English Harbour, Antigua: The Rise and Fall of a Strategic Military Site

Author(s): DAVID B. WEAVER

Source: Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 4 (December 2002), pp. 1-11
Published by: University of the West Indies and Caribbean Quarterly
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 1

EnglishHarbour,Antigua:The Rise and Fall ofa

StrategicMilitarySite

by

DAVID B. WEAVER

Introduction
The post-Columbian incorporation of the Caribbeaninto the capitalistworld
economy is associated with dramatic transformationsin theregionalculturalgeography,
involvingthe establishment of export-based agriculturaleconomiesthroughlarge-scale
landclearances,theintroduction of exoticplantandanimalspecies,forcedhumanmigra-
tions,and theestablishment ofroadnetworks, portsand otherrelatedservices.Whilethe
natureof changein thisagricultural systemand itsunderlying causes have been investi-
gatedextensively , other elements of the post-Conquest culturallandscaperemainne-
glected.Relatively little for
research, example, hasbeen conducted into theevolutionofthe
military which
facilities were to and
required safeguard potentially extend such colonial
investments.This paper focusesupon the EnglishHarbourregionof Antiguawhich
accommodated one ofthelargestandmoststrategic Britishmilitary sitesoftheeighteenth
century Caribbean.The riseandfalloftheEnglishHarbourmilitary complexis presented
through a seriesof stages,each of whichmaybe seen in broadtermsas a reflection of
changing patterns in the great power and
rivalries, in narrower but relatedterms as the
consequenceoflocal andregionalconsiderations.
Early Developmentsin theMilitaryLandscape
Fundamentally, themilitary evolutionofEnglishHarbourcan be understood as a
manifestationoftheshifting greatpowerrivalries oftheemergent post-Conquestcapitalist
worldeconomy.3Theserivalries effectivelybeganin 1536,whenSpain'sregionalmonop-
oly was firstchallengedby theupstartkingdomsof north-western Europe,and endedin
1814,when Great Britainattaineda temporary position globalhegemony.Withinthis
of
of
framework acceleratingEnglish, French and Dutch involvement in the Caribbean,
severaldistinctstagesof confrontation can be identified. between
Initially, 1536 and the
early1600s,theFrench,English and Dutch were not yetpowerfulenoughto challenge
Spainon equaltermsintheregion,and were thereforelimited toa policyofharassment and
contraband trade,withprivateerscarrying outsporadic armed raidsagainstSpanishprop-
Under such circumstances, the English were presented with fewopportunities to
erty.4
itablishor fortify bridgeheadsin the region. By the 1620s, however,
territorial the
increasinglypowerful statesof north-western Europewereable to acquireterritorial foot-
holdsin thosepartsof theCaribbean,essentially in theLesserAntilles,which had not
Montserrat
actuallybeensettledby a nowdecliningSpain. Antiguawas settledalongwith
the in
English 1632,following earliercolonizations in St. Kittsand Barbados (1624),
by

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2

and in Nevis (1628). The English presence in the north-easternCaribbean islands, how-
ever, was challenged by the Dutch acquisition of St. Maarten (1631) and St. Eustatius
(1632), and more importantly, by the Frenchacquisitionof Guadeloupe and Martiniquein
1635. Otherislands to thesouthwere notpermanentlysettledduringthisera due mainlyto
the successfulresistanceof theCarib Indians.
On most English and French islands, the colonization process initiallyinvolved
European yeoman settlementand experimentation with a varietyof exportcrops. By the
latterpartof the seventeenthcentury,thispeasant-basedsystemwas effectivelysupplanted
by thepervasive Implantationsystem"based on black slave labour and sugarproductionfor
the European market.6 The firstsuccessfulsugar plantationin Antigua,"Betty's Hope",
was establishedby ChristopherCodringtonin 1674, althoughthe crop had been cultivated
on the island as early as 1655.7 As Antigua and the other Lesser Antillean islands
developed into importantagriculturalperipheriesduringthe latterhalf of the seventeenth
century,theyalso became more significantas militaryobjectivesin thewars which erupted
sporadicallyamong the rival European powers. In addition,most of the conflictinvolved
in theseearlywars occurredwithintheLesser Antillesbecause of theirrelativeproximityto
theEuropean naval bases fromwhichthecompetingfleetsoriginated.The generalstrategy
followed in the Caribbean duringthe seventeenthcentury,however, was not to acquire
enemyterritory (given the limitationsof available capital and the desire not to produce a
surplusof sugar),but ratherto carryout raids withthe intentionof destroyingor removing
as muchpropertyas possible in orderto gain a short-term advantagein the European sugar
markets.
It was withinthis strategiccontextthatthe incipientmilitarylandscape of the
English Harbour area emerged. Ten years afterthe destructiveFrench-Caribraid of 1666,
theAntiguangovernmentsupplementedthedefencesof FalmouthTown, thecapital,witha
More significantly,
simple defensivework,FortCharles,on an isletin FalmouthHarbour .
the raid induced the Council of Antigua to consider the constructionof a bastion at their
own expense for the protectionof the white population and their propertyduringfuture
attacks. The site identifiedas most appropriatefor this purpose was the Monies Hill
promontory overlookingFalmouthHarbour. However, constructionon this"deodand" (or
defensive citadel), named Great George Fort, did not actually commence until the late
10
1680s, and it was not completeduntil 1705. Four years earlier,the firstsmall non-per-
manent British garrison was posted in Antigua.11 The size of the deodand is made
apparent in a 1724 reportto the Council of Trade and Plantationsby GovernorHart,who
describesits walls as enclosing eightacres of land.12 Furtherindicationsof theperceived
defensiverole and capacities of Great George Fort is providedby GovernorMathew in a
1734 letterto the same Council. The fortresson Monk's Hill is describedas:

