359

■ Lachhman Singh v. Pi'itam Chand and another, (Mehar Singh, C.J.)

(12) No other point having been argued in this case, the revision
petition fails and is dismissed. As, however, the landlord has suc­
ceeded on the question of interpretation of the provision of law on
which there was a conflict of decisions on account of which this
revision petition was admitted to a Division Bench, we leave the
parties to bear their own costs of the proceedings in this Court.

S hamsher B ahadur, J.—I agree.

K. S. K.
FULL BENCH

Before Mehar Singh, C. J., D. K . Mahajan and B. R. Tuli, JJ.,

L A C H H M A N SINGH,— Appellant.

versus

PRI T A M C H AND A N D ANOTH ER,— Respondents.

Regular Second Appeal No. 532 o f 1968.

December 22, 1969.

Punjab Pre-em ption A ct (I of 1913), — Section 15(1) (b) Fourthly —

"Co-sharers”— Meaning of— Purchaser of specific killa numbers in specified
rectangles out of joint land — W hether becomes a co-sharer with the other
co-sharer of the land.

Held, that the word ‘co-sharers’ signifies persons owing a share or shares
in the whole of the property or properties of which another share or other
shares were the subject of sale. In Section 15(1) (b ), Fourthly of Punjab
Pre-emption Act, 1913, a co-sharer has a preferential right of pre-emption
where the sale is of a share out of joint land or property and is not made
by all the co-sharers jointly. A sale, however, by a co-sharer of a specific
piece or plot of land or property does not make the purchaser or the vendee
a co-sharer with other co-sharers, but where such a purchaser or vendee
takes, on sale, a fractional share of a co-sharer in the joint land or property,
then he comes to hold the land along with the other co-sharers in the frac-
tional proportion of the whole which he has purchased. Hence the purchaser
from a co-sharer of specified killa numbers in specified rectangles only and
not in the whole land of the co-sharers, does not become a co-sharer with the
other co-sharers and has no preferential right of pre-emption under section
15(1) (b ), Fourthly of the Act.
__ Paras 8 and 9).

Case referred to b y the Hon’ble Mr. Justice D. K . Mahajan, on 5th August,

1969. to a Full Bench for decision o f an important question of law involved
in the case. The Full Bench consiting of Hon’ble the Chief Justice M r. Mehar
 I. L. R. Punjab and Haryana ( 1970)2

Singh, the Hon’ble Mr. Justice D. K . Mahajan and the H on’b le Mr. Justice Bal
Raj Tuli, finally decided the case on 22nd Decem ber, 1969.

Regular Second Appeal from the decree of the Court of Shri Gurbachan
Singh, District Judge. Ludhiana, dated the 18th day of March, 1968, reversing
that of Shri Jagdish Rai Gupta, Sub-Judge II Class, Samrala, dated the 27th
March. 1967, and granting the plaintiffs a decree for possession of the land
in dispute b y pre-emption on payment of Rs. 35129.50.

M. L. S e t h i , S en io r A d v o cate , w it h I c h h p a l, S in g h . A d v o c a t e s , f o r th e
Appellant.
J agan N a th K aushal. S e n io r A dvocate, w it h A shok B han, and C. B.
K a u s h a k , A d v o c a t e s , f o r th e Respondents.

