POLICING THE POLICE: A DEMOCRATIC

EXIGUITY IN PAKISTAN
Tahir Ul Mulk Kahlon*

Abstract
Proficient policing mirrors democratic governance through the role played by citizens
in their policing. The public participation in their policing plans contributes towards
the transparency as well as autonomy of the police. It is a fundamental societal
obligation towards the marginalized communities who are the most affected by police
misconduct. This paper explores the policing regime in Pakistan, adopting the
theoretical framework of Kempe Hope for police oversight. It reviews police reform
initiatives by various governments in Pakistan from the democratic perspective. It
discovers that public role in policing has remained insignificant and the
implementation of policies of democratic oversight disregarded. The paper concludes
that the police preserves colonial structure and remains unresponsive to the societal
needs. The ingress of democracy in policing continues to be exiguous in Pakistan.
Some policy recommendations are provided for an operationally autonomous and
popularly accountable police.

Keywords: Policing, Governance, Implementation, Democracy,

Accountability

Introduction

T he death of Gorge Floyd in Minneapolis and abrupt eruption of protests

globally, has further accentuated demands for public
oversight against police brutality, racism and lack of accountability. 1 People
around the world are clamoring that police should treat them fairly and with
respect. To achieve that, governments must institute effective mechanisms to
enable citizens to influence their policing plans, powers to arrest, interrogate
and use of force by the police. Democracies recognize the philosophy of
legitimate policing as crucial to the modern governance. The existence of public
control is a true expression of the efficacy of police accountability. In Pakistan,
the imperious application of power by police from the Model Town Lahore to
Sahiwal and beyond portrays police incompetence, brutality and corruption. 2
Consequently, public demand for police accountability occasionally becomes

*
Dr Tahir Ul Mulk Kahlon is an Ex Assistant Professor of Governance and Public Policy,
Islamabad, Pakistan.

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vociferous because the inherited colonial structure of the police is not

responsive to public needs. Police was a tool in the hands of the empire for
subjugation of the population. The system was created to serve the empire
whose targets were transitory with no obligation to native people. The irony,
however, is that the repressive system was retained 3 in the new republic which
espoused a democratic dispensation and the sovereignty of people.
Police, like any other institution of a government, has to be accountable to
people for its performance. More so, because it has the legal authority to use its
coercive powers to resolve awkward situations.4 It can become a tool for the
rulers to turn a democracy into a tyranny. A responsive and goal-oriented
mechanism is hence must for the performance as well as credibility of police. In
a democracy, it means the involvement of stakeholders from different layers of
the society to form oversight bodies. Pakistan promulgated the Police Order
2002 to infuse a semblance of police autonomy and accountability. It remains
questionable, however, if this law was meant to establish democratic oversight
or was merely a gesture of public appeasement. Government could not
implement even its meekest accountability provisions due to political as well as
bureaucratic resistance. Police accountability appears to be shelved since any
further progress has faltered. The battle for power in Pakistan continues, and
control of police reflects its pivot and the benchmark. This paper takes a
‘Governance’ perspective of the policing with its focus on the citizens’
participation; and where the ‘state’ is not the sole but just one of its actors. It
begins with a discussion on the notion of police accountability, examines
worldwide experiences for the policy learning and then turns to the discussion
on the policing milieu in Pakistan. It proffers governance insights for
overcoming the democratic deficit in the policing system. It concludes with the
call for a conceptual overhaul in the policing ideology in Pakistan, anchoring its
logic on the academic insights from comparative policing systems. This paper is
however not an exposé of police problems and reform initiatives in Pakistan.

Policing in a Democracy
Democratic policing is a multidimensional, multilevel and a challenging
concept, rooted in philosophies of ‘governance’. Its theoretical underpinnings
are hence not singular or neutral but are situated in the ideologies of Right,
Center-Right, Left and Center-Left (i.e. Neo-Populism, Conservatism, Social
Democratic/Liberal Socialism, and Populism, respectively). 5 Many scholars now
endorse that policing in a democracy cannot survive without transparency and
its accountability to public.6 Even the United Nations has called for establishing
accountable police systems replete with checks and balances to thwart misuse
of powers and to stimulate public trust and the legitimacy in policing.7 There
are two prominent concerns about the police in a democracy. The first being
how to hold police responsible for its services i.e. crime control etc and the

