OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

CLARENDON PLATO SERIES

Laws 1 and 2
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

CLARENDON PLATO SERIES

Volumes published
Gorgias
Terence Irwin

Laws 10
Robert Mayhew

Phaedo
David Gallop

Philebus
J. C. B. Gosling

Protagoras
C. C. W. Taylor

Theaetetus
John McDowell
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Plato
Laws 1 and 2

Translated with an Introduction and Commentary

by
SUSAN SAUVÉ MEYER

1
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Susan Sauvé Meyer 2015
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2015
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2015934067
ISBN 978–0–19–960408–1
Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

To Hannah
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Preface

Why the present volume? Students of Plato’s Laws already have the
benefit of several excellent commentaries and translations produced
in the last century. England’s magisterial commentary on the Greek
text (1921) continues to be a valuable resource to readers in English,
as is the more limited set of notes on the text in Saunders (1972).
Neither, however, offers much guidance on points of philosophical,
as opposed to philological, interpretation. On many fronts both have
been superseded by the excellent commentary in German, with
accompanying translation, recently completed by Schöpsdau
(1994–2011). The latter contains considerably more historical ma-
terial than England, and is an indispensable resource for any serious
scholarship on the Laws today. Readers of Spanish or French have
the benefit of up-to-date scholarly translations with accompanying
notes by Lisi (1999) and Brisson/Pradeau (2006), respectively.
While readers in English have in recent years had the benefit of a
number of pioneering studies (such as Bobonich 2002) and collec-
tions of essays (Lisi 2001; Scolnicov and Brisson 2003; Bobonich
2010; Horn 2013; Peponi 2013b; and Sanday 2013), the closest we
have to a philosophical commentary on the Laws in English are the
notes and long interpretive essay that accompany the translation by
Pangle (1980) and the detailed analysis by Strauss (1975); however,
the aggressively ‘Straussian’ orientation of these two works makes
them less helpful to readers of other philosophical persuasions. Of
course, no philosophical commentary can plausibly claim to be
without theoretical presuppositions, and the orientation of the pre-
sent work reflects presuppositions characteristic of scholarship on
Plato by so-called ‘analytic’ philosophers in the English-speaking
world over the last half-century. The translation aims to be more
idiomatic than Pangle’s, and is heavily indebted to the very elegant
and readable translation by Saunders (1970). The latter displays a
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

viii Preface
detailed and nuanced appreciation of Plato’s Greek that it would be a
formidable task to match, but on points crucial to the interpretation
of the philosophical and psychological doctrines, it is often less
precise than is optimal for the Greekless philosophical reader. It is
to the needs of such a reader that the present translation is addressed,
while still striving to maintain a fluent and readable English style.
The main concern of the commentary is to understand how the work
is structured as a complex piece of argumentation, and to appreciate
the theories (legal, ethical, and psychological) expounded and criti-
cized within it. For the most part, it pays attention to textual or
philological issues only when these have implications for philosoph-
ical issues. (The present volume went into production simultaneously
with the appearance of Prauscello 2014, and thus too late to benefit
from this welcome addition to the scholarship on Book 2.)
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Acknowledgements

While preparing the translation and commentary I have benefited

from the generosity and advice of many colleagues, friends, and
correspondents: Elizabeth Asmis, Chris Bobonich, Carlos Cortissoz,
Anna Cremaldi, Radcliffe Edmonds III, Paula Gottlieb, Margaret
Graver, Brad Inwood, Charles Kahn, Grace Ledbetter, Jessica Moss,
Henry Newell, Harold Parker, Ralph Rosen, Marcel Rose, Saul
Rosenthal, Krisanna Scheiter, Gregory Scott, Peter Struck, Franco
Trivigno, Christian Wildberg, Joshua Wilburn, and Emily Wilson.
I am grateful to three anonymous referees for Oxford University Press
for their meticulous comments, and wish to express special thanks to
Henry Newell, whose uncompromising editorial eye and keen ear for
language greatly improved the style of the English translation.
Audiences at Cornell University, The University of Toronto, The
University of Pennsylvania, The Catholic University of Louvain, and a
meeting of The American Philosophical Association Central Division
provided helpful discussion of preliminary versions of the commen-
tary. Errors and infelicities that remain are entirely my own, and I
welcome hearing from readers who find them. I thank Nora Donovan,
Jesse Dubois, Harold Parker, Jan Maximilian Robitzsch, and Victoria
Koc for research assistance, Michael Vazquez for proofreading and
preparing the index, and for assistance with Spanish I am grateful to
Hannah Meyer. Milton Wachsberg Meyer has been supportive on all
fronts, as always. Grants from the University Research Foundation
and the School of Arts and Science at the University of Pennsylvania
supported the preparation of the manuscript, and a sabbatical leave
from the university in 2011–12 gave me the intellectual leisure in
which to complete the penultimate draft of the project.
Susan Sauvé Meyer
November 2014
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Contents

Abbreviations and texts xiii

INTRODUCTION 1
OUTLINE OF THE TEXT
Book 1 9
Book 2 12
TRANSLATION
Book 1 19
Book 2 49
COMMENTARY
Book 1 77
Book 2 205

Bibliography 341
Index 355
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Abbreviations and texts

The text translated is that of des Places (1951), and all citations from
the Laws are from the Budé edition of des Places and Diès (1951–6).
A list of earlier editions and commentaries appears at the start of the
bibliography. Notes in the commentary are indexed to the pagin-
ation and line numbers of the Greek text of des Places and will not
always line up precisely with the lines of the printed translation. The
Stephanus numbers in the margins of the translation (626a, b, etc.)
are also approximate. All other ancient texts are cited from the
editions in the TLG. References within the notes and index make
use of the Latin abbreviations:
ad loc at that place (as in ‘see 632d5 and note ad loc’)
cf. compare
ff. and following pages
sc. introduces explanation
passim (throughout the text)
Citations of ancient works use the abbreviations:
An. Pr. Aristotle, Prior Analytics
Ap. Plato, Apology
Catg. Aristotle, Categories
Charm. Plato, Charmides
DL Diogenes Laertius, Lives, Teaching, and Sayings of
Famous philosophers (ed. Dorandi)
EE Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics
EN Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
Ep. VII Plato, Seventh Letter (authenticity disputed)
Euth. Plato, Euthyphro
Euthyd. Plato, Euthydemus
GA Aristotle, Generation of Animals
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

xiv Abbreviations and texts

Gorg. Plato, Gorgias

HA Aristotle, History of Animals
Hipp. Min. Plato, Hippias Minor
La. Plato, Laches
Lys. Plato, Lysis
Parm. Plato, Parmenides
Phd. Plato, Phaedo
Phdr. Plato, Phaedrus
Philb. Plato, Philebus
Phys. Aristotle, Physics
Pol. Aristotle, Politics
Protag. Plato, Protagoras
Rep. Plato, Republic
Soph. Plato, Sophist
Stsm. Plato, Statesman
Symp. Plato, Symposium
Tht. Plato, Theaetetus
Thuc. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War
Tim. Plato, Timaeus
Other abbreviations:
FGrH F. Jacoby, ed. (1923–55). Die Fragmente der grie-
chischen Historiker. Berlin: Weidmann.
LSJ H. G. Liddell and R. Scott (1968). A Greek-English
Lexicon, 9th ed. Revised and Augmented by H. S. Jones
with a Supplement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
MSS manuscripts
TLG Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (2009). A digital library of
Greek literature. University of California, Irvine.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Introduction

THE P LACE OF THE LAWS IN PLATO ’S

PHILOSOPHY

Our ancient sources tell us little about the date and composition of
Plato’s Laws other than that it was written after the Republic (Pol.
1264b26) and that it was ‘in the wax’ when Plato died, after which it
was ‘copied out’ by Philip of Opus (DL 3.37). Stylometric analysis
groups it with other dialogues generally considered to be late works,
such as Philebus, Sophist, Statesman, and Timaeus (Kahn 2002), and
the dialogue’s style, syntax, and organization bear the marks of a
work left unrevised on the author’s death. Only a minority of
scholars today doubt its authenticity (see Nails and Thessleff
2003), a view that was widespread among nineteenth-century
scholars (see Guthrie 1978: 321–3).
The Laws revisits many themes of the Republic. It articulates a
detailed law code for a city state that has much in common with the
ideal state described in the Republic, even though it is avowedly
‘second best’ in comparison to the former (739e). It contains many
extended reflections on psychology, education, art, legislative theory,
criminology, and theology. For a general introduction to the work,
see Stalley 1983, Laks 2000, and Brisson/Pradeau 2007. On the
relation between Republic and Laws, see Schofield 1999, Bobonich
2002, Kahn 2004, Laks 2005, and Zuolo 2012; on the development
of Plato’s political philosophy more broadly, see E. Barker 1918,
Bolot 2006, Klosko 2006, and Schofield 2006.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

2 Introduction
OVERVIEW OF THE DIALOGUE

On the island of Crete three elderly men begin a lengthy pilgrimage

on foot to the sacred cave of Zeus. They are citizens of three different
Greek city states—Athens, Sparta, and the Cretan city of Knossos—
who agree to occupy their time on the journey with a discussion of
‘law codes and legislation’ (625a6–7, 641d9). In particular, their
concern is to investigate what makes for good legislative practice
(637d2, 630d8–632c7), and to compare the relative merits of dif-
ferent ‘nomoi’ or laws (627d3–4, 638b4–7). Much of Books 1 and 2
is devoted to a comparative evaluation of institutions distinctive of
the interlocutors’ home cities, for example the characteristically
Dorian1 institution of communal meals (sussitia) practised in Sparta
and Knossos, and the paradigmatically Athenian institution of the
drinking party (sumposion). The Athenian here develops the themes
that a city’s laws and institutions shape the character of its citizens,
that the legislator’s goal is to inculcate virtue in the citizens, and that
choral song and dance has an important role to play in ethical
training. Book 3 investigates the origins of the practice of legislation,
and attempts to explain the successes and failures of different types of
constitution. Book 4 turns to the task of devising legislation for a
soon-to-be founded Cretan colony, later described as ‘the city of the
Magnesians’ (860e). This project occupies the remainder of the
twelve books of the work, which in fact contain at least as much
methodological discussion as they do actual legislation, along with
extended discussions of education and culture (Books 7–8), penology
(Book 9), and theology (Book 10).

THE RANGE OF ‘LAW ’ (NOMOS )

The ‘laws’ (nomoi) under examination are not restricted to the

products of a legislator or a formal legislative process, but include a
1
On the label ‘Dorian’, see note on 624a1–2 and on 625e2–7.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Introduction 3
wide variety of social norms, both written and unwritten (see note on
625a6–7). For example, the Dorian norm that forbids the youth to
inquire into legislation and requires everyone to ‘sing out their
agreement’ in praise of the laws (634d–e) is hardly likely to be a
statute of these cities, and the practice under examination in much of
Books 1 and 2, the after-dinner drinking party (sumposion) prevalent
in Athens and other non-Dorian cities, is what we might call an
institution or a social practice, but it owes neither its origin nor its
continued existence to legislation (except to the extent that legisla-
tion does not forbid it). By and large, Plato’s Laws (especially Books
1 and 2) is a sustained examination of the goals and merits of such
norms and practices. While the interlocutors are particularly inter-
ested in methodological and epistemological problems faced by those
who devise legislation and seek to implement it, even these issues
cluster around the focal question of what makes for a good or bad
norm or social practice, broadly construed. The semantic range of
the Greek term ‘nomos’ (generally rendered as ‘law’ in this transla-
tion, but occasionally by ‘custom’, as at 637c7) is broad enough to
encompass this extension; other terms used to refer to this object of
inquiry include ‘nomima’ (customs, norms) and ‘epitêdeumata’
(practices).

THE THREE INTERLOCUTORS

The three interlocutors are an unnamed Athenian, a Spartan named

Megillus, and a Cretan named Clinias who is identified as a citizen of
Knossos. Plato’s refusal to give a name to the Athenian (who comes
from Plato’s home city) has roused considerable speculation as to
whether he is intended to be recognized as a philosopher (thus
Zuckert 2009: 31–3)—perhaps even Plato’s teacher Socrates, the
main speaker in many other Platonic dialogues (Strauss 1975: 1–2,
Rowe 2012; rejected by Nightingale 1993: 294–6). At any rate, it is
clear that, first of all, the Athenian is the dominant speaker in the
dialogue (pretty much the exclusive speaker after Book 2); it is the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

4 Introduction
views he articulates that comprise the ‘doctrine’ of the work, such as
there is any. Second, the stubbornly generic classification of the
Athenian in terms of his home city is in line with the fairly stereo-
typical characterization of Clinias and Megillus as paradigmatic
exemplars of their own home cities’ national characteristics. While
it is possible that Megillus is based on a historical figure, nothing is
known about Clinias (see note on 642b4). In any case, their names
add no greater depth to their characterization than does the minimal
characterization of the Athenian in terms of his native city. Clinias
and Megillus are portrayed from the outset as products of their
Dorian upbringing (625a5)—whence their preference for militaristic
institutions and distaste for luxury (628e, 636e–637b). Plato depicts
their intellectual tastes and ethical notions in line with the familiar
stereotypes of Spartans as brief and wooden in discourse and Cretans
as similarly disinclined to verbal elaboration (641e, 721e; cf. Protag.
342c–343c). The loquacity of the Athenian and his greater intellec-
tual fluency are also in keeping with the stereotype of Athenians
articulated in the same context in Laws (641c–d). While the differ-
ences between Knossian and Spartan norms turn out not to be of
great interest to the Athenian (see note on 624a1–2), the character-
istically Dorian features that these cities share and their differences
from non-Dorian cities such as Athens are a topic to which Plato
consistently directs our attention throughout Books 1 and 2.
As paradigmatic products of two very different types of institu-
tions, the three interlocutors replicate almost exactly the position of
the original legislators in the natural history of legislation set forth at
the beginning of Book 3: they are members of societies that prize
different and conflicting norms who come together to select which
norms are best to implement as written laws (681a–d; see Meyer
2006). Even the term the interlocutors use to address each other,
xenos, highlights this feature of their respective relations. The term is
a respectful form of address to a foreigner. It is often translated
‘visitor’ or ‘guest’, which reflects its link to a deeply rooted norm of
offering hospitality to strangers (718a). But this won’t do for the
present translation, since all three interlocutors address each other as
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Introduction 5
xenoi, and only Clinias is on his home turf. For want of a more
idiomatic alternative, the term is consistently rendered ‘Stranger’ in
this volume. In keeping with their status as xenoi to each other, the
three interlocutors of Laws are engaging in a cross-cultural inquiry
premised on mutual respect. And unlike so much of the discourse
that goes by that name in the present day, Plato’s interlocutors
proceed on the assumption that it is possible for such inquiry to
yield results of universal significance.

SYNOPSIS OF BOOK 1

The book opens with Clinias and Megillus claiming a divine pedi-
gree for the law codes of their respective cities. The Athenian asks
Clinias to identify what the divine legislator had in mind when
devising Cretan institutions. Clinias replies that victory in war is
the legislator’s primary concern, since war and conflict are the human
condition (624a–627c). The Athenian counters by arguing that
reconciliation and friendly relations between citizens are better
than victory of one faction over another (627c–628e), and so the
legislator will seek to equip the citizens with the full range of virtues,
including justice and moderation, not just the courage touted by
poets such as the Spartan Tyrtaeus (628e–630c). These virtues,
together with wisdom, are ‘divine goods’, on which all ‘human
goods’ such as wealth, power, and strength depend (630d–631c).
This ranking and dependence are what the proper legislator will have
in view when devising institutions and giving instructions to the
citizens. So, the Athenian concludes, the divine lawgivers for Crete
and Sparta must have had more in view than cultivating courage in
the citizens (631d–632d).
The problem for the interlocutors then becomes to identify laws or
institutions of Knossos and Sparta that promote the full range of
virtues, with the discussion to proceed one virtue at a time (632e).
Megillus is able to identify many Spartan institutions that promote
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

6 Introduction
courage, conceived of as resistance to pain and fear, but neither he
nor Clinias is able to identify any Spartan or Knossian institution
designed specifically to cultivate moderation, conceived of as resist-
ance to pleasure and desire (633a–636e). In response to Megillus’
proposal that Spartan laws forbidding drinking parties (sumposia)
promote moderation, the Athenian makes the provocative claim
that such parties in fact provide an important educational benefit,
provided they are properly led (637a–641d ). A proper defence of
this claim, he warns, will require an extensive discussion of education
(641d–643a). He proceeds to define education (paideia, 643a–644b),
and then provides a model of the human subject trained in that
education: we are like divine puppets pulled by opposing cords of
pleasure, pain, and anticipation on the one hand, and by the golden
cord of calculation (logismos) on the other (644b–645c). While
drunkenness has the temporary effect of weakening the golden cord,
a properly supervised drinking party is a training ground in which a
person may cultivate resistance to shameless pleasures and desires
(645d–649d). In fact, it is an especially safe forum in which to reveal
a person’s character (649e–650b).

SYNOPSIS OF BO OK 2

Book 2 opens with the announcement that there is an even greater

benefit to be had from drinking parties than the diagnostic function
mentioned at the end of Book 1. True to his earlier claim that the
practice has an important educational function (641b–d), the Athen-
ian now announces that it is a safeguard to education (653a). He
follows up with a more precise and detailed account of education
than the one he sketched in Book 1: fully fledged virtue consists in
the ‘agreement’ (sumphônia) of correctly trained pleasures and pains
with one’s rational judgement (logos), while ‘education’ (paideia)
consists in having correctly trained pleasures and pains (653a–c).
The training is to be done by choral performance (choreia)—ensem-
ble song and dance regularly performed by citizens at festivals to the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Introduction 7
gods (653c–654a). Since only beautiful or admirable (kalon)2 music
will have the requisite training effect, the question of how to safe-
guard education thus becomes, for much of the rest of Book 2, the
question of what makes choral music beautiful, and of what institu-
tions will ensure that only beautiful music is selected for choral
performance. In a long and complicated argument directed mainly
against the thesis that music is beautiful insofar as it gives pleasure,
the Athenian insists instead that beautiful choral music trains per-
former and audience alike to enjoy what is actually good and beautiful;
thus musical composition must be strictly controlled (654b–660a).
He faults Crete and Sparta for failing to live up to this standard on
the ground that their music, however regimented, fails to teach the
appropriate lessons about virtue and goodness—most importantly,
that the just life is happy and most pleasant, and the unjust life
miserable (660b–664a). He then specifies the institutions that
should structure musical education if a city is to avoid such errors
(664b–670e). These are the three choruses, composed respectively of
children, young adults, and elders. The first two will perform choral
song and dance in festival settings while the third, identified as the
chorus of Dionysus, will vet choral compositions for performance.
The criteria on which they will do so are articulated at length by the
Athenian (666d–670b) in a discussion that amounts to a general
theory of what is beautiful in representational art. The chorus of
Dionysus is thereby an important safeguard to education, although
its activities as described so far have no obvious role for
the drunkenness associated with Dionysus and with the drinking
parties whose importance the Athenian has proposed to defend.
Accordingly, the Athenian concludes by explaining that the chorus
of Dionysus will function as a drinking party, where wine ‘loosens
up’ the singers and makes them amenable to the educational effects
of song (671a–674c).

2
On the nature of the kalon (beautiful, admirable, noble), see note on 630c7.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Outline of the text

BOOK 1

I. Introductory conversation (624a1–625c5)

The divine origin of legislation, and the human project of inquir-
ing into laws.

 (624a1–625a3) Zeus and Apollo credited with the origin of

Cretan and Spartan laws.
 (625a4–c5) A discussion of ‘law codes and legislation’ pro-
posed to fill the journey to the sacred cave of Zeus.

II. Peace not war is the proper focus of legislation (625c6–632d7)

Articulation then criticism of the thesis that war is the human
condition and victory in war the ultimate aim of the legislator.
The legislator aims not only at producing citizens who excel in
battle against external foes, but also, more importantly, at endow-
ing them with the virtues that enable them to live peacefully with
fellow citizens and cooperate in the project of self-government.

 (625c6–626c5) A survey of Cretan practices, from which it is

inferred that war is the human condition and victory in war the
primary concern of the legislator.
 (626c6–627c2) Development of the idea that war and conflict
are the human condition: between states, villages within states,
families within villages, siblings within families, and within
individual persons (the better part struggling against the worst).
 (627c3–628c8) Reconciliation of warring parties proposed as
preferable to victory of the better over the worse;
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

10 Outline of the text

 (628c9–e1) Hence peace is a goal superior to victory.
 (628e2–630d1) Application of this result to criticize the mili-
tary ethic propounded by the Spartan poet Tyrtaeus.

 The goals and practice of the proper legislator

◦ (630d2–631b2) Proper legislation aims at virtue in its
entirety (wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage), not
just courage.
◦ (631b3–d1) These virtues are the divine goods on which
all human goods (health, wealth, etc.) depend.
◦ (631d1–632b8) The legislator instructs citizens in this
ranking of goods, and monitors and evaluates their emo-
tional responses, financial dealings, etc.
◦ (632c1–d7) ‘Finishing touches’ to that legislation, includ-
ing guardians of the laws.