JUDGMENT.
M ehar S ingh . C.J.—This second appeal arises out of a pre-emption
suit by Britain Chand and Wazir Chand, plaintiffs, against Laehman
Singh defendant, and concerns land situate within the area of village
Khamano in Tehsil Samrala of Ludhiana District.
(2) There is the Jamabandi of 1960-61, copies, Exhibits P. 7 and
P. 8, of Khewats Nos. 171 and 172, showing Rajinder Singh and
Harinder Singh, real brothers, in possession of half share, and Ajmer
Singh in the remaining half share of rectangles 6, 12, 13 and 16, among
others, in Khewat No. 171, and of rectangles 13 and 16 in Khewat
No. 172. There is the copy of the Jamabandi of 1952-53', Exhibit P. 2,
in which those three co-shares are shown owners of Khewat
No. 132/146, among others, rectangles 6, 12, 13, and 16. Apparently
the Khewat numbers changed in the subsequent Jamabandi, but the
rectangle numbers continued to be the same and so also, it follows,
the Killa numbers in each rectangle.
(3) On August 20, 1960, by registered sale-deed, Exhibit P. 1,
Harinder Singh co-sharer sold 48 Kanals and 2 Marlas of land to the
plaintiffs. The description of the land sold by him given in this sale-
deed is that he was selling his share of 46 Kanals and 12 Marlas, out
of 186 Kanals and 8 Marlas comprising of rectangle 6, Killas Nos. 16
and 25, and rectangle 13, Killas Nos. 1 to 19, and 22 to 26, one-fourth
•share, and again 1 Kanal and 10 Marlas, out of 7 Kanals and 10 Marlas
comprising of rectangle 13, Killa No. 20, one-fifth share. So Harinder
Singh co-sharer sold two Killas out of rectangle 6, and 24 Killas out of
rectangle 13, in the share as already given. With this sale-deed is
.attached a copy of the Jamabandi of 1952-53, Exhibit P. 2, which shows
that rectangles 6 and 13 are in Khewat No. 132/146. In the Jamabandi
of 1960-61, copies Exhibits P. 7 and P. 8, rectangles 6 is in Khewat
No. 171, and rectangle in Khewat No. 172.
 Laehhman Singh v. Pritam Chand and another, (Mehar Singh, C.J.)

(4) On February 2, 1965, another co-sharer Ajmer Singh by regis­

tered sale-deed, Exhibit D. 1, sold to Lachman Singh defendant 103
Kanals and 8 Marlas of land out of rectangle 16, Khewats Nos. 171
and 172 of the Jamabandi of 1960-61, copies Exhibits P. 7 and P. 8. In
that sale-deed Ajmer Singh co-sharer referred to rectangles 12, 13 and
16 and also to the specific Killas from each rectangle of which the
total area came to 243 Kanals and 2 Marlas, and of which he sold 103
Kanals and 8 Marlas from rectangle 16, Killas Nos. 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15,
27/2. 16, 17/1, 18, 19, 23', 24 and 25. Rectangle 16 appears in Khewats
Nos. 171 and 172 according to the Jamabandi of 1960-61. Killas Nos. 6,
7, 8. 13, 14, 15 and 17/2 are in Khatauni No. 251 of Khewat No. 171, and
Killas Nos. 16, 17/1, 18, 19, 23, 24 and 25 are in Khatauni No. 258 of
Khewat No. 172'. So that the land from rectangle 16 sold by Ajmer
Singh to the defendant came from Khewats Nos. 171 and 172. In
Khewat No. 171 also come, according to the same Jamabandi,
rectangles 6, 12, and 16, and in Khewat No. 172 come rectangles 12', 13
and 16.

(5) The plaintiffs sought to pre-empt the sale in favour of

Lachman Singh defendant claiming a preferential right of pre-emption
as co-sharers according to section 15(1) (b), Fourthly, of the Punjab
Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab Act 1 of 1913), on the ground that by
the earlier sale in their favour, Exhibit P. 1, by Harinder Singh co-
sharer, they had become co-sharers of the land sold by Ajmer Singh
co-sharer to the defendant, being co-sharers with him in the same
Khewat.

(6) It will be seen that Ajmer Singh, Harinder Singh and Rajindar
Singh have been co-sharers of the land of Khewat No. 132/146 of the
Jamabandi of 1952-53, equivalent to Khewats Nos. 171 and 172 of the
Jamabandi of 1960-61. They were co-sharers of rectangles 6, 12, 13
and 16, apart from other land, and while Harinder Singh co-sharer
sold land to the plaintiffs by an earlier sale-deed in their favour out
o f rectangles 6, and 13, by a subsequent sale Ajmer Singh co-sharer
sold land to the defendant out of rectangle 16. So while the plaintiffs
purchased the share of land earlier out of rectangles 6 and 13 and no
share out of rectangle 16, by the later sale the defendant purchased
the whole of the area of Killa numbers of rectangle 16 as given in the
sale-deed Exhibit D. 1, and although that sale-deed refers to rectangle
13 and some of its Killas, no part of rectangle 13 was sold by Ajmer
Singh co-sharer to the defendant.

