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AFR
Judgment reserved on 27.09.2022
Judgment delivered on 30.09.2022

Court No. - 66

Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 6178 of 2022

Petitioner :- Naval Kishor Sharma

Respondent :- State of U.P. and Another
Counsel for Petitioner :- In Person, Mohammed Iftekhar
Counsel for Respondent :- G.A.

Hon'ble Samit Gopal, J.

1. Heard Sri Mohammed Iftekhar Farooqui, Advocate learned

counsel for the petitioner, Sri Manish Goyal, learned Senior
Advocate/Additional Advocate General, Sri S.K. Pal, learned
Government Advocate, Sri A.K. Sand, learned Additional
Government Advocate, all assisted by Sri Rupak Chaubey, Sri
B.B. Upadhyay, Sri S.B. Maurya and Sri Raj Kumar Gupta,
learned counsels for the State of U.P. and perused the records.

2. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India has been filed by Naval Kishor Sharma, S/o Deonath
Sharma with the following prayers:-

“It is therefore most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble

Court may be pleased to set aside the judgement and order
dated 26.4.2022 passed by Sessions Judge, Mau in
Criminal Revision No. 54 of 2022, Nawal Kishor Sharma
Versus State of U.P. as well as judgement and order dated
11.03.2022 passed by Civil Judge (S.D.)/Addl. Chief Judicial
 (2)

Magistrate/M.P. M.L.A. Court, Mau in Misc. Case No.128 of

2019, Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Ajay Singh Vishtha @ Yogi
Adityanath. Otherwise petitioner would suffer with
irreparable loss.

It is further prayed that the court below may be directed to

register complaint case against respondent no.2 and hear
the matter accordingly.

Or may pass any such further order or direction which this

Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the
circumstances of the case.”

3. The brief facts of the case are that a complaint dated 11.1.2019
was filed by the petitioner against Ajay Singh Bist alias Yogi
Adityanath for offences under Section 295 (A), 298, 419, 420, 501
IPC, Police Station Dohrighat, District Mau titled as Naval Kishor
Sharma Versus Ajay Singh Bist alias Yogi Adityanath mentioning
therein the date of occurrence as 28.11.2018, the names and
addresses of the witnesses as Naval Kishor (complainant), Yugal
Kishore Sharma, S/o Devnath Sharma, Santosh Prajapati, S/o
Sidhari Prajapati and other witnesses and record keeper
Superintendent Police, Mau alleging therein that the respondent-
accused is a Mahant of Gorakshapeeth, Gorakhnath, Police
Station Gorakhnath and at present the Chief Minister, Government
of Uttar Pradesh. On 28.11.2018, he addressed a public meeting
with regards to general Vidhan Sabha Elections in Malakheda,
Alwar (Rajasthan) in which he stated certain words for Lord
Bajrangbali due to which the religious sentiments of public who
are followers of Sri Bajrangbali have been hurt. The respondent
knowing that his speech will cause hurt to the sentiments of a
 (3)

specific group of people has stated about it in his general public

meeting. He has also caused disrepute to his position as Chief
Minister which is a constitutional post and has also not followed
the circular issued by the Election Commission, Government of
India. The said acts have been done by him for benefits in a
wrongful manner to his party in elections and also to separate two
group of persons so that they may start hating each other and
may fight. The said fact has been read by the complainant and
other persons in daily newspapers due to which the religious
sentiments of other persons also got hurt. A legal notice dated
30.11.2018 was sent by the complainant but despite service of
notice calling upon the respondent to tender apology to the public
in writing and orally, he did not do it and by taking law in his hands
the presiding deity of the complainant has been humiliated and to
cause gain to his political party, humiliated Lord Bajrangbali in a
public meeting. The faith of the complainant has been hurt. The
complainant tried to lodge a report at the local police station and
also gave a report to the Superintendent of Police, Mau on
1.1.2019 but no action has been taken and hence he has filed the
present complaint. He prays that after taking the evidence, the
accused be punished for offences under Section 295 (A), 298,
419, 420, 501 IPC.

