2025 INSC 397 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1405/2019

STATE REP. BY THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT

OF POLICE, VIGILANCE AND ANTI CORRUPTION
CHENNAI CITY-I DEPARTMENT ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

G. EASWARAN ...RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.

1. This appeal arises out of the final judgment of the High Court

of Madras 1, by which criminal proceedings against the respondent

under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 2 for possessing assets disproportionate to

known sources of income were quashed while exercising

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 3.

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
KAPIL TANDON
Date: 2025.03.26
17:11:55 IST
Reason: 1
Crl. O.P. No. 5835 of 2017 dated 21.04.2017, wherein the High Court has quashed the C.C.
No. 30 of 2013.
2 Hereinafter “PC Act”.
3 Hereinafter “Cr.P.C”.

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2. Facts: The relevant facts are that the respondent joined

government service as a surveyor in 1980 and was working as

Assistant Director with Nagercoil Local Planning Authority at the

relevant time. Upon receipt of a complaint that the respondent is

hoarding assets disproportionate to known sources of income

earned during check period 01.01.2001 to 31.08.2008, an

investigation was conducted, which revealed that he had, in fact,

acquired assets worth Rs. 26,88,057/- disproportionate to his

income. An FIR bearing number 11/AC/2009/CC-III was

registered under Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the PC Act on

27.07.2009, and the State government granted sanction to

prosecute the respondent on 08.07.2013. After investigation, the

chargesheet was filed on 23.09.2013.

3. The respondent filed a discharge application under Section

239 of the Cr.P.C. before the Special Court, Chennai, which came

to be dismissed vide order dated 27.01.2016. While deciding the

discharge application, the Special Court considered the matter in

detail and noted that the prosecution has, in fact, accepted the

explanation regarding: (i) the valuation of the house owned by the

respondent at Poona Nagar and revised the amount from

Rs.17,19,541/- to Rs.10,48,861/- after leaving out the value of the

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first floor constructed after the check period; and (ii) value of the

asset with respect to the loan of Rs.3,00,000/- obtained by the

respondent’s wife for the purchase of a car from Kotak Mahindra.

Ultimately, the total value of the disproportionate assets was

modified from Rs.43,78,383/- to Rs. 37,07,703/- and thereafter to

Rs. 26,88,057. On the other hand, the explanation with respect to

the non-deduction of the claim of: i) income earned by the wife

through real estate business, ii) gift said to have been received by

the respondent’s daughter from her grandfather, and iii) income

said to have been earned by the respondent’s son were not

interfered with on the basis of a prima facie finding. The relevant

portion of the order of the Special Court is as follows:

“11…The case is in the stage of framing of charge and the validity

of the said documents viz gift deed, source of income of
Chinnasami to make a gift of Rs.7,80,000/- and the regarding
income of the petitioner’s wife which was not relied upon by the
prosecution cannot be decided at this stage. It is a settled law that
at the stage of framing of charges the court has got a limited
jurisdiction only to see whether a prima facie case has been made
out by the prosecution against the accused to frame charge. The
appreciation of evidence for the purpose of arriving at the
conclusion whether the prosecution has proved the case against
the accused beyond reasonable doubt would arise only after all
the evidence are brought on record after trial…though the
petitioner counsel contends that income of other family members
were not considered by prosecution, but the prosecution had
contended that there is no document to substantiate the income of
petitioner’s wife and the alleged gift of Rs.7,80,000/- to the
petitioner’s daughter by her Grandfather is an afterthought as the
gift deed is not registered and no source of income for the said
Chinnasami. Hence the validity of the same cannot be decided at
this stage so known source of income at this stage has to be

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 considered only the sources of income known to the prosecution
and the document viz books of account not produced and relied
upon by the prosecution cannot be considered and analyzed and
the court cannot conduct a mini trial at the stage of framing of
charges.”

4. In view of the above, while dismissing the application for

discharge, the Special Court concluded:

“14…At this stage the court has to consider whether the prima
facie case has been made out against the accused on the basis of
evidence produced by the prosecution and the court cannot make
elaborate enquiry by sifting and weighing the materials to find out
the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt which has
to be done only at the time of final hearing. From the documents
produced by the prosecution, the prosecution has facie establishes
that Investigation Officer has considered the explanation offered
by the petitioner under Document No. 70 and the contention of the
petitioner is that his wife had earned Rs.18,51,028/-during the
relevant period as a Real Estate Broker and the gift of Rs. 7 lakhs
was given to the petitioner's daughter by her Grandfather and
whether the petitioner's daughter's grandfather had source of
income to gift Rs. 7,80,000 /- are all can be considered only after
full trial after appreciating the validity of the documents and
statements of the petitioner. At this stage, the documents
produced by the prosecution prima facie establishes there are
materials for framing charges against the accused u/s 13(2) r/w
13 (1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. In view of the above
discussions this petition is dismissed.”