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second, how to hold individual police officials liable for trampling human
rights/dignity8 and discriminatory/disrespectful behavior towards citizens. 9
Police in a democracy therefore must account for what they do and how they go
about doing it. Conclusively, it is the public control of the police conduct,
operations and activities.10
Various mechanisms have been adopted by the democracies in the world11
having internal and external controls to ensure that police performs effectively
and is castigated if it falls short.12 Policing is steered by government institutions
and monitored by a vigilant civil society to ensure that it is not held hostage to
the whims and desires of powerful leaders or political parties. The overall
governing system maintains the policing integrity, prevents police misconduct
and creates a public trust.13 It espouses the laws and values of humanism to
restrain police officials from abusing their powers, rights and privileges. 14
Different nations have adopted diverse mechanisms for public oversight. These
comprise external as well as some internal agencies for investigation and control
of the police excesses.15 In Pakistan one finds independent commissions,
regulators and ombudsman for the external control.16 The internal controls of
police are mainly departmental or judicial. These deal with different dimensions
of policing, like human rights violations, police corruption and complaints
against individual officers. But it is the mechanism employing citizens’ control
of police which embodies ideals of ‘governance’ i.e. operational transparency
and utmost regard to the protection of human life and dignity. 17 Police has to be
highly skilled to deliver such outcomes efficiently and respond to the
community respectfully.18 Conclusively, democratic police is a moralistic and
sophisticated form of policing.19

Public Oversight and Control

Police is a disciplined service fundamentally organized on a military
model.20 It is uniformed, hierarchical and a rule-based bureaucracy21 which
employs military tactics in its routine duties.22 In Pakistan, police is now an
integral component of the security sector actors (military, paramilitary and
police) that uses lethal force. It is a necessity to control such a legitimate
coercive power to encumber its excessive and indiscriminate application.23 Its
public supervision is hence paramount. The supervising public body should
have access to the internal and classified police documentation of the plans,
policies, processes, actions, and their utilization in the investigations. It should
ensure that police acts inside the laws, uses its assets proficiently and
accomplishes its tasks professionally with autonomy, transparency and
integrity.24 Ideally, public body mandate should also include on-scene
monitoring and investigation of critical incidents of police misconduct.
Public accountability and control as narrated above, is contemporarily

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being accomplished through independent external public agencies.25 These

agencies should not have a majority representation of government servants.
Their procedures to provide checks and balances should be built on democratic
principles of crime prevention, investigation, transparency, discipline, and
autonomy of policing.26 It must be realized that public oversight organization is
a ‘public good’. That highlights a discrepancy with the potential to frustrate
accountability because police may rationalize their role as protectors of
democracy.27 Filing a complaint against the police misconduct to the police or
judiciary is now considered insufficient to meet the demands of natural justice. 28
Public control of police has twin aims. First is to ensure police
accountability democratically and promptly; the second is to uphold the rule of
law.29 The public control may cause aspersion in the police department for
losing their monopoly on the manner of being held accountable to public.30 This
entails a massive cultural shift in the police to accept public supremacy. 31 Public
supervision of the police will incur many benefits, some of which are given
below.32 The actual benefits will depend on the model adopted and as to how
well the stakeholders work collectively.

 Complainants can voice concerns outside of the police department for

their accountability

 Provides better quality of investigations of misconduct

 Public gets reassurance of the transparency of the disciplinary process

 Vindicates either the complainant or the police officer

 Improves community-police relations and communication

 Reduces public indignation about controversial incidents

 Improves public confidence of the policing procedures

 Helps police to identify/rectify their weaknesses in policing. Police can

better understand how their behaviors affect public perceptions

 Reduces costly litigation by proposing alternative solutions

 Agency mediation provides solutions and satisfaction in a neutral

environment

 Increases police accountability and elimination of misconduct

Police Frameworks in a Democracy

In a democracy, public oversight can operate under a wide range of
frameworks. Sharon Fairley’s framework has been the most generalized and
robust model supported by a sound empirical research.33 The framework

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consists of seven elements i.e. Investigative, Review, Audit, Adjudicative,

Appeals, Supervisory, and Advisory. This study however suggests another
influential framework which identifies five models practiced in countries with
diverse cultures.34 This framework is preferred being contemporary and applied
in Kenya, a country where police structure has colonial legacy like Pakistan. The
model is summarized below:

 Independent Investigation Model. The independent or external

investigation model is the most acclaimed model. It is robust and
credible but is expensive.35 It is primarily focused on investigations of
allegations against police officials. Because, it operates outside police
department, it inhibits the risk of sabotage and manipulation of
investigations by the police. The complaints are handled by
professional civilian investigators. Accountability body enjoys
unfettered powers to substitute or duplicate internal investigations of
the police. On the flip side, it carries the potential of departmental
resistance to investigation and can prove a disincentive for police to
create or strengthen their internal accountability structure. Police can
also use it for tossing the blame of its inefficiency to the public body. 36

 Review Model. This model reviews and in some cases evaluates and
monitors the output quality of investigations conducted by the police
internally. The public body receives complaints and reviews completed
police investigations. If the complaint is factual, it will recommend its
redress to the police department. It receives public input about police
performance through public hearings. The oversight body holds joint
community-police meetings for mutual collaboration and
communication. If dissatisfied with the internal police investigations, it
can ask police for reinvestigations. The members of this authority are
volunteers. It is therefore the least expensive model. However,
volunteers may become an efficiency handicap with their limited
authority and resources. They may also lack the requisite skills for
accountability, which can consequence into a softer accountability
regime.37

 Appeals Model. This model provides the mandate to handle appeals

of the public on the outcomes of their complaints to police. Complaints
are initially received, investigated and redressed by the police. As the
entire process is managed by the police, the complainant if dissatisfied
with the outcome may submit an appeal to this body. The body may
comprise of both civil persons and police officers. 38 After scrutinizing it,
the authority can either uphold the old proceedings or can make
different recommendations on the appeal and send it back to the police
leadership for action. The processes under this model consume longer

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time comparatively. Since this model bestows only limited powers to

the accountability body, it can diminish the public trust on the
accountability.

 Auditor/Monitor Model. This model is entrusted to identify systemic

failures in police service delivery. It endeavors to discover existence of
any patterns in the police practices and misconduct. The model
provides full access to previous investigations to facilitate their reviews
and assess their outcomes. The accountability body scrutinizes and
analyzes investigations quality, fairness, accuracy and police policies to
recommend reforms and organizational changes for improvement. Its
officials possess considerable expertise to meet their mandate.39 It is
less expensive than the investigation model but more expensive than
the review and appeal models. Due to cumbersome and technical
procedures, this is time intensive model. Consequently, only a few
cases get monitored or audited.

 Hybrid Model. This model is unique in its approach as it visualizes the

combination of two or more of the above mentioned models, taken as a
whole or some of their elements. It allows the development and
application of desired powers considered appropriate for a given
political jurisdiction or a country.40 Its goal is police governance
through effective accountability mechanisms that satisfy public
concerns about policing. The expansive nature of this authority may
make it overwhelmed by the volume of work and the lack of the
appropriate expertise to handle such workload.

Democratic Policing: The Case of Pakistan

A skilled and ingenious police service is critical for Pakistan since it has
endured extreme periods of security instability for decades. The security threats
come in all shades like limited/hybrid war, terrorism and insurgency. Pakistan
police therefore has to be a vibrant force to address multidimensional fallout of
societal violence. This comes over and above usual police functions i.e. battling
crime and maintaining law and order in the society. The capacity of the police
to perform efficiently on all these issues has grossly diminished because of
various reasons, of which the major is its political manipulation and the rulers’
control. Other limitations of Pakistan police include the inadequate training,
lack of forensic skills, and corruption.
The institution of police has its legacy in the colonial history of Pakistan
which dates back to Police Act of 1861. This Act emerged from the sociopolitical
milieu of India, after the failed attempt to restore Mughal rule. It objectified
enforcement of political and executive orders, laws to maintain foreign rule and
“keep the natives on tight leash”41 rather than public service delivery. On its