a retreatfor women and children,and for ourselves

when we can keep the fieldno longer,a cover forour
best effects,a disappointment(sic) to the enemy that
come forplunderchiefly,and whereH.M. sovereignty

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 3

ofthisIslandmustbe preserv'dtothelastextremity.13

Mathewstatesthatthefortress vitalin protecting

was particularly "thebootythe
enemychieflywants",namelytheblackslaves,who wouldbe less likelyto desertto the
raidersiftheirchildrenwerekeptwithinitswalls. He further describesMonk'sHill as
thechiefarsenalon Antigua,accommodating cannotLof
thirty-three variouscaliberswhich
wouldbe availableto attackanylandingpartyatFalmouthHarbour.Mathew'sreport also
thatthematter
clarifies ofexpensesforrepairs, oftheAntiguans
etc.was theresponsibility
themselves,who,forexample,providedthesalariesofa residentgunner andnine"montros-
or
ses", gunner's assistants.
The DockyardPhase
The Caribbeanarenaintheeighteenth century was characterized bytheescalating
greatpowerrivalry between and and the
England France, by increasingly marginal statusof
SpainandtheNetherlands, to a
whowererelegated supporting during role the fiveformal
warswhichoccupied45 yearsoftheperiod. As thecentury progressed, andin contrast
tothetrendofthelate 1600s,theFrenchandBritishactivelysoughtto acquireeachother's
sugarcolonies,giventheexpansionintheavailablecapitalandintheEuropeanmarket for
17
thisproduct. Thischangein strategy, combinedwiththeincreasedmilitary powerofthe
combatants and thehighereconomicstakes,made itbothnecessaryand possibleforthe
English to invest significant effort,over and above thoseinvestments providedby the
islandersthemselves, in the fortificationof English Harbour and other strategicsitesinthe
Caribbean,such as BrimstoneHill St. in Kitts. References to the strategic potentialof
EnglishHarbouritselfwerefirst madeas earlyas 1671,whenGovernor Stapletonreported
totheCouncilofPlantations thatthesiteshouldbe developedformilitary purposes,given
itscapacityforsheltering vesselsanditsfortuitous locationfacingtheFrenchraidingbases
on Guadeloupeand Martinique.18The earliestmilitary construction on theharbouroc-
curredin 1700,whenFortsBerkeleyand Charlotte wereerectedat itsmouthin orderto
intercept anyFrenchattacksuponFalmouthfromtheeast.19 By 1705 itwas reported that
navalvesselswereusing Falmouth and English Harbour frequently,20 although no facilities
wereyetin place fortheirmaintenance.The destructive Frenchattackon St. Kittsin the
followingyearagain pointedto thevulnerability of the small islandsto Frenchattack,
prompting theCouncilofTradeandPlantations tourgetheEnglishgovernment topostsix
sloopstotheLeewardIslandsforpatrolagainsttheFrench.
The importance of theseincipient defenceswas mademanifest on July6, 1712,
whena Frenchforceunsuccessfully attempted to land on the south-eastern shoreof the
island. Thisevent also prompted the Governor of Barbados to add his voice in urgingthe
British militarycommanders to concentrate all available naval forces in the Leewards, and
atAntiguainparticular.22However,itwas not until 1725, as a result of theinvestigations
of CaptainsCooper and Del Garno of the Britishnavy,thatthe authorities seriously
considered thepotential ofEnglishHarbouras a navalbase. In thatyear,workbeganonthe
firstsimpledockyardat St. Helena,on theeastbankof EnglishHarbour. Subsequent
lobbyingby theAntiguangovernment and otherprominent Antiguansinvolvedbotha