5. The respondent assailed the above findings and dismissal of

the discharge application by filing a revision petition before the

High Court. Having considered various grounds raised by the

respondent and having examined the matter in detail, the High

Court came to the conclusion that the findings of the Special Judge

were correct and that the contentions about the income earned by

the respondent’s wife and daughter cannot be considered at the

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stage of discharge. While affirming the findings of the Special

Court, the High Court dismissed the revision petition in the

following terms:

“22…But, in my considered view, prime facts, the material

available on record show that before filing the charge sheet,
the investigation agency has duly considered all the
relevant materials including the proof of possession of
properties/income beyond the known sources of income,
and hence, the said submission cannot be countenanced.

23. With regard to the revisional powers of this Court under

Section 397 and 401 Cr.P.C., as relied on by the learned
counsel for the petitioner/ accused, the Supreme Court in-
extensu dealt with the same in the decision reported in Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, 4 and following the said
decision of the Apex Court, in this case, this Court finds that
all the material records were placed by the prosecution, and
therefore, it is incorrect to state that the since the said letter,
dated 05.01.2009 was not placed, the trial court ought to
have allowed the discharge petition.

24. Hence, in my considered opinion the submissions made

by the learned counsel for the petitioner/ accused with
regard to the merits of the case, as discussed supra, are all
not the grounds for discharge of the petitioner from the
criminal case. Hence, I do not find any valid ground to
interfere with the impugned order of the trial Court, as this
Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the same
and hence, the impugned order is liable to be confirmed.

25. Accordingly, this Crl.R.C. is dismissed, with liberty to

the petitioner/ accused to put-forth all his contentions
during the course of trial. The trial Court shall complete the
trial as early as possible, for which, the petitioner/ accused
and the prosecution shall co-operate.”
(emphasis supplied)

4 2012 (9) SCC 460.

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6. Within seven months, the respondent filed a petition under

Section 482 for quashing the criminal proceedings, virtually on the

same grounds as those taken in the discharge application.

7. It is not in dispute that the Special Court, while dismissing

the discharge application, as well as the High Court while

dismissing the revision petition, arrived at clear findings that there

was a prima facie case, and this conclusion was drawn after

examining the allegations as they stand. The impugned order

operates against the established law that while the bar under

section 397(3) of the CrPC does not curtail the remedy under

Section 482, it is trite that inherent powers must be exercised

sparingly. This Court, in Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, 5 has held:

“8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind

conferring the revisional power under Section 397, read
with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest
continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent
miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the
procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the inherent
power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The
power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However,
the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and
cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously
exercised revisional power under Section 397(1)….

10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section

397(3) of the Code, a person — accused/complainant —
cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the
High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers
of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may
amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3)
or Section 397(2) of the Code…As stated earlier, it may be

5 (1997) 4 SCC 241.

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 exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of
procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of
proceedings. The object of criminal trial is to render public
justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is
concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness
fades out…”
(emphasis supplied)

8. In a later decision in Renu Kumari v. Sanjay Kumar,6

where the High Court had entertained and allowed a petition under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. in similar circumstances to quash the

proceedings after a petition for discharge was dismissed by the

Magistrate and the subsequent revision petition was dismissed by

the Sessions Judge, this Court set aside the High Court’s quashing

order and held as follows:

“9. (….) In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab 7 this Court

summarised some categories of cases where inherent
power can and should be exercised to quash the
proceedings:
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is
no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly
or manifestly fails to prove the charge. (AIR p. 869)

In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in

mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal
evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may
not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court would not
ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in
question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable

6 (2008) 12 SCC 346.

7 AIR 1960 SC 866.

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 appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That
is the function of the trial Judge…It would not be proper for
the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the
light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a
conviction would be sustainable and on such premises
arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be
quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material
before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be
proceeded with…”
(emphasis supplied)

9. In the present case, the inherent power under Section 482

Cr.P.C. for quashing the criminal proceedings was invoked after

the dismissal of the discharge application and the consequent

revision petition. In State by Karnataka Lokayukta, Police

Station, Bengaluru v. M.R. Hiremath, 8 this Court examined a

similar situation where the High Court entertained a petition

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed against the dismissal of a discharge

petition. Setting aside the judgement of the High Court, this Court

held:

“25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the

fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for
discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The
parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction
have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It
is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering
an application for discharge the court must proceed on the
assumption that the material which has been brought on
the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the
material in order to determine whether the facts emerging
from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the

8 (2019) 7 SCC 515; also see the decision of this Court in State of T.N. v. R. Soundirarasu,
(2023) 6 SCC 768 where this Court set aside the judgement of the High Court quashing the
criminal proceedings clearing setting out the limits of interference with an order passed under
Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C for discharge.