III. Institutions to cultivate courage and moderation (632d8–

643a8)
A survey of Spartan institutions identifies many designed to culti-
vate endurance of pain, but none to cultivate resistance to pleasures.

 (632d8–633a3) Proposal to identify the ways in which Dorian

institutions satisfy the larger legislative goals identified at
630d–632d; discussion to proceed one virtue at a time.

Courage
 (633a4–c7) Courage as resistance to pains
Many Spartan institutions noted for cultivating resistance to
pain and fear.
 (633c8–634c4) Courage as resistance to pleasures
No Spartan or Cretan institutions cultivate resistance to
pleasures.
◦ (634c5–635b3) Interlude: etiquette and credentials for criti-
cizing norms.
◦ (635b4–e3) Cultivating resistance to pleasures requires
exposure to pleasures.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Outline of the text 11

Moderation
 (635e4–636d4) Practices that cultivate courage undermine
moderation.
 (636d5–637c3) Happiness is not a matter of simply resisting
pleasures (or enduring pains). Rather it depends on intelligent
selection of pleasures and pains. Are drinking parties among
the pleasures to be selected or rejected?
 (637c3–639a1) How to evaluate the merits of drinking parties
and other social practices?
 (639a2–641a3) A drinking party, like any communal under-
taking, must have a leader; its goal is to cultivate friendly
relations among its participants.
 (641a4–643a8) The benefit of a properly conducted drinking
party can be explained only in the context of a theory of
education—which will require a lengthy discussion.

IV. Education, virtue, and self-mastery (643b1–646e2)

 (643b1–644b5) Education (paideia)

Defined as channelling of pleasures and desires from childhood
via play. In the strict sense, it cultivates virtues of citizenship.
 (644b6–c3) Self-mastery proposed as a paradigm for virtue.
 The psychology of self-mastery
◦ (644c4–d6) Pleasure, pain, anticipation, and calculation.
◦ (644d7–645c8) The divine puppets.
 (645d1–646e2) Drunkenness and self-mastery
Drunkenness weakens self-mastery in the short term, but this
is a temporary debility, to be offset by a resulting strengthen-
ing—on analogy with physical training, which weakens the
body in the short term, but ultimately strengthens it.

V. Drinking parties as training for moderation (646e3–650b10)

Drunkenness simulates the conditions that elicit in citizens the
shameless pleasures and desires that moderation requires them to
resist.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

12 Outline of the text

 (646e3–647c2) Varieties of fear and daring
The legislator must not only cultivate the daring required by
courage, but the sense of shame (a type of fear) required by
moderation and justice.
 (647c3–d8) Cultivating shame by exposure to shamelessness
Cultivating moderation requires exposure to ‘shamelessness’
and practice at battling against it.
 (647e1–649d7) Wine as a drug to induce shamelessness
Inebriation simulates the conditions in which we are prone to
such shamelessness.
 (649d7–650b10) Drunkenness as a test for character
A drinking party therefore provides a way of testing people’s
character, without exposing fellow citizens to danger.

BOOK 2

I. Education, virtue, and choral performance (652a1–654d4)

 (652a1–653a4) Drinking parties are a safeguard of education

(paideia).
 (653a5–c6) Education (paideia) is properly trained pleasures
and pains—v. virtue, which is agreement (sumphônia) between
properly trained pleasures and pains and the account (logos) that
one grasps.
 (653c7–654a8) It is by singing and dancing in choruses at
festivals to the gods that we maintain our education.
◦ The natural origins of choral dance (653d5–654a3)
The natural youthful exuberance of voice and gesture, together
with the distinctively human enjoyment of harmony and
rhythm, makes us eager to engage in song and dance.
 (654a9–d4) The finely educated person sings and dances finely,
and as a result feels appropriate pleasure and pains.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Outline of the text 13

II. Virtue, not pleasure, is the standard of beautiful choral art
(654d5–660a8)
 (654d5–655b8) Beautiful song and dance depict the speech
and actions of virtue.
 (655b9–656b8) Taking pleasure in wicked characters shapes
one’s own character accordingly.
◦ opinions about the pleasant and the beautiful or admirable
(655c4–d4).
◦ enjoying what one thinks shameful (655d5–656a6).
◦ benefits and harms from choral pleasures (656a7–b8).
 (656c1–657c2) Thus it is important for the legislator to estab-
lish what correctness in music consists in, and to require that
composers conform to it (as e.g. in ancient Egypt).

The problem with using pleasure

as the standard
 (657c3–658a3) The intimate relation between feelings of
pleasure, judgements about goodness, and choral music gives
initial plausibility to the thesis that the finest choral music is
that which gives the most pleasure.
 (658a4–e5) But on this criterion, those of different age, sex,
and education would give different verdicts. However, the
most authoritative judgement would be from those with the
best education: the elders.
 (658e6–659c8) Thus in musical education the pleasures of the
better should be used to shape those of the inferior; the reverse
is what happens when the mass audience delivers the verdict in
choral competitions.
Conclusion
 (659c9–660a8) The job of the poets is to put into pleasant
vehicles (beautiful phrases, harmony, and rhythm) the speech
and actions of virtue. Songs are ‘charms’ to make serious
matters pleasant.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

14 Outline of the text

III. The teachings of beautiful choral art (660b1–664b2)
Beautiful choral works must teach that the just person is happy
and lives a pleasant life, while the unjust are unhappy and live
unpleasant lives.
 (660b1–d10) Clinias proposes that only Crete and Sparta
conduct music according to the principles above.
 (660d11–663e2) The Athenian clarifies what composers must
teach:
◦ Justice, happiness, and so-called goods
The just are happy, the unjust unhappy, and so-called
goods and bads are such only for the good person
(660d11–661d5).
◦ But this is not what Cretans and Spartans are taught
(661d6–662a8).
 (662b1–664b2) Pleasure, persuasion, and compulsion
To teach that the just life is good, composers must present it as
pleasant; this makes citizens willing to pursue it.
◦ Such a view will be obvious to those with a proper musical
education, and composers must be compelled to teach it
(662b1–c5).
◦ Four arguments to the effect that the just life is most
pleasant (662c5–663e2).
◦ The ease with which poets can be expected to persuade
children of these salutary doctrines (663e3–664b2).

IV. The institutions of correct education: the three choruses

(664b3–666d2)
 (664b3–665d8) Three choruses introduced: of the Muses, of
Apollo, and of Dionysus.
 (665d9–666d2) Where the chorus of Dionysus will perform
These elders will not sing in choruses at public festivals, but in
drinking parties, where wine will lessen their reluctance to
sing, which naturally accompanies advancing age.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Outline of the text 15

V. The ‘finer’ music of the Dionysian Chorus (666d3–671a1)

 (666d3–667b4) What the Chorus of Dionysus will ‘sing’

Rather than perform choral works, they will sing a ‘finer
music’.
That finer music identified
 (667b5–668b8) Music, as a representational art, is not to be
judged by the standard of pleasure, but by the accuracy of its
representation of admirable (kalon) behaviour.
 (668b9–669b4) A wise judge of a piece of music must know
three things:
1. what the work represents.
2. how accurately it represents it.
3. how ‘well rendered’ it is in ‘phrases, tunes, and rhythms’.
 (669b5–670a3) The third criterion explained
Are the harmony and rhythm employed appropriate to each
other and to the gestures and tunes of the choral song and
dance?
 (670a3–671a1) The finer music of the Dionysian chorus
requires expertise in the third criterion, which is distinct
both from the expertise of the composers, and from that of
choral performers.

VI. Drinking parties (671a2–674c7)

 (671a2–672d10) Drunkenness replicates, in the elderly, the

youthful exuberance that makes one eager to participate in
music. When drinkers are in this malleable condition, a cap-
able leader of a drinking party can lead them in the songs that
will repair and renew their education.
 (672e1–673d9) The discussion so far has focused on music,
which concerns the movements of the voice. Still to be ad-
dressed is athletics (gumnastikê), which concerns the motions
of the body.
 (673d10–674c7) Drunkenness is a serious business, not a
recreational activity. The consumption and production of
wine should occupy a very small part of the activities of a
society.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation

Persons in the dialogue

ATH: An Athenian
CL: Clinias of Crete
MEG: Megillus of Sparta
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Book 1

ATH: Is it a god or a human being, Strangers, who gets the credit for 624a
establishing your laws?
CL: A god, Stranger, most assuredly a god! Here on Crete we say it is
Zeus, while in Sparta, where our friend here comes from, I believe they
say it is Apollo. Isn’t that so?
MEG: Yes.
ATH: Don’t you say, as Homer does, that Minos made a pilgrimage to
his father every nine years and formulated the laws for your cities by b
following the oracles he received from him?
CL: That is exactly what we say here. You will also have heard of his
brother, Rhadamanthus, who was a paragon of justice. We Cretans
would say he deserves this accolade from the excellent way he adjudi- 625a
cated legal disputes.
ATH: A fine reputation indeed, most appropriate to a son of Zeus.
Now since you and our friend here have been raised under such
distinguished laws, I expect you would not find it unpleasant if we
whiled away our journey today in a conversation about law codes and
legislation. In any case, we are told that the road from Knossos to the b
sacred cave of Zeus is fairly long, with shady places under tall trees along
the way where one can rest, which is a good idea in this hot weather.
Those at our stage of life would do well to take frequent breaks in those
spots and refresh ourselves with conversation. That way the distance will
pass quite easily.
CL: You are right, Stranger. There are indeed amazingly tall and
beautiful cypress trees in the sacred groves up ahead, as well as meadows c
in which we might spend time and rest.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

20 Translation: Book 1
ATH: A very good idea.
CL: Yes, indeed. When we see for ourselves, we shall think so all the
more. So let us be off, and may good fortune go with us.
ATH: May it indeed. Now let me ask you why the law has ordained
your communal meals, your regime of athletic training, and your style of
armament. What is their point?
CL: I think our ways are pretty easy for anyone to understand, Stranger.
The nature of the terrain all over Crete, you may observe, is unlike the
d flat land of the Thessalians, which is why they train mainly on horseback
and we train on foot, since our uneven ground is well suited to foot
racing. Our arms accordingly have to be lightweight, so that we aren’t
unduly burdened while we run. The lightness of bows and arrows, then,
makes them the perfect weapons for us to use. All this equips us well for
e war, and it is with the same end in view, I believe, that the lawgiver
devised all our institutions—even our communal meals. He organized
these, I would venture, based on the observation that an army on
campaign is compelled to eat together in order to maintain a proper
guard—and he dismissed the folly of most people, who fail to grasp that
every city is engaged in a continuous lifelong war against every other. If
we must dine together in order to be on our guard during times of war,
626a with a roster of sentinels and their officers to keep watch, we should do
likewise in peacetime—for what most people call peace exists only in
name, while in fact every city is by nature always in an undeclared war
against every other. If you look at it this way, you will discover, I submit,
that it is with war in mind that the Cretan lawgiver established all the
institutions that govern our public and private life. He endowed us with
b laws to guard us on the understanding that those who fail to prevail in
war derive no benefit from anything else they practise or possess, since all
the goods of the vanquished go to the victors.
ATH: You evidently have a well-trained understanding of Cretan in-
stitutions, Stranger. But please clarify one point about the criterion you
c gave for being a well-governed city. You are saying, I gather, that its
affairs must be arranged to make it victorious in war over other cities.
Isn’t that so?
CL: Absolutely, and I think our friend here agrees with me.
MEG: How could a Spartan answer any differently, Sir?
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 21
ATH: Now, suppose you are right about the relations between cities. Is
it any different between villages?
CL: Not at all.
ATH: So is it the same there?
CL: Yes.
ATH: What about relations between households within villages, and
between individual men? Is it still the same?
CL: The same.
ATH: And a man in relation to himself—should we think of him as d
one enemy pitted against another? What is our position here?
CL: Well done, Stranger from Athens—I wouldn’t want to address you
as hailing from Attica, when you so clearly deserve to be called after the
goddess! You have gone right to the heart of the matter and made it easy
to see the truth of our present contention. Everyone is the enemy of
everyone else in public life, and in private each person is pitted against
himself.
ATH: My goodness! What do you mean? e
CL: In the latter contest, Stranger, victory over oneself is the highest
and most excellent of all victories, and being defeated by oneself is the
most shameful and wretched of defeats. These ways of speaking indicate
that each of us is engaged in an internal war against himself.
ATH: Well, let’s apply this thesis back to the previous cases. Since each
of us as a single individual is either master of or defeated by himself,
should we say that the same thing happens in households, villages, and 627a
cities? Or should we deny it?
CL: You are asking whether some of them are masters of themselves
and others defeated by themselves?
ATH: Yes.
CL: Another good question. This sort of thing most emphatically does
occur, especially within cities. Where the better people are victorious
over the inferior masses, the city would correctly be called ‘master of
itself’. This kind of victory is truly praiseworthy, while the opposite
holds when the opposite happens.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

22 Translation: Book 1
b ATH: As to whether we should ever accept that it is possible for the
inferior to be master over the superior, that would take too long to
discuss—but what I take you to be saying is the following. It sometimes
happens that a large number of unjust citizens collectively undertake to
force their will on the just minority and enslave them—even though all
are members of the same tribe and born into the same city. When the
former prevail you say it is right to call the city ‘defeated by itself’ and
bad, and when they are defeated, ‘master of itself’ and good.
c CL: While this way of speaking is decidedly odd, Stranger, it is un-
deniable that these things do happen.
ATH: Let’s stay with that point. Presumably there could be many
brothers born to a single man and wife and it would not be unheard
of if the majority of them turned out to be unjust and the minority just?
CL: Not at all.
ATH: We are not seeking to mandate that the household or tribe as a
whole be called ‘defeated by itself ’ when the wicked parties win, and
d ‘master of itself ’ when they are defeated. That wouldn’t be fitting, since
our concern is not with the felicity of this popular expression, but with
what is correct and mistaken in the nature of laws.
CL: What you say is very true, Stranger.
MEG: I agree. Your remarks so far strike me as just right.
ATH: Now consider the following. These brothers we spoke of might
find themselves before a judge?
CL: Certainly.
ATH: Now which would be a better judge: one who put the wicked
e parties to death and set up the better ones to rule themselves, or one who
made the worthy ones the rulers and let the inferior ones live but made
them agree to be ruled? Even better is a third judge—the sort who is able
to take in hand this tribe at odds with itself and, without killing any of its
628a members, reconcile them by establishing laws that will secure their
friendship with each other for the future.
CL: This sort of judge and lawgiver would be better by far.
ATH: And yet it would not be with a view to war but to its opposite
that he establishes their laws.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 23
CL: That is true.
ATH: Now what about the person who sets up a city? Is it more with a
view to war against external foes that he arranges its life, or with a view to
the type of war that from time to time arises within cities, and is called b
faction? No one would ever want this in his own city, and should it ever
arise there he would want to be rid of it as quickly as possible.
CL: He will clearly be concerned with the second kind of war.
ATH: Now in which condition would you prefer that the city be forced
to direct its attention to external enemies—with the faction resolved
into peace because one side is destroyed and the other victorious, or with
friendship and peace achieved through reconciliation?
CL: Anyone would prefer the latter for his own city. c
ATH: And the lawgiver would be of like mind?
CL: Certainly.
ATH: Now isn’t it for the sake of what is best that any lawgiver will
establish his institutions?
CL: Of course.
ATH: The best, however, is neither war nor faction (one should pray to
be spared the necessity of either) but rather peace and mutual goodwill.
Victory of a city over itself, it would seem, is not the highest achieve- d
ment but a necessity. To think otherwise is like supposing that a disease-
ridden body is performing at its best after being flushed out by a
purgative—with no thought to the case of a body that needs no such
treatment. For the same reason no proper statesman will assess the
happiness of either a city or an individual solely and primarily with a
view to war against external enemies, and no lawgiver is any good unless
he regulates military matters for the sake of peace, rather than regulating
peacetime for the sake of war. e
CL: Your argument appears sound, Stranger, but unless I am much
mistaken, our own institutions, as well as those of the Spartans, are
fashioned entirely and emphatically with this goal in view.
ATH: That may well be. However, there is no need on our part to push 629a
the point aggressively. We should maintain a civil tone as we question
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

24 Translation: Book 1
them, since we and they alike take these matters most seriously. Let us
follow up the argument together, taking as our authority Tyrtaeus, who
was of Athenian stock but became a Spartan citizen. He takes these
matters most seriously, if anyone does, for he said:
‘I would not memorialize a man nor take any account of him’
b —not even, he says, the richest man of all, or one who possessed good
things in abundance (he enumerates virtually all of them)—‘who did not
always prove to be best in war’. Presumably you are familiar with his
poems. Our friend here, I expect, knows them by heart.
MEG: I do indeed.
CL: They have made their way from Sparta to our shores as well.
ATH: Well then. Let’s join forces and question our poet more or less
like this: ‘O Tyrtaeus, most divine poet, we think you are wise and good
c to have praised so highly those who distinguish themselves in war. All of
us here—myself, this gentleman, and Clinias here from Knossos—are
emphatically in agreement with you on this point, we think. But we’d
like to be sure that we are talking about the same men. So please tell us
whether or not in your view, as in ours, there are clearly two kinds of
war.’ I think that even a poet far inferior to Tyrtaeus would say,
d correctly, that there are two. One of these, which we call ‘faction’, is
the hardest conflict, as we were saying just now. The other type of war
we all posit, I believe—the kind we wage against external enemies and
foreigners—is far milder.
CL: To be sure.
ATH: ‘Well then, which kind of men and which kind of war do you
have in mind when you praise some men so highly and censure others? It
seems to be the one we wage against external enemies, inasmuch as you
e said in your poems that you cannot abide those who “fail to be embold-
ened by the sight of bloody slaughter” and do not
“lay waste the enemy, assailing him at close quarters”.’
So then next we’d say, ‘It seems your praise, Tyrtaeus, is particularly
directed at those who have distinguished themselves in battle against
external and foreign enemies.’ I gather he would say ‘yes’ and agree
with us?
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 25
CL: Of course.
ATH: We, on the other hand, hold that while these men are good,
there are others who are better by far—those who show themselves to be 630a
best in the most important kind of war. We too can invoke a poet as our
witness: Theognis, citizen of Megara in Sicily, who says:
A trustworthy man, O Kyrnus,
is worth his weight in silver and gold,
in times of hard faction.
This man, we say, is far better in the harder conflict than that other
one—to nearly the same degree as a blend of justice, moderation, and
wisdom along with courage is better than courage on its own. For no b
one would be trustworthy and dependable in the face of faction unless
he had all of virtue. While plenty of mercenaries are willing to march
forth and die fighting in the kind of battle Tyrtaeus mentions, the vast
majority of these are rash, unjust, insolent, and utterly witless, with very
few exceptions. Now, what point are these remarks intended to estab- c
blish? Clearly, and above all else, it is that the legislator from Zeus in this
country and any legislator who is any good will set his primary sights on
nothing other than the greatest virtue when he establishes laws. This,
according to Theognis, is trustworthiness in a crisis, which one might
call complete justice. By contrast, the virtue that Tyrtaeus singles out for
praise, although it is admirable and appropriately celebrated by the poet,
nonetheless comes fourth in rank and merit, strictly speaking. d
CL: Dear Stranger, we are casting our own legislator in a very poor
light.
ATH: Not at all. It is we who are doing poorly by supposing that
Lycurgus and Minos had war in view when establishing the institutions
here and in Sparta.
CL: So what should we be saying instead?
ATH: What is only right and true to say on behalf of a divine lawgiver,
that he made the laws looking not to a part of virtue, and the most e
trifling one at that, but to virtue in its entirety. That is, he worked out
his laws according to different categories from the ones that guide
legislators today. These people seek out laws under the category of
whatever need arises, adding it in to the rest. One works out laws
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