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4

series of petitionsdesigned to secure a permanentnaval presence,and thepassing of a law

allocating twentyacres of land "forthe use of HM ships" . In addition,the Legislature
undertookthe constructionof a fortat the entranceto English Harbour as an incentivefor
the Britishnavy to establish a large dockyardwithin25.Partlyas a consequence of these
initiatives,and in considerationof its own strategicmotivations,the Britishnavy began in
1743 to constructa major dockyardfacilityacross the harbourfromthe St. Helena site.26
Almost all subsequentconstructionin the English Harbourarea until 1780 occurredat the
Dockyard and its immediate vicinity,which acquired the wide range of services and
infrastructure necessaryto servicea permanentsquadron,includinga wet dock, boathouses,
masthouses,a naval hospital,a watercatchment,troopand officersquarters,and a galley.
Some indicationof peak usage is providedby Southey,who notedthat18 warshipscarrying
608 guns, includingthe 80-gun Foudroyant,were based in English Harbour on July12,
1762.27 Furthermore,it was estimatedthat between four and ten men-of-warwith a
complementof 2.000 to 3,000 hands were typicallyin theharbourat any given timetoward
the end of the eighteenthcentury.28
The interrelatedfactorswhich led to the establishmentand developmentof the
Dockyards will now be consideredin detail. Of primaryimportanceat a strategiclevel was
the Britishdecision in the 1740s to establishpermanentnaval bases at Jamaica and the
Leeward Islands, in contrastto the Frenchpolicy of sending a fleetdirectlyfromFrance
each year. Permanentsquadronswould allow forthe continualharassmentof enemytrade
and the maintenanceof a continuousoffensivethreatagainst French possessions, while
providingconvoy forEnglish trade,and patrolsagainstpossible Frenchraids. Site and
situationadvantagesfavouredEnglishHarbouras thelocation of thisbase. The situationof
English Harbournear the easternextremityof the Leeward Islands was ideal forintercept-
ing incomingvessels fromFrance, thusprotectingthe otherLeeward Islands and posses-
sions furtherwest. At the same time, St. Kitts,Nevis and Montserratcould be accessed
readily simply by plying the prevailing tradewinds,which would also allow severely
damaged ships to retireto the sisternaval base in Jamaica forrepairs. As forsite advan-
tages, the Harbourwas commodious,and sufficiently deep to accommodate most contem-
porary naval vessels. English Harbour was also hidden by hills at itsmouth , and offered
protectionagainst the hurricanes to which the island was susceptible. Disadvantages
included a narrowmouthwhich impeded navigation, and a depthwhich forcedthe largest
naval vessels to reduce theirloads. As well, English Harbour had a reputationas a death
trapduringthehurricaneseason, on accountof yellow fevercarried by mosquitos breeding
in themarshlandsjust to the east33. Despite theseshortcomings,the dockyardsat English
Harbour appear to have performedtheirrole reasonably well, with at least one source
attributingthe victoryof the Britishover the French in the Caribbean arena of the Seven
Years War (1756-1763) to the strategyof permanentnaval bases34 .
Economic and demographicfactorsassociated withAntigua itselfcontributedto
the militarybuild-up at English Harbour. A primaryconsiderationwas the immense
as
importanceof eighteenthcenturyAntigua and the otherLeeward Islands sugar produc-
was
ers, a statuswhich the ongoing rhetoricof the Antiguanpetitioners quick to exploit.
From 1715 to 1717, forexample,the£403,394 in goods exported from the Leeward Islands

