germans).
The French sociologist Marie Hoquet explains the reasons for such deroga-
tory stereotyping:

These accusations, fuelled by the daily incursions of the opposite group gave
rise to a rhetoric of mutual rancour, where the West Germans were blamed for
 The Mental Wall  229

their selfishness, conquering attitude and superficiality, while the East Germans
were decried for being uncivil, sluggish and prone to self-pity. . . . Gradually a
moral judgment crept into inter-German relations: West Germans pointed ac-
cusatory fingers at the biographies of their East German compatriots, while the
latter reproached the former for their haughtiness and condescension.33

In a report covering the last 20 years, Poppe (2010) confirms two impor-
tant factors: the lack of interest by the West for the East, and the feeling
harbored by the former inhabitants of East Germany that they are treated
like second-class citizens. However, these observed differences seem to be
diminishing.34
Being for or against governance varied by the East/West sector. In East
Germany, political opinions or personal convictions were a marker of iden-
tity and a factor of sociability. A minority of East Germans, those opposed to
the regime, were wary of the State and its institutions and representatives;
for the others, life in East Germany left some room for freedom. Employees
could openly criticize managers or discretely disobey orders without fear of
losing their jobs. Despite latent discontent, most of the population identi-
fied with or took for granted their socialist homeland, which was predict-
able and provided for the future. Everyday security and comfort (such as
housing, employment, health and education) was a benefit and a source of
pride: East Germany had no unemployment and no poverty.
The situation in West Germany was different. Indeed, views about gov-
ernment affected participation, social relations, and trust. Moreover, sig-
nificant inequalities continued.35 Interestingly, West Germans, who were
confident in their country and in themselves, were not fully aware of such
disparities. For them, East Germany remained ill-defined and abstract, grey,
and boring. They knew little about and were not interested in their neigh-
bors. The emergence of the half-humorous, half-pejorative term “Dunkel-
deutschland” (“Dark Germany”) is currently the subject of much debate in
online forums.36
“We wanted justice and we got the rule of law.”37 The fall of the Wall was
clearly not viewed as liberation by the whole East German population. The
State shaped perceptions of the event: an optimistic view for those mistrust-
ful of the State (“staatsfern”), pessimistic for those who remained loyal (“sta-
atstreu”). The bitter comment made by the painter Bärbel Bohley attests
to this. The readjustments and reappraisals made after the opening of the
Berlin Wall (“Nachwendezeit”) elicited either enthusiasm or disenchantment
according to individual experiences and expectancies. In reality, the situ-
ation was not positive for all: unemployment and divorce rates increased,
while the number of marriages and births dropped.38 East Germans had to
take a stance about a new Germany. The 2010 social report of the Berlin-
Brandenburg centre for sociological research reviews the evolution of the
last twenty years. (See Tables 7.3 and 7.4)
230  D. MARTIN and R. R. VERDUGO

Data in Table 7.3 suggest that East Germans do not feel part of the Fed-
eral Republic, and yet would not go back to East Germany. In contrast,
West Germans tend to be non-committal to the new Germany. Table 7.4
presents data on views about Democracy. Generally, Westerners have bet-
ter views than Easterners about Democracy as a governance system. They
are more satisfied and believe that their futures will improve. In contrast,
East Germans are less satisfied with democracy, and are not as likely to see
improvement in their futures.
Continuity and success varied by sector. East Germans experienced dis-
continuity and collective failure, West Germans continuity and collective
success. Hence East Germans, collectively, have had negative experiences:
suspicious of the unknown and feeling left behind, bewildered, or helpless.
However, for East Germans, confronting the West was compulsory and in-
escapable, whereas West Germans had little reason to feel self-doubt or any
need for re-examination. Identifying with a united Germany and its Demo-
cratic regime was more likely among the educated and those with a better
standard of living, and who enjoy stability in social relations.

TABLE 7.3 Identification with Germany 20 Years after Unity

As an East German . . .   As a West German . . .
After 20 years, I now feel a full 25% Only since reunification do I feel 6%
citizen of the Federal Republic like a full German
I wouldn’t like to go back to East 59% I feel better since the 20%
Germany, but I don’t yet feel at reunification
ease in the Federal Republic
I would like to go back and live 9% I don’t feel any different since 44%
in East Germany the reunification
Don’t know/no reply 7% I don’t feel at ease any more in 10%
today’s Federal Republic
I would like to go back to the 11%
time of the Wall
Don’t know/No reply 9%
Totals 100% 100%
Source: Sozialreport 2010. Die deutsche Vereinigung—1990 bis 2010—Positionen der Bürgerinnen
und Bürger. Im Auftrag der Volkssolidarität (2010)—Bundesverband e.V., erarbeitet vom
Sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungszentrum Berlin-Brandenburg e.V., p. 28/30/31. URL:
http://www.sfz-ev.de/zeitnahe%20veroeffentlichungen.htm; http://www.sfz-ev.de/index_htm_
files/1_Sozialreport_2010.pdf (annual report based on a survey of 2090 East and West German
citizens in 2010, translation Dana Martin / Richard Ryan, retrieved 22/04/16).
 The Mental Wall  231

TABLE 7.4 Evaluation of Democracy*

Germany Old Länder New Länder
Democracy as a Value
Very important 79% 82% 69%
Moderately important 14% 13% 20%
 Not important/not at all 4% 3% 8%
important
Don’t Know/No reply 3% 3% 3%
Totals 100% 100% 100%
Satisfaction With Democracy
Very satisfied / satisfied 24% 26% 16%
Partly satisfied 40% 41% 33%
Dissatisfied/very dissatisfied 31% 28% 45%
Don’t Know/No reply 5% 5% 6%
Totals 100% 100% 100%
N Insert sample 2.090 citizens Insert sample
size size
Expected Trends in Democracy
Improvement 10% 11% 7%
No change 52% 53% 46%
Deterioration 31% 29% 38%
Don’t Know/No reply 7% 7% 8%
Totals 100% 100% 100%
N Insert sample 2.090 citizens Insert sample
size size
Source: Sozialreport 2010. Die deutsche Vereinigung—1990 bis 2010—Positionen der
Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Im Auftrag der Volkssolidarität–Bundesverband e.V., erarbeitet vom
Sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungszentrum Berlin-Brandenburg e.V., p. 31 URL: http://www.
volkssolidaritaet.de/cms/sozialreport_2010_deutsche_einheit.html; www.volkssolidaritaet.de/
cms/vs_media/.../100831SR2010langDF.pdf (annual report based on a survey of 2090 East and
West German citizens in 2010, translation DM / RR, retrieved 03/01/14).

CONCLUSION

To conclude, it is useful to bear in mind the degree to which the switch from
division to unity was accompanied by hope, especially in Germany, and fear,
especially outside Germany. The quip ascribed to François Mauriac—“We
love Germany so much that we’re glad there are two . . .”—speaks volumes
232  D. MARTIN and R. R. VERDUGO

about the scepticism of Germany’s neighbors.40 The famous speech of Willy

Brandt, made after the fall of the Berlin Wall, reflects the German point of
view: “The war and the division of the victors divided Europe, Germany and
Berlin. Those meet now who are to join as one. We live to see, and I thank
God I am able to be there, the different parts of Europe come together.”41
The fall of the Wall changed the rules and the stakes, and created a fresh
situation. East Germans witnessed one of the fastest transformations in his-
tory: they saw their world collapse as if stricken by an earthquake or a tidal
wave. Whether it is experienced as an opportunity, a dramatic upheaval or
both together, any sudden metamorphosis comes as a shock. However, the
impact of this great event and its aftermath were in no way shared by the
West Germans, whose stable existence continued unstirred. It is important
to bear in mind that This difference is a fundamental one, and the ultimate
effects of which must not be underestimated. The split will mend with time,
but will never close completely. The question then arises of whether unity
will have caused a bringing together of one nation or on the contrary an
estrangement between East and West Germans.
Is the famous “Wall in our heads,” a concept largely popularised in the
German media and elsewhere, a myth or a reality? Opinions diverge, and
in all likelihood will continue to do so for a long time.42 The mere ques-
tion is just as revealing as the balance of opposing opinions, which can be
variously interpreted. Whether the phenomenon is deemed or not to exist
tells us nothing about how it is judged. The term “Wall” implies painful di-
vision and problematic severance, especially for the generations who have
lived in its shadow, but when it is replaced by “difference,” especially by the
younger generations, it loses its sternness. If we take into account the fact
that in Germany, differences are traditionally perceived as self-evident and
a source of enrichment, we may hope that the days of the mental Wall will
soon be over. It will fold into collective memory.
 The Mental Wall  233

APPENDIX A
A Methodological Note

The construction and transformation of identity forms a rich, broad field of

study that is also shifting and controversial. A sound methodological strat-
egy is approaching the topic from three levels of analysis, macro (national
identity), meso (collective identity) and micro (individual identity), and
marking a division between thematic units and historical periods. The aim
of such a methodology is to proceed in an interdisciplinary and intercultur-
al manner. The starting point is a corpus of both primary sources (testimo-
ny and analysis by citizens and observers), and secondary sources (surveys
and research). Such an approach is supported by the work of researchers
in different areas of expertise, of different nationalities, and with different
affiliations, in order to condense knowledge and different perspectives.
The present text was first drafted in French and then translated to Eng-
lish (by Richard Ryan). The utmost caution was needed in the choice of
terminology, as French and both East and West German usage had to be
reconciled, while at the same time catering to an English-speaking audi-
ence. Any vagueness or confusion arising from these linguistic, intercultur-
al and scientific acrobatics is entirely our responsibility.39 Painting a portrait
of a country’s identity and that of its people is a difficult task: a transver-
sal synthesis was therefore chosen to gain a simple overview of its current
configuration.
234  D. MARTIN and R. R. VERDUGO

NOTES

1. Note that ethnicity has different definitions: in America, ethnicity is associ-

ated with a minority group, or some other ethnic group. In Europe, especially
in Eastern Europe, ethnicity refers to a people or peoplehood. It has greater
community or group connotations.
2. Though we identify Smith’s strategy middle of the range, it is not to be con-
fused with Merton’s (1957) definition of middle-of-the-range theories, which
contrast Talcott Parson’s Grand Theorizing or Minor theories. Merton de-
fines middle-of-the-range theory as “. . . theories that lie between the minor
but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during the day-
to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified
theory of social behavior, social organization, and social change” (Merton,
1957, p. 39).
3. Paradigm shifts are associated with T.S. Kuhn’s masterwork, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions. The shift refers to a revolutionary change in how scien-
tific problems are viewed and framed. Kuhn’s work was heavily influenced by
the earlier work of Ludwik Fleck (1935[1979]). Fleck argued that scientific
truth was situational to a specific scientific community, and that truths and
falsehoods could never truly be established. Fleck’s notion of a scientific com-
munity predated Kuhn, and is an especially important concept that led to
the emergence of the Sociology of Science discipline, in which scientists are
studied much like other communities.
4. Rousseau’s vision of identity is in contrast to J. G. Fichte’s, which is based on
ethnicity, blood and social traits such as language. See Fichte (1807/08). Re-
den an die deutsche Nation. The German version may be downloaded from
www.gutenberg.org, or in English from www.ghi-dc.org.
5. Cf. Thierse, Wolfgang (2013). Künste im geteilten Deutschland. Eine Erin-
nerung. Talk presented at the meeting ‘Autonomie und Lenkung. Die Kün-
ste im doppelten Deutschland’ Sächsische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu
Leipzig / Zeitgeschichtliches Forum Leipzig, 04/04/2013. URL: http://www.
dradiowissen.de/ddr-geschichte-die-normale-und-die-besondere-kunst.88.
de.html?dram:article_id=257748 (retrieved 15/01/14).
6. Source: Christof (graduate engineer), Vivre en RDA, 10 November 2009,
URL: http://verel.typepad.fr/verel/2009/11/vivre-en-rda.html (retrieved
30/07/13).
7. Source: Steffi (teacher), Être chrétien en RDA, 08 November 2009, URL:
http://verel.typepad.fr/verel/2009/11/etre-chr%C3%A9tien-en-rda.html
(retrieved 30/07/13).
8. For more information on occupational bans (“Berufsverbote”) see the inter-
net site of a collective assistance initiative that exists since 2011, URL: http://
www.berufsverbote.de/ (retrieved 30/07/13).
9. In French, the term “duty to remember” (“Erinnerungspflicht”) is used: this
term is not very common in German.
10. The triple Berlin memorial (to the memory of the Jews of Europe, homo-
sexuals and European Roma) was unveiled in 2005, after nearly 20 years of
debate. For more information: Stiftung Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden
 The Mental Wall  235

Europas, Denkmal für die im Nationalsozialismus verfolgten Homosexuellen,

Denkmal für die im Nationalsozialismus ermordeten Sinti und Roma Euro-
pas, URL: http://www.stiftung-denkmal.de/ (retrieved 04/01/14).
11. Concerning the victims of East German communism see also URL: http://
www.berliner-zeitung.de/berlin/zentraler-gedenkort-die-neue-wache-als-den-
kmal-fuer-ddr-opfer-,10809148,22092170.html; URL: http://www.bundesstif-
tung-aufarbeitung.de/wettbewerbe-1440.html (retrieved 03/01/14).
12. Cf. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, http://www.his-online.de/en/;
Bartov, Brink, Hirschfeld, Kahlenberg, Friedrich, et al. (2000) Bericht der
Kommission zur Überprüfung der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrech-
en der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944.” November 2000, 103 p. URL: http://www.
his-online.de/index.php?eID=trackdown&uid=1096&cHash=8aa08019b061b
e813698cf820c93e8b0 (retrieved 03/01/14).
13. Cf. Behörde des Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherhe-
itsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, http://
www.bstu.bund.de (retrieved 03/01/14). The directors of this now emblemat-
ic institute were Joachim Gauck (1990–2000), Marianne Birthler (2000–11),
Roland Jahn (since 2011).
14. For West Germany: German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), Im-
ages–Denazification and War Crimes Trials under the Allies, Denazification
Questionnaire (1946), http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_image.
cfm?image_id=1012 (retrieved 04/01/14). For East Germany: Foitzik, Jan
(ed.) (2012). Sowjetische Interessenpolitik in Deutschland 1944–1954: Doku-
mente. München / Berlin, Institut für Zeitgeschichte. 629 p.
15. For example: Claer, Thomas (2010), www.justament.de/archives/1420; Her-
zog, Roman (1996), www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/
Roman-Herzog/Reden/1996/03/19960326_Rede.html; Holtmann, Ever-
hard (2010), www.bpb.de/themen/YIC2C0.html; Regner, Freihart / Rink,
Johannes (2012), www.inter-homines.org/unrechtsstaat_ddr_lstu11.pdf;
Rolleke, Gerd (2009), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/
zeitgeschichte-war-die-ddr-ein-unrechtsstaat-1813196.html; Schwan, Gesine
(2009), www.zeit.de/2009/27/Oped-Schwan#commen (retrieved 30/07/13).
16. Source: Martenstein, Harald (2009). Muss auch mal Schluss sein? Unser Kol-
umnist fragt sich, ob er in der DDR bei der Stasi gewesen wäre. In: Die Zeit,
06/2009, URL: http://www.zeit.de/2009/06/Martenstein-06 (retrieved
30/07/13).
17. Among a great number of publications, see for example the diary of a woman
of Berlin who describes the spring of 1945. Anonyma (2003). Eine Frau in
Berlin: Tagebuchaufzeichnungen vom 20. April bis 22. Juni 1945. Rheda-Wie-
denbrück / Gütersloh, RM-Buch-und-Medien-Vertrieb. 291 p. A film with the
same name was made by Max Färberböck in 2008.
18. Cf. Hein-Kircher, Heidi (2013). “Deutsche Mythen” und ihre Wirkung. In: Aus
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, (APuZ 13-14/2013), URL: http://www.bpb.de/
apuz/156772/deutsche-mythen-und-ihre-wirkung?p=0; Hein-Kircher, Heidi
(2007). Politische Mythen. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ 11/2007),
URL: http://www.bpb.de/apuz/30604/politische-mythen?p=0 (retrieved
04/01/14).
236  D. MARTIN and R. R. VERDUGO

19. On the subject of “Ostalgie” see also URL: http://www.handelsblatt.com/un-

ternehmen/industrie/20-jahre-wirtschaftsunion-welche-ddr-marken-heute-
noch-stark-sind/3478302.html (retrieved 30/07/13).
20. On militarism in East Germany: Sachse, Christian (2004). “Genosse Direktor,
ich melde . . . ”- Zur Militarisierung der Volksbildung in der DDR. In: Horch
und Guck, Zeitschrift zur kritischen Aufarbeitung der SED-Dikatur, Heft
47/2004 | ddr – schulkonflikte, p. 39-47, URL: http://www.horch-und-guck.
info/hug/archiv/2004-2007/heft-47/04708/ (retrieved 28/07/13).
21. In essence, in the new West Germany, merit based on intelligence, hard work,
and talent were seen as the prime movers of attainment. However, such a sys-
tem also engenders much inequaliy.
22. In Granovetter’s seminal paper, he theorized that isolated communities fail to
realize economic gains unless they expand outward to the larger community.
One factor in being isolated is a strong sense of community that keeps its
inhabitants within their community and its value system.
23. See the novel by Eugen Ruge, awarded the Deutscher Buchpreis in 2011 (In
Zeiten des abnehmenden Lichts, 2011). For further information: http://www.
drb.ie/essays/fathers-and-sons (retrieved 03/01/14).
24. Cf. GMD (Geschichte Mitteldeutschlands) - Das Magazin, MDR Fernsehen:
Der Haushaltstag: Einer für alle? (20.12.2011), interview with Carola Sachse,
Professor of contemporary history at the University of Vienna URL: http://
www.mdr.de/geschichte-mitteldeutschlands/magazin/haushalt124.html (re-
trieved 04/01/2014); Labrousse, Agnès (2003). L’évolution de l’activité fémi-
nine en Allemagne orientale. Une analyse institutionnelle comparée. Work-
ing paper 03-2 CEMI (EHESS), February 2003, 38 p.
25. Source: Thürmer-Rohr, Christina (2010). Dossier 1989—und danach? Denk-
bewegungen vor und nach 1989 (Part 2), URL: http://www.forumcivique.
org/de/artikel/dossier1989-und-danach-denkbewegungen-vor-und-nach-
1989-2-teil; Additional document (Part 1): http://www.forumcivique.org/de/
artikel/dossier-1989-%E2%80%93-und-danach-denkbewegungen-vor; cur-
riculum vitae: http://home.snafu.de/thuermer-rohr/ (retrieved 06/01/14).
26. Source: http://www.marianne.net/Personne-n-a-rien-compris-a-la-chute-du-
Mur_a182697.html (retrieved 05/01/14).
27. Cf. http://www.hdg.de/lemo/html/DasGeteilteDeutschland/index.html
28. See the chapter in this volume on Russian National Identity by Oxana Kar-
naukhova and Richard R. Verdugo.
29. For example, see the publications of Jacques-Pierre Gougeon, 2009 URL:
http://www.ac-strasbourg.fr/academie/espace-presse/communique/arti-
cle/jacques-pierre-gougeon-nouveau-recteur-de-lacademie-de-strasbourg-1/,
or Henri de Bresson, URL http://www.parisberlinmag.com/qui-sommes-
nous/ (retrieved 07/01/14).
30. For example, see the publications of Michel Meyer (Histoire secrète de la chute
du mur de Berlin, 2009 / Le Roman de l’Allemagne, 2013), URL: http://www.
editionsdurocher.fr/Le-Roman-de-l-Allemagne_oeuvre_11012.html, http://
www.rfi.fr/emission/20130921-allemagne-histoire-michel-meyer-roman-re-
naissance-edition-rocher (audio file, 4 min.), or Édouard Husson, http://
www.edouardhusson.com/CV-francais_a211.html (retrieved 07/01/14).
 The Mental Wall  237

31. On the German capitals: http://www.documentArchiv.de/in/1945/besat-

zungszonen-deutschlands_fst.html; http://einestages.spiegel.de/static/topi-
calbumbackground/3634/kampf_der_moechtegern_metropolen.html (re-
trieved 28/07/13).
32. There were initially 14 Bezirkes, but East Berlin was added in 1961. The 15
were: East Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Magdeburg, Rostock,
Halle, Erfurt, Potsdam, Gera, Schwerin, Cottbus, Zwickau, Jena, and Dessau.
33. Source: Hocquet, Marie (2011). Mémoire, oubli et imaginaires urbains. Étude
de deux hauts-lieux de la mémoire communiste à Berlin-Est : le Palais de la
République et le Musée de la Stasi. Doctoral thesis in sociology, supervised
by Michel Rautenberg (University of Saint-Etienne), p. 444/445; URL: tel.
archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/69/08/60/PDF/These_-_Hocquet.pdf (re-
trieved 08/01/2014).
34. Cf. Poppe, Ulrike (2010). “Wessis” und “Ossis”—Wirklichkeit oder Stereotyp?
In: Reiner Marcowitz (ed.), Ein ‘neues’ Deutschland? Eine deutsch-franzö-
sische Bilanz 20 Jahre nach der Vereinigung / Une ‘nouvelle’ Allemagne?
Un bilan franco-allemand 20 ans après l’unification. Ateliers des Deutschen
Historischen Instituts Paris, vol. 7. Oldenbourg Verlag, 187 p, p. 120-131.
35. Capitalism and social inequality are highly correlated, and some degree of
inequality will exist in Capitalist driven economies.
36. For example, several online forum discussions: http://mundmische.de/
bedeutung/6081-Dunkeldeutschland; http://www.forum-3dcenter.org/
vbulletin/archive/index.php/t-368808.html; http://de.answers.yahoo.com/
question/index?qid=20100906114456AA2PVJw (retrieved 08/01/2014). In
the past, the best known terms were “Zone” (“Soviet occupation zone”) and
just after reunification, “Neufünfland” (“Five Newfoundländer”). However,
the word “Nullhoffnungszone” (“no hope zone”), discussed by French Ger-
manists, is much less representative Cf. Herbet, Dominique (2009): «Dun-
keldeutschland, Nullhoffnungszone»: quelle image la presse allemande
véhicule-t-elle à la veille des vingt ans de la chute du mur? In: Allemagne
d’aujourd’hui, 189/2009, p. 217–228.
37. Source: http://www.baerbelbohley.de/zitate.php (retrieved 02/01/2014).
38. Cf. Blum, Buscher, Gabrisch, Günther, Heimpold, et al. (2010). Ostdeutsch-
lands Transformation seit 1990 im Spiegel wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Indi-
katoren. 2nd edition, Halle/Saale, URL: http://www.iwh-halle.de/d/publik/
sh/ dkompendium.pdf; http://www.berlin-institut.org/online-handbuchde-
mografie/bevoelkerungsdynamik/regionale-dynamik/ostdeutschland.html
(retrieved 02/01/2014).
39. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany is denoted BRD in German,
an abbreviation that was, however, more often used in the East than in the
West, where ”Deutschland” (Germany) or “Bundesrepublik” (Federal Repub-
lic) were preferred terms. This highly significant linguistic and political detail
is not necessarily familiar to non-Germans. Similarly, the terms “communism
/ socialism / social-democracy” or “capitalism vs. social market economy”
have different meanings in France and in Germany.
238  D. MARTIN and R. R. VERDUGO

40. Cf. dossier “1949–1961: de la partition de l’Allemagne à la construction du

mur de Berlin,” URL: http://www.sciencespo.fr/bibliotheque/pratique/
collections/dossiers-presse/1949-1961 (retrieved 10/01/14).
41. Translation Dana Martin/Richard Ryan. The citation in German: “Aus dem
Krieg und aus der Veruneinigung der Siegermächte erwuchs die Spaltung Eu-
ropas, Deutschlands und Berlins. Jetzt wächst zusammen, was zusammenge-
hört. Jetzt erleben wir, und ich bin dem Herrgott dankbar dafür, daß ich dies
miterleben darf: die Teile Europas wachsen zusammen.” Source: http://
www.cvce.eu/obj/discours_de_willy_brandt_a_l_occasion_de_la_chute_
du_mur_de_berlin_berlin_10_novembre_1989-fr-0f8f11b6-6a7f-4d6d-b925-
7c6f71a454cb.html (retrieved 12/01/14).
42. Cf. http://www.welt.de/politik/article3775359/Ost-und-Westdeutsche-entfernen
-sich-voneinander.html; http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-einheit/lange
-wege-der-deutschen-einheit/47423/wohlbefinden?p=all (retrieved 07/01/14).