4. In support of the complaint, the complainant was examined

under Section 200 Cr.P.C. wherein he reiterated the version of the
complaint. Under Section 202 Cr.P.C. Yugal Kishore Sharma, S/o
Devnath Sharma was examined as P.W.1 and Anoop Kumar
Yadav, S/o Rajendra Yadav was examined as P.W.2. The
complainant also filed a copy of a newspaper named “Jansandesh
Times” along with complaint, the copy of the same has been
 (4)

annexed as Annexure No. - S.A-1 to the supplementary affidavit

dated 7.9.2022.

5. The complaint as filed was numbered as Criminal Complaint

Case No.128 of 2019, Naval Kishor Sharma Versus Ajay Singh
Bist alias Yogi Adityanath.

6. Vide order dated 11.03.2022 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior

Division)/Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, M.P. M.L.A, Mau the
said complaint was dismissed under Section 203 Cr.P.C. with the
observation that the court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain
the same. Against the said order dated 11.03.2022 the
complainant/petitioner filed a criminal revision before the Sessions
Judge, Mau which was numbered as Criminal Revision No.54 of
2022, Naval Kishor Sharma Versus State of U.P. and another. The
said revision was also dismissed vide judgement and order dated
26.04.2022 passed by the Sessions Judge, Mau. The present
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has thus
been filed before this Court.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that:-

1) The hate speech was a deliberate intention in the general

rally during election campaign. The opposite party no.2 was
in his knowledge that it would cause turmoil and agitation
throughout the country.

2) Due to the deliberate speech against Lord Bajrangbali,

crores of his followers were pained.

3) The words used against Lord Bajrangbali were to impress

people of reserved constituency.
 (5)

4) The hate speech was read by the petitioner which hurt his
religious sentiments and thus he pursued the remedy
available under law.

5) This is not the first incident by the opposite party no.2 but
is a repeated incident by a person holding a prestigious and
constitutional post.

6) The complaint is maintainable in view of Section 179

Cr.P.C. which states that the offence may be inquired into or
tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has
been done or such consequence has ensued and in the
present matter the consequence has ensued being the
petitioner reading the said newspaper which has hurt his
religious feelings.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following
judgements:-

(i.) Dr. Subramaniam Swamy Vs. Prabhakar S. Pai and

another, 1983 (2) BomCR 129 (para 9).

(ii.) P. Lankesh & another Vs. H. Shivappa & another, 1994

0 CrLJ 3510 (para 10).

(iii.) Dilip Hazarika Vs. Nalin Ch Buragohain, 2002 CrLJ

1608 (para 6).

(iv.) Pankaj Jyoti Borah Vs. The State of Assam and others,
2018 0 CrLJ 1908 (para 9).

(v.) Ashok Singhal Vs. State of U.P. and another, 2005 2

Crimes (HC) 7 (para 10).
 (6)

(vi.) Lee Kun Hee, President, Samsung Corporation, South

Korea and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others,
(2012) 3 SCC 132 (para 35).

9. It is argued that in all the said cases, the courts concerned have
held that the place where the consequence has ensued is the
place where a court gets territorial jurisdiction.

10. Learned Additional Advocate General for the State of U.P.

vehemently opposed the present petition and the arguments of
learned counsel for the petitioner. It is argued that:-

1. The opposite party no.2 in the present petition who has

been arrayed as the accused in the complaint is a non-
existent person. A person who has renounced the world and
has entered into Sanyasi world and has become a Yogi
cannot be called by any other name except for the name
which he has adopted after becoming a Yogi. It is argued
that the complaint states of a non-existent person as the
accused and even the same person has been made as a
respondent no.2 in the present petition.

2. The complaint is totally silent inasmuch as where and

when the complainant read the newspaper. The complainant
has not even stated that he was a subscriber to the said
newspaper. It is also not stated either in the complaint or in
his statement that the said newspaper was having any
circulation in his area. It is argued that the newspaper is the
foundation of creation of territorial jurisdiction in the present
matter. The description about the same is totally missing.