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 5

exceededthe£382,576exported NorthAmericancoloniestogether.
fromall oftheBritish
Antiguaalonepossessedsome 300 sugar duringthe1760s,withan averagevalueof
estates
£10,000 . The British thereforedid have a sound economicrationaleforprotecting
Antiguafrompotential notall ofwhichwereexternal.
dangers,
Slave insurrections constitutedthemaininternalthreat.The normaldeterrent to
slave uprisingsin the eighteenth-century Caribbeanwas the maintenanceof a militia
comprisedof residentwhites. However,as in all otherBritishWest Indianislands,the
availablepool ofwhitemanpower declinedsteadilybothinabsoluteandrelativetermsafter
theearly1700s. The white of
population Antigua decreased froma peak of 5,200in 1724
to2,590in 1770,whiletheslavepopulation expandedduring thesameinterval from19,800
to 37,808,resulting ratiofrom3.8 to 14.6. Furthermore,
in an increasein slave/white the
militiawas widelydeemedto be poorlytrainedandundisciplined.38 the
It was following
thwarted slaveuprisingof 1736,therefore, thatthegovernment ofAntiguapetitioned fora
permanent Britishgarrison toprotectthewhitelandowners .
An additionalandmoreunexpected camefromthewhitesthemselves,
threat many
ofwhomcarriedoutoratleastcondonedillicittradewithnon-British shipsincontravention
of theNavigationLaws. AdmiralHoratioNelson,themostfamouspersonality to be
associatedwithEnglishHarbour, oftenclashedwiththewhiteAntiguan establishment over
his zealous enforcement of thetradelaws 40. EricWilliamsmaintainsthat"butforthe
Britishnavy,itwouldhavebeenimpossible toprevent theBritishWestIndiesfrom joining
the(American) Revolution"41 . Additional tensions withinthe whitecommunity were
engendered by thestratificationof thisgroup intodivergenteconomic and social classes.
Local governments in Antiguaand theotherLeewardIslandsweredominated by a plan-
tocracywhichwas resentedand generally despisedby the"poorwhites",manyof whom
wereofCatholicIrishdescentandtherefore viewedas unreliable bytheauthorities .

ShirleyHeights
In 1781, the newlyarrivedCaptain-General of the LeewardIslands,Thomas
Shirley,inducedtheGeneralAssemblyofAntiguato approvea planto fortify theeastern
heightsabove the Dockyards.Subsequentconstructions were largelypaid forfromthe
Treasury ofAntigua,although thesefundswereapprovedwithincreasedreluctance as costs
escalated.AftertheAssemblyin 1790refused toallocatefurtherfundsforthispurpose,the
BritishGovernment invested£100,000towardsthecompletion ofthecomplex,giventhata
renewal of with
hostilities France appeared inevitable43. According to Nicholson,the
was to defend the to serve as a military
purposeof thecomplex effectively Dockyards,
facilitieswhere the could be acclimatizedto West Indian
depot,and to provide troops
conditions andheldin reserve untilrequired .
The decisionto expandthemilitary functionof thearea was sensiblewithinthe
contextof eventsduringthistime. First,theBritishat thatparticular timewereengaging
thecombinedstrength of France,SpainandtheNetherlands, andwereaboutto relinquish
controlovermuchof theAmericanmainland.WithintheCaribbean,onlyJamaica,Bar-
badosandAntiguaremained underBritishcontrolfollowing a majorFrenchoffensive, and

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6

it was justifiablybelievedthatAntiguawouldbe attackednext . WhiletheTreatyof

Versaillesin 1783 temporarily eliminatedthe threatof further Frenchincursionsand
essentiallyrestoredthepre- 1776territorialstatusquo,a newthreat was posedin 1784by
theestablishment in Martinique ofthefirstFrenchpermanent navalbase in theregion .
As itturnedouthowever,theonlysubsequent FrenchassaultuponEnglishHarbourwas a
tragicomic 1803 expedition in which a force of 700 men on 13 schoonerssentfrom
Guadeloupe was scatteredat sea a
by single British
frigate47. In thatyear,approximately
onethousand in
Britishtroopswerestationed Antigua, thoughnotall atEnglishHarbour*
Some fifty structureswereeventually constructedat ShirleyHeightsduringthe
1780sandearly1790s,reflecting boththestrategicimportanceofthesiteandtheavailabil-
of
ity capital to effect such an level
intensive of development.Dominantamongthese
wereFortShirley,theRoyalArtillery
structures a canteen,theofficers
quarters, quarters,
thepowdermagazine, and the for
barracks theenlistedmen. The lastsignificant
military
to be constructed
structure in theareawas Dow's Hill Fort,completedin 1791. Revenues
continuedto be allocatedforthemaintenance of ShirleyHeightsuntil1814, whenthe
Frenchthreatcollapsedentirely.
Decline
The majorfactorscontributing to thedeclineof theEnglishHarbourarea as a
military complexwere the attainment of Britishhegemonyafter1814, and therelative
declineof theCaribbean(and of theLeewardsin particular) as an important economic
periphery50 . Firstto be abandonedwerethesmallperipheral forts,some of whichhad
already become obsolete at a much earlier date. Fort Charlotte,forexample,was decom-
missionedas earlyas 173051. Otherfortsremained"active"in name only,providing
sinecuresforfortunate individuals exemptedfrommilitiaduty . The AntiguaHouse of
Assemblyproposedin 1827 that most fortson theislandoutsideof ShirleyHeightsbe
abandoned. Ironically, thoughthedeodandon Monk's Hill was describedin the 1827
StatisticalReportas being"totally uselesstothecolony"53 , andhad alreadybeenobsolete
formanyyears,thisfacility retained somekindofpracticalfunction longerthaneitherthe
Dockyardsor ShirleyHeightsduringthisperiodof decline,servingas an important
convalescent stationforas longas thegarrison remained onAntigua,andfunctioning when
barracks. In 1822, forexample,GreatGeorgeFort housed
requiredas an emergency
soldiersfroma troopshipboundforJamaicawhichstrucka reefoffAntigua . Monk's
Hill also functioned until1923 as a signalstationconnecting EnglishHarbourwiththe
capitalcity of St. John's 55.
The Dockyardcontinued to servças a navalbase untildecommissioned in 1889,
althoughmen-of-war apparently continued to use thefacilityuntil 189556 . Duringthe
1840s,EnglishHarbourwas used as a portforpassengers andmail,given the shallowness
of theharbourat St. John's57. A seriesof naturaldisasters, including ζ lightning firein
181558, a majorhurricane in 1835, and a severeearthquake in 1843 caused serious
atthe which accelerated itsdecline.Technical changealso rendered the
damage Dockyards
navalbase obsolete,as theiron-hulled, steam-driven vesselswhichreplacedsailingships
duringthe latenineteenth century were too long and deep to use EnglishHarbour,andtoo