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 CHAPTER 8

NATIONAL IDENTITY
IN FRANCE
Immigration and the Validity
of Civil Tests

Andrew Milne

In the 1980s, sociologists and politicians in France asked whether it was pos-
sible to assimilate immigrants, erasing all traces of their previous cultural
background, and thus increasing cohesion in France. Some thirty years
later, the question is still being asked, though in a different manner.
Currently, 35% of the French population are immigrants or descendants
of immigrants.1 According to the 2006 French census, 16.9% of people
living in France are immigrants (born outside of France to non-French
nationals). Approximately 18% of the French population is made up of
people born on French soil, but with at least one parent not of French na-
tionality.2 Immigration and immigrants are important topics in France and
at the center of much current debate.
The current question, as opposed to the one asked many years ago, is
not about how to assimilate immigrants, but about protecting France from

National Identity, pages 245–270

Copyright © 2016 by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 245
246  A. MILNE

being substantially changed by the presence of its immigrant populations,

and thus about French national identity, which has become a topic of much
debate in France. Since 2007, the question of national identity has been
brought to the forefront of all debates in France—namely, how best, if at
all, to preserve and maintain diversity and at the same time maintain a
unique French culture? This question raises many others. Will immigrants
be able to maintain their culture in the face of a dominant French culture,
which presses them to identify as French? Is it possible to promote not just
one but many cultures and at the same time maintain the cultural heritage
of France? Is France flexible enough to adapt and take into account the rec-
ognition needs of its immigrant populations? By national identity I mean
the constructed set of values, symbols, and beliefs that come to be viewed
subjectively by a group of people as being ancestrally related and originat-
ing in the long-forgotten past that pre-dates even the nation. Nancy Morris
calls it “an individual’s sense of belonging to a collectivity that calls itself a
nation” (Morris, 1995, p. 14).
The values, the symbols, and the beliefs, as well as the mindset, language,
traditions, and even religion have become those elements that are to be
claimed by a community as common amongst them. Community members
might even state that they have a common destiny. Their past, present, and
future are controlled for all intents and purposes by a national identity
that is considered to be real. Often, national identity is applied to a com-
munity grouped together into a nation, and on rare occasions subgroups,
such as the Breton community in Brittany, France, or the Corsicans, might
state that they too possess a national identity different from the dominant
French identity. However, national identity relies upon the subjective be-
lief of a community that is transformed into a state of being. The com-
munity believes that they have the common elements that founded their
group. National identity is a crucial factor in integrating individuals into a
nation. Milton Esman defines national identity as the “set of meanings that
individuals impute to their membership in an ethnic community, including
those attributes that bind them to that collectivity and that distinguish it
from others in their relevant environment. A psychological construct that
can evoke powerful emotional responses, ethnic identity normally conveys
strong elements of continuity” (Esman, 1994, p. 27).
With this in mind, in recent years integration in France has meant pass-
ing a national test (at first in written format and then orally which is ad-
ministered at the time that an immigrant applies for French nationality).
Despite the fact that there was no official law requiring a test to be taken by
applicants to nationality, it was systematically carried out. The test attempts
to tap into immigrants’ knowledge of French culture, and by implication,
their desire to be French citizens. But, how valid are these tests at tapping
into a respondent’s’ knowledge of French culture and history, let alone
 National Identity in France  247

their desire in identifying as French? There is an underlying assumption

being made that French citizens are knowledgeable about French culture
simply by being born and living in France. If this is so, then French nation-
als should perform well on these civic exams. The assumption lends itself
nicely to an empirical examination. The purpose of my chapter is to test
such an assumption. I examine results from tests administered to two popu-
lations: a sample of the general French population and a sample of univer-
sity students. My results seriously call into question the validity of such tests
if they assume that French nationals would perform well simply by being
born and raised in France. Another validity concern is whether these exams
actually measure national identity, but examining such a question is beyond
the scope of this chapter.
Before starting my analyses, I provide a brief overview and discussion of
the national identity research, how the research is reflected in debates in
France, and where France stands in relation to these theories. I am particu-
larly interested in the relationship between France’s civic tests and their
relationship to the major theories of national identity.

BACKGROUND

Theories of National Identity

Essentialist and Constructivist Theories of National Identity

Essentialists. Essentialist theories regarding national identity espouse the
belief that there are innate attributes that are essential to the founding and
the functioning of a national identity of a particular nation. The essence of
national identity is unalterable, unchanging, and eternal. National identity
is fixed and based on ethnicity, a common language, common values, birth,
and blood.
Not only does essentialist theory entail the listing of essential elements,
but it also allows the condemnation of those that either do not possess these
elements, or those that possess different national identities. National iden-
tities, as seen through the eyes of essentialists, limit movements and halt
changes “to impose a single, drastically simplified group identity, which
denies the complexity of people’s lives, the multiplicity of their identifica-
tions and the cross-pulls of their various affiliations” (Fraser, 2001, p. 24).
Culture becomes the property of the dominant group and can only be pos-
sessed by that group. All others are forbidden from either participating in
or benefiting from the community until they have shown themselves to be
worthy: “it risks reifying cultures as separate entities by over-emphasizing
the internal homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitimise
repressive demands for cultural conformity” (Benhabib, 2002, p. 68).
248  A. MILNE

Essentialist discourse places the value upon bloodlines, ethnicity, and

national homogeneity that are unbending and cannot be criticized; it is
a fixed and tightly wound viewpoint: “ever more tightly into precisely the
same national logic of purity, authenticity and fixity” (Cowan, 2001, p. 171).
Essentialism reduces national identity to elements that are both histori-
cized and yet, at the same time, de-historicized. National identities are built
out of a fictitious history that comes to be taken as national tradition, be-
come unchanging and can never be modified. Social and cultural change
becomes impossible. All attempts to change national identity are simply
returned to the ancestral beginnings of the community, and is so far in the
past that it has become unquestionable.
Constructivists. The constructivist approach describes national identity
as a socially constructed concept. According to this theoretical paradigm,
French national identity is socially constructed, and emerges through the
interaction of individuals. National identity is used by politicians to maintain
their power by manipulating the population. Politicians, via state institutions,
are given the authority of carrying out structural changes, such as domestic
and international affairs, and other processes that influence national identity
and alter society (Wendt, 1992). Social structures, the patterned and routine
ways of behavior and social organization, are controlled by the state.
Individuals or groups that are viewed as speaking “the truth” (Burr,
1995) or those with power (politicians) gain control over identities. They
become powerful forces in manipulating a nation’s population. The con-
structivist approach views national identity as continuously and dynamically
constructing itself:

Community exists in the minds of its members, and should not be confused
with geographic or socio-graphic assertions of “fact.” By extension, the dis-
tinctiveness of communities and, thus the reality of their boundaries, similarly
lies in the mid, in the meanings which people attach to them, not in their
structural forms. (Cohen, 1985, p. 98)

The discourse of national identity in constructivism tends to views im-

migrants as part of the “Other,” rather than the “In” group that adheres to
national identity:

Immigrants are ‘Others’ within the own national territory, who trigger the
explicit or implicit reproduction of categories and characteristics of national
identity. . . . Confronted with or challenged by immigration, nations tend to re-
define or reinforce what they believe to be the basic characteristics binding to-
gether the members of their particular ‘in group.’ (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009, p. 34)

Immigrants are seen as a possible source of distorting national identity

since they represent different cultures and views of society. Following a
 National Identity in France  249

constructivist approach, national identities are a collective identity con-

structed by the belief and the feeling that a community belongs together
due to their language, culture, religion, common history, or civic elements
(such as secularism in France and the belief that they are “equal” in soci-
ety). As social roles change in society, so does national identity.

Critique
Identities serve group interests and they are believed to be the essence of
a nation, and yet are used for political gain. Huntington believed that one
reason why civilizations clashed was due to cultural differences that are im-
mutable, stating that “cultural differences promote cleavages and conflicts”
(Huntington, 1996, p. 128). Essentialists believe that identity is ahistorical,
coherent, integrated, and fixed. Constructivists believe that national iden-
tity can be changed and that politicians use national identity as a means
of influencing people. Can we not also consider the development of the
metissage of society to counteract the Essentialist arguments? There is some
danger from political discourse claiming that we must not allow national
identity to be altered, and that we must preserve national ideals and myths.
For example, does France really treat all its citizens equally despite equality
being a significant factor in its national identity motto? Until 2015, France
has as its most recent gender-equality law dating back to 1975. The 1975 law
and the 2015 laws both promote equality between men and women in the
workplace, and yet women continue to earn about 16% less than men for
the same job. When did France, upholding the precepts of democracy, have
a good rating on the Democracy Index, where it is currently listed as being
a “flawed democracy,” ranking 27th position (2014) in the world?
Looking back into the past to one’s roots may be important to a com-
munity; however, one’s roots are just a minor part of identity. The problem
with national identities is that they tend to be constructed upon myths and
lies. They are given a disproportionate place in the nation by the State, as
a way of controlling its population. Searching for one’s identity is part of
growing into something different and it is part of what makes us who we
are. However, I would argue that our national identities are not unalterably
fixed. Viewing national identity as fixed ultimately places a nation in the
past, not the present. Using a civic test to determine one’s integration in
society is superficial because it fails to tap into a feeling of belonging, nor
will it measure the same feelings citizens have of their own country.
When the State only recognizes citizens, it becomes a closed system and
blurs the balance between citizenship and nationality, which gave birth to
the nation-state:

The tragedy of the nation-state was that the people’s rising national conscious-
ness interfered with these functions. In the name of the will of the people the
250  A. MILNE

state was forced to recognize only “nationals” as citizens, to grant full civil
and political rights only to those who belonged to the national community
by right of origin and fact of birth. This meant that the state was partly trans-
formed from an instrument of law into an instrument of the nation. (Arendt,
1998, p. 110)

Separating nationality from citizenship would allow Republicans political

power (Arendt, 1968). To be sure, citizens would actively participate in
public affairs, but national identity would wane. Cultural unity based upon
nationality is dangerous, and enforced national identity fragments society.
Active citizenship is influenced by making allowance for multiple identities
rather than just one national identity.

Essentialists, Constructivists, and National Identity

in France

In 2007, the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and

Co-development3 was created by the President at the time, Nicolas Sarkozy,
and brought the topics of immigration and national identity to the fore-
front of national debate. The creation of the Ministry was not merely sym-
bolic, it reflected a real national concern about French national identity
and growing fears among some segments of the French population about
immigrants and how they were changing French society.
National identity is assumed to create group cohesion through a sense of
belonging to a community (Meyran, 2009; Resch, 2001). Creating a feeling
of belonging to a country is based on similarity among a national popula-
tion. Globalization, democratization, and travel all increased contact with
other cultures and heightened knowledge of differences among cultures
(Huntington, 1997). These factors also led to fears that unique national
identities will be lost unless they are protected. In this section, I attempt to
place recent debates in France about national identity within the national
identity research. That is, I organize the French national identity debates
within one of the two major identity models: Essentialist/Primordial ver-
sus Constructivist/Postmodernist. I then attempt to identify where France’s
strategy of testing immigrants’ knowledge of French culture falls within this
framework.

The Essentialist/Primordial Argument and Practices in France

France’s national identity is largely based on cultural elements from
the Roman Empire and Antiquity (Resch, 2001). Cultural elements were
chosen that are synonymous with the French Republic (the olive branch
in the right hand of Marianne, the Fasces of Lictor,4 etc.), but when they
were constructed in the 19th century, they had little to do with France. In
 National Identity in France  251

creating their national identities, many countries emulated the Roman Re-
public and aspired to become recognized for their greatness. Mythology is a
defining factor in a nation’s history, though France presents this mythology
as historical fact, thus giving it some legitimacy.
The construction of French identity was clearly planned. In the moments
that followed the French Revolution, the revolutionary decision-makers
had the belief that there should be complete liberty to speak the language
that one should wish in the regions of France. Monarchs in France had
done very little historically to stop subjects speaking anything other than
their local vernacular. The Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts (1539) only made
French the language of legal documents and the written laws, but it did
not impose French as the official language of the nation. However, when
the old provinces of the monarchy and the Revolution reinforced the uni-
fication of the country and the centralization of the administrative power
in France, it became increasingly necessary to construct French identity
through the notion of one language and one nation. Allowing the peasants
to speak their regional languages would mean that they would remain in
obscurantism. French would enable enlightenment and unification. Henri
Grégoire wrote the “Rapport sur la nécessité et les moyens d’anéantir les patois
et d’universaliser l’usage de la langue françoise”5 in 1794 and presented it to
the French state. It showed that at that time only one in five French people
actually spoke French. The lack of linguistic uniformity would bring about
antidemocratic feelings if the people of the country were unable to un-
derstand and participate in debates that were going on in the opinion of
the decision-makers. Thus, the objective was to annihilate local minority
languages by forbidding them and imposing French as the language of in-
struction and daily use everywhere. French revolutionaries constructed that
unity through language.
Rituals, symbols, and cultural practices are important for national iden-
tity. A nation needs shared values in order to be operational (Schnapper,
2007). However, no culture can exist on its own without interaction with
other cultures. If it chooses to remain isolated, it will become stagnant in
terms of its development (Lévi-Strauss, 1952). We can only be French, by
opposition to the British, the Germans, or the Dutch. We can only find
identity where we recognize our differences with those that are outside the
group. But opposition from within the group is also important for further
development. France has faced many external and internal tensions chal-
lenging its identity (Lagrange, 2010; Rivera, 2010). Consequently, national
identity has emerged as an important topic, especially in the promotion of
specific French values and symbols.
However, in promoting national identity, immigrants are portrayed as the
Other, not really part of the Republic. The external pressures placed upon
France may be due to a feeling of humiliation, defined as “the enforced
252  A. MILNE

lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or

strips away their pride, honour or dignity” (Lindner, 2000). The Old World
has been in decline since the late 19th century, and France is one of for-
merly great old world empires that has been in decline. The French Empire
has lost its once-immense power, declining from a world leader to a middle
power that attempts to save its lost power by attempting to maintain influ-
ence around the world (Wolton, 2004, p. 13). France has endeavored to
maintain that influence by threatening other world powers that it will act
alone on major global issues, such as when President De Gaulle withdrew
from NATO in 1966 due to the lack of fair balance of power between the
United States and other members, or with regard to President Bush’s inva-
sion of Iraq, and France’s threat to use its veto at the United Nations Secu-
rity Council. France’s lost world status has driven it to make superficial and
feeble stances on many important global issues.
The invasion of France in June 1940 by Nazi Germany and the occupation of
the country, followed by the loss of colonies in Asia and Africa in the 1950s and
the 1960s, signaled its historic downfall. The defeat and occupation of France
has had a profound effect on the perception of national identity. The historical
discourse in the post-war years by De Gaulle strongly promoted the need to pres-
ent history in other terms, so that the French people might have “dreams that
elevate them instead of truths that degrade them” (De Gaulle, 2000).
Other events have also conspired to humiliate France. The recent kill-
ings at the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris and the subsequent
hostage taking at the kosher supermarket by three radical Islamic-funda-
mentalist terrorists have brought into question the validity of certain poli-
cies in France, such as the banning of the wearing of the full veil (Septem-
ber 14th 2010: Loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public,
“Act prohibiting concealment of the face in public space”) or the real or
perceived integration of Muslims in France.
Implemented or proposed policies reflecting the Essentialist paradigm. In
the wake of the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015 perpetrated against
the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, political discourse became radically
Essentialist. The suburbs, the seat of the apparent social problem in
France, according to politicians, is due (in their words) to the violence that
categorizes those places. The inhabitants of such places are no longer seen
as the result of the social dysfunction of certain zones in the country, but as
a sub-population considered to be dangerous for France.
Rather than addressing the problem of inequalities in the suburbs,
there have been comments about the need to increase and tighten con-
trol of these areas. Essentializing and racializing the immigrant suburbs
raises questions about ethnic origins and exacerbates the Essentialist view
of national identity. Valérie Pécresse (former spokeswomen of the Sarkozy
 National Identity in France  253

government between 2011 and 2012 as well as Minister of the Budget at

the same date) immediately spoke of the “need for a U.S.-style Patriot Act.”
The French government, headed by Prime Minister Valls, had already
adopted measures to fight terrorism in September 2014, and in the process
eroded civil liberties. These measures included travel restrictions, control-
ling the freedom of movement via bans on leaving the country, or adminis-
trative blocking of certain internet websites. But, in the wake of the terrorist
attack in January 2015, Prime Minister Valls proposed individualized prison
cells for terrorists’ prisoners in an effort of removing the spread of radical
and dangerous ideologies into the French suburbs that are perceived to be
a threat to France’s Essentialist national identity. In 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy’s
government proposed screening immigration applicants for DNA to prove
their genetic bloodlines when applying to join family members; it was re-
fused by the Constitutional Council of France. French decision makers and
politicians continue to deny the real source of the problem: social isolation,
exclusion, and severe economic inequalities. As Albert Einstein once said,
“You cannot solve a problem with the same mindset that created it.”

The Constructivist/Postmodernist Argument and Practices in France

Constructivism in France. National identity is based on the invented or
imagined history of a nation’s past. National identity is a myth, constructed
in the present and based on the past (Meyran, 2009; Anderson, 1996;
Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). A common history is based on ambiguous
points of time in the past, handed down from generation to generation,
deformed and changed and that becomes a myth. National myths are part
of national identity. The origins and beginnings of a nation are either
imagined or so far in the past that they are barely recognized by a nations’
citizenry, who simply acquiesce and accept these invented/imagined myths.
The French state has addressed its concern about national identity by
testing its immigrant populations. The test was the creation of the Ministry.
The Ministry was intended to promote national identity in France. Indeed,
its main goals may be deduced from its official title: The Ministry of Im-
migration, Integration, National Identity, and Co-development. Its name
embodies a specific ideological view about immigrants and yet is destined
to fail in its goal because it negatively emphasizes differences about im-
migrants; it basically sends a message to the nation that immigrants are
the “Other.” National identity has been reduced to a list of elements that
French citizens should possess as proof of their Frenchness.
When the Ministry was created it had four main objectives, which were to:

1. Control immigration in France.

2. Create a program of integration for immigrants.
3. Conserve and maintain French national identity.
254  A. MILNE

4. Provide for the possibility of co-development in the country of origin

of immigrants.

There is a current fear of foreigners in France. In times of crisis (eco-

nomic, social, and political) there is an introverted assertion of one’s iden-
tity (Ramet & Adamovic, 1995, pp. 102–103).
Globalization has brought about the fear of losing one’s national identity
in an ever-increasing crisscrossing of geographical and relational boundar-
ies. Technology and other factors have led to growing tensions and fears
that national identities will lose or are losing their hold on a nation’s pop-
ulation. Identities should be in constant evolution, but the mythological
part, a major component of national identity, forbids such flexibility and
progress. Identities of nations were chosen and constructed; they are differ-
ent from the identities of other nations.
Implemented or proposed policies reflecting the Constructivist paradigm. The
Charlie Hebdo killings drove the state into action. The state debated whether
satirical newspapers printing caricatures of Mohammed were tantamount
to blasphemy. France, as a secular country, was fearful that there would be
misunderstandings about the freedom of speech and the principle of freedom
of the press. The state and political leaders used the killings as a means of
reiterating the importance of separating Church and State, and thus upholding
a long established law: blasphemy has not been considered a crime since 1789
(although they failed to point out that in the region of Alsace-Moselle, the same
is not true6). The State proposed a superficial ritual.
The State recommended that students take a minute’s silence in
memory of those killed. Over 200 complaints were lodged because some
students refused to participate in the State’s recommended ritual. In re-
sponse, it was suggested that civic education become compulsory and that
students be asked to sing the Marseillaise, the French national anthem,
in class either regularly or every day to ensure that they understand the
patriotism that is necessary to live in France. Granted, the singing of a
song in unison may arouse sentiments of togetherness and belonging,
but a feeling of belonging has to exist in the first place. Politicians in
France continue to design and implement strategies driven by a view that
national identity is immutable and mythological; it is an illogical and mis-
guided viewpoint.

Critique of the Literature

The problem with the idea of national identity is that it is based on the
power of emotional attachment, on inflexibility, and has a negative focus on
differences of those who are not in the inner circle (de Buron-Brun, 2010).
But, the question remains as to how to create that emotion in immigrant
populations. Therein lays the difficulty.
 National Identity in France  255

We live in an era of unprecedented melding of cultures. Perhaps we

might benefit from actually recognizing positive differences that exist be-
tween immigrants and nationals. If we were to peel away these differences,
and if we were to concentrate upon the positive aspects, then it might lead
to greater understanding and improve the likelihood of integration.
Durkheim advanced the conjecture that humans have two selves. First,
there is the individual, composed of unique character traits, personal history,
background, and origins. The second self is our social being, made up of the
sum of habits, standards, values, ideas, thoughts, and emotions. The sum of
our individual and social beings is our personal identity. Durkheim stated,

There exist two beings, while inseparable except by abstraction, remain dis-
tinct. One is made up of all the mental states which apply to ourselves and the
events of our personal lives. This is what might be called the individual being.
The other is a system of ideas, sentiments and tendencies which express in us,
not our personality, but the group of different groups of which we are part;
these religious beliefs, moral beliefs and practices, national or professional
traditions [ . . . ]. (Durkheim, 1956, p. 29)

Sarup believes that there are “two models of identity. The traditional view is
that all dynamics (such as class, gender, and ‘race’) operate simultaneously to
produce a coherent, unified, fixed identity. The more recent view is that identity
is fabricated, constructed, in process, and that we have to consider both psycho-
logical and sociological factors” (Sarup, 1996, p. 14). But, if the sum of our indi-
vidual and social beings is our personal identity, then what is national identity?
It is possible that as society becomes too diverse with too many personal
identities that do not resemble each other, it tends to fragment society, but
it is also possible that if social unity is too great, society may suffer from a
form of sclerosis as noted by Levi-Strauss (1952, p. 41) who pointed out that
“. . . if a culture were left to its own resources, it could never hope to be ‘su-
perior’ . . . and it is for this reason that mankind has remained stationary for
nine-tenths or even more of its history.” There must be a balance between
diversity and unity for a social system to progress.
National identity defines who and what we are in relation to the “Other.”
Through the construction of national identity we create boundaries; bound-
aries between things that are and those that are not. The values and symbols
chosen are within that boundary, protected against infiltration, and change
regardless of whether a group member crosses over a geographical border.

Theory and Research Questions

My basic argument is that national identity is a changing and develop-

ing element of the nation, influenced by culture and the mindset of those
256  A. MILNE

making up the community. The issue is postmodernist and constructivist,

since a test given to applicants for residency confirms the notion that French
national identity is not something that is handed down from generation to
generation through blood ties, but something that the State believes may
be acquired or learned. This raises two questions:

1. Are the present civil tests able to determine immigrants’ “Frenchness”?

2. If these tests were valid, how would French nationals perform on
these exams?

Both questions lead to the following research hypothesis:

Hypothesis: French nationals are expected to perform well on these civic exams
since they are persons who were born and raised in France and have acquired
knowledge and experiences about being French.

It is with this in mind that I decided to undertake research regarding

French nationals and their ability to correctly answer the questions that are
asked of applicants for nationality.

METHODOLOGY

The Integration Test

Since the enactment of the July 24, 2006 law (in effect from January 1,
2007) it is a legal obligation for all immigrants who wish to set up residence
in France to sign a “Contrat d’acceuil et d’intégration” (Welcome and Inte-
gration Contract). The contract is usually signed after attending a half-day
information class. Before obtaining residency (temporary for the first two
years), the immigrant must pass various tests, including a French Language
Test. I now discuss other tests.

Integration Test
Immigrants are asked eight questions. At the present time there is a sug-
gested list of questions and no set type of question. In theory, the immi-
grant may be asked to answer a question on anything related to France,
French life and French society. Currently, there are no plans to either pub-
lish a full list of questions or to bring out a book that all immigrants should
learn in order to pass the test. The French administration refuses to do
either of these things since it does not wish immigrants to actually just learn
the answers off by heart or to respond without real proof of their form of
integration.
 National Identity in France  257

Areas of testing. There are two areas which should play an important role
in that test: The symbols of the Republic and the values of French society.
There are 9 official symbols of the French Republic:

1. Face: Marianne
2. National Anthem: Marseillaise
3. Emblem: Tricolore flag
4. Motto: Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité (Liberty, Equality, and Brotherhood)
5. National holiday: July 14th
6. Founding charter: The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen
7. Animal: Rooster
8. Authority: Seal of the Republic
9. One nation: Fasces of Lictor

Values being tested and testing procedures. Five values are officially
representative of the French Republic:

1. Rights
2. Equality
3. Fraternity
4. Secularism
5. Protection

After arrival, migrants will be evaluated five times if they request natural-
ization. First, there will be an interview upon arrival and a request for a visa.
It should be noted that this process only pertains to migrants from outside
the Europe Union.
Secondly, there will be another test and information gathering during
the half-day. The third test will be administered after the first year of French
residency. The immigrant will be evaluated a fourth time when applying
for a residency permit. The permit can only be applied for after one year
and will allow the immigrant to live in France for five years. The permit is
renewable. Finally, the immigrant will be evaluated upon filing a request to
become a naturalized French citizen.
The questions related to the symbols and the values of the French Re-
public could be in any format (multiple-choice, open, or closed questions).
It is up to the person (prefect or the mayor depending on the size of the
town) administering the questions to determine what and how they wish to
evaluate an immigrant.
The Questions. The French administration uses eight questions to
evaluate immigrants’ French cultural knowledge. These items are based on
258  A. MILNE

suggested areas to be dealt with by the Haut conseil à l’intégration (The High
Council for Integration). The questions are:

1. The 14th of July is a national holiday in France. But, what year does
it commemorate?
2. What is the name of the text that separated the Church from the
State in France?
3. Children that are born outside of wedlock have:
a. More rights than those born in wedlock?
b. Fewer rights than those born in wedlock?
c. The same rights as those born in wedlock?
4. What do the following elements symbolize?