26 Translation: Book 1
about inheritance and heiresses, another about assault, and countless
others in like manner. We, on the other hand, maintain that the
631a proper way to formulate laws is to start where our present inquiry
began. I am altogether impressed, in fact, at your own first stab at
legal interpretation. You were correct to begin with virtue and say that
it was for its sake that the legislator framed his laws. However, you were
clearly incorrect, in my view, to suppose that it was only to a part
of virtue, and the smallest one at that, that he referred all his laws.
That was the whole point of my subsequent argument so far. Now, shall
b I explain the sort of divisions I would have hoped to hear you make in
your speech?
CL: Certainly.
ATH: You should have said: ‘Stranger, it is for good reason that Cretan
laws are held in such high repute among the Greeks. They are correct
laws and bring happiness to those who live by them, since they provide
them with every good. Now goods are twofold—some of them human,
others divine—and the former depend on the divine. A city that receives
c the greater ones acquires the lesser as well; otherwise, it is bereft of both.
Chief among the lesser goods is health, second beauty, and third is
strength for running and other physical activities. Fourth is wealth that
is not blind but clear-sighted, which comes from following wisdom.
Wisdom itself is first and leader of the divine goods. Second is a
moderate disposition of the soul involving intelligence. Third would
be justice, which arises when these two are combined with courage, and
d fourth would be courage. The latter goods are naturally ranked above
the former, and the lawgiver must rank them thus as well.
‘Next, he must inform the citizens that all his other instructions to
them have these goods in view, the human goods directed at the divine,
and the divine ones directed at their leader, intelligence. When the
citizens join together in marriage, when they beget and raise children,
e male or female, when they are young, and as they mature and reach old
age, he must take care to mete out honour and dishonour correctly. In
the citizens’ dealings with each other, he must scrutinize carefully their
632a pains and pleasures, their desires, and the general intensity of their
passions. He will praise and blame these correctly, through the laws
themselves. As for their feelings of anger and fear, when their souls are
disturbed on account of misfortune, and relief from these in times of
prosperity—the sorts of feelings people have in illness, war, poverty, and
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 27
their opposites—for all of these he must define and teach what is
admirable and what is not in different people’s responses.
‘Next, the lawgiver must safeguard the ways the citizens acquire and b
dispose of property. He must review joint enterprises and their dissolu-
tions, both voluntary and involuntary, indicating where justice is to be
found and where it is missing in such transactions. He will award
honours to those who are receptive to the laws, and ordain penalties
for those who are resistant to persuasion. Finally, he will put the
finishing touches on his constitution by determining what sort of burial c
rites should be performed and what sorts of honours awarded to
different people when they die. With his survey complete, the author
of these laws will appoint guardians for them all. Some will operate with
wisdom, others with true opinion—so that intelligence will bind it all
together to follow moderation and justice rather than wealth and
ambition.’ This, Strangers, is how I was hoping to hear you explain d
the laws attributed to Zeus and Pythian Apollo, which Minos and
Lycurgus established. Indeed, I still wish to hear how these features are
present in those laws, and how it is that their order is obvious to anyone
experienced in the law—whether the experience is due to knowledge or
results from some training—but is completely obscure to the rest of us.
CL: And how are we to go about doing that, Stranger?
ATH: I think we need to return to our original starting point and
examine first the practices to do with courage. After that, if the two of e
you are willing, we will then go through the next kind of virtue, and
after that the next. Our exposition of the first will serve as a model for
the rest, and we will lighten our journey, so far as we can, with
conversation. In the end we will have gone through virtue in its entirety
and shown it to be the focus of the things we were just discussing—
provided the god is willing.
MEG: An excellent proposal. Let our admirer of Zeus here be the first 633a
one you set out to examine.
ATH: I shall try, but I’ll be examining you and myself at the same time,
since our discussion is a group effort. So tell me. We say that it is with
war in mind that the legislator devised your communal meals and your
regime of athletic training?
MEG: Yes.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

28 Translation: Book 1
ATH: And what practices shall we list third and fourth? We will no
doubt need to enumerate them just as thoroughly for virtue’s other
parts—or whatever we should call them; it doesn’t matter so long as
what we mean is clear.
b MEG: Well third, like any other Spartan, I would say that he invented
the hunt.
ATH: Let’s try to list a fourth, and if possible a fifth.
MEG: Now fourth, I would venture to say, is our large set of activities
that involve endurance of pain. For example, we have our boxing
matches and the raids that regularly involve a severe beating. In addition,
our so-called ‘secret service’ involves amazingly heavy practice in
c endurance—going barefoot and sleeping without bedding during the
winter, ministering to one’s own needs without the help of servants, and
ranging over the whole countryside night and day. Our ‘naked games’
are also gruelling exercises in endurance as we compete in the worst heat
of the summer—not to mention a great many additional examples too
numerous to go through separately.
ATH: Well done, Spartan Stranger. But let’s consider what we take
courage to be. Does it amount quite simply to a battle against fears and
d pains alone? Or does it also oppose yearnings and pleasures, those
powerfully seductive flatterers that can melt the resolve even of those
who consider themselves highly dignified?
MEG: That’s what I think. It opposes all these things.
ATH: Now, if I recall our previous discussion correctly, our friend here
spoke of a city being ‘defeated by itself’, and likewise a man. Isn’t that so,
Stranger from Knossos?
CL: Quite true.
e ATH: So now, is it the person defeated by pains whom we call bad, or
also the one defeated by pleasures?
CL: Even more so, I think, in the case of pleasures. Pretty well everyone
has in mind the person controlled by pleasures when we speak of being
‘defeated by oneself’ in the reprehensible sense, rather than the person
defeated by pains.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 29
ATH: But surely Zeus and the Pythian lawgiver did not legislate for a 634a
lame form of courage, able to attack only on the left and incapable of
doing battle against the insidious pleasures ranged to its right? Didn’t
they equip it to fight in both directions?
CL: Yes, in both, I think.
ATH: So let’s go back and identify in your two cities the practices that
engage with pleasures rather than flee them. Where pains are concerned,
your practice isn’t to avoid them but to thrust a person into their midst,
where he is compelled and persuaded by honours to master them. What
arrangement is there in your laws to do likewise concerning pleasures? b
Please tell me what practice you have that makes the same person
courageous in the face of pains and pleasures alike, so that he defeats
the ones he ought to and is never defeated by the enemy that is hardest
and closest at hand.
MEG: Well Stranger, I was able to mention a large number of laws
directed against pains, but I don’t think I could as easily come up with c
large-scale and striking examples in the case of pleasures, although
perhaps I might succeed at finding some small ones.
CL: Nor would I find it any easier to identify a clear case among Cretan
laws.
ATH: That’s not surprising, Strangers. Now, sirs, if one of us criticizes
something in the laws of the others’ home city, but his intent is to
discover what is true and best, we should accept this criticism mildly
rather than harshly.
CL: Quite right, Athenian Stranger—a persuasive point.
ATH: At our age, Clinias, acting otherwise would hardly be fitting. d
CL: Indeed it wouldn’t.
ATH: Now whether it is right to criticize the Spartan and Cretan
constitutions is the topic for another discussion—although I would
probably find it easier than either of you to voice what is generally
said. That’s because, as soundly based as the rest of your legal arrange-
ments are, one of your finest is the law that forbids the young to inquire
into what is and isn’t admirable among those arrangements. Instead, e
everyone must join voices and sing out their agreement that all the laws
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

30 Translation: Book 1
are beautifully arranged, since they are edicts of the gods. If anyone says
otherwise, they must absolutely refuse to listen. An old man, however, if
he has any misgivings about your institutions, is allowed to communi-
cate them to a state official, or to someone else his own age, as long as he
is out of hearing of the young.
CL: Absolutely correct, Stranger, and spoken like a diviner. Even at this
635a great remove from our legislator, you have hit upon exactly what he was
thinking and articulated it most truly.
ATH: Well, there are no young men present now, and we are at an
advanced age, so your legislator would allow us to discuss these matters
among ourselves without striking a discordant note?
CL: That’s right—and don’t hold back at all in your criticism of our
laws. There is no dishonour in recognizing that something is less than
admirable. Indeed, it gives one the opportunity to correct it, provided
b one receives the criticism with goodwill rather than resentment.
ATH: Very good. What I’m going to say, in any case, is not a criticism
of your laws. I wouldn’t do that without first giving them a thorough
examination. I simply express my puzzlement. Among all the Greeks
and foreigners known to us, your legislator is the only one who com-
mands abstinence from the greatest pleasures and enjoyments and
forbids you to taste them. But when it comes to pains and fears,
which we were just discussing, his view was that if from an early age a
c person avoids these on every occasion, when he does encounter those
hardships, fears, and pains that are unavoidable he will be put to flight
and enslaved by people with training in such matters. That same
lawgiver, in my view, should have thought the same thing about
pleasures. He should have said, ‘If our citizens grow up without experi-
ence of the greatest pleasures, they will have no practice at enduring in
the face of pleasures and refusing to be compelled into shameful con-
duct. Their weakness in the face of pleasures will subject them to the
d same fate as those who are defeated by fears, only their enslavement will
be different and more shameful, since it will be to men who are both able
to endure in the face of pleasures and also well versed in matters of
pleasure—utterly bad people, some of them. Our citizens’ souls will be
slaves in one respect and free in another, unworthy of being called
courageous and free without qualification.’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 31
Consider, now, whether you two think anything in those comments
is on the mark.

CL: Well, it seems so on first hearing, but I worry about rushing to e

judgement on such a weighty matter, like foolish adolescents.
ATH: Well, Clinias—and you too, Stranger from Sparta—if we might
proceed to the next item on our agenda, let us talk about moderation
next after courage. What will we find in your legal systems that makes
them superior on this front to the system of any randomly governed
people, as in the military matters we were just discussing? 636a
MEG: That’s hardly easy. Still, it seems that our communal meals and
athletic training are well designed to achieve both effects.
ATH: What really seems hard, Strangers, is that constitutional matters
are as contradictory in their effects as they are controversial in discus-
sion. The same problem arises in physical training, where there is hardly
a single regimen one can prescribe for a given body that does not
evidently harm our bodies in some respects, while benefiting them in
others. Take your system of athletic training and communal meals. b
They benefit your cities in many ways, but constitute a danger in
times of faction, as the youth of Miletus, Boeotia, and Thurii have
made clear. What’s more, it seems the great antiquity of these practices
has corrupted the sexual pleasures that are natural to humans and beasts.
Your cities in particular are to be criticized for bringing about this effect,
yours and any others that put such great emphasis on athletic training. c
Whether it is right to be playful or serious about such matters, it is
imperative to keep in mind that it seems natural for male and female to
experience pleasure when they have intercourse for procreation, but that
the pleasure of males coupling with males or of females with females is
unnatural, one of the greatest outrages arising from failure to control
one’s pleasures. Indeed, we all fault the Cretans for coming up with the
story of Ganymede. Convinced as they are that their laws come from d
Zeus, they saddle him with this tale so that they can be following the
god even when reaping this particular pleasure.
Enough now about stories. The upshot for our legislative inquiry is
that virtually the whole subject concerns pleasures and pains, those in
cities and those in individual characters. These two springs flow freely by
nature, and whoever draws from the right one at the right time and to
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

32 Translation: Book 1
e the right extent lives a happy life—whether a city, an individual person,
or an animal—while the one who draws from them unintelligently and
at the wrong time lives the opposite way.
MEG: That’s more or less right, Stranger; at any rate, we are at a loss to
say anything against it. Nonetheless, I still think that the lawgiver for the
Spartans quite rightly commanded us to avoid pleasures. As for the laws
in Knossos, our friend here, if he wishes, will come to their defence. To
637a me, the Spartan legislation concerning pleasure is the finest in all the
world. For example, our law has entirely banished from the country the
activity in which people are most likely to indulge in extreme pleasures,
outrageous behaviour, and utter folly. In neither the countryside nor any
town under Spartan control will you find drinking parties, with all that
they involve, stirring up every possible pleasure. Nor is there anyone
b who, on encountering a drunken reveller, will not visit upon him a
severe and immediate punishment, even if he has the festival of Dio-
nysus as his excuse. I have seen revellers of this sort piled into wagons in
your city, and in Tarentum among our own colonists I once saw the
whole city drunk at the Dionysian festival. At home we do nothing of
the sort.
ATH: But, Spartan Stranger, such activities are all perfectly commend-
able when practised with discipline, although I admit they are the height
c of stupidity when practised without restraint. In fact, someone defend-
ing our own ways might well take a shot at you, pointing to the lack of
restraint in your women at home. Of course, for all such practices—
whether in Tarentum, in my home, or in yours—there is thought to be a
single reply that acquits a practice of the charge that it is faulty rather
than correct. To the stranger who is shocked at the unfamiliar ways that
he observes in their home, everyone will respond, ‘Don’t be shocked,
Stranger. This is our custom here and no doubt you do things differently
d where you come from.’ But our present discussion, my dear friends, is
not about what other people do but about the excellence or deficiency of
their lawgivers.
Now, let us continue with the general topic of drinking, which is a
practice of no small importance and requires a good legislator to under-
stand it. I’m not talking simply about whether drinking wine should be
allowed, but about drunkenness itself. Should a people indulge in this,
as the Scythians and Persians do, as well as the Carthaginians, Celts,
e Iberians, and Thracians—warlike peoples, all of them—or follow your
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 33
practice instead? While your people, as you say, abstain completely, the
Scythians and Thracians take their wine unmixed. Women and men
alike spill it all over their clothes and think this an admirable and happy
practice to engage in. The Persians too, although they imbibe in a more
orderly manner, still engage most assiduously in this and the other
indulgences that you reject.
MEG: When it comes time to take up arms, sir, we put all these peoples 638a
to flight!
ATH: Don’t say that, sir! There have been and will be many cases of
flight and pursuit that tell us nothing, so this is a dubious criterion to
invoke. In fact, it is highly disputable that victory and defeat in battle
show whether a people’s practices are admirable. For instance, larger
cities defeat smaller ones in battle. The Syracusans subjugated the b
Locrians, whose laws were thought to be the best in that region, and
the Athenians did the same to the Ceians, with many other examples
easy to find. So let’s set aside talk about victory and defeat and focus on
the specific practices themselves, attempting to persuade ourselves that
such-and-such a kind of practice is admirable, while such-and-such
another is not. To begin with, let me tell you something about the
right way to determine the value of these practices.
MEG: What do you mean? c
ATH: My own view is that anyone who is ready to criticize or praise a
practice as soon as it is mentioned is not going about this business in the
right way. It is as if one person praises cheese as a wholesome food and
another immediately denounces it—without first finding out its effects
and its presentation: how and to whom it is served, with what accom-
paniments and in what condition, as well as the condition of the person
who eats it. That’s just what’s going on in our discussion, if you ask me. d
Drunkenness is barely mentioned and right away some of us are criti-
cizing it and others praising it, quite absurdly. Each of us invokes
witnesses and advocates for our own side, some thinking the large
number on their side settles the matter, others taking it to be conclusive
that those who don’t engage in the practice are victorious in battle
(although even here we might dispute the facts). If this is the way we e
are going to treat all the other institutions we examine, it makes no
sense, in my opinion. Let me show you instead, if I can, the different
approach that I think we must follow in all such matters, and illustrate it
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

34 Translation: Book 1
in the case of drunkenness. After all, thousands upon thousands of
peoples who dispute the position of your two cities on this topic
would combine forces against you in argument!
MEG: Well, if there is a correct way to investigate matters of this sort,
639a we ought not to balk at hearing about it.
ATH: We should conduct our inquiry more or less along the following
lines. Suppose one person praises goat-keeping, and praises the animal
itself as an admirable possession, while another reviles the practice
because he has seen goats untended by a herdsman and causing damage
as they graze in cultivated fields. In the same way he disparages any
animal that he has seen unsupervised or tended by incompetent masters.
In our opinion, are the denunciations of such a critic soundly based at all?
MEG: How could they be?
ATH: Now, is someone a good ship’s captain as long as he is skilled at
b navigation, regardless of whether he is prone to seasickness? What
should we say about that?
MEG: He is no good at all if his skill is combined with the affliction you
just mentioned.
ATH: What about a leader of armies? Is he fit to lead as long as he is
skilled in military science, even if he is a coward in the face of dangers,
seasick, and drunk with fear?
MEG: How could he be?
ATH: And what if he is both unskilled and a coward?
MEG: That’s a thoroughly rotten leader, only fit to command women!
c ATH: Now take any gathering you like that naturally has a leader and is
beneficial when it does. Suppose someone praises or disparages it, but
has never seen a properly conducted instance of it, only cases where there
is no leader or a bad one. Do we think that praise or criticism from this
kind of observer of this kind of gathering is of any value?
MEG: How could it be, if the critics have never observed or partici-
d pated in a properly conducted assembly of this sort?
ATH: Hold on to that point a moment. Would we say that drinking
companions, or a drinking party, are one kind of gathering?
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 35
MEG: Most emphatically.
ATH: Now, has anyone ever observed one that was properly conducted?
The two of you can easily reply with a resounding ‘No’, since the practice
is not native or lawful in your countries. I, by contrast, have encountered
many of them in many places and examined them all quite thoroughly,
but pretty well none of those I have observed or heard of was conducted e
properly in its entirety, except perhaps for a few short bits here and there.
On the whole, they were almost entirely off the mark.
CL: What do you mean, Stranger? Could you be more precise? Our
lack of experience, which you have noted, hardly equips us to recognize
what is correct and incorrect in such a gathering, even if we were to 640a
attend one.
ATH: Most likely not, but see if you can learn from what I have to say.
You grasp the point, don’t you, that in any gathering, or collective
activity of any kind, the correct thing is for the participants to have a
leader?
CL: Yes, of course.
ATH: Now we were just saying that a leader of warriors has to be
courageous.
CL: Of course.
ATH: And a courageous man is less disturbed by fears than cowards
are.
CL: That too is true. b
ATH: If there were a way to appoint a completely fearless and undis-
turbed general to command an army, wouldn’t we make every effort to
employ it?
CL: We surely would.
ATH: Now the leader we are concerned with at present is not one who
will lead an army into battle against enemies in wartime. Rather, in
peacetime, he will lead friends gathered together in mutual goodwill.
CL: Right.
ATH: Now such a gathering, if it is to involve drinking, will not be c
without disturbances, will it?
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

36 Translation: Book 1
CL: Of course not—quite the contrary, I should expect.
ATH: So, first of all, they too are in need of a leader?
CL: They are indeed, like nothing else.
ATH: And shouldn’t they be provided with a leader who is himself
undisturbed, if possible?
CL: Of course.
ATH: And also, it would seem, one who is wise about social gatherings,
for his job is to safeguard the existing friendly relations among the
d participants and use the present gathering to strengthen them for the
future.
CL: Very true.
ATH: So we must set up as ruler over our drinkers a leader who is sober
and wise, rather than the opposite? With a party of drunks led by a
drunk, or by a young and inexpert leader, it would be a stroke of great
luck if things failed to turn out badly.
CL: Absolutely.
ATH: If someone were to fault these gatherings in cities where they are
conducted as correctly as possible, and he directed his criticisms against
e the practice itself, he might, perhaps, be correct in his criticisms. But if
someone were to abuse the activity because he sees it done all wrong, it is
clear that he fails to realize two things—first, that the activity is not
being done correctly, and second, that any practice will appear perni-
cious when conducted, as this one is, without a sober leader as its master.
Surely you understand that an intoxicated captain, or leader of anything
641a at all, will overturn the ship or the chariot or the army, or whatever he is
in charge of?
CL: What you have said is all very true, Stranger, but please move on to
the next point. What possible good could we get from this drinking
practice, even supposing it is conducted correctly? For example, take
that army under correct leadership that you mentioned: those who
follow the leader reap the not inconsiderable benefit of victory in war,
b and similarly with the other examples. But what is the great benefit that
a city or private citizens would reap from a properly led drinking party?
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 37
ATH: Well, if you are asking what great benefit we would say a city
derives from having a single pupil or chorus properly trained, our answer
would be that from a single case the benefit is fairly small. But if you are
asking what benefit a city derives from educating people in general, then
it is not hard to say that those who are properly educated become good
men, and as a result do admirably in all things. They even defeat their c
enemies in battle! Education, you see, delivers victory, although victory
sometimes undermines education. For many are made insolent by their
victories in war, and this in turn fills them with myriad other vices.
Many have won, and will win, Cadmean victories, but there is no such
thing as a ‘Cadmean’ education.
CL: You seem to be telling us that the practice of drinking wine
together is important for education, provided it is conducted properly! d
ATH: I am indeed.
CL: Are you in a position to affirm, next, that this claim is true?
ATH: As for the truth, Stranger, in such a contentious matter only a
god may insist that this is how things are. But if I am simply to say how
things seem to me, I won’t begrudge you an answer, seeing as we are
already embarked on a conversation about laws and constitutions.
CL: That is exactly what we are trying to ascertain—your opinion on
the point at issue! e
ATH: Then we are doing the right thing; you are trying to figure out
what my view is, and I am doing what I can to present it clearly. Now let
me say this as a preliminary. Every Greek is of the opinion that my city
loves argument and long discussion, while Sparta is brief of speech and
Crete more given to extended thought than extended exposition.
Now, I don’t want to give the impression that I am going on and on 642a
about a trifling matter, stretching out my discussion of drinking with
fussy elaboration. However, a correct and natural treatment of the topic
is impossible without first giving a clear and adequate treatment of
correctness in music, and this, I’m afraid, is impossible without first
discussing education as a whole—a very long discussion indeed. So what
do you think we should do? Should we abandon this topic of discussion
for the time being and shift to a different issue about laws? b
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

38 Translation: Book 1
MEG: Perhaps you aren’t aware, Athenian Stranger, that my family
holds the position of proxenos for your city. Now maybe all children,
upon learning that they are proxenoi of a particular city, are imbued with
a feeling of goodwill towards it right from youth, as if it were a second
fatherland after their own city. In my case, that’s just what happened. I
c would hear other children say, when Spartans praised or criticized the
Athenians for something, ‘O Megillus, your city has treated us badly’ or
‘treated us well’. From listening to this and always defending you against
those casting aspersions on your city, I acquired broad feelings of
goodwill towards you. Even your accent is dear to me, and I hold to
be most true the popular saying that ‘good Athenians are exceptionally
d so’. They alone are good not by compulsion but of their own nature, by
divine allotment, truly and without pretence. So don’t hold back on my
account. As far as I’m concerned you may speak as long as you like.
CL: That goes for me too, Stranger. After you’ve listened to what I have
to say, don’t hold back: go ahead and speak at whatever length you wish.
You have heard, presumably, of Epimenides, a divinely good man native
to this area and in fact my kinsman. He visited your city on a mission
from the god’s oracle ten years before the Persian war, and performed
sacrifices commanded by the god. The Athenians were alarmed at the
e time about the military preparations in Persia, but he assured them that
the Persians would not invade for another ten years and that when they
did, they would be driven back without accomplishing any of their
objectives and would suffer greater damage than they inflicted. My
ancestors formed ties of hospitality with you then, and ever since my
643a people and I have been well disposed towards yours.
ATH: Well, it seems that you, for your part, are ready to listen. I for
mine am ready as well, at least as far as intentions go. As for whether I
am able to carry it off, that’s more difficult, but I must try nonetheless.
As a first step in our argument, then, let us define education, what it is
and what it can do, since we said that the discussion on which we are
embarked needs to go through this topic before reaching the god that is
its destination.
CL: Certainly, let’s do it that way, if it pleases you.
b ATH: Let me tell you how we should understand education. See
whether you are pleased with that.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 39
CL: Please tell us.
ATH: My view is that anyone who will be good at anything at all when
he is grown must practise it right from childhood; both his playtime and
his serious attention must be occupied with its activities. Those who will
be good farmers or builders should build toy structures or work the soil c
in their play, and their caregivers should supply them with miniature
tools of the trade, replicas of the real ones. What they must learn, in
particular, are the essential preliminary skills. The future carpenter
learns to take measurements, and the warrior to ride a horse, by doing
these things (or things like them) when they play. It is through playful
activities that their caregivers try to direct children’s pleasures and
desires towards what they must do when they are fully grown. Indeed,
it is of the utmost importance for education, on our view, that one
receives a correct upbringing, since this inculcates as far as possible in the d
soul of the child at play a passion for the occupation in which the grown
man will need to be completely good.
So tell me, are you pleased with my account so far?