3. The complainant has not made the Editor of the

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newspaper as an accused. The bare reading of the said

newspaper shows that it is some postal edition of the
newspaper. There is no averment by the complainant that
the said newspaper is circulated in his area. It is argued that
Section 179 Cr.P.C. is not attracted at all in the present
matter. The provision which applies is Section 177 Cr.P.C.
The complainant does not anywhere stated about the
credentials of the newspaper which would go to show that
the same was a paper being circulated in his area. In the
complaint he states of the news item to be read in daily
newspaper but in his statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C.,
he states that the said news was heard, seen and read by
him in print media and electronic media. The witnesses
produced by him have also stated that they and other
persons have read the news in daily newspaper but even
the said witnesses have not stated about the date of the
said newspaper, their names and the place where they have
read it.

4. In so far as the alleged witnesses produced by the

complainant are concerned, Yugal Kishore Sharma, P.W.1
who was examined under Section 202 Cr.P.C. is his real
brother as is apparent from his parentage and also his
address. The said fact has been concealed by the
complainant and even by the said witness.

5. It is argued that the present petition is under Article

227 of the Constitution of India. The Court is a supervisory
court under the said jurisdiction. There has been concurrent
findings by two courts below being the trial court and the
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revisional court. This Court cannot act as a Court of first

appeal to reappreciate, reweight evidence or facts upon
which determination under challenge is based. When a final
finding is justified or can be supported, the supervisory
jurisdiction cannot be used to correct it.

6. The document at page 22 of the supplementary

affidavit which is being stated to be the list of cases lodged
against the respondent no.2 is a new document filed before
this Court. There is no reference of the same before the trial
court and even before the revisional court and as such the
same cannot be considered at this stage.

11. Learned counsel has relied upon the following judgements:-

(I) Aroon Purie Vs. Jayakumar Hiremath : (2017) 7

SCC 767 (para 3).
(II) Mahendra Singh Dhoni Vs. Yerraguntla
Shyamsundar : (2017) 7 SCC 760 (para 14).
12. By placing the judgement in the case of Aroon Purie (Supra), it
is argued that the inquiry in the matter was completed by the
learned Magistrate who then came to the conclusion that the court
has no territorial jurisdiction over it and then by a detailed order
dismissed the same. Further by placing the judgement in the case
of Mahendra Singh Dhoni (Supra), it is argued that the Apex Court
has put a word of caution that the Magistrates who have been
conferred with the power of taking cognizance and issuing
summons are required to carefully scrutinize whether the
allegations made in the complaint proceeding meet the basic
ingredients of the offence, whether the concept of territorial
jurisdiction is satisfied and whether the accused is really required
 (9)

to be summoned and the said things are to be treated as the

primary judicial responsibility of the Court issuing process. In the
present case, the learned Magistrate has made an inquiry with
regards to territorial jurisdiction of the matter and the jurisdiction of
the said court and then has reached to its satisfaction that the
court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said complaint
and as such dismissed the same under Section 203 Cr.P.C. It is
argued that the present case is a case which deserves to be
dismissed with exemplary cost as the petitioner is abusing the
process of law and courts for vested interest knowing the actual
position of law as he is an Advocate.

13. After having heard learned counsels for the parties and
perusing the records, the facts which emerge out are that the
petitioner herein had filed a complaint dated 11.1.2019 against the
opposite party no.2 for offences under Section 295 (A), 298, 419,
420, 501 IPC for an incident which is said to have taken place on
28.11.2018 in Malakheda, District Alwar (Rajasthan). The
complaint has been filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Mau, District Mau by the petitioner who is a resident of Mau for
attracting territorial jurisdiction there. The complainant states that
he and other persons have read in daily newspaper a news item
relating to a hate speech given by the accused in Malakheda,
District Alwar (Rajasthan) on 28.11.2018 by which words being
derogatory in nature against Lord Bajrangbali were used which
has hurt his religious sentiments. It is relevant to state here that it
is stated that the said speech was addressed in a public meeting
of general Vidhan Sabha Elections at the said place. The
complainant in the inquiry under Section 200 Cr.P.C. then states
that the accused with an intention to hurt the religious sentiments
 (10)