5. What year did the symbol of Marianne first appear in France?

The first question relates to the foundations of the French Republic and
finds its roots in the historical background of the country. The answer that we
should be looking for in this instance is, in actual fact, 1790. The French Re-
public in creating a national holiday on July 14th decided to ignore the date of
July 14th 1789 (the Storming of the Bastille) since it was a bloody reminder of
the loss of lives in the early hours of the Republic. Instead it was decided that
July 14th should commemorate the year 1790 (when there was the Fête de la
Fédération, or the Federation Festival, on the Champ de Mars in Paris), when
French citizens united and celebrated the newly founded Republic in unity.
The second question concerns the central value of France: secularism. The
founding text was the law of 1905, the year in which the Church and the State
became separate entities. From this date onward, France ceased to have an of-
ficial religion. Schools became secular institutions and in the name of equality,
religion was banished from public life and relegated to the private sphere.
The third question concerns the notion of equality in the Republic. All
children, whether born in or out of wedlock, have exactly the same rights
as citizens. The question is supposed to test one’s knowledge of equality of
people in French society.
 National Identity in France  259

The images shown of the allegorical figure of Marianne point to central

values of the Republic. Marianne is often represented in paintings or stat-
ues with a naked breast since she represents the nurturing mother (or wet
nurse) of France. The Phrygian cap that she wears is a piece of clothing that
dates back to the Roman Empire when freed slaves were given the right to
wear it as a means of recognition that they were free. The cap represents
French citizens now being free from the slavery of monarchy. The crown
represents power of the people. The olive branch is a promise of national
peace in response to the bloodshed of the Revolution. Lastly, Marianne
wears the clothes of the Roman Empire, because the French Republic will
be as strong and as widespread as the Roman Empire once was.
Lastly, with reference to question five, 1792 is the date when the allegori-
cal figure of Marianne first appeared in France.
Clearly, the questions put to immigrants are based on founding symbols
and the values of French society, values that one would expect every French-
born citizen to know.

Research Samples

I use students as the starting point for the research on the civil tests. Stu-
dents should be in the best position to answer such questions because they
have recently been exposed to French culture and its symbols. I decided to
interview the students in their 1st year and 5th year of higher education at
university level. The cohort was chosen as a starting point since the Institut
d’Études Politiques (Institutes of Political Studies, IEP) is a prestigious es-
tablishment in France and part of the Sciences-Po network.
Students enrolled in the IEP are selected for entry through an entrance
examination. Traditionally those students with the highest grades after the
French Baccalaureate (High-School leaving diploma) are taken after suc-
cessfully passing the entrance examination. Part of that examination in-
volves French history and general culture of France. Once admitted, stu-
dents follow set courses in History and Law about France.
It also seemed interesting to interview 5th year students since it would
determine whether or not the central values and symbols to the Republic
remained engrained 4 years later. So for all intents and purposes we should
expect a good score on the civil tests from the two groups of students.7 The
cohort was divided into 2 distinct parts (1st year and 5th year) in order to
determine if there was a discrepancy in the answers provided.
In the 1st year cohort the age range of respondents was from 16 to 21
years of age. There were more females than males (61.18% for females and
38.82% for males). This is a demographic factor is exhibited in every year at
Sciences-Po. There are a total of 170 students in this cohort. In the 5th year
260  A. MILNE

cohort the average age was 23 years old and the ages ranged from 21 to 23
years of age. The ratio of females to males was almost identical as for the 1st
year (62.5% for females and 37.5% for males). There were 88 people in this
cohort, making a total of 258 people that were interviewed over a period of
4 days at the IEP of Toulouse, France.
With regard to nationality, 162 people out of 170 for the 1st year cohort
were French nationals. There were 8 people in this cohort that had dual
nationality, French being one nationality. However, it should be stressed
that all were born French and not naturalized. The other nationalities were
Algerian, Belgian, Congolese, German, Irish, Italian, Swiss, and Turkish.
In the 5th year cohort, 92.05% of the people interviewed were French
by birth. There were six people who were dual French nationals (Algeri-
an, Cameroonian, Moroccan, Portuguese, and Swiss). One person was not
French, but a Chinese national resident in France for 5 years.

RESULTS

Question One: Commemoration of July 14th

The correct answer to the first question about the commemoration of

July 14th should be 1790. For the 5th-year cohort, 5.68% of those ques-
tioned provided the correct answer. Some 94.32% provided an incorrect an-
swer. Perhaps this is not surprising since the date of 1789 (and the storming
of the Bastille) is so very much a part of French culture and has superseded
the date of the Federation Festival of 1790. It is surprising however that one
of the questions that is recommended as being a founding element of the
French Republic is answered incorrectly by those people that might be the
most apt at answering it. Interestingly, one immigrant student also gave the
1789 answer and exhibited his integration in French society, but the French
authorities would consider his answer incorrect. There are only five correct
answers from the 5th year cohort out of a total of 88 people interviewed.
The 1st year cohort, composed of 170 students, provided the same sort
of answers. There is a slight improvement over the score that was provided
by the 5th year cohort. Two people interviewed decide not to answer the
question. This may be attributed to the fact that students in the 1st year
are younger and perhaps not as sure about their responses. There were
37 correct answers and 130 incorrect answers. In percentages this means
1.18% did not provide an answer, 77.06% provided an incorrect answer, and
21.76% provided the correct answer.
 National Identity in France  261

Question Two: Separation of Church and State

The second question concerned the separation of Church and State that
occurred in 1905. Given the debates that have been occurring all over Eu-
rope about religion, especially about the wearing of the Muslim veil, the re-
moval of all ostentatious religious signs in schools,8 in the civil service or in
public places, and the prohibition of the wearing of the Burqa or the Niqab
in public places,9 it would seem that the separation of Church and State in
1905 would be well known by French citizens.
Among the 5th year cohort, 89.77% (79 people) provided the correct
answer. Those that did not provide any answer to the question amounted to
6.82% (6 people), while an incorrect answer was provided by 3.41% (3 peo-
ple). Consequently, almost 90% of the students in the 5th-year cohort re-
plied correctly to the question. It would seem that the secularism of France
is well known by this cohort.
The 1st year cohort was more likely than the 5th year cohort to answer
incorrectly. However, only 50% (49.41%) provided the correct answer, 20%
(20%) did not respond at all, and 30.59% provided an incorrect answer.
If we combine both groups of students, we see a general tendency:
63.18% replied correctly by citing the Law of 1905, 21.32% provide the in-
correct answer, and 15.5% leave the answer blank.

Question Three: The Rights of Children Born out

of Wedlock in France

The third question concerned the rights of children born out of wedlock
in France. The correct answer was: Children born out of wedlock have the
same rights as those who are born in wedlock in the name of the Republic’s
value of equality.
For the 5th year cohort, 88.64% answered correctly, 9.09% incorrectly,
and 2.27% failed to provide any answer. It would seem surprising today
in French law to imagine that children who are born outside of marriage
have fewer rights than those that are legitimate children from the marriage.
However, up until 2001 this was not the case.
The 1st year cohort provided 159 correct answers (93.3%), 11 incorrect
answers (6.47%), and no questions were left unanswered. The fact that no
students left the answer blank suggests that the answer was most likely con-
sidered easy by students. How many actually know that it was only intro-
duced legally in the constitution in 2001 is a different matter and perhaps
this might be taken further.
Among both samples, a total of 258 people interviewed, 91.86% respond-
ed correctly, 7.36% answered incorrectly, and 0.78% left the question blank.
262  A. MILNE

Perhaps the reason behind these excellent scores is that students at the IEP
have extensive legal training during their 1st year.

Question Four: French Symbols

Question 4a: The Symbolic Meaning of the Naked Breast of Marianne

Among the 5th year cohort, only 15.9% answered correctly, 67.06% an-
swered incorrectly, and 17.05% left the question blank. Of the 59 incor-
rect answers, 27 people provided the same incorrect answer of “Liberty.”
Only 14 people provided the correct answer of the symbolic meaning for a
“nurturing foster mother”; the Republic that looks after and protects the
citizens of the newly formed State.
The 1st year cohort did a bit worse. Indeed, 13.53% provided a correct
answer, 41.18% answered incorrectly, and 13.53% left the question blank.
Overall, 14.34% of the total sample provided a correct answer, despite
the fact that the allegorical figure has been part of French symbolism since
1792. It would seem that the deep symbolic meaning is indeed unknown by
over half of my sample.

Question 4b: Wearing of the Phrygian Cap

The cap has its origins in Greece (Trojans such as Paris is depicted as
wearing one,10 also Castor and Pollux wear a similar one in mythology), and
in the late Roman Republic, symbolizing freedom from tyranny since slav-
ery. The descendants of slaves wore the cap to show that they were emanci-
pated and citizens of the Empire. In France, the origins of the Phrygian cap
date back to 1790 in the town of Troyes where it was first seen on a statue
representing the nation. It became associated with the idea of freedom and
a rallying point to the cause of revolutionaries, during the Great Terror
(1793–1794). It also became associated with the figure of Marianne.
For the 5th year cohort there were 9 correct answers (10.23%) and 75 in-
correct answers (85.23%), along with 4 answers left blank (4.54%). The vast
majority of respondents answered the ‘Revolution’ (32 people, 42.67%) or the
“Republic” (28 people, 31.82%). The original meaning of freedom from slav-
ery and enfranchisement seems to be completely unknown among this cohort.
The 1st-year cohort performed better, with 49 providing correct answers
(28.82%), 97 incorrect answers (57.06%), and 24 answers that were left
blank (14.12%). There were almost three times more correct answers in
this cohort than in the 5th year cohort. There were also more answers that
were left blank. There was also a reduction in terms of incorrect answers
provided for this question in the 1st year cohort.
Among both cohorts, 66.67% provided incorrect answers to this ques-
tion, 10.85% left the question blank, and 22.48% answered correctly. One
 National Identity in France  263

of the important founding symbols of the French Republic is recognized

but its symbolic meaning is unknown.

Question 4c: Crown Worn by Marianne

The crown symbolizes the power of the people and the Republic. The
5th year cohort provided 10 correct answers (11.36%), 51 incorrect answers
(57.95%), and there were 27 answers left blank (30.68%). The overriding
incorrect answer (provided by 22 people) was that of “sovereignty.” Eight
people replied that the symbolic meaning was “monarchy.”
For the 1st year cohort there was a greater number of those not replying
to this question (60.59% or 103 people). There was a dramatic decrease in
the number of correct answers (3.53% or 6 respondents), and a decrease in
the number of incorrect answers (35.88% or 61 people). The two responses
that stood out in the list of incorrect answers were “victory” (17 people)
and “sovereignty” (16 people).
For both cohorts, 50.39% left it blank. Only 6.20% provided a correct
answer, and 43.41% answered incorrectly.

Question 4d: The Olive Branch Held by Marianne

It is meant to symbolize peace after the bloody Revolution.11 The 5th
year cohort provided 63 correct answers (71.59%), 16 incorrect answers
(18.18%), and left 9 answers blank (10.23%).
The 1st-year cohort did not perform as well as the 5th year cohort. Sixty-eight
people (40%) answered the question correctly. There were 39 people who an-
swered incorrectly (22.94%), and 63 1st year cohort respondents left the answer
blank (37.06%). Overall, there were a total of 131 correct answers (50.78%),
21.32% provided an incorrect answer and 27.91% left the answer blank.

Question 4e: Clothes Worn by Marianne

The Roman toga was traditionally worn by Roman citizens only and was
not allowed to be worn by slaves nor by workers. One had to be free and a
Roman citizen to be able to wear this piece of clothing. The fact that Mari-
anne represents the foster mother of the French people, coupled with the
fact that she is sometimes depicted wearing the toga means that the French
people benefit from the fundamental rights of the Roman Republic (the
right to vote (jus suffragii), the right to property (jus census), and the right
to bequeath one’s goods to one’s heirs, amongst others.
The question was somewhat difficult to answer correctly among the 5th
year cohort. There were no correct answers at all, 39 incorrect answers
(44.32%), and 49 answers left blank (55.68%). There were many proposals
for the symbolic meaning of the clothes worn by Marianne: 18 different
incorrect answers were provided, of which a few stood out (democracy, re-
public, and Latin heritage).
264  A. MILNE

The 1st year cohort provided answers along the same lines as the 5th year
cohort. One person gave the correct answer (0.59%). There were 74 incor-
rect answers (43.53%) and 95 respondents left the question blank (55.88%).
There were 14 different incorrect answers provided by this cohort includ-
ing once again answers such as “democracy” or “Latin heritage.”

Question Five: The Origin Date of Marianne

The 5th and final question of the questionnaire concerned the date
when Marianne first appeared. The correct answer is 1792. Marianne was
officially adopted by the National Convention of September 25th, 1792 and
has been used as the iconic symbol on the Republic’s official seals ever since.
The figure disappeared under Napoleon (on November 9th, 1799) but re-
surfaced under the 3rd Republic (1870–1940). In terms of Marianne’s ori-
gins, it is unclear. Marianne could be based upon the revolutionary Occitan
song entitled Garisou de Marianno or she could be the contraction of two
names Marie and Anne (the aristocracy would have used a hyphen (“Marie-
Anne”), whereas the one-word name ‘Marianne’ would have been consid-
ered less aristocratic and more connected with the common people12).
The 5th year cohort provided 4 correct answers (4.55%), 50 incorrect
answers (56.82%), and 34 respondents left the question blank (38.64%).
Amongst the incorrect answers there were 27 different responses were of-
fered by this cohort. Dates range from 1789 to 1974. The overriding answer
is the year 1848 (the start of the 2nd Republic in France).
The 1st year cohort provided 5 correct answers (2.94%), 95 incorrect an-
swers (55.88%), and 70 left the question blank (41.18%). The percentages
remain very similar between the two cohorts.
Overall, for both cohorts, 3.49% provided the correct answer, 56.2% pro-
vided the incorrect date, and 40.31% left it blank.
Given the poor performance on these questions by IEP students, it
would seem interesting to widen the scope of the research by examining re-
sponses among the general public. My research hypothesis did not receive
confirmation from these findings. I did not find that native born students
performed well on these questions. More importantly, it tends to cast doubt
on the ability of such a test to evaluate the “Frenchness” of natives, much
less immigrants. Table 8.1 provides data for the above study.
As a control, I decided to compare these results with those from the gen-
eral French public.13 Please refer to Table 8.2.
Overall, the general publics’ responses exhibited a strong association
with the IEP student responses. I will only focus on those answering cor-
rectly. Among the general public, the question with the greatest correct re-
sponses was Question 3: equality. For this question, nearly 84% of the public
 National Identity in France  265

TABLE 8.1 Overall Numbers and Percentages From Both Cohorts

of IEP Students
Numbers Percentages
Blank Correct Incorrect Blank Correct Incorrect
Q1 July 14th 2 42 214 0.78 16.28 82.95
Q2 Secularism 40 163 55 15.50 63.18 21.32
Q3 Equality 2 237 19 0.78 91.86 7.36
Q4a Foster Mother 85 37 136 32.95 14.34 52.71
Q4b Freedom 28 58 172 10.85 22.48 66.67
Q4c Peace 130 16 112 50.39 6.20 43.41
Q4d Power 72 131 55 27.91 50.78 21.32
Q4e Roman Republic 144 1 113 55.81 0.39 43.80
Q5 1792 104 9 145 40.31 3.49 56.20
Note: Bolded numbers indicate answers with highest score.

TABLE 8.2 Overall Numbers and Percentages for the General Public
Numbers Percentages
Blank Correct Incorrect Blank Correct Incorrect
Q1 July 14th 33 50 474 5.92 8.98 85.10
Q2 Secularism 230 159 168 41.29 28.55 30.16
Q3 Equality 2 467 88 0.36 83.84 15.80
Q4a Foster Mother 214 151 192 38.42 27.11 34.47
Q4b Freedom 171 69 317 30.71 12.39 56.91
Q4c Peace 205 226 126 36.80 40.57 22.62
Q4d Power 276 35 246 49.55 6.28 44.17
Q4e
Q5 1792 225 56 276 40.39 10.05 49.55
Note: Bolded numbers indicate answers with highest score.

provided the correct answer. In contrast, question 4d, power, received the
lowest correct response rate: only 6% answered correctly
The overall trend of both cohorts combined provided us with the follow-
ing percentages in Table 8.3. Both samples did not perform well on the test.
Of the eight questions that were common between the two cohorts, four
exhibited a significant number of incorrect answers (the national holiday,
the foster mother of France, freedom and 1792), two had a large number of
blanks (peace and power), and questions had a majority of correct respons-
es (secularism and equity). The question regarding equality in the Republic
is the only one where a majority of respondents answered correctly (nearly
90% of people answered it correctly).
266  A. MILNE

TABLE 8.3 Responses From Combined IEP and Public

Percentages
Blank Correct Incorrect
Q1 July 14th 3.35 12.63 84.02
Q2 Secularism 28.40 45.86 25.74
Q3 Equality 0.57 87.85 11.58
Q4a Foster Mother 35.69 20.72 43.59
Q4b Freedom 20.78 17.43 61.79
Q4c Peace 43.60 23.39 33.01
Q4d Power 38.75 28.53 32.74
Q4e
Q5 1792 40.35 6.77 52.88

Figure 8.1 Correct answers between IEP cohorts and the general public.

Figure 8.1 displays the relationship between the percentage of correct

answers among the IEP cohorts and the general public. Seven of the an-
swers provided by the general public cohort were below 50% (in compari-
son to five of the IEP cohort).
There is a clear association between the correct responses between both
samples. Unfortunately, the overriding conclusion is that both groups
would have failed the exam, and failed to qualify for residency in France.
 National Identity in France  267

CONCLUSIONS

France, in its attempt at integrating immigrants, has used a strategy of test-

ing their knowledge of French culture and history. The assumption being
made by those advocating for the use of the test is that French nationals
would perform well on the test simply because they are French. This is
an assumption that has received little, if any, empirical examination. The
purpose of my chapter was to examine the validity of such an assumption
by administering the test to two samples of French citizens: a group of IEP
students and the general public.
The findings from my study show that the majority of French nationals
have little knowledge of the cultural elements that make up their national
identity. While such results do not make them any less French, it does raise
serious questions about the validity of the civics test and whether there is
a discrepancy between the official French administration and the reality
of French society. Will answering these questions ensure that one is more
French or that one is more likely to integrate (or is capable of integrating)
into French society? Another question that my research raises is: Does it
make sense to demand something from immigrants which the general pub-
lic is unable to provide as well? The civics test is clearly inadequate for its
intended purpose.
Integration takes time. Research has consistently found that over time,
the children of immigrants and their own children will be well integrated
into their host society (Abramson, 1981; Child, 1943; Glazer, 1993; Gleason,
1981; Warner & Srole, 1945; Whyte, 1955). But this research also finds that
integration takes many paths, depending on several factors, such the recep-
tion context, the socio-economic status of the co-ethnic community, and
the degree of hostility/discrimination (Portes & Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997).
The linear path that French officials seem to prefer would require develop-
ing positive contexts for immigrants, such as economic opportunities for
immigrants that would provide economic stability; good, safe school; and
the reduction of hostility and discrimination against immigrants.

NOTES

1. Retrieved from http://www.iau-idf.fr/detail-dune-etude/etude/les-descen-

dants-dimmigres-vivant-en-ile-de-france.html on February 23rd 2015.
2. Between September 2008 and February 2009, there was a study carried out
(‘Trajectoroires et origines’—transalated as Trajectories and Origins) to de-
termine this figure, along with the existing statistics provided by the ‘Institut
national de la statistique et des etudes économiques’ (French National Office
of Statistics, INSEE).
268  A. MILNE

3. This ministry became known from 18th March 2008 as the Ministry of Immi-
gration, Integration, National Identity and Joint Development.
4. Fasces lictoriae symbolize power in ancient Rome. The lictors were a group of
subordinate officials that carried fasces (a bundle of birch rods with an axe
blade emerging from the side) and accompanied magistrates. It came to rep-
resent both unity (the birch rods were bound together and formed one) and
power and jurisdiction. It came to be associated with the unity of France and
the supremacy of power and justice in post-revolutionary France.
5. “Report on the Necessity and Means to Annihilate the Patois and to Univer-
salize the Use of the French Language.”
6. In 1905, the Concordat of 1801 was abrogated in France, except in the area
of Alsace-Moselle. Due to Alsace-Moselle being under German rule at the
time, the Concordat still held, meaning that four religions were recognized:
the Jewish religion, Catholicism, the Lutheran religion and the Reformed
church. Religious education is therefore compulsory there both in primary
and secondary schooling (unless the parents opt out of that, with a secular
equivalent). It is also true that blasphemy laws must still be abided by (except,
naturally, for Islam, since this religion was never recognized as an official reli-
gion in 1801 in the original law). So, in theory, it would be acceptable to com-
mit blasphemy against Islam, but not against Catholicism or the other three
religions.
7. The interviews took place on November 3 and 4, 2010 (1st year) and November
25 and 26, 2010 (5th year) on the premises of the IEP in Toulouse.
8. This has not been allowed in schools since 2004. As from July 2010 the French
national Assembly approved a bill that banned the wearing of full veils on
public transport and in public services. In September 2010 this law was ex-
tended to cover all public places in France (effective as from April 2011).
9. Despite the fact that the Ministère de l’Intérieur (Home Office) stated in July
2009 that there were only 367 women in France who wore a full veil.
10. A pileus or pileum was a traditional cap often in felt.
11. The olive branch is often associated with the Roman goddess Pax or can find
its roots in the olive branch that was carried by the dove as a sign from God to
Noah after the Great Flood.
12. There is also the added reference here to the name of Mary, mother of Jesus
and her own mother, Anne. Thus, the result is that we have a religious ele-
ment that is the founding symbol of a secular country today. This seems to
point to the fact that France has only been secular since 1905. However, the
religious aspect in the reading of the symbol of Marianne seems to have been
lost today by French citizens. Secularism is so part and parcel of their make-
up in society today that they could hardly conceive of there being any time
presecularism.
13. A study was carried out via a questionnaire on internet made available to the
general public between January 26th and January 31st 2011. This cohort will
be referred to as the ‘general public cohort’ and was made up of 557 people.
Ages ranged from 18 to 46 years old, but the vast majority (447) was aged
between 19 and 25 years old. This was important since the ages corresponded
to the ages that we had already interviewed at the IEP and meant that a cor-
 National Identity in France  269

relation would be significant. The general public cohort was made up of pre-
dominantly French nationals (537 people or 96.41%).

