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Social Epistemology: A
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Alternative epistemologies
and the value of truth
James Maffie
Published online: 26 Nov 2010.

To cite this article: James Maffie (2000) Alternative epistemologies and the
value of truth, Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy,
14:4, 247-257, DOI: 10.1080/0269172001/0008617

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 social epistemolog y, 2000, vol. 14, no. 4, 247–257

Alternative epistemologies and the value

of truth

JAMES MAFFIE
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Knowledge in a Social World represents Alvin Goldman’s second pioneering study in the
area of applied epistemology ;" Epistemology and Cognition was his Ž rst (Goldman, 1986).
While the latter explored issues in what Goldman called individual epistemology,
Knowledge in a Social World explores issues in what he calls social epistemology. Together,
the two will stand as deŽ nitive works in applied epistemology for a long time to come.
Like ethics, epistemology admits of three levels of analysis : normative, meta-, and
applied. Applied epistemology—like its analogues applied ethics (which evaluates
speciŽ c practices such as abortion, euthanasia and suicide) and applied philosophy of
science (which evaluates speciŽ c theories such as scientiŽ c creationism, racialism and
sociobiology)—evaluates the epistemic status of speciŽ c processes of belief formation.
The applied individual epistemology of Epistemology and Cognition evaluated the epistemic
status of individual cognitive psychological processes such as perception, memory, and
probability judgements. The applied social epistemology of Knowledge in a Social World
turns to the epistemic evaluation of social processes of belief formation such as science,
speech regulation, the technology and economics of communication, and education and
legal institutions.
The time is long overdue for applied epistemology. For too long epistemologists have
been concerned with ideal cognizers and necessary truths ; for too long they have
disdained and hence abstained from the meliorative task of o¶ ering counsel and
guidance in the concrete realm of actual belief formation. Goldman’s two works
represent important reversals of this trend. Hopefully others will follow. It is in this light
that I see Goldman’s work as a continuation of what epistemologists such as Bacon,
Descartes, Marx and Dewey saw themselves as doing : viz., bringing epistemology down
from the heavens in order to tackle the ‘problems of men ’ (as Dewey put it). Goldman’s
commitment to ‘the problems of men ’ places him in the unlikely company of such
recently self-anointed heirs of Dewey as Richard Rorty and Cornell West. However, by
addressing concrete matters in detail, Goldman quickly distinguishes himself from
Rorty and West who, by contrast, rarely o¶ er more than vague anti-philosophica l
nostrums. In doing so, Goldman comes much closer to Dewey than either Rorty or
West. Like Marx, however, Goldman does so without sacriŽ cing his commitment to
realist notions of truth and knowledge. Finally, Goldman’s social epistemology
represents a welcome crossing over by epistemology into the areas of politics, economics,
communication, education and law.

Author: James Maµ e teaches philosophy at Colorad o State University, Ft Collins, CO, 80523–1871, USA;
e-mail: maµ ej!spot.colorado.edu

Social Epistemology ISSN 0269-172 8 print}ISSN 1464-529 7 on line ’ 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd
http :}}www.tandf.co.uk }journals
DOI : 10.1080}0269172001 }0008617
 248 james maffie

A short essay such as this cannot do justice to the scope, richness and depth of
Goldman’s work. In light of this, and in light of the fact that I share many of Goldman’s
fundamental philosophical commitments, I see what follows as a series of invitations to
Professor Goldman to elaborate further upon several aspects of his programme.

1. Veritism

Goldman’s social epistemology embraces what he calls veritism, i.e. the thesis that :
(a) humans across culture and history commonly seek truth ; (b) epistemic notions such
as knowledge are properly conceived in terms of truth ; and (c) epistemology properly
evaluates social practices in terms of their veritistic outputs, e.g. ‘ weak ’ knowledge
(deŽ ned as true belief), error (false belief) and ignorance (the absence of true belief).
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‘ The main question for veritistic epistemology ’, writes Goldman, ‘ is : Which practices
have a comparatively favorable impact on knowledge as contrasted with error and
ignorance ? ’ (p. 5 ; see also p. 87).
Goldman embraces a semantic realism that deŽ nes truth non-epistemically in terms
of correspondence. The truth or falsity of a proposition P is deŽ ned independently of
human belief, norms, and evidential practices. And although he does not do so
explicitly, he appears to embrace some form of metaphysical realism, i.e. the thesis that
external reality exists independently of human perceptions, values, norms, theories, and
evidential practices.

1.1. Discussion
Although I share Goldman’s commitment to veritism, it is not as clear to me as it is to
Goldman (and as it was once to me for example, see Maµ e (1995)) that truth is
everyone’s concern and that epistemology is universally deŽ ned in terms of corres-
pondence truth.
Truth is undoubtedly the prevailing goal of cognition in the history of Western
epistemology—Nietzsche, Dewey, James and Quine being notable exceptions—as it is
for South Asian, post-Han East Asian and many African epistemologies. However,
recent studies suggest that truth does not play this role in Pre-Columbian North and
MesoAmerican epistemologies or Pre-Han East Asian epistemologies. What’s more, it is
not clear that these philosophies even possess the concept of (correspondence) truth.
The Pre-Columbian Nahuatl-speakin g peoples of the High Central Plateau of
Mexico—the Nahuas, among whom were the Aztecs—not only appear not to have been
concerned with truth, they appear to have lacked the concept of truth altogether.
Instead, they sought deeply rooted (neltiliztli) cognizing. Cognizing was neltiliztli if and
only if rooted in teotl, the single, vital, dynamic, self-generating energy or force which the
Nahuas believed originally created as well as continually permeates, encompasses and
shapes the universe. Deeply rooted cognizing enabled one to live a psychologically,
physically and socially balanced and stable life, a morally upright life, and hence
ultimately a life of well-being. In short : the Nahuas conceived the aim of cognition not
in terms of truth, true belief, or truthful representation but in terms of living wisely.
Knowledge (tlamatiliztli) did not consist of theoretical or propositional truths about the
world but rather practical skills or know-how which enabled humans to keep their
balance as they walked upon the twisting, jagged path of life. Knowledge and illusion
were thus deŽ ned not in terms of truth and falsehood (respectively) but in terms of
 alternative epistemologie s and the value of truth 249

rootedness and unrootedness (respectively) (Maµ e, 1999 ; unpublished manuscript).

Studies of native North American epistemologies by Cheney, Peat, Reichard and
Witherspoon likewise suggest a concern for wise living rather than true believing or
representing (Reichard, 1950 ; Witherspoon, 1977 ; Peat, 1994 ; Cheney, 1998).
The Taoist and Confucian epistemologies of Pre-Han, classical China also appear to
have been concerned not with truth, true belief or truthful representation but with
identifying the proper path or appropriate model of conduct that enables humans to live
the kind of life suitable for humans. According to Confucianism, e.g. the proper life
consists of living harmoniously with one’s surroundings . Correspondence truth plays no
role in attaining or maintaining this kind of life. One aims at living a life characterized
by authenticity, genuineness, rectitude and wholeness—not by knowledge or true
beliefs. Epistemology seeks to identify the kind of knowledge that is needed for following
this path : knowledge that is performative and participator y rather than represen-
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tational (see Hall, 1978 ; Hall and Ames, 1987 ; 1998 ; Ames, 1989 ; Hansen, 1985 ; 1992).
In sum, nonveritistic epistemologies seek right or appropriate belief rather than true
belief.
What’s more, nonveritist epistemologies typically presuppose metaphysical views
that are radically di¶ erent from the metaphysical views typically presupposed by
veritist epistemologies. For example, the former deny that there is an ontological
distinction between appearance and reality, whereas the latter uphold the distinction ;
the former equate reality with becoming, process and change, the latter equate reality
with being, permanence, and stability. Nahuatl and Taoist metaphysics, e.g. deny the
existence of an overarching metaphysical principle that structures, orders and governs
existence. Reality is fundamentally anarchic.
What is the upshot of the foregoing excursion into the anthropology of epistemology ?
Although I am not prepared to argue the point at this time, I suspect that the fact that
nonveritists embrace an alternative metaphysics defuses the standard veritist criticism
of nonveritism, viz., that truth better promotes success than falsehood and therefore
nonveritists have a sustaining interest in truth and cannot a¶ ord to eschew it (p. 75, see
also Kornblith, 1993). The veritist’s criticism presupposes a metaphysics that is rejected
by nonveritists and therefore begs the question against nonveritists. If my suspicion is
correct, we should not Ž nd it terribly surprising. After all, all but the most diehard
defenders of Archimedean standpoints now openly acknowledge the impossibility of
doing epistemology ‘ from scratch ’ i.e. without metaphysical assumption. Consequently,
when adjudicating between alternative epistemologies we must take into account the
fact that they very likely presuppose alternative metaphysics.
Secondly, to the degree the foregoing philosophies may be characterized as advancing
genuine epistemologies—and it appears diµ cult to deny them such status without
begging the question (e.g. by appealing to ‘our ’ intuitions or ‘our ’ concept of
epistemology)—it follows that : human beings do not universally seek truth ; that they
do not universally construct veritistic epistemologies ; and that it is not the case that ‘a
single concept of truth seems to be cross-culturall y present ’ pace Goldman (p. 33).
None of this gainsays, however, Goldman’s claims that ‘ truth is a vital concern of
humankind across history and culture, not an idiosyncratic concern of modern white
Europeans ’ (p. 33), or that ‘it is eminently reasonable for a discipline to be devoted to
the systematic and critical evaluation of truth-oriented practices ’ (p. 33). And these two
claims seem to be all Goldman needs to motivate veritistic epistemology.
Yet it does bear noting that Goldman’s judgement that it is ‘ eminently reasonable for
a discipline to be devoted to the systematic and critical evaluation of truth-oriented
 250 james maffie

practices ’ must rest ultimately upon a metaphysical picture of the world, one which
Goldman never makes explicit. Presumably, as one of the pioneers of naturalized
epistemology, Goldman would invoke the metaphysics of contemporary science. This
points, once again, to the fact that we develop our theories of knowledge and rationality
as well as dispense our epistemic evaluations and judgements of reasonableness within a
context of background assumptions about the nature of things.
Finally, the foregoing does impact Goldman’s discussion of education. Goldman
claims veritism supports an ‘Enlightenment ’ conception of education which sees the
acquisition of new ‘ propositional knowledge … as education’s most pervasive and
characteristic goal ’ (p. 349). Simply put : the ‘ aim of learning is to learn truths ’ (p.
351). Veritism tells us where to Ž nd those truths and evaluates alternative ways of
imparting them.
However, the Enlightenment view is not shared by those who embrace nonveritistic
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epistemologies. Confucianists, Taoists, Navajos and Nahuas, e.g. conceive the goal of
education as the cultivation of proper, genuine or noble character. So conceived,
education focuses upon cultivating practical dispositions and skills that enable one to
live wisely. Cognitive states are conceived behaviourally and pragmatically rather than
propositionally. Veritism would seem to be little help in assessing these pedagogies.

2. Veritistic value

Goldman streamlines his theory of knowledge in Knowledge in a Social World over earlier
formulations. He entertains only what he calls ‘weak knowledge ’ which he deŽ nes
simply as true belief (p. 24). He spends little or no time discussing traditional
epistemological evaluative notions such as justiŽ cation. In place of traditional evaluative
notions Goldman introduces the notion of veritistic value (V-value), which he proposes
we use when evaluating social practices. Veritistic social epistemology evaluates social
practices consequentially in terms of their veritistic outputs, ‘ where veritistic outputs
include states like knowledge, error, and ignorance’ (p. 87). Social practices have
instrumental veritistic value to the degree they have a causal propensity to ‘promote or
impede the acquisition of fundamental veritistic value ’ (p. 87).
Instrumental V-value is an externalist notion since deŽ ned in terms of causal
propensities and causal e¶ ects as well as correspondence truth. The concrete application
of V-value in evaluating existing social practices thus requires that we adopt an external
point of view. As Goldman notes, ‘ this makes the task of veritistic social epistemology
extremely diµ cult ’ (p. 91). At some time Goldman needs to tell us more concerning
how we obtain this perspective. If as naturalists we look to the natural and social
sciences for the information needed in making these evaluations, Goldman needs to tell
us more about this process.
Goldman deŽ nes fundamental V-value as follows. Individual belief states possess
fundamental V-value (as opposed to social practices which possess instrumental V-
value). These belief states are (roughly) : belief, disbelief and withholding of belief.
Given his spirited defense of truth, veritism and knowledge as true belief, one might
expect Goldman to deŽ ne V-value in terms of maximizing truth and minimizing
falsehood. Such is not the case. Goldman insists that V-value be assessed ‘ relative to
questions of interest ’ (p. 89). Adopting a question-answering model which maintains that
an agent’s belief-states have value or disvalue depending on whether they are responses
to questions that interest the agent, Goldman deŽ nes V-value in terms of truth together
 alternative epistemologie s and the value of truth 251

with an agent’s interest. More precisely, assuming that an agent S has an interest (be it
occurrent, narrowly or broadly dispositional [p. 95]) in the truth of a proposition P, and
assuming proposition P to be true, Goldman stipulates the V-value of S’s believing P as
1 ; the V-value of S’s withholding judgement towards P as 0.50 ; and the V-value of S’s
disbelieving P as 0.0 (p. 89).# He writes:

a good epistemic practice should not be indi¶ erent to the relative amounts of interest that a given agent
takes in di¶ erent questions. A social practice that systematically delivers information on topics of mild
interest to an agent while regularly concealing or masking evidence on topics of core interest is an
epistemically unsatisfactory practice. (p. 95)

V-value is thus conceived as interesting truth to someone. V-analysis is appropriate only

when someone is interested in the outcome: ‘ sensitivity to relative amounts of interest
should play a modest role in assessing a practice’s epistemic credentials ’ (p. 96). If there
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is no interest in the answer to a question or the truth of a proposition, believing the

proposition has no V-value and a social practice yielding belief in the proposition has no
instrumental V-value (at least on this score). In short : no interest, no V-value.

If a certain question fails to interest an agent … and fails to interest any other pertinent body, there is
no basis for rendering a V-analysis of his credal performance vis-a-vis that performance. (p. 95f.)

Goldman’s analysis thus explains why the obligation in USA law that courtroom
witnesses ‘ tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth ’ is incoherent. A
witness needs to know in which truths the court is interested before testifying. The same
applies to the impatient, condescending remark of the Ž ctional character, Police
Sergeant Joe Friday : ‘ Just the facts ma’am ’.

2.1. Discussion
Goldman’s view has several surprising and controversial consequences.

2.1.1.
In light of the prominent role that interests play in his analysis, it would appear the goal
of cognition from the epistemic point of view is interesting truth—not truth simpliciter.
Several things follow from this. Firstly, it seems misleading of Goldman to cast his view
as veritistic simpliciter when truth is only one of two properties of belief sought from the
epistemic point of view, the other being the satisfaction of nonveritistic interests.
Secondly, when Goldman uses such phrases as ‘veritistic analysis ’ and ‘ veritistic
assessment ’, one must remember that he means interesting truth rather than truth
simpliciter. The word ‘ veritistic ’ thus acquires an ambiguous character in the book.
Sometimes Goldman uses it narrowly to mean truth simpliciter (e.g. pp. 5, 6–87
passim) ; other times he uses it broadly to mean truth plus interest-satisfactio n (pp.
87–100 passim).
Thirdly, why Goldman continues to deŽ ne knowledge as true belief rather than as
true interesting belief becomes puzzling. By deŽ ning knowledge as true belief but
epistemic value (V-value) in terms of interesting truth belief, Goldman divorces
knowledge from epistemic value and epistemology. What is valuable from the epistemic
point of view is interesting knowledge—not knowledge simpliciter. In short : knowledge is
 252 james maffie

no longer an epistemological notion ! Indeed, it is no more an epistemological notion

than is belief.
Fourthly, it thus seems Goldman’s claim, ‘The main question for veritistic
epistemology is : Which practices have a comparatively favorable impact on knowledge
as contrasted with error and ignorance? ’ (p. 5), needs to be revised to read : ‘ Which
practices have a comparatively favorable impact upon interesting knowledge as
contrasted with error and ignorance? ’. Similarly, it seems Goldman must be mispeaking
when he claims that veritism maintains ‘the aim of learning is to learn truths ’ (p. 351),
and that ‘The fundamental aim of education, like that of science, is the promotion of
knowledge ’ (p. 349). These claims cannot be so given his own discussion of the role of
question-answering and interests in the deŽ nition of V-value. The aim of learning must
be—on pain of incoherence—to learn interesting truths. The aim of science and
education must be—on pain of incoherence—the promotion of the kind of knowledge
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which scientists and educators Ž nd interesting—not knowledge per se.

Lastly, the foregoing would seem to bear upon Goldman’s discussion of education,
law and democracy : in short, whose interests and hence whose truths and whose
knowledge are relevant to these endeavours ? Deciding which truths to teach students,
e.g. is a matter of deciding whose truths are important and hence whose interests are
worthwhile. But this is something social epistemology appears ill-equipped to do.

2.1.2.
Let’s examine V-value more closely. By deŽ ning V-value, V-evaluation, and epistemic
goodness in terms of the satisfaction of interests, I submit Goldman makes these notions
ineliminably interest-laden and hence interest-relative . What’s more, since interests are
always some agent’s interests, it appears that V-value, V-assessment and epistemic
goodness are agent-relative ; and to the extent that social science supports the claim that
agents’ interests are historically and socially conditioned, it would appear that V-value,
V-evaluation and epistemic goodness are historically and socially relative as well.
Therefore, despite the fact that interests play merely a ‘ moderate role ’ (p. 95) in
epistemic assessment, I fear Goldman is unable to avoid V-value relativism and thus a
particular species of epistemological relativism all his own. Truth, of course, does
remain nonrelative ; as does knowledge, since knowledge is deŽ ned merely as true belief.
But because knowledge is no longer an epistemological notion for Goldman, its
nonrelativity does not gainsay the appearance that he now embraces some form of
epistemological relativism. V-value is the primary epistemic notion and it is clearly
relativist. What is valuable from the epistemic point of view is not knowledge simpliciter
but knowledge that is interesting to someone. Therefore, although he remains a realist
about truth and knowledge, Goldman now rejects epistemological realism or realism
epistemic value (V-value).

2.1.3.
By deŽ ning V-value, epistemic goodness and the epistemic value of true belief
(knowledge) in terms of interests, Goldman’s view dramatically underscores the fact
that human truth- and knowledge-seeking enterprises are socially, politically and
economically situated. In so doing, it opens the door to a host of empirical questions
typically ignored by analytic epistemology, e.g.: who wants to know, and why ? What
kinds of questions are being asked, and why ? Whose problems are being solved ; whose
are being ignored ? Who participates in the regulation of belief, and who is excluded ?
 alternative epistemologie s and the value of truth 253

Knowledge for what ? What and whose interests govern the regulation and development
of our belief formation practices and social processes of information transmission, and
how, in turn, are these interests socially conditioned ? What are the V-value e¶ ects of
di¶ erent nonepistemic interests ? What interests motivate the pursuit of knowledge by
di¶ erent individuals or communities ? How do social categories such as class, race,
gender and power shape those interests and in so doing shape and possibly skew the
output of di¶ erent cognitive practices ? I regard the fact that Goldman’s view brings
such questions to the foreground of epistemology as a virtue of his account. I wonder
whether Professor Goldman does.$

2.1.4.
By incorporating interest-satisfactio n into the deŽ nition of V-value and epistemic
goodness, and by failing to place any restrictions on the content of those interests,
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Goldman e¶ ectively elevates any and all nonveritistic interests (i.e. narrowly construed
as interests in anything other than truth)—e.g. power, beauty, happiness, confraternity
with nature, social harmony, intuitiveness, etc.—into playing an intrinsic rather than
extrinsic role in truth-seeking enterprises. Consequently, all truth-seeking enterprises
are inescapably infected with nonveritistic interests (narrowly construed) and therefore
not objective in the traditional sense of objectivity as disinterestedness. To borrow from
Richard Rudner, the truth-seeker qua truth-seeke r makes nonveritistic (narrowly
construed) value judgements (Rudner, 1953).
What’s more, since the V-value of belief-states and cognitive practices is interest-
relative and agent-relative, it appears that the V-value of belief-states and cognitive
practices is ultimately socially relative to the degree that agents’ interests are socially
situated and conditioned. Social factors such as gender, etc. not only become relevant
to assessing V-value in terms of their external e¶ ects upon information transmission,
they become ineliminable components of the very deŽ nition of V-value itself. As a result,
e.g. V-value becomes unavoidabl y gendered.
Even more profoundly, by deŽ ning epistemic value in terms of the satisfaction of
interests, Goldman elevates any and all nonveritistic interests (narrowly construed) into
epistemic interests. Any interest whatsoever becomes an epistemic interest if pursued
in conjunction with true belief. Once again, Goldman seems now to embrace epis-
temological relativism.
I confess I do not see the motivation for incorporating nonveritistic interests
(narrowly construed) into the make-up of epistemic value and goodness. Instead, why
not specify the goal of cognition from the epistemic point of view as truth (e.g.
maximizing truth and minimizing error) and relegate nonveritistic interests to the
pragmatics of epistemology and epistemic evaluation ? Doing so allows one to preserve
the pragmatic importance of truth as well as capture the epistemic relevance of
nonveritistic interests in terms of their causal consequences upon the production of
maximal truth and minimal error. Equally if not more importantly, doing so enables
one to avoid making nonveritistic interests part of the concept of epistemic goodness and
thereby enables one to preserve epistemological realism and nonrelativism. Since I
suspect Professor Goldman prefers to preserve epistemological realism and non-
relativism, I invite his response.

2.1.5.
Goldman suggests that commonly regarded virtues of scientiŽ c cognition such as
simplicity, explanatory power, and accuracy be viewed not as separate from and
 254 james maffie

additional to truth but as ‘demarcating kinds of true propositions that science is

especially interested in Ž nding ’ (p. 245, original emphasis). Once again, we see that
veritism claims we seek a particular kind of truth, not truth simpliciter. The kinds of
interests we entertain thus become epistemically relevant, and as a consequence, we
always need to ask what kinds of interests motivate and govern our various truth-seeking
practices : simplicity, social harmony, conservatism , explanatory power, accuracy,
beauty, confraternity with nature, intuitiveness, etc.?
Nonveritistic interests (narrowly construed) therefore penetrate the very heart of
cognition and in so doing determine the ‘ kinds ’ of truths and knowledge produced. If
this is correct, then the issue of what kinds of truths we Ž nd interesting becomes
signiŽ cant in yet another way. Taking a page from Dewey, Hook and Laudan, I suggest
the kinds of questions we ask and the kinds of truths we Ž nd interesting play a
determining role not only in shaping the doxastic outputs of our cognitive processes but
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more profoundly, a determining role in shaping the historical construction, development

and architecture or form of these cognitive processes (Hook, 1927 ; Dewey, 1929 ; Laudan,
1984). While external reality has an undeniable ‘say ’ in the matter, this alone does not
gainsay the fact that di¶ erent questions and interests lead us to develop di¶ erent
methods. Hook, for example, observes that such commonplace instruments as hammers,
corkscrews, computers and microscopes are historical products whose present design
and form re ects the kinds of problems we ask them to solve and the kinds of interests
that motivate their construction. As a consequence, according to Hook, they are not
neutral between alternative tasks. For example, hammers cannot perform the tasks of
microscopes, corkscrews and computers. Pragmatists like Dewey, Hook and Laudan
suggest we view our cognitive practices in analogous terms, i.e. as instruments which
humans design, construct and revise in order to solve particular problems. This means
that the kinds of problems we place before our cognitive instruments shape the kinds of
cognitive instruments they eventually become. In short : drawing from Hegel by way of
Dewey, content shapes form, which in turn shapes content, and so on in dialectical or
spiral-like fashion.
If the preceding argument is sound, it appears to raise the following worry. The
concrete social and historical development of di¶ erent cognitive instruments driven by
di¶ erent interests and questions need lead neither to identical cognitive results, logically
compatible cognitive results, nor even epistemically commensurable cognitive results.
There seems no guarantee—even if as metaphysical realists we assume the existence of
a theory- and evidential practice-independent reality—that alternative cognitive
instruments will yield pictures of the world that are any more epistemically
commensurable than hammers and corkscrews. What might such alternative questions
look like ? Here’s a start : how can I live in harmony with my environment ? How can I
manipulate and control my environment ? How can I contribute to the creation of a
more harmonious and beautiful world ? How can I live in accordance with sacred text ?
How can I live in harmony with other humans ? How can I manipulate and control
other humans ?

2.1.6.
If the foregoing considerations are sound, they would seem to have far-reaching
implications for our epistemic evaluations of education, law, and democracy. Once
again : Whose interests and thus whose truths and whose knowledge are relevant to these
endeavours ? Veritism o¶ ers us no guidance in this matter since it is not equipped to help
us choose between alternative conceptions of V-value.
 alternative epistemologie s and the value of truth 255

3. Goldman’s conception of the social

In Goldman’s hands social epistemology examines the veritistic impact of various

‘ interpersonal and institutional contexts ’ (p. i) and various ‘ social paths and routes ’
(p. 4) upon the belief-states and knowledge-acquisition of individual cognizers. It
treats individuals cognizers as the relevant knowing agents, not social groups (p. 4).

3.1. Discussion
Goldman’s social epistemology adopts an anthropologica l individualism that casts
individuals as accidentally social and an epistemological individualism that casts
social cognition as individual cognition under the in uence of social factors. Social
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epistemology studies individuals in a social world—not socialized individuals. We get

little if any sense from his discussion that humans are profoundly social beings who are
from the outset always already socialized. Rather, he treats humans as creatures who
just happen to live with other humans and who just happen to rely upon other humans
for information.
I submit Goldman’s conception of the social is empirically unmotivate d and
unacceptably narrow.% While it is clear that the social enters into the genesis of
individual cognition in the ways discussed by Goldman, it seems equally clear that the
social also enters into individual cognition by way of the phylogensis and ontogenesis of
the individual cognizer herself. Let’s examine the latter.& Social psychology splits into
roughly two schools. Psychological social psychologies (following Allport) emphasize
the priority and autonom y of the psychological over the sociological. Sociological social
psychologies (following Marx, Dewey, Durkheim, Mead and Blumer) deny the priority
and autonom y of the psychological over the sociological.’ Goldman sides with
psychological social psychologies yet never motivates his doing so.
By siding with psychological social psychologies Goldman delimits the range of
possible social in uences upon belief formation and knowledge-acquisition, excluding a
priori many of the ways cognition may be the most deeply and inescapably social, and
hence many of the ways that epistemic value may be in uenced by the social.
Sociological social psychologists along with sociological psychoanalysts such as
Chodorow maintain that human cognition, whether conducted singly by Robinson
Crusoe or jointly by Crusoe and Friday, is profoundly and inescapably social because
conducted by agents whose a¶ ective-motivationa l make-up is causally constructed
through social transactions (Dewey, 1917, 1922 ; Mead, 1934 ; Blumer, 1937 ;
Chodorow, 1978). This make-up in uences the interests, values, goals and attitudes
which guide the regulation of belief. In a similar vein, sociologists of knowledge such as
Marx, Durkheim, Mannheim, Douglas and Smith argue that cognition is structurally
in uenced by such social factors as language, ethnophilosophy , weltanschauung ,
conceptual framework, and style of reasoning (Durkheim, 1915 ; Mannheim, 1936 ;
Marx, 1963, 1970 ; Douglas, 1966 ; Geertz, 1974 ; Farr, 1980 ; Smith, 1987). Recent
studies likewise suggest that class, race and gender a¶ ect cognitive performance in ways
not fully captured in terms of information-base d transactions between individuals
(Chodorow, 1978 ; Belenky et al., 1986 ; Collins, 1990 ; Code, 1991). In short, the
architecture of cognition itself is partly a social product, making cognition social in ways
independent of its immediate input, output or social organization. I submit Goldman’s
social epistemology is empirically inadequate to the extent it ignores this.
 256 james maffie

4. Conclusion

Knowledge in a Social World expands our understanding of the social avenues of human
cognition as well as the epistemological evaluation of such cognition. What’s more, it
suggests an exciting set of questions for future research into the nature of epistemological
evaluation and epistemology itself. I hope the preceding comments help further our
understanding of these our questions.

Notes

1. Unless speciŽ ed, all page references are to Goldman (1999).

2. Epistemic assessment becomes more complex when Goldman suggests the additional necessity of
factoring into this formula the diµ culty vs easiness of questions asked (pp. 95, 248).
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3. For further re ection upon these issues, see Adritti et al. (1980), Scheman (1991) and Rose (1994).
4. The following borrows from Maµ e (1991).
5. For discussion of the social contribution to the phylogenesis of human cognition, see, e.g. Blakemore and
Cooper (1970), Hirsch and Spinelli (1971), Geertz (1977), Gould (1977), Sahlins (1977), Cowan (1979),
Hubel and Wisel (1979), and Ostrom (1980).
6. Psychological social psychologies include : Allport (1924). Sociological social psychologies include :
Dewey (1917, 1922), Mead (1934), Blumer (1937), Marx (1963), Marx and Engels (1970), and Farr
(1980). For general discussion of this debate in social psychology, see : House (1977), Cartwrigh t (1979),
Ostrom (1980), Forgas (1981), Graumann (1988), and Gergen (1988).

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