(7) The suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed by the learned trial
Judge on the ground that they are not co-sharers of joint land with
362

I. L. R. Punjab and Haryana (1970)2

Ajmer Singh vendor. The learned Judge pointed out that the plaintiffs
have not any share in the whole of Khewats Nos. 171 and 172, and all
that they have purchased from Harinder Singh co-sharer under an
earlier sale has been purchased of specific share out of specific Killa
numbers of specific rectangles. The learned Judge further pointed
out that the plaintiffs never purchased any part of rectangle 16. In
appeal the learned Judge was of the opinion that by reason of the sale
in their favour under the earlier sale-deed, Exhibit P. 1, the plaintiffs
have become co-sharers in Khewats Nos. 171 and 172, because one-half
share of the entire holding of Khewats Nos. 171 and 172 has within it
rectangles 12, 13 and 16 in the Jamabandi of 1960-61, copies Exhibits
P. 7 and P. 8. The learned Judge in the first appelate Court came to
the conclusion that the sale-deed, Exhibit P. 1, shows that it was not
the specific Kallas that were sold by Harinder Singh co-sharer to the
plaintiffs but a share out of the joint Khewat. So the learned Judge
was of the opinion that the plaintiffs have become co-sharers of Ajmer
Singh, Harinder Singh and Rajinder Singh, co-sharers and they have
a preferential right to pre-emption the sale in favour of the defendant.
This is the defendant’s second appeal from the appellate decree.

(8) The plaintiffs have one-fourth share of Harindar Singh co­

sharer in Khewat No. 171, rectangle 6, and Khewat No. 172, rectangle
13, of the Jamabandi of 1960-61, copies Exhibits P. 7 and P. 8. The total
holding of the three co-sharers, namely, Ajmer Singh, Harindar Singh,
and Rajindar Singh, consists of much more area and has within it
rectangle 16 of Khewat Nos. 171 and 172 of the same Jamabandi. So
the same plaintiffs have one-fourth share of rectangles 6 and 13 of the
joint land of those three co-sharers, but they have not a fractional or
a proportional share in the total joint holding of those co-sharers,
including rectangle 16 of Khewat Nos. 171 and 172. So the plaintiffs
have a fractional share in defined and specific Killas of joint holding
of those co-sharers, but not in the total area of their joint land. In
section 15(1) (b), Fourthly, of the Act a co-sharer has a preferential
rVht of pre-emption ‘where the sale is of a share out of joint land or
property and is not made by all the co-sharers jointly’. Here the sale
to the plaintiffs was by a co-sharer, Harinder Singh, of a share out of
a define! part of the joint land of the three co-sharers but pot out of
the whole of their joint land. The question then that has arisen in
this case is, whether the plaintiffs have become co-sharers in the
joint land of those three co-sharers and thus have a preferential right
of pre-emption in regard to the sale made by Aimer Singh co-sharer
to Lachman Singh defendant? One more fact may be noted here
before proceeding with the consideration o f this question and that i»
 363

Lachhman Singh v. Pritam Chand and another, (Mehar Singh, C.J.)

that according to the Jamabandi of 1952-53, Exhibit P. 2, the Killas in

rectangles 6,12, 13 and 16 were all in Khewat No. 132, of which there
was only one Khatauni number, which was 146. So Killas of all
those rectangles were in one Khewat number which had only one
Khatauni number and the description has commonly been given as
Khewat No. 132/146. However, in the Jamabandi of 1960-61, copies
Exhibits P. 7 and P. 8, under Khewat No. 171, rectangle 6 is shown in
Khataunis Nos. 248 and 250, and rectangle 12 in Khatauni No. 249, and
some of the Killa numbers of rectangles 16 in Khatauni No. 251, and
in Khewat No. 172 Killa numbers of rectangle 13 appear under
Khataunis Nos. 252, 253, 254, 258, 263, and 266, and the remaining
Killa numbers of rectangle 16 appear under Khatauni No. 258. So
some of the Killa numbers of rectangle 13 and some of rectangle 16
are in Khatauni No. 258 of Khewat No. 172.

