Research in Transportation Business & Management 6 (2013) 11–18

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Research in Transportation Business & Management

Deregulation of and mergers among American and Canadian railroads: A study of

four decades
Paul D. Larson ⁎
CN Professor of SCM, University of Manitoba, 484 Drake Centre, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Deregulation of the North American railroad industry continues to be controversial (Trunick, 2010). Class I
Received 26 June 2012 American and Canadian rail carriers have exploited the policy environment, consolidated and prospered.
Received in revised form 11 December 2012 However, some of their customers, the “captive” shippers, have complained about lack of competition, higher
Accepted 14 December 2012
rates and deteriorating service. This paper reviews developments in the industry over the last four decades,
Available online 16 January 2013
and looks to the future in discussing policy implications. Each decade is characterized by an important event
Keywords:
or development impacting the industry, as follows: 1970–1979 is the decade of deregulation; 1980–1989, the
Railroads decade of intermodal growth; 1990–1999, the decade of mega-mergers; and 2000–2009, the decade of rising
Deregulation oil prices. The paper also draws on secondary data to analyze the impact of deregulation and other factors on
Mergers rail freight rates, service and traffic volume. The industry faces new challenges and opportunities due to
Oil prices increasing demand for rail service, rising fuel costs and concerns about emissions. To meet the rising demand,
rail capacity will have to increase. Given that rail is generally “greener” than trucking, an important public
policy question is whether the government should facilitate further modal shifting via some sort of carbon
tax.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction concludes with a discussion on implications for railroad management,

for public policy, and for further study.
This paper starts with a look at the railroad industry over the last
four decades, one decade at a time. The 1970s is called the decade of
2. 1970–1979: the decade of deregulation
deregulation. Though the single most important Congressional Act of
rail deregulation, the Staggers Act, was not passed until 1980, events
The 1970s witnessed numerous American railroad bankruptcies
and legislation of the 1970s set the stage for Staggers—and further
(Willig & Baumol, 1987), leading to a close examination of federal
deregulation. The 1980s is the decade of intermodal growth. During this
regulatory policy. A series of congressional acts followed, highlighted
decade, trailer and container loadings in the United States doubled.
by the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) Act of
Next, the 1990s is the decade of mega-mergers. By 1999, there were
1976.
only two large railroads “serving” the western United States, two
more in the east, and a total of eight Class 1 railroads, including the
American operations of Canadian National and Canadian Pacific. By 2.1. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970
contrast, back in 1970, there were 71 Class 1 railroads. Finally, the first
decade of the new millennium, 2000–2009, is called the decade of rising Railroads traditionally provided passenger and freight service
oil prices. After fourteen years of relative stability, hovering around $20 under their common-law obligations. A dramatic decline in passenger
per barrel between 1986 and 1999, oil prices rose rapidly and became traffic–due to growing use of automobiles and commercial air travel–
more volatile, before “settling” somewhere around $80 per barrel. made railroads eager to eliminate unprofitable passenger trains.
This is followed by two short sections, looking briefly at Class 1 The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) authorized discontinu-
railroads in Canada and presenting a statistical profile of U.S. rail- ance of 768 trains, but required continuance of 531 trains, from
roads, from 1970 to 2009. The data help explain intermodal growth, 1959 to 1970 (Locklin, 1976). To eliminate additional trains, the rail-
along with trends in traffic volume and freight rates. The paper roads downgraded passenger service, inspiring the ICC to permit
discontinuance.
⁎ Tel.: +1 204 474 6054. Concern over declining availability and deteriorating service
E-mail address: [email protected]. quality led the ICC to issue the following warning in its 82nd Annual

2210-5395/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rtbm.2012.12.003
12 P.D. Larson / Research in Transportation Business & Management 6 (2013) 11–18

Report: “without immediate action on the part of the federal of years available for use of the subsidy was extended to five. The Act
government, significant segments of the country will soon face the also authorized Federal expenditures of up to $540 million during
loss of their last remaining rail passenger service” (ICC, 1976). the five-year period: $180 million for the Northeastern Region and
Congress recognized that the railroad industry was important to the $360 million to assist the entire nation through June 30, 1981 (Fair &
economic well-being of the nation. Could railroads be expected to Guandolo, 1983). By the late 1970s, more than 20% of the railroad tracks
provide services if revenues were less than costs? in the United States were being operated by bankrupt firms (Ellig,
This question was first addressed in the Rail Passenger Service Act 2002).
of 1970. Under the Act, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak) was created to take control of inter-city rail passenger ser- 2.4. Rail deregulation in the late 1970s
vice, starting May 1, 1971. It covered any railroad providing inter-city
passenger service that chose to enter into contracts with Amtrak. The In 1979, an ICC directive eliminated regulation of rail transporta-
cost of subsidizing passenger rail service was transferred from private tion of fresh fruits and vegetables. As a result, fresh produce rail
industry (railroads) to the government (DOT, 1977). freight traffic increased 14% from 1978 to 1979, reversing a 25-year
decline. The Commission also refined its handling of rail rate cases
2.2. Regional Rail Reorganization (3R) Act of 1973 during 1979, and allowed further reductions in uneconomic branch
line operations (AAR, 1980). Finally, key committees in the Senate
The Penn Central bankruptcy, declared June 21, 1970, revived and the House moved forward with legislation aimed at some addi-
interest in a possible federal government take-over of some or all of tional relief from regulation for railroads. The deregulation of the
the American railroad system. Of the 208,000 miles of track that American railroad industry was a legislative priority throughout
comprised the system, between 10 and 20% was being operated by 1979 and into 1980.
bankrupt railroads, which were almost exclusively located in the
manufacturing region of the United States (Black & Runke, 1975).
2.5. A note on deregulation and privatization
Congress passed the 3R Act to manage the collapse of the North-
eastern railroads. It created a publicly-financed entity, the United
There is a close practical connection between deregulation and
States Railway Association (USRA). The purposes of the USRA includ-
privatization, although these terms are conceptually distinct. According
ed preparing a system plan for restructuring Northeast freight opera-
to Morrison, Yarrow, Lawton-Smith, Yamauchi, and Murakami (1995),
tions and assisting in the establishment of the Consolidated Rail
“privatization itself is a form of deregulation: although in principle
Corporation (Conrail). The USRA also provided for the financing of
state-owned enterprises can be required to operate as fully commercial
Conrail and Amtrak (Fair & Williams, 1975). The ICC was directed
operations, in practice they are frequently used as instruments to
by Section 207(d) of the 3R Act to submit an evaluation of the USRA's
achieve certain types of political or public policy goals.” Privatization
final system plan to Congress (ICC, 1975).
of railroad freight transportation in the U.S. is largely limited to the
In the early 1970s, railroads faced continuing decline in traffic. As
case of Conrail in 1987 (Høj et al., 1995). However, Winston (2009)
traffic over a given line declined, the railroad reduced line mainte-
observes there has been little if any “pure privatization,” since the
nance. Such lines rapidly fell into a downward spiral of declining
government often maintains some form of regulation such as maximum
traffic, reduced maintenance, deteriorating service, further declining
rates and limits on entry. Pure privatization and deregulation are trans-
traffic—and ultimately, application for abandonment. Between 1920
formative policies where government transfers ownership, operation
and 1970, American railroads filed 4473 abandonment applications,
and/or control of transportation assets and decisions to private firms
an average of 89 per year, involving 73,555 miles of track. From
and does not regulate their rates, services, expansion and contraction.
1971 to 1973 alone, the ICC received 780 abandonment applications,
Winston suggests that the American experience with railroad deregula-
involving more than 4400 miles of track (Spraggins, 1976).
tion can identify important issues for other countries interested in
The 3R Act also extended the principle of the Rail Passenger
privatization.
Service Act of 1970 to unprofitable freight lines in the Northeast.
The federal government would assume financial responsibility for
unprofitable service to continue, and would underwrite the corre- 3. 1980–1989: the decade of intermodal growth
sponding losses. Thus, a program was established to enable continua-
tion of local rail service for which social costs of termination, e.g., job During the 1980s, intermodal (trailer and container) traffic doubled,
losses, exceeded the costs of subsidy (DOT, 1977). In 1974, 140 appli- from 3 million units in 1980 to 6 million in 1989 (AAR, 1998). Inter-
cations seeking authority to abandon 2251 miles of rail line were modal became the second largest source of railroad traffic, after coal
filed. Only two certificates of abandonment, involving 529 miles, (Spraggins, 1989). Moreover, rail–truck intermodal traffic, compared
were granted by the ICC. This development was largely attributable to boxcar traffic, offered greater potential for competition among
to certain provisions of the 3R Act (e.g., Section 304) and the Harlem railroads, since shipper locations were less tied to the tracks of a single
Valley decision, which required the ICC to establish new guidelines for carrier (Fitzsimmons, 1987). One study linked the growth of intermodal
assessing environmental impacts of abandonment. traffic to the freight rates and service capabilities of railroad vs. motor
carriers—and to deregulation (Babcock & German, 1989).
2.3. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) Act of 1976
3.1. More deregulation
This act mandated major changes in the regulation of American rail-
road transportation. For the first time since the creation of the ICC in The movement toward deregulation of American railroads contin-
1887, Congress enacted legislation reducing regulation imposed by ued into the 1980s. Prior to 1980, the federal government set maxi-
the Interstate Commerce Act. The 4R Act included provisions giving rail- mum and minimum rates, required “open routing” without regard
roads more flexibility to raise and lower freight rates, imposing time for the profitability of any given route, and strictly limited track aban-
limits on ICC handling of railroad proceedings, and establishing both donment (Ellig, 2002). Following the 4R Act of 1976, on October 14,
an Office of Rail Public Counsel in the ICC and a permanent Rail Services 1980, the Staggers Act lifted much of the remaining economic regula-
Planning Office. tion off of the railroads (Barrett, 1987). Staggers granted railroads
The 4R Act expanded subsidization of essential but unprofitable rail considerable freedom to set rates. It declared rail-freight contracts
service beyond the Northeast to the entire nation. Further, the number legal and exempt from ICC regulation. In conjunction with the 4R
 P.D. Larson / Research in Transportation Business & Management 6 (2013) 11–18 13

Act, Staggers also shortened the timeframe for ICC decisions on productivity and service quality without raising legal questions
merger applications (Harper, 1982). (Ettorre, 1987).
Additional deregulation directly facilitated the growth of inter-
modal transportation (Bitzan & Keeler, 2011). ICC proceeding Ex 3.4. Re-regulation
Parte No. 230, effective March 23, 1981, freed trailer-on-flatcar
(TOFC) traffic from regulation. Later, a January 6, 1983 ruling gave The Staggers Act brought benefits for railroads, consumers,
railroads freedom to create or acquire trucking firms, enabling oppor- taxpayers and most shippers. Still, “in 1986, Congress came within a
tunities for rail–truck coordination (Muller, 1995). hair of re-imposing many of the restrictive rules” lifted in 1980
Grimm and Smith (1986) reported that rail rates had fallen and (Barnekov, 1987). Congress also considered revisions to the Staggers
service (speed, reliability, availability of cars) had improved since Act, toward reregulation, in 1988 (Clements, 1988). However, in a
the passage of Staggers. Ten years after the Staggers Act, Dillon 10-to-9 vote, the Senate Commerce Committee defeated a bill
(1990) confirmed these shipper benefits, noting that “more than proposed by Consumers United for Rail Equity (CURE) (Anonymous,
60% of all rail freight now moves via contracts.” Another 1990 report 1988). A critical issue was the impact of deregulation and mergers
found that average rail rates had declined 22% and intermodal rates on railroad competition.
had fallen 29% since the Staggers Act (Anonymous, 1990). Dennis
(2000, p. 63) estimates: “shippers saved nearly $28 billion per year”
4. 1990–1999: the decade of mega-mergers
due to rate reductions from 1982 to 1996. According to Ellig (2002,
p. 159), “an unpredicted effect of rail deregulation was improvement
During the 1990s, the number of Class I American railroads
in the quality of service.” Routing flexibility and shipper/carrier con-
dropped from 14 to eight (see Appendix A). After the 1995 consolida-
tracts enabled faster, more reliable service—the essence of just-in-
tion of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe and Burlington Northern
time logistics.
(BN) into BNSF, and the 1996 merger of Southern Pacific (SP) into
Union Pacific (UP), only two major railroads remained in the West
3.2. Just-in-time (JIT)
(Wilner, 1997). Meanwhile, in the East, two large railroads controlled
most traffic following the division of Conrail between Norfolk South-
During the 1980s, American manufacturers began adopting
ern and CSX (Anonymous, 1998a). Partly due to these mega-mergers,
just-in-time (JIT) logistics management (Larson, 1998). In a study of
the U.S. Senate was again considering reregulation of the railroad
manufacturers' inbound transportation, 87% of survey respondents
industry near the end of the 1990s (Barnes, 1999a).
were into JIT implementation. An interesting finding was that JIT
implies greater demand for air cargo—and less demand for rail freight
service (Harper & Goodner, 1990). Another survey-based study on JIT 4.1. BNSF
transportation concluded: “the biggest loser in both inbound and
outbound movements is the railroad industry” (Lieb & Miller, 1988). On July 20, 1995, the ICC voted unanimously in favor of the consol-
Others viewed JIT as an opportunity for, rather than a threat to, the idation of Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe and BN (Wilner, 1997). Since
railroads. Spraggins suggested shipper requirements for JIT delivery the ICC was retired at the end of 1995, after controlling the American
(i.e., speed and reliability) makes movement of freight by truck railroads for 108 years (Worsham, 1996), this was among the
more attractive. However, he also noted that railroads could attract Commission's last official actions. [As noted by Ellig (2002), after
JIT traffic with intermodal service (Spraggins, 1989). Higginson and 1995, ICC regulatory authority over the railroads moved over to the
Bookbinder (1990) assert that rail freight contracts, legalized through Surface Transportation Board (STB)]. This largely end-to-end unifica-
deregulation, permit railroads to offer JIT tailored services. One JIT tion made BNSF the largest North American railroad, with over
opportunity for railroads is TOFC Plan 2, with railroad-owned trucks 31,000 miles of track (Morris, 1995). For four months, Union Pacific
performing pick-up and delivery. tried to take control of Santa Fe's stock and block the merger. While
it failed to halt the merger, UP forced BN to pay approximately 50%
3.3. Mergers more than originally offered for the Santa Fe (Burns, 1998). As a
condition of the merger, UP was granted trackage rights over Santa
Wilner (1997) writes: “the ICC proved an enthusiastic enabler of Fe between Abilene, Kansas and Superior, Nebraska, a major grain
railroad mergers and consolidations during the 1980s.” There were traffic center (Welty, 1995). In gaining Santa Fe's intermodal fleet,
six large (10,000+ miles of track) mergers from 1980 to 1989. First, BNSF was well-positioned to compete against its Western rivals, UP
the St. Louis–San Francisco merged into Burlington Northern in and SP (LaMonica, 1995).
1980. Also in the West, Union Pacific (UP) gained financial control
of Missouri Pacific and Western Pacific in 1982; Denver & Rio Grande 4.2. Union Pacific
Western gained control of Southern Pacific in 1988; and UP gained
control of Missouri–Kansas–Texas (Katy) in 1988. In the East, the On July 3, 1996, the Surface Transportation Board (STB) approved
Chessie System and Seaboard Coast Line consolidated to form CSX the UP/SP railroad merger. This merger enabled UP to surpass BNSF as
Transportation in 1980, and Norfolk & Western and the Southern the largest American railroad, and gave these two rivals control of
Railway unified to become Norfolk Southern in 1982. 90% of all the rail freight traffic in the West. STB approval came with
Burns (1998) argues that regulation, including restrictions on conditions, including trackage rights granted to BNSF on all
mergers between railroads and motor carriers, was the main “two-to-one” lanes, i.e., lanes formerly served by both UP and SP
constraint on intermodal growth during the 1970s. Deregulation in (Burke, 1996). Prior to this merger, UP and SP operated along a
the late 1970s and early 1980s eased restrictions on multi-modal large number of parallel lines. Parallel mergers create opportunities
mergers. In 1984, Norfolk Southern acquired a motor carrier, North to route faster intermodal trains over one line and slower trains
American Van Lines. In 1986, Burlington Northern acquired three over the other (Bradley, 1997). Such mergers could also eliminate
Class 1 motor carriers and UP moved to acquire Overnite Express, competition and reduce incentives for the remaining railroad to
the largest non-union motor carrier in the United States. Some offer outstanding service to shippers (Anonymous, 1978). In another
experts expressed concern about legal and regulatory implications important merger, UP won unanimous ICC approval to merge the
of rail–truck mergers. Perhaps strategic alliances–rather than Chicago & North Western into its rail system in February 1995
mergers–between rail and motor carriers could improve cooperation, (Wilner, 1997).
14 P.D. Larson / Research in Transportation Business & Management 6 (2013) 11–18

4.3. Dividing Conrail barrel. Generally, fuel prices had fallen since 1983 (Bitzan & Wilson,
2007). But that was about to change.
Norfolk Southern and CSX had been vying for control of Conrail since
1985, when Norfolk Southern offered $1.2 billion. In October 1996, CSX 5. 2000–2009: the decade of rising oil prices
offered to purchase Conrail for $8.1 billion. Norfolk Southern quickly
countered with a bid of $9.1 billion. After that offer was rejected, a Fig. 1 shows the price of oil in US$ per barrel, from 1970 to 2011.
three-way deal emerged, with CSX and Norfolk Southern dividing Throughout the 1990s, oil prices were relatively stable at around $20
Conrail. The price tag was $10.2 billion (Wilner, 1997). On July 23, per barrel. Note that the average price of oil rose from $30 per barrel
1998, the STB approved the split-up with limited conditions in 2000 to over $60 per barrel in 2009, after approaching $100 per
(Anonymous, 1999a). Norfolk Southern acquired 58% of Conrail—and barrel in 2008. At the time of this writing, the price of oil is about
CSX got the rest. Dividing Conrail made CSX and Norfolk Southern the US $85 per barrel. Average cost of diesel fuel for the railroads also
third and fourth largest among American railroads, behind UP and skyrocketed during the decade, from 87.5 cents per gallon in 2000
BNSF (Anonymous, 1998a). up to $3.12 per gallon in 2008 and back down to $1.77 per gallon in
2009 (AAR, 2010, p. 61).
4.4. Impact of mega-mergers Fuel has long been a significant element of transportation operat-
ing costs. Naturally, its significance rises with oil prices. In 2000, fuel
The three mega-mergers of the 1990s have all been plagued with accounted for approximately 20% of transportation operating costs.
problems. It took BNSF much longer than expected to operationally More recently, at $140 per barrel (in 2008), it represented over 50%
merge the two railroads. BNSF had trouble consolidating dispatching of operating costs. Further, were the price of oil to reach $200 per
operations, handling delays in information system integration, and barrel, it would be over 70% of the operating costs (DOT, 2008, p. 4).
avoiding shortages of locomotive power (Welty, 1997). These prob- While this calculation ignores possible railroad responses to soaring
lems were blamed on everything from poor customer service to bad fuel costs, e.g., alternative fuels and other “green” transportation
weather (Bradley, 1997). strategies, oil prices are likely to have an increasing impact on rail-
By 1998, economists estimated that the UP/SP merger had cost road operations.
American shippers $2 billion. UP's stock price fell from $71 to $50 The North American economy and transportation system has become
per share. Blame for the fiasco was pinned on computer problems, increasingly dependent on oil since the 1950s (DOT, 2008, p. 2). In a
labor rules, federal regulators, shippers with too much freight to recent survey, “reliance on oil was identified as the greatest vulnerability
move, arrogant railroad management—and the weather (O'Reilly, and an immediate change in oil availability as a result of external disrup-
1998). A telephone survey found Northern Nevada shippers very tions such as civil unrest, terrorist attacks, strikes or export restrictions
concerned about lack of railroad competition following the UP/SP could have an extensive global impact on supply chain and transport
merger. It also revealed a dramatic deterioration of rail service, networks (WEF, 2012).” Dependence on oil was also found to be the
along this two-to-one lane, since the merger. Some captive shippers least well-managed vulnerability facing global supply chains today.
suggested that the merger should be dismantled and/or the rail
industry should be regulated anew (Larson & Spraggins, 1998). How- 5.1. Peak oil
ever, other shippers reported that UP's service was improving
(Anonymous, 1998b). The recent rise in oil prices appears to reflect long-term growth in
Breen (2004) presents a case study of the UP/SP merger, including global demand that existing supply cannot meet (DOT, 2008). Some
a look at post-merger benefits of interest to the STB, i.e., cost reduc- experts suggest that global average energy use per person peaked in
tions and service improvements. Despite early post-merger service about 1973, and has since gone into a steep decline (Gibbons, Blair,
problems–caused by labor and systems integration issues, along & Gwin, 1989). Duncan (1996) uses the ratio of world energy use to
with rising demand and bottlenecks–these problems were largely world population to estimate the peak. According to Duncan, the life
overcome by the end of 1998. In addition, the evidence suggests expectancy of Industrial Civilization is the duration between the year
that the merger yielded cost savings, some of which were passed on average energy use per person rose to 37% of its peak value (1930)
to shippers in the form of rate reductions. and the year it is expected to fall back to 37% of its peak (2025). “It is
Like BNSF and UP/SP, the division of Conrail between CSX and a short, extravagant period when transportation, commerce and indus-
Norfolk Southern was a rough ride. There were reports of bogus try were powered predominantly by (nonrenewable) fossil-fuels.” The
data entered in computers, rail cars going in the wrong direction, peak was reached in about 1977, less than fifty years after it began.
and shipments moving back and forth without being unloaded Then, for the first time, average per capita energy use started to decline.
(Popke, 1999). According to shippers, the problems also included
heavy track congestion, low train availability and lack of crews to 100.00
operate equipment (Bradley, Gooley, & Cooke, 1999). The railroads 90.00
and their customers could not agree about whether congestion had 80.00
abated (Anonymous, 1999b). UPS, the largest railroad customer in 70.00
the United States at the time, diverted half its intermodal traffic 60.00
from CSX and Norfolk Southern to various motor carriers. This was 50.00
in response to the deteriorating rail service, i.e., poor on-time delivery 40.00
performance (Lang, 1999).
30.00
Happily, by 2001, service problems from the UP–SP merger and
20.00
division of Conrail by CSX and Norfolk Southern were largely solved
10.00
(Ellig, 2002). Bitzan and Wilson (2007) estimate that from 1983
0.00
to 2003, railroad consolidation accounted for an 11.4% reduction 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
in industry costs. Moreover, the two largest mergers (UP–SP and
Source: http://www.economagic.com/em cgi/data.exe/tmp/205 200 149 195!20120528173800
BN–SF) coincided with the largest cost savings. Near the end of
1999, BNSF and CN announced their intention to merge. Also, as the Fig. 1. Oil prices, US$ per barrel, 1970–2011.
turn of the century approached, fuel costs were a bright spot for the Source: http://www.economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/tmp/205-200-149-195!
railroads. In 1999, oil prices averaged slightly less than US$20 per 20120528173800.
 P.D. Larson / Research in Transportation Business & Management 6 (2013) 11–18 15

More recent estimates of peak oil production range from 2003 to 2035 by rail also reduces highway congestion, as one freight train can
(de Almeida & Silva, 2009). carry the load of nearly 300 trucks (AAR, 2011a, 2011b).

5.2. Emission control

6. Oh, Canada
The decade starting in 2000 also came with increasing concerns
Rail deregulation came later to Canada, starting with the National
about harmful emissions caused during transportation. In 2008, total
Transportation Act of 1987. The NTA eased restrictions on rail-line
U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were 7052.6 million metric tons
abandonments and allowed railroads to negotiate confidential
carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2e). Transportation is the second
contracts with shippers (Madar, 2002). According to Dempsey,
largest source of CO2 emissions, at 33% of the total. (The electric
Thoms, and Clapp (1990, p. 145), “the Canadian government chose
power sector is first, at 40.6%.) Transportation emissions come princi-
to follow the U.S. example and substantially deregulate the rails.
pally from combustion of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel (EIA, 2008).
Many of the features found in the National Transportation Act
In 2010, the DOT sent a 605-page report to the Congress titled
(of 1987) were found originally in the Staggers Rail Act in the U.S.”
Transportation's Role in Reducing U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
They also suggest that assuring competitive access for captive shippers
In North America, railroad emissions are mostly produced through
was the unique difference in Canadian deregulation. The Canada Trans-
combustion of diesel by locomotives. Carbon dioxide (CO2), the domi-
portation Act of 1996 further deregulated the rails. Line-abandonment
nant GHG produced by railroads, tends to vary directly with the amount
controls were eased, and rate intervention was made available only
of fuel burned. Locomotive criteria air contaminant (CAC) emissions in-
on appeal (Madar, 2002).
clude oxides of nitrogen (NOX), particulate matter (PM), hydro-carbons
Rail mergers have been less of an issue within Canada, which has
(HC) and carbon monoxide (CO). They are toxic to humans, and can
had only two major carriers for many decades. Canadian National
contribute to the formation of smog. Unlike GHG emissions, CAC emis-
(CN) was created as a crown corporation in a series of mergers
sions vary substantially based on locomotive design and application—
between 1917 and 1923; CN and Canadian Pacific (CP) have been
and their impact on air quality increases in proximity to railway opera-
the two national railroads ever since. However, both CN and CP
tions (rail yards, in particular), where there is substantial locomotive
have been involved in American railroad mergers. CP absorbed the
activity (SDTC, 2009).
Soo Line in 1990, and acquired the bankrupt Delaware and Hudson
Steenhof, Woudsma, and Sparling (2006) note that GHG emissions
in 1991.
produced by transportation of freight are influenced by volume of
CN was privatized in 1995. In the years following privatization,
freight moved, share of the freight moved by various modes, types
CN aggressively developed north–south routes by acquiring American
of fuel used and energy efficiency of the transportation modes. In
railroad assets (Steenhof et al., 2006). In 1999, CN purchased the
Canada, emissions increased from 1990 to 2003, mostly due to greater
Illinois Central, which provides a direct route from Chicago to the
freight volume and a modal shift, from rail to truck. They attribute the
Gulf Coast, and entered an alliance with Kansas City Southern (KCS),
modal shift to truck to growing interest in “just-in-time” delivery and
which offers a through connection to Mexico. By this time, CN was
increasing cross-border traffic following the Canada/U.S. Free Trade
widely considered North America's most cost-efficient railroad
Agreement in 1989.
(Madar, 2002).
Railroading is considerably more fuel efficient and environmentally-
On December 20, 1999, CN and BNSF announced plans for a merg-
friendly than trucking. And railroads continue to reduce their energy
er. In March 2000, the STB responded by imposing a 15-month
and emission intensity by increasing the volume of freight in an average
moratorium on rail mergers. This would allow time for the STB to
carload and onboard an average freight train; deploying newer, higher
consider the situation and develop new rules (Beargie, 2000). On
efficiency locomotives; installing idling-reduction technologies, such as
June 11, 2001, the new merger rules were issued, raising the standard
auxiliary power units (APU); and re-positioning locomotives in the
for demonstrating public benefits. These rules represented a “para-
middle of trains to reduce the horsepower required for movement
digm shift” from being favorable on mergers to regarding them with
(AAR, 2011a). Bitzan and Keeler (2011) make the case that American
skepticism. The onus was suddenly on applicants to demonstrate how
transportation deregulation in 1980 facilitated a modal shift from truck-
a proposed merger would increase efficiency and enhance competition
load to rail intermodal, leading to lower emissions and fuel consumption.
(Anonymous, 2001).
Further, a carbon tax on fuel would surely shift even more freight from
truck to intermodal.
7. A brief statistical profile of the American railroad industry,
5.3. Modal shift 1970–2009

Whether to delay our descent into the Olduvai valley (Duncan, While the purpose here is to profile the industry across several
1996), reduce emissions, or reduce fuel consumption and save critical operational and performance indicators, a number of previous
money; a growing number of shippers will likely revisit the rail studies have conducted econometric analyses of the impact of both
option. “For rail, increasing oil prices are far less of a problem than deregulation and railroad mergers on rates, volume and various
for trucking because rail is far more fuel efficient.” Further, the cost input factors. For instance, Dennis (2000) studied rail shipments
of fuel is a smaller fraction of operating costs for rail vis-à-vis from 1982 to 1996 and found that productivity-adjusted cost reduc-
trucking. However, it is unclear how much capacity the current tions accounted for about 90% of rail rate reductions. Based on a
American railroad system has to expand market share (DOT, 2008, p. 7). study of numerous cost factors–e.g., length of haul, shipment size,
A recent study compares rail vs. truck fuel efficiency for 23 origin– train length and railroad labor productivity–Ellig (2002, p. 143)
destination freight movements, in terms of ton-miles per gallon. Rail concluded: “the principal effect of railroad deregulation was to facili-
was found to be more fuel efficient for all 23 movements, with rail– tate large cost reductions, which then led to price reductions.”
truck fuel efficiency ratios ranging from 1.9 to 5.5 (FRA, 2009). Railroads Other studies have focused on the service impact of deregulation.
on average are about four times more fuel efficient than trucks, and For instance, Barnekov and Kleit (1990) estimated that increases
GHG emissions are directly related to fuel consumption. If just 10% of in service reliability, enabled by deregulation, resulted in $5 billion
long-haul freight now moving by truck moved by rail instead, annual to $10 billion inventory cost reductions for shippers during 1987.
GHG emissions would fall by more than 12 million tons—and fuel Transit time speed and variability are primary determinants of pipe-
savings would exceed one billion gallons per year. Moving more freight line and safety stock. Winston (1998) estimated greater than 20%
16 P.D. Larson / Research in Transportation Business & Management 6 (2013) 11–18

reductions in both average and standard deviation of transit time a

since deregulation in 1980. BTM
Berndt, Friedlaender, Chiang, and Vellturo (1993) investigated the 1800
impact of deregulation and mergers on Class I railroad costs, from
1700
1974 to 1986. For the six Class I railroads involved in mergers
1600
between 1980 and 1986, they found that about 91% of accumulated
1500
cost reductions were due to deregulation and the remaining 9%
1400
were due to mergers and acquisitions. Of course, the mergers were
also facilitated by deregulation. As noted above, Breen (2004) 1300
reported evidence of considerable cost savings from the 1996 UP/SP 1200
merger, along with evidence that some of these savings were passed 1100
on to shippers in the form of lower rates. Bitzan and Wilson (2007) 1000
studied the railroad industry from 1983 to 2003, with a focus on 900
mergers and acquisitions facilitated by deregulation. Similar to 800
other studies, they found substantial cost reductions for Class I rail- 700
roads following the mergers. 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.50 6.00 6.50
Appendix A shows selected annual data on Class 1 American CDRR
railroads, including industry characteristics, performance measures
and economic indicators, from 1970 to 2009. Constant dollar rail b
rates (in 2005 dollars) declined from 5.96 cents to 2.74 cents per
7.00 1750
ton-mile over these 40 years. Meanwhile, the volume of freight
carried more than doubled, from 765 billion to 1777 billion ton-miles
in 2008, before falling to 1532 billion ton-miles in recession year 6.00 1500
2009. Even more impressive is the growth of intermodal traffic,
from 2.4 million to over 12 million containers and trailers. Note also CDRR
that while the average length of haul in miles and ton-miles moved 5.00

BTM
1250
per employee hour rose sharply, track miles operated and number
of Class 1 railroads dropped dramatically.
Table 1 compares the American railroad industry across four 4.00
1000
decades; one before the Staggers Act (1970s) and three after the Act
(1980s, 1990s, 2000s). Significant reductions in miles of track operat-
3.00
ed and number of Class 1 railroads reveal that the industry took 750
advantage of relaxed rules and procedures on line abandonment
and mergers. Further, significant increases in average haul length 2.00
and ton-miles per employee hour suggest that deregulation enabled 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
railroads to increase efficiency and productivity. The significant Year
decline in constant dollar rail rates, from nearly six cents to less Key: = BTM; O = CDRR
than three cents, can be interpreted to mean American railroads
shared their savings from deregulation with their customers. Finally, Fig. 2. (a) Ton-miles, rates and deregulation. (b). Railroad rates and volume, 1970 to
2009.
these results show strong rail freight traffic growth after deregula-
tion, especially in the area of intermodal traffic.
Fig. 2 plots rail freight volume in billions of ton-miles (BTM) vs. of Fig. 2 include all the years before the Staggers Act, i.e., 1970–1979.
constant dollar rail rates (CDRR) or revenue per ton-mile/GDP price Fig. 2(b) plots rates and volume over time, making it apparent that
deflator. A power function provided the best fit with the data deregulation was followed by a decline in constant dollar rail rates—
(R-square = .87). The circled points in the lower right-hand corner and a rise in traffic volume.

8. Implications

Table 1
The American railroad industry across four decades.
8.1. For railroad management

Variable Decade F p-Value For the railroads, there appears to be an opportunity to capture
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s substantial market share from trucking. Due to their relative fuel econ-
CDRRa 5.98 5.00 3.08 2.63 117.6 .000 omy and “friendliness” to the environment, there should be growth in
BTMb 813.1 907.6 1227.1 1623.0 112.6 .000 the types of movements, by commodity and origin-to-destination
Haula 535.4 659.3 805.6 886.8 183.8 .000 distance, for which railroad transportation is competitive. Unfortunate-
TM/EHa 694.8 1242.3 2566.4 3891.7 195.8 .000 ly, this opportunity may be constrained by availability of railroad capac-
Tracka 318.2 243.1 182.8 165.1 191.1 .000
Class 1c 62.5 26.7 11.5 7.3 101.7 .000
ity (DOT, 2008) and ability to offer high quality service (Larson &
TnCa 2.66 4.51 7.70 10.58 122.4 .000 Spraggins, 1998). Krier, Klindworth, Menjivar, and Neill (2011) found
that rail service quality was highly variable between 2004 and 2009.
CDRR (constant dollar rail rates)=revenue per ton-mile/GDP price deflator (2005=1.0);
BTM (billion ton-miles); TnC=millions of trailers and containers; Haul=average In particular, when demand for rail service surged, service deteriorated.
haul length (miles); TM/EH = ton-miles per employee hour; Track = miles of track Further, commodity shippers reported increasing difficulty getting
(thousands); Class 1 = # of class 1 railroads. service guarantees from the railroads.
a
All decades significantly different, based on LSD multiple comparisons test. Stone and Landry (2008, p. 70) see a looming railroad capacity
b
All decades significantly different, except 1970s vs. 1980s, based on LSD multiple
comparisons test.
“crisis,” arguing that “the industry has a serious long-term capacity
c
All decades significantly different, except 1990s vs. 2000s, based on LSD multiple problem.” According to a panel of experts interviewed by Machalaba
comparisons test. (2011), railroads will enjoy substantial freight volume increases in the
 P.D. Larson / Research in Transportation Business & Management 6 (2013) 11–18 17

future, provided they can find a way to increase their capacity. Railroads of economic, social and environmental sustainability. In light of rising,
must also assure service quality (transit time and reliability) and offer volatile fuel prices and growing concerns about energy security and
competitive rates to increase their share of traffic vis-à-vis trucking. emissions, both modes have been moving forward aggressively with
Rail rates are less than motor carrier rates for long distance a variety of green transportation initiatives (SDTC, 2009, Chapters 4
movements. Traditionally, the weakness of rail freight transportation and 6). It would be useful to develop several plausible scenarios of
has been service, in terms of speed and reliability. When shippers surface freight transportation in North America, in terms of technolo-
want their goods delivered fast and on-time, it is hard to beat truck- gies and modal market shares, and estimate the impact of these
ing. But given the link between speed, fuel consumption and emis- scenarios on fuel consumption and emissions. For instance, what if
sions, shippers and receivers may be willing to sacrifice speed to be 10 or 20% of current long-haul truck traffic moved by rail? How
green and save money. much fuel would be saved? How much less CO2 and other gases
According to Oracle (2008), “Speed is no longer always of the would be emitted? Do the railroads have sufficient capacity to accom-
essence for today's supply chain professionals, with many considering modate these traffic increases? If not, what level of investment would
slower forms of logistics as a complement to faster modes.” This trend be required? Should the federal government facilitate this sort of
has been termed slow-gistics. However, slow does not suggest that modal shift? If so, how should it be facilitated?
poor service is acceptable. Moving slower makes reliability even more
important, to offset increases in pipeline stock. In North America,
modal shifts from truck to rail freight are another example of slow- Acknowledgments
gistics. While rail is a little slower than trucking, it is also associated
with lower freight rates, less fuel consumption, and reduced GHG The author thanks Don Harper and Barry Spraggins for providing
emissions. inspiration.

8.2. For public policy

Appendix A. A profile of the American railroad industry, 1970–2009

Kaufman (2009) argues that deregulation under the Staggers Act

of 1980 saved the American railroad industry; after construction of Sources: Railroad Facts, American Association of Railroads; Statistical Abstract of the
the Interstate Highway System in the 1950s nearly destroyed it. United States, Department of Commerce; Transportation in America, Eno Foundation;
Today, there are more captive rail shippers due to the mega-mergers, www.economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/tmp/205-200-156-68!20120618170544 (for GDP
and many of them are unhappy with freight rates and/or service price deflator).

(Machalaba, 2011). They have been pushing Congress to reregulate Year CDRR BTM TnC Haul TM/EH Track Class 1 Oil Prime
the railroads. Others are concerned that reregulation would lead to de- 1970 5.96 765 2.363 490.4 605 336.3 71 3.35 7.91
terioration of service and reduction in capacity-building investment. 1971 6.12 740 2.204 506.8 604 334.9 70 3.56 5.72
Investment in infrastructure is needed, as considerable growth in de- 1972 6.00 777 2.407 511.3 637 331.1 69 3.56 5.25
mand for rail freight service is expected for many years to come. 1973 5.79 852 2.758 531.0 696 328.6 70 3.87 8.03
1974 5.97 851 2.753 526.5 696 327.3 74 10.37 10.81
Most shippers, along with consumers and railroads, have enjoyed
1975 6.00 754 2.238 515.9 677 324.2 74 11.16 7.86
the benefits of improved economic performance since 1980. In addition, 1976 6.08 794 2.538 540.0 712 312.8 57 12.65 6.84
freedom to set rates and negotiate confidential contracts enabled the 1977 6.03 826 2.850 548.8 738 309.7 58 14.30 6.82
railroads to invest in appropriate capacity and offer innovative services. 1978 5.90 858 3.177 572.0 775 300.0 41 14.85 9.06
Until rail rates began rising in recent years, partly driven by fuel costs, 1979 5.91 914 3.278 611.0 808 277.2 41 22.40 12.67
1980 5.94 919 3.059 615.8 863 270.6 40 37.38 15.26
there was little political pressure for reregulation (Caves, Christensen, 1981 6.12 910 3.151 626.4 906 267.6 38 36.67 18.87
& Swanson, 2011). Indeed, the periodic calls for reregulation tended 1982 5.84 798 3.397 628.8 927 263.3 33 33.64 14.86
to be tabled due to more pressing matters. For instance, Boyce (2002) 1983 5.38 828 4.090 640.8 1072 258.7 32 30.40 10.79
argues that a 2001 bid by captive shippers for reregulation in the form 1984 5.15 922 4.566 644.7 1167 252.7 29 29.28 12.04
1985 4.90 877 4.591 664.5 1196 242.3 23 27.97 9.93
of open access was derailed by 9/11.
1986 4.63 868 4.997 664.5 1302 233.2 22 15.04 8.33
Should the federal government turn back the clock and reregulate 1987 4.20 944 5.504 687.7 1531 220.5 18 19.16 8.21
the railroad industry? If Congress is concerned about energy security 1988 4.06 996 5.780 696.9 1683 213.7 17 15.96 9.32
and GHG emissions, not to mention a healthy railroad industry, then 1989 3.81 1014 5.987 722.8 1776 208.3 15 19.59 10.87
the answer appears to be “no.” Indeed, perhaps Congress should be 1990 3.69 1034 6.207 725.7 1901 200.1 14 24.49 10.01
1991 3.45 1039 6.246 751.3 2020 196.1 14 21.48 8.46
promoting energy security, fuel efficiency and green transportation 1992 3.35 1067 6.628 762.5 2176 190.6 13 20.56 6.25
by supporting the railroads. The railroads would like Congress to 1993 3.23 1109 7.157 794.2 2280 186.3 13 18.46 6.00
pass a 25% tax credit for investments that increase railroad capacity 1994 3.11 1201 8.128 816.8 2509 183.7 13 17.19 7.15
(Kaufman, 2009). Carbon pricing and/or fuel taxes could also be 1995 2.93 1306 8.073 842.6 2746 180.4 11 18.43 8.83
1996 2.83 1356 8.154 841.7 2965 177.0 10 22.15 8.27
used to facilitate prosperity, energy security, sustainability—and a
1997 2.82 1349 8.696 850.9 2973 172.6 9 20.60 8.44
modal shift from truck to rail. 1998 2.72 1377 8.773 835.1 2955 171.1 9 14.39 8.35
1999 2.62 1433 8.908 834.9 3139 170.0 9 19.25 8.00
8.3. For further study 2000 2.54 1466 9.177 843.3 3293 168.5 8 30.30 9.23
2001 2.46 1495 8.935 858.5 3516 167.3 8 25.92 6.91
2002 2.46 1507 9.312 853.0 3651 170.0 8 26.10 4.67
In the future, commodity flows, fuel costs, labor availability, 2003 2.43 1551 9.956 862.4 3805 169.1 7 31.14 4.12
technology and public policy will blend to determine the evolving role 2004 2.42 1663 10.994 901.5 3908 167.3 7 41.44 4.34
of railroads in moving North America's freight. Scenario development 2005 2.62 1696 11.694 893.5 4019 164.3 7 56.47 6.19
is a useful tool to paint several plausible pictures of future surface 2006 2.76 1772 12.282 905.6 4059 162.1 7 66.10 7.96
2007 2.82 1771 12.027 912.8 4182 161.1 7 72.36 8.05
freight movement across the continent. Scenarios, i.e., descriptions of
2008 3.06 1777 11.500 919.1 4307 160.7 7 99.57 5.09
alternative futures that reflect multiple stakeholder perspectives, can 2009 2.74 1532 9.881 918.5 4177 160.8 7 61.69 3.25
be a basis for action, including strategic investment planning or public
CDRR (constant dollar rail rates)=revenue per ton-mile/GDP price deflator (2005=1.0);
policy making. BTM (billion ton-miles); TnC=millions of trailers and containers; Haul=average haul
There is a need to expand comparisons of rail vs. truck freight length (miles); TM/EH=ton-miles per employee hour; Track=miles of track (thousands);
transportation beyond rates and service, into broader considerations Class 1=# of class 1 railroads; Oil=price per barrel (US$); Prime=interest rate.
18 P.D. Larson / Research in Transportation Business & Management 6 (2013) 11–18