CL: How could we not be?

ATH: Now, let’s be precise about what we are calling education. As it
is, when we praise and disparage the upbringing of different people,
saying this person is educated and that one uneducated, the latter is
often quite thoroughly ‘educated’ in retail trade or merchant shipping or e
some other such thing. But our discussion, presumably, is not with
those who consider that sort of thing to be education. Rather, it
concerns the education that, right from childhood, directs a person
towards virtue, giving him an appetite and passion to become a perfect
citizen, one who knows how to rule and be ruled with justice. I think it
is clear that this sort of upbringing is what our present account aims to 644a
single out with the title ‘education’. By contrast, an upbringing directed
at making money or cultivating strength—or any other skill that does
not involve intelligence and justice—it classifies as ‘mechanical’, ‘slav-
ish’, and unworthy of the name ‘education’. Rather than quibble over
labels, let us stick with our present agreement that as a rule those who
are properly educated become good and that education is never to be
disparaged, since it is the first of the very finest things bestowed upon b
the best of men. If it ever goes off course and there is the possibility of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

40 Translation: Book 1
correcting it, then anyone, at any time of life, must devote all his
energies towards correcting it.
CL: You are right. We agree with what you say.
ATH: Now, we previously agreed that those who are able to rule
themselves are good, while those who are unable to do so are bad.
CL: Exactly.
ATH: Let us return to this phenomenon and clarify further what we
c take it to be. I hope you will allow me, if I can, to illustrate by means of
an image.
CL: Go ahead.
ATH: We assume each of us is a single individual?
CL: Yes.
ATH: But we each have inside ourselves two opposite and witless
advisors, which we call pleasure and pain.
CL: That’s the case.
ATH: Besides these two, we have opinions about the future, whose
common name is ‘anticipation’ and whose particular names are ‘fear’,
d the anticipation before pain, and ‘daring’, the anticipation before the
opposite. And against all of these we have calculation as to which of
them is better or worse. When it becomes the common view of a city, it
is called ‘law’.
CL: I am barely able to follow you, but please continue as if I did.
MEG: That’s what I’m feeling too.
ATH: Let’s think about it this way. Consider each of us, living beings
that we are, to be a divine puppet—whether constituted as the gods’
plaything or for a serious purpose, we have no idea. What we do know is
e that these various experiences in us are like cords or strings that tug at us
and oppose each other. They pull against each other towards opposing
actions across the field where virtue is marked off from vice. Our
account singles out one of these pulls and says that each of us must
follow it and pull against the other cords, never loosening our grip on it.
645a This is the sacred and golden guidance of calculation, also called the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 41
city’s common law. The other pulls are hard as iron, but this one is soft
because it is golden, while the others resemble all kinds of different
material. One must always pitch in with the noblest guidance, that of
law, since calculation—although it is noble—is gentle rather than
violent, so its guidance requires helpers if our golden element is to be
victorious over the others.
Here is how we may vindicate the tale of virtue that likens us to b
puppets. It makes clearer, in a way, what is meant by ‘self-mastery’ and
‘self-defeat’, as well as the manner in which a city and an individual
person ought to live—a person must grasp within himself the true
account concerning these pulls and live in accordance with it, while a
city, having received this account from a god or from the person who
understands these matters, must establish it as law and conduct its
internal and external affairs accordingly. In addition, the tale gives us a
more lucid articulation of virtue and vice, and greater clarity here will c
perhaps shed light on education and various other practices, particularly
the drinking party. While it might appear that, in the latter case, we have
said too much about a trifling matter, it might equally turn out to be
worth the lengthy treatment.
CL: You are right. Let’s finish whatever in our present enterprise is
worth the effort.
ATH: So tell me, what sort of effect will we produce by getting our d
puppet drunk?
CL: What are you getting at with that question?
ATH: Nothing in particular yet. I’m just asking what generally results
when the one is combined with the other. I’ll try to state more clearly what
I have in mind. My question is this. Doesn’t drinking wine make our
pleasures and pains, our angry feelings, and our passions more intense?
CL: Very much so.
ATH: What about our perceptions, memories, opinions, and cogni- e
tions? Are they likewise intensified? Or don’t they, rather, completely
abandon a person who is full of drink?
CL: You are right; they abandon him completely.
ATH: So his soul returns to the same condition as when he was a young
child.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

42 Translation: Book 1
CL: Indeed.
ATH: Wouldn’t he then be least in control of himself?
646a CL: Yes, least.
ATH: Don’t we affirm that this sort of person is the worst?
CL: Very much so.
ATH: So it is not only an old man who becomes a child again, but also,
it seems, a man who is drunk.
CL: Well said, Stranger.
ATH: So is there any argument that could even try to convince us that
we should partake of this practice rather than flee it with all our strength
and ability?
CL: I gather there is. So you say, at any rate, and you were only a
moment ago prepared to give it to us.
b ATH: You remember correctly. I am in fact still prepared to give it,
since the two of you have emphatically declared your willingness to
listen.
CL: How could we not listen—if only for the bizarreness of the
proposal that a man should willingly launch himself into utter
degradation!
ATH: You mean degradation of soul, don’t you?
CL: Yes.
ATH: Well, my friend, what of the body and its degradations—
emaciation, disfigurement, and weakness? Would we find it bizarre if
c someone willingly brought such things upon himself?
CL: Of course we would.
ATH: What about people who present themselves for medical treat-
ment with drugs? Are we to suppose they don’t know that starting
shortly thereafter and continuing for many days their bodies will be in
such a state that they would be unwilling to go on living if it were a
permanent condition? Or consider those who go in for strenuous
athletic training. Don’t we know that they become weaker immediately
afterwards?
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 43
CL: Yes, we know all that.
ATH: And we also know that it is for the sake of the resulting benefit
that they willingly go in for these things.
CL: Precisely. d
ATH: So, shouldn’t we think about other practices along the same
lines?
CL: Of course.
ATH: So this is how we should think about the practice of wine
drinking—provided it is correct to place it in the same category.
CL: No doubt.
ATH: If it turns out to provide us with a benefit not inferior to what is
produced in the bodily case, then wouldn’t it have the advantage over
bodily exercises that, in the initial stage at least, the latter is painful,
while it itself is not?
CL: Correct. But I should be surprised if we were able to discover any e
such benefit in it.
ATH: That’s the very task incumbent upon us at the moment, it would
seem. Now tell me: are we able to distinguish two roughly opposing
kinds of fear?
CL: What kinds do you mean?
ATH: The following. On the one hand, we fear bad things when we
expect them to befall us.
CL: Yes.
ATH: On the other hand, on many occasions we fear for our reputa-
tion, believing that people will think ill of us if we do or say something
that is ignoble—a kind of fear that we call ‘shame’, and I dare say 647a
everyone else does too.
CL: Certainly.
ATH: These are the two fears I was talking about. The latter opposes
not only pains and other fears but also the most prevalent and strongest
pleasures.
CL: Very true.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

44 Translation: Book 1
ATH: So doesn’t the legislator, and anyone else worth his salt, hold this
fear in great esteem, calling it ‘shame’, and calling the daring that is
b opposed to it ‘shamelessness’—the latter being, in his view, the greatest
evil in private or public life?
CL: You are right.
ATH: Not only does this fear safeguard us in many other and import-
ant respects, but nothing is more effective, man for man, at securing
victory and safety in war itself. For there are two things that secure
victory—daring in the face of the enemy and fear of being disgraced in
front of one’s friends.
CL: That is the case.
ATH: So each of us needs to become both fearless and afraid, for the
c reasons we have explained in the two cases.
CL: Absolutely.
ATH: Now when we want to make someone unafraid of various things,
we achieve this effect by exposing him to fear in a controlled manner.
CL: Certainly.
ATH: What about when our task is to make someone justly afraid? To
make him victorious in the fight against his pleasures, don’t we need to
throw him into the ring with shamelessness and make him wrestle
against it? In order to become perfect in courage, a person must face
d off against the cowardice within him and defeat it, since without
experience and practice in struggles of this kind, no one would get
even halfway towards virtue. So will anyone become perfect in moder-
ation if he has not done battle against the many pleasures and desires
that urge him to commit shameless and unjust actions—if he has not
defeated them by dint of argument, effort, and skill, both in play and in
earnest—if he has, on the contrary, never experienced such things?
CL: It hardly seems likely that he could.
e ATH: Well then, has any god given humans a potion for fear? I have in
mind the sort of drink that the more one is willing to imbibe, the more
one comes to suppose, with each drink, that he has fallen into misfor-
tune, a drink that makes him fearful about everything in his present and
648a future circumstances, one that ultimately delivers even the most
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 45
courageous person into absolute and total dread, but once he has slept it
off, he is back to his usual self?
CL: And where in the world might one find such a drink, Stranger?
ATH: Nowhere, I’m afraid. But if there were such a drink somewhere,
wouldn’t it be useful to the legislator for inculcating courage? For
example, we could put the question to him, ‘Legislator—whether you
make laws for the Cretans or for any other people—wouldn’t you b
welcome, first of all, a test for courage and cowardice in your citizens?’
CL: Any legislator would clearly say yes.
ATH: And if we asked whether he would prefer a test one could
conduct in safety and away from danger, as opposed to the opposite?
CL: He would undoubtedly agree to the safe option.
ATH: ‘Wouldn’t you employ it to lead your citizens into fears and test
their reactions, so that by exhorting, chastising, and bestowing honour
upon them, you would compel them to become fearless? You would c
heap disgrace upon the disobedient for failing to be exactly as you
command. Whoever performed well and courageously in these training
exercises would escape punishment, but those who did badly would be
penalized. Or would you decline to make use of the potion, even if you
found no other reason to find fault with it?’
CL: How could he not use it, Stranger?
ATH: As a method of training, my friend, this would be much easier
than present methods, whether for individuals, small groups, or however
many one might want. A single person training by himself in peacetime d
who was bashful about being observed by others before he was in good
condition might train against his fears in this way. He would do well to
supply himself with this one drink instead of a lot of other equipment. A
person who was confident that he was well equipped by nature and
practice would not hesitate to strip and train with fellow drinkers so that
he could demonstrate his ability to escape and overcome the compulsive e
shaking induced by the potion. His virtue would keep him from being
seriously tripped up or led astray by impropriety, although he would
leave off drinking before the final round, since he would fear the drink’s
power to defeat any human being.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

46 Translation: Book 1
CL: Yes, Stranger, that would be very moderate of him.
649a ATH: Let’s return to address our legislator. ‘Well then, Legislator, I
gather no god has gifted us with such a potion for fear, and we have not
managed to devise one for ourselves (setting aside the claims of quacks).
But what about fearlessness, the excessive and untimely daring to do
what we should not? Is there any drink for this, do you think?’
CL: He will presumably answer that there is such a drink, and that it is
wine.
ATH: Now isn’t this drink exactly the opposite of the one we were just
discussing? The immediate effect of drinking wine is to make a person
b more affable than he was before, and the more he drinks, the more he is
filled with optimistic expectations and belief in his abilities. In the end
he is brimming over with unchecked speech and freedom, in conceit of
his own wisdom, and full of every kind of fearlessness, so that there is
absolutely nothing that he would hold back from saying, and likewise
from doing. Everyone would agree, I think, that this is what happens?
CL: Of course.
ATH: Recall now the two things that we said should be cultivated in
our souls: the first is that we should be supremely daring, while the
c second, its opposite, is that we should be supremely afraid.
CL: We gather this is the shame you were talking about?
ATH: You remember well. Since it is in the presence of fears that we
must practise being courageous and fearless, we should consider whether
the opposite condition is to be cultivated in the opposite circumstances.
CL: That seems likely.
ATH: So it is in the presence of things that naturally make us especially
daring and bold that it seems we must practise at not being shameless
d and full of audacity, but rather afraid of daring to say, undergo, or do
anything shameful at all.
CL: So it seems.
ATH: Well, all these things have such an effect on us: anger, passion,
insolence, ignorance, greed, and cowardice—along with wealth, beauty,
strength, and everything that by making us drunk with pleasure drives
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 1 47
us out of our minds. Now for an inexpensive and relatively harmless
way, first of all, to test ourselves, and second, to get practice in these
matters, what more suitable pleasure can we name than the recreation e
and testing afforded by wine—provided it is conducted with some care?
Look at it this way. Suppose we wanted to put to the test an ill-tempered
and savage soul, prone to all kinds of wrongdoing. Would it be more
dangerous to do so by entering into a business deal with the man and
exposing oneself to the attendant risks, or by keeping company with him 650a
at a festival of Dionysus? The same goes for testing a soul in thrall to
sexual passion by entrusting to its care our own daughters, sons, and
wives. We would be endangering what is most precious to us in order to
discern the soul’s character. No further examples are necessary to
establish the superiority of testing through this relatively innocuous
form of recreation. And in fact, as far as this feature of the activity
is concerned, we think neither Cretans nor any other peoples would b
dispute that it is a fitting way of testing each other, superior to other
testing methods in its low cost, safety, and speed at delivering results.
CL: That at any rate is true.
ATH: Now, to be able to discern the natures and dispositions of
people’s souls—wouldn’t this be extremely useful to the discipline that
cares for these matters? We agree, I take it, that this is the task of politics?
CL: Of course.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Book 2

ATH: Presumably the next thing to consider is whether the only good 652a
thing about drinking parties is that they reveal our natures. Or is there
also some great benefit, which we must take very seriously, that arises
from properly conducted communal drinking? What do we say? The
present argument evidently aims to establish that there is, but we need
to listen attentively if we are not to get tripped up by it. b
CL: Go on, then.
ATH: Well, I want to recall what we said correct education is in our
case. My proposal is that this drinking practice, when properly conduct- 653a
ed, is its safeguard.
CL: That is a very large assertion.
ATH: Here’s what I mean. When we are children, the first sensations
we experience are pleasure and pain, and it is in our pleasures and pains
that virtue and vice first develop in our souls. By the time we are old, we
are lucky if we have also developed wisdom and stable true opinions, for
these goods and all that they involve complete a person, but it is the b
virtue that first develops in children that I am calling education. If
pleasure and liking and pain and hatred develop correctly in our souls
when we are not yet able to grasp the account, and when we do grasp the
account they agree with it because they have been correctly trained by
appropriate habits, this agreement is virtue in its entirety. But the part of
virtue that consists in having properly nurtured pleasures and pains, so
that we hate what we should hate and love what we should love from c
beginning to end, if you separated this off in your account and called it
education, you would be exactly right, in my view.
CL: And in our view too, Stranger. Your earlier remarks about educa-
tion as well as your present comments strike us as quite correct.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

50 Translation: Book 2
ATH: Very good. Now this condition of having correctly nurtured
pleasures and pains—that is, education—tends to slacken and be un-
done over the course of human life. However, the gods took pity on the
d sorry lot of humankind and ordained intervals of respite from their toils
in the form of festivals to the gods. To set them back on the correct
course, they gave them the Muses, their leader Apollo, and Dionysus as
fellow celebrants. They are nurtured during these festivals in the com-
pany of the gods.
Here’s a hymn we hear—let’s see whether its message is true to nature
or not. It says that every young creature is practically unable to sit still or
e keep quiet, always straining to move about and make noise. Some leap
and bound as though they were dancing in playful glee, while others
break out in sounds of every sort. Now the other animals do not sense
order and disorder in movement (what we call rhythm and harmony).
654a But the gods whom we said were given to us as partners in the dance
gave us pleasure in rhythm and harmony, and that is how they set us in
motion and lead our choral dance. When they link us together in song
and dance we call it a chorus—from the name for delight, which fits its
nature. So shall we accept this as our first point, that our initial
education is through the Muses and Apollo, or what?
CL: Just what you said.
ATH: So in our view the uneducated person will be unversed in choral
b dance, and the educated person will have a proper choral training.
CL: Of course.
ATH: Now choral performance as a whole is a matter of dancing and
singing.
CL: Necessarily.
ATH: So the well-educated person would be able to sing and dance well.
CL: So it seems.
ATH: Let’s see what this thing we’ve just said amounts to.
CL: What thing?
ATH: ‘He sings well’, we say, and ‘he dances well’. Should we add,
c ‘provided the things he sings and the things he dances are beautiful’? Or
shouldn’t we?
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 2 51
CL: We should add it.
ATH: Now suppose that what he considers beautiful really is beautiful
and what he considers ugly really is ugly, and he treats them as such. Do
we hold him to be better educated in choral dance and music than a
person who is able to comply in particular cases with what is thought to
be beautiful, using his body and his voice, but who fails to enjoy
beautiful things and fails to hate their opposites? Or is the better
educated person the one who gets it right in his pleasures and pains, d
embracing what is beautiful and offended by what is not, even if he is
not quite able to get it right in voice and body or to grasp it in his
thought?
CL: You describe a far superior education, Stranger.
ATH: So if we three can identify what is beautiful in song and dance,
we can also discern who is correctly educated and who is not. Without
this knowledge, however, we could never know whether there is any
safeguard for education, or where it is to be found. Isn’t that so? e
CL: Very much so.
ATH: Next we must, like hounds in the hunt, track down beautiful
gesture, tune, song, and dance. For if these elude us, any further
discussion of correct education, whether it be for Greeks or for barbar-
ians, will be in vain.
CL: Yes.
ATH: Well then, what should we say is a beautiful gesture or tune?
Consider a courageous soul encountering great hardships, and a cow-
ardly soul in the equivalent circumstances. Will their gestures and 655a
utterances be alike?
CL: How could they, since not even their colouring is?
ATH: A nice phrase, my friend. However, it is not correct to speak of
gestures or tunes as having ‘good colour’ (in the image employed by
chorus masters). Rather, since gestures and tunes are in music, which is a
matter of harmony and rhythm, it is correct to speak of them as having
good rhythm or good harmony. As for the gesture or tune of the
cowardly or courageous person, the correct thing to say is that those b
of the courageous are beautiful and those of the cowardly are ugly. Now,
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