of a group of persons had given the speech which was heard,

seen and read by him in print media and electronic media. Yugal
Kishore Sharma, P.W.1 and Anoop Kumar Yadav, P.W.2 in their
statements under Section 202 Cr.P.C. have stated that the
complainant, they and other people have read in daily newspaper
about the said speech due to which their religious sentiments
have been hurt. The details of the newspaper and its credentials
are conspicuously missing in the complaint, statement recorded
under Section 200 Cr.P.C. of the complainant and the statements
of the alleged witnesses under Section 202 Cr.P.C. The
complainant does not anywhere state about the date and time
when he read the said news item. His witnesses are also silent
about the same. A copy of Jansandesh Times newspaper has
been filed before the trial court which has also been filed before
this Court as Annexure S.A-1 to the supplementary affidavit. The
relevant paragraphs in which it has been addressed in the said
supplementary affidavit is para no.4 in which the same has been
described as newspaper dated 29.11.2018 and for the first time, it
is stated in the said paragraph that the said newspaper is having
its circulation and selling in district Jaunpur, Azamgarh, Mau and
Gorakhpur and is published from Varanasi. The said averments
are missing in the complaint, statement of the complainant and in
the statement of his witnesses.

14. The backbone of the present complaint is the news published

in a local newspaper. The basis for making allegations is an article
relied by the petitioner said to have been published in a
newspaper named as “Jansandesh Times”. Admittedly the
complainant and his witnesses were not present in the said
meeting where the words as said to have been hurt their religious
 (11)

sentiments, faith and have caused disrepute to Lord Bajrangbali

were said. The complainant in his statement under Section 200
Cr.P.C. states that he heard, saw and read the same in print
media and electronic media but his witnesses in the inquiry under
Section 202 Cr.P.C. stated of reading the same in daily
newspapers but there is nothing on record to corroborate the
same and it is too vague to be believed. Only a newspaper cutting
has been placed by the complainant on record as evidence
although he states to have seen and heard it in electronic media
also.

15. The reporting in newspaper has to be fortified whether it is

correct or not. It is a hearsay secondary evidence in itself and
unless the person reporting it is examined, is not admissible. Any
other person before whom the incident has occurred can also be
examined to prove the said fact and make it admissible.

16. The admissibility of news paper reports in evidence has been

considered and decided many times. In the case of Samant N.
Balkrishna v. George Fernandez : (1969) 3 SCC 238, the Apex
Court in paragraph 47 has held as under:-
"47. The meeting at Shivaji Park about which we shall
say something presently, was not held in Mr Fernandez's
constituency. The similarity of ideas or even of words cannot
be pressed into service to show consent. There was a
stated policy of Sampurna Maharashtra Samiti which
wanted to join in Maharashtra all the areas which had not so
far been joined and statements in that behalf must have
been made not only by Mr Atrey but by several other
persons. Since Mr Atrey was not appointed as agent we
cannot go by the similarity of language alone. It is also very
 (12)

significant that not a single speech of Mr Fernandez was

relied upon and only one speech of Mr Fernandez namely,
that at Shivaji Park was brought into arguments before us by
an amendment which we disallowed. The best proof would
have been his own speech or some propaganda material
such as leaflets or pamphlets etc. but none was produced.
The “Maratha” was an independent newspaper not under
the control of the Sampurna Maharashtra Samiti or the
S.S.P. which was sponsoring Mr Fernandez or Mr
Fernandez himself. Further we have ruled out news items
which it is the function of the newspaper to publish. A news
item without any further proof of what had actually
happened through witnesses is of no value. It is at best a
second-hand secondary evidence. It is well-known that
reporters collect information and pass it on to the editor who
edits the news item and then publishes it. In this process the
truth might get perverted or garbled. Such news items
cannot be said to prove themselves although they may be
taken into account with other evidence if the other evidence
is forcible. In the present case the only attempt to prove a
speech of Mr Fernandez was made in connection with the
Shivaji Park meeting. Similarly the editorials state the policy
of the newspaper and its comment upon the events. Many
of the news items were published in other papers also. For
example Free Press Journal, the Blitz and writers like
Welles Hengens had also published similar statements. If
they could not be regarded as agents of Mr Fernandez we
do not see any reason to hold that the “Maratha” or Mr Atrey
can safely be regarded as agent of Mr Fernandez when
 (13)

