CLASS ASSIGNMENT
BENEFITS OF CHINA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH AFRICA
PRESENTED BY
PETER THUKU
23-1512
PRESENTED TO
2024
Is Chines – Africa Relationship Beneficial?
Since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1947, Africa has been a pivotal element in China’s
foreign policy. During the Cold War, China supported numerous African liberation movements,
and since 1950, with only one exception, the foreign minister of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) has made their first official visit of the year to an African country. In January 2023, the
new foreign minister, Qin Gang, visited five African countries and the African Union. His
predecessor, Wang Yi, visited 48 African countries, while Premier Xi Jinping made 10 visits to
Africa between 2014 and 2020. In 1971, African countries’ votes were crucial in securing the
PRC’s seat in the UN General Assembly and Security Council, replacing the representatives of
the Chinese nationalist forces who had retreated to Taiwan after their defeat in the civil war.
Over the following decades, China focused on eliminating any remaining recognition of
Taiwan’s government in Africa, with countries like Burkina Faso, Malawi, Liberia, and Senegal
switching their recognition to the PRC. As of 2023, Eswatini remains the only African nation
recognizing Taiwan.
In 1999, China launched its ‘Going Out’ strategy, encouraging Chinese companies to invest
abroad, which marked a new wave of Chinese engagement in Africa and provided employment
opportunities for Chinese citizens on infrastructure projects. The first tri-annual Forum for
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit was held in Beijing in November 2003, aiming to
enhance cooperation between China and African states and signaling China’s growing strategic
interest in the continent.
In 2013, Xi Jinping launched China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the goal of revitalizing
the ancient Silk Road trading route along the East African coast. While the initial focus was
expected to be on East Africa, the initiative quickly expanded as many other African nations
sought to benefit from it. This led to a broader scope and ambition for the BRI.
The initiative resulted in numerous significant infrastructure projects across Asia and Africa,
funded by Chinese loans that were often opaque in terms of size, nature, and origin. During this
period, some African countries became heavily indebted to China. Chinese investment in Africa
peaked around 2016, but since then, loans to African governments have significantly declined,
dropping from $28.4 billion in 2016 to $1.9 billion in 2020. This decline is partly due to shifting
priorities in Chinese domestic politics and partly due to the difficulties African countries faced in
repaying these loans.
China’s Investments In Africa
China’s approach to African investment contrasts sharply with that of Western governments. It
frames its loans as mutually beneficial cooperation between developing countries, pledging not
to interfere in the internal politics of its loan recipients. This stance positions China against
Western countries, which are often accused by China and some African governments of arrogant,
democratic posturing—especially by former colonial powers that exploited African resources
during the 18th and 19th centuries.
Through experience, China has learned the limitations of its large-scale investments. For
example, during the South Sudanese civil war, China had to negotiate with various factions
opposed to the government to maintain the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, operated by the China
National Petroleum Corporation. Since the end of the Cold War, China has not actively sought to
export communist ideology to Africa, asserting that Chinese communism cannot be replicated
outside of China. However, ideological connections do exist, such as between the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and Ethiopia’s Prosperity Party, which has roots in ‘revolutionary
democracy’ and Marxist-Leninism.
China’s National People’s Congress maintains formal relations with 35 African parliaments, and
the CCP International Liaison Department (ILD) engages with 110 political parties across 51
African countries. Meanwhile, Western politicians increasingly express concerns that China’s
intentions in Africa are predatory, aiming to create a network of indebted African states that
provide China with access to resources, trade opportunities, and strategic locations for military
bases.
The Debt Trap
US commentators often describe Chinese policy in Africa as a ‘debt trap,’ suggesting it is a
deliberate strategy to lend unmanageable sums to African countries, drawing them into China’s
sphere of influence and forcing unfair commitments upon them. While some African nations do
have extensive Chinese loans and are suffering from out-of-control debt—exacerbated by the
COVID-19 pandemic, the invasion of Ukraine, and high interest rates—their situations cannot be
entirely blamed on Chinese loans. Countries like Kenya and Zambia have poorly managed their
debt to all creditors, not just China.
Conversely, other African countries have established realistic, manageable debt arrangements
with China, avoiding the significant risks and uncertainties that characterized some major BRI
projects. China also faces challenges due to its extensive loans made during the BRI boom
period, as it struggles to enforce repayment while maintaining its image as a friend of developing
nations. The largely uncoordinated and unplanned nature of BRI projects, with credit offered by
competing Chinese lenders, contradicts the notion of a coherent ‘debt trap’ policy. However, the
idea that China may use debt strategically to expand its influence in Africa and secure access to
resources cannot be entirely dismissed. As an emerging superpower in strategic competition with
the US, building stronger economic relationships in Africa aligns with China’s aspirations to be a
global power.
Future Relations
In the past, China has aggressively pursued repayment of its debts from African countries,
demanding first payment. But this approach creates real problems for China’s international
standing as a champion of developing nations. China’s best hope for protecting its reputation in
Africa while reaching a reasonable financial settlement is to work to help countries in debt
distress alongside the West, through multilateral organizations like the G20. This will be difficult
for China to agree to, having founded BRI deals based on strictly bilateral and often opaque
agreements. It would also be problematic for a country in global strategic competition with the
US, aggravated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is therefore critical that African nations ask
China and the West to cooperate on debt distress, ideally speaking with one voice through
institutions such as the African Union (AU). An EU push for the AU to join the G20 could be an
important step to creating equitable, cooperative solutions to debt distress between Africa, China
and the West.
Conclusion
China’s relationship with Africa has evolved significantly since the end of the Chinese civil war
in 1947. Initially, China supported various African liberation movements during the Cold War,
and since 1950, the foreign minister of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has traditionally
made their first annual visit to an African country. This longstanding diplomatic engagement
underscores Africa’s importance in China’s foreign policy. In 1971, African countries played a
crucial role in securing the PRC’s seat in the UN General Assembly and Security Council,
replacing Taiwan. Over the decades, China has focused on eliminating any remaining
recognition of Taiwan in Africa, with only Eswatini still recognizing Taiwan as of 2023.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, significantly expanded China’s economic
footprint in Africa, leading to numerous infrastructure projects funded by Chinese loans. While
some African countries have benefited from these investments, others have faced challenges with
debt management, exacerbated by global economic disruptions like the COVID-19 pandemic and
the invasion of Ukraine. Despite criticisms of ‘debt trap’ diplomacy, China’s engagement in
Africa has been multifaceted, involving not just economic but also political and cultural
exchanges. China’s National People’s Congress maintains formal relations with 35 African
parliaments, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) engages with 110 political parties across
51 African countries.
Reference
China in Africa | Council on Foreign Relations (cfr.org)