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 PART III
NATIONAL IDENTITY: THE IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE
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 CHAPTER 9

“HOW CAN I FEEL BELGIAN

IF BELGIANS
DON’T ACCEPT ME?”
Ethnic Boundary Perception and National
Identity Among Turkish Belgians

Klaartje Van Kerckem

This chapter presents an empirical study about perceptions of exclusion by

the mainstream among Turkish Belgians, and how these perceptions shape
their national and ethnic self-identifications. Being Europe’s largest immi-
grant and Muslim population, Turkish Europeans have been the target of
many anti-immigrant and Islamophobic sentiments and practices. Differ-
ent studies demonstrate that stereotypes and anti-immigrant sentiments are
stronger towards Muslims, compared to other immigrant groups (Allen &
Nielsen, 2002; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008).
In many European countries, the strained relationship between the
mainstream population on the one hand, and several Muslim populations
on the other hand, can best be described as “bright ethnic boundaries”

National Identity, pages 273–309

Copyright © 2016 by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 273
274  K. VAN KERCKEM

(Alba, 2005). Muslim immigrants and their descendants not only experi-
ence general anti-immigrant sentiments, but are also seen as the quintes-
sential Other that is difficult to integrate (Betz & Meret, 2009; Field, 2007;
Kunst, Tajamal, Sam, & Ulleberg, 2012). In both everyday and public dis-
course, Muslims are depicted as “the outsider within”: a group that is dif-
ferent from “Europeans” in terms of culture and religion, and therefore
non-belonging.
In addition to such discursive practices of Othering (Jensen, 2011;
Schneider, 2001), there is also the de-facto exclusion of members of Muslim
groups, through everyday and institutional discrimination in the labor mar-
ket, in housing, in education, and in social relations (De Rycke, Swynge-
douw, & Phalet, 1999; Granato & Kalter, 2001; Silberman, Alba, & Fournier,
2006; Skrobanek & Jobst, 2010; Stevens, 2008; Vandezande, Fleischmann,
Baysu, Swyngedouw, & Phalet, 2009; Van der Bracht & Van de Putte, 2013).
Muslims are an excluded group.
I have two objectives in this study. First, I wish to explore how exclu-
sionary practices are experienced by members of the Turkish population
in Belgium. A large number of studies focus on various ways in which in-
dividuals and institutions from the mainstream culture draw and enforce
ethnic boundaries, but little is known about how members of the targeted
group experience and interpret these exclusionary behaviors and practices
in their daily lives. This is an important issue in studying the impact of
exclusion on subjective perceptions of belonging, and ethnic and national
self-identification.
I argue that in exploring how exclusionary practices are experienced,
it is important to pay attention to both behavioral and symbolic practices.
Most studies that focus on how an exclusionary context shapes national or
ethnic self-identification take perceived discrimination as their independent
variable. However, ethnic boundaries have both a symbolic and a behav-
ioral dimension (Wimmer, 2013), and it is therefore important to not only
focus on perceived behavioral discrimination, but also to study how ethnic
boundaries are constructed through discourse and other forms of symbolic
representation and how this is perceived by members of minority groups.
A second objective of this study is to examine how exclusionary dis-
courses and behaviors shape Turkish Belgians’ ethnic and national self-
identification. Acts of categorization and exclusion can have a far-reaching
impact on ethnic minorities’ self-identification (Jenkins, 2008; Rumbaut,
2005; Waters, 1990), and the discursive context in which the second gen-
eration grows up directly affects feelings of belonging (Crul & Schneider,
2010). Surprisingly, European scholarship has devoted very little attention
to how anti-immigrant and Islamophobic sentiments and discourses shape
the self-identification of Muslim immigrants and their descendants. A lim-
ited number of studies have investigated how perceived discrimination affects
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  275

self-identification, ethnically and nationally (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012;

Maxwell, 2009; Skrobanek, 2009). Yet, much less research has been con-
ducted on how discursive boundary drawing—for instance through practices
of Othering, categorization, or subtle “everyday racism” (Essed, 1991)—
shapes national and ethnic identification. In this study, I address both.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. After a brief introduction to
the Turkish population in Belgium, I introduce the theoretical model that
will guide the data analysis. I start with a discussion of mechanisms of eth-
nic boundary construction, focusing on both its behavioral and symbolic
dimensions. This section subsequently reviews theories of ethnic and na-
tional identification, paying particular attention to the importance of the
internal-external dialectic of identification. In the final part of the theo-
retical section, I put the two together to build a theoretical model that can
help to analyze how symbolic and behavioral exclusion shapes ethnic and
national identification.
After an overview of the data and methods used, I present the findings
to the two main research questions. I start by analyzing the participants’
narratives of exclusion, discussing the different ways in which Turkish-Belgian
research participants experience exclusion in their everyday lives. In the
second part of the analysis, I analyze the participants’ identity narratives,
and link them to their narratives of exclusion. I distinguish five different
narratives, based on how Turkish Belgian research participants position
themselves in terms of national and ethnic identity, and draw attention to
the internal-external dialectic of identification—how self-identity is shaped by
both internal assertions and external categorizations (Jenkins, 1994). As
such, I set out to demonstrate that both context (exclusion and Othering)
and self-understandings interact in the formation of a stable identity, and
that people are active agents in constructing their own identities by reclaim-
ing, reaffirming, or rejecting those identities that they are denied from the
outside.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Turks in Belgium: A Brief History

Turkish migration to Belgium offers a classic example of the labor migra-

tion typical in Western Europe during the 1960s and early 1970s (Reniers,
1999). Immigrants originated mainly from rural areas in Turkey and had
little or no formal education (Phalet & Heath, 2011). In 1961, 320 Turkish
nationals resided in Belgium, but by 1970 the number increased to 20,000
(Schoonvaere, 2013). In 1974, the Belgian government stopped granting
visas to low-skilled workers in 1974, but migration from Turkey continued,
276  K. VAN KERCKEM

via family reunification and family formation. The Turkish population is

now the fifth largest foreign population in Belgium behind the Moroccan,
Italian, Dutch, and French populations.
Over fifty years after the first Turkish migrants arrived in Belgium, eth-
nic boundaries between the established population and Turkish Belgians
are still bright, both in social and symbolic terms. The social aspect of the
boundary is reflected in high inequality and an ethnic patterning of social
relations. Turks occupy one of the lowest rungs on the socioeconomic lad-
der and are “at the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy” (Phalet & Heath, 2011,
p. 162). Turkish immigrants and their offspring are among the most disad-
vantaged members in Belgian society in terms of educational attainment
(Timmerman, Vanderwaeren, & Crul, 2003). Although the second genera-
tion does significantly better than their parents in terms of educational at-
tainment, the “ethnic disadvantage” (Phalet & Heath, 2011) persists into
the second generation. A significant number of Turkish children are fun-
neled into lower-ranked vocational tracks, have drop-out rates four times
greater than Belgian students, and the number of Turkish Belgians who
attend university is low (Duquet, Glorieux, Laurijssen, & Van Dorsselaer,
2005; Lacante et al., 2007; Phalet, Deboosere, & Bastiaenssen, 2007). Ad-
ditionally, the unemployment rates for Turkish Belgians are much greater
than for the Belgian population. Moreover, Turkish Belgians are less likely
to enter professional, administrative, and managerial careers (Phalet &
Heath, 2011; VDAB, 2012; Vertommen & Martens, 2005).
Social boundaries may also be measured by intermarriage rates. In 1991,
7% of all married Turkish men and 3.8% of Turkish women had a Western-
European spouse (Lievens, 1999). A recent study documents an increase
in intermarriage rates between Turks and Western Europeans over the past
two decades, but numbers still remain relatively low: 14.3% of the Turkish
men who got married in 2008—but only 8.2% of the women—married an
EU-citizen (Van Kerckem, Van der Bracht, Stevens, & Van de Putte, 2013).
Belgium is one of Europe’s “leading” countries regarding racist and
anti-immigrant sentiments and right-wing opinions (Quillian, 1995; Zick,
Pettigrew, & Wagner, 2008). In addition, such sentiments are consistently
stronger when it concerns Muslims. For instance, in 2000, Belgium ranked
second compared to 29 other European countries in terms of ethnic preju-
dice towards Muslims, with 22.7% of the respondents objecting to a Muslim
neighbor (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). These findings have been corrobo-
rated by Billiet and Swyngedouw (2009), who report that in Flanders, 48%
of the voters have “an extremely negative opinion on Islam and Muslims,”
42% consider Islamic culture more violent than other cultures, and a stun-
ning 81% believe that Muslim men are “too domineering” towards their
women. In Flanders, these Islamophobic and anti-immigrant sentiments
are reflected in high political racism, expressed as a vote for Vlaams Belang,
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  277

an extreme-right wing party with anti-immigrant views (Billiet & De Witte,

2008). Undoubtedly, the violence committed by a few Muslim extremists,
and the January 2015 and June 2015 attacks in France, are fueling and exac-
erbating Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiments. Given these attitudes,
it should not surprise that Turkish Belgians—being Muslim—experience
much discrimination, especially in the labor market and in housing (De
Rycke et al., 1999; Stevens, 2008; Van der Bracht & Van de Putte, 2013).

Boundary Construction by the Mainstream

The above described forms of exclusion and Othering can all be regard-
ed as ways in which the mainstream contributes to the construction of the
ethnic boundary between the established population and people of Turk-
ish descent. According to Barth (1969), ethnic boundaries between groups
do not persist because of continuing cultural differences, but because of
the continuous construction of these boundaries by groups on both side
of the boundary. Processes of ethnic boundary construction can be subdi-
vided into two separate, but equally important mechanisms: (a) marking
the boundary—the symbolic dimension of ethnic boundary construction;
and (b) creating barriers that structure intergroup relations and access to
resources—the behavioral component of ethnic boundary construction.
Both dominant and subordinate groups actively take part in the construc-
tion of ethnic difference and boundaries. For the purpose of this study,
however, I limit the following discussion to the different ways in which the
established population draws boundaries (for an example of how subordinate
groups draw boundaries, see Van Kerckem, Van de Putte, & Stevens, 2013).

Symbolic Dimension of Boundary Construction

A first step towards the construction and maintenance of a boundary
is the continuous dichotomization and marking of a symbolic boundary
between insiders and outsiders (Barth, 1969; Lamont & Molnar, 2002; Wim-
mer, 2013). This process of boundary marking consists of the categorization
of others as members of another group, as well as the identification of par-
ticular contrasting cultural diacritica—a careful selection of those cultural
differences that help to define one’s group identity in opposition to that of
the other group. It is through these carefully chosen contrasting diacritica
that dichotomous notions of “us” versus “them” are created, lumping indi-
viduals together in “objectively” differentiated groups.
Symbolic boundaries are essentially cognitive, but they tend to mani-
fest themselves through discourse—language in use, both in spoken and
written form. On a micro-level, examples of discursive boundary drawing
include practices of social categorization and Othering. The practice of
278  K. VAN KERCKEM

Othering serves to mark and name those thought to be different from one-
self, and magnifies and enforces the idea that “the other” is essentially dif-
ferent (Weis, 1995). In essence, Othering is a type of discursive everyday
racism—a term coined by Essed (1991) to refer to “practices that infiltrate
everyday life and become part of what is seen as ‘normal’ by the dominant
group.” In societies where most citizens express commitment to democratic
principles of justice, equality, and fairness, the notion of everyday racism is
important to understand how ethnic and racial inequalities and boundaries
are perpetuated (Beagan, 2003).
Taken individually, the effect of each utterance might seem trivial, but
the cumulative impact is far less so: “Each racist joke, each racist assump-
tion, occurs in the context of a personal and collective history of such trivial
incidents, in the context of one’s own past experiences of racism and the
experiences of friends and loved ones” (Beagan, 2003, p. 853).
Boundary construction is not necessarily restricted to the micro-level:
symbolic boundaries can also be marked on a meso- or macro-level, outside
of direct interaction. Examples include political pamphlets of anti-immi-
grant parties, policy documents that focus on integration of immigrants/
ethnic minorities, or representations of Muslims in print media. Consider-
ing that public discourse is typically transmitted through the media, media
play a very important role in shaping and reproducing interethnic rela-
tions, ethnic boundaries, and identities. Consequently, the media have to
be a major target in the analysis of identity politics and boundary work
(Schneider, 2001).

Behavioral Dimensions of Boundary Construction

The symbolic dimension of ethnic boundary construction can be cou-
pled with a behavioral dimension, in which case people behave in a par-
ticular way vis-à-vis in-group and out-group members. Behavioral dimen-
sions of ethnic boundary construction include processes related to social
closure—the creation of barriers that make valued resources within the
group unavailable to outsiders—as well as processes that aim to strengthen
in-group cohesion. Social closure typically occurs through discrimination
of members of the other group, hence denying them access to resources
within one’s own group. Wimmer (2013) distinguishes three modes of dis-
crimination, depending on the degree of formalization. Legalized discrimi-
nation is formal and involves the institutionalization of ethnic boundaries
by differentiating between the rights of members of different ethnic cat-
egories. Extreme examples include South Africa’s Apartheid regime in the
mid-1900s and American Jim Crow Laws of the late 19th and early 20th
century. Institutional discrimination refers to discrimination that is part of
the day-to-day workings of the state administration that lacks a legal basis.
Wimmer (2013) gives the example of preference and quota policies as a
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  279

soft form of institutionalized ethnic discrimination. Everyday discrimination,

finally, happens in interactions outside the domains of state control. Ex-
amples here include discrimination by employers in the labor market or by
property owners in the housing market.

Symbolic and Behavioral Exclusion of Turkish Belgians

To what extent now are Turkish Belgians the targets of symbolic and be-
havioral exclusion? Given that most people of Turkish descent are Muslim,
and increasingly perceived as such by the established population, symbolic
and behavioral exclusion of Turkish Belgians should be considered against
the backdrop of the country’s attitude towards Islam and Muslims.
In European immigration debates and public discourse, Islam is the fo-
cus of attention, because European identity, despite national variations, re-
mains deeply embedded in Christian tradition in which Muslim immigrants
constitute a visible “other” (Zolberg & Woon, 1999). In Europe, religious
boundaries function in the same way as racial boundaries in the United
States (Bail, 2008; Foner & Alba, 2008): it is religion—more specifically
Islam—that marks the boundary between “us” and “them,” between those
who belong to the mainstream and those who are considered outsiders.
The boundary is “bright” (Alba, 2005) because there is no ambiguity over
who belongs where: Islam and the culture of Muslims are presented as es-
sentially different from Western values, and more often than not they are
essentialized and represented as monolithic, unchangeable, and incompat-
ible with European identity. Given that most Turks in Europe are Muslim,
Turkish Europeans are—together with those of Moroccan descent—con-
sidered as prototypical foreigners and essential others (for Belgium, see
Spruyt & Elchardus, 2012).
The contemporary perception of Islam can be seen as an example of
neo-orientalist thinking (Saeed, 2007) in the sense that it homogenizes and
essentializes the Muslim population, and represents so-called Muslim cul-
ture and religion as essentially different from Western identity. Muslim soci-
eties and culture are represented as overly patriarchal, and characterized by
tribal or feudal values and a culture of honor in which the status of women
is low. In contrast, the prototypical European is conceived of as modern,
tolerant, equality-minded, and individualist (Razack, 2004). The image of
the Muslim today strongly resembles Mosse’s description of “the Wander-
ing Jew” decades ago: “The eternal foreigner in our midst who clings to his
backwardness and who could never learn to speak the national language
properly or strike roots in the soil” (Mosse, 1985, p. 115).
When it comes to behavioral boundary drawing, several studies point
out that in Europe (and Belgium is no exception), discrimination versus
Muslims is pervasive in many countries and different domains of life. Every-
day discrimination of Turkish Belgians has been documented in the labor
280  K. VAN KERCKEM

market, housing market, in public space, and in contact with authorities

(Kalter & Kogan, 2006; Van der Bracht & Van de Putte, 2013; Vandezande
et al, 2009).
In addition, Muslims are also prone to legalized and institutional dis-
crimination. A typical example of institutional discrimination is the pro-
hibition of headscarves in all GO! schools—the public school system in
Flanders. On September 11, 2009, the Board of GO! Introduced a general
ban prohibiting the display of religious and philosophical symbols, a ban
that applied to pupils, teachers, and anyone else charged with pedagogical
tasks. According to Amnesty International, such a ban “has a disproportion-
ate impact on Muslim girls who wish to wear headscarves and discriminates
against them in the exercise of their rights to freedom of religion or belief
and to freedom of expression.”(Amnesty International, 2012, pp. 64–65).
Institutional discrimination also occurs because certain institutions are not
(yet) adapted to increasing linguistic and religious diversity in society, re-
sulting in discrimination against members of particular immigrant popu-
lations. Examples of such indirect discrimination include observance of
Catholic national holidays, but not Islamic ones, and the lack of attention
paid to dietary restrictions of particular religious groups in private or public
institutions.
Legalized discrimination, finally, can be found in the nation-wide prohi-
bition against wearing a full veil that covers the face in public. According
to Human Rights Watch, this prohibition “violates the fundamental right
to freedom of religion, thought, and conscience as well as the right to per-
sonal autonomy.” The law prohibits “the wearing of clothing that conceals
the face partially or entirely in public places in a way that makes identifica-
tion impossible.” As such, one could say it is formulated neutrally, but, in
fact, it is clearly targeted towards Muslim women wearing a niqab or burka
(it is commonly referred to as “the burka ban”) as it disproportionately
targets them. A second example of indirect legalized discrimination is the
tightening of the regulation of marriage migration. Even though the law
applies to all Belgian citizens, it mainly targets Turkish and Moroccan Bel-
gians, as they are the ones who more commonly marry transnationally. In
response to a similar law passed in the Netherlands, Human Rights Watch
has warned that the law “disproportionately impacts two of the largest mi-
grant communities in the Netherlands—Moroccans and Turks—who wish
to bring family members to the Netherlands.” Consequently, it might give
people of these origins the feeling they are being discriminated against,
even by the state they are born in, which potentially reinforces their sense
of exclusion.
To the best of my knowledge, apart from a number of quantitative stud-
ies on discrimination, very little research has been carried out on how
Muslims—in this case Turkish Belgians—experience the above described
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  281

mechanism of boundary construction. A first objective of this study, there-

fore, is to examine in what ways Turkish Belgians experience boundary
construction in their daily lives. By analyzing their narratives of exclusion,
I hope to get a better insight into different mechanisms of boundary con-
struction—both symbolic and behavioral—and Turkish Belgians’ subjective
experiences of exclusion.
By most indicators, Turks in Belgium are considered Outsiders, and this
has affected socioeconomic status as well as the degree to which they identi-
fy as Turkish, as Belgians, or as both Turks and Belgians. In the next section
I review the research on ethnic and national identity and use it in formulat-
ing my thoughts about how boundary mechanisms shape the national and
ethnic identity of the Turkish population in Belgium.

Theories of Ethnic and National Identity

Theories of ethnic and national identity can be broadly subdivided in two

strands, namely essentialism, which sees groups and identities as stable and
rooted in nature, and constructivism, which regards groups and identities as
social constructions, and therefore multiple, fluid and context-dependent.

Essentialist and Primordialist Visions of Ethnic and National Identity

Essentialism can be defined as “the attribution of behavior or think-
ing to the intrinsic, fundamental nature of a person, collectivity, or state.”
(Suny, 2001). Essentialist visions of identity accept identity as stable, singu-
lar, bounded, internally harmonious, and rooted in nature. Within an es-
sentialist view, ethnic and national communities and identities are seen as
having grown organically out of preexisting cultural communities (Eriksen,
2001). Such a view aligns with a Herderian social ontology that sees each
people as defined by three characteristics: the formation of a community
held together by strong ties among its members, a shared group identity
based on a sense of shared historical destiny, and a common culture and
language.
Essentialist approaches to nationalism stress that national and ethnic
identity are inextricably linked, in the sense that nations represent (domi-
nant) ethnic groups, and that, therefore, ethnic and national identities are
essentially the same. Smith (1991), for example, stresses the importance of
preexisting ethnic groups for the development of nationalism. Such a view
leaves little room for hybrid and multiple identities, as one’s ethnic identity
is seen as defining one’s national identity. As such, immigrants or ethnic
minorities are easily considered as outsiders, who have pre-existing ethnic
or national attachments, and can therefore not identify with the (new) na-
tion. Such a view has its roots in primordialism—which stands for “the idea
282  K. VAN KERCKEM

that ethnic and racial identities are fixed, fundamental, and rooted in the
unchangeable circumstances at birth” (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007).
In academia, this view has been criticized extensively (See for instance
Cornell & Hartmann, 2007; McKay, 1982), and for many social scientists,
essentialism and primordialism now “appear as dated as pre-darwinian bi-
ology” (Eriksen, 2001, p. 45). In European public and political discourse
however, primordialism and essentialism still hold sway. As I have dem-
onstrated above, certain ethnic and religious groups—in this case Turk-
ish Muslims—are regarded as the essential other that will never be able to
adapt to European society, as their values and identities are incompatible
and essentially different.
However, some scholars still see merits in the primordialist approach
(Bayar, 2009; Roosens, 1994). Those who do, do not see ethnicity as an-
chored in blood ties, given by birth, fixed and unchanging, but draw at-
tention to the idea of constructed primordialities. This refers to the idea that
ethnicity is often felt or constructed as being something primordial:

Whatever [the] actual origins, [ethnicity is] experienced by many people as

touching something deeper and more profound than labels or interests or
contingency. This felt power . . . seems to be rooted in intimately shared ex-
periences and interactions, in the sense of connection to the past, and in the
quasi-mystical significance often attributed to blood ties. (Cornell & Hart-
mann, 2007, p. 93)

The power of these so-called primordial attachments (Geertz, 1963) lies in

the human need to belong to communities of interaction and meaning,
based on something more meaningful than mere rational or utilitarian in-
terests (Shils, 1957). Even in increasingly individualized industrial and post-
industrial societies, individuals need relationships that give them a feeling
of deep and lasting connectedness, and ethnic and racial ties often satisfy
this need (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007, p. 58).

Constructivist Approaches to Ethnic and National Identity

Nowadays, most social scientists agree that ethnic and national identities
are not fixed and unchangeable but rather fluid, dynamic, constructed,
and situational (For national identity see Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 1997;
for ethnic and racial identity see Hall, 1992; Jenkins, 2008; Nagel, 1994;
Waters 1990). Moreover, constructivists do not see identities as singular and
internally harmonious, but rather as hybrid, complex, and multidimen-
sional. Following McBeth (1989), Nagel (1994) talks about the “layering of
ethnic identity,” arguing that every individual carries a portfolio of identi-
ties that are more or less salient in various situations and vis-à-vis various
audiences. For instance, Padilla (2006) and Espiritu (1993) find that indi-
viduals choose from an array of pan-ethnic and nationality-based identities,
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  283

“depending on the perceived strategic utility and symbolic appropriateness

of the identities in different settings and audiences” (Nagel, 1994, p. 155).
For constructivists, national communities and identities do not organi-
cally grow out of preexisting, culturally bounded communities, but are
rather the result of conscious nation-building efforts. According to Gellner
(1997), nations are entirely modern creations which “more or less fraudu-
lently invent their past to gain a semblance of antiquity and deep roots”
(Eriksen, 2001, p. 45). Also, Anderson’s idea of imagined communities fits
with a constructivist approach to national identity. For Anderson (2006),
a nation is an imagined community that invents cultural traditions and as-
serts commonness. It is imagined, because members of even the smallest
nation will never know most of their fellow members; it is a community
because “it is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship,” despite
actual inequality and exploitation within the imagined community.
The constructivist approach to ethnicity similarly stresses the fluid, hy-
brid, constructed, and contextual nature of ethnic groups and identities.
The constructivist approach is rooted in Weber’s definition of ethnicity
(1968, p. 389), in which ethnic groups are “human groups that entertain a
subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physi-
cal type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and
migration.” What matters in this view of ethnicity is not a set of common
cultural practices or blood ties, but rather a subjective belief or social con-
struction of common descent, either by in-group or out-group members.
At the core of the constructivist approach is that ethnic identification
is context-dependent. One of the most important factors in this respect
are processes of external ascription and social categorization (Jenkins, 1994),
because these create boundaries which designate which categories are avail-
able for individual identification (Nagel, 1994). Waters (1990) for instance
claims that the “ethnic options” available to individuals are limited to so-
cially and politically defined ethnic categories, and she hence attributes the
difference in identification between Blacks and Whites in the United States
to the limits of individual choice. Applying the same rationale to Turks in
Belgium, it seems likely that—given the high degree of othering by the es-
tablished population—identity options are limited to “Muslim” and “Turk-
ish,” with no room for a national “Belgian” identification.
Considering the impact of mere categorization on identification, a strong
impact of behavioral exclusion through discrimination should not surprise.
Discrimination and divisive political campaigns sharpen ethno-racial identity
boundaries and increase the salience of the category on the basis of which
people experience unfair treatment (Rumbaut, 2005, p. 146). In the face of
these perceived threats, descendants of immigrants can develop a so-called re-
active ethnic identity (Portes & Rumbaut, 1990; Rumbaut, 1994). Research on
this matter among immigrants in Europe has yielded mixed results. Studies
284  K. VAN KERCKEM

among Turks in the Netherlands and Germany have found a direct positive
effect of perceived discrimination on (re-)ethnicization (Skrobanek, 2009), as
well as a negative relationship between perceived discrimination and national
identification (Kunst et al., 2012; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012). In contrast,
among Pakistanis in Norway, national identification was not influenced by per-
ceived Islamophobia or religious discrimination (Kunst et al., 2012).
Given the bright symbolic boundary and the realities of everyday, institu-
tional and legalized discrimination towards Turkish Belgians and Muslims
in general, this study aims to contribute to the debate by linking people’s
narratives of exclusion to their identity narratives. As such, I set out to ex-
plore how people’s experiences with symbolic exclusion, and how everyday
institutional and legalized discrimination shape their identification in eth-
nic and national terms. In doing so, I pay particular attention to how peo-
ple construct a positive identity in a context where certain identity options
are made unavailable from the outside. It is for that reason that I now turn
to theories that focus on the internal-external dialectic of identification.

The Constructionist Vision: Focus on the Internal/External Dialectic

of Identification
Combining elements of both the primordialist and the constructivist ap-
proaches, Cornell and Hartmann’s constructionist approach focuses on the
fluidity of ethnicity as well as on the power of primordial attachments. In
their vision, both self-ascription and ascription by others are critical in the
making of ethnic groups and identities. Ethnicity and race, they argue, are
not simply labels forced upon people; they are also identities that people
accept, resist, choose, specify, invent, redefine, reject, actively defend, and
so forth. They involve not only circumstances, but also active responses to
circumstances by individuals and groups, guided by their own preconcep-
tions, dispositions, and agendas.
This approach matches well with what Jenkins (1994) has termed “the
internal-external dialectic of identification,” which refers to the observa-
tion that identity construction is the result of a dialectic between external
ascription and internal assertion. In the field of ethnicity, Rumbaut stressed
that ethnic self-identities “emerge from the interplay of racial and ethnic
labels imposed by the external society” on the one hand, and “the original
identification and ancestral attachments asserted by the newcomers” on the
other hand (Rumbaut, 2005, p. 3).