acting for the newspaper so as to prove his consent to the

publication of the defamatory matter. We are therefore of
opinion that consent cannot reasonably be inferred to the
publications in the “Maratha”. We are supported in our
approach to the problem by a large body of case law to
which our attention was drawn by Mr Chari. We may refer to
a few cases here : Bishwanath Upadhaya v. Hardal Das
[1958 Ass 97] ; Abdul Majeed v. Bhargavan (Krishnan) [AIR
1963 Ker 18] ; Rustom Satin v. Dr Sampoornanand [20 ELR
221] ; Sarla Devi Pathak v. Birendra Singh [20 ELR 275] ;
Krishna Kumar v. Krishna Gopal [AIR 1964 Raj 21] ; Lalsing
Kesbrising Sehvar v. Vallabhdas Shankarlal Phekdi [AIR
1967 Guj 62] ; Badri Narain Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh
[AIR 1951 Pat 41] and Sarat Chandra Rabba v.
Khagendranath Math [AIR 1961 SC 334] . It is not
necessary to refer to these cases in detail except to point
out that the Rajasthan case dissents from the case from
Assam on which Mr Jethamalani relied. The principle of law
is settled that consent may be inferred from circumstantial
evidence but the circumstances must point unerringly to the
conclusion and must not admit of any other explanation.
Although the trial of an election petition is made in
accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been
laid down that a corrupt practice must be proved in the
same way as a criminal charge is proved. In other words,
the election petitioner must exclude every hypothesis except
that of guilt on the part of the returned candidate or his
election agent. Since we have held that Mr Atrey's activities
must be viewed in two compartments, one connected with
 (14)

Mr Fernandez and the other connected with the newspaper

we have to find out whether there is an irresistable inference
of guilt on the part of Mr Fernandez. Some of the English
cases cited by Mr Jethamalani are not a safeguide because
in England a distinction is made between “illegal practices”
and “corrupt practices”. Cases dealing with “illegal practices”
in which the candidate is held responsible for the acts of his
agent are not a proper guide. It is to be noticed that making
of a false statement is regarded as “corrupt practice” and
not an “illegal practice” and the tests are different for a
corrupt practice. In India all corrupt practices stand on the
same footing. The only difference made is that when
consent is proved on the part of the candidate or his election
agent to the commission of corrupt practice, that itself is
sufficient. When a corrupt practice is committed by an agent
and there is no such consent then the petitioner must go
further and prove that the result of the election insofar as the
returned candidate is concerned was materially affected. In
Bayley v. Edmunds, Byron and Marshall [(1894) 11 TLR
537] strongly relied upon by Mr Daphtary, the publication in
the newspaper was not held to be a corrupt practice but the
paragraph taken from a newspaper and printed as a leaflet
was held to be a corrupt practice. That is not the case here.
Mr Patil's own attitude during the election and after is
significant. During the election he did not once protest that
Mr Fernandez charged his workers with hooliganism. Even
after the election Mr Patil did not attribute anything to Mr
Fernandez. He even said that the Bombay election was
conducted with propriety. Even at the filing of the election
 (15)

petition he did not think of Mr Fernandez but concentrated

on the “Maratha”."
17. In the case of Laxmi Raj Shetty v. State of T.N. : (1988) 3
SCC 319 the Apex Court in paragraphs 25 and 26 has held as
under:-
"25. As to the first, the accused Laxmi Raj Shetty was
entitled to tender the newspaper report from the Indian
Express of the 29th and the regional newspapers of the 30th
along with his statement under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. Both the accused at the stage of
their defence in denial of the charge had summoned the
editors of Tamil dailies Malai Murasu and Makkal Kural and
the news reporters of the Indian Express and Dina Thanthi
to prove the contents of the facts stated in the news item but
they dispensed with their examination on the date fixed for
the defence evidence. We cannot take judicial notice of the
facts stated in a news item being in the nature of hearsay
secondary evidence, unless proved by evidence aliunde. A
report in a newspaper is only hearsay evidence. A
newspaper is not one of the documents referred to in
Section 78(2) of the Evidence Act, 1872 by which an
allegation of fact can be proved. The presumption of
genuineness attached under Section 81 of the Evidence Act
to a newspaper report cannot be treated as proved of the
facts reported therein.
26. It is now well settled that a statement of fact
contained in a newspaper is merely hearsay and therefore
inadmissible in evidence in absence of the maker of the
statement appearing in court and deposing to have
 (16)