(9) In Matu v. Hirde (1), Plowden, S.J., observed that “ the pur­
chase by defendant of specific land cannot make him a sharer in the
khata, and whatever right he may have to the land comprised in the
deed if it falls to the share of his vendor, as it probably will, it can­
not alter the land from being joint property of the co-sharers in the
khata into separate property of the purchaser” , and the same learned
Judge in Champa Mai v. Baisakhi Mai (2), in which a co-sharer had
sold undivided half of his half, or one-fourth o f the holding, observ­
ed that the land “was joint undivided immovable property in which
all the proprietors were co-sharers ............. The land in dispute is
a portion of the village which belonged, as an entirety, to the record­
ed proprietors, as co-owners with a joint title, the recorded shares
merely representing the quantity of the interest of each group
among them in the whole village in unity.” A sale by a co-sharer
of a specific piece or plot of land out of joint land or property does
not make the purchaser or the vendee a co-sharer with other co-
sharers according to the past case, but where such a purchaser or
vendee takes, on sale, a fractional share of a co-sharer in the joint
land or property, then he comes to hold the land along with the
other co-sharers in the fractional proportion of the whole which he
has purchased, and this is the second case. The present case is
neither the one nor the other. Here the plaintiffs have been pur­
chasers of a fractional share of defined Killas of and in rectangles 6
and 13. but not a fractional share in the whole of the joint land o f
the three original co-sharers including rectangle 16. It is, however,.

(1) 44 P R . 1894.
(2) 87 P.R. 1894.
364

I. L. R. Punjab and Haryana 0 9 7 0 )2

urged on the side of the plaintiffs that even in the facts of the pre­
sent case the plaintiffs have become co-sharers of the joint land of
the three original co-sharers in both Khewat Nos. 171 and 172, and
reliance in this respect is placed by their learned counsel on Kuljas
Rai v. Pala Singh (3), in which the learned Judges held that “when
a person sues for land jointly owned by two persons, even if specific
plots are sold, in law it is treated as a sale of a share of the joint
property. No co-sharer has any right to sell specific plots out of the
joint khata and, therefore the value of an individual plot comprised
in the joint khata is wholly immaterial in determining the point of
court-fee.” It is apparent that the decision was given for purposes
of court-fee under the Court Fees Act of 1870 and has nothing to do
with a case like the present under Punjab Act 1 of 1913. It is evi­
dent that so far as the present matter is concerned, if Kuljas Rai’s
case (3), is to be read in the manner as the learned counsel for the
plaintiffs would have it, it runs contrary to the first judgment of
Plowden, S.J., but Rajindra Singh v. Umrao Singh (4), and Sher
Singh v. Nand Lai (5), proceed on a view exactly the same as ex­
pressed by Plowden S.J., in the two cases already referred to. In
these last-mentioned two cases the learned Judges held that the word
‘co-sharers’ signifies persons owning a share or shares in the whole
of the property or properties of which another share or other shares
were the subject of sale. So Kuljas Rai’s case (3), does not support
the contention on the side of the plaintiffs. For Lachhman Singh
defendant reliance is placed on cases of Rajindra Singh (4), and
Sher Singh (5), that the plaintiffs have not become co-sharers in
the joint land of the original three co-sharers, because they have
not puchased undivided share of the whole of that joint land. It
may, however, be stated that khata is equivalent to Khewat, and it
is apparent from the opinion of Plowden, S.J., in the cases already
referred to that, in the matter of finding out for the exercise of a
preferential right of pre-emption, the status of a party as co-sharer
has to be seen in a khata or thus a Khewat.

(10) The present is not a case of one or the other class of cases
disposed of by the judgments of Plowden, S.J., but it is apparent
that the present case, in which the plaintiffs are purchasers of a
share of specified Killa numbers in specified rectangles only and not
in the whole joint land of the three original co-sharers, is more near
the dictum of the learned Judge in Matu’s case (1), than in Champa
(3) A.I.R. 1,945 Lah. 15
(4) (1924) 5 Lah. 298.
(5) A.I.R. 1947 Lah. 184.
 365

Lachhman Singh v. Pritam Chand and another, (Mehar Singh, C.J.)