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creation, Pakistan did not replace this Act with some service oriented legislation
despite the loss of rationale behind this Act. The colonially designed police
continues to tighten the ‘leash’ in the new republic, further strengthening its
bite with additional regulations to become the supreme administrative power of
the country. Police service has been expediently divided into a privileged elite
‘gazetted’ corps of officers as decision-makers and an illiterate, ill trained class
of lower ranks subordinated and beholden to the orders of officers.42 While the
police leadership seeks out political patronage, the lower ranked police work at
the behest of local rich instead of the poor people.43 The ideals of independence,
welfare of the people and democracy were hence forgotten and evaded during
the governing history. People, somehow continue(d) to clamour for their
constitutional rights to life, liberty and dignity. Multiple attempts to reform
Police through various commissions and committees have failed to change the
colonial legislation.44 Similar fate has so far been also met by the incumbent
government.45
The inherited laws provided a window for redressal of public grievances (no
accountability or oversight) against the police through recourse to judiciary, the
Justice of Peace. This external mechanism also has a colonial philosophy and
heritage. Its antiquity originated from the England’s concept of ‘King’s Peace’ in
12th century and ‘Justice of Peace’ in year 1361. Despite being a judge, Justice of
Peace is an administrative officer. People could approach this office for their
grievances against police pertaining to registration of FIRs, investigations and
any other excesses. The office has remained dormant or underutilized due to
lack of public awareness and access issues. Even the process and procedures of
this office are complicated, expensive and hence painful for the masses.
Rationalizing on the public disenchantment for police, the first ever change in
the colonial law was introduced in the shape of Police Order 2002. The
succeeding discussion in this paper is not a commentary on the new law. It is
delimited to democratic policing and the role of ‘demos’ in their’ kratos’.
The Police Order 2002 was promulgated on 14 August 2002. The change was
in the backdrop of following concerns about the Police Act 1861:46

 It was preambled to create police as an instrument for the prevention

and detection of crime. It left a very thin space for modern policing.

 It vested police “Superintendence” to the government i.e. political

executives. Government then was of the England. Police in Pakistan
became subservient to rulers’ “superintendence”, who extensively
exploited police power to perpetuate their rule and suppress dissent.

 Functionally the “superintendence” of the police in Pakistan was

transformed into the police of/by/for the District Magistracy (Deputy
Commissioner), a legacy of the powers and ethos of Indian Civil

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Service, designed to serve a ruler ported outside the country.

 It diluted public confidence in police as there was no institutional

arrangement for public say in policing.

 It mired the professionalism in police.

The Police Order 200247 redesigned the police roles and responsibilities to
instill professionalism in the maintenance of public order. It was an important
step towards transformation of a dysfunctional police undertaken with the input
from police leadership, senior serving and retired. The Order introduced new
ideas of law enforcement. It separated police from the magistracy and provided
autonomy in its functions. The envisaged accountability system was a
semblance of community policing models drawn mainly from the experiences of
Japan, USA and UK. The Order projected to reinvigorate the police as an
institution and purge their traditional ruling attitude. Public accountability was
instituted through the Public Safety and Police Complaint Commissions. These
commissions were to be created all the way up to national level, starting from
the districts. But, the implementation of this law was also expediently kept
selective or abandoned. A number of amendments were made in this Order to
remove or dilute its provisions related to public accountability. The core
institution of democratic control, the public safety commissions, were not
completely established or made functional.48
The Justice of Peace was retained by the Order. However, an amendment
was made through Criminal Procedure Ordinance in November 2002, which
extended the power of Justice of Peace to issue suitable orders to register
criminal cases against the police officials for their neglects, failures or excesses.
This amendment was primarily not for public appeasement but was intended to
lessen the burden of writ petitions on similar issues in the High Courts. 49
However through an interesting turn in 2019, Justice of Peace was almost turned
dysfunctional. This happened as a consequence of decisions taken in the
National Judicial Policy Making Committee in March 2019, wherein the Chief
Justice of Pakistan rolled back the office of Justice of Peace, thereby overturning
an earlier Supreme Court judgment.50 The rationale of the decision was based
on three factors. Firstly that engagement of judges in such functions has
burdened the district judiciary and hindered the dispensation of justice.
Secondly and crucially, the involvement of the judiciary in executive functions is
against the constitution. Thirdly, the Police Order 2002 provides such remedies
through various commissions and Justice of Peace is merely a duplication.
Police Order 2002 came under strong criticism from political parities across
the divide, as they feared loss of influence on a tool of their coercive powers.
The political hostility came in the garb of criticism on the legitimacy of this law
highlighting its despotic roots. The antagonists blamed that it usurped the