Theoretical Model

In order to explore how symbolic and behavioral exclusion shapes Turk-

ish Belgian’s identification in national and ethnic terms, one needs to focus
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  285

on two separate but interrelated aspects. A first step in the analysis is to

explore Turkish Belgians’ perception of exclusion by the established popu-
lation. Following theories of ethnic boundary construction, I argue that in
exploring subjective feelings of exclusion, it is important to pay attention to
both behavioral exclusion through discrimination, and to symbolic exclu-
sion through—for example—othering. This will be done by analyzing peo-
ple’s “narratives of exclusion,” which are treated as representing people’s
subjective experiences of exclusion. Second, I analyze research participants’
identity narratives, paying particular attention to the internal-external dia-
lectic of identification. Given that both internal and external factors shape
identification, a thorough analysis of these narratives should pay attention
to both the role of circumstances (in this case symbolic and behavioral ex-
clusion), but also on how people actively respond to circumstances, guided
by their cultural practices, history, and pre-existing identities.

DATA AND METHOD

My results are based on a qualitative study carried out among 63 second

and third generation Turkish Belgians. The main research method was in-
depth interviews in order to flesh out the complexities of the identification
processes. I restricted my sample to the cohorts who were born in Belgium
in the 1980s and 1990s, and living in Flanders. Flanders is a region with a
high degree of anti-immigrant sentiments and political racism. Thus, our
respondents were raised in a time when anti-immigrant feelings took center
stage in public and political discourse.
The sample includes both second and third generation Turkish Belgians.
Following Lievens (1999), I define the second generation as those who were
socialized primarily in Belgium (born in Belgium or moved there before
the age of 6). The third generation includes individuals who have at least
one second generation parent. The sample is heterogeneous with regard to
gender, age, and educational attainment.
All participants in the study were told about the purpose of the research
and promised confidentiality and privacy. Each was given the opportunity
to choose the interview location and his or her own pseudonym. All inter-
views were carried out in Dutch, since all respondents were born and raised
in Belgium. Most respondents were interviewed only once; interviews lasted
from 36 minutes to 2 hours 45 minutes, and were transcribed verbatim.
Before the start of the interview, respondents were asked to complete the
Twenty Statement Test1 (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) in order to determine
how much importance they attached to the different social identities that
would be discussed during the interview. Subsequently, respondents were
given a series of labeled cards, each of which had a particular social identity
286  K. VAN KERCKEM

written on it (such as “Turk,” “Turkish Belgian,” “Muslim,” “Husband/wife,”

“student”) and were asked to choose those that they considered applicable to
themselves. I deliberately focused on more than just ethnicity or nationality-
related identifications in order to obtain a broad view of the respondent’s
self-identification, and to contextualize their ethnic and national identifica-
tion. The entire interview was built around several issues: these labels, a dis-
cussion why some had been chosen and others not, a discussion about con-
structing and explaining the hierarchy and salience of their responses, and a
discussion about the meaning respondents gave to the labels.
The research is based on a Grounded Theory approach to data-analysis,
using a combination of open-ended and axial coding. Open coding is “the part
of the analysis that pertains specifically to the naming and categorizing of
phenomena through close examination of data” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990,
p. 62), making it essentially about data management. Axial coding refers to
“a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways af-
ter open coding, by making connections between categories” (Strauss &
Corbin, 1990, p. 96), and is hence all about the generation of findings.
In a first phase, I read through the first interviews and identified interest-
ing themes (including, for instance, perception of exclusion and self-identifica-
tion), and applied them to the data, systematically indexing (coding) the
data using computer software package NVIVO. Once the first interviews
were organized in this manner, I read through the raw data again and used
an iterative approach in creating a refined and inductively generated tree
structure. The initial theme self-identification, for instance, was broken up
into second-level codes ethnic identity, national identity, gender identity, local
identity, and so on.
I used several of the Grounded Theory techniques grouping the differ-
ent codes in a meaningful way. One such technique was to use basic ques-
tions that denote a type of relationship (who, when, where, what, how, why?)
in grouping different codes into one category. For instance, I grouped all
the ways (how?) in which ethnic boundaries manifested themselves to the
researchers, which resulted in second-level codes ethnic jokes, othering, dis-
crimination, as subtypes of the first-level code ethnic boundary perception.
After this first phase of data management, I began looking closely at the
different codes and established links between the different categories, us-
ing principles of axial coding. This included a close reading and narrative
analysis of the coded data, and identifying explicitly mentioned links be-
tween different codes (e.g., when respondent him/herself links a self-iden-
tification to exclusion). Finally, I looked at differences in ethnic-boundary
perception and self-identification and tried to account for them by linking
them with socio-demographic and other relevant characteristics.
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  287

RESULTS

Perceived Ethnic Boundaries: Body Language,

Discourse, and Discrimination

In line with the distinction between symbolic and behavioral exclusion,

we can discern at least three sets of mechanisms that give people the feeling
that they are excluded. First of all, we can distinguish between discursive
manifestations (reflecting the symbolic) and behavioral manifestations. In
addition, our analyses show that it is also important to consider body lan-
guage as a way of inferring boundaries.

Body Language
Body language is one way in which respondents felt categorized. Male
informants in particular mentioned people looking at them in a fearful or
negative way, which they interpreted as a sign of prejudice or anti-immi-
grant behavior.

[Q: Do you often get the evil eye?] Seriously. Yes, always, yes, yes. I can see it
on people’s faces (imitates it). They walk away, their eyes like this. You just
see it. . . . They only have to pass a mosque, even then. Instead of just saying
hello. . . . You often get the evil eye and if you pay attention to it, it destroys
you, but most Turks do not pay attention to it anymore. They say: it is just a
Belgian. (Ömer, 21M)
They look at you with a different eye, some people. They look like . . . yeah,
a foreigner or something. Or “what is he doing in our country?” And then
you have a hard time because, you know, you are born here, you cannot do
anything about it. We know the language, our nationality is Belgian, but we
continue to be seen as Turks. (Seyid, 16M)

Both quotes are very powerful examples of how exclusionary it feels to

be looked at as if one is dangerous or not welcome. By saying that he feels
that people are looking at him as if he is “a foreigner,” Seyid signals his per-
ception of being categorized, and implicitly rejects the label of “foreigner.”
The fact that he is looked at as someone who does not belong in Belgium
makes him feel bad (“you have a hard time”) because of his powerlessness
due to this categorization: he is Belgian by nationality and he knows the
language, but still people see him as Turkish.

Discourse
Our respondents’ identity narratives reflect the many ways in which
members of the established population construct ethnic boundaries in dis-
course, ranging from subtle everyday racism (Essed, 1991) to blatant forms
of discursive racism.
288  K. VAN KERCKEM

A first manifestation of everyday racism that is mentioned by our respon-

dents is the widespread use of the word allochtoon (meaning both allochtonous
and allochton—the noun derived from the adjective). In the 1990s, the word
became common in Flanders and the Netherlands as a term to refer to
migrants and their descendants. Although semantically, allochtoon refers to
“someone who comes from elsewhere,” it is most commonly used in policy
practice and public discourse to refer to members of non-Western (read:
Muslim) ethnic groups considered disadvantaged or less integrated into
Belgian/Dutch society.
There is a shared understanding among the respondents that the term
is denigrating and exclusionary. People describe the word as “horrible”
(afschuwelijk), “humiliating” (vernederend), “third division player” (derdek-
lasser), and the practice as unacceptable and narrow-minded.

I even think it is not acceptable, considering the whole migration history.

I can understand that our ancestors were seen as migrants. But that in the
case of the present generation, that you [Belgians] still feel the need to stick
the label allochtoon, I find this . . . you know, I think that is in fact the narrow-
mindedness of the people who live here [in Belgium]. (Aleyna, 27F)

According to Aleyna, it is unjustified to make a difference between es-

tablished Belgians and those with foreign roots. By saying “considering the
whole migration history,” she means that Turks have been present in Bel-
gium since the 1960s, and that by now, their descendants should no longer
be considered as foreigners. Yet, the word allochtoon continues to be used
and she attributes this to “the narrow-mindedness” of the Belgians.
Our respondents view the term negatively. The word not only signals an
ethnic boundary between those with foreign ancestry and ethnic Belgians,
but it also has a negative ring to it because it is applied to those who are
considered problematic. To put it in the words of one of our informants:
“If the media says ‘a couple of allochtonous youngsters’—if you put young-
sters behind it, then the fences are down—then you know what is going to
follow: ‘have caused a riot,’ ‘have demolished,’ there is no other way.” The
word “allochtonen” tends to be used in negative contexts only. Allochtonen
are never just “people from elsewhere” but treated as “second class citizens,
never quite the norm, as a problem, lagging behind” (Essed & Trienekens,
2008, p. 58).
A second way in which everyday racism manifests itself to our informants
is through so-called ethnic jokes (Davies, 1982). Those who utter them con-
sider them “just a harmless joke,” but the narratives of our respondents
illustrate their power as an exclusionary mechanism:

I am like conditioned to think that all Belgians see me as allochtoon. I don’t

know how come, but that is how I feel. And . . . sometimes it happens that it
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  289

is ostentatiously manifested. For example in the train last time, children of

eight years old were laughing amongst each other, they were joking and then
one tells a joke and he says “And it was a Turk!” And then they all started
laughing [she laughs] and you know, it really was like extremely funny. But it
felt like—so I am the other, the different one so to say. Yes, I think Belgians see
me as allochtoon, I do think so. I do not think that I will ever fit one hundred
per cent in the group as Belgian. (Dilek, 27F)

Dilek perceives the joke as a sign of categorization and exclusion. In

the beginning of her narrative, she says that she assumes that all Belgians
see her as allochtoon, and uses the story about the joke to support this im-
pression. Although she thought the joke was funny, it gave her the feeling
of being an outsider. Based on her joke narrative, she concludes that she
will never fit a hundred per cent in the group as Belgian. The observation
that jokes about ethnic minorities are part and parcel of ethnic boundar-
ies has been discussed extensively by Davies (1982, 1990). She argues that
ethnic jokes delineate both social and moral boundaries of a nation or eth-
nic group and that “by mocking peripheral and ambiguous groups, they
reduce ambiguity and clarify boundaries or at least make ambiguity less
frightening” (Davies, 1982, p. 400).
Third, many informants feel categorized and excluded through cases
of Othering, and a repeated focus on ethnicity in everyday interethnic
encounters:

It is like people do not feel at ease when you arrive in a certain group
and . . . they seem to feel the need to make a remark about your cultural back-
ground. Like about talking Dutch, or our weddings, or you know our kebab
places. Those are the things you always hear. ( . . . ) It is like if I would move to
Paris, and I would tell to every Parisian I meet “wow your Eiffel tower!” You
get what I mean? Come on, it is . . . I think it is not useful and I think . . . instead
of just seeing me as a person . . . Like who am I and who is [Aleyna]? They just
automatically put it in the cultural context. (Aleyna, 27F)

By referring to her ethnicity, people give Aleyna the feeling that she is
reduced to her Turkish roots. Instead, she would like to be seen in her en-
tirety, as a person. Aleyna’s frustration is exemplary for the difficulties many
members of ethnic minority groups have in conveying “the humanity that
encompasses [their] total identity” (Lyman & Douglass, 1973, p. 353). Ac-
cording to Schneider and Crul (2013, p. 33), the dominant discursive con-
text in most European countries presents a serious challenge for belong-
ing, because “it overemphasizes ethnic background as the main signifier in
all societal contexts.” Indeed, in another part of the interview, Aleyna ex-
plains that she perceives this categorization as very exclusionary: “A couple
of times, [my classmates] gave me subtle remarks like ‘Oh, I thought that
290  K. VAN KERCKEM

in your culture it was not like that.’ So they kind of exclude you automati-
cally.” By referring to how things are done differently “in [her] culture,”
her classmates give Aleyna the feeling that she is an outsider to their group.
Aleyna considers this subtle boundary as even worse than overt racism or
discrimination, because these are people she trusts, which makes it all the
more painful to realize that they too see her as an outsider.
Another example of everyday racism is subtle expressions of prejudice
and cases of group homogenization. Utterances that signal ethnic prejudice
are irritating and frustrating, even when they are positive or neutral about
Turkish-Belgians. Many respondents were especially irritated by comments
such as “Wow, your Dutch is really good!” which they not only consider
ridiculous because they are born in Belgium, but also irritating because
it signals a prejudice that all Turkish people in Flanders speak bad Dutch.
Another example is the expectation that all Turkish girls have only limited
freedom and are expected to stay at home rather than going out:

There are question marks immediately—always, in all sorts of ways. Also at

work: “[Emine], we are going out to party, will you be able [signifying allowed]
to come?” And I HATE that. I tell them “Why not? Why not?” It is just like,
everybody sees it as different. And that is a pity. (Emine, 26F)

The tendency to Essentialize2 and see the Turkish population as a homo-

geneous cultural entity also manifests itself in the utterance “but you are
different”:

Sometimes people say—and I hate that utterance—“But you are not a real
Turk, you are different . . . I really hate that little sentence “You are not a real
Turk.” Why am I not a real Turk? Are all Turks like THAT? I mean, just go to
Turkey, just not to those regions where people here originate from, and you
will notice that they are much more modern than people here. That is really
something I hate. (Emine, 26F)

People like Emine, who do not fit the stereotypical idea of what Turkish
people are like, are often labeled as “different from other Turks” and there-
fore “not a real Turk.” In doing so, ethnic Belgians homogenize the Turkish
population and reaffirm existing stereotypes. Labeling people who do not
fit the stereotype as “not real Turks” signals that they consider particular
cultural practices—in this case limited freedom for young women—as es-
sential for defining Turkish identity, hence conveying the idea that all Turks
are the same.
In addition to cases of everyday racism, some informants have also been
confronted with blatantly racist or anti-immigrant comments, either direct-
ed at themselves or others. Sometimes these comments are even uttered by
those occupying a formal position, such as teachers:
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  291

She really hated that teacher, my daughter. She had bad grades with that
teacher. It was a teacher who looked through the window ( . . . ) and said
“Look, the little criminals of the future.” I swear. I swear. “Little criminals of
the future.” About two little Moroccans. It didn’t matter [that they were Mo-
roccan], [my daughter] is Turkish, but it does not matter, this is something
you don’t say. Just the fact that this teacher utters these words to the children,
that hurts. [My daughter thought] “If they say it behind their back, they will
probably do the same about me.” (Pinar, 49F)

Pinar continues her narrative by saying that such cases of racism play an
important role in her children’s identity formation, particularly because
they happen in her children’s most formative years and in a context in
which they should feel safe, rather than be exposed to identity threats. The
idea that age matters is also implicit in the following quote:

I might write down [that I am] “Belgian” but I experienced a lot of negative
things, cases of racism, as a soccer player. As young soccer player, I was in a
rather good team ( . . . ) and there were a lot of allochtonen in the team. ( . . . )
It was a good team and it was met with frustration by the parents of the oppo-
nents. With comments such as “brown monkey” and this and that. Shouting
at twelve year old boys ( . . . ) and in a way, that has shaped the idea in my head
“Look [Achmed], you are no Belgian dude, that is not how they treat.” So no,
you are not looked at as Belgian. (Achmed, 27M)

In this narrative, Achmed shows how racist comments made him real-
ize that ethnic Belgians do not accept him as a true Belgian. In the open-
ing sentence, he implicitly rejects a self-identification as Belgian, because
of these experiences. He goes on with an example to illustrate and justify
his claim, and concludes by making the link between his self-identification
(“you are no Belgian dude”) and his sense of not being considered Belgian.

Discrimination
Most of our respondents explicitly said that they encountered very few
cases of discrimination. Given that many discriminatory practices are re-
lated to particular life-course events, such as finding a job or a house, this
limited experience with discrimination might be related to the informants’
age: at the time of the interview, the majority were in their early or mid-
twenties and many were still studying and living with their parents. Conse-
quently, chances are low that they had already encountered discrimination
in the labor or housing market, simply because they have not been looking
for jobs or housing yet.
The examples of discrimination that were mentioned were exclusively
cases of what Wimmer (2013) labels everyday discrimination—discrimination
by individual people during everyday interactions outside the domains of
292  K. VAN KERCKEM

state control. Several of our male interviewees for instance experienced

discrimination when they tried to enter nightclubs:

I was often denied entrance in nightclubs and stuff. Especially in Belgium. In

the Netherlands it is not that bad, but in Belgium we were often rejected. One
time we were going to Zillion, we were four guys, and we had found (sic) three
girls in the parking lot. Probably Pakistani, or Indian. They looked a bit like us
(laughs). You behave decently, friendly and ask them to maybe try and get in
together. Four guys, three girls, maybe that is a good group. They [the girls]
did not reject us, so I would be really grateful if I would see them again. We
arrived at the door, we were happy, they let us in and we get a piece of paper,
a form, and we move on and it turns out to be a horror tunnel, like the fair-
ground attraction: we enter one door and exit just like that through another
one. Accompanied. And we could not go anywhere because the bouncer was
in our way. (laughing) He accompanied us to the other door and that was
the exit. So we were back outside, the entire group. We were looking at each
other and realized we had been rejected. (Armageddon, 32M)
Sometimes I think maybe [the bouncers at clubs] heard a lot about fights or
God knows what. I do not blame them, but I am not saying that everyone is
the same. They say: “Yes you are a Turk, we have heard so much about you,”
you know, that is what you always hear. “Fights and the like, so you cannot
enter [the club].” But not everyone is the same. ( . . . ) You are denied access,
but I think people should get a chance. I mean the Turks who have not done
anything. (Sedat, 25M)

Like Armageddon and Sedat, many men talked about how they were
often denied access to a nightclub, just because they were Turkish. Sedat’s
narrative shows that he understands that he is denied entrance based the
prejudice that “Turks cause trouble,” and to a certain extent, he even partly
accepts this discriminatory practice as legitimate. At the same time however,
he considers the generalization that the prejudice entails as unfair, because
“not everyone is the same,” and “people should get a chance.”
The narrative of Armageddon shows that men develop strategies in or-
der to enhance the chance of being granted access. It is not uncommon for
Turkish men to try and find a couple of women who are willing to show up
at the door of a nightclub with them, as if they are a group of friends that
wants to enter together. In doing so, men show they are aware of the ste-
reotypes that exist about them: by arriving at the door with young women,
they signal to the bouncers that they are not there to harass women or
cause trouble—two prejudices that many ethnic Belgians have about young
Muslim men.
Several informants, both male and female, also referred to discrimina-
tory practices when they were looking for a job or a place to live. In most
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  293

cases, they felt the discrimination was based on prejudices, as is illustrated

in the following narratives:

I went to the job office and that lady said “Oh good morning, I have not had
time yet to look at your file, but I will do so right away.” And then she looks
at it and says “(surprised tone) Higher education?” It sounded like “Good
gracious! Higher education . . . you?!” ( . . . ) And that lady, really, she was con-
stantly trying to undermine my self-confidence. After I went to see her for the
second time, I really thought I would never find a decent job. She always gave
me the lousy jobs. I mean, lousy, like social sector and stuff, and I thought
“how are those good for me?” I mean seriously, what am I going to do in the
social sector? Nothing. (Damla, 27F)
[Finding an apartment] was completely traumatizing. I never imagined
it would be that bad. I always thought “We speak Dutch, we do not wear a
headscarf and I am already a bit blonde.” So I did not think it would be prob-
lematic. But finding a place to stay really was a trauma. We were refused ev-
erywhere. And in the job market it is even more difficult to check. You are
rejected, ok, but you do not know who the other candidates were and which
qualities or skills they possess that I don’t have. I notice that all allochtonen who
graduated, and who have a job, are doing a job that is related to allochtonen,
and I think it is really unfair. I feel like, if I graduate from university I have
the same qualities as my co-students. We should be equal on the job market. I
want to be in competition with them in the private job market. Why do I have
to do a job that involves allochtonen and be dealing with those problems and
matters. I might as well do my thing in the [regular] economy. (Dilek, 27F)

Both women have experienced difficulties in the job market and both
explicitly or implicitly convey the message that this is due to the prejudice
that Turkish Belgians do not do well in school. Due to the generally low
educational attainment among second and even third generation Turks,
ethnic Belgians seem to have the prejudice that all Turkish Belgians do
poorly in terms of education. Both women, who have both done very well
in relation to many of their co-ethnics, experience frustration because they
are not treated equally compared to ethnic Belgians with the same educa-
tional level. As Dilek argues, it is difficult to prove differential treatment,
because one never knows anything about the skills and qualities of other
job applicants. However, several highly publicized cases of ethnic discrimi-
nation in the job market3 signal that their gut feeling about not getting a
fair chance is probably right.

The Importance of Gender and Education

There are socio-demographic differences in perceptions of ethnic
boundaries. First, as with previous research (De Rycke et al., 1999), I found
that there are gender differences: compared to women, men report more
294  K. VAN KERCKEM

blatant forms of exclusion, such as explicit racism and discrimination, and

they have more concrete examples of personal everyday discrimination.
Women on the other hand discuss subtle and discursive ethnic boundaries,
and many state that they personally have not experienced blatant racism or
discrimination. The observation that men experience more discrimination
compared to women is probably partly related to the fact that they spend
a larger amount of their time in public spaces. In addition, it might also
be related to the stereotypical image of Muslim men as “dangerous” and
“threatening,” which stands in sharp contrast with the stereotype of the
Muslim woman as a victim.
Secondly, there seem to be differences in ethnic-boundary perception
according to educational level: the better educated more frequently report
being excluded, compared to those who only have a high school education.
One possible explanation is that more-educated people are more politi-
cized in their behavior and attitudes, and therefore more sensible to dis-
crimination or Othering practices. Another hypothesis is that the better edu-
cated are also more likely to be confronted with ethnic boundaries because
they have more contact with prejudiced ethnic Belgians. Turkish Belgians
who do not move on to tertiary education have generally been in a voca-
tional track at secondary school. Because this track is especially popular
among ethnic-minority pupils, these pupils might have a lower perception
of being different, both because there are many co-ethnics, and because
the ethnic Belgian pupils and teachers are used to ethnic diversity. Those
people who go to schools that are specialized in the higher-ranked general
track—schools which often have a low proportion of ethnic minority pu-
pils—seem to experience more categorization and exclusion. When people
move on to tertiary education, chances are high that they experience even
more categorization as a result of increased contact with people who are
not used to ethnic diversity and are hence more prejudiced. Thus, the con-
text surrounding ethnic-boundaries is important.

Exclusion by Turkish Turks

Before I move on to the discussion of different identity narratives, it is
important to point out that many informants not only feel excluded and
Othered by members of the established population in Belgium, but that they
equally have a feeling of being outsiders during their trips to Turkey:

People do not see me as Turkish either you know. Because the moment you are
on holiday abroad or in Turkey, you are the one who comes from Europe, you
are European. You are the German in fact. If I were to say “I pack my belong-
ings and move to Turkey,” I would not be one of the guys. Maybe I would be
after a while, but I will always be considered as the European. (Achmed, 27M)
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  295

Because ethnic Belgians do not consider them as true Belgians, and

Turks do not consider them as Turkish, several interviewees reported a
feeling of not belonging anywhere and some even said they were confused
about their identity. Such a feeling may be related to what Durkheim re-
ferred to as Anomie (Durkheim, 1951); that is a breakdown in the bonds
between an individual and the community.
But a feeling of being an outsider does not necessarily lead to identity
crises. In what follows, I demonstrate how identification is to a large extent
shaped by processes of Othering and exclusion, while simultaneously high-
lighting that people are active agents in constructing a positive identity.

From a Sense of Exclusion to an Inclusive Identity: Five

Identity Narratives

Based on how people position themselves vis-à-vis the labels “Turkish” and
“Belgian,” I identify five different identity narratives. In discussing each of
these narratives, I zoom in on the meaning people give to the labels “Bel-
gian” and “Turkish,” as well as on how they link their self-identification to
perceptions of exclusion and Othering, hence uncovering the internal/exter-
nal dialectic of identification. We treat these identity narratives as expressions
of the different ways in which people make sense of their multidimensional
identity and as the internal/external dialectic of identification in action, and
not as an reified, exhaustive list of all possible “identification types.”