perceived the fact reported. The accused should have

therefore produced the persons in whose presence the
seizure of the stolen money from Appellant 2's house at
Mangalore was effected or examined the press
correspondents in proof of the truth of the contents of the
news item. The question as to the admissibility of
newspaper reports has been dealt with by this Court in
Samant N. Balkrishna v.George Fernandez [(1969) 3 SCC
238 : (1969) 3 SCR 603 : AIR 1969 SC 1201] . There the
question arose whether Shri George Fernandez, the
successful candidate returned to Parliament from the
Bombay South Parliamentary Constituency had delivered a
speech at Shivaji Park attributed to him as reported in the
Maratha, a widely circulated Marathi newspaper in Bombay,
and it was said: (SCC p. 261, para 47)
“A newspaper item without any further proof of what
had actually happened through witnesses is of no value. It
is at best a second-hand secondary evidence. It is well
known that reporters collect information and pass it on to
the editor who edits the news item and then publishes it. In
this process the truth might get perverted or garbled. Such
news items cannot be said to prove themselves although
they may be taken into account with other evidence if the
other evidence is forcible.”
We need not burden the judgment with many citations.
There is nothing on record to substantiate the facts as
reported in the newspapers showing recovery of the stolen
amount from the residence of Appellant 2 at Mangalore. We
have therefore no reason to discard the testimony of PW 50
 (17)

and the seizure witnesses which go to establish that the

amount in question was actually recovered at Madras on the
29th and the 30th as alleged.”
18. In the case of Quamarul Islam v. S.K. Kanta : 1994 Supp
(3) SCC 5 in paragraph 48 it has been held by the Apex Court as
under:-
"48. Newspaper reports by themselves are not evidence
of the contents thereof. Those reports are only hearsay
evidence. These have to be proved and the manner of
proving a newspaper report is well settled. Since, in this
case, neither the reporter who heard the speech and sent
the report was examined nor even his reports produced, the
production of the newspaper by the Editor and Publisher,
PW 4 by itself cannot amount to proving the contents of the
newspaper reports. Newspaper, is at the best secondary
evidence of its contents and is not admissible in evidence
without proper proof of the contents under the Indian
Evidence Act. The learned trial Judge could not treat the
newspaper reports as duly ‘proved’ only by the production of
the copies of the newspaper. The election petitioner also
examined Abrar Razi, PW 5, who was the polling agent of
the election petitioner and a resident of the locality in
support of the correctness of the elereports including
advertisements and messages as published in the said
newspaper. We have carefully perused his testimony and
find that his evidence also falls short of proving the contents
of the reports of the alleged speeches or the messages and
the advertisements, which appeared in different issues of
the newspaper. Since, the maker of the report which formed
 (18)

basis of the publications, did not appear in the court to

depose about the facts as perceived by him, the facts
contained in the published reports were clearly inadmissible.
No evidence was led by the election petitioner to prove the
contents of the messages and the advertisements as the
original manuscript of the advertisements or the messages
was not produced at the trial. No witness came forward to
prove the receipt of the manuscript of any of the
advertisements or the messages or the publication of the
same in accordance with the manuscript. There is no
satisfactory and reliable evidence on the record to even
establish that the same were actually issued by IUML or
MYL, ignoring for the time being, whether or not the
appellant had any connection with IUML or MYL or that the
same were published by him or with his consent by any
other person or published by his election agent or by any
other person with the consent of his election agent. The
evidence of the election petitioner himself or of PW 4 and
PW 5 to prove the contents of the messages and
advertisements in the newspaper in our opinion was wrongly
admitted and relied upon as evidence of the contents of the
statement contained therein."
19. In the case of Ghanshyam Upadhyay v. State of U.P. :
(2020) 16 SCC 811 it has been held by the Apex Court in
paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 as under:-
"6. As noted, the entire basis for making the
allegations as contained in the miscellaneous petition is an
article relied on by the petitioner said to have been
published in the newspaper. There is no other material on
 (19)