52 Translation: Book 2
to avoid going on at great length about every case, let us posit the general
principle that all the gestures and tunes connected with virtue of soul or
of body are beautiful—whether this is the virtue itself or its representa-
tion—while all those connected with vice are the opposite.
CL: A very good proposal. Let our answer for now be that this is how
things stand.
ATH: Now a further question. Do we all get the same enjoyment from
c every choral work, or is this far from the case?
CL: Very far indeed.
ATH: Now what do we say is the cause of this divergence? Is it that the
same works are not beautiful for everyone? Or that they are, but they just
don’t seem to be so? Presumably no one would say that the choral dances
of vice are more beautiful than those of virtue, or avow that he takes
pleasure in the gestures of wickedness while others find enjoyment in a
contrary Muse. Of course, most people do say that the power to bring
d about pleasure in the soul is what makes music correct. Their view is
insupportable and altogether impious to pronounce, but another doc-
trine is even more likely to lead us astray.
CL: What doctrine is that?
ATH: Well, choral dances imitate different types of character found in
all kinds of actions and fortune, the performers drawing both on their
respective characters and on imitation. When the words, songs, or any
other component of the choral work comport with a performer’s char-
e acter—either with his nature or with his training or with both—he will
necessarily enjoy them and praise them and call them beautiful. But if
the choral components run contrary to his nature, type, or training the
inevitable result will be that he cannot enjoy or praise them but will
instead call them ugly. In cases where a person’s nature is correct, but his
training is the opposite, or his training is correct but his nature the
656a opposite, his praises will conflict with his pleasures, and he will call such
choral dances ‘pleasant but wicked’. People like this, when they are in
the presence of those they think wise, are ashamed to move their bodies
in such dances, and ashamed to sing out their hearty approval, although
they do enjoy doing so when they are on their own.
CL: What you say is most correct.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 2 53
ATH: So does any harm come to a person who enjoys the gestures or
tunes of wickedness, or any benefit accrue to those who welcome the
opposite pleasures?
CL: It seems likely.
ATH: Likely, or is it in fact necessary? It’s just like what happens to b
someone who associates with bad men of wicked character and comes to
enjoy and welcome their company instead of disliking them. When he
condemns their wickedness it is as if he is playing a game or dreaming.
When this happens, surely it is inevitable that the person who is pleased
becomes like the sort of person he enjoys, even if he is ashamed to praise
him. Indeed, can we name any greater good or evil that befalls us than
this absolutely necessary consequence?
CL: I can think of none.
ATH: So, in places where there are good laws concerning musical c
education and recreation (either now or in the future), do we think
composers will be allowed to put whatever rhythm, tune, or phrases they
please into a work and teach it to the youths and children of the law-
abiding citizens in their choruses, regardless of the effect it may have on
their development towards virtue or wickedness?
CL: This makes no sense at all. How could they be allowed?
ATH: They are in fact allowed to do this in practically every city— d
except in Egypt.
CL: In Egypt, you say! How have they regulated these matters there?
ATH: It is really quite astonishing. A long time ago, it seems, they
recognized the principle that we are now affirming, that the youth of the
city must be trained to practise beautiful gestures and songs. Having
established which ones are beautiful, and what they are like, they put
these on display in their temples, permitting no painter or anyone else e
who depicts gestures to introduce new forms or to invent anything that
departs from the ancestral tradition. Even today this is not allowed in
those arts, or in music quite generally. If you examine the artworks
there, you will find painting and sculpture that have lasted a thousand
years—not practically a thousand, but actually a thousand—with the
works produced today no more beautiful or ugly than those of the past, 657a
since they are produced by exactly the same art.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

54 Translation: Book 2
CL: What you describe is astonishing.
ATH: An extreme feat of legislation and statecraft indeed! Now you
may find fault with other matters over there, but as far as music is
concerned, this truth is worth noting—that it is possible to provide
enduring stability to songs that have a natural correctness, provided the
legislator is bold enough. This is a task for a god, or a divine man (in
b Egypt, they say it is Isis who composed the songs that have lasted this
great expanse of time). Now, as I was saying, if someone were able
somehow to grasp the standards of correctness in these matters, he should
be bold enough to regiment them into law. After all, the pursuit of
pleasure and pain in the constant striving after novelty in music has little
power to undermine sanctified choral dancing by branding it ‘old fash-
ioned’. In Egypt at any rate it has turned out to have no such power—
indeed, quite the opposite.
c CL: Such would seem to be the case, from what you are saying now.
ATH: So are we bold enough to describe roughly as follows the correct
use of music and recreation in choral dance? When we think we are
doing well we are pleased and, conversely, when we are pleased we think
we are doing well. Isn’t this the case?
CL: It certainly is.
ATH: And in such circumstances, feeling pleasure, we are unable to
keep quiet.
CL: That is so.
d ATH: Isn’t it the case that the young among us are eager to dance in a
chorus, while those of us who are elders think the proper way to conduct
ourselves is as their audience? We take a vicarious pleasure in their
recreation and revelry now that our own agility has left us, and out of
nostalgic longing for it we set up competitions for those who are most
able to evoke in us the memories of our youth.
CL: Very true.
ATH: So we don’t find entirely off the mark, do we, the opinion about
e festival performers widely expressed today, that the most accomplished
and deserving of victory is the one who gives us the greatest pleasure and
delight? These festivals are occasions of recreation for us, so the per-
former who most delights the most people should be honoured most
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 2 55
highly and, as I said, carry off the victory prize. Isn’t this the correct 658a
thing to say, and the right way of proceeding on these matters?
CL: Perhaps.
ATH: In these matters, sir, ‘perhaps’ is not good enough. Let us divide
the matter into its parts and examine it along the following lines.
Suppose someone were to set up a completely open contest, restricted
neither to athletics, nor music, nor horsemanship. After assembling
everyone in the city, he would set up a prize and proclaim that anyone
who wished could compete in a contest that is simply about pleasure.
Whoever most pleases the spectators will be victorious, with no require- b
ments on how he is to do this. He will win by being best at achieving
this result—that is, he will be judged the most pleasing of the contest-
ants. What do we think would result from such a proclamation?
CL: What kind of result do you have in mind?
ATH: It is likely, I suppose, that one person will perform as a rhapsode,
in the manner of Homer, while others will play the lyre, stage tragedies,
and put on comedies. It wouldn’t even be surprising if someone thought
that putting on a puppet show gave him the best shot at victory. Now c
with these and other contestants advancing in droves, can we say which
one is rightly the winner?
CL: That’s a strange question to ask. How could anyone answer, as if he
could tell without having listened to each of the contestants himself?
ATH: Shall I tell you the strange reply?
CL: Sure.
ATH: Well, if the very small children are delivering the verdict, won’t
they select the puppeteer?
CL: Of course. d
ATH: And if it is the older children, they will choose the producer of
comedies, while tragedy will be the choice of the educated women,
adolescent boys, and pretty well the majority of the crowd.
CL: Yes, probably.
ATH: But we old men would probably get the most pleasure from
listening to a rhapsode reciting beautifully from the Iliad and Odyssey or
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

56 Translation: Book 2
from some work of Hesiod. We would declare him to be the over-
whelming winner. Now the next point to raise, isn’t it, is which of these
would be the rightful winner?
CL: Yes.
e ATH: It is clear that you and I at any rate must declare the proper
winners to be those selected by our own age group. For our training
seems to be the best by far in any city anywhere today.
CL: Of course.
ATH: I agree with the majority this far at any rate: that music is to be
judged by pleasure—not, however, the pleasure it affords any random
person. My view is, roughly, that the finest Muse delights the best
people, those who are properly educated, and especially the single person
659a who is pre-eminent in virtue and education. We say the judges of these
events need virtue because they must possess not only wisdom but
courage as well. For a true judge must not take his lessons from the
audience, dazzled by the clamour of the crowd and by his own lack of
education. Nor, if he has come to the correct verdict, should he be so
b spineless and cowardly as to lie and deliver a shoddy judgement through
the very lips through which he has sworn he will deliver the verdict of
the gods! A judge is rightly the spectators’ teacher, not their pupil. He
sits in judgement of them, and opposes them if their pleasures are
unseemly or incorrect. This used to be possible under the ancient law
of the Greeks. Today, however, in the manner of the Sicilian and Italian
law, the verdict is entrusted to the mass of spectators, with the winner
determined by a show of hands. This practice has not only corrupted the
c poets—for they compose with an eye to the base pleasures of the judges,
and thus the spectators are educating them—it has corrupted the pleas-
ures of the spectators as well. Their pleasures are supposed to improve
from listening to better characters than their own, but quite the opposite
is in fact what befalls them, and by their own doing.
Now that we have given a thorough treatment to that topic, let’s
consider what significance it has for our discussion. See whether you
think it is this.

CL: What?
ATH: I think this is the third or fourth time that our discussion
d has come round to the same point, that education is the drawing and
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 2 57
guidance of children towards the correct account that is articulated by
the law and accepted as correct by the worthiest and eldest citizens on
the basis of their experience. The soul of a child must not become
trained to feel pleasure or pain that opposes the law, or opposes those
who accept the law. Rather, it must follow the law and be pleased and
pained at the same things as are the elderly. Bringing about this e
‘agreement’, as we call it, is the very serious purpose of the things
that we call ‘songs’ (which are really charms for our souls). Children’s
souls, you see, can’t abide seriousness, so we perform these charms in
the playful guise of songs. We are like those who care for the ill and
infirm, who deliberately use pleasant-tasting dishes and drinks to 660a
deliver wholesome foods and put unhealthy foods in bad-tasting dishes
so that their charges will become trained, correctly, to enjoy the
one and hate the other. The correct legislator will persuade the
composers to do the same thing with their lovely and laudable phrases,
and if he fails to persuade them he will compel them to compose
correctly—by setting into rhythms the gestures of people who are
moderate, courageous, and completely good, and couching their
tunes within harmonies.
CL: By Zeus, Stranger, is this how you think poets compose in b
other cities today? As far as I can tell, except in my own home and in
Sparta, I don’t see that things are done in the way you describe. Rather,
there is always something new going on in dance and in the other
branches of music, with the changes guided not by law but by unregu-
lated pleasures. Things are so far from remaining the same and following
the same forms, as in your Egyptian example, that they are never c
the same!
ATH: Very good, Clinias! If I gave you the impression that I was
describing how things are actually done these days, I wouldn’t be
surprised if it’s my own fault for failing to express my point clearly.
Perhaps I presented what I wish to happen in such a way as to make
you think that I was affirming it to be the case. After all, it is never
pleasant to inveigh against errors that are irremediable or far advanced,
although sometimes it is necessary to do so. Now since you and I are of d
like mind on this question, tell me this. You say that this is how things
are done in your city and in that of our friend here, in contrast to the rest
of Greece?
CL: Of course.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

58 Translation: Book 2
ATH: What if other cities were to do it this way too? Would we say
their practice would be more admirable than at present?
CL: It would be a vast improvement if they did it as his city and mine
do it, and, what’s more, as you say they ought to be doing it.
ATH: Now, let’s be sure we are thinking along the same lines. Is this
e what is proclaimed in all the musical education in your cities? You compel
your poets to say that the good man, since he is moderate and just, is
happy and blessed—whether he is tall and strong or short and weak, and
whether or not he is wealthy—but that the unjust man, no matter
whether he is ‘richer than Cinyras and Midas’, is wretched and lives
miserably? Your poet says, if he speaks correctly, ‘I would not memorial-
ize, nor take any account of a man’ who fails to accomplish with justice all
his so-called admirable achievements— even one who in such a condition
661a ‘lays waste the enemy and assails him at close quarters’, but is unjust, or
who is ‘emboldened by the sight of bloody slaughter’, or ‘outruns the
North Wind of Thrace’, or achieves any other of the so-called goods.
You see, the things most people call good are incorrectly so called.
They say that being healthy is best, having good looks is second, and
wealth is third. Many other things too get called goods: keen sight and
b hearing, along with acuteness of the other senses; acting the tyrant,
doing whatever one desires; and, as the summit of all blessedness,
achieving immortality upon acquiring all these goods. Now you and I
on the other hand presumably say this: that all these things are the best
possessions for just and pious men, but to unjust men they are the worst,
c starting right with health. In fact, seeing, hearing, and perceiving, even
simply being alive, are the worst things for the person who, though
immortal for all time and endowed with the rest of the things called
good, lacks justice (that is, virtue as a whole), although they are less bad
for such a person if he lives only for a very short time.
These views of mine, I gather, are what you persuade and compel the
poets in your cities to affirm and cast into corresponding rhythms and
harmonies in the education they provide for your youth? Isn’t that so?
d Look, my obvious point is that the things called bad are good to the
unjust, but bad to the good, while the good ones are genuinely good to
those who are good, but bad to those who are bad. So, to return to my
question, are you and I in agreement, or not?
CL: As I see it, we are more or less in agreement on some points, but
not at all on others.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 2 59
ATH: Presumably our disagreement concerns the person who possesses
health, wealth, and absolute tyranny? I’ll even add in for you that he has
superlative strength and courage, and is free from death and all the other e
so-called bad things, but within him there is nothing but injustice and
insolence. Do I fail to persuade you that a person living like this is
obviously wretched rather than happy?
CL: Exactly.
ATH: Well! How should we go on from here? Take the man who is
courageous, strong, handsome, wealthy, and does whatever he likes his 662a
whole life long. If he is unjust and insolent, don’t you think it necessary
that he lives shamefully? This much, perhaps, you would concede, that
he lives shamefully?
CL: Certainly.
ATH: And also badly?
CL: I am not prepared to go that far.
ATH: Would you at least agree that his life is unpleasant and of no
benefit to him?
CL: How could we possibly concede this further point?
ATH: How indeed, my friends? We are so badly out of tune with one b
another that it would take a god to bring us into agreement! As far as I’m
concerned, my dear Clinias, these things appear so necessary that not
even ‘Crete is an island’ is as obvious. If I were a lawmaker I would do
my best to compel the poets, and everyone in the city, to abide by these
doctrines in their utterances. I would mete out virtually the highest
penalty to anyone in the land who spread word that there are wicked
people who live pleasantly, or that while some things are beneficial and c
profitable, others are more just. I would persuade the citizens to pro-
claim the opposite of what it seems Cretans and Spartans are saying
these days, and no doubt other peoples as well.
In the name of Zeus and Apollo, my excellent friends, suppose we
asked these very gods, your lawgivers, ‘Is the most just life the most d
pleasant, or are there two lives, one of them the most pleasant, the other
the most just?’ If they answered that these are two different lives, the
right question to ask next would be, ‘Should we call happiest those
leading the life that is most just, or the life that is most pleasant?’ If they
replied that it was those living the most pleasant life, their position
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

60 Translation: Book 2
would be very strange; however, I would prefer not to attribute such a
position to the gods, but rather to our ancestral legislators. So let the
e preceding question have been posed to our ancestral legislator and let
him be the one to reply that the person living the most pleasant life is
most blessed. I would then say, ‘Didn’t you wish for me to live the
happiest life? But you never stopped exhorting me to live most justly!’ A
legislator or father who took such a position would be very strange and
quite at a loss to stay in agreement with himself. If instead he declared
that the life that is most just is the happiest, anyone hearing this, I think,
would want to find out what good and admirable thing the law com-
663a mends in such a life that outstrips pleasure. For what good could there be
for the just person that is separated from pleasure? Look, in the eyes of
men and gods, are renown and praise good and admirable but unpleas-
ant, while ill repute is the opposite? We will hardly assent to that, my dear
legislator. Well, what about neither wronging anyone nor being wronged
by anyone? It is surely not the case that this is unpleasant but good and
admirable, while the contrary is pleasant but shameful and bad?
CL: How could it be so?
b ATH: Surely the doctrine that does not divorce the pleasant and the
just or the good and the admirable, even if it accomplishes nothing else,
can persuade a person to be willing to live a just and pious life. So, as far
as the legislator is concerned, any doctrine that denies this is the most
shameful and is to be resisted to the utmost, since nobody would
willingly be persuaded to do anything that failed to yield more pleasure
than pain. Now objects viewed from a distance appear hazy to most
people, especially to children, but the legislator will dispel the haze and
c clarify our judgement. He will persuade us, however he can, by means of
training, praises, and doctrines, because matters of justice and injustice
are subject to perspective. When considered from the perspective op-
posite to the just person’s—that is, from the standpoint of one’s own
injustice and wickedness—unjust actions seem pleasant and just ones
unpleasant. From the standpoint of the just person, the situation is
completely reversed on both counts.
CL: So it seems.
ATH: Now which judgement shall we say is more authoritatively
true—that of the worse soul or that of the better?
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 2 61
CL: Necessarily, I suppose, that of the superior person. d
ATH: So it is necessary that the unjust life is not only more shameful
and more depraved, but also in truth more unpleasant than the just and
pious life.
CL: So it would seem, friends, at least as far as the present argument
goes.
ATH: But even if matters were not as the present argument maintains,
could any halfway decent legislator, if he dared to lie to the youth for the
sake of the good, tell a lie more beneficial than this? Is there any lie with
greater potential to make everyone always act justly—not because they e
are forced, but willingly?
CL: Truth is a beautiful thing, Stranger, and an enduring one. But
persuasion, it seems, is not an easy matter.
ATH: Well, haven’t people been easily persuaded of the Sidonian’s tale,
implausible though it is, and of many others as well?
CL: What kind of tales?
ATH: About armed warriors growing from teeth sown in the earth—a
perfect example to show the legislator that if he tries he can persuade the
souls of the young of whatever he wants. All he needs to figure out is 664a
what doctrine will deliver the greatest good to the city should he
convince them of it. Then he must use every means at his disposal to
ensure that the whole community, all their lives long, are of one voice on
this topic—in their songs, in their stories, and in their judgements. Of
course if you think at all differently, no one will begrudge you the
chance to dispute the argument.
CL: I don’t see either of us as capable of disputing these points. b
ATH: Then I will take it on myself to continue. For I maintain that all
choruses (and there are three of them) should direct their charms at the
souls of children, which are still young and pliable. They should affirm
all the beautiful doctrines we’ve gone through, and still others we could
mention, but the most important point—let it be noted—is this. In
affirming that the gods call the same life both most pleasant and most
excellent, we will be speaking truth to the highest degree and we are c
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

62 Translation: Book 2
more likely to persuade those whom we need to persuade than if we were
to proclaim any other doctrine.
CL: What you say must be conceded.
ATH: To begin with, the chorus dedicated to the Muses and consisting
of children would rightly be the first to take the stage, singing out such
doctrines with all their heart before the entire city. Second will be the
chorus of those up to 30 years old, calling upon Paean Apollo as witness
for the truth of what they affirm, and praying that he grace the youth
d with persuasion. In addition to these two, a third chorus must also sing.
It will consist of those over 30 and up to 60 years of age. Those who are
beyond all that and no longer up to the challenge of singing will be
allotted the role of storytellers. They will recount divinely inspired
stories about these same characters.
CL: What’s this you say about the third choruses, Stranger? We don’t
quite follow what you mean to say about them.
ATH: They are, in fact, pretty much the whole point of most of the
preceding discussion.
e CL: We don’t understand at all. Please try to explain more clearly.
ATH: At the beginning of our discussion, if you recall, we said that all
young creatures have a fiery nature. They are unable to keep their bodies
or their voices still, and are always uttering noises and jumping about in
disorder. A sense of order in both domains, we said, is missing in the
other animals, and belongs to human nature alone. Rhythm is the name
665a for order in movement; order in voice, a blend of high pitch and low, is
called harmony; and the combination of the two is called a chorus. The
gods took pity on us, we said, and gave us Apollo and the Muses to join
and lead our choral dance. And third, if you recall, we said they gave us
Dionysus.
CL: How could we not remember!
ATH: Now that we’ve spoken of the chorus of Apollo and that of the
b Muses, we need to discuss the third and remaining chorus, that of
Dionysus.
CL: What do you mean? Please tell us. A Dionysian chorus of elders
sounds exceedingly strange, on first hearing. Will those over 30, 50, and
even up to 60 years of age really dance a chorus in his honour?
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 2 63
ATH: That is exactly what I mean. Now, I do owe you an account,
I think, of the way in which it would be reasonable for this to take place.
CL: I should say!
ATH: Are we agreed on the points that we took up before?
CL: Which ones? c
ATH: That every man and child, free person and slave, female and
male, indeed the whole city, should perpetually sing to itself those
charms that we discussed—always with some alteration or other and
at any rate with sufficient variety to please the singers and make their
thirst for the hymns insatiable.
CL: How could one not agree with this way of doing things?
ATH: Now as for this best element of the city, whose collective age and d
wisdom makes it the most persuasive group of citizens, where should it
sing those finest songs, if it is to bring about the most good? Or will we
be so foolish as to overlook those with the greatest command of the
finest and most beneficial songs?
CL: We cannot let them go, according to our present argument.
ATH: So what would be the appropriate way for them to sing? See
whether it is this.
CL: What way?
ATH: As a person advances in age, doesn’t he become increasingly
reluctant to sing? That is, he enjoys it less and, when compelled to do it, e
he feels especially embarrassed—the more so the older and more mod-
erate he has become. Isn’t this so?
CL: Very much so.
ATH: And he would feel even more embarrassed if he sang in the
theatre, standing up before all kinds of people. Even worse, suppose
such men had to be lean and sing on an empty stomach, like choruses
who are engaged in competition. Wouldn’t they find singing the height
of unpleasantness and humiliation, and carry out their task with no
eagerness at all?
CL: Most necessarily. 666a
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

64 Translation: Book 2
ATH: So how shall we encourage them to sing eagerly? Shouldn’t we
legislate, first of all, that children 18 years old and younger are forbidden
to partake of any wine at all? We would explain that one should not pour
additional fire into the bodies or souls of our youth, but rather be
mindful of their excitable condition in the period before they engage
with the burdensome toils of life. Next, our law will allow those up to 30
b years of age to drink wine in moderation, but the young must abstain
completely from drunkenness and from drinking large quantities of
wine. A person approaching 40, however, when invoking the gods at
the end of a communal dinner, will call upon Dionysus in particular,
inviting him to that rite and recreation for the elders which he gave to
humans as a remedy for the crabbedness of old age. It makes us grow
c young again and forget our ill temper as our souls’ hardened character
softens, like iron that becomes pliable when placed in the fire. In such a
condition, wouldn’t a person be less embarrassed about singing—if he is
not in a large gathering, but a moderately sized one, and among familiars
rather than strangers? Wouldn’t he be more willing to sing with enthu-
siasm those songs that we have repeatedly said are charms?
CL: Very much so.
ATH: To the extent that it leads them to join with us in song, then, this
d practice would not be at all unseemly.
CL: Not at all.
ATH: Now what kind of sound, or music, will issue from these men?
Surely it must be suitable for them?
CL: Of course.
ATH: Well, what kind of music would suit divine men? Would it be
that of a chorus?
CL: Well, Stranger, speaking for my own city and that of the Spartans,
the only type of song we are capable of is what we learned to sing in our
own choral training.
ATH: So it would seem. As a matter of fact, you are missing out on the
e finest kind of song. I mean, your legal systems are fit for an army camp,
rather than the inhabitants of a city. You keep your youth herded
together like colts at pasture, and none of you lays hold of his own
colt, drags him wild and kicking away from his fellow grazers, and
commits him to the individual care of a groom who will stroke him
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 2 65
and tame him and give him all the elements of an upbringing that will
make him not only a good soldier but a capable participant in the affairs 667a
of a city or town. This is the sort of person whom we said earlier was
even more warlike than the warriors of Tyrtaeus, one who consistently
values the possession of courage as fourth in virtue, not first, both for
individuals and for the city as a whole.
CL: If I’m not mistaken, Stranger, you are again casting aspersions on
our lawgivers.
ATH: If I do, sir, it is not my intent. Let us simply follow the argument
where it leads, if you are willing. Now, if there is a kind of ‘music’ finer
than that of choruses and public theatres, let us try to assign it to those b
whom we said were embarrassed by the latter kind but eager to partake
of the finest variety.
CL: Yes, indeed.
ATH: Now, in the case of anything that brings us enjoyment, mustn’t
we first of all say the following? Either this very feature on its own is the
most important thing about it, or else what is most important is a certain
correctness or, third, a benefit? Consider eating and drinking, for
example, and taking in nourishment quite generally. These bring us
enjoyment, which we might call ‘pleasure’, but if we are talking about
correctness and benefit, we talk of what is healthy in a given meal, and c
this is what is most correct in it.
CL: Absolutely.
ATH: Learning, too, has its pleasure, an element of enjoyment that
comes along with it. But its correctness and benefit, what is good and
beautiful in it, derive from its truth.
CL: That is so.
ATH: Now consider the representational arts. Their business is to
produce likenesses, and when they succeed, any pleasure that accom- d
panies their product, should any pleasure arise, is appropriately called
‘enjoyment’.
CL: Yes.
ATH: But presumably the correctness in such cases would be pro-
duced, roughly speaking, by accuracy in quantity and quality, not by
pleasure.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

66 Translation: Book 2
CL: You are right.
ATH: So the only thing that would be correctly judged by pleasure is
what provides neither benefit nor truth nor likeness when it is achieved
e (nor harm either, for that matter). Rather, it comes to be solely for the
sake of this very thing, enjoyment, which those other things bring in
their wake, but when it occurs without them, is best called ‘pleasure’.
CL: You mean only harmless pleasure.
ATH: Yes. I also call it ‘recreation’ when it produces neither harm nor
benefit worthy of serious mention.
CL: Quite correctly.
ATH: On the basis of our present discussion, wouldn’t we say that no
imitation is to be judged by pleasure and false opinion? In particular,
668a accuracy should never be. For it is never the case that something is
accurate, or in general proportional, simply because someone thinks so,
or fails to enjoy something. Rather, an imitation is to be judged in terms
of its truth above all else, and least of all by any other standard.
CL: Absolutely, indeed.
ATH: Now all music, we say, is representational and imitative?
CL: Of course.
ATH: So we should be least prepared to accept it when someone says
that music is to be judged by the pleasure it gives. That sort of music, if
b there should be any, is unworthy of our serious attention. We should
seek instead the kind that achieves likeness in imitating what is beautiful.
CL: Very true.
ATH: So those who seek out the finest song and music must not search
for the kind that is pleasant but the kind that is correct. For, as we said,
correctness of imitation consists in rendering the actual dimensions and
qualities of the object imitated.
CL: How could it not?
ATH: Now anyone would agree on this point about music, that all of
c its compositions are imitations and representations. Surely all com-
posers, audiences, and actors would agree on this?
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 2 67
CL: Certainly.
ATH: So, in order not to misjudge a particular composition, it seems,
one must recognize just what it is. Without recognizing its nature—just
what it intends, what it actually represents—one will hardly discern
whether the intention is carried out correctly or misses the mark.
CL: Hardly indeed.
ATH: And if one fails to recognize whether it is correct, will one ever be d
able to discern whether it is good or bad? I’m not expressing myself very
clearly here. Perhaps this way of stating the point is clearer.
CL: What way?
ATH: There are no doubt myriad likenesses involving our sense of
sight.
CL: Yes.
ATH: Suppose, in these cases, a person did not know the bodies being
imitated. Would he ever recognize what is correct in their rendering?
I mean, for example, the dimensions of each body and, if it has parts,
their position, number, and proper arrangement, as well as their colours e
and shapes. Is it rendered with these things all mixed up? Do you think
that a person completely ignorant of what the imitated creature is could
make these discriminations?
CL: How could he?
ATH: Now suppose we recognized that the drawn or sculpted figure is
a human being, and that all its parts, colours, and shapes have been
captured by the art. Is it necessarily the case that someone who recog- 669a
nizes these things is thereby in a position to recognize whether the work
of art is beautiful, or whether it falls short of beauty in some way?
CL: But then, virtually all of us would recognize which pictures are
beautiful!
ATH: You are quite correct. So, for each representation, whether in
painting or in music as a whole, doesn’t a wise judge need to have the
following three things? One must know first of all, what it is, next how b
correctly it is rendered, and third, how well the particular representation
is rendered in phrases, tunes, and rhythms.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

68 Translation: Book 2
CL: So it would seem.
ATH: Now, let us not omit to state the difficulties we face in the case of
music. It gets talked about more than any other kind of representation,
but in fact it requires the greatest care of all. Not only is making a
mistake here extremely harmful, since one will come to welcome evil
c characters, but it is extremely difficult to notice. This is because the
composers are inferior poets to the Muses. The Muses would never
make the blunder of composing words suitable for men and then giving
them the colour or tune of women, or attaching rhythms of the servile
and slavish to the tune and gestures of the free. Nor, having composed
rhythms and gestures of a free person would they attach to them a tune
or speech that conflicts with the rhythms. Furthermore, they would
d never mix together animal and human voices, the sounds of instru-
ments, and every kind of noise, yet purport to be imitating a single
thing. Human composers, however, eagerly spin these elements into a
great jumble devoid of reason, a source of laughter for people who are in
what Orpheus calls the ‘prime season of delight’. It is not enough that
composers confound these things, they also wrench them apart—when
they separate rhythm and gesture from tune and set bare speech into
e metre, or separate tune and rhythm from words when they employ
bare lyre or reed pipe. This makes it extremely difficult to recognize
what the wordless rhythm and harmony intends, what worthy object of
imitation it resembles. You must understand, however, that it is utterly
crude to be so enamoured of speed, dexterity, and animal cries that
670a one employs reed pipe or lyre other than to accompany dance and song.
The bare employment of either instrument is completely unmusical
showmanship.
Well, enough said on that topic. After all, our inquiry is not into what
we shouldn’t do when we have reached our thirties or gone past 50 and
are availing ourselves of the Muses, but rather what we should do. Our
discussion has already indicated this much, I think: that those who have
b reached 50 and are fit to sing must have received an education better
than that of the choral Muse. They must have keen perception and
knowledge of rhythms and harmonies. How else could one recognize the
correctness of tunes—which of them should be in the Dorian harmony,
and whether the rhythm the composer has attached to a tune is correct
or not?
CL: Clearly, there is no way.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 2 69
ATH: So it’s laughable for the general crowd to think that they are able
to recognize what is and isn’t harmonious and well rhythmed, simply
from having been drilled at singing to the reed pipe and marching in
rhythm. They fail to appreciate that they don’t know a single thing c
about what they are doing. Presumably the tune with the appropriate
features is correct, while the one with inappropriate features is in error.
CL: Most necessarily.
ATH: Suppose a person does not even recognize what features a tune
has. Will he ever be able to do what we said—that is, recognize whether
it is correct in any given case?
CL: By what means could he do so?
ATH: That is exactly what we are discovering now, it would seem.
Those singers of ours, whom we encourage and in a way even compel to
sing willingly—they must be educated to the point that each is able to d
follow closely the feet of the rhythms and the notes of the melodies.
Thus, with a synoptic grasp of harmonies and rhythms, they will be able
to select what is appropriate. This is what is fitting for people of their age
and character to sing, and when they do, they not only enjoy the
harmless pleasures of the moment, they also guide the younger singers
towards the appropriate embrace of worthy characters. They will have e
been educated to the point that the skill they practise is more exact than
that of the common run, and even that of the composers themselves. For
there is no need for a composer to recognize the third thing, whether the
imitation is beautiful or not. All he needs to know, basically, are
harmony and rhythm. These people, by contrast, must know all three,
in order to select what is most beautiful as well as what is second.
Otherwise, their incantations will never succeed in drawing the youth 671a
towards virtue.
Our argument has done its best to establish that we were right in our
earlier defence of the chorus of Dionysus, so let us consider whether it
has succeeded. Now, a gathering of this sort inevitably becomes more
boisterous as the drinking proceeds—an unavoidable feature, we ori-
ginally supposed, of these events as they take place nowadays. b
CL: Necessarily.
ATH: Anyone who participates in such a gathering loosens up and
becomes merry. Bursting with unchecked speech and unwilling to listen
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

70 Translation: Book 2
to his neighbours, he thinks he is fit to rule both himself and the rest of
the company.
CL: Indeed.
ATH: Didn’t we say that when this happens the souls of the drinkers
are like iron in the fire? They become softer and more youthful,
c receptive to the influence of a skilful educator who can shape them
anew, just as when they were young. The one who moulds them, the
same as before, is the good legislator. His task is to make laws about
drinking parties. These are laws that can take in hand that cheerful
drinker—who is emboldened, unduly shameless, and unwilling to abide
by the order of taking turns at listening, speaking, drinking, and
singing—and make him willing to do just the opposite. Against the
shameful boldness that is filling him they can send in the finest oppon-
d ent: fear with justice. This is the divine fear that we have called ‘modesty’
and ‘shame’. Isn’t that so?
CL: That is so.
ATH: As guardians and assistants of these laws, there will be undis-
turbed and sober commanders for the inebriated. To battle against
drunkenness without these commanders is more dangerous than taking
the field against an enemy army in the absence of undisturbed officers.
And he who cannot willingly obey his leaders in the realm of Dio-
e nysus—those over 60 years old—bears an even greater shame than he
who disobeys his officers in the realm of Ares.
CL: Correct.
ATH: Now, with this sort of drunkenness and recreation, aren’t
the drinking companions benefited by participating? Don’t they
part company better friends than when they started—unlike today,
672a when they part as enemies—since they behave in a lawful and com-
pliant manner throughout, given that the sober are in charge of the
inebriated?
CL: Correct, provided the gathering is as you describe.
ATH: So let us no longer roundly condemn the gift of Dionysus as a
bad thing that should not be allowed into the city. Indeed, I could go on
and recount the greatest good he has given us—only I am hesitant to do
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 2 71
so in front of the general public, since people have difficulty under-
standing the point and take it in the wrong way. b
CL: What sort of thing do you mean?
ATH: According to a widespread oracular tale about this god, it is in
revenge for being driven out of his mind by his stepmother Hera that he
inflicts us with Bacchic frenzy and all that manic dance, and it is for this
purpose that he gave us the gift of wine. For my part, I leave it to those
who think they have sound judgement about the gods to pronounce on
such matters, but this much I do know: that no creature is born with the c
degree of intelligence that is appropriate to it when it is fully grown.
During the time before it possesses its proper intelligence, it raves and
shouts at random and as soon as it gets to its feet it jumps about in
disorder. Let us remember that we called these the origins of music and
athletics.
CL: We surely do remember.
ATH: Do we also remember saying that in the case of us humans, this d
origin gives rise to a sense of rhythm and harmony, and that Apollo and
the Muses and Dionysus among the gods are responsible for this?
CL: Of course.
ATH: On the subject of wine, the situation seems to be this. The story
other people tell is that wine was given to human beings in an act of
revenge, to drive us mad. But the story we are telling now is quite the
opposite. It says that wine was given to us as a potion for instilling shame
in the soul and health and strength in the body.
CL: An excellent recapitulation of our discussion, Stranger!
ATH: So much for one half of choral dancing. As for the other half, we e
will either continue with it or pass over it, depending on how the matter
strikes us.
CL: What sort of halves do you mean? How do you divide them?
ATH: Well, we said that choral performance as a whole is pretty much
the whole process of education, and one part of it, the vocal part,
involves rhythm and harmony.
CL: Yes.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

72 Translation: Book 2
ATH: The other part concerns bodily movement. Like vocal move-
ment, it involves rhythm, but its distinctive feature is gesture. The other
673a part, vocal movement, has tune as its distinctive feature.
CL: Very true.
ATH: Now, in the case of the vocal activities that reach the soul and
cultivate virtue, we ventured to call this ‘music’.
CL: And rightly so.
ATH: As for bodily movements, which we call ‘dance’ when they are
performed as recreation, when such movement leads to virtue of the
body, let us call the skilled guidance towards that bodily condition
‘athletics’.
CL: That would be quite correct.
b ATH: So much for our account of music, which is the half of choral
performance whose treatment we said we had completed. As for the
other half, shall we discuss it too, or how should we proceed?
CL: Sir, you are talking to Cretans and Spartans here! If we have dealt
with music, but omitted athletics, what do you expect us to answer to
your question?
ATH: I would say that your question gives me my answer loud and
c clear. I take your question to be not only a reply but also an order to
complete the discussion of athletics.
CL: You have understood me perfectly. Do just that.
ATH: Yes, we must. It will not be a very difficult discussion, since both
of you are familiar with this discipline and considerably more experi-
enced in it than in the previous one.
CL: That is pretty much the truth.
ATH: Now this kind of recreation has its origin in the natural propen-
d sity of all animals to jump about. Add in the human sense of rhythm
that we mentioned, and you have the genesis and birth of dance. Since
tunes remind us and rouse us to rhythm, the union of these with each
other gives birth to recreation in choral dance.
CL: Very true.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Translation: Book 2 73
ATH: Having gone through one part of the subject, as we said, we will
next try to go through the other.
CL: Absolutely.
ATH: Let us first put the finishing touches on our discussion of the use
of drunkenness—that is, if you agree. e
CL: What do you have in mind?
ATH: Suppose a city treats the activity in question as a serious matter:
they employ it in an orderly and law-governed manner—as a means to
practise and cultivate moderation. And suppose it treats other pleasures
along the same lines; it does not abstain from them but cultivates
mastery over them. That is what it should be doing. But suppose it
treats the activity as a form of recreation, allowing anyone who wishes to
drink whenever and with whomever he wishes and in conjunction with 674a
any activity whatsoever. I would not vote to let this city, or man, engage
in any drunkenness whatsoever. Indeed, I would go beyond even the
Cretan and Spartan practice and vote for the Carthaginian law that
prohibits all wine drinking to soldiers on campaign. It requires that their
gatherings during this period serve only water, and that even in the city
itself no slave, male or female, shall taste it, nor shall any of the officials
during their year in office. Ship captains and jurors shall drink no wine b
when they are on active duty, nor shall any person who is about to
participate in important deliberations, or anyone at all during the day
(except for purposes of bodily training or medical treatment), or even at
night if they are intending to beget children (this holds for women as
well as men). There are many other circumstances one could mention in
which no one in their right and lawful mind should drink wine. The
upshot of all this is that a city does not need many vineyards. Once all c
agricultural and dietary matters have been arranged, those involving
wine will turn out to be the most measured and to comprise the smallest
part.
With your agreement, Strangers, let this be the finishing touch to our
discussion of wine.

CL: Well put. We do agree.

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary

A NOTE TO THE READER

The line numbers cited in the commentary are keyed to the Greek
text of des Places, and will not correspond precisely to the lines in the
English translation. In order to reduce visual clutter, the philosoph-
ical convention of using single quotes to mark the mention of a term
is not employed for transliterated Greek terms, which are in italics.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Book 1

I
INTRODUCTORY CONVERSATION

(624a1–625c5)
The divine origin of legislation, and the human project
of inquiring into laws
624a1 ‘A god or a human being’
The theme of the divine origin of the law runs throughout the Laws.
The Athenian will describe law as management by reason (nous),
which is the spark of the immortal in us (713e–714a; cf. 644d2–3
(and note ad loc), 645a1–2, 645b4–8). The so-called ‘divine’ goods
identified at 631b–d are all expressions of wisdom (phronêsis). The
Athenian’s project in Books 1–2 is to draw out the implications of
assuming that the Spartan and Cretan constitutions meet the stand-
ards of such a ‘divine’ origin, and ultimately to reject the assumption.
Note that the Athenian does not take the assumption of divine origin
to preclude a rational human investigation into the basis of law;
indeed, the assumption that identifies reason and god presumably
licenses such an investigation. Nowhere in Laws is it assumed that
correct norms are based on divine fiat inaccessible to human reason
or immune to moral evaluation. Thus the position put forth in
Plato’s Euthyphro (that what is holy is not thus because the gods
command it—10d) is completely consistent with the Laws. On
the nature and existence of the gods, as well as their concern for
human affairs, see the extended arguments in Book 10. These
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

78 Commentary: Book 1
arguments are recapitulated at the end of the Laws, where the
Athenian reiterates the importance of divine guidance for human
legislation (966c–968b).

624a1 ‘Strangers (Xenoi)’

A polite form of address to a foreigner. The dialogue’s three inter-
locutors are Xenoi to each other (see Introduction) and repeatedly
address each other as such throughout Book 1. In subsequent books,
the frequency of the term drops significantly.

624a1–2 ‘your laws’

The Athenian addresses Clinias and Megillus together, as is typical
in Books 1–2 (e.g. 625a5–6, 643b1–2), and each typically replies
on behalf of both—e.g. 626c3, 628e2–5, 636e5, 644b5. The two
men are citizens of different city states—Clinias of the Cretan city
of Knossos (629c3) and Megillus of Sparta (624a4)—but the
Athenian takes Cretan and Spartan law codes to be ‘akin’ (adelphois
nomois, 683a2). Their law codes are characteristically Dorian in that
they are distinctive of the cities whose population was believed in
Plato’s day to descend from so-called Dorian invaders who settled
the Peloponnese and Aegean Islands (including Crete) after the
collapse of Mycenean civilization (Laws 682e–683a; Thuc. 1.12.3;
see O. Murray 1993: 9–15.) The common historical roots of the
Dorian cities in Greece are explored in Book 3 and their character-
istic features are the subject of study (and criticism) in Books 1 and
2. On the characteristic features of Cretan law codes, see Griffith
2013.

624a7–b3 ‘Don’t you say, as Homer does, that Minos made a

pilgrimage to his father . . . ?’
Zeus is the father of Minos. The question, addressed to Clinias,
inquires into specifically Cretan stories about the divine source of
legislation. On Minos, see Homer, Odyssey 11.568–71 and
19.178–81. Like Minos, the three interlocutors in Laws are em-
barked on a pilgrimage to the cave of Zeus (625b2; see Nightingale
1993: 282 and Morrow 1960: 27–8). The human legislator in the
corresponding Spartan stories is Lycurgus (630d6).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 79
625a2 ‘legal disputes’
This prefigures Clinias’ general point that conflict is the context for
all norms and laws (625e–626b). The Athenian, like Socrates in
Republic 3 (405a–410a), will denigrate legal disputation (Laws 11,
937d–938a), although, in keeping with the attention to practical
realities that distinguishes the Laws from its more utopian predeces-
sor, he makes provisions for litigation in the city of Magnesia (e.g.
766d–768e, 932d–938c). In any case, the lived experience of the
laws envisioned by the Athenian will not be battles in court, but
correct living and the shaping of character. On the Athenian’s
version of the proper judge, compare 627d–628a.

625a4 ‘a fine reputation (kalon . . . to kleos)’

alternatively: ‘a noble [or admirable] reputation’
On the range and translation of the term kalon, see note on 630c7.

625a5 ‘raised under such distinguished laws (en toioutois êthesi

tethraphthe nomikois)’
more literally: ‘raised in such lawful training (alt: habits, êthesi)’
The parallel language at 695d8–e1, 708c8, and 751c9 (cf. 752c3–5,
770d2) indicates that êthos is used here, not in its typical sense of
‘character’ (as e.g. at 636d7, 650a5, 655d6, 656b2, 666c1), but as
the training or practice that shapes character (a reversal of the
terminology of 792e2: ‘all êthos is due to ethos’). On ethos as training,
see note on 655d7–e1. On the reputation of Cretan and Spartan laws
for producing good citizens who are obedient to the laws, see
Aristotle, EN 1102b9–12.

625a6 ‘not . . . unpleasant’

Pleasure and its relationship to laws and institutions is a persistent
theme throughout the Laws (631e–632a, 636d–e, 643c–e, 653a–c,
732e–733d). See Stalley 1983: 59–70; Bobonich 2002: 350–73.

625a6–7 ‘in a conversation about law codes and legislation (peri te

politeias . . . kai nomôn)’
more literally: ‘ . . . about government (alt: political constitution) and
laws’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

80 Commentary: Book 1
Politeia, here translated ‘law code’, sometimes refers to constitutional
law, but it often (as at 632c1, 634d5, 635e7, 676a1) simply refers to
a body of laws. The discussion will address not only written laws (the
products of legislation) but also a wide variety of social norms and
practices (see Introduction); on what counts as a social norm, see
Bicchieri 2006: 8–28. ‘In a conversation’ (more literally, ‘speaking
and listening’—legontas te kai akouontas) implies that the interlocu-
tors will take turns in each role. In fact, the conversation will be
decidedly one-sided, with the Athenian doing almost all the talking.
But here, as England points out, the Athenian’s initial invitation to
engage in a legislative inquiry invokes his interlocutors’ credentials,
not his own.

625b4 ‘Those at our stage of life (tais hêlikiais)’

The three interlocutors are self-proclaimed old men (gerontes) (634e,
658d; see note on 664d1–2). As such, they are at the proper age to
engage in legislative inquiries (634d–635a) and their views on legis-
lation and education are to be accorded a special authority, according
to the Athenian in Book 2 (658e–659d, 670b–e). The significance of
different stages of life is marked in the institution of the three
choruses (664b–665d).

625b6–7 ‘refresh ourselves with conversation (logois te allêlous para-

muthoumenous)’
alternatively: ‘encourage ourselves . . . ’ cf. 632e4–5 and note ad loc

II
P E A C E NO T W A R AS TH E P R O P E R
F O C U S OF LE G I S L A T I O N

(625c6–632d7)
Clinias indicates that the institutions of his home city, Knossos, are
organized to promote victory in war (625c–626c). This is a mark of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 81
their excellence, he argues, since war and conflict are a ubiquitous and
inevitable feature of human life at every level (626c–627c). The Athen-
ian responds that reconciliation of warring parties is preferable to victory
of the better party over the worse, and hence that peace is a superior goal
compared with victory (627c–628e). The military ethic propounded by
the Spartan poet Tyrtaeus is criticized in this light (629a–630c) and the
Athenian concludes that a correct legislator will aim at cultivating ‘the
whole of virtue’ in the citizens, which will involve training them in
wisdom and justice, not just courage (630d–632d).

The military focus of Cretan institutions

625c6–9 ‘let me ask you why the law has ordained your communal
meals (ta sussitia), your regime of athletic training (ta gumnasia), and
your style of armament. What is their point?’
more literally: ‘on what principle (kata ti) has the law ordained your
common meals . . . ’
The question is asked of Cretan city states in general, not just of
Clinias’ own city, Knossos. See note on 624a1–2. On the communal
meals (sussitia), see note on 625e2–7. ‘Athletic training’ here renders
gumnasia—which includes military training; on the scope of the
related term gymnastikê, see note on 673a8–10.

625e2–7 ‘our communal meals . . . [he] organized . . . based on the

observation that . . . every city is engaged in a continuous lifelong war
against every other’
Here Clinias passes from specifically military institutions to familiar
features of Dorian societies even in peacetime: the communal meals
(sussitia) in which all male citizens participate, instead of dining in
private at home. On the classification ‘Dorian’, see note on 624a1–2.
On the difference between Cretan and Spartan sussitia, see Aristotle,
Politics 1271a26–37, 1272a1–27. A version of sussitia plays a role in
the ideal city outlined in Republic (416e), and will be included in the
plan of legislation endorsed by the Athenian in Laws 6 (780a–781d,
783b–c; cf. 7, 806e), but not without criticism of the institution’s
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

82 Commentary: Book 1
potential for undermining the norms of a peaceful and law-abiding
society (636b–c). On sussitia in Laws see David 1978, Samaras 2010,
Schöpsdau 2003. Even if the sussitia are not in fact of Dorian origin
(as argued by O. Murray 1993: 176–7), Plato still took them to be a
distinctive feature of the Dorian societies of his day.

626a3–4 ‘exists only in name’

literally: ‘is nothing but a name’

626a4–5 ‘every city is by nature always in an undeclared war

against every other’
Aristotle reports that city states on Crete were in persistent conflict
with each other (Politics 1269a40–b1).

626a6–8 ‘it is with war in mind that the Cretan lawgiver established
all the institutions (nomima) that govern our public and private life’
Aristotle concurs with this diagnosis of the goal of Cretan constitu-
tions (Pol. 1324b6–9). As at 630d7, ‘institutions’ translates nomima,
which differs little in meaning here from epitêdeumata (practices) at
626b2. These need not themselves be the result of legislation; in
Book 3 (681a–b) national or ethnic temperament is cited as a source
of nomoi.

626a8–b1 ‘endowed us (paredôke) with laws (nomous) to guard us

(phulattein)’
Thus Clinias portrays the laws as performing the function of phulakê
(defence, standing guard), which he has just identified (625e–626a)
as the central function of Cretan institutions. (Thanks to Brad
Inwood for pointing this out.) While Clinias has in mind the defence
against military foes, the Athenian will later use the vocabulary of
guardianship to invoke the role that legislation or institutions play in
supporting peacetime objectives such as friendship, justice, or edu-
cation (628a2, 632b2, 640c10, 654d8; for a further extension of the
use, see 705d3). See note on 632b2–3.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 83
The present translation takes tous nomous (b1) to be the subject
of the infinitive phulattein (a8). By contrast, most translators
take tous nomous to be the object. Herodotus 1.73.12–14 shows
that the latter construal is not necessary. In the present case it
would yield either the translation ‘and commanded us to abide
by (phulattein) the laws’ (England, followed by Schöpsdau and
Lisi)—an odd use of phulattein—or ‘commanded us to preserve
the laws’ (Brisson/Pradeau). The latter sense would prefigure the
Athenian’s later theme that laws require guardians (632c, 752e; see
note on 632c4).

626b3–4 ‘all the goods of the vanquished go to the victors’

Clinias implies here that the point of victory in war is to ‘possess
goods’—presumably material possessions such as money and prop-
erty. The Athenian will reject this view when he affirms the doctrine
of divine and human goods at 631b–d, claiming instead that any
benefit to come from possessing such ‘human goods’ depends on the
proper use of and attitude towards them, which issue from moder-
ation and justice. A militarized analogue of the Athenian’s principle
by the Spartan poet Tyrtaeus is quoted at 629a7–b3; see Bobonich
2002: 131–6. The value Clinias implicitly places on material posses-
sions explains why he will later balk when the Athenian proposes
(661d–662a) that someone might possess such things in abundance
without being happy.

626b5–6 ‘a well-trained (kalôs . . . gegumnasthai) understanding of

Cretan institutions (nomima)’
The training is that invoked at 625a5–6. The Athenian’s choice of
words here recalls the athletic training (gumnasia) invoked at 625c7.
Given the traditional understanding that gumnasia is training of the
body, while ‘music’ is training of the mind (673a, 764c, 795d, Rep.
376e; cf. 441e), there is also a suggestion here that Clinias’ views are
inculcated by rote (e.g. a ‘well-rehearsed understanding’). See also
note on 632d5–6.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

84 Commentary: Book 1
626c1–2 ‘its affairs must be arranged to make it victorious in war
over other cities’
By contrast, the Athenian will argue that peace is the proper goal of
law (627d–628d).

626c6–627c2
War and conflict as the human condition
Responding to Clinias’ and Megillus’ proposal that victory in war is
a city’s ultimate aim, and thus the primary focus of a legislator
(626c1–5), the Athenian asks whether war or conflict also character-
izes the relations between villages within the domain of a city,
between households within villages, and between siblings within a
household (626c6–13). After his interlocutors answer ‘yes’ in all
cases, he asks whether the same applies to an individual person’s
relation to himself—again an emphatic ‘yes’ (d1–9). Victory in the
battle against oneself, Clinias declares, is ‘the highest and most
excellent of all victories’ (626e2–3). Victory over oneself, Clinias
clarifies, consists in the better part (or party) defeating the worse
(627a3–c2), although the point is not developed in the context of
psychological conflict within a person, but in that of civil strife
within a city state. The analysis of internal psychological conflict
will not occur until 644b–645c.

626d3–4 ‘hailing from Attica . . . called after the goddess’

The city of Athens (in the region of Attica) is named after Athena, the
goddess of wisdom. With the main speaker now identified as stereo-
typically Athenian, Plato has completed his presentation of the three
interlocutors as displaying the distinctive features of their respective
home states.

626d5–6 ‘You have gone right to the heart of the matter (ep’
archên) and made it easy to see the truth of our present contention’
more literally: ‘You invoke quite correctly (orthôs) the fundamental
principle (archên) that clarifies the matter (logon)’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 85
The ‘heart of the matter’ (archên, d5) is stated by Clinias at 626d7–9:
‘everyone is the enemy of everyone else in public life, and in private
each person is pitted against himself’—on which see note on 626e5.
This principle supports Clinias’ original contention (625e–626b)
that victory in war is the primary focus of the legislator.

626e1 ‘my goodness (ô thaumasie)’

literally: ‘you amazing man’

626e2–3 ‘victory (to nikân) over oneself is the highest and most
excellent of all victories’
This affirmation is consistent with Clinias’ earlier claim (626a–b)
that victory in battle against external foes is the ultimate aim of the
legislator, even though the present claim invokes a victory over
internal psychological forces. As Clinias and Megillus understand
it, the victory-over-oneself that they praise—later to be called ‘self-
mastery’ (to kreittô heautou 645b2; cf. 626e8)—is displayed by the
warrior who conquers his fears in battle (cf. 635b–c, 649c). By
contrast, Schöpsdau (1994: 159–60) proposes that the present intro-
duction of the personal case provides the Athenian with the basis on
which he will criticize the militaristic focus of Dorian institutions.
However, the Athenian’s criticisms of the victory ideal (articulated at
627c–628d and 629c–630c) make no mention of conflict internal to
a person; the conflict invoked in those contexts is internal to a city or
a family (see note on 628c9–11, and ‘A tactical concession?’ in the
general note on 628e2–630d1). While the Athenian is responsible
for the line of questioning that leads to the present focus on internal
conflict within a person, it is not the Athenian but his interlocutors
who embrace victory in such conflict as a paradigm for virtue. While
the Athenian will later exploit his interlocutors’ belief that virtue,
quite generally, is displayed in victory over opposing internal
impulses (633d–634b, 644b), he will himself endorse a very different
conception of virtue in Book 2 (653a–b)—also implicit in the
account of education he offers in Book 1 (643b–644b)—on
which virtue consists in ‘agreement’ (sumphônia) between internal
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

86 Commentary: Book 1
elements. These very different conceptions of virtue will be referred
to below as the ‘victory’ and ‘agreement’ models. See notes on 626e5,
627a6–7, 628c9–11, 632d8–643a1, and 643b1–646e2.

626e4 ‘These ways of speaking (tauta)’

These are the common locutions, ‘defeated by oneself’ (hêttôn heau-
tou) and its contrary ‘master of oneself’ (kreittôn heautou)—used, for
example, in Protag. 358c–d and Rep. 430e–431b. The Athenian will
substitute the latter at 626e8 for Clinias’ locution, ‘victory (nikan)
over oneself’ (e2). He will later use akrateia and enkrateia respective-
ly, as synonyms for these terms (636c7, 645e8). The latter is the term
Aristotle uses for continence, in contrast to akrasia (incontinence,
weakness of will, EN 1145a15–18). The phenomena here invoked,
which will be a recurring focus of the Athenian throughout Book 1
(633c–634b, 644d–646a, 647c–648e), correspond roughly to what
Aristotle calls akrasia and enkrateia in EN VII 1–3, conditions that
the latter distinguishes from genuine virtue and vice of character. The
Athenian too will propose a model of virtue in Book 2 that rejects
mere enkrateia as sufficient for virtue. See notes on 626e2–3 and
636c6–7.

626e5 ‘each of us is engaged in an internal war against himself’

Under the prompting from the Athenian’s questioning, Clinias has
now extended his original proposal, that conflict is a universal feature
of human life, to apply to an individual person’s relationship to
himself. The internal analysis of personal self-conflict, however, is
not pursued in the present context and will not be addressed expli-
citly until 644d–645c. The assumption that such conflict is inevit-
able informs the paradigm for virtue invoked at 632e–636c and
644b. On the difference between that paradigm and the alternative
conception that the Athenian will endorse in Book 2, see notes on
626e2–3, 628c9–11, 634e1–2, 643b1–646e2.

626e7 ‘let’s apply this thesis (logon) back to the previous cases’
The thesis is that of 626d1–e5—that an individual person is subject
to internal conflict. Instead of dwelling on the psychological
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 87
implications of this thesis in its application to an individual person
(a point not raised until 644b ff.), the Athenian here will immedi-
ately apply it to the parties involved in the types of conflict just
enumerated at 626c–d: ‘households, villages, and cities’ (627a1). It is
the problem of internal conflict within cities, not within persons,
that will allow the Athenian to conclude at 628c9–e1 that peace, not
war, is the proper focus of legislation. On the Athenian’s tactical
reasons for not pressing the analogous point about individual virtue,
see note on 626e2–3.

627a6–7 ‘This sort of thing most emphatically does occur, espe-

cially within cities’
This remark introduces the notion of stasis or civil faction, internal
conflict within a city, which was a common problem in Greek city
states in Plato’s time, but has as yet not figured in the discussion
between the interlocutors. The problem of civil strife also looms large
in Plato’s Republic, where it is deployed as an analogue to the
psychological turmoil within the unjust person. Here, however, the
Athenian conspicuously fails to draw the analogy between civic strife
and the psychology of vicious character. No doubt this is at least in
part because the Athenian’s interlocutors are attracted to a model of
virtue that involves—indeed presupposes—internal conflict. See
notes on 626e2–3 and 643b1–646e2.

627a7–9 ‘Where the better people are victorious over the inferior
masses, the city would correctly be called “master of itself” ’
This passage invokes better and worse parts of a political entity, and it
will not be until 644b–645c that the analogous parts of an individual
person are identified.

627b1–2 ‘whether we should ever accept that it is possible for the

inferior (cheiron) to be master (kreitton) over the superior
(ameinonos)’
An allusion to the surface paradox more accessible in Plato’s Greek
than in English translation. ‘Master’ here translates kreitton, which is
ambiguous in meaning between ‘better’ and ‘stronger’—hence the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

88 Commentary: Book 1
paradox is something like saying that the inferior are superior to their
betters. Such a paradox is exploited by Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias
488b–e; and a different paradox in the notion of self-mastery is
articulated at Rep. 430e–431a, where it is solved by positing, as in
our present passage, a ‘better’ and ‘worse’ part within a person’s soul
(see Dorion 2007). Schöpsdau, by contrast, following Gigon, pro-
poses that the Athenian’s doubts here rest on the conviction that a
good person cannot be harmed by a bad one (Ap. 30c–d). However,
the Athenian never endorses such a thesis, even at 660e–661e, where
he allows that bad things can happen to a good person (661d).

627b3–4 ‘members of the same tribe (suggeneis)’

An imprecise kinship relationship that applies both to the fellow
citizens in the present example and to members of a nuclear family in
the following example (627c–628a), where the cognate term suggen-
eia is used (627c10 and e5). See also note on 627e5.

627b4–5 ‘unjust (adikoi) citizens . . . the just minority’

As is typical in Plato, justice and injustice are primarily conceived of
as properties of persons, rather than features of institutions.

627c1 ‘this way of speaking is decidedly odd’

The expressions for self-mastery and self-defeat apply, in ordinary
speech, to individual persons (see note on 626e4). Clinias is com-
menting on the anomaly of using them to describe a city.

627c3–628c8
Reconciliation of warring parties is preferable to victory
In response to his interlocutor’s claim that victory in internal conflict
is the ‘highest and most excellent victory’, the Athenian distinguishes
three different ways in which such conflict might be settled,
illustrated in the case of a feuding family brought before a judge
(627d8–628a5). The first two are varieties of victory of a better party
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 89
over its rebellious inferiors; the latter party are either (1) executed, or
(2) politically subjugated (627d11–e3). On the third option (3) the
parties are reconciled by laws that ensure their future peaceful and
friendly coexistence (627e3–628a3). Only (3) is a legislative solu-
tion, and only in that case is the conflict eliminated rather than
decided in favour of one of the warring parties. Clinias agrees that it
is the preferable solution, both in itself (628a4–5), and for strength-
ening the city against external foes (628b6–c3). Thus the Athenian
will conclude at 628c9–e1 that peace is the ultimate focus of the
legislator. Drawing this conclusion puts him in a position to make
the analogous point about an individual person: that internal har-
mony is a superior achievement to victory of the better part over a
recalcitrant worse part; however, the Athenian conspicuously fails to
draw the latter conclusion; see note on 628c9–11.

627c8–10 ‘We are not seeking to mandate that the household

(oikia) or tribe (suggeneia) as a whole be called “defeated by itself” ’
This would indeed be an odd way to use the expression in Greek
(see note on 627c1). The primary application of the expression is
to the self-control or lack thereof in an individual person (as at
644d–645c). Here the expression is extended to apply to interper-
sonal or inter-group conflict; ‘seeking to mandate that’ translates
thêreuein 627c9 (more literally: ‘hunting for’).

627d5–7 ‘very true (alêthestata) . . . just right (kalôs)’

As at 625c4–5, Clinias displays his preference for practical over
verbal matters, and the hitherto passive Megillus concurs. On the
Dorian distaste for verbal elaboration, see 641e. Megillus’ kalôs
[sc. legeis] simply reiterates the sense of Clinias’ alêthestata . . . legeis;
he is endorsing the content, not the style of the Athenian’s remarks
(by contrast: Saunders translates it ‘nicely put’). On the expression,
see note on 630c7.

627e1 ‘the better ones to rule themselves (archein . . . hautôn)’

The expression ‘rule themselves’ (archein hautôn) will be used at
644b7 to refer to individual self-control or self-restraint, which is
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

90 Commentary: Book 1
then explained at 644d–645c as the victory of calculation’s golden
pull over the opposing ‘iron pulls’ of pleasure and pain (see note on
644b6–7). In the present context, by contrast, the expression has its
ordinary meaning of political self-rule—with no implication that a
better part is ruling a worse. Indeed, the self-rule invoked here is
exercised entirely within the ‘better part’ of the family, since the
worse part, on this first option, has been eliminated.

627e2–3 ‘made them agree to be ruled’

more literally: ‘makes them . . . be ruled voluntarily (archesthai
hekontas)’
While hekôn (voluntarily) is often correctly translated as ‘willingly’
(as at 663b4–6), this is too strong for the present context and would
obscure the difference between the second and third judges’ solutions
(see note on 627e3–4). Even actions performed under duress or
constraint may be classified as hekousion (voluntary) in ordinary
Greek, provided they are performed intentionally; this is why such
actions will constitute a grey area for Aristotle’s discussion of the
topic to exploit (EN 1110a4–b9). Given this elasticity of the notion
of the hekousion, the Athenian’s characterization of the wicked
brothers as hekontas is consistent with their displeasure at being
ruled. It is because the brothers prefer this arrangement to the
alternative of being put to death that they are made to ‘agree’ to it.
The notion that citizens should be voluntary (hekontes) subjects to
the laws will be a persistent theme of the Athenian’s (e.g. 700a5),
although the relevant notion of voluntariness in those contexts
(captured by the translation ‘willingness’), unlike the one at play in
the present passage, implies the absence of constraint or reluctance
(as at 663e1–2, 690c3, 832c3–5, 921d9); see Laks 2005. For further
citations within Laws, see note on 663b4–6. On the different ways of
marking the contrast between hekousion (voluntary) and akousion
(involuntary), see Meyer 1993: 9–14.

627e3–4 ‘Even better is a third judge’

literally: ‘third in excellence (triton . . . pros aretên)’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 91
The excellence (aretê) is specifically that of a judge (cf. the aretê of a
legislator at 637d2). Later (630a ff.) the more general human aretê,
consisting of wisdom, moderation, courage, and justice, will become
the focus of the discussion, where the term is translated ‘virtue’. See
notes on 629e9–630a2 and 630b2–3.
England and others puzzle over how the third judge is different
from the second, but there is a clear contrast if we construe the evil
brothers’ attitude in the second case as in the note on 627e2–3. The
first judge executes the evil parties, the second makes them submit to
the rule of their betters (even if they are not entirely happy with this
arrangement), and the third reconciles the two parties, making them
friends (philous, 628a3) rather than masters and subjects (the im-
portance of friendship (philia) among fellow citizens is stressed in
Book 3). By contrast, England, followed by Schöpsdau, supposes
that the third makes permanent, through laws, the arrangement
instituted by the second. Strauss (1975: 5) takes the Athenian to
present the third judge as the worst, on the grounds that the laws
allow the bad as well as the good to rule; however, we may suppose
that the reconciliation that establishes the friendship between the
citizens (628a1–3) rehabilitates the wicked brothers and so makes all
the brothers good.

627e5 ‘this tribe at odds with itself’

The term translated as ‘tribe’ (suggeneia) applies equally to the family
invoked at 627c and the fellow citizens invoked at 627b (see note on
627b3–4). Thus the superiority of the third solution (reconcile the
warring parties) applies to both family and city. Note that the
language used at 627c8–d3 and 627d11–628a3 is not specific to
the case of the family. The term ‘brothers’, which appears in some
translations (Saunders, Taylor) is not in Plato’s text.

628a1–2 ‘reconcile them by establishing laws’

The third alternative is the first truly legislative solution, in contrast
to the first and second, which are judicial verdicts. The point of
proper legislation, as the Athenian will explain in Book 3, is to raise
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

92 Commentary: Book 1
citizens under institutions that will make them well disposed to each
other and to the importance of following the laws; as a result, no
conflict should arise in the first place.

628a6–7 ‘it would not be with a view to war but to its opposite
that he establishes their laws’
The Athenian here neatly draws the conclusion that contradicts
Clinias’ initial claim that victory in war against other cities is the
single focus of the legislator (625d7–e2, 626a5–8). This is not to say
that victory in war is unimportant, but simply that establishing
friendly relations among citizens is an important goal of the legisla-
tor. Since the issue in the immediate context concerns conflict within
families or states, not between them, all the Athenian establishes here
is that it is better to have a community whose members are reconciled
to each other than one where a discordant element is kept under
control. At 628c9–e1 he will draw the stronger conclusion that the
goal of victory in war is subordinate to that of living in peace without
faction. See also note on 628c9–11.

628a9 ‘the person who sets up (sunarmottôn) a city’

A transition from the case of the judge to the case of the legislator.
The verb sunarmozein, here translated ‘sets up’ (with Taylor, Lisi),
also evokes the ‘harmonizing’ functions of the ‘third judge’ above at
627e3–628a3, as well as the notion of sumphônia (agreement) that
will be important later on (see notes on 628c9–11 and 634e1–2).
Thus Saunders translates the verb as ‘harmonizes’, and similarly des
Places and Brisson/Pradeau; however, the former meaning is likely to
be operative here. Otherwise it prejudges the question that the
Athenian is about to ask concerning the legislator (see note on
628a9–b2). Schöpsdau manages to capture both connotations of
the verb.

628a9–b2 ‘Is it more with a view to war against external foes that
he arranges its life, or with a view to the type of war that . . . arises
within cities . . . ?’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 93
This question is in superficial tension with the Athenian’s claim that
the proper legislator does not have war as his focus (628a, 630d).
However, as the present context develops the point, it is clear that the
legislator has civil war in mind as something to avoid.

628b6–9 ‘in which condition would you prefer that the city be
forced to direct its attention to external enemies . . . ?’
Here the Athenian exploits the high value placed by his Dorian
interlocutors on victory in war against external enemies, even though
he does not endorse their view.

628c6 ‘for the sake of what is best (tou aristou heneka)’

Here Plato uses aristos to indicate not just the greatest good, but
a goal—that for whose sake the other things are pursued; on the
connection between good and goal, see Aristotle EN I 1094a18–22,
1097a18–24. Aristos in some contexts might alternatively be ren-
dered by ‘excellent’ (as at 629b3 and 630a2, where for consistency’s
sake, it is also translated ‘best’). Its cognate noun (aretê) is translated
as ‘virtue’ at 630b3, c4, e1–3, 631a3–5; on the translation see note
on 629e9–630a2.

628c9–e1
Peace, not victory, is the ultimate goal of legislation
In this difficult paragraph, the Athenian takes up his announced
points in reverse order: victory over internal faction is not the best
thing to aim at (628c11–d4); nor is victory in external war (d4–e1).
His conclusion, that war is ‘for the sake of’ (charin) peace (d8), allows
victory in external war to be a goal of the legislator, but one that is
subordinate to the ultimate goal of peace.

628c9–11 ‘The best (ariston), however, is neither war nor fac-

tion . . . but rather peace and mutual goodwill’
Presumably ‘war’ and ‘faction’ are here shorthand for ‘victory in war’
and ‘victory against faction’. The Athenian here articulates this
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

94 Commentary: Book 1
conclusion only as a claim about what is good for a city state (polis),
not an individual person, notwithstanding the mention of the latter
at 628d5. It is, of course, easy to make the analogous point in
criticism of the ideal of self-mastery affirmed by Clinias at 626e2–3:
while ‘victory over oneself’ is better than being ‘defeated’ by pleasures
or pains, far superior to either is the condition of not being torn by
opposing inclinations in the first place (thus Stalley 1983: 55 and
1994: 164). Indeed, the latter condition is captured by the concep-
tion of virtue as ‘agreement’ (sumphônia) that is implied in the
account of education that will be presented later in Book 1 (see
note on 643b1–646e2), and articulated explicitly in the fuller ac-
count of education in Book 2, 653a–b. In the present context,
however, the Athenian conspicuously fails to apply his conclusions
to the case of an individual person. Indeed, as the discussion pro-
ceeds, he will continue to appeal to his interlocutor’s conception of
virtue as victory over oneself at 633c–d, 635b–d, 644b. (On the
tactical reasons for doing so, see note on 627a6–7 and general note
on 628e2–630d1.) On ‘victory’ and ‘agreement’ as competing para-
digms for virtue, see notes on 626e2–3 and 643b1–646e2.

628d1 ‘not the highest achievement (tôn aristôn) but a necessity

(tôn anankaiôn)’
more literally: ‘not one of the best things but a necessity’
If it was the best thing, it would be the legislator’s goal (628c6–7).
On the opposition between necessity and the good, see Laws 858a,
Rep. 493c.

628d2–3 ‘a disease-ridden body is performing at its best (arista

prattein) after being flushed out by a purgative’
Another analogy to a purgative is invoked at 646c. On ‘performing
(or doing) one’s best’ as a synonym for happiness (eudaimonia), see
note on 628d5.

628d5 ‘the happiness (eudaimonia) of either a city or an individual’

 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 95
‘Happiness’ (eudaimonia) is used as equivalent to ‘performing at
[one’s] best’ (arista prattein) at 628d3. It means ‘living well’ (eu
zên) or ‘doing well’ (eu prattein—Rep. 354a1; Euthyd. 278e3,
279a2–3, 280b5–6; cf. Laws 657c5–6; Aristotle EN 1095a18–20)
and is also captured by ‘doing admirably’ (kalôs prattein—641c1; see
note on 637e5). Thus eudaimonia is a kind of well-being, or well-
functioning, rather than subjective contentment, in contrast to what
the English translation ‘happiness’ might suggest. It belongs not only
to individual people (Laws 631b) but also to cities (Laws 636d–e,
683b, 697b, 710b, 781b, 927b, 945d; Rep. 500e), and it is the
lawgiver’s business to bring it about (Laws 628d, 631b, 742d–743c).
The Athenian will explain at 631b–d that one is happy insofar as one
has good things, and that the greatest of these are the virtues—hence
his later remarks that one is happy (eudaimôn) insofar as one is good
(agathos) or just (dikaios)—Laws 660e–661d; cf. 742d–743c. On the
notion of ‘happiness’ in Greek ethics, see Kraut 1979; Annas 1993:
27–46. On the relationship between being good (or virtuous) and
being happy, see Meyer 2008: 11–14. See also notes on 631b5–6,
636e1, and 660e7–9.

628d8–e1 ‘rather than regulating peacetime for the sake of war’

A point repeated in Book 7, 803d. On the expression ‘for the sake of’
(charin—equivalent to heneka at 628c6), see notes on 631d5–6 and
on 647c1.

628e2–630d1
Criticism of the military ethic of the poet Tyrtaeus
Clinias notes that, whatever the merits of the Athenian’s remarks,
Spartan and Cretan institutions obviously have war as their primary
focus (628e2–5). The Athenian encourages him not to be defensive
on the issue, but to proceed on the assumption that all parties to
the discussion take military success ‘most seriously’ (629a2–3). As a
device to make concrete this common sense of purpose, he shifts
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

96 Commentary: Book 1
the conversation away from an examination of Clinias’ and Megil-
lus’ views to a hypothetical conversation with the poet Tyrtaeus
(629a–630c), whose alleged ties to both Athens and Sparta (629a5)
make him an appropriate spokesman for the alleged shared con-
cerns. It is Tyrtaeus, rather than the Dorian interlocutors or their
legislators, who is criticized for eulogizing prowess in war against
external foes instead of the broader range of virtues that include not
only courage but also justice and moderation (629e–630d). The
engagement with Tyrtaeus thus serves to introduce the notion of
virtue (aretê) into the discussion. The issue is no longer whether
peace or victory is the legislator’s goal, but which virtues the
legislator should aim to cultivate in the citizens—those for peace
or those for war.

A tactical concession?
The Athenian’s argument takes the curious tack of conceding the
Dorian assumption that excellence in war is of the utmost importance
(629a–c), and limiting the debate to the question of which kind of
war (external or internal) is more important (629c–d). On the face of
it, this concession contradicts the conclusion just articulated by the
Athenian that war is not the legislator’s ultimate focus (628c9–e5; to
be reiterated at 630d4–7). Having previously established
(a) that civil conflict poses greater dangers than external war (628a–b),
and
(b) that peace is a higher goal than victory in conflict (628c–d),
the Athenian now appears to conduct his ‘conversation’ with Tyr-
taeus as if (b) had not been established. He argues simply that the
person who excels in civil conflict is superior to Tyrtaeus’ warrior
against external foes (629e–630a). However, the Athenian’s enumer-
ation of the virtues required for success against internal faction
(630a–c; developed further in 631c–e) makes it clear that these
include the virtues of sociable cooperation during peacetime—in
particular, moderation and justice. Rather than simply equipping a
person for success in the battles of a civil war, these virtues will
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 97
prevent faction and civil strife from arising in the first place. It is the
combination of these that the Athenian presents to Tyrtaeus as
superior to strictly military courage. However strained the assumption
that this expanded range of virtue displays ‘excellence in civil war’, it
fits with the Athenian’s strategy of appealing to normative assump-
tions that his interlocutors find attractive.

628e4–5 ‘with this goal in view’

literally: ‘are for the sake of these (toutôn heneka)’, i.e. success in war
against external enemies. See notes on 631d5-6 and 647c1.

629a2 ‘to push the point aggressively (diamachesthai) . . . maintain

a civil tone’
more literally: ‘to be contentious . . . ’
(Cf. a similar contrast between contentious or combative argument
and civilized discussion at Meno 75c–d). The Athenian’s point here
is that the present discussion is not a contest for victory but an
inquiry into the truth. ‘Civil’ translates the adverb êrema—‘gently’,
which invokes the gentleness (praotês or hêmerotês) that in Plato is
typically associated with persuasion and reasoning and contrasted
with force or violence (Stsm. 307a–b, Rep. 375b–e, 410c–411e; Laws
634c, 666e, 731b–d; cf. Rep. 399a–c). See also notes on 629d2,
634c7–8, 645a6. On the importance of balancing gentleness
and forcefulness, see note on 631c7–8. On contentious argument
(eristikê), see also Lys. 211b–c, Euthyd. 272a–b, Soph. 226a, 231e.

629a2–3 ‘we and they alike take these matters most seriously’
The antecedent of ‘they’ is not supplied by the context, but it is
presumably the legislators of the Spartan and Cretan institutions
invoked by Clinias at 628e2–5, who are the assumed object of
anerôtan (‘question’ 629a2). ‘These matters’ (tauta, 629a3) are
most likely the military goals (toutôn, 628e4) that Clinias has just
cited as the focus of Dorian legislation. Thus Schöpsdau. By contrast,
England proposes ‘laws and government’ as the antecedent. How-
ever, as Schöpsdau notes, Clinias’ use of ‘emphatically’ (spoudên) in
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

98 Commentary: Book 1
628e4 (which concerns military matters) is picked up by the Athen-
ian’s ‘take . . . seriously’ (spoudazontôn) here at 629a3. The two
occurrences of ‘these matters’ (peri tauta) in 629a3 and a6 both refer
back to the ‘toutôn’ in Clinias’ remark at e4; cf. 629c2–4.

629a4 ‘Tyrtaeus’
An elegiac poet of the seventh century bce whose martial poems
glorifying valour in combat were a staple in Spartan culture. See
Podlecki (1984). Pausanias 4.15.6 reports that Tyrtaeus transferred
his allegiance from Athens to Sparta; the tale is not very flattering to
the poet and reflects the centuries-long tension between Athens and
Sparta. See also note on 634a2, where Tyrtaeus may be alluded to.

629a7–b3 ‘I would not memorialize a man . . . not even . . . the

richest man of all . . . who did not always prove to be best in war’
The quotation-cum-paraphrase from Tyrtaeus (fragment 12 West)
continues at 629e1–3 and is revisited in Book 2 at 660e–661a. The
poet articulates a slightly skewed version of the principle that the
Athenian will express in the doctrine of divine and human goods at
631b6–d2. In refusing to praise wealth and the other generally
recognized standards of success unless it is combined with ‘virtue’,
Tyrtaeus implies that there is no value in possessing such putative
goods as wealth unless one also possesses virtue (aretê). By contrast,
Clinias at 626b2–4 implies that military valour is to be prized
because it secures and defends material possessions. For development
of this point, see Bobonich 2002: 131–6. Tyrtaeus’ error, attributed
to the interlocutors quite generally at 630d4–e3, is an overly narrow
conception of the requisite virtue or excellence. (On ‘virtue’ and its
connection to being ‘best in war’, see note on 629e9–630a2.)

629b9 ‘most divine’

A typically Spartan locution, also used by Megillus at 626c4; see note
on 642d5.

629d2 ‘the hardest (chalepôtatos) conflict’

 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 99
‘Hardest’ translates the superlative of chalepos, which is regularly
contrasted with praos (mild, gentle; see notes on 629a2, 634c7–8,
645a6) but also with ‘easy’ (rhadion) at 636a2–4; cf. 641b7. England
prefers ‘deadliest’, but the Athenian’s point is unlikely to be that
external war causes less death and destruction than civil war, given
the bloody carnage he has invoked to characterize external war just a
few lines later in the quote from Tyrtaeus (629e2–3). Presumably
chalepos is to be understood in the same sense as in the quote from
Theognis at 630a4–5 where it (and its comparative form) is used to
modify dichostasiê (faction) and polemos (conflict, a6): roughly, civil
war is the most difficult battle to fight. In Book 2, the same term is
used to describe the dangers posed by improper song and dance
(see note on 669b5–6).

629d3 ‘as we were saying just now’—628a9–b4.

629d5 ‘far milder (praioteron)’—see note on 629d2.

629e9–630a2 ‘while these men are good (agathôn), there are others
who are better (ameinous) by far—those who show themselves to be
best (aristous) in the most important kind of war (megistôi polemôi)’
Agathos is an ordinary adjective meaning ‘good’ and is used here
along with its comparative (ameinôn) and superlative (aristos) forms
(cf. 628c6–7, 629b3). Many translators, however, translate the
terms here by forms of ‘courageous’ or ‘brave’ (Bury, Saunders, des
Places, Brisson/Pradeau, but not Lisi or Schöpsdau). This is unwar-
ranted. While the sort of goodness that Tyrtaeus has in mind is
undoubtedly courage or bravery, it is important to distinguish the
general notion of goodness that is invoked by agathos and its cognates
from the specific kind of goodness that is manifest in the bravery
extolled by Tyrtaeus. Even if, as the Athenian charges, Tyrtaeus and
his ilk collapse all of goodness into courage (andreia), one cannot
articulate this point without respecting the distinct meanings of the
two terms.
At 630b–c, the Athenian will restate the present affirmation as a
claim about ‘excellence’ or ‘virtue’ (aretê—the abstract noun cognate
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

100 Commentary: Book 1

with the superlative aristos). In many literary contexts, including the
poems of Tyrtaeus, aristos, the cognate verb aristeuein, and the noun
aretê characterize warriors who are victorious over opponents (e.g.
Homer Iliad 6.208, 11.784), and in such contexts aretê often refers
to strength, speed, or military prowess (e.g. ibid. 8.535, 11.90,
22.268; cf. Tyrtaeus fr. 12.33 West). But in the political context of
the fourth and fifth centuries bce that Plato depicts in his dialogues,
aretê connotes excellence much more broadly construed. For ex-
ample, it is the object of pursuit by any ambitious participant in
public life (dramatized by Plato in openings of Protagoras 310b–
319a; see Meyer 2008: 8–11). Thus even if what Tyrtaeus has in
mind when he uses the term aretê is bravery (as at Tyrtaeus fr. 12.13
West), we must translate the term as ‘virtue’ or ‘excellence’ rather
than ‘bravery’. On virtue, see also note on 630b2–3.

630a4 ‘Theognis . . . of Megara’

An elegiac poet of the sixth century bce. The verse quoted is Book
1.76–77 (Diehl/Young).

630a7–b2 ‘a blend of justice, moderation (sôphrosune), and wis-

dom along with courage (andreia) is better (ameinôn) than courage
on its own’
literally: ‘justice, moderation, and wisdom coming to the same thing
(eis t’auton elthousa), along with (meta) courage is better . . . ’
This remark, together with the classification of courage as ‘fourth
in rank and merit’ at 630c8, is elaborated and explained by the
ranking of ‘divine goods’ at 631c5–d1 (on which see note on
631c7–8). The phrase ‘than courage on its own’ (b2) is missing
from the MSS but quoted in Eusebius and Proclus. Whether or
not the phrase was in Plato’s text, the comparison the Athenian
intends is clearly with the virtue singled out for praise by Tyrtaeus
(630c6–7). The latter is exemplified in the behaviour of the rapa-
cious mercenaries (b5–8). Unlike the virtues invoked by Socrates in
Protag. (329c–333b, 349b–d), it does not depend on or imply
the presence of the other virtues, and the same might be said of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 101

the ‘moderate disposition of a soul’ invoked at 631c7 that must be
combined with wisdom (phronêsis) to become a divine good (see note
ad loc). Such isolated ‘courage’ and ‘moderation’ are rather like the
traits that go by those names in Euthyd. 281c, Stsm. 306a–308a,
310d–e; Laws 661e, 696d, 710a; cf. 681b: tendencies to aggression
and risk-taking on the one hand (‘courage’), and to restraint and
deliberateness on the other (‘moderation’); see Irwin 1995: 340,
347–8, Lane 1998: 171–2, Carone 2002: 336–7, Bobonich
2002: 289–90; for a history of discussion on this point see Cairns
1993: 374n90. These tendencies do not always yield appropriate
action (witness the case of the mercenaries, on which cf. Protagoras’
initial position in Protag. 349d). Only when balanced against each
other and tempered with wisdom do they amount to the conditions
that are called ‘courage’ and ‘moderation’ in Protagoras, and are there
argued by Socrates to involve wisdom (361b). By contrast, the
Athenian counts the mercenary’s imperfect trait as a virtue (aretê)
at 630c6–7 (taking aretên at c4 to be the antecedent of hên at c6). It
is still worth having, although less valuable than if it were part of
‘complete virtue’. See also note on 661d8–e1.

630b2–3 ‘no one would be trustworthy and dependable in the face

of faction unless he had all of virtue (sumpasês aretês)’
What is here called ‘all of virtue’ (sumpasês aretês) is called ‘the
greatest virtue’ (megistên arêten) at 630c3–4. It is the blend of justice,
moderation, wisdom, and courage invoked at 630a7–b2 (see note
above) and called ‘virtue in its entirety’ (pasan aretên) at 630e2–3,
632e5–6; cf. aretês hapasês at 661c4. This is the virtue that the
legislator should aim at (630c2–4). It is necessary for trustworthiness
in times of civil strife because while courage alone might equip one to
defeat the seditious party in battle, the other virtues (especially
moderation and justice) equip one to resist the temptation to engage
in sedition oneself. The latter virtues, moreover, if cultivated widely
in the citizen body, are proof against the tendency for faction to
develop in the