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provincial autonomy and hence was a violation of the constitution. The political
confrontation led to many amendments in this law in 2004 and 2006, which
diluted whatever autonomy was provided to the police. The amendments also
distorted the structure of democratic policing visualized in the Police Order
2002.51 A counter factual argument projected by the political parties was that
military government wanted to abrogate constitution and deprive people of
their constitutional democratic rights by detaching legislators from the
oversight and accountability of the police. In an intriguing observation the
International Crises Group concluded that the promulgators of this law (the
military government) never meant to implement it.52
The Commissions under this law at all levels comprised a mix of
government nominees from provincial and national assemblies and some
independent members including a share for women. Democratic policing was
envisaged in a provision of this law which required that police must prepare an
annual policing plan with the approval of these commissions. Such plan must
include their objectives/targets and evaluation methodology of the targets. The
commissions were empowered to issue directions to the police for taking action
against poor performers or those alleged for misconduct. The Order also
provided for promoting Citizen-Police Liaison Committees (CPLC) to encourage
police-public cooperation and to protect the people from the exploitation by the
police.
The Commissions could initiate measures to stop unlawful activities of
police and simultaneously shield it from the pressures of their superior
authorities from obeying unlawful or mala fide orders. They could receive and
process the public complaints against the police and direct police authorities to
conduct investigations. They had the powers for enforcing the attendance of
witnesses, obtaining of documents and the examination of witnesses. If police
official is found culpable, the Commission could direct higher police authority
to take action and submit compliance within a specified period. Failure by
police to comply the directions of the Commission could be reported to next
higher police authority for the remedy. If the complaint redressal involved a
department other than police, Commission was empowered to ask that
department for remedy. If the complaint was found vexatious or frivolous, the
Commission could direct action against the complainant, including the filing of
criminal proceedings. The investigation portfolio was kept internal to the police
procedures.
The Police Order 2002 created a Federal Complaint Authority on police
matters. Its members were picked from diverse backgrounds having relevant
knowledge, skills, experience and integrity. Its functional procedures, roles and
powers were similar to those adopted by the lower level police commissions,
except that its jurisdiction was federal. It acted as an umbrella organization of

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police accountability at national level. It was endowed with an additional power

to initiate a judicial inquiry on the complaint. It could recommend disciplinary
action against negligent enquiry officers for any mishandling or malaise in the
inquiry and seek government assistance on the matters of grave nature. The
Authority was accountable to parliament where it presented its annual
performance report. In the nutshell, the Police Order 2002 provided sufficient
tools and powers for public the oversight of the police. Its implementation
however remained quiescent. Federal Complaint Authority was later dissolved
and merged with Provincial Public Safety Commissions in 2006. These
Commissions are now staffed by the members of provincial assemblies. This
change has conclusively sabotaged the police accountability as it is tantamount
to police working under the influence of politicians because they would shield it
from public accountability.53 Police subservience was amply exposed in the case
of desecration of Quaid-e-Azam mausoleum and the ensuing hype of the
“abduction” of Inspector General and mutiny by the Sindh Police. 54

Beyond Police Order 2002

Police Order 2002 was promulgated in all provinces, repealing the Police
Act 1861. It was a paradigm shift in the police system towards the creation of a
democratically accountable police that enjoys public trust. Its implementation
however did not reflect its legislative intent. Conversely, the law was exploited
and skimmed to enlarge police ‘empire’, perks and privileges. The number of
elite officers’ corps at various government tiers multiplied, utilizing its
establishment friendly provisions, while provisions related to public
emancipation were ignored or diluted. With a few public safety commissions on
ground and that too dysfunctional, law was molded towards aggrandizement of
jobs and blurring of accountability and oversight.
The exit of Musharraf regime and provincially focused 18th constitutional
amendment led to the demise of Police Order 2002. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
Balochistan and Sindh have since repealed the Order and enacted their own
laws. The thrust of new laws was not towards public accountability, but towards
enhancing powers of the rulers. Interestingly, the preambles of even the new
laws claim to make police function according to the constitution, law, and
democratic aspiration of the people and make police professional, service-
oriented, and accountable. The claims in preamble are nowhere to be found in
the enacted laws.
Sindh now has its Police Order 2019 which hits hard on the public role in
policing, as it dissolved the powers of the local governments and took control of
the police. Balochistan enacted Police Act 2011 which gives more powers to the
rulers over the police. The consequence of rulers’ power was exemplified in
judicial acquittal of the daylight manslaughter of a traffic police official. 55 The