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 7

complexto be maintained
technologically and repairedat theDockyards . In 1906,the
Dockyards werehandedoverto theAntiguangovernment,afterwhichtheyrapidlyfellinto
disrepair .
The ShirleyHeightscomplexwas used to accommodate troopsuntil1854,when
thelastregiment leftforreassignment in Trinidad . One majorreasonforretaining the
garrisonafter1814 was thecontinuing threat ofa slave British
uprising. troops were in fact
commendedby theAntiguaHouse of Assemblyfortheirrole in suppressing the slave
63 .
insurrectionof 1831 However, thisthreat evaporatedafter
the abolitionof slaveryin
1833,andno further a
rationaleexistedforfinancing garrison which continued to experi-
enceveryhighratesofattrition dueto disease. Thebuildingsaccordingly wereabandoned
and graduallyfellintoruinor weredamagedby naturaldisasters.The onlyevidenceof
facilitiesherehavingundergonesome formof functional adaptationwas thetemporary
conversion oftheRoyalArtillery Quarters intoa asylumduringthe1920s .
lunatic

By the 1940s,thedockyards of EnglishHarbourwereessentially

and fortresses
deserted, save forthepresenceof a full-time
watchman, theoccasionalvisitorand three
smallnearbyvillages.The senseofdesolationandlostglorywhichmusthavepervadedthe
placeis effectivelycapturedinthefollowingnarrative, in 1949:
written

Capstans,forcareening themen-o'-war, radiatinglong

rottenbeams,overhungthe water'sedge like enor-
mous spiderstoo old to walk away... The galleried
officers'quartersat theend of thespithad relapsed
intoa stateofbam-likedesolation...
moldering nautical
gear and anchors eaten by this
rust... was a queerly
movingplace, heavy with melancholy and the allu-
sionsofancientfame .
Conclusion
The militarylandscapeof EnglishHarbourwas an integralcomponentof the
broaderculturallandscapewhichemergedinthesmallerCaribbeanislandsfollowing their
into
incorporation the post-Conquest world economy after1620. the
Essentially, evolution
of EnglishHarbourthrough a numberof distinct phasesmirrored changinggreatpower
and
dynamics core/periphery relationshipscentred uponagricultural exports.In thefirst
phase,theconstruction of a massive deodand on a height ofland behind FalmouthHarbour
between1680 and 1705 reflected thedefensive strategicconsiderationsoftheseventeenth
century,in whichplantation-based were
settlements subject to thecontinualthreatofraids
bytheirrivals,andrequireda saferedoubt for theprotection person property.The
of and
establishment of an increasingly sophisticatednaval base at theHarbouritselfbetween
1725and 1780 constituted a secondphase,duringwhichBritainandFrancewereengaged
in a greatpowerrivalryinvolvingactiveattempts to acquireeach other'sterritory.The
build-upat EnglishHarbour,madepossiblebecauseoftheincreasedwealthofBritainand
hersugarcolonies,was intended inpartto defendAntiguaandtheLeewardsfromexternal
and internal
threat, and in partto providea new offensivearmto the Britishmilitary

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8

presencein theregion.Whenthegreatpowerrivalry betweenBritainandFrancereached

its climaxbetween1780 and 1814,Britainand theAntiguanelitein a thirdphase con-
structedand maintaineda massivegarrisoncomplexat ShirleyHeightsto augmentthe
navalbase. Finally,a fourth
phase entailedthedeclineof theEnglishHarbourmilitary
complex(1814-1949), whichbecame unnecessary
increasingly theattainment
following of
Britishhegemony intheeconomically-declining
region,andobsoletedue to advancements
inmilitarytechnology.
it shouldbe mentioned
As a postscript, thatEnglishHarbouris currentlyexperi-
encinga fifthstage,duringwhichtheareahas emergedas a majorCaribbeantourist node.
An ambitious projecthasbeenunderway
restoration manyof
forseveraldecadesto.restore
thefortsandmilitary as tourist
facilities whiletheDockyardsthemselves
attractions, have
beenrestoredto theiroriginalnauticalfunction, thoughservicingnotthe of a
battlecraft
bygoneera, but the
rather pleasurecraftof the era.
contemporary

NOTES

1. See forexampleC. Saur,TheEarlySpanishMain,Berkeley:University ofCaliforniaPress,1966; B.C.

Richardson,TheCaribbeanintheWiderWorld, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1992; D-Watts,
TheWestIndies:PatternsofDevelopment, CultureandEnvironmental Changesince1492,Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press,1987;A.W. Crosby,TheColumbianExchange:Biologicaland CulturalCon-
sequenceson 1492,Westport, GreenwoodPress,1972;D.R. Harris,Plants,Animalsand
Connecticut:
Man intheOuterLeewardIsle, WestIndies,University ofCalifornia in Geography,
Publications 1965;
"The HistoricalRecordofMan as an EcologicalDominantin theLesserAntilles",Canadian
G.C. Merrill,
Geographer 3, 1958/1959:17-22;E.R. WolfandS.W. Mintz,"HaciendasandPlantations in MiddleAmer-
ica andtheAntilles",Social andEconomicStudies6, 1957:380-412.
2. AmongthefewstudieswhichexaminesomeaspectofCaribbeanmilitary "The
landscapesareD. Buisseret,
ElusiveDeodand:A StudyoftheFortified JournalofCaribbeanHistory
RefugesoftheLesserAntilles",
6, 1973:43-80,andD. Buisseret,TheFortifications 1655-1914,Kingston,
ofKingston, Jamaica,1972.
3. s WorldSystemsTheoryprovidesa usefulframework
Wallerstein' theshifting
forinterpreting char-
rivalries
ofthecapitalist
acteristic worldeconomywhichgradually The
emergedafter1450. See 1. Wallerstein,
ModernWorldSystem I. CapitalistAgricultureand theOriginsoftheEuropeanWorld-Economy in the
SixteenthCentury,New York:AcademicPress,1974; 1. Wallerstein, TheModemWorld-System II. Mer-
cantilismand theConsolidation oftheEuropeanWorld-Economy, 1600-1750,New York:Academic
TheModernWorldSystem
Press,1980; 1. Wallerstein, III - TheSecondEra of GreatExpansionofthe
CapitalistWorld-Economy, 1730-1840s,New York:AcademicPress,1989. Fora worldsystems interpre-
tationoftheCaribbean,see Richardson, op. cit.
4. H. Blume,TheCaribbeanIslands,London:Longman,1974.
5. Theseincipient colonization bytheearlierTreatiesofLondon(1604)andAntwerp
werefacilitated
efforts
(1609),in whichEnglandandtheNetherlands acknowledged Spanishsovereignty onlyoverthoseterrito-
ries,mainlyin theGreaterAntilles,whichwereeffectivelyoccupiedbySpain. See Blume,op. cit.,66-67,
Watts,op. cit,131-173.
6. Fora fulldiscussionoftheplantationsystem"see Pan AmericanUnion,Plantation SystemsoftheNew
World,Washington: Social ScienceMonographs, VII, 1959;L. Best,"A ModelofPurePlantation Econ-
omy",Social and EconomicStudies17, 1968:283-326;G. Beckford, Persistent
Poverty.Underdevelop-
mentinPlantationEconomiesoftheThirdWorld, New York:OxfordUniversity Press,1972; S.W. Mintz,
CaribbeanTransformations, JohnsHopkinsUniversity
Baltimore: Press,1974.
7. C. Jane,ShirleyHeights:TheDefenceofNelson's Dockyard, EnglishHarbour,Antigua:ReterenceLibrary
ofNelson'sDockyard, NationalParkFoundation, 1982:9.
8. Watts,op. cit.,240.

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 9

9. H. Multer,M. WeissandD. V. Nicholson,Antigua:Reefs,RocksandHighroadsof History, An-

St. Johns,
tigua:LeewardIslandsScienceAssociates,no. 1,no date.
10. Buisserop. cit.,53; Jane,op. cit.,11. Similarmotivesduringthissameperiodprompted a commonpattern
throughout theregion,withtheestablishment Nevis,Guade-
ofotherdeodandsin St. Kitts,Montserrat,
loupe,St. Lucia and Dominica. See Buisseret, op,cit.
11. Jane,op. cit.,11.
12. CalendarofStatePapers,ColonialSeries,AmericaandWestIndies,1724-1726,no. 260viii,6152.
13. CalendarofStatePapers,ColonialSeries,AmericaandWestIndies,1734-1735,no.314ii,214.
14. Ibid,215-216.
15. Ibid,214-215.
oftheseformalconflicts,
16. Fora summary alliances,see Watts,op. cit,240-258.
including
17. Blume,op. cit.,68.
18. miscellaneous
D.V. Nicholson,untitled fortsandcannons.St. John's,Antigua:Na-
noteson Antiguan
tionalMuseumofAntiguaandBarbuda,no date.
19. Ibid
20. W. Ross,"EnglishHarbour,Antigua"CanadianGeographicalJournal62, 1961: 96.
21. CalendarofStatePapers,ColonialSeries,AmericaandWestIndies,1706-1708,no. 1031,499-500.
22. CalendarofStatePapers,ColonialSeries,AmericaandWestIndies,1712-1714,no. 38, 25-26.
23. A. Aspinall,ThePocketGuideto TheWestIndiesandBritishGuiana,BritishHonduras,Bermuda,The
SpanishMain,Surinam,ThePanama Canal,London:MethuenandCo. Ltd.,10thed., 1954,215.
24. CalendarofStatePapers;ColonialSeriesAmericaandWestIndies,1726-1727,no. 151,71. Contemporary
includeSpeakeroftheAssemblyGeorgeThomastotheLordsCommissioner
petitions oftheAdmiralty
on Feb.28,1727; see CalendarofStatePapers,ColonialSeries,AmericaandWestIndies;1728-1729,
no.886L472-473,andAgentofAntiguaJohnYeomanstotheCouncilofTradeandPlantations in 1731;
see CalendarofStatePapers,ColonialSeries,AmericaandWestIndies,1731,no. 183, 105-106.
25. CalendarofStatePapers,ColonialSeries,AmericaandWestIndies,1728-1729,no. 886i,472-473.
26. D.V. Nicholson,"EnglishHarbourandShirleyHeights",inAntiguaand BarbudaIndependence(R.Sand-
Antigua,1981,43.
ers,ed.), St. Johns,
27. T. Southey,Chronological HistoryoftheWestIndies,vol 2, London:FrankCass andCo. Ltd.,1963,(first
published1827),354.
28. Ross,op. cit.,96-97. Ross citesSirKennethBlackburne, a formerGovernor oftheLeewardIslands.

29. R. Pares,Warand Tradein theWest Indies,1739-1763, London: Frank Cass andCo. Ltd.,1963(firstpub-
lished1936),287-288. Paresalso pointsoutseveraldisadvantages ofthepermanent suchas
base strategy,
ofBritishshipsconfined forlongperiodsin theCaribbeanwithout access to
therelatively poorcondition
themorecomprehensive oftheEuropeandockyards,
facilities andtheubiquity ofpoorlyunderstoodtropi-
cal diseases,whichresultedin a highmortality rateamongmilitary personnel.However,incoming expedi-
tionsfromEuropecouldexperience mortalityratesofat leastequal magnitude.AdmiralHosier's
Caribbeanexpedition of 1726,forexample,suffered 4,000deathsovera twoyearperiodoutofa contin-
gent of 4,750 personnel. See N.A.M. Rodger.. The Wooden World:AnAnatomy oftheGeorgianNavy,
Glasgow: Fontana Press, 1986,98.
30. According to Ross,op. cit.,95, "Theharbour itselfis smallandnarrow, a windingvalleydrownedbythesea
severalthousandyearsago afterthegreatcontinental ice sheetsofourlatitudesmeltedaway. Cutneatly
intothemountainous southcoastofAntigua,itis almostinvisiblefromseaward,anda stranger couldsail
withina quarter mileoftheentrance without suspecting itspresence.
31. Ross,op. cit.,96, notesthathurricanes struck Antiguain 1681,1722,1740,1754,1766,1772,1780,1811
and 1835. It is also likelythatthehurricanes whichstruckMontserrat in 1707,1737,1744,1747,1756,
1786,1792,1804,and1827also hadsomeeffect uponAntigua.See M.M. Wheeler,Montserrat, WestIn-
A
dies: Chronological History, Plymouth,Montserrat: Montserrat National Trust,1988.

32. Pares,op. cit.,272

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10

33. Rodger,op. cit.,99.

34. Blume,op. cit.,68-69.
35. Jane,op. cit., Towardtheendoftheeighteenth
century, thatfour-fifths
WilliamPitttheYoungerestimated
ofall BritishoverseasincomecamefromtheWestIndies.Ibid
36. R.B. Sheridan, A Case StudyofAntigua,1730-1775",EconomicHistoryRe-
"The Rise ofa ColonialGentry:
view,SecondSeries13, 1961:343.
37. Watts,op. cit.,313.
38. Pares,op. cit.,236.
39. Ibid,254.
40. Ross,op. cit.,97.
Norfolk:An-
41. Ε. Williams,FromColumbusto Castro:TheHistoryoftheCaribbean1492-1969,Thetford,
dreDeutsch,1983,226.
42. Sheridan,op. cit,examinesthedomination ofAntigua'splantocracy overthelocal AssemblyandCouncil
duringthemid-1700s. RichardDunnindicatesthattheIrishconstituted a significant oftheLee-
proportion
wardIslandswhitepopulationduringthelate 1600sandearly1700s,andthattheywereliableto co-oper-
atewiththeFrenchduringtimesofinvasion,giventhemutualantipathy oftheIrishand English.Unlike
Montserrat orSt. Kitts,theIrishneveractuallyroseup againsttheEnglishinAntigua,eventhoughthey
constituted26% ofthatisland'swhitepopulation in 1678. See R. Dunn,Sugarand Slaves: TheRiseofthe
PlanterClass in theEnglishWestIndies,1624-17IS, New York:W.W.NortonandCo. Inc.,1972,118,
127. 134. Fora chronoloevofEnelish-Irish relationsin Montserrat,see Wheeler,op. cit.
43. Jane,op. cit.,15-22.
44. Multer,WeissandNicholson,op. cit.
45. Jane,op. cit.,15-17.
46. Watts,op. cit,252-253.
Islandsto Windward.CruisingtheCaribbees,Toronto:D. Van NostranCompany,Inc.,1948,
47. C. Mitchell,
120.
48. Ross,op. cit,97.
withintheShirleyHeightscomplex.
ofthemajorfacilities
49. See Jane,op. cit.,fora description
50. The economicdeclineoftheBritishWestIndies,andparticularly thesmallerislands,is exempliliedbythe
relativedeclineofthisregionas a sugarproducer duringtheeighteenthcentury.Williams(op. cit.,366)
pointsout,forexample,thattheBritishWestIndianshareofregionalsugarproduction droppedfrom62%
around1815to 18% in 1894,primarily becauseofthegreatincreasein Cubanproduction.In addition, the
large-scalediffusionofsugarproduction toAsia andotherareas,competitionfromEuropeanbeetsugar,
theslowadoptionoftechnological andtherescinding
innovations, ofpreferential pricesin 1846all con-
tributedtodropping pricesforBritishWestIndiansugar.See Richardson, op. cit.,60-62.
notes,op. cit.
miscellaneous
5 1. Nicholson,untitled
52. Lanaghan,AntiguaandtheAntiguans, etc.,London:SaundersandOtley,1844,328.
53. AntiguaHouseofAssembly, Minutes1828-1831,91.
notes,op. cit.
miscellaneous
54. Nicholson,untitled
op. cit.,55.
55. Buisseret,
56. Aspinall, op. cit.,215.
57. R. Baird,Impressions oftheWestIndiesandNorthAmericain low, νnnaaeipnia:Leaana
and Experiences
Blanchard,1850,33.
58. T. Southey,Chronological HistoryoftheWestIndies,vol. Ill, London:FrankCass andCo. Ltd.,1968
published1827),612-613.
(first
59. Lanaghan,op. cit.

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 11

60. Ross,op. cit

61. Β. Dyde,Antiguaand Barbuda:HeartoftheCaribbean,London:MacMillan,1986,107.
62. Jane,op. cit.
63. AntieuaHouseofAssembly,od. cit..521-522.
64. Jane,op. cit.
65. The Traveller'sTree:A Journey
P. Fermor, theCaribbeanIslands,London:JohnMurray,1950,
through
206-09.

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