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 existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the
offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, 9 adverting to
the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held:
29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials
has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go
deep into the matter and hold that the materials would
not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to
be considered is whether there is a ground for
presuming that the offence has been committed and
not whether a ground for convicting the accused has
been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks
that the accused might have committed the offence on
the basis of the materials on record on its probative
value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction,
the court has to come to the conclusion that the
accused has committed the offence. The law does not
permit a mini trial at this stage.

26. For the above reasons we are of the view that the
appeal would have to be allowed. We accordingly allow the
appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the High
Court dated 27-4-2017….We accordingly maintain the
order passed by the learned trial Judge on 5-12-2016
dismissing the discharge application filed by the
respondent.”

10. It is not disputed that in the instant case, the Special Court,

as well as the High Court, while dismissing the petition for

discharge, examined the allegations and arrived at clear findings

that there was a prima facie case against the respondent. The

impugned order revisits the earlier decisions without any statable

change in the facts and circumstances of the case, traverses to the

extreme end of the spectrum, and concludes that: i) the wife of the

accused purchased the properties in the name of the daughter

having power of attorney; ii) that there was no satisfactory evidence

9 (2014) 11 SCC 709.

9
of Benami; iii) even if allowed to prosecute, the chances of

conviction were bleak; or iv) the probability of conviction is low;

and v) the statements of witnesses do not warrant prosecution. It

is clear that the High Court jumped to the probable conclusion of

trial by not appreciating the limited scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Instead of determining “whether or not there is sufficient ground for

proceeding against the accused” based on the material, it asked the

wrong question as to, “whether that would warrant a conviction” 10.

We are of the clear opinion that the High Court has exceeded the

well-established principles for exercising jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

11. The next issue before us is regarding the validity of the

sanction granted to prosecute the respondent. Dealing with the

same, the impugned order goes into the merits of the sanction,

taking into account the statement of LW-1 Mr. Thanga

Kaliyaperumal, who is the Secretary of Housing and Urban

Development, Government of Tamil Nadu and is the sanctioning

authority. Perusing the statement of LW-1, the High Court makes

10 In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, this Court held:
“32.4…the court has not sifted the materials for the purpose of finding out whether or not there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but whether that would warrant a
conviction. We are of the opinion that this was not the stage where the court should have
appraised the evidence and discharged the accused as if it was passing an order of acquittal.
Further, defect in investigation itself cannot be a ground for discharge.”

10
a finding regarding the sanction being invalid and belated in the

following terms:

“36. From the above circumstances enumerated under

clauses a, b & c, the following crucial questions are arisen
for the consideration of this Court:

(1) The request made by the Director, Vigilance and Anti-

Corruption, seeking order of sanction dated 15.08.2012
was received by the Government on 20.12.2013 i.e., after
one year four months and five days. What is the reason for
the abnormal delay of one year and above to receive the
report from the Director, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption even
though it is dated back to 15.08.2012.
(2) It is revealed that the Governor had accorded sanction
for the prosecution. When such being the case how the
petitioner was authorized to speak about the order of
sanction for the prosecution against the petitioner. Where is
the authorization letter from the Government or from the
Governor?
(3) Who had perused the First Information Report,
statement of witnesses and connected documents and who
had subjective to satisfaction after perusal of the records to
launch prosecution against the petitioner. These questions
are remained unanswered by the prosecution.

37. From the statement of LW-1 Mr. Thanga Kaliyaperumal

it revealed that the Governor vide Government Order in G.O.
Ms. No. 178, Housing and Urban Development (UD2(1))
Department, Government of Tamil Nadu had accorded
sanction for the prosecution on 08.07.2013. The requisition
of the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption in
RC306/09/RDP/CC-III was made on 15.08.2012: But the
requisition was received by the Government on 20.12.2013.
When the request of the Director, Vigilance and Anti-
Corruption dated 15.08.2012 was received on 20.12.2013,
how the Governor could have accorded sanction for the
prosecution on 08.07.2013 i.e., with anti-date. This serious
defect or lacuna has not been explained by the prosecution.

***
39. Insofar as this Court is concerned the above narrated
circumstances leave scope to suspect the order of sanction.
This Court also is of view that the order of sanction might
have been passed without application of mind,
mechanically at the behest of higher officials.

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 ***
43. On coming to the given case on hand, as a matter of
fact, at no stage the grievance of the petitioner regarding
delay in granting sanction has been disputed by the
respondent State. Not only that, but no justification has
even been put forward explaining the delay in prosecution.

***

45. It is also to be noted here that the delay in granting

order of sanction itself is fatal to criminal investigation as
well as to the trial. It gets worse if it can be attributed to
lethargic and investigation lackadaisical manner of
investigation.
(emphasis supplied)

12. Learned counsel for the State submits that the conclusions

drawn by the High Court about the impossibility of granting

sanction on 08.07.2013 when the government received the request

only on 20.12.2013, was not raised at any point of time, neither in

the discharge application before the Special Judge nor before the

High Court in revision petition. He further submits that the

argument is not even mentioned in the quashing petition under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed before the High Court. He also submits

that this question was not put to LW-1, whose statement is the

sheet anchor for the High Court to question the validity of the

sanction. The State also explained the actual position in the

Special Leave Petition. It is explained that the misconception about

the dates arose because of a typographical mistake of mentioning

the letter requesting sanction as 20.12.2013, instead of the correct

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date being 20.02.2013. This is typically the problem that would

arise when the High Court seeks to interdict proceedings and

quash the criminal case before the relevant material to support the

case of the prosecution is brought on record.11 Findings regarding

the legality, validity, or delay in grant of sanction were premature.

Validity of the sanction is an issue that must be examined during

the course of the trial. In Dinesh Kumar v. Chairman, Airport

Authority of India, 12 this principle is reiterated as follows:

“10. In our view, invalidity of sanction where sanction

order exists, can be raised on diverse grounds like non-
availability of material before the sanctioning authority or
bias of the sanctioning authority or the order of sanction
having been passed by an authority not authorised or
competent to grant such sanction. The above grounds are
only illustrative and not exhaustive. All such grounds of
invalidity or illegality of sanction would fall in the same
category like the ground of invalidity of sanction on account
of non-application of mind—a category carved out by this
Court in Parkash Singh Badal, 13 the challenge to which can
always be raised in the course of trial.”
(emphasis supplied)

11 See, generally, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335:

“103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal
proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the
rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and
that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to
act according to its whim or caprice”
Further, in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460, this Court held:
“27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence
is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing
of charge or quashing of charge”.
12 (2012) 1 SCC 532; followed in CBI v. Pramila Virendra Kumar Agarwal, (2020) 17 SCC 664.
13 (2007) 1 SCC 1.

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13. Similar view was taken in Director, Central Bureau of

Investigation v. Ashok Kumar Aswal14, where it was held that:

“15. All the above apart, time and again, this Court has
laid down that the validity of a sanction order, if one exists,
has to be tested on the touchstone of the prejudice to the
accused which is essentially a question of fact and,
therefore, should be left to be determined in the course of
the trial and not in the exercise of jurisdiction either under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in a
proceeding under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)

14. Thus, there is no doubt that the High Court committed an

error in quashing the prosecution on the ground that the sanction

to prosecute is illegal and invalid. In conclusion, we find that the

objections raised in the revision petition against the Special

Court’s order dismissing the discharge application were identical

to the grounds raised in the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,

from which the present appeal arises. Second, apart from being

congruent and overlapping, the respondent could not demonstrate

any material change in facts and circumstances between the

dismissal of the revision petition by the High Court and the filing

of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Third, the

validity of the sanction can always be examined during the course

of the trial and the problems due to the typographical error as

14 (2015) 16 SCC 163.

14
alleged by the State could have been explained by producing the

file at the time of trial. Fourth, it is settled that a mere delay in the

grant of sanction for prosecuting a public authority is not a ground

to quash a criminal case.

15. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the

reasoning adopted by the High Court for interdicting the criminal

proceedings is contrary to the well-established principles laid

down by this Court. We, therefore, set aside the judgment while

reiterating the correct position of law.

16. The appeal is allowed accordingly. In view of the aforesaid, we

restore C.C. No. 30/2013 to the record of the Court of the Special

Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act Cases, Chennai, for the

continuation of the trial from the stage the trial was interdicted.

Since the matter pertains to the check period 2001-2008, we

request the Trial Court to conclude the trial as expeditiously as

possible.

………………………………....J.
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

………………………………....J.
[MANOJ MISRA]

NEW DELHI;
MARCH 26, 2025.
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