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KP Government repealed the Police Order 2002 and now has its Police Act 2017.
This was the most flaunted achievement of provincial government, which
claimed that police has been made apolitical, autonomous and hence
professional. This claim is a hoax if compared with the democratic provisions of
Police Order 2002. Order 2002 had focused on the public empowerment and
devolution at all levels, whereas new Act vests all powers in the person of
Inspector General of Police.56 KP police has however been fortunate to have
financial comfort being a frontline to counter terrorism. With easy inflow of
money, it embarked on various development programs funded by the World
Bank and the USA. The reforms are of administrative nature that autonomize
police operations. From the democratic perspective, there is no corresponding
recourse for public grievances. The critics claim that changes are cosmetic for
perception management by police whereas the reality remains unaltered and
colonial.57
Despite the mad race for changing laws to wrest powers, interestingly,
Islamabad, Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir are still keeping the
Police Act of 1861. Moreover, police in the whole of Pakistan functions under the
Police Rules of 1934 which contain its organizational, operational, and
procedural systems. While provinces hurried to repeal Police Order 2002, both
the police and their political masters remain content with the usefulness of the
colonial police rules. Consequently, police continues to protect all types of elites
against threats to their supremacy. The public attitude and the role of civil
society to assert their rights has been mostly quiescent. Except occasional cries
on the incidents of police brutality, people of Pakistan have generally been
apathetic to this issue. The media too is selective in projecting police excesses,
being the beneficiary of the police powers. The governance of police has thus
been captured by the vested interests in the legislature, executive, judiciary,
business, and the societal elites. Police Order 2002 has become a textbook case
of ‘policy implementation’ and governance failure.

Policy Recommendations
The policing history of Pakistan expresses the democratic upend that “the
safety and security of the public will always be secondary to the safety and
security of the ruler or politician”.58 The policing regime of Pakistan is replete
with the abuse of the police by the elites and the abuse of the powers by the
police with impunity. The governments’ unwillingness or repudiation to reform
police portrays an acceptance of policing beyond the law. A comment of senior
police official reflects the truth in Pakistan that “police encounters, though
inhuman and a clear violation of human rights and law, are the only way to
bring heinous crimes under control”.59 A democratically accountable police is
crucial for the liberty, welfare, security and the rights of citizens. It is to the
benefit of polity that the police are subjected to supervision by the self-

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governing public authorities to provide remedies for the police excesses. Indeed,
policing cannot be left to the police only. Regardless of the police model
adopted, there will be challenges for the embedding accountability in policing
in Pakistan. Following considerations will help in creating a democratic police
system in Pakistan;

 The Legitimacy Bind. Legitimacy is often dependent on the manner

an organization is created. Legitimacy also requires that legislative
process of the accountability framework be transparent. This has an
effect o n police cooperation and influences funding of the body.60 All
military governments in Pakistan instituted governance reforms, which
were disparaged by the deposed political elites as being a gimmick of
the unconstitutional rulers. Later governments therefore inverted these
institutions to bolster their own power. Laws need legitimacy to
function and obeyed. Police is a power which would not present itself
for accountability to a weak body. Absence of a broader political
support creates a legitimacy deficit. That provides maneuvering space
to police to sabotage and ignore public oversight laws. The crafting of
any future public oversight mechanism must therefore be built on
sound consensus of all stake holders. Ignoring this dimension can be
construed by the police that people do not trust the monitoring
authority. Legitimacy question will thus be exploited by police to limit
its impact.61

 Disciplining Police. Accountability bodies have lacked the power to

discipline police officials or modify their policies and practices. They
could only recommend such actions or assist the police to identify their
problem officials.62 The literature provides multiple global experiences
as discussed in this paper to handle this insufficiency, but there is no
‘one fit all’ solution.63 Pakistan being a federation faces jurisdictional
and constitutional limitations. It is structured on laws and privileges
which cannot be neutralized by any subnational accountability body.
Even where the laws are clear, the slack criminal justice system can
turn a success into failure. The police functions in a weird legal cocoon
which inhibits its disciplining. Police leadership is federally recruited
and managed but functionally engaged in autonomous provinces.
Provinces have no power to discipline a police officer. Unless this
quagmire is resolved, the police officers would continue to savor power
and authority without any fear of reproach.