record to confirm the truth or otherwise of the statement

made in the newspaper. In our view this Court will have to
be very circumspect while accepting such contentions
based only on certain newspaper reports. This Court in a
series of decisions has repeatedly held that the newspaper
item without any further proof is of no evidentiary value. The
said principle laid down has thereafter been taken note in
several public interest litigations to reject the allegations
contained in the petition supported by newspaper report.
7. It would be appropriate to notice the decision in
Kushum Lata v. Union of India [Kushum Lata v. Union of
India, (2006) 6 SCC 180] wherein it is observed thus :
(SCC p. 186, para 17)
“17. … It is also noticed that the petitions are based on
newspaper reports without any attempt to verify their
authenticity. As observed by this Court in several cases,
newspaper reports do not constitute evidence. A petition
based on unconfirmed news reports, without verifying their
authenticity should not normally be entertained. As noted
above, such petitions do not provide any basis for verifying
the correctness of statements made and information given
in the petition.”
8. This Court in Rohit Pandey v. Union of India [Rohit
Pandey v. Union of India, (2005) 13 SCC 702] while
considering the petition purporting to be in public interest
filed by a member of the legal fraternity had come down
heavily on the petitioner, since the said petition was based
only on two newspaper reports without further verification."

20. From the above judgements it is clear that newspaper report

 (20)

by itself does not constitute an evidence of the contents of it. The

reports are only hearsay evidence. They have to be proved either
by production of the reporter who heard the said statements and
sent them for reporting or by production of report sent by such
reporter and production of the Editor of the newspaper or it's
publisher to prove the said report. It has been held by the Apex
Court that newspaper reports are at best secondary evidence and
not admissible in evidence without proper proof of its content
under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It is thus clear that
newspaper report is not a “legal evidence” which can be examined
in support of the complainant.

21. It is trite law that there has to be legal evidence in support of

the allegations levelled against a person. In the present case the
only evidence relied upon is the newspaper reporting and nothing
else. For what has been stated above and as per the settled legal
position, a newspaper report is not a “legal evidence”.

22. In so far as the judgements relied by learned counsel for the

petitioner are concerned, in the case of Dr. Subramaniam
Swamy (Supra) the same related to a press conference which
was held by the accused at Chandigarh in which he had made
certain statements which were said to be defamatory. The same
was made in the presence of several newspaper reporters and
others and then on the next day it was published in the
newspaper. In the case of P. Lankesh (Supra), the accused were
the printer, editor and publisher of a news magazine “Lankesh
Patrika” in which an article containing alleged defamatory
imputations against the complainant was published. In the case of
Dilip Hazarika (Supra), the two accused were the Managing
 (21)

Director and the Editor of a weekly “Raijer Prahri” which had

published a news item against which a complaint was filed. In the
case of Pankaj Jyoti Borah (Supra), the accused persons had
held a press meeting at a press club which was covered by the
electronic media and print media and was published in
newspaper. In the case of Ashok Singhal (Supra), an article had
appeared in a weekly news magazine “Panchjanya” which had
carried an interview of the accused in which it was alleged that
there were certain offending things said by him. The case of Lee
Kun Hee (Supra), is totally different on facts and distinguishable
from the present case. The said case arises out of an agreement
between two parties with regards to supply of certain products and
the dispute related to business transaction. It has no application
as such in the present case.

23. Conveying a press conference and/or giving an interview to

the press is a totally different act than addressing a general public
meeting in elections. A person holding a press conference and a
person giving an interview to the press has a clear intention and
message to the persons present that his speech or lecture or
answers be published in newspaper and magazines. Addressing a
general public meeting during elections for the purposes of
canvasing in elections is a totally different act with a different
intention and object. The same is to address the gathering present
at the spot so as to imbibe a thought in them for supporting the
said political party.

24. Section 177 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 reads as

under:-

“177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial. - Every offence

 (22)

shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within

whose local jurisdiction it was committed.”

25. Section 179 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 reads as

under:-

“179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence

ensues. - When an act is an offence by reason of anything
which has been done and of a consequence which has
ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court
within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or
such consequence has ensued.”

26. While dealing with the word “consequence” appearing in

Section 179 of Cr.P.C., in the case of Ganeshi Lal Vs. Nand
Kishore : 1912 SCC Online All 76 : 1912 (Vol. X) A.L.J.R. 45, it
has been held as under:-

“The word "consequence" in this section, in my opinion,

means a consequence which forms a part and parcel of the
offence. It does not mean a consequence which is not such
a direct result of the act of the offender as to form no part of
that offence. In Babu Lal Vs. Ghansham Dass : (1908) 5
A.L.J.R. 333, it is remarked: "it is contended that section
179 by reason of the words ‘contained in it’ and ‘of any
consequence which has ensued’ gives the Magistrate at
Aligarh in this case jurisdiction. But the only reasonable
interpretation which can be put upon these words is that
they are intended to embrace only such consequences as
modify or complete the acts alleged to be an offence." The
above remarks support the view I take.”
 (23)

27. The Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Singh Dhoni

(Supra) has specifically in para 14 sounded word of caution to the
Magistrates conferred with the power of taking cognizance and
issuing summons to satisfy themselves with regard to concept of
territorial jurisdiction apart from the other aspects of the matter. In
the present case, the trial court has rightly followed the procedure
and passed the impugned order dated 11.03.2022. The trial court
was even cognizant of the fact that summoning of a person in a
criminal case is a serious matter. Times and again the Apex Court
and this Court has been reminding the legal position that
summoning of a person is a serious issue and a person cannot be
summoned merely by making an allegation against him. The order
of the trial court is thus found to be a proper and judicious
exercise of its power. The revisional court while deciding the
revision against the order dated 11.03.2022 passed by the trial
court has also considered every aspect of the matter and then has
come to its conclusion that the order impugned therein does not
suffer from any illegality and has dismissed the revision. The place
of occurrence in the present case is Malakheda, District Alwar
(Rajasthan). The complaint, inquiry on it in the nature of
statements under section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. are vague in so far
as accruing of the cause of action to the complainant at the place
of filing of the complaint is concerned. This Court does not find
any irregularity, illegality or perversity in the judgement and order
dated 26.04.2022 passed by the revisional court also.

28. Thus looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the
legal pronouncements as enumerated above, this Court comes to
the conclusion that the Court at Mau had no territorial jurisdiction
to entertain the said complaint. The dismissal of the same vide
 (24)

order dated 11.03.2022 under Section 203 Cr.P.C. is just and

proper. Further the dismissal of the revision vide judgment and
order dated 26.04.2022 (wherein the order dated 11.03.2022 was
challenged) is also without any illegality, irregularity and perversity.

29. The present petition is thus dismissed.

30. At this stage it would be apt to state that there has been a
concurrent finding by two courts with regards to the question of
territorial jurisdiction. The same is also been affirmed by this court.

31. The complainant/petitioner is an Advocate by profession as

has been declared by him in the affidavit given in the present
petition before this Court. Even in the alleged legal notice dated
07.01.2019 sent by him, the copy of which is annexed as
Annexure No. S.A-3 to the supplementary affidavit dated
07.09.2022 in the bottom at the place of his signature he has
disclosed himself to be an Advocate. He has clearly abused the
process of law. In these circumstances, this Court imposes a
token cost of Rs. 5,000/- on him to be paid within 30 days from
today in the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court for
utilization therein.

(Samit Gopal, J.)

Order Date :-30.09.2022

Gaurav

Digitally signed by GAURAV

KULSHRESTHA
Date: 2022.09.30 16:21:49 IST
Reason:
Location: High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad