Air War over Angola
Air War over Angola:
Cuba vs. South Africa
The general image in the West about the Angolan Civil War (1975-88) was that the South African Defence Force (SADF) -
particularly the SAAF (South African Air Force)- and their UNITA allieds always mantained an overwhelming edge of
proffesionalism against their Angolan and Cuban adversaries, who only obtained some succeses due to a crushing
numerical superiority. Like many others, such impression was false, this article will show that in many occasions the MiG-
21 and MiG-23 pilots of the FAR (Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria: Revolutionary Air Force) took the upper hand and finally
defeated the SAAF, and such victory was obtained not only because they were so proffesionals as the SAAF pilots, but
also despite a South African superiority in some aspects. I show my respects and congratulations to the proffesional
South African personnel who fought in this war, but I specially devote this article to my brothers of Hispanic race, the
brave Cuban MiG pilots, who defeated the Apartheid regime, one of the most unfair political systems since the
disappearance of the Nazism. - Diego Zampini.
Top of the page: Two Cuban MiG-23ML Floggers (C-454 and C-436) with Angolan roundels. The MiG-23 was the best aircraft of
the war, and was the fighter who decided the war in the Angolan skies.
When in 1975 the Portuguese government gave the independence to their colonies of Angola and Mozambique after several years of
guerrilla warfare, almost immediately the factions who had joined forces against the Portuguese began to fight each other. The 3
main factions were the Communist MPLA (Acronym in Portuguese of Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), and the non-
Communist FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola). Seeing a great danger in the establishment of a Communist government so close to Namibia (where a Communist guerrilla
was fighting for the independence against Pretoria's regime since 1966), the SADF was sent to support UNITA in the last months of
1975, in the Operation "Savannah". The MPLA requested for assistance, and received it from the Socialist President of Cuba, Fidel
Castro, who sent Cuban ground troops and detachments of the FAR (Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria) to assist and to train the
unexistant Angolan air force.
1976: FAR wins the First Round
The first 12 MiG-21MFs (NATO codename Fishbed) and 9 MiG-17Fs arrived to Luanda's airport on January 8 1976, carried by
Soviet giantic cargo planes Antonov An-22 Antei. Few days later (January 21) the MPLA leader and official President of Angola
Agostino Neto was present in the foundation of the FAPA (Força Aerea Popular Angolana), which was at that time actually a force
where Cuban pilots flew Cuban planes with Angolan roundels. The FAR performed its first close support mission on February 8
1976 when a Cuban patrol of 16 men fell under the attack of a bigger UNITA force. The veteran of Pigs Bay Col. Rafael Del Pino
(flying a lone MiG-21MF) took off from Luanda at 8:00 hs, and destroyed one mortair battery which was punishing the besieged
Cuban patrol with 32 rockets of 57 mm. After that Del Pino disrupted the UNITA assault with 2 runs of 30 mm cannon fire.
Ironically, Del Pino did so disobeying the strict orders about do not perform ground attacks without Havanna's authorization, and he
lost the command of the FAR forces in Angola, being replaced in May by other veteran of Pigs Bay, Colonel Enrique Carrera Rolas.
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Air War over Angola
Left: The Angolan President Agostino Neto (right) congratulates the Cuban MiG-21MF Fishbed pilot Colonel
Rafael Del Pino (left) for his succesful attacks at UNITA's HQ in Gago Coutinho on March 13 1976. Colonel Del
Pino was a veteran of Pigs Bay in April 1961, where he shot down an Anticastrist B-26B flying a T-33, and he
had already saved of aniquilation a Cuban patrol on February 8 1976 with an accurate rocket attack and
several cannon fire passes.
Right: this is the MiG-21MF Fishbed C-54, the one used by Colonel Rafael Del Pino to destroy a SAAF Fokker F-
27 in the ground of Gago Coutinho airbase on March 13 1976. This photo was taken 2 days later, when Del
Pino performed an emergency landing in Munhango village due to fuel starvation. The next day he returned to
Luena airbase after a take off assisted by JATO rockets.
The proffesionalism and the superior equipment of the Cuban troops began to work and the FNLA was simply exterminated, and
both the SADF and the UNITA were forced to withdraw southwards. It is worth of mention the succesful evacuation of isolated
South African troops north of Luanda using Westland Wasp helicopters from frigates of the South African Navy. With a SAAF
presence reduced to only a few Puma and Alouette III helicopters, plus some C-130 and F-27 cargo planes to supply the UNITA, it
was easy for the FAR to gain the complete air superiority and to perform precise air attacks against the UNITA and SADF forces.
The most devastator of all those attacks was the one against the HQ of UNITA in Gago Coutinho on March 13 1976: four MiG-
21MFs leaded again by Col. Rafael Del Pino took off from the recently prepared Luena airbase at 10:00 hs and performed an
surprise raid against Gago Coutinho airbase, where Del Pino destroyed a South African cargo plane Fokker F-27 in the ground with
S-24 rockets, as his wingmen neutralized the AA defences. A second raid is done few hours later, and during it the Cuban MiG-21s
destroyed the airstrip and the hangars of the airbase, plus 12 vehicles.
Left: The remains of the SAAF F-27 destroyed by the Cuban MiG-21MF pilot Colonel Rafael Del Pino in Gago
Coutinho airbase on March 13 1976. Del Pino and his 3 wingmen used S-24 rockets of 240 mm to destroy this
plane and the AA defences in the first wave.
Right: this is one of the hangars of Gago Cuitinho airbase as it was found by Cuban ground troops in late
March 1976, showing the damages caused by Del Pino and his 3 wingmen in the second wave of attacks on
March 13.
During the next 2 weeks the FAR MiG-21s and MiG-17s kept on striking the UNITA and South African positions, causing important
damage and softening such positions to the assault of Cuban and MPLA troops supported by T-55 and T-34/85 tanks. Finally on
March 27 the SADF withdrew to Namibia and UNITA retreated to the SE corner of Angola. So, the Operation "Savannah" ended as
a bitter defeat to the SADF, with 49 deads, several POWs, hundreds of casualties, at least a dozen of Eland-90 armoured vehicles
destroyed or captured and one F-27 destroyed in the ground. With those victories, the MPLA consolidated its position as the official
government of Angola and changed its name to FAPLA (Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola).
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Air War over Angola
Some SADF armoured vehicles Eland-90 were destroyed (left) by the air strikes of the MiG-21s of the FAR in
February-March 1976. Many SADF soldiers also became POWs (right) of the Cuban troops. Despite most of the
3,300 South African soldiers sent to support the UNITA in 1975-76 could perform an ordered withdrawal out
of Angola, the Operation "Savannah" was a bitter defeat for the SADF.
New Alliances
The mutual untrust that the Pretoria and Luanda had for each other caused the beginning of a "chess game" where both sides gave
supplies and protection to guerrilla forces operating in the territory of the adversary. So, as the FAPLA gave AK-47 assault rifles and
antitank launchers RPG-7 to the SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization, the guerrilla movement created by the Ovambo
tribe in 1966 and which fought for the independence of Namibia) the SADF provided FALs, Galils and other military supplies to the
UNITA. Both guerrilla forces -SWAPO and UNITA- began succesful campaigns against their adversaries, and particularly in
Namibia that forced the SADF and the Koevet (a paramilitar force responsible of security purposes in Namibia) to perform a
continue search in the chaparral.
In an attempt to destroy the SWAPO
in Namibia, the SADF developed an
air-ground join team: helicopters (as
the SA.330 Puma of the photo)
would watch over the chaparral, and
whenever they found a guerrilla
party, they sent a ground patrol
(sometimes reinforced with light
armoured vehicles like this Eland-90)
to surround it and destroy it. This
tactic proved to be very successful.
In this particular warfare, South Africa used a new generation of wheel VAPs like the Casspir and the Wolf Turbo especially
designed to survive after a mine denotation, and developed a tactic of join air-ground effort; as in the air the Puma and Alouette III
helicopters looked for the guerrilla warriors, in the ground also did patrols in fast, light armoured vehicles (Ratel, Casspir, Eland 90,
etc). When the helicopters detected suspicious movements, called the ground patrol and guided them to adecuate blockade positions
where they would be ables to destroy the SWAPO party. Such tactics proved to be very efficient along the next 10 years, but the
existance of camps inside Angola where the SWAPO warriors could be trained in counter-tactics, and the arrival of RPG-7s, AA
cannons ZU-23 and portable SAMs 9M32 Strela (NATO codename SA-7) from the Angolan border also meant that the SADF had a
prize to pay for its succeses. Addittionally, the SADF -particularly the SAAF- realized that to pursue the guerrilla warriors once they
were in Namibia was difficult and expensive, but to attack them when they still were in their trainings camps in Angola had much
more profit, and then began the periodic SADF raids inside Angola to destroy the SWAPO-FAPLA training camps.
Target: Cassinga
One of the first raids across the Angolan border was also one of the bigger ones. The important SWAPO camp in Cassinga was 250
kms inside Angola, and any SADF assault by ground should be detected rapidly. So, the solution was to create a temporary
helicopter base 22 kms south of Cassinga, and to drop parachutists few kms away of the town. With the surprise at their favor, the
SADF parachutists could destroy the SWAPO camp fast, and to escape in the helicopters to Namibia before any FAPLA or Cuban
force could arrive. The codename of the raid was Operation "Reindeer", and the chosen D-Day to execute it was May 4 1978.
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Air War over Angola
One Buccaneer of the SAAF No.24 Sqdn shows their weaponry of four rocket pods SNEB. This weapon was
used by the Buccaneer pilot Captain Dries Marais to destroy one Cuban T-34/85 during the battle of Cassinga
on May 4 1978, as other Buccaneer pilot destroyed 3 BTR-152s more. Such attacks saved the SADF
parachutists of being slaughtered by a Cuban relief armoured column.
The operation began with the establishment of the temporary helicopter airbase, followed soon by the Phase II: a group of air strikes
which mission was to soften the SWAPO-FAPLA defences: four Canberras of the No.12 Sqdn performed a North-South pass
dropping cluster bombs over the camp, followed by three Buccaneers of No.24 Sqdn which dropped bombs of 454 kg against the
same targets. A fourth Bucaneer attempted to destroy an AA position in the outskirts of the camp, and despite it missed, two Mirage
IIICZs of the No.2 Sqdn could destroy it with 30 mm cannon fire. The Phase II of the operation was accomplished perfectly and
without losses.
Phase III was a different matter: for reasons that the SAAF and the SADF still recriminate each other, the cargo planes Transall
C.160 and C-130 Hercules dropped the parachutists some kilometers away of the scheduled LZ. So, they arrived to Cassinga when
the SWAPO and FAPLA soldiers had partially recovered of the previous bombardment, and the struggle lasted until dusk. By then a
nearby Cuban force of five T-34/85s and a dozen of BTR-152s arrived from Techamutete, and the helicopters were now in the range
of fire of the 85 mm cannon of the tanks.
A Mirage IIICZ of the SAAF No.2 Sqdn flying over the chaparral. The Mirage III played an important role in the
battle of Cassinga, both softening the AA positions and riddling with 30 mm cannon fire the unexpected Cuban
armoured column which arrived from Techamutete. The Mirage IIICZs saw a lot of action in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, but by 1984 the attrition and the improvals of the FAPLA/Cuban air defences forced them to
retirement.
The fate of the Phase IV (the evacuation of the parachutists in the helicopters) was entirely in the hands the SAAF fighters pilots.
Without hesitation one Buccaneer of No.24 Sqdn fired 54 rockets of 68 mm against the Cuban armoured column and apparently
knocked out 3 BTRs, and 2 Mirage IIIs arrived from Ondangwa airbase in Namibia to riddle with cannon fire the Cuban vehicles.
However, by then the T-34/85s were at fire range, and one SA.330 Puma was destroyed by a 85 mm shell, being killed the crew and
the nearby 'passengers'. Then appeared the Buccaneer piloted by Capt. Dries Marais, who saw the two tanks which were firing
against the helicopter LZ, and claimed to destroy one of the T-34s with 12 rockets. Marais ran out of ammo, but perform a run at full
speed and low altitude against the remaining T-34 to force it to quit, and he achieved his goal enough time to allow the helicopters to
end the recover of all the parachutists and run away. Despite the errors, Operation "Reindeer" was a great victory and became a
model for future SADF raids against SWAPO bases inside Angola.
Note: From the Namibian point of view, the Operation "Reindeer" was not an attack against an SWAPO training camp, but a an
attack an defenceless refugee's camp, where used to be guerrilla warriors of SWAPO, but which was not a training camp. According
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Air War over Angola
to the same sources, only 12 out of the 600 people who were massacred by the air strikes and the SADF parachutists were armed and
mebers of SWAPO.
SAAF vs FAR: First Blood
Several other South African succesful incursions against the SWAPO campaments inside Angola occured in the next years, like the
Operations "Rekstok" and "Safraan" in 1979, and "Sceptic" (1980). However, was during the Operation "Protea" when the SAAF
had the chance to obtain some of their greatest succeses: On November 6 1981 two Mirage F.1CZs of the No.3 Sqdn took by surprise
two MiG-21bis of the FAR, and the South African leader, Major Johann Rankin, fired an air-to-air missile -probably an R.550 Magic-
which struck the MiG-21 of Lt. Danacio Valdéz and forced him to eject. Apparently Rankin's wingman also had the second MiG at
fire range, but his launching system failed. The MiG disengaged at full speed and the SAAF pilots did not chase him. That was the
third loss of the FAR since the beginning of the war in 1976 (the two first were MiG-21s lost by AA fire on March 15 1981 and May
2 1981 respectively), and the first aerial victory of the SAAF since WW2. That some day a group of Impala Mk.IIs (the SAAF
version of the Italian trainer Aermacchi MB.326) surprised a convoy of 15 SWAPO-FAPLA vehicles, and attacked them mercyless
with rockets, machinegun and cannon fire. The South African flight leader Major Eugene Kotze destroyed 7 of them, and his
wingmen left in flames the remaining ones (Kotze was shot down and killed by AAA fire in June 1982).
Left: Two SAAF Mirage F.1CZs. On November 6 1981, during Operation "Protea", the Mirage F.1CZ pilot Major
Johann Rankin (No.3 Sqdn) shot down the MiG-21bis of Lt. Danacio Valdéz, the first air-to-air kill of the SAAF
since WW2. Another MiG-21 was damaged by Mirage F.1s one year later.
Right: One SAAF Impala flew over the caparral. On November 6 1981 the Impala pilot Major Eugene Kotze
surprised a enemy convoy of 15 vehicles and he personally destroyed 7 of them, being the remaining ones
destroyed by his wingmen. In September 1985, during Operation "Alternator", some Impala Mk.II pilots
claimed to shot down 3 FAPA helicopters (2 Mi-25s and 1 Mi-17).
Almost one year later, on October 5 1982 the SAAF and the FAR met again: two Mirage F.1s piloted by (again) Major Rankin and
Cobus Toerien were escorting a Canberra PR.9 in a recce mission over Angola, when they were intercepted by two MiG-21MF.
During the ensuing combat, Major Rankin managed to hit the MiG leader with a burst of 30 mm. Both MiG-21MF could return to
Lubango airbase and their pilots (Lts. Raciel Marrero Rodríguez and Gilberto Ortíz Pérez) could land safe and sound but the aircraft
of Raciel Marrero should be repaired. Those combats proved the superiority of the South African ground control and also a better
training of the SAAF pilots in air combat. The story would be different 5 years later.
Canganba Siege and the Operation "Alternator"
The continue South African supply of weaponry and ammo, and the effective guerrilla warfare implemented by its leader Jonas
Savimbi, allowed the UNITA to mantain the FAPLA out of the SE corner of Angola in 1977-82. By 1983 the UNITA felt confident
to expand its operations to areas under FAPLA and Cuban control, an in June the UNITA isolated the town of Canganba, deffended
by the 32nd Brigade of FAPLA (and some Cuban advisors), and put it under siege. The brunt of the Cuban troops were assigned to
internal security missions, but due to the strategic importance of Canganba, the Cuban commanders decided to send supplies by Mi-8
helicopters regularly to the besieged town. On June 30 the first mission occured, and two MiG-21bis took off from Menonge (250
kms away of Canganba) to escort the Mi-8 Hips, performing succesful attacks against all the AA guns which tried to stop the
choppers. But on August 2 UNITA began an strong assault against Canganba, and five more MiG-21bis arrived to Menonge from
Huambo to begin fighter-bombing sorties in an attempt to assist Canganba deffenders. Addittionally, one Mi-8 Hip carried to
Canganba the MiG-21 pilot 1st Lt. Julio Chiong to act as a FAC (Forward Air Controller). With his guidance, the MiG-21bis
Fishbeds commanded by Col. Henry Martínez could attack without fear of hit their friends, and between August 2-11 1983 they
performed over 400 sorties firing 2,741 S-5 and S-24 rockets and 2,700 30 mm shells against the enemy, totally disrupting the
UNITA assault. On August 11 two Cuban armoured regiments relieved the Canganba deffenders and the UNITA retreated after
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Air War over Angola
suffering 2,000 casualties.
A Cuban MiG-21bis Fishbed with Angolan roundels. An Squadron of these aircraft commanded by Colonel
Henry Martínez played a vital role in the defeat of the UNITA during the Canganba siege in June-August 1983.
The MiG-21bis flew over 400 close support sorties, and during them fired 2,741 S-5 and S-24 rockets,
decimating the UNITA forces. Two MiG-21bis Fishbeds like that also shot down an SAAF C-130 with a R-60M
Aphid missile and damaged a second one with cannon fire on April 3 1986.
Meanwhile, the SADF kept on performing 'preventive' attacks against the SWAPO camps in southern Angola, and during one of
them (Operation "Alternator") on September 27 1985 two Impala Mk.IIs surprised two Mi-25 Hind gunship helicopters trying to
support the FAPLA forces, and the Impala pilots -Leon Mare and Pine Pienaar- could shot down one Mi-25 each. Two days later
(September 29) the anti-helicopter ability of the Impala Mk.II was dramatically confirmed again, even when this time the
interception was not peace of cake: a couple of Impalas engaged two Mi-17s who this time were flying a little bit lower, which
forced one of the Impalas to perform his run in a very steep dive angle and low speed, causing it a flame-out and an stall almost fatal.
The second Mi-17 had a very good pilot and turned towards the second Impala, forcing it to overshoot. However his luck was over
when a second couple of Impalas arrived to the area, and was hit by the pilot of one of them -Wayne Westoby- forcing the Mi-17 to
did a controlled crash landing. The presence of nearby MiG-23s suggested to the SAAF pilots that a discrete retreat was desirable.
However, the aerial victories didn't happen one-side only: on the night of April 3 1986 two Cuban MiG-21bis Fishbeds intercepted a
couple of SAAF C-130 dropping supplies to the UNITA, and shot one Hercules down with an R-60M Aphid IR missile, damaging
seriously the second one with cannon fire. This meant a serious defeat for the SAAF, and during several months the supply flights to
UNITA were cancelled. Adittionally, since the second half of 1985 the Cuban and Soviet advisors helped to built a dense deffensive
net of SAMs -mainly Kubs (SA-6) and Strela-2 (SA-9)- and AAA in southern Angola. Even worse, about that time Cuba received 50
fighters MiG-23ML and trainer MiG-23UB (NATO codename Flogger) from the USSR, and sent them directly to Angola. For the
SAAF, the time of the easy raids over Angola was over.
MiG-23 Flogger vs. Mirage F.1: Payback
The Cuban FAR was now determined to stop in a definitive way the SADF incursions inside Angola, and a way to do it was to
obtain the air superiority defeating the SAAF Mirage F.1s, and the match with the newcomer MiG-23MLs began soon. The first
round against them happened -according to SAAF sources- on September 10 1987; two Mirage F.1s of No.3 Sqdn met 10 MiG-23s
carrying bombs and escorted by other two MiG-23s, and the South African attack them, forcing the fighter-bombers to return and
claiming Capt. A. Van Rensburg a probable kill against one of the escorting MiG-23s with an R.550 Magic missile. The truth is that
the Cuban MiG-23ML returned home only with minor damage.
This draw (courtesy of Chris Banya-Riepl) shows a Cuban MiG-23MF Flogger with Angolan roundels. However,
it must be noted that there were never MiG-23MFs in Angola, but MiG-23MLs. Armed with accurate medium-
range R-23/24 Apex and agile IR R-60M Aphid missiles, with well trained Cuban pilots and helped by
excellent ground controllers, the FAR MIG-23ML Floggers gained the air superiority over Angola after shoting
down one Mirage F.1 and damging another on September 27 1987. Russian sources credit them with one more
Mirage, one Impala and one Puma helicopter in late 1987 had been shot down by them (None of such possible
victories is mentioned in Cuban sources).
But the most important clash between those adversaries happened on September 27 1987: two MiG-23MLs were directed by the
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Cuban ground control in a head-on interception course against 2 Mirage F.1s which were detected entering Angolan airspace and
heading north. Despite the MiG wingman (1st Lt. Juan Carlos Chávez Godoy) had R-23 missiles he could not fire because the MiG
leader (Major Alberto Ley Rivas) accidentally placed in the fire line. However, after the head-on cross, the Cuban
MiG-23ML pilots, well trained in the use of the variable geometry wings of their aircraft, could
maneuver tighter than their adversaries and despite the South African pilots could fire 3 Magics, all
were skillfully evaded by Ley Rivas and Chávez Godoy [that is the Cuban assertions, but the Cuban
could also saw how the Mirage pilots drop their fuel tanks and mistook it as a missile launching]. After
two tight circuits in a clockwise turn where both sides tried to put in each other´s tail, finally Alberto
Ley Rivas managed to put his MiG-23ML Flogger at 800 mts in front and bellow of the Mirage F.1
wingman (Captain Arthur Piercy) almost in head-on course and he launched one missile R-60M Aphid
which scored a direct hit in the SAAF plane. Both Mirages disengaged and Piercy attempted to land his crippled Mirage
F.1CZ No.206 in Rundu airbase. However, during the emergency landing the hydraulic system collapsed and the Mirage crashed,
being totally destroyed (the unfortunate Piercy ejected out of the aircraft when he saw he lose control, but the parachute did not open
properly, and Piercy became invalid when hit the ground). So, the second round between the MiG-23 and the Mirage F.1 ended with
a clear Cuban victory, with one Mirage shot down.
Three Cuban pilots pose in front of the
MiG-23UB I-21. The first pilot from the
left is Major Alberto Ley Rivas, the MiG-
23ML Flogger pilot who shot down the
Mirage F.1CZ No.206 piloted by Arthur
Piercy on September 27 1987 with an R-
60M Aphid missile. With this victory the
Cuban Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria
finally began to gain the complete
control of the Angolan skies.
According to the Russian TsAGI (Center for Aero and Hydrodinamics Studies) during the next last days of September, a Puma fell
victim of one MiG-23; and both a second Mirage F.1 and the Impala Mk.II No.1024 were shot down in November 1987 by Cuban
MiG-23MLs (the Mirage kill was apparently scored by Lt.Col. Eduardo González Sarría). However, it must be noted that the FAR
sources did not give further details about such victories, and those are not mentioned in official Cuban sorces. So, by the end of 1987
the MiG-23MLs of the FAR had gained the complete air superiority over southern Angola, and both the SADF and the UNITA
would begin to suffer due to that.
These 2 photos show the damages
caused by the hit of the R-60M missile
fired by the MiG-23ML pilot Major Alberto
Ley Rivas to the Mirage F.1CZ No.206
piloted by Capt. Arthur Piercy on
September 27 1987. Piercy crashed
during landing, and ejected in an attempt
for saving his life. The parachute did not
open properly and the unfortunate Piercy
became invalid (photo courtesy of
William Marshall).
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Air War over Angola
The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale
Ironically, at that moment (September 1987), when finally the aerial warfare was favourable to the FAR, the UNITA and the SADF
were taking the best part in the ground warfare. The FAPLA began in July 1987 an offensive which main goal was the capture of the
UNITA capital and HQ, Mavinga (the Cuban advisors did not support the implementation of such offensive). The UNITA leader
Jonas Savimbi simply let the FAPLA forces to advance offering only weak ressistance until the FAPLA supply lines were too long.
Then, reinforced by SADF ground elite forces, the UNITA counter-striked in September near the Longa river, and caused a crushing
defeat to the FAPLA (as predicted the Cuban advisors), which withdrew in panic towards Cuito Cuanavale leaving tons of
equipement (armoured vehicles BTR, rocket-launchers BM-21, trucks and some SAM launchers) in SA hands. On November 9 1987
the SADF armoured forces engaged the FAPLA ones in the western shore of Cuito river, S of Cuito Cuanavale, and during the
struggle, the South African tanks Olifants (the SADF version the British tank Centurion) destroyed five T-55s suffering only 3
Olifants damaged by mines (that was the first tank-vs-tank battle of the SADF since WW2). So, the vital city and airport of Cuito
Cuanavale were really threatened by the SADF-UNITA forces, and if both fall in their hands, Pretoria would be able to dictate its
terms to Luanda and Havanna, and that was something that Fidel Castro would not allow.
This UNITA soldier poses besides a downed FAPA
MiG-23 downed during the failed FAPLA offensive
against Mavinga in July-August 1987, most likely
victim of a portable SAM Stinger, courtesy of the US
Ronald Reagan's administration. Some FAR - FAPA
planes fell victim of the Stingers, like the two-seats
MiG-21UM of Lt.Col. Manuel Rojas García and Capt.
Ramón Quesada Aguilar, downed on October 28
1987 when they were performing a recce sweep
over Luvuei. Both crew members bailed out and
were captured by the UNITA. However, it most be
noted that the figure of 200 planes claimed as
downed by the UNITA is simply inflated and
senseless propaganda (the FAR and FAPA would
just ran out of aircraft if such assertion would be
true!)
On November 15 Fidel Castro ordered his troops in Angola to intervene in the battle, and the best pilots of MiG-23 were sent to
Luanda in Il-62Ms of the airline "Cubana", plus a whole new squadron of MiG-23s in the cargo ship "Las Coloradas". The first
Cuban advisors arrived to Cuito Cuanavale on December 5, who taking advantage of the forced truce offered by the SADF-UNITA
forces (the fast advance from Longa to Cuito river had over-stressed their supply lines too) established new mines fields and artillery
'death zones', and re-structured the defences. One Cuban armored regiment equipped with T-62s was manteined as a reserve to
contain any break of South African armoured forces.
The joint SADF-UNITA assault against Cuito Cuanavale, known as Operation "Hooper", began on January 13 1988, when 6,000
South Africans and 20,000 UNITA warriors (that is the Cuban estimation, the SA sources mention 3,000 SADF soldiers, a similar
amount of SWATF members and 5,000 men of UNITA) attacked the 10,000 Cuban-FAPLA deffenders. That day, however, several
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SA armoured vehicles were surprised and destroyed by Cuban MiG-23s. One of the most intense assaults happened in February 14
1988, when 30 Olifants, 60 Elands and Ratels followed by UNITA infantry smartly attacked in the gap between the 21st and 59th
FAPLA Brigades, crushing their defences and almost sorrounding the 59th Brigade. A Cuban armoured force with eight T-55s
leaded by Lt.Col. Héctor Aguilar striked back and was able to destroy 10 Olifants and 4 Ratels, forcing the SADF and UNITA to
withdraw, saving the 59th Brigade of the aniquilation, against the loss of 6 of his tanks. The accurate close air support of the Cuban
MiG-23MLs and MiG-21bis (the one provided by the Angolan aircraft was not so accurate) operating from Menongue and the
airbase of Cuito Cuanavale itself helped the deffence to stop the assaults. On February 21 a Buffel was destroyed and several more
damaged by a MiG-21bis attack.
The photo shows the burned remains of two South African armoured vehicles destroyed by MiG-23s of the FAR
on January 13 1988, the day of the beginning of the Operation "Hooper".
In an attempt to neutralize the Cuban air superiority, the SADF began to use then its brand new superb artillery pieces G-5 and G-6
(designed by the famous Gerard Bull) from 30 kms to hit Cuito Cuanavale airbase, forcing the MiGs to escape to Menongue and
operate only from this airbase. Such event, the precision of the G-5 and G-6 bombardment and the fierce pressure of the
SADF/SWATF/UNITA on the area of the 25th and 59th Brigades forced them to an ordered withdraw to new positions, less
exposed.
The excellent G-5 (left) and the self-propelled howitzer G-6 (right), both of 155 mm, were succesfully used by
the SADF in 1987 and later in 1988 to deny the use of Cuito Cuanavale airbase to the FAR MiGs. However,
once the MiG-23MLs and MiG-21bis began to operate from Menongue, the hunter became the prey: many
batteries were found and destroyed by the MiG-23s, and the remaining ones should stop its fire as long as the
MiGs were in the air.
Addittionally, the SAAF did its last attempts to regain the air superiority. On February 25 1988 a lone MiG-23ML piloted by Captain
Orlando Carbó -who was performing a CAP south of Cuito Cuanavale- was warned by the ground control about the presence of a
Mirage F.1 in the nearby. When Carbó prepared for the combat, the ground controller -1st. Lt. Ricardo López Castillo- realized about
the presence of other 2 Mirages behind him (a clear ambush) and told him to break. With the superb guidance of López Castillo,
Carbó could skillfully evade 3 air-to-air V-3 Kukri missiles fired by the Mirage F.1s and when he prepared to strike back, the
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Mirages (evidently low of fuel) disengaged and headed south to Rundu airbase in Namibia. That was the last time that the SAAF
aircraft tried to engage the Cuban MiGs, and after that they simply gave up and left the aerial battlefield in Cuban hands.
The experienced Cuban ground
controllers were a key piece in the Cuban
achievement of the air superiority. On
February 25 1988 the excellent guidance
done by the ground controller Ricardo
López Castillo allowed the MiG-23ML
pilot Captain Orlando Carbó to survive an
ambush mounted by three SAAF Mirage
F.1s.
Despite the South African victory in denying the use of Cuito Cuanavale airbase to the MiGs, the Cuban retaliation was to develop a
coordinated system of artillery radars which calculated the aproximate range and position of the G-5s and G-6s howitzers and
transmited such coordinates to ground controllers, who called already airborne MiGs. Several G-5 and G-6 batteries were found and
destroyed by MiG-23MLs and MiG-21bis in late February 1988, and since then the SADF artillery was forced to withdraw at its
maximum range of 40 kms (losing accuracy) and simply stopped its fire as soon as the radars warned about the presence of MiGs in
the air. Finally it was compelled to operate only during night. In comparison, the Cuban artillery (mainly the powerful and accurate
M-46 of 130 mm) could fire undisturbed all the time.
A Cuban MiG-23ML Flogger armed
with empty UV-32-57 rocket pods
returns to Menongue airbase after a
succesful attack against the SADF in
February 1988. The MiG-23s of the
FAR performed over 1,000 close
support sorties in the period January
13-March 23 1988, decimating the
SADF and UNITA assaults, and
destroying several Olifant and Ratel
armoured vehicles during the battle
of Cuito Cuanavale.
The last South African attempt to capture Cuito Canavale happened on March 23 1988, in the area of Tumpo, which was supported
by an powerfull armoured fist of Olifants and Ratel-90s. But the dense mine fields created by the Cuban engineers, slowed down the
assault, and then the Cuban artillery marked the paths of the armoured vehicles with smoke shells to the MiG-23MLs and MiG-21bis
(about 80 of them were operating from Menongue at that time) which performed low altitude runs and destroyed the Olifants and
Ratel with S-24 rockets and FAB-500 bombs of 500 kgs, disrupting the South African assault. After that, the SADF and the UNITA
withdrew to the S in an attempt to avoid the encirclement and the aniquilation. The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was the greatest battle
of the war, and it was doubtless a huge Cuban victory which left the government of Pretoria ready to sit in the negotiations table.
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Brigade General Leopoldo Cintra Frías (CO of the Cuban Southern Front) can't hide his happyness as he posses
in front of one out of the four Olifant tanks captured by the Cuban ground forces after defeating the SADF-
UNITA in Cuito Cuanavale in March 1988. The Olifant had a thick armour and the excellent L7 105 mm cannon,
but it was too heavy for operations in the chaparral. In comparison, the Cuban T-62 -its defeater in Cuito
Cuanavale- had a more powerfull 115 mm cannon and was much more maneuverable.
This map shows the main war
actions performed by both Cuban
(red arrows) and South African
troops (blue ones) during the last
years of war (1987-88). The map
also show the main airbases used by
both sides, plus the aproximate
flight path (green arrows) used by
12 Cuban MiG-23ML Floggers to
destroy Calueque dam in Namibia on
June 27 1988.
The SADF troops were still attacking in the Ondjiva area in southern Angola, and the Cuban forces began to move towards them to
expell them out of Angola. With the inttention to give the so needed close air support the Cuban engineers decided to built a new
airbase to the MiG-23s in Cahama because Lubango was too far of the combat area. In only 75 days were built 2 runways of 2,700
and 2,500 mts long respectively, putting the SAAF airbases of Oshakati and Ondangwa inside the combat range of the FAR MiGs.
On June 26 the G-5s fired against the Cuban positions in Tchipa, and the 61st Mechanized Battalion of SADF were moving towards
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such positions. However, the vanguard of that unit (70 men and 8 Ratel-90s) was ambushed by an smaller Cuban force of 30 men
and 3 BMP-1s, which destroyed 5 Ratels, killed 20 South Africans and captured one Ratel and one POW. The next day another
armoured column tried to attack Tchipa again, but two MiG-23ML took off from Lubango at 10:45 hs and stopped the column 30
kms south of Tchipa, causing it heavy losses.
The Destruction of Calueque Dam
Few hours later an attack what had been plannified long time ago finally became a reality: the strike against Calueque dam and
hydroelectric station over Cunene river, which was in the Namibian border, few mts out of Angola, and gave electricity to about half
Namibia. The dam was also used by the SADF a concentration point before to enter in Angolan territory, so it was expected to find
South African troops and armoured vehicles in there. On June 27 1988 eight MiG-23MLs took off from Lubango carrying 8 FAB-
250 bombs of 250 kgs each, followed few minutes later by other two MiG-23s which departured from Cahama (plus other 2 MiGs
which performed a CAP over Cahama in case the SAAF decided to appear). Both groups met each other near the Namibian border
and descend to an altitude of only 20-30 mts and headed south until to reach the border, then turned 90 degrees to the left and headed
towards Calueque in total radio silence. Flying at such altitude there was no chance that the South African radars could detect their
approach, besides they were closing to its target from an totally unexpected direction.
Captains Gustavo Clavijo (left) and
Carlos Palacios (right) were two of
the 12 MiG-23ML Flogger pilots who
participated in the devastator attack
against Calueque dam on June 27
1988. Clavijo was the wingman of
Lt.Col. Jorge Rodríguez Marquetti,
and both destroyed the engine room
and the crane of the dam. Capt.
Carlos Palacios and his unknown
wingman destroyed the transformers
with 16 FAB-250 bombs of 250 kgs.
At 13:00 o'clock on June 27 1988 the first couple of MiG-23ML Floggers, the ones piloted by Major Mauricio López and Captain
Orlando Carbó, appeared over the Calueque and destroyed the bridge over the sluicegates with 16 bombs FAB-250. Seconds later
arrived the MiG-23MLs of Lt.Col. Jorge Rodríguez Marquetti and Capt. Gustavo Clavijos, who destroyed the engine room and the
crane, and the next two MiG-23s (leaded by Capt. Carlos Palacios) blew up into pieces the transformers. The remaining MiGs
attacked the concentrations of SADF troops and vehicles. The attack was so unexpected that there was no AAA or small weapons
fire against the Cuban aircraft, and all of them returned to their respective airbases without a single scratch. Few minutes later (13:04
hs) two MiG-23s more took off from Lubango, and gave the 'coup d´grace' to the South African troops in the dam. The results of the
attack were verified by the C-in-C of the FAR in Cuba, Colonel Pedro Pérez, who flew over Calueque in other MiG-23 later that
same day.
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Left: This is the look of the destroyed sluicegates of Calueque dam when Cuban troops occupied the
installations, and shows the accuracy of the 250 kgs bombs dropped by the MiG-23ML pilots Major Mauricio
López and Captain Orlando Carbó.
Right: A destroyed armoured VAP Casspir of the SADF destroyed in Calueque. At least a dozen of burned
vehicles like that were found by the Cuban troops, a testimony of both the effectiveness of the attack of the
MiG-23s, and the proffesionalism of the Cuban pilots.
At least one SADF Buffel and one SWATF Eland-90 were totally destroyed in such devastating attack, plus 13 South African
soldiers killed (Those were the admitted SA losses). When the Cuban armoured troops arrived to the dam one week later found the
remains of those burned wehicles spreaded for everywhere, besides the installations of the dam and the hydroelectric plant totally
destroyed. The strike against Calueque was also a proof that the FAR was fully able to attack and destroy any SADF complex or
airbase in Namibia, and the determination to do it if was forced to do so.
The Apartheid Is Over
That was a message that Pretoria understood quite well, and in the night of that same June 27 the South African Minstry of Foregin
Affairs made a phone call to the American mediator Chester Crocker and asked for a cease of fire. By late-August all the SADF
troops were out of Angola, and on December 22 1988 a Peace Treaty was signed where both Cuba and South Africa agreed in
ceasing their support to the FAPLA-SWAPO and UNITA respectively, letting Angola to solve its internal affairs without more
foreign intervention. Addittionally, South Africa agreed to give the independence to Namibia. Certainly it was a fair and good deal.
"MIK 23 sak van die kart": These words in Afrikaans means "The MiG-23s broke our heart", and were written
by an unknown SADF soldier in this wall of Calueque before to escape inside Namibia. It was a laconic
admittance of the proffesionalism of the Cuban MiG-23 pilots made by the enemy, and a testimony of the FAR
contribution to the fall of the Apartheid.
One of the comsequences of the South African defeat in Cuban hands during the Angolan Civil War was the end of the Apartheid. It
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is true that it was demolished by a multitude of factors -the internal pressure of the prestigious Nelson Mandela, who still was in jail
at that time, the international embargo of weapons against South Africa (which increased in 1988, at the point that even Israel ceased
to sale arms to SA), etc-, but certainly the defeat of the elite forces of both the SAAF and the Army -composed by white men with
boer ancestors, theoretically members of the 'dominant race'- by Cuban pilots and soldiers with Hispanic and sometimes black roots,
was a hard strike to the very soul of the Apartheid system, and when it joined to the other factors, the system simply fall apart: in
1990 Frederik De Klerk ordered the freedom of Nelson Mandela, and began the proccess of democratization of South Africa.
Sources:
● "MiG-23 Flogger en Angola" written by Rubén Urribarres (in Spanish language).
● "El MiG-21 en acción" written by Rubén Urribarres (in Spanish language).
● "The Cuban MiGs" written by Rubén Urribarres.
● Air Aces Homepage, by Allan Magnus
● Vladimir Ilyn: "MiG-23: Long Way to Perfection", Krylia Rodiny magazine, Moskow, February 2000.
● "Aviones de Guerra", Fascicle # 15, Editorial Planeta-De Agostini, Madrid, 1986.
● "Armas de Guerra", Fascicle # 47 ("La Guerra del Chaparral"), Editorial Planeta-De Agostini, Madrid, 1992.
● History of the SAAF, by D. Wingrin.
● "The SAAF fights 2 African wars"
Acknowledgments:
My bother Pablo for his knowledge of the English language, and specially to Rubén Urribarres (my input door to the Cuban
side of the Angolan War), for the given information and material.
Back to Air Wars home page
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