References Fair, M. L., & Williams, E. W. (1975). Economics of transportation and logistics. Dallas,
TX Business Publications.
AAR (1980). Railroad facts. Washington, DC Association of American Railroads. Fitzsimmons, E. L. (1987). Can railroads compete with each other? Transportation
AAR (1998). Railroad facts. Washington, DC Association of American Railroads. Quarterly, 41(3), 365–380.
AAR (2010). Railroad facts. Washington, DC Association of American Railroads. FRA (November 19). Comparative evaluation of rail and truck fuel efficiency on
AAR (2011a). The environmental benefits of moving freight by rail. Association of competitive corridors. Washington, DC Federal Railroad Administration.
American Railroads ( http://www.aar.org/~/media/aar/Background-Papers/The- Gibbons, J. H., Blair, P. D., & Gwin, H. L. (1989). Strategies for energy use. Scientific
Environmental-Benefits-of-Rail.ashx) American, 3, 86–93.
AAR (2011b). Freight railroads help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Association of Grimm, C. M., & Smith, K. G. (1986). The impact of rail regulatory reform on rates,
American Railroads ( http://www.aar.org/~/media/aar/Background-Papers/Freight- service quality, and management performance: A shipper perspective. Logistics
RR-Help-Reduce-Emissions.ashx) and Transportation Review, 22(1), 57–68.
Anonymous (October 30). How shippers view rail mergers. Railway Age (pp. 44–45). Harper, D. V. (1982). Transportation in America: Users, carriers, government (2nd ed.).
Anonymous (September 28). Railroad re-regulation bill defeated. Rail News Update Englewood Cliffs, NJ Prentice-Hall.
(1 and 4). Harper, D. V., & Goodner, K. S. (1990). Just-in-time and inbound transportation.
Anonymous (1990). Rail rates lower since Staggers Act. Inbound Logistics (pp. 4). Transportation Journal, 30(2), 22–31.
Anonymous (1998a). Conrail deal is ok'd, with conditions. American Shipper (pp. 71–72). Higginson, J. K., & Bookbinder, J. H. (1990). Implications of just-in-time production on
Anonymous (1998b). UP service getting closer to normal. American Shipper (pp. 89). rail freight systems. Transportation Journal, 29(3), 29–35.
Anonymous (1999a). CSX, NS await ‘split date’. American Shipper (pp. 26–27). Høj, J., Kato, T., & Pilat, D. (1995). Deregulation and privatisation in the service sector.
Anonymous (1999b). CSXT, NS say congestion has eased. American Shipper (pp. 68). OECD Economic Studies, 25, 37–74.
Anonymous (2001). STB's new merger rules no surprise. Progressive Railroading. ICC (August 25). Evaluation of the U.S. Railway Association's final system plan.
Babcock, M. W., & German, H. W. (1989). Toward a rail TOFC/COFC demand model. Washington, DC Interstate Commerce Commission.
Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, 30(1), 202–209. ICC (March 15). Report on the effectiveness of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970.
Barnekov, C. C. (1987). The track record. Regulation, 1, 19–27. Washington, DC Interstate Commerce Commission.
Barnekov, C. C., & Kleit, A. (1990). The efficiency effects of railroad deregulation in the Kaufman, L. H. (2009). Renaissance-or retreat? Railway age (20–22, 24, 28, 30).
United States. International Journal of Transport Economics, 17, 21–36. Krier, B., Klindworth, K., Menjivar, S., & Neill, S. (February 15). Quality of service
Barnes, D. (March 15). Senate considers re-regulation of rail industry. Transport Topics provided to rail shippers. Federal Railroad Administration.
(pp. 33). LaMonica, P. R. (December 5). From sea to shining sea. Financial World (pp. 44–46).
Barrett, C. (1987). Practical handbook of transportation contracting and rate negotiations. Lang, D. (September 6). UPS again pulls freight from rails. Transport Topics (1 and 67).
New York The Traffic Service Corporation. Larson, P. D. (1998). Air cargo deregulation and JIT: Two 20th anniversaries in
Beargie, T. (2000). STB halts rail mergers. American Shipper (pp. 14–16). American logistics. Transportation Quarterly, 52(2), 49–60.
Berndt, E. R., Friedlaender, A. F., Chiang, J. S. W., & Vellturo, C. A. (1993). Cost effects of Larson, P. D., & Spraggins, H. B. (1998). Union Pacific/Southern Pacific merger: Impact
mergers and deregulation in the U.S. rail industry. Journal of Productivity Analysis, on shippers. Journal of Transportation Management, 10(1), 45–52.
4(1/2), 127–144. Lieb, R. C., & Miller, R. A. (1988). JIT and corporate transportation requirements.
Bitzan, J. D., & Keeler, T. E. (2011). Intermodal traffic, regulatory change and carbon Transportation Journal, 27(3), 5–10.
energy conservation in US freight transport. Applied Economics, 43(27), 3945–3963. Locklin, D. P. (1976). Economics of transportation (7th ed.). Homewood, IL Irwin.
Bitzan, J. D., & Wilson, W. W. (2007). Industry costs and consolidation: Efficiency gains Machalaba, D. (May 23). The future of rail. The Wall Street Journal.
and mergers in the U.S. railroad industry. Review of Industrial Organization, 30(2), Madar, D. (2002). Rail mergers, trade, and federal regulation in the United States and
81–105. Canada. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 32(1), 143–159.
Black, W. R., & Runke, J. F. (1975). The states and rural rail preservation—Alternative Morris, G. (August 2). BN, Santa Fe merger approved. Chemical Week (pp. 45).
strategies. Lexington, KY The Council of State Governments. Morrison, S. A., Yarrow, G., Lawton-Smith, H., Yamauchi, H., & Murakami, H. (1995).
Boyce, C. (March 11). Back to the fight. Traffic World (pp. 5). International comparison of privatization and deregulation among the USA, the UK
Bradley, P. (1997). Tough times in the short haul. Logistics Management (pp. 46–48). and Japan. Airline & Trucking, Volume III, ( http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/
Bradley, P., Gooley, T., & Cooke, J. A. (1999). NS and CSX in hot seat over Conrail. public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN020998.pdf)
Logistics Management (pp. 19–20). Muller, G. (1995). Intermodal freight transportation (3rd ed.). Lansdowne, VA Eno
Breen, D. A. (2004). The Union Pacific/Southern Pacific Rail merger: A retrospective on Transportation Foundation.
merger benefits. Review of Network Economics, 3(3), 283–322. O'Reilly, B. (March 30). The wreck of the Union Pacific. Fortune (pp. 94–102).
Burke, J. (1996). STB unanimously approves UP–SP merger with expanded trackage Oracle (2008). The shape of tomorrow's supply chains: The science of sustainability
rights conditions. Traffic World (pp. 11–12). http://www.oracle.com/us/products/applications/green/051300.pdf
Burns, J. B. (1998). Railroad mergers and the language of unification. Westport, CT Popke, M. (1999). So far, not so good: NS, CSXT struggle to integrate Conrail. Progressive
Quorum Books. Railroading (pp. 8–9).
Caves, D. W., Christensen, L. R., & Swanson, J. A. (Winter). The Staggers Act, 30 years SDTC (2009). Chapter 4: Railway freight transportation. Industrial Freight Transporta-
later. Regulation (pp. 28–31). tion (pp. 23–52). Ottawa Sustainable Development Technology Canada.
Clements, J. (January 11). Surface transportation. Forbes (pp. 180–181). Spraggins, H.B. (1976, June). An evaluation of Interstate Commerce Commission rail
de Almeida, P., & Silva, P. D. (2009). The peak of oil production—Timings and market line abandonment policy and procedure in Minnesota, Doctoral Dissertation,
recognition. Energy Policy, 37, 1267–1276. University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
Dempsey, P. S., Thoms, W. E., & Clapp, S. (1990). Canadian transport liberalization: Spraggins, H. B. (1989). Marketing rail service in a deregulated environment.
Planes, trains, trucks and buses rolling across the Great While North. Transportation Transportation Quarterly, 43(2), 277–293.
Law Journal, 19(1), 113–192. Steenhof, P., Woudsma, C., & Sparling, E. (2006). Greenhouse gas emissions and the
Dennis, S. M. (2000). Changes in railroad rates since the Staggers Act. Transportation surface transport of freight in Canada. Transportation Research: Part D, 11(5),
Research: Part E, 37(1), 55–69. 369–376.
Dillon, T. F. (1990). Ten years after Staggers: Happy anniversary? Inbound Logistics Stone, R. D., & Landry, M. (2008). The railroad capacity crisis: After cutting to the bone
(pp. 26–28). and more, trains are back. Essays in Economic & Business History, 26, 63–72.
DOT (1977). Effects of railroad abandonment on the modal distribution of traffic and Trunick, P. A. (2010). Reassessing rail reregulation. Inbound Logistics.
on related costs. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Transportation WEF (2012). New models for addressing supply chain and transport risk. Geneva World
Systems Analysis and Information. Economic Forum.
DOT (2008). Impact of high oil prices on freight transportation: Modal shift potential in five Welty, G. (1995). Easing the way for BN–Santa Fe. Railway Age (pp. 63).
corridors. Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation/Transportation Welty, G. (1997). Managing the mega-mergers. Railway Age (pp. 33–35).
Economics & Management Systems, Inc. Willig, R. D., & Baumol, W. J. (1987). Using competition as a guide. Regulation, 1, 28–35.
Duncan, R. C. (June 27). The Olduvai Theory: Sliding towards a post-industrial Stone Wilner, F. N. (1997). Railroad mergers: History, analysis, insight. Omaha Simmons-Boardman
Age. Institute on Energy and Man ( http://dieoff.org/page125.htm) Books.
EIA (2008). Emissions of greenhouse gases in the United States. Washington, DC U.S. Winston, C. (1998). U.S. industry adjustment to economic deregulation. The Journal of
Energy Information Administration. Economic Perspectives, 12(3), 89–110.
Ellig, J. (2002). Railroad deregulation and consumer welfare. Journal of Regulatory Winston, C. (2009). Lessons from the U.S. transport deregulation experience for privatization.
Economics, 21(2), 143–167. OECD/International Transport Forum.
Ettorre, J. J. (1987). New Intermodalism: Joint ventures or megacarriers? Transportation Worsham, J. (1996). End of the line for the ICC. Nation's Business (pp. 32).
& Distribution (pp. 22).
Fair, M. L., & Guandolo, J. (1983). transportation regulation. (9th ed.). Dubuque, IA W.C.
Brown.