Narrative One: Belgian on Paper, Turkish by Heart

The first identity narrative is one in which people combine a strong feel-
ing of being Turkish with recognition that they are Belgian by birth:

I feel like . . . I am Turkish but I am born here in Belgium so I am actually also

a Belgian. And that is the thing, you feel very Turkish . . . but actually you are
Belgian. . . . So if you ask me, yes I am Belgian, but I am a Belgian from Turkey.
Most people say “I am just Turkish,” no, if you are born here, you are Belgian.
(Emine, 26F)

For people who identify as Belgian on paper and Turkish by heart, the
two identities each have a different meaning, as Emine’s narrative illustrates.
When she talks about the label “Belgian,” she uses the verb to be, whereas she
uses to feel in the context of her Turkish identification. Hence, what it means
to be Belgian is defined in terms of nationality, whereas being Turkish is de-
fined in emotional terms. In many cases, people smile or touch their heart
while talking about being Turkish, signaling a strong emotional attachment.
They talk about how they feel closer to the Turkish culture than to the Bel-
gian one, and about how they feel better around Turkish people.
296  K. VAN KERCKEM

This distinction between an emotional identification on the one hand

and a civic, national one on the other hand, mirrors Verkuyten and De-
Wolf’s (2002) distinction between being, feeling, and doing. Just like the Chi-
nese in their study, many of our respondents make an unconscious distinc-
tion between what could be labeled as an emotional identification (feeling)
and a categorical one (being); the latter referring to a category they merely
belong to, without necessarily feeling closely attached to it.
In many cases, the lack of emotional identification with the label Belgian
is explicitly or implicitly linked to the perception of being excluded or con-
sidered different by ethnic Belgians.

“Do you feel Belgian?” [my teacher] asked me. I replied: “The moment that
you are going to see me walk in the streets as a Belgian, I mean, when you walk
in the street and you think ‘Hey, look, that Belgian kid there,’ then I will feel
Belgian,” I said. “I promise.” (Achmed, 27M)
Yes, I am a . . . Turkish Belgian. Or Belgian Turk. You can maybe look at it from
both sides. One who actually . . . who feels more Turkish here in Belgium. And
who still has these feelings that you are seen by some people as, you know, let’s
say “the brown one,” you know. (Ayhan, 31M)

In the first narrative, Achmed signals that he is conscious of the fact

that his teacher categorizes him as Turkish, and links this categorization
to his emotional self-identification: he promises that once the teacher
starts to see him as Belgian, he himself will in turn feel Belgian. What he is
saying more implicitly is that as long as people categorize him as Turkish,
he will never feel Belgian. Also, Ayhan links his emotional identification
to external categorization: he feels more Turkish (compared to Belgian)
and immediately links this to the fact that he is racially categorized by
some people as “the brown one.” Both narratives demonstrate the power
of symbolic exclusion and everyday racism, the “mere” categorization as
foreign or different, even in the absence of behavioral exclusion, gives
people a strong sense of being otherized, which has an impact on how
they emotionally identify.
But the limited emotional identification with the label Belgian does not
imply that people reject a Belgian identity. In fact, many informants stress
their Belgian identity as a way of reclaiming an identity that is denied to
them from the outside. They object to the limited “identity options” (Wa-
ters, 1990) available, and narratively assert their Belgian identity by stress-
ing that they are good Belgian citizens, and that Belgium is the country
where they are born and have spent all of their lives.

It is not because I have other habits, another culture, that we do not belong
here. Because we go . . . we also follow the same rules as the Belgians. We also
have to do our paperwork, we also have to do payments. . . . In terms of life
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  297

in Belgium, everything is the same. We also do our payments for instance.

When we go shopping, we also wait in line for our turn like the Belgians do.
(Serpil, 27F)

As a result of exclusion and categorization, Serpil does not feel very Bel-
gian, but this quote shows that she does identify as such in terms of citi-
zenship. Based on her Belgian citizenship and the fact that she fulfills her
duties as a Belgian citizen, she demands equal treatment: she observes the
rules just like ethnic Belgians do, so she should be treated equally and be
seen as belonging in Belgium.
In sum, this narrative combines a strong emotional identification as
Turkish and a more categorical national or civic identification as Belgian,
which serves to reclaim an identity that is denied from the outside. The lim-
ited emotional identification as Belgian is often explicitly linked to percep-
tion that they are not considered “true Belgians” by ethnic Belgians. Such a
distinction again shows that discursive manifestations of ethnic boundaries
are potentially as important as actual or perceived discrimination.

Second Narratives: Belgian With Turkish Roots

The second identity narrative is built around a strong emotional iden-
tification as Belgian and recognition of one’s Turkish roots. Here again,
people make a distinction between how they feel (i.e., Belgian) and what
they recognize they are (i.e., Turkish):

We are born in Belgium but you cannot just ignore your roots. You cannot
say “my parents are Belgian,” because that is not the case. We are Turks, we
are Turks by roots. And I see myself as a Belgian Turk. I cannot say that I am
hundred per cent Turk, no. I am born here [in Belgium], I live here, I speak
the language, I work between these people, I have always lived here. I do feel
Belgian. (Otoman, 32M)

The difference between the previous identity narrative and this one is
that people in this category feel Belgian and recognize their Turkishness,
whereas in the former pattern it was reversed. What it means to be Belgian
is in this case not only defined in terms of citizenship, but the identification
is also emotionally felt. This narrative is most typically found among those
who have frequent, close contacts with ethnic Belgians and have lost much
of their sense of being Turkish. They seem to have a stronger sense of being
integrated into Belgian society.
Most respondents who identify this way have experienced cases of Other-
ing or exclusion just like anyone else, but these experiences do not take up
a prominent role in their identity narratives. Rather, their negative experi-
ences are minimized, or presented as something they actively try to prevent:
298  K. VAN KERCKEM

It is the way it is, you don’t have to complain about it. My name is not Jan, or
Peter. You know? You don’t get to choose your parents, nor your origins. But
you have to assert yourself. That is how I function. Someone else would say
“(lamenting tone) Uuuu, we are not accepted and blahblahblah.” No, you
have to make yourself accepted (Ferhat, 28M).

According to Ferhat, Turkish people have to accept that they are treat-
ed differently because of their ethnic origin, but that does not mean they
have to be passive about not being accepted. Rather, his stance is that
people are active agents who need to assert themselves and make them-
selves accepted. Rather than focusing on potential threats to his Belgian
identification, Ferhat chooses to not give too much importance to exclu-
sionary discourses or practices, but to actively make himself accepted. As
such, he eliminates potential threats to his Belgian identity, hence making
such identification possible.
The idea that Turkish Belgians have to work especially hard “to prove
themselves” vis-à-vis ethnic Belgians also surfaced in other identity narra-
tives. Those espousing such views saw this as being “exhausting” and “unfair.”
Within this identity narrative, however, respondents accepted it as legitimate,
and as something one “just has to do” in order to become accepted.

Narrative Three: The Essential Turk and Rejecting Belgian Identity

In this third identity narrative, people stress and are proud of their Turk-
ish identity and reject a Belgian one:

In fact, I do not feel Belgian at all. I have Belgian friends and stuff. But . . . I
know of myself that I have Turkish blood and that I am not a Belgian in fact,
that I would rather have been born in Turkey; or would rather live there than
here. (Seyid, 16M)

In the Essential-Turk narrative, Turkish and Belgian identities are reified

and presented as mutually exclusive. Turkishness is described as an essential
part of who they are and as something that is incompatible with Belgian
identity. The rejection of Belgian identity is usually accounted for by refer-
ring to a sense of being essentially different from Belgians, and a strong
sense of belonging in Turkey. People who identify as such describe Turkey
as “their country” and long to be reunited with “their people.” Such a way
of self-identifying is a clear example of what Cornell and Hartman have
termed “constructed primordialities” (2007, p. 93).
What is remarkable in the identity narratives of the essential Turk is that
they do not explicitly link their identification with a sense of exclusion.
They are proud of being Turkish and link their identification up with Es-
sentializing narratives in which they refer to blood ties and roots, rather
than narratives of exclusion. However, all of them talk about a strong sense
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  299

of exclusion and cases of discrimination at some point in the interview. It

seems they have constructed a reactive ethnicity (based on their already
present ancestral attachments) and attached a positive meaning to it.

Narrative Four: The In-Between Narrative

The most dominant narrative among our respondents is that of being
in-between. This sense of being in-between is usually described as feeling both
Turkish and Belgian, but as considered neither of the two:

I am a Turk and I am also a Belgian, because I am born here, I have the Bel-
gian nationality, I went to school here, I studied here, I work here. I feel both.
But I personally think that we are in-between. Like when we go on holiday
to Turkey, they say like . . . “look, there’s a Belgian.” They do not accept us as
Turks ( . . . ) [And here in Belgium], they will definitely say “that is a migrant,”
“that is a stranger.” And in Turkey it is exactly the same. We are not accepted
there, nor here . . . We are in-between. (Azra, 34F)

The sense of being in-between results from the combination of a self-

identification as both Turkish and Belgian, and the awareness of being
considered an outsider in both Turkey and Belgium. Depending on which
feeling dominates, a distinction can be made between attached and unat-
tached in-between narratives. In attached in-between narratives, people high-
light the positive aspects of being in-between in cultural terms, referring
to a creolization process in which they combine the positive of both worlds.
Also, they do not seem to favor one of the two identities (i.e., Belgian
and Turkish). They stress that they can feel both, usually depending on
the circumstances. In the unattached in-between narratives, people interpret
their in-between position negatively in terms of belonging nowhere—a state
which is characterized by the absence of a positive social identification as
Turkish and/or Belgian, and labeled and felt as an identity crisis. Consid-
ering the fluidity of identification however, it is likely that as time passes,
this identity crisis fades away, as people find an alternative source of iden-
tity, which is not ethnic or national but, for instance, local, religious, or
supra-national.

Narrative Five: The World Citizen/Human Being

A final identity narrative is one in which people stress their identity as a
world citizen or human being, either because these all-embracing categories
provide an alternative identity in the absence of other positive options, or
because they simply refuse to identify in ethnic or national terms. The case
of Dilek is illustrative for the first of these motivations. Dilek has a strong
sense of exclusion, and during the interview she explicitly rejected Belgian
identity. While talking about how she lives her life however, she started to
consider her own narrative as very contradictory:
300  K. VAN KERCKEM

Actually, maybe I do have an identity crisis. Because I am very contradictory.

I say that I am Turkish, but in fact I have a hundred reasons (laughs) [why
I am not Turkish]. . . . You know, maybe . . . Isn’t it possible that because I am
not Belgian, or I do not want to call myself Belgian, and because I do not fit
in with being Turkish, that I comfort myself with the idea that I am a world
citizen. So that is maybe how I identify. . . . Because I do not fit into those two
things, I see myself as a world citizen. And it is so broad, that I cannot but fit
in (laughs). That is a category that suits me. Yes, world citizen! (Dilek, 27F)

This quotation reflects Dilek’s pathway to the construction of an all-em-

bracing identity: in reaction to a high sense of exclusion by Belgian society,
she has constructed a strong Turkish identity, but during her narrative she
starts to realize that she “does not fit in with being Turkish” either. Because
she now feels she can neither identify as Belgian, nor as Turkish, she choos-
es the label world citizen as an alternative inclusive identity.
In Dilek’s case, the identification as a world citizen grew out of a lack
of other group identities, but for others it can also grow out of a refusal to
think in terms of, ethnic boundaries:

[I put world citizen at the top of the hierarchy] because I am a human being.
What is most important for me is a human being. We are all built with the
same raw material. You, me, Jan, Ahmet, Mustafa or Abdel of Jean. We are
all human beings. That is [what] world citizen [means to me]. (Armaged-
don, 32M)

Armageddon first and foremost wants to identify as a human being,

and chooses this label because it is all-inclusive and uniting. It focuses on
what links people together, rather than on the differences and boundar-
ies. By identifying as a world citizen, they represent the change they want
to see.
In socio-demographic terms, this identity narrative is especially com-
mon among the better educated, who in most cases have a strong sense
of exclusion. Because of their better education, they have more contact
with ethnic Belgians, which has led to a cultural creolization process in
which they have mixed Turkish and Belgian cultural practices and atti-
tudes into a new hybrid culture. To a certain extent, they feel similar to
ethnic Belgians in terms of lifestyle; but the experienced or perceived
exclusion—both in Belgium and in Turkey—results in a strong sense of
exclusion. Although some of the informants were at the time of the inter-
view still struggling with the resulting identity crises, many have found a
way out by identifying with an all-embracing category such as world citizen
or human being.
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  301

CONCLUSION

Summary and Discussion

Research has demonstrated that Belgium is one of Europe’s “leading”

countries with regard to ethnic prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiments,
and that these negative feelings are even stronger towards the Muslim popu-
lation (Quillian, 1995; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). Being the largest Muslim
population in Europe and the second largest in Belgium (the largest be-
ing the Moroccan population), Turks are exposed to an array of orientalist
prejudices, discursive Othering practices and institutional and everyday dis-
crimination. Considering the importance of exclusion and categorization
for self-identification, this study focuses on how these discourses, the prac-
tices of exclusion, and Othering shape Turkish Belgians’ national and ethnic
self-identification. Drawing on in-depth interviews with second and third
generation Turkish Belgians, I explore how Turkish Belgians themselves
experience ethnic boundary construction in their everyday lives and how
their narratives of exclusion and Othering act out in their identity narratives.
I find that Turkish Belgians are confronted with ethnic boundaries
through a variety of practices: ethnic Belgians’ body language, discourse,
and discriminatory practices. The observation that boundaries manifest
themselves in both discourse and practice echoes Wimmer’s (2013) claim
that boundaries always consist of a categorical (or symbolic) and a behav-
ioral dimension. The categorical dimension is acted out by ethnic Belgians
through a myriad of discursive practices, including both subtle everyday
racism (Essed, 1991) and blatantly racist utterances. The behavioral dimen-
sion translates itself in everyday discrimination in the housing and labor
market and within certain social settings, most particularly nightlife—in
short, the behavioral component is part of Belgian social structure or the
routine, organized way of life in Belgium. Compared to cases of discursive
exclusion and everyday racism, cases of discrimination are much less fre-
quently voiced, and mentioned almost exclusively by male respondents.
Our analysis shows that even in the absence of explicit racism or per-
sonal discrimination, many of our respondents have the feeling of being
considered different and excluded, as a result of subtle ethno-religious
boundaries implicit in discourse and behavior among ethnic Belgians. In
fact, many more respondents based their sense of exclusion and being dif-
ferent on practices of categorization and subtle everyday racism than on
factual discrimination. One hypothesis for this strong impact of everyday
racism and discursive exclusion is that it is much more socially acceptable
and therefore more widespread than actual discrimination. Moreover, the
fact that it not only occurs in hostile contexts but also in friendly interac-
tions with friends and in supposedly safe settings such as a therapy session
302  K. VAN KERCKEM

or the school context, makes it all the more painful and maybe an even big-
ger identity threat for those who experience it.
In line with previous research (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007; Jenkins,
2008), the analysis demonstrates that identification of Turkish Belgians is
the result of a dialectic between external processes of ascription and exclu-
sion on the one hand, and internal assertion on the other hand. I have
identified five different identity narratives, based on how people position
themselves vis-à-vis the labels Turkish and Belgian, and on how they link their
self-identification to their experiences of exclusion and Othering. Although
I observed that narratives of Othering and exclusion often take center stage
within the identity narratives, I also found that perceived symbolic exclu-
sion or discrimination do not necessarily result in a rejection of a Belgian
identity or in the adoption of a reactive, Turkish identity.
Results suggest that a sense of exclusion does not determine identity
construction in an inescapable manner, but that people are active agents
who can reject categorization and assert certain identities. In the absence of
an emotional identification with Belgians, people do seem to need another
identity that provides them with a sense of belonging. For some people,
this sense of belonging is provided by their membership in the Turkish
community. Those identifying as Turkish by heart, Belgian on paper and as the
essential Turk, compensate their sense of exclusion with the positive feelings
attached to being Turkish. When the sense of belonging in the Turkish
community is not strong, people nevertheless are able to construct a posi-
tive, inclusive identity by identifying with the all-embracing categories of
world citizen or human being. In case of no alternative identification, people
can perceive an identity crisis, but given the fluidity of identification, this is
most likely to be a temporary phase which will eventually end as people find
alternative forms of identification.
The different identity narratives not only represent different constella-
tions of ethnic, national, and supra-national identities, but also different
ways of negotiating ethnic boundaries and responding to discourses and
practices of exclusion: those who identify as Belgian on paper, Turkish by heart
report that it is hard to feel Belgian, but nevertheless reclaim the Belgian
identity that is denied to them from the outside, by stressing their Belgian
citizenship. The few who identify as being Belgian with Turkish roots refuse
to see themselves as victims of exclusion and actively try to be accepted
and hence eliminate a possible threat to their Belgian identity. Essential
Turks have constructed a narrative that presents their ethnic identity as
reified, primordial and incompatible with Belgian identity, hence making
external categorization seem inconsequential. In the in-between narrative,
the double sense of exclusion is counterbalanced with the positive feelings
associated with having “the best of both worlds.” In the final narrative—
that of the world citizen or human being—people react to ethnic boundaries
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  303

and exclusion by rejecting the idea of boundaries and stressing what unites
people, hence “being the change they want to see.”
This study confirms Jenkins’ findings that externally-located processes of
social categorization are very influential in the production of social identi-
ties. To a certain extent, it also confirms the finding that categorization and
exclusion can limit the availability of ethnic options (Waters, 1990). In par-
ticular, when it comes to emotional identification, those who have a sense
of being excluded by ethnic Belgians do not feel any emotional attachment
to Belgium, but this does not mean that they do not identify as such.
Our most remarkable finding is that people not only find alternative
ways of identification when certain options are unavailable, but that they
also actively reclaim those identities that have been denied to them.
Overall, reactive identifications such as the essential Turk are rather
uncommon, given the observation that a sense of exclusion or Othering is
widespread among our respondents. This finding puts into perspective the
quantitative studies on the link between perceived discrimination and reac-
tive ethnicity (Maxwell, 2009; Skrobanek, 2009). Although there is certainly
a relationship to be found between the two, our analysis shows that it should
not be assumed that perceived discrimination or exclusion necessarily leads
to a reactive ethnic identity. Some people choose to ignore that exclusion,
or re-claim the identity that is denied to them by others, referring to their
nationality, birth, or good-citizenship practices.
Our analysis also suggests that much remains to be done. First, I have
demonstrated that both subtle and blatant forms of ethnic-boundary draw-
ing shape self-identification, but quantitative research is necessary to study
the exact impact of both. Based on the presented findings, I hypothesize
that practices of everyday racism—such as ethnic jokes, a repeated focus on
one’s ethnicity, generalizations and categorizing labels such as allochtoon—
are experienced as at least equally exclusionary as actual discrimination.
Such forms of discrimination are more widespread and they tend to occur
in supposedly safe and familiar contexts. Consequently, I hypothesize that
identification is shaped at least as much by the subtle discursive experiences
of ethnic boundaries as by practices of discrimination.
Secondly, I have hinted at the role of temporal and life course factors
have for understanding the exposure to and impact of exclusion. Neverthe-
less, more research is needed to understand whether the impact of Othering
and exclusion differ according to age or between particular stages in the
life course. For instance, does it make a difference if one experiences ex-
clusion and discrimination early on in the life-course—during one’s most
formative years? What happens when people start being confronted with
discrimination after having grown up in a context with little or no experi-
ences of exclusion?
304  K. VAN KERCKEM

Finally, the study also does not allow for an in-depth exploration of how
patterns of identification shape perceptions of exclusion or Othering, nor
does it enable us to answer how perceived exclusion relates to actual experi-
ences of personal discrimination. All of these are interesting research ques-
tions in their own right and I hope that our study will be an incentive for
other researchers to take up the challenge to tackle them.
In conclusion, I want to draw attention to three of the most remark-
able findings of this study. First, symbolic boundary construction is by many
respondents experienced as equally, if not even more, exclusionary than
behavioral exclusion. One possible explanation for this observation is that
symbolic boundary drawing through, for example, othering and other forms
of daily racism are more socially acceptable, and therefore more omnipres-
ent. Second, despite a high sense of symbolic exclusion and, consequently,
restricted identity options, people manage to construct a positive identity.
Even if people feel like outsiders or excluded, many are still active agents
that invent strategies to avoid negative consequences of exclusion: they re-
claim a Belgian identity, minimize negative experiences, and stress their
own responsibility in avoiding them; find strength in primordial attach-
ments or a reactive ethnicity; reframe being in-between in positive terms;
or—in case they do not have a sense of primordial attachment—identify
with a broad, all-inclusive category. Third, people seem to make a distinc-
tion between what could be labeled as a categorical identification (being)
and an emotional identification (feeling), and boundary drawing seems to
impact both differently. Whereas symbolic and behavioral exclusion seems
to limit “ethnic options” for emotional identification, this is much less the
case for categorical identification. On the contrary, exclusion might even
strengthen the need to reaffirm and hence reclaim one’s national identity.

NOTES

1. The Twenty Statements Test (TST) is a socio-psychological test designed by

Kuhn and McPartland to “measure” people’s self-concept. The test is a survey
in which people are asked to give 20 different answers to the open-ended
question “Who am I?.” According to Kuhn, answers can be grouped into 5
categories, including “social groups and classifications,” “ideological beliefs,”
“interests,” “ambitions” and “self-evaluations.” In our own study, we asked
the informants to complete the test before the start of the interview, and did
so for two reasons. First, it gave us an idea of the total self-concept of the in-
formant in question, which helped us to contextualize how important their
ethnic, national and religious identities were. Second, it helped in establish-
ing rapport and contributed to the flow of the interview because it identified
those aspects which were most central to the informants’ self-concept and
which, consequently, they could and liked to talk about at length.
 “How Can I Feel Belgian if Belgians Don’t Accept Me?”  305

2. By essentializing I mean giving specific traits to a group, which is a factor in

categorizing a group.
3. In 2008, gate manufacturer Feryn was convicted for discrimination because
the director publicly declared that he refused to hire mechanics of foreign
origin. He argued that he did not want to hire “Moroccans” because his cus-
tomers preferred someone of Belgian origin and would not appreciate a me-
chanic with foreign roots (CGKB, 2008). In 2001, ex-employees of the job
agency Adecco disclosed that their former employer kept track of “ethnic
preferences” of their customers (i.e., corporations or employers that hired
their help to find candidates for job openings). During the investigation, over
a hundred files were found that thad the code “BBB” (which stands for “Bleu
Blanc Belge,” a well-known Belgian cow race), in addition to 34 other files
that mentioned “no foreigners,” “no Blacks,” “no Arabs.”

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 CHAPTER 10

BRITISH MUSLIMS’
DISCOURSES
OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
Saliha Anjum, Andrew McKinlay,
and Chris McVittie

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 has
kept Islam and Muslims at the forefront of international debates. There
have been extensive discussions about terrorism, Islamophobia, and the
resulting discrimination against Muslims. This has also led to demands that
Muslims show their loyalties to their country of residence. While there is
much research on Muslims’ identity, there is still much to learn about how
Muslims in the United Kingdom make sense of their identities. This chap-
ter seeks to build on earlier research about national identity by examining
the different ways British Muslims construct identity across generations.

National Identity, pages 311–337

Copyright © 2016 by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 311
312  S. ANJUM, A. MCKINLAY, and C. MCVITTIE

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Muslims in the United Kingdom: A Brief History

Brief Demographic Profile of Muslims in Great Britain

Islam is the second largest religion in the United Kingdom according to
data from the 2011 UK Census. In 2011, there were an estimated 2,786,635
Muslims in the UK and Wales, or about 4.4% of the total population.
Table 10.1 presents some additional demographic data on the Muslim
population in England and Wales from 1961 to 2011.
The Muslim population has grown significantly since 1961, and the ef-
fects on the demography of England and Wales are important. Indeed,
from 1961 to 2011, the percent change in the total Muslim population has
been over 5,000%. In turn, the percent of the Muslim population of the to-
tal population in England and Wales increased from less than 1% in 1961 to
nearly 5% in 2011 (4.83%). Moreover, as the Muslim population increased
so have the number of Mosques in the nation, from 7 in 1961 to approxi-
mately 1,500 in 2011.
Being Muslim is a religion, not an ethnicity or race. Table 10.2 displays
the race and ethnicity of the Muslim population in England. The three larg-
est Muslim race/ethnic groups, self-identified, in 2011 were British Asians
(1,830,560), White (210,260), and Arab (178,195).
Muslims tend to be concentrated in certain areas in England. Figure 10.1
displays this concentration. The darker the color, the greater percentage of
the Muslim population in that area of England. However, they do not ap-
pear to be isolated and lacking in interaction with Christians. The isolation
index for 2011 is 14.16, and the interaction index is 49.98.1

TABLE 10.1 Muslims in England and Wales, 1961–2011

Percent of Population
Year Muslim Population in England and Wales Registered Mosques
1961 50,000 0.11 7
1971 226,000 0.46 30
1981 553,000 1.11 149
1991 950,000 1.86 443
2001 1,600,000 3.07 614
2011 2,706,000 4.83 1,500
Percent change:
1961 to 2011 5,312% 4,290% 21,329%
Source: www.brin.ac.uk/figures
 British Muslims’ Discourses of National Identity  313

TABLE 10.2 Race and Ethnic Composition of the Muslim

Population in England, 2011
Race/Ethnicity Population
White 210,260
Mixed 102,582
British Asian 1,830,560
Black/Black British 272,015
Arab 178,195
Other 112,094
Total 2,706,066
Source: www.brin.ac.uk/figures

Figure 10.1 Distribution of Muslims in England. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org.

314  S. ANJUM, A. MCKINLAY, and C. MCVITTIE

Religious and British Identities

Available research on the religious and national identities of British Muslims
shows mixed results.2 In some studies, religious identity dominates the life of
Muslims, while in other research belonging is more important. According to
the Labour Force Survey (2003–2004), about 65% of Muslims describe them-
selves in terms of their national identity as British, English, Scottish, or Welsh
rather than in terms of their ethnic identity, and 93% of UK-born Muslims also
considered their national identity to be British. Furthermore, more than half
of the Muslim adults living in England and Wales reported their religion to be
very important for their self-identity (Attwood, 2003).
A larger percentage of second generation Muslims compared to first-
generation Muslims consider themselves British. Din (2006) found that
second generation youth prefer being British than Asian or Pakistani. Hy-
phenated identities are often used, such as Asian-British, Scottish-Asian,
and Pakistani-Scot. An interesting feature is that young people perceived
their parents as more Pakistani rather than more British. Young people ex-
press more attachment and adjustment to Britain through language skills,
employment, and length of stay, in contrast to identifying with their eth-
nic group. Research suggests that few young people describe themselves
as “Asians” and most present themselves as culturally “British,” which is
reflected in their appearance, forms of socializing, and choice of entertain-
ment (Modood, Berthoud, Lakey, Nazroo, Smith, Virdee, & Beishon, 1997;
Stopes-Roe & Cochrane, 1990; Ghuman, 1999).
Geography within Britain has a role in national identity. Hopkins (2007) ex-
amined national and religious identity among Scottish-Muslims, and focused on
two themes: being Scottish and being Muslim. Hopkins found that though there
were some ties in ethnicity, these Muslims preferred their Scottish identity over
other identities. This is attributed to the fact that they were born and brought
up in Scotland, received their education there, and had Scottish accents.
The research shows that British Muslims identify as British. Yet, other
research argues that British Muslims give more importance to their reli-
gious identity than to other cultural identities. Jacobson (1997) conducted
research on the dual identities among British-Pakistani Muslims. Her young
respondents gave more importance to their religious identity than to their
ethnic identity. Moreover, because nationalism is forbidden in Islam, they
expressed their belongingness to a more global Muslim Umma (brother-
hood). They draw very clear boundaries between what is right and wrong
in their religion and think that their ethnic identity is not well defined, so
they prefer their religious identity (Jacobson, 1997).
Thus we can see that the identities of British Muslims are mixed and not
conclusive. There is no general agreement on whether British Muslims give
more importance to their religious identity or to their national identity. Ac-
cording to another study, in order to show the two aspects of their culture
 British Muslims’ Discourses of National Identity  315

and nationality, second generation Muslims make use of hybrid identities

like British-Pakistani (Modood et al., 1997). A similar idea has been very
skilfully discussed in the following words of Ansari (2002):

Among young British Muslims, there is much heart searching about where
they belong—in Britain, or in an “Islamic” community? They are developing
their perceptions of national, ethnic and religious belonging, and negotiat-
ing new ways of being Muslim in Britain, in which the British element of their
identity form important part of the equation.

This indicates that being British and being Muslim are the part of same
equation, as seen in hyphenated identities. But how these two identities
function together is another question that is beyond the scope of our re-
search. In this chapter, we focus on how acceptance or rejection by the host
society affects national identity.

Acculturation and Being Muslim

Non-acceptance by White peers is a major stressor experienced by some
Muslim immigrants. Moreover, well settled, high profile British Muslims
view British multiculturalism as a superficial strategy: it fails to accept the
individual, focuses on certain aspects of the individual, and does not wel-
come different faiths (Modood & Ahmad, 2007).
Assimilation3 is a complaint among some Muslims as are the negative at-
titudes toward Muslims held by some of the White British population. Both
factors may be a barrier for Muslims from identifying as “British” (Modood
et al., 1997). Jacobson (1997) reported that Muslim respondents believed
that their being accepted as British is linked to assimilation: an unreason-
able demand for them to leave their culture. The negative perceptions of
the White British population may not be speculative. Khan (2000) found
that British citizens consider Islamic values and culture to be backward and
out-dated. Acceptance, then, is a major challenge in the way of Muslims
fully integrating into British society.
Another factor challenging Muslim integration is language. Vedder (2005)
found that national language proficiency contributes to high self-esteem among
Muslim immigrant students in Netherlands, whereas ethnic language proficien-
cy and ethnic identity leads to negative adaptation to the host country (Vedder,
2005). Based on this and similar findings, we may hypothesize that Muslims in
Britain may also face similar challenges to Muslims in the Netherlands.
It is clear that there is much research on the national identity among Brit-
ish Muslims, but little on the collection and analyses of discursive informa-
tion. A discursive design allows us to look at their everyday lives, how they
perceive how others perceive and interact with them, and how these factors
lead to the construction of identity. In this chapter, we look at two themes of
national identity construction: (a) positive construction of national identity,
316  S. ANJUM, A. MCKINLAY, and C. MCVITTIE

and (b) negative construction of national identity. Moreover, we also examine

and discuss dilemmas associated with the construction of national identity,
including how British Muslims make sense of their British national identity.

Theories of Nations and National Identity

Essentialists and Primordialists

Previous research has offered highly contrasting ways of studying and
understanding national identities. One version proposes that nations are
rooted in primordial elements of human experience, such as kinship ties or
genetic similarities (e.g., Van Den Berghe, 1990). For them national iden-
tity is a matter of fixed, unchanging factors. In another form of this argu-
ment, language is presented as marking an essential feature of the nation
and of national identity. In these terms, language is seen as an intrinsic part
of establishing a nation, with language use denoting identification with the
nation (Fishman, 1972; Wright, 2000). For other scholars, nations have less
to do with the manifestation of primordial or essential elements than they
do with the embodiment of political and social forces.
Modernists point to the construction of nations as part of the formation
of social units that were required for the effective implementation of cer-
tain forms of production (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). On this argument,
national identities, instead of being indicators of inherent factors that link
the individual to the community, are outcomes of historically and politically
situated forms of social organisation. All such approaches to understanding
nations, then, have somewhat different implications for studying national
identities: they can be seen either as ostensibly natural and inherent enti-
ties, or as historical and political products. Smith (1986; 1991; 1999) has ar-
gued that these differences can be reconciled, with nations encompassing a
range of features taken up by its populations. What approaches share is the
central tenet that nations exist beyond individuals’ grasp, and that national
identities incorporate essential, pre-existing features.

Postmodernists and Constructivists

Other theories of national identities, by contrast, adopt a different perspec-
tive about national identities. Postmodern theorists such as Anderson (1991)
and Bhabha (1990), for example, have argued that nations should be under-
stood as a collection of cultural artifacts that are in effect linguistic or imagined
constructions. In a similar vein, discursive writers (Billig, 1995; Condor, 2000)
have pointed out that nations do not “exist” beyond individuals per se, but are
imagined. Billig (1995), for example, points to the ways in which nations are
routinely presented to us in unnoticed “banal” ways that do not reflect exter-
nal realities but, instead, construct specific versions of reality. Similarly, Condor
 British Muslims’ Discourses of National Identity  317

(2000) points to how descriptions of a world made up of nation states perme-

ate many of the ways in which people make sense of themselves and of others,
and are reworked to the requirements of local contexts. National identities are
constructions that are designed to accomplish more specific objectives.
It is this latter understanding of national identities that forms the basis
for our research. We look to extend previous understandings of how British
Muslims negotiate and construct their identities, British or Muslim. As will
be seen below, individuals, in constructing their identities, refer to specific
elements of a nation, such as language, that they use as links with others. Our
focus is on the actions that respondents take, via their descriptive accounts,
and the contextual nature of how national identities are constructed.

Theoretical Framework: Identities and Discourse Analysis

In order to examine how British Muslims construct their identities, we

draw upon the theoretical approach of discourse analysis (McKinlay &
McVittie, 2008). Discourse analysts treat discourse as a topic in its own right
and not just the expression of one’s inner thoughts. Discourse has certain
properties that people recognize and use to accomplish certain goals.
Another feature of discourse is social construction of identities in a par-
ticular interactional context. So identities do not occur in vacuum, but re-
quire a social setting where two or more people are involved in a social
action (McKinlay & McVittie, 2011).
The discourse analytic perspective has particular implications for un-
derstanding identity. McKinlay and McVittie (2011) have summarized the
important features of identities: Identities are the discursive characteriza-
tions about self or others that are not condensable to objective facts about
that person, such characterizations develop an identity that is either unique
or common with others, these characterizations are action oriented and
bound up with social actions, and these categorizations are situational.
Based on this approach, identities are constructed, fluid in nature, subject
to change, negotiated, resistant, and acceptable.
Applying this perspective to the study of national identity offers an un-
derstanding that is markedly different from that found elsewhere. In this
regard, the map of nations as they appear in the world atlas with rigid
boundaries is considered to be misleading in many ways. For example, ac-
cording to Giroux (1995), processes like globalization and development
of supra-national political bodies such as the European Union are some of
the major threats to the status of the nation state. Rather than treating na-
tional identities as (mere) indicators of geographical affiliation, therefore,
discourse analysis turns attention to the issue of what people are actively do-
ing when they claim, resist or rework descriptions of identity. For example,
318  S. ANJUM, A. MCKINLAY, and C. MCVITTIE

De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999) suggested that people draw their na-
tional identity on cultural similarities and national boundaries while focus-
ing on common national myths, symbols, memories and rituals of everyday
life. According to them, these symbolic processes of national identity are
not static but instead are constructed dynamically in discourse. In this re-
gard, Reicher and Hopkins (2001) point towards the importance of un-
derstanding the way in which people are constructed as belonging to one’s
own nation. They further suggested that analysts should be aware of the
wide variety of resources like economic development and cultural histories
that are available to the individual to draw from, in a particular context of
discourse, to construct his national identity. This suggests that there should
be some particular forms of discourse that could be attributed to national-
ism. For example, Billig (1995) used the term “banal nationalism” to refer
to the practices of nationalism that is, nationalist talk and expressions like
“we” and “us.” He further argues that these are the expressions that are
used by individuals to reproduce their relationship with their nations. The
research in the field of discourse of national identity indicates that national
identities are characterizations of oneself and others through the use of
‘identification’ with a nation. Moreover, such characterizations also attri-
bute common features of a nation to oneself and others. Below, we will see
how British Muslims draw upon and use characterizations such as these.

METHODS

Data: The Semi-Structured Interviews

For this study, data were collected using semi-structured interviews and
focus groups conducted with first and second generation British Muslims
residing in Edinburgh and Glasgow (both in Scotland, UK). The data come
from 40 semi-structured interviews and four focus groups, conducted be-
tween June 2011 and December 2012. This study has used the term British
instead of Scottish because many of the respondents moved to Scotland
from England, so they consider their identity as British and not specifically
Scottish. The interview questions were constructed as open-ended in order
to resemble naturalistic conversation.
Participants’ age range was from 17 to 70 years. Both first and second
generations of Muslims were included in the study to provide diverse ob-
servations of the subject under study. First generation Muslims included
participants who migrated to Britain from their home countries as an adult
or as a teenager and were conscious of their migration from home country
to Britain. Second generation Muslims were those participants who were
either born in Britain or came to Britain at a very young age (up to 8 years)
 British Muslims’ Discourses of National Identity  319

along with their parents. Both of these generations were included in the
study in order to explore the differences of their experiences in relation
to Britain. Similarly, participants belonged to both genders, which allowed
us to have a cross-gender understanding of their lives in Britain. This is
important because Muslim males and females have different roles in life
based on their religious beliefs. Therefore, men and women were expected
to display somewhat different aspects of experiences. Current study has not
related its findings with participants’ other demographic information such
as education or employment status; therefore, it is not mentioned here.
Considering the fact that the majority of first generation Muslims in Britain
are from South Asia, especially from Pakistan, interview and focus group
schedules were translated into Urdu. In order to validate the translated ver-
sion of interview schedule it was reviewed by two multilingual profession-
als. In providing English translations of Urdu interviews and focus groups,
every attempt was made to ensure that translated data were as close as pos-
sible to the wordings used by the participants themselves. As a reliability
measure, the final extracts for data analysis were reviewed by a multilingual
researcher to establish the closeness of translation to the actual data.
All discussions were audio-recorded with the consent of the participants
and later transcribed using an abbreviated version of Jeffersonian transcrip-
tion notation (Jefferson, 2004). This form of transcription notation is used
to transcribe not just the words used by participants but also features of
how talk is delivered, including speakers’ use of speech particles, pauses,
emphasis, overlapping talk, and so on. For present purposes, transcriptions
of the extracts presented below include the following features:

(2.0) numbers between parentheses indicate a pause between utter-

ances measured in seconds;
(.) a dot within parentheses indicates a brief (untimed) pause be-
tween utterances;
a:: colons indicate that the immediately preceding sound has been
prolonged;
(name) words in parentheses indicate descriptions of material that has
been rendered anonymous by the transcriber;
that- hyphen indicates broken off speech;
I is abbreviation for Interviewer;
FM initials of the respondent.

These extracts therefore should not be seen as free from grammatical er-
rors as they are designed to reproduce both what the participants said and
how it was said.
Data were analysed for major themes, then all the extracts were select-
ed if national identity was mentioned. These extracts were then micro-
analyzed for identifying the discursive strategies and patterns used by the
320  S. ANJUM, A. MCKINLAY, and C. MCVITTIE

respondents. Finally, nine extracts that exemplified the participants’ uses

of positive and negative constructions of national identity were selected for
analysis and use in this chapter.

FINDINGS

Our analyses cover both positive and negative construction of British iden-
tity. We examine results from a series of semi-structured interviews in put-
ting together a portrait of what each type of identity entails and the reasons
behind such identities.

Positive Constructions of British Identity

This section covers the positive constructions of national identities

among first and second generation British Muslims. The first two extracts
are from second generation participants, and the last three from first gen-
eration Muslims. We explore how the two generations make different claims
about their identity while using positive references from their daily lives.

Second Generation Respondents

The first extract is taken from an interview with a second generation
female. We will see her construct multiple identities and how they facilitate
one another.

Extract 1: FM
1 I While living in UK how would you define your religious identity as a British
2 Muslim?
3 FM Umm yes I am an (sect name) Muslim in Britain and but as an (sect) Muslim I
4 can be Insha’Allah on God willing I will be (sect) Muslim wherever I lived
5 umm and the fact that (.) God so fitted me to be born in this country that must
6 be a good- it’s a good thing I am very fortunate because when I- because in this
7 country I am allowed to practice my faith I don’t have any restrictions upon me
8 you know saying aslamoalaikum (.) greeting people you know with the you
9 know with a little prayer for them and (0.5) you know I can practice my faith
10 as I like to (.) some people might think it strange (.) some people sometimes
11 people can abuse you for it but they can’t there is not actually a law to say that
12 what they are doing is right so the law is actually saying that you can practice
13 your faith so I think that’s why this is a:: this is a wonderful country to live in.
 British Muslims’ Discourses of National Identity  321

FM is responding to the question about her religious identity. She began

by introducing herself as belonging to a particular sect of Muslims in Brit-
ain, and added an additional dimension to her British Muslim identity by
introducing the sect along with her Muslim identity. She then claims that
she will remain a Muslim of that sect regardless of where she might live. Her
loyalty to her sect is clear based on her saying that no matter where she lives
she will maintain her Muslim identity. Further, by using the expression of
“God willing” in Line 4, she presents her identity in terms of her religion;
she is relying on the belief that whatever happens, happens by God’s Will.
In Line 5, FM attributes her birth “in this country” as a good event, and
associates the event with God. Mentioning God as a divine who allowed her
to be born in this particular country is constructing her identity around her
strong belief in God. There is also the notion of attributing “goodness” to
being born “in this country”—Britain. FM is building her identity based on
place, which is an important factor in constructing identity (Dixon & Dur-
rheim, 2000).
FM merges two identities in her responses. In the first two lines of her
response, FM merges her religious identity as a Muslim belonging to a
specific sect with her British identity. Further, Goodness is important to FM.
In Line 6, FM used the word good twice, and strengthens her claim about
Goodness. The reason for such a clam is that she is allowed to practice her
faith in Britain. Britain is a place where she is free to practice her religion.
She supports her claim with the example of greeting people with a small
prayer, and thus provides a vivid example of her freedom in Britain.
Although she enjoys the freedom of practising her religion in Britain,
she introduces the possibility that some people might not be so receptive.
However, she immediately claims that people cannot prohibit or abuse her
right to practice her religion as it is her legal right to do so. This has also
been put forth as the reason for this country being “wonderful.” So Britain
is presented as a wonderful country in which to live because it gives her
freedom to practise her religion and legal security for her religious beliefs.
In this extract, FM has constructed three forms of identity i.e., sectarian,
Muslim, and British. The confluence of these three identities suggests the
possibility of hyphenated identities that incorporate multiple aspects of an
individual’s experiences. In FM’s case, being British is a facilitating factor
because it allows her to practice her religion freely.
Our second extract is from a second generation female respondent. In
this extract, MS describes how her parents helped her understand her cul-
ture and religion and its differences from British culture.

Extract 2: MS
1 I As you said earlier that British culture is different from Islamic culture so how
2 you manage to adapt here?
322  S. ANJUM, A. MCKINLAY, and C. MCVITTIE

3 MS I think because like I said before my parents gave me a very good grounding
4 (0.8) in terms of my values- my moral values that they gave me at home (0.8)
5 so I was able to become an own person (.) I didn’t have to be like my friends
6 (0.5) my friends actually accepted me for the way that I was (1.0) because they
7 had so much respect for the fact that I respected my values that I have been
8 given at home by my family (1.0) in terms of my (1.0) umm religious
9 obligations (.) I use to wear the hijab when I was at school and the university
10 (0.8.) I use to umm (1.5) pray (.) if I had to pray (0.5) I go and pray in school
11 or university and all those things were accepted by my friends (.) and I think
12 that is an aspect of British society (.) which allows us to be Muslims here (0.5)
13 even now that you are a British Muslim (0.5) I think it’s the way that the
14 British (2.0) the British culture is very adaptable to other people’s
15 circumstances (0.8) and in fact I find that they are (1.5) I think that the British
16 people are actually more willing and much more accommodating for your
17 needs than even our own culture is (.) if you go to Pakistan and you need to do
18 something in terms of observing a certain thing (.) regardless of whether you
19 are a Muslim or Christian (0.8) they don’t have the same umm understanding
20 and the same willingness to cooperate with you (0.8) as the British society does
21 and that’s an amazing quality that the Brits have (0.8) that they would go out of
22 their way to allow you to live your life the way you want to live it (1.0) and I
23 think that’s very important (.) I think that’s been a great I have had (1.0) I am
24 very lucky I have had very good experiences in my life where I haven’t felt like
25 (2.0) I have to accommodate myself in any other way (1.0) I can be myself
26 (0.5) and I think I have been able to do that throughout my life and it’s been (.)
27 I have been happy to live my life as the British Muslim (0.8) I am a British
28 person (0.8) I have my Muslim values (.) I have Pakistani values as well that
29 my family has given me (0.5) but (0.5) I am own person.

In this extract, MS was asked about her being Muslim and her adjust-
ment to British society. MS responded by referring to how her parents had
given her sound moral values. According to MS, this grounding has helped
her become “an own person”; the basis of her individual identity are the
moral values instilled in her by her parents. MS is constructing her identity
as a unique person, different from her friends, who may be British, but who
still accept her. Her friends are very accepting and respect her religious val-
ues. In Lines 9 and 10, MS gives examples of the religious obligations that
she used to follow, including wearing hijab and offering prayers and “all
those things.” According to MS, these religious obligations were accepted
by her British friends, and are an indication about the acceptance of her
values by British society.
 British Muslims’ Discourses of National Identity  323

In Line 12, she states that this acceptance by British society actually “al-
lows her to be Muslim here.” She expands this argument by giving details
that British society is “adaptable to other people’s circumstances.” This is
similar to what FM mentioned in the previous extract—being British facili-
tates her identity as a Muslim. MS makes the same claim but in greater de-
tail. MS’s view about the acceptance by British society is further supported
by comparing British society with Pakistani society in Line 16.
MS continues to claim that British society is very accommodating by not-
ing that it is more accommodating than her Pakistani culture. This use of
the expression “out of the way” indicates the intensity of the efforts made
by Britons to accommodate people from different religious backgrounds.
In Lines 23–24, MS uses the expression, “I am very lucky.” She is content
with her life in Britain as a British Muslim.
Second generation Muslims tend to have multiple parallel identities.
In the last three lines of her responses, MS summarizes her responses by
constructing her identity as a hyphenated British-Muslim-Pakistani. This
extract is a good example of second generation Muslims’ construction of
multiple identities. Like FM, MS has also constructed being a British citizen
as something facilitating her Muslim identity. FM attributed this to the reli-
gious freedom in Britain, and MS attributed it to the acceptance found in
British society. In both the extracts, there is no mention of any identity con-
flict between these multiple identities—as described by the respondents,
these hyphenated identities seem to facilitate one another. Moreover, it is
clear that MS feels happy and fortunate to be a British citizen.
Our results suggest that second generation Muslims construct a positive
British identity because they view British society as accepting of their Muslim
backgrounds. Being born in Britain appears to be a primary reason for such
a positive construction of one’s identity among these two second generation
Muslims. This raises an interesting question about place of birth and national
identity. In the next extract we examine the views of first generation Muslims.

First Generation Muslims and Identity

The following extract is by a first generation male, who has been living in
UK for the past 40 years. In this extract he is discussing his culture and identity.

Extract 3: SMR
1 I What different things of both cultures do you follow?
2 SMR I don’t think so that it is aa::: if you ask this question from my children then I
3 think they can give you a better answer than this, but although we are British
4 but our culture is still Pakistani, culture of our children is possibly different but
5 we are still Pakistani, we have Pakistani culture, meaning we follow
6 everything.
324  S. ANJUM, A. MCKINLAY, and C. MCVITTIE

This extract is from a first generation British Muslim male. He was asked
to discuss some aspects of his home and host culture. Interestingly, he did
not begin the interview by talking about his culture but began with the
use of “I don’t think so,” and then advised the interviewer that she should
address this question to his children in order to get a better answer. By say-
ing this, SMR is positioning himself as someone not suitable to answer this
question, and minimizing the possibility of later accountabilities.
After establishing his inability to provide a “better answer,” he returns to
the actual question and goes on to develop at greater length, his national
identity as “British.” He used the words “we are British,” which indicates the
addition of some unspecified people in his response. The question was direct-
ed towards SMR individually, but he has used “we,” which may indicate that
he might be constructing this response on behalf of people of his generation
and nationality and not about himself. This use of “we” may be seen as an
example of “banal nationalism” as was briefly discussed in the introduction.
Although SMR initially claimed to be British, he added a cultural condi-
tion to this identity construction. SMR is British but his culture is Pakistani.
Multiple identities are being raised, but SMR is constructing his national
identity as British but his cultural identity as Pakistani. He is forming the
hyphenated identity of a British-Pakistani. This construction of multiple
identities is very similar to what we have seen in earlier extracts from FM
and MS, but without the Muslim attachment.
SMR views his culture as different from his children’s. He does so in
Line 4. SMR has positioned himself so that his culture is different from his
children’s. In Line 5, he lists three things in asserting his Pakistani identity
by saying that he is “still Pakistani,” has Pakistani culture, and follows ev-
erything in that culture. The use of the phrases such as “still Pakistani” is
pointing towards the continuation of his Pakistani identity (Lines 4 & 5).
Although he claimed earlier that he is British, soon afterwards he claims
that he is “still Pakistani.” Both identities seem to work together smoothly,
and this may indicate that he is claiming to have both simultaneously. Then,
after giving some examples about his culture, he introduces his religious
identity into this equation of hyphenated identities. Let us see how he fur-
ther constructs his identity in the following extract.

Extract 4: SMR
1 SMR . . . we are a:: proud to be Muslims we are proud as well as to be British as well
2 as but obviously we live here and we are hundred percent dedicated to this
3 country aa we going to die here, we going to be buried here and our children
4 are here now, our roots are, we are leaving our roots in this country in UK so
5 obviously we are British and we are also loyal to this country but if there is
6 anything happen in Pakistan which is now a days are I feel very pain . . .
 British Muslims’ Discourses of National Identity  325

In the first line of this extract, he is claiming to have Muslim identity as

well as British identity. Moreover, he give them equal status. He then expands
on his British identity by giving a detailed list of examples of why such an
identity is important to him. First, he argues that he is 100% dedicated to the
country. As a first generation immigrant this claim is significant because his
discussion about his other identities may have put into question his loyalty to
Britain. He has made it clear that he is fully dedicated to Britain.
SMR then claims that he will be buried in Britain, and further highlights
his loyalty to his British identity. This could be seen in the context of many
first generation immigrant Muslims wishing to be buried in their homelands.
Some people might want to be buried in their country of origin, but SMR is
expressing his desire to be buried in Britain. SMR goes further by arguing
that since his children are here, his roots are in Britain. So not only is SMR
claiming a wish to be buried in Britain, but he is also creating a lasting rela-
tionship with the country by leaving his roots here in the form of his children.
In Line 5, after claiming to be British he then discusses his home country
and constructs a relationship with it by stating that anything negative hap-
pens in his home country, “I feel very pain.” So now he is working up his re-
lationship with his home country. This may be an effort at avoiding any ac-
countability for not being loyal to his home country. So though he claimed
loyalty to Britain, he also claims that he feels pain if anything happens in
Pakistan. There is no way for us to know exactly the meaning behind these
statements. For him, then, identity is not a straightforward matter of align-
ing either with Britain or with Pakistan but involves elements of both.
Similarly to FM and MS, SMR worked up his identity using three dif-
ferent identities as British-Muslim-Pakistani. Also, SMR saw no conflict
between these identities—they exist parallel to one another. Interestingly,
SMR also represented his British national identity by using a positive dis-
course, but unlike FM and MS, SMR used different examples to support
such an identity. FM and MS argued that acceptance by British society is a
major factor of their British identity, whereas SMR focused on his children
and being buried in Britain. SMR did not mention the acceptance or rejec-
tion of British society as factors in his British identity. Moreover, he also
fluctuated between his cultural, religious, and national identity throughout
his discourse. SMR’s comments offer one or more interpretations. First, his
comments may express a desire not to be held accountable from any soci-
ety. Second, SMR may have very tactfully presented all three identities as of
equal importance to him. Finally, his comments may indicate that national
identity is a complex and at times confusing process.
In some cases, national identity is also constructed as a source of per-
sonal benefits. The following extract is an example of this kind of identity
construction produced by a first generation male who has been living in the
UK for over 40 years.
326  S. ANJUM, A. MCKINLAY, and C. MCVITTIE

Extract 5: GA
1 I Describe about your attachments to these countries?
2 GA The point is this that the difference between Pakistan and Britain (1.0) life style
3 and:: (2.0) in practical life like the problems a person face so because in this
4 country (1.0) this is a developed country so comparatively there are more
5 opportunities and therefore we feel more comfortable here and therefore we
6 have also kept our nationality British because we have ease in it but our country
7 is our so as far as we are concerned (1.0) we remember our country (0.5) but
8 because of the circumstances there we don’t go there sometimes (1.0) or go
9 reluctantly so it is a separate thing but the love of your country is still there (.)
10 we were born there and we got education from there also (.) Masters I did from
11 Government college Lahore MA Economics (.) so my all education is from
12 there (.) after coming here I haven’t taken any further education but as compare
13 to this what I have noted in my kids (1.0) that the kids doesn’t feel that what we
14 feel about Pakistan (.) for them this is (pointing downwards) more important (.)
15 and they in fact- as we live in Scotland so they call themselves Scottish (0.5)
16 my one daughter who is married and living in Luton (.) she also feel good in
17 calling herself Scottish (.) so the next generation is of this condition (0.5) they
18 have more with this country (.) with Pakistan:: because their parents- father is
19 from there they have some attachment but not more than this.

GA was asked about his attachments to his native and host countries. GA
begins by constructing life style differences between Pakistan and Britain,
though he was not asked about differences. GA then expands the com-
parison by using the example of problems in practical life, and claims that
Britain has more opportunities because it is a developed nation. First, GA
concludes that Britain is better in terms of opportunities and uses this con-
clusion as a reason for his comfort in Britain and for maintaining his British
nationality. So GA is claiming to have British identity because of the ben-
efits to be realized in Britain that are not available in Pakistan.
In Line 7, GA reminisces about Pakistan. If he introduces himself as a
British national with no regards to his home country, he may be held ac-
countable for being forgetful or disloyal to his home country, especially
since earlier he had stated his preference for his British identity over a Paki-
stani identity. He attends to this dilemma by claiming that he still remem-
bers his country and also claims to love it in later lines.
He addresses the issue of not going to Pakistan or going there reluctantly
because it is, to him, a separate matter. He is not going to discuss the issue.
Regardless of the circumstances he still loves his native country where he
was born and educated, and uses the name of his college alma mater to
 British Muslims’ Discourses of National Identity  327

reaffirm his statement. “Place identity” is at work here as GA is relating to

his place of birth.
Generational differences exist between GA and his children regarding
Pakistan. GA states that whatever he feels for Pakistan, his children do not
feel the same, and they feel proud in calling themselves Scottish. Because
his children live in Scotland, they identify with Scotland rather than with
Pakistan. GA uses his daughter as an example, which is interesting because
it suggests a division of two national identities within Britain. According
to GA, his daughter lives in Luton, which is in England, but she prefers to
call herself Scottish. Thus, in spite being part of Great Britain, his daughter
specifies her identity as Scottish. His children have little attachment to Paki-
stan because it is not the country in which they were born. This seems to be
a consistent finding between first and second generation immigrants: first
generation Muslims relate more to their home country because it is their
birth place, while second generation Muslims relate more to their Scottish
or British identity because it is their country of origin.
In this extract, we have seen two forms of national identities. First, GA’s
construction of his identity as British and then later his construction of his
children’s identity as Scottish. Both the constructions use positive evalu-
ations. First GA associates his British identity with comfort and ease and
secondly, he then reports that his daughter feels “good” about her Scottish
identity. Also, GA discusses concerns about his native country, balancing his
attachment to both Great Britain and Pakistan. This has also been seen in
the extracts of SMR in that he constructed his British and Pakistani identity
together to create a balance. Moreover, like SMR, GA has constructed his
whole response with the use of “we” instead of “I,” thus using some form of
expression that indicates something about nationalist inclusion.

Negative Constructions of British Identity

This section deals with somewhat negative constructions of national identi-

ty and identity dilemmas. We examine, in detail, how first and second genera-
tion British Muslims differ in making use of negative social cues in construct-
ing their national identities. The first two extracts are from first generation
respondents, and the last two are from second generation British Muslims.
The following extract is taken from an interview with a first generation Mus-
lim female discussing the negative cues she receives due to her ethnicity.

Extract 6: MA
1 I So how that impacts you?
2 MA Yes I feel dishearten a lot (.) I feel a lot of pain that what is the reason (.)
328  S. ANJUM, A. MCKINLAY, and C. MCVITTIE

3 although we are now British nationals (.) after coming home if I tell my
4 husband sometimes about this he says to me that the way she spoke to you, you
5 also speak with her in the same manner, what is lacking in you, you have the
6 same passport as she has, he says this to me that talk in the same manner as she
7 does, why don’t you talk to her similarly, you have got the same passport as
8 hers (.) but:: I can’t be like that I mean I don’t feel myself on their level or (.) I
9 mean or I also have language problem that I cannot talk like that (.) but my
10 husband tells me that you are same like they are nationals here we are also
11 nationals here, there is nothing like that (.) if somebody talk to you equally
12 reply them back (1.0) whatever rights they have got, you also have same rights
13 as a British national (1.0) if there is any problem (.) if they can go to court, we
14 can also go so (1.0) there is no such problem.

MA begins with an emotional response. The use of words like “feel,”

“dishearten,” and “pain” indicates the construction of emotions as a result
of being treated poorly by others. MA is not only explaining that she “felt
dishearten” but also enhancing its intensity by using the expression “a lot.”
In the next line, she does the same while using the expression of “pain.”
An extreme level of emotional discomfort has been constructed here as
a response to the attitude of local people. MA paints herself as a victim.
Agency is located here in the local people, who are the agents of creating
such intense feelings in MA as a result of their rejecting of her; to them she
is not British.
Later, she changes this emotional discourse into a search for reasons why
she is being rejected. She constructs her identity as a British national and
looks for the reason(s) for her mistreatment in spite of being British. The
implication also indicates that being British is a status which should protect
her from such behavior or attitudes. If she is not British then such attitudes
are justified, but if she is a British national these attitudes are not justified—
she is an equal to local people.
Having British nationality is or should be associated with a certain sta-
tus in society. In the following line, she reports her husband’s response to
this issue. First, in Line 4, the use of “sometimes” refers to the frequency
of her reporting these events to her husband, which indicates that these
events happen on a number of occasions and she reports only a few to her
husband. So when she tells this to her husband he advises her to speak with
the locals in the same manner. According to MA, her husband asks “what is
lacking in you?” and then answered the question himself by referring to the
fact that that “you have got the same passport.” Having a British passport
is seen as having the licence to speak with local people as equals. The use
of “what is lacking in you?” makes it clear that she needs to stand up for
herself and assert that she be treated as a British citizen.
 British Muslims’ Discourses of National Identity  329

Later, MA repeats her husband’s response and constructs its significance.

Later she does admit her inability to view herself as at the “same level” as
locals (Line 8). MA is struggling with her status, and has trouble placing her-
self on equal footing as locals, which she attributes to her inability to speak
English. If MA does not speak English adequately, then she cannot respond
to the local people even if she wishes to do so. Thus, language is an impor-
tant factor in British identity. In MA’s case, her difficulties with language are
a problem in being accepted as a British national by the local community.
In this extract, national identity is constructed through equal status be-
tween locals and immigrants, language, and the entitlement of civic rights as
citizens. MA constructs her identity as being a British citizen even though her
construction of a British identity is not recognised or accepted by locals, and
as a result she does not “feel [her]self on their level.” MA has attributed all
the discourse about equality with locals to her husband and that she “actively
voices” (Wooffitt, 1992) his responses in her descriptions of her problems.
By attributing to her husband the potential for challenging other peo-
ple’s actions, MA is able to develop her claims to identity in two ways. First,
the active voicing of her husband’s words provides apparent corroboration
of her claims to identity and suggests that these are not simply based on her
own words and actions. Second, she distances herself from making these
challenges against others. Should these challenges be unsuccessful, any fur-
ther querying of identity is likely to be directed at the nominated source of
the challenge, that is MA’s husband, rather than at MA herself. MA is thus
able to offer a defence of her claims to be British while also protecting that
defence from non-acceptance that would further undermine the identity
that she is claiming. All of this discursive work points to the sensitive and po-
tentially problematic description of identity that MA proposes for herself.

Extract 7: SAL
1 I Like how you feel about “rude attitudes” that you mentioned earlier?
2 SAL I feel pain from this sometimes that when I this thing when I went to Pakistan
3 two years back then I noted this thing a lot (.) in fact I felt pain from this thing
4 (1.0) that I mean when we are here then they say us overseas (1.0) or I mean
5 they say us refugees (1.0) right but when we go to our country then they say
6 they have come from abroad (1.5) they live there (.) so when I came back I
7 said I mean from this point of view we don’t have an identity (.) these people
8 say us that we are, mean we are no matter we have got British nationality (.)
9 anything happens (.) we are still called Pakistani (1.0) right (1.0) we are from
10 here mean no matter how much we say that we are rooted here I don’t think so
11 (.) from this perspective I don’t think this so (.) no matter if we live here years
12 after years (.) no matter how long we have been here but no.
330  S. ANJUM, A. MCKINLAY, and C. MCVITTIE

This discourse is from a first generation female from Pakistan (SAL). The
discussion began with the interviewer’s question about her earlier mention
of the rude attitudes of British people and its impact on her happiness.
Like MA in Extract 6, SAL is hurt by the bad attitudes displayed by British
people. She expands her response by adding other experiences affecting
her emotional pain. She mentions her visit to Pakistan two years previously
and associates “a thing” with it, which she first mentions as “noticed” but
then says “in fact I felt pain from this thing” (Line 4). She unfolds that
“thing” as a sort of dilemma that she is called a refugee in her host country
and an overseas citizen in her home country. After explaining this situation
she claims that, based on this, “we don’t have an identity.”
There is a general strategy of avoiding personalizing problems. SAL uses
“we” instead of “I” and has generalized her problems to all Pakistani im-
migrants like her. This is indeed a very painful construction of her identity
dilemma of being an immigrant, because she has presented herself as hav-
ing a home and not having an identity of her own. She has constructed a
complaint about British society as non-accepting of refugees, and also a
non-acceptance by her native society because of the fact that they no longer
live in Pakistan. So she presents the situation as one in which her home
country has accepted her permanent immigration to the host country, and
the host country is resisting accepting her as a legitimate member. This is
an ideological dilemma facing many immigrants (Billig, Condor, Edwards,
Gane, Middleton, & Radley, 1988).
SAL states that even if she is a British national she will be referred to as
Pakistani by natives. She expands her comment by saying “anything hap-
pens (.) we are still called Pakistani.” She thus constructs an identity dilem-
ma—having no identity—and then claims that there is no way of resolving
this dilemma. Though she is rooted and has a strong connection to Britain,
it does not help her from being viewed as a refugee. Regardless of what
happens, she is going to have that dilemma throughout her life. She has
constructed a pessimistic future by saying that this situation will remain the
same even if “we live here years after years.”
SAL’s extract exhibits how non-acceptance by the host society can lead
to the formation of identity dilemmas among some immigrants. The re-
sponses of local people play a crucial role in building an immigrant’s sense
of his or her national identity.
Such identity dilemmas are not limited to first generation Muslims; in
fact, they are also prevalent in the second generation of British Muslims
who have not known any other national identity than being British. The
following extract is taken from a second generation female, who has spent
most of her life in Britain and visited her parent’s home country just once.
Let us see how she constructs such events in her discourse and her reac-
tion to that.
 British Muslims’ Discourses of National Identity  331

Extract 8: FMA
1 FMA . . . .another thing that my grandfather told me when I was very younger umm
2 (1.0) because when I was younger another thing that I use to do to show
3 attitude or something (0.5) was that I didn’t use to speak Urdu (.) and I say I
4 just don’t want to speak it (.) I said this isn’t my language you know this is not
5 m- I am British I speak English I don’t speak that language you know and (.)
6 my grandfather used to just you know he just used to be very mildly poking
7 fun at me says that look (.) anybody would look at your face they would not
8 say that you are British and I say no I am British it doesn’t matter it doesn’t
9 matter by that I am British I am British and (0.5) unfortunately umm I have
10 (1.0) come across many experiences with my grandfather what he said to me
11 was proved right because many people don’t (.) don’t unfortunately consider
12 me British (.) when I open my mouth they so oh (.) good English you speak
13 (laugh) you know terrible things like that you know (.) so but it’s that’s not
14 umm that’s not it’s not a terrible thing

This particular extract is taken from the middle of the interview, and it
is the continuation of her (FMA) response to a question about her future
hopes of living in the UK. Just before this point FMA was discussing her
children’s identity as not being confined to just one country and saying that
they are the citizens of world. She then changed the topic and began dis-
cussing an event from her childhood. She says that at a young age she used
to show “attitude” and refused to speak Urdu. She is associating the refusal
to speak Urdu with a sort of arrogance as she used the word “attitude.” Her
reason for her not speaking Urdu and rejecting Urdu as her language was
due to her being British and speaking English. Being British is constructed
as a matter of pride. Thus having a British identity and speaking English is
associated with something honorable in comparison to speaking Urdu. It
is similar to the higher status associated to being British by MA (extract 6).
Moreover, language is constructed here as a crucial component of one’s
national identity.
In Line 6, FMA returns to what she was saying in the beginning about
what her grandfather used to tell her. However, before reporting her grand-
father’s speech FMA tries to minimize the seriousness of what is coming
by saying that he used to say that while “poking fun” at her. After this, she
states that he said that anybody looking at her face will not identify her as
being British. In this way, FMA says that her grandfather was pointing out
one visible aspect of her identity: her somatic appearance. Somatic similari-
ties (Van Den Berghe, 1990) with people of a nation are important in one’s
national identity, and in this case it would appear to put in doubt FMA’s
claim to be British. FMA thereafter attends to this possibility in Lines 8
and 9 by discounting this suggestion by stating that “it doesn’t matter, it
332  S. ANJUM, A. MCKINLAY, and C. MCVITTIE

doesn’t matter by that” and by restating her description of herself as Brit-

ish. Thus, FMA rejects the suggestion that appearance is an essential part
of national identity, in her case of an identity other than being British, and
instead returns to her description of herself as being British on the basis of
her own feelings and preferences.
Later she moves to her current life experiences and constructs its rela-
tion to her grandfather’s earlier comments about her identity. She contin-
ues by explaining how her grandfather’s joke has become the reality of her
life. FMA has used “unfortunately” twice in this sentence, which indicates
the negative emotions associated with her grandfather’s comments. In Line
11, she said “many people” do not consider her British, which is pointing
out the non-acceptance by these people who are perhaps local people. This
is similar to the earlier extracts in which speakers argued that everything
boils down to the acceptance or rejection of one’s British identity by local
people. In this extract, this rejection of British identity has been construct-
ed as something “unfortunate.” FMA gives an example of people’s reac-
tion to her language skills in order to support her claim. As people do not
consider her British, sometimes when she speaks English they offer her a
compliment (Line 12). Although she reproduced this example while laugh-
ing, at the same time she has used words like “terrible” for such incidences.
She might be using laughter to position herself as not bothering about such
events, but her use of “terrible” indicates that she evaluates them nega-
tively. Later in her responses she changes her claim saying that it’s not a
“terrible thing.” Like the use of laughter, this can also be seen as an effort to
reduce the significance of such events in her life. Initially, she claimed that
such rejection of her British identity by local people was a terrible event and
also requested an approval from the interviewer by using “you know” twice.
However, at a later point she has tried to minimize the intensity by claiming
that it is not that terrible, reducing the significance of such events.
Here, FMA is struggling to show the minimal impact of those rejecting
her British identity. This can be seen throughout the extract—her grandfa-
ther’s speech, using humor, but then she used “unfortunate” for the nega-
tive experiences of being not seen as British. Later she narrated an example
while laughing, but then again used the word “terrible” for such events,
and then, yet again, denied their being terrible. Local people apparently
play a role in judging whether FMA is British.
FMA’s responses also show English speaking ability as an important com-
ponent of one’s British identity by both locals and immigrants. FMA con-
nects her British identity with the English language and refused to speak
Urdu. Similarly, the local populace seem to be surprised by FMA’s English
language skills because, in their view, she does not look British.
 British Muslims’ Discourses of National Identity  333

In Extract 9, MS1 described the opportunities she has as a result of being

a British citizen, and how she is constructing threats to her national identity
by the local populace.

Extract 9: MS1
1 MS1 . . . I just felt I was treated as a British individual but I do feel NOW that in
2 society for example like I was talking about when I went to (0.5) when I came
3 to this area I was treated as if I didn’t know how to speak English (0.5) THAT
4 was a bit of shock to my system because I have never experienced that before
5 umm (1.0) and I don’t know whether that’s the result of just this particular area
6 (1.0) umm and you know the move from London to Scotland and you know
7 there isn’t that much diversity in this part of Edinburgh (.) and maybe that’s the
8 reason for it.

The extract is part of MS1’s response to a question about her future ex-
pectations about living in Britain. In the beginning, she claims that she was
treated as a British person; she then moves to her current status. This use
of temporal discourse is made along with her noting that she has moved
to a different area. The move is to an area where she is treated as a person
with limited English speaking ability. MS1 is highlighting the importance of
language in her British identity. Afterwards, MS1 notes that it was a “bit of
shock to my system” (Lines 3–4). The shock results from questions about
her ability to speak English for the first time. Later, she rationalizes these
events by noting that she moved from London to Scotland. She associates
the non-accepting behavior to her British identity with a geographical area
and its lack of cultural diversity.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we examined the positive and negative constructions of

national identity by first and second generation British Muslims. There is
little research in the realm of discursive psychology on the national identity
among this group of immigrants. Our research hopes to fill this void.
British national identity among our second-generation Muslims in Brit-
ain is a dilemma free process of merging three identities: British, Muslim,
and the homeland origin of their parents. Specifically, the second genera-
tion seems to have successfully merged their hyphenated identities from
religion, nationality, culture, and sectarian. Such use of hyphenated identi-
ties by second-generation British Muslims has been discussed in previous
research (Din, 2006; Hopkins. 2007; Jacobson, 1997). However, our results
exhibit an interesting role taken by British identity—it acts as a facilitator
334  S. ANJUM, A. MCKINLAY, and C. MCVITTIE

for other identities rather than conflicting with them. Such positive con-
structions about British national identity were also related to acceptance by
British society. The British were depicted as welcoming and accepting, and
it is because of this that second generation British Muslims articulate feel-
ings of happiness and being fortunate.
First generation British Muslims have different perceptions. First gen-
eration respondents successfully construct their national identities as Brit-
ish-Pakistani-Muslims in a balanced way. While they claim to have British
national identity, they also have strong attachments to Pakistan. They may
have a British identity and an attachment to Pakistan in order to avoid be-
ing criticized by their community for being disloyal to their country. Thus,
in order to avoid such accountability, they make mention of their home
country while claiming to be British at the same time.
First generation respondents also associated their British national iden-
tity with positive words like “comfort,” “ease,” “dedication,” and “loyalty.”
The use of such positive language suggests the high value they place on
their British identity. In a way, this is similar to the earlier extracts where
British identity is constructed as having a somewhat higher status. However,
unlike other respondents, first generation respondents made no reference
to acceptance or rejection by British society in relation to their national
identity. Clearly, this group does not care what others might say or think of
them. Instead, they have built their identity based on their own views; it is
internally constructed, as opposed to externally driven.
There are also negative constructions that are associated with British
national identity. The main element in such a construction is one’s status
as an immigrant and their treatment by members of the host society. Our
research indicates that among immigrants, British identity has higher status
than an identity from the country of origin. Such a higher status is associ-
ated with being born in Britain, and two other traits associated with being
accepted by members of the host society: physical appearance and English
language speaking ability. So here we can see again how local people’s treat-
ment of immigrants plays a crucial role in how immigrants construct their
national identity. Modood and Ahmad (2007) argued that such rejection
by local community acts as a stressor for even high profile British Muslims.
According to Modood and colleagues (1997), such negative treatment by
the host society works as a barrier towards one’s national identity as a Brit-
ish person.
Moreover, the construction of British identity may become a dilemma.
When one is rejected by both the host society and one’s country of origin, it
leads to the dilemma of having no identity. So these immigrants are looked
upon as overseas citizens in their home countries and as refugees in the host
country, meaning that they question whether or not they have an identity at
all. The acceptance or rejection of the host society plays a vital role in the
 British Muslims’ Discourses of National Identity  335

life of an immigrant and his or her well-being. Previous research by Phin-

ney, Horenczyk, Liebkind, and Vedder (2001) proposed an interactional
perspective of immigration, wellbeing, and ethnic and national identity,
where immigrant adaptation involves the interaction between the attitudes
and characteristics of the immigrant and the responses of the receiving so-
ciety. We reach a similar conclusion in our study in acceptance: Acceptance
by British society leads to positive accounts of one’s British identity, whereas
rejection results in negative accounts of British national identity.
Such dilemmas are not limited to the first generation immigrants, but
are also visible among the second generation. Although the second genera-
tion people are born and bred in Britain and have a positive sense of being
British, they also report events where their identity as British nationals has
been put into question. They are treated negatively by some locals based
on their somatic appearance and are accused of having limited English
language ability. If the local population sees that they speak English well,
they are given compliments by locals because of the perceived discrepancy
between their appearance and their command of the English language.
Researchers have also highlighted the significance of host-language profi-
ciency and concluded that lack of such proficiency often results in immi-
grants having low self-esteem and lesser satisfaction with their lives (Vedder,
2005; Liebkind & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000).
We have drawn several conclusions from our analyses. First, the construc-
tion of national identity is not invariant. Many factors play a role; the most
important may be whether one is a first, second, or later generation im-
migrant. The negotiation of national identity is no straightforward matter.
Second, we found that having a positive British national identity works
to facilitate other forms of identity. In fact, a hyphenated form of identity:
British-Muslim-Pakistani. This facilitating role of national identity needs
more research. In our view, the most important questions are (a) why does
national identity act as a facilitator for other forms of identity, and (b) is a
hyphenated identity among a segment of the population a positive or nega-
tive for the country. For a multiculturalist it may be, but for others it may
not. Further research may provide some important answers.
Finally, we find that the behavior of the local population has an impor-
tant effect on how and if immigrants develop positive or negative views of
national identity. A local population bases its views and kinds of interactions
it has with immigrants on immigrants’ physical appearance and their abil-
ity to speak the host society’s native language. The effects are not straight-
forward, though. They appear to depend on immigrants’ generation sta-
tus and level of self-confidence. Of particular importance is the individual
trait of self-confidence. The greater an immigrant’s self-confidence, the
more they rely on internal dispositions in developing national identity. In
contrast, the less the self-confidence, the more an immigrant will rely on
336  S. ANJUM, A. MCKINLAY, and C. MCVITTIE

external factors, such as the behavior and views of the local populace, in
constructing their national identity.

NOTES

1. Both Indices were computed by Richard R. Verdugo from the 2011 UK Census.
2. Some 38% of England’s Muslims live in London, where 1,012,823 identified
as Muslim in 2011 (12.4% of London’s population).
3. Assimilation is the complete or near complete absorption of a group in the
larger community. In contrast, acculturation is associated with adaptation to a
larger community, but still maintaining important elements of one’s culture.

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