Mai’s case (2). The plaintiffs have purchased specified survey num­
bers in specified rectangles wiht this differences only from Mata’s
case (1), that in that case the total area of the specified land was
purchased, but here a share of that has been purchased. These mat­
ters then come for consideration.

(11) In the first place, it is clear that if the plaintiffs were to

claim a decree for joint possession of the whole of the joint land of
the three original co-sharers, they would not succeed in that, for
the smiple reason that they would be held to the terms and condi­
tions the sale in their favour, which limits their right to the share
of Harindar Singh co-sharer to the extent of one-fourth in the Killa
numbers stated of rectangles 6 and 13. So that the plaintiffs will
not succeed in obtaining a decree for joint possession with the other
co-sharers of Harindar Singh as to the land other than the Killa
numbers of rectangles 6 and 13 sold to them.
(12) Secondly, it is settled that possession of one co-sharer as
such is not adverse to his other co-sharer or co-sharers. This is ob­
viously qua joint land or property of such co-sharers. If the plain­
tiffs are in possession of any Killa numbers or any part of Killa num­
bers, not sold to them in rectangles 6 and 13, they will not hold such
possession adversely to the other co-sharers, that is to say Ajmer
Singh and Rajindar Singh, but it is not quite clear why they cannot
adversely possess that part of the land of the original co-sharers
which is not the subject of their sale-deed and which does not come
within the ambit and scope of that sale-deed. They have purchased
Harindar Singh co-sharer’s share in Killa numbers of rectangles 6 and
13, and there is apparently no reason why they should not be able to,
should they succeed in this, hold possession of any part of rectangle
16 and that adversely to the other co-sharers Ajmer Singh and
Rajindar Singh. The learned Judges in Sant Ram-Nagina Ram v.
Daya Ram-Nagina Ram (6), pointed out that the basis of co-sharers
not being able to prescribe by mere possession of joint land against
other co-sharers is that every co-sharer has a right to use the joint
property to the whole extent. On the side of the plaintiffs the argu­
ment of the learned counsel has been that in a case like the present
the plaintiffs, if they go into possession of any part or whole of
rectangle 16, they by the mere fact of having possession of the same
will not be holding it adversely to the other co-sharers. In this res­
pect reliance is placed on Kanhaya v. Trikha (7), but in that case the
(6) I.L.R. (1962 1 Pb. 1 0 1 = A .I.R . 1961 Pb. 52&
(7) A.I.R, 1935 Lah. 651.
366

I. L. R. Punjab and Haryana (1970)2

vendors sold 2' Bighas and 6 Biswas out of a joint Khata of 1800
Bighas. That was not a case of sale of specific plot or field or survey
numbers, but was a case of sale of a proportionate area out of the
whole. It is the same thing to sell 2 Bighas out of 100 Bighas or one-
fifdeth of 100 Bighas, in either case the sale is not of a specific survey
number or plot out of the joint land but of a proportionate share of
the same. Kanhaya’s case (7), was of this type and, therefore, does
not advance the argument on the side of the plaintiffs. Another case
that has been relied upon in this respect by the learned counsel for
the plaintiffs has been Charan Kaur v. Hari Singh ((8). But in that
case the learned Judge upon the evidence found that adverse posses­
sion as claimed had not been proved. In the beginning of the judg­
ment reference is to a gift of half share of the land, but later on the
learned Judge has observed that the gift was of specific properties
and the donee’s possession could not be adverse to the other co­
sharers, the learned Judge in this respect following Mam Raj v.
Chhotu (9). In the last-mentioned case what had been sold to the
vendee was a share of the joint holding and not a specific part of it.
So Mam Raj’s case is not a satisfactory instance which lends support
to the argument on the side of the plaintiffs. In the circumstances
of the present case in the terms of the sale-deed in favour of the
plaintiffs they will not be able to prescribed by possession against the
other co-sharers in the Killa numbers of rectangles 6 and 13 in which
they have purchased share of Harindar Singh co-sharer, but, as has
already been said, there is no reason whatsoever why they, should
they obtain possession, be not able to prescribe so far as the other
land of the original three co-sharers is concerned.

(13) Thirdly, if the plaintiffs apply for partition as between

themselves and the original three co-sharers, they cannot possibly ask
for the division of the whole of the joint land of the three original
co-shares. Here again they would be confined to the terms and con­
ditions of the sale-deed in their favour. According to that deed what
they have purchased is one-fourth share of certain definite Killa
numbers out of rectangles 6 and 13, and they cannot ask that that
one-fourth share should be taken in partition in relation to the whole
of the joint holding of the original three co-sharers, should the others
two co-sharers, than the vendor of these plaintiffs, take exception
to that. The reason is obvious. A co-sharer cannot so deal with
joint land or property as to prejudice the rights and title of the

(8) A.I.R. 1954 Pb. 124.

(9) A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 763.
 367

Lachhman Singh v. Pritam Chand and another, (Mehar Singh, C.J.)

other co-sharer or co-sharers in the same, but severance of tenancy-

in-common may take place, apart from partition by "common consent-
If on an application for partition by the plaintiffs, the other two
co-sharers, than the plaintiffs vendor, consent to the parti­
tion being confined to rectangles 6 and 13, one-fourth share of the
Killas of which has been sold to them, then that would amount to
the act of the three original co-sharers in first making a division of
their joint land into two parts, one that of rectangles 6 and 13, and the
other that of the rest of their joint land, and thereafter the partition
of the first can take place between the plaintiffs and those co-sharers.
The plaintiffs cannot compel the other co-sharers to bring in the
rest of their joint land for the matter of partition though those co­
sharers may compel the plaintiffs to bring in what has been sold to
them in a partition of the whole of the joint holding of the original
co-sharers. This obviously proceeds on the basis, as stated,
that no co-sharer can do any act prejudicial to the interest
of the other co-sharers in the joint land or property. The learned
counsel for the plaintiffs refers to Nihalu and another v. Chandar, and
others, (10), to contend that the plaintiffs have the right to insist on
partition that the whole of the joint holding of the three original co-
sharers should be brought into consideration. In that case the
learned Judges observed “that a person whose interest is not co­
extensive with the common property may insist that the omitted
property be included in the suit or at any rate that such properties
should be included in the suit as will result in setting off to him in
severally some portion co-extensive with his interest.” In a case
like the present there can be no two opinions that at the time of
partition what should happen should be that the whole of the joint
land of the three original co-sharers be partitioned and sale, in favour
of the plaintiffs be taken into consideration to the extent it goes.
This is as much as the learned Judges held in Nihalu’s case, (10).
Apparently the plaintiff’s will not be able to insist contrary to the
claim of the other co-sharers to bring in property, to which their
sale does not relate, for partition, because they must be held to the
terms and conditions of the sale in their favour, they being purchasers
not of a share o f the joint land of the original three co-sharers, but
only a share of a defined part of it, that is to say, Killa numbers of
rectangles 6 and 13.
(14) And, lastly, the plaintiffs not having purchased a share of
the whole of the joint land of the original three co-sharers and having
only purchased a share of defined Killa numbers of defined rectangles,
that is to say rectangles 6 and 13, they obviously, in the terms of
(10) I.L.R. 1959 Pb. 162— A.S.R. 1956 Pb. 115.
368

I. L. R. Punjab and Haryana (1970)2

their sale-deed, do not have their rights extending beyond the land
of which share lias been sold to them. In other words, while they
become joint owners or co-sharers of the land of rectangles 6 and
13 with the original co-sharers, they do not become co-sharers with
them in the other or the remaining joint land of those three original
co-sharers. In Mahla Singh v. Harnam Singh (11), the learned
Judge observed—Mehla Singh has it, is true, purchased some specific
fields in Khataunis Nos. 83 and 84 in the Khata which can be
described as Hakkiat Mutfarrika. But this would not make Mehla
Singh a co-sharer of the vendor in Khata No. 14. The same line of
reasoning applies to Khata No. 39 where also the plaintiff and Hira
Singh are co-sharers while Mehla Singh has no fractional share in
it. He owns certain Khataunis in this Khata, namely, Nos. 419 to
421 but that would not make him a co-sharer in the Khata.” In
Mir Alam Khan v. Abdul Hamid Khan (12), the pre-emptor had
purchased three specific survey numbers out of a Khata, and the
learned Judge held that that did not make him a co-sharer in the
Khata. These two cases negative the claim of the present plaintiffs,
and on case to the contrary has been cited at the bar. On considera­
tion of these matters’ the conclusion is obvious that the plaintiffs
have failed to prove that they are co-sharers in or in regard to rec­
tangle 16 sold by Ajmer Singh co-sharer to the defendant.

(15) The learned counsel for the plaintiffs has referred to Safdar
Ali v. Dost Muhammad (13),Dakhni Din v. Rahim-un-Nissa (14),
Ali Husain Khan v. Tasadduq Husain Khan (15), Ram Govind
Pande v. Danna Lai (16), and Ramjimal v. Riaz-ud-din (17), for the
proposition that a purchaser of a specific field in a village or a
Mahal becomes a co-sharer in the same, but all those cases proceed­
ed on the basis of the meaning and scope of the word ‘co-sharer’
either in the wajab-ul-araz of the particular place or a particular
statute, which has nothing in common with the provisions of sec­
tion 15(1) (b), Fourthly, of Punjab Act 1 of 1913. So these cases are
not really relevant to the controversy in the present case. Similar
is the case with regard to Karuppan v. Pon/narasu Ambalam (18), as

(11) 1935 P.L.R. 276.

(12) A.I.R. 1944 Peshwar 40.
(13) (1890) 12 A ll. 426.
(14) (1894) 16 A ll. 412.
(15) (1906) 28 A ll. 124.
(16) A.I.R. 1924 A ll. 305.
(17) A.I.R. 1935 F.C. 169 (A ll.).
(18) A.I.R. 1965 Mad. 389.
 369

Jagat Singh and others v. Teja Singh and others, (Harbans Singh, J.)

in that case what was the subject of transfer was a share of the
property. .. ____.

(16) In consequence, the plaintiffs fail to prove that they have

a preferential right of pre-emption under section 15(1) (b), Fourth­
ly, of Punjab Act 1 of 1913 on the ground that they have been co­
sharers with Ajmer Singh vendor in the land of rectangle 1* sold
by him to the defendant and thus co-sharers with Ajmer Singh ven­
dor in the joint land. So the appeal of the defendant is accepted and,
reversing the decree of the llower appellate Court, the decree of the
trial Court is restored, so that the suit of the plaintiffs remains dis­
missed, with costs throughout.

D. K. MAHAjAiN, J— I agree.
B al Ra j T uxj, J,—So do I.

FULL BENCH

Before Harbans Singh, H. R. Sodhi and S. S. Sandhawalia, JJ.

JA G A T SINGH A N D OTHERS,— Appellants,

versus

TEJA SINGH A N D OTHERS,— Respondents.

Letters Patent Appeal No. 39 o f 1964

January 20, 1970.

Hindu Succession Act, 1X X X of 1956) — Section 14 — W idow alienating

her limited estate — Re-conveyance of the estate b y the alienee to the widow
— W hether permissible — Reversioners obtaining usual declaratory decree
before re-conveyance — Such decree — W hether prevents the alienee to re­
convey the estate back to the widow — Re-conveyance to the widow effected
after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, — Such widow —
W hether becomes absolute owner of the estate.

Held, that when an alienee from a widow or other alienor with restricted
power comes to know, either because he is threatend with litigation or a
suit is actually filed or otherwise, of the defect or the lacuna in the title of
bis alienor, there is nothing either in the Hindu Law or the Customary Law
or any other law which stands in his way of reconveying the property back
to the alienor and thus restoring the position of the property as it existed
prior to the alienation which is being challenged. A fter all, the relief that i#
claimed by a reversioner in the usual declaratory suit is that a declaration
may be granted t the effect that the impugned alienation would not affect