 Laws of Secrecy. The Official Secret Act 1923 presents a prodigious

challenge to public/authority’s access to police documents. It provides
a gag privilege to public servants. Secrecy is the foremost shield for the
abuse of power and a major source of frustration for the public

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accountability bodies. Documents are critical for investigations and

judicial evidence, and this need has temporal dimensions. Lack of
information and cooperation from the police can ultimately make the
accountability ineffective, lengthy and may lead to its abandonment.
Instead of any legal remedy, this warrants a cultural transformation in
the bureaucracy to become sensitive to democratic values and rights of
the citizens. Ethically sensitized police may become accountability
friendly. The legitimacy of the system plays an important role here as
well. Police officials, who perceive public oversight as legitimate, are
significantly more likely to accept and support it.64 The domination of
accountability narrative internationally may trickledown to Pakistan, if
the police training institutions play their part. The laws in Pakistan
should make it mandatory for the police to cooperate with such bodies.
People should also not endure indignity as they have national and
international agencies in their support to empower public for policing
the police.65 Pakistan can get priority for such assistance due to its
‘post-authoritarian and post-conflict contexts’66 which can also harness
the next challenge.

 Financial Sustainability. Pakistan has mostly been confronted with

the economic disorder which has worsened due to COVID-19. Any
resource starved public body will have lower probability of its
objectives being met, will make it ineffective or disintegrate.67 Limited
resources can consequence in political manipulation, recruitment and
retention issues for the professional staff. 68 Political patronage and
legitimacy also pay a great deal in generating and allocating funds for
such bodies. Pakistan must proceed carefully because politicians envy
‘police capture’ and collaboration to engage even in criminal
activities.69

 Investigation Powers. The public body should be given essential

powers to investigative and coerce police f o r cooperation. It
should be able to compel both police and civilian witnesses to
provide information. It must get the needed documents, wherever such
documents may lie, whether in a government or private agency.
Evidence is essential for the investigatory process, review and appeals.
Conversely, the authority will be unable to make informed judgments
regarding the police conduct or misconduct.

 Planning and Staffing. The public body must be adequately and

professionally staffed with the employees having relevant skills to fulfill
their mandate. The experienced and competent human resource lends
credibility to their findings, reports and other outputs. Similarly,
strategic planning is a management tool to set objectives and take

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42 TAHIR UL MULK KAHLON

initiatives linked to outcomes. It lays priorities and programs

commensurate with resources and assures that employees/stakeholders
work towards common goals to achieve intended outcomes. The plan
has to be responsive to changing political, legal or financial
environments. It is through the plan that authority will determine what
it intends to do now and in the future, and how will it get there in
pursuit of its mandate.

 Public awareness and Outreach. Most people of Pakistan are hardly

aware about the existence of police oversight bodies. Being
uninformed, they cannot conceive of complaining against the police to
some external agency. At best they are aware about internal remedy
with the police and judiciary. To be meaningful, accountability bodies
must therefore be appropriately visible and accessible to public. 70
Outreach is a significant element in building trust and to improve
police legitimacy.71 The government should educate its citizens about
the procedure for filing complaints about the police misconduct. The
communication link between the police and the public will shape
community confidence that their grievances will be heard. The police
needs to be seen as legitimate not only by citizens but the surrounding
agencies and governments as well.

Conclusion
Policing the police is imperative for democratic governance and the
protection, security, welfare and freedom of citizens. The ideal policing should
mirror democracy wherein citizens participate in their policing plans. The
existence of electoral democracy alone does not reflect the values of democratic
policing. Minority and marginalized communities are typically the most affected
by police misconduct and hence deserve an effective antidote to the police
abuse. Public oversight of the police promotes transparency and independence
of police work.72 Some significant examples have been set across the globe and
mentioned in this paper to develop democratic policing framework in Pakistan.
The initiatives taken under the umbrella of governance reforms so far have
failed to bring police in the public jurisdiction. Police would continue to resist
and detest their oversight. But the same is necessary for the institutionalization
of democratic culture and practices. The existing police system is ill reputed and
appropriate to serve the rulers only. Reforms process is likely to be cumbersome
and protracted but its disregard will be a peril. Government must comprehend
that safety of its citizens and its own, can best come from a democratically run
police which is operationally autonomous but democratically accountable.

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 POLICING THE POLICE: A DEMOCRATIC EXIGUITY IN PAKISTAN 43

Endnotes

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Pakistan adopted Government of India Act 1935 as an interim constitution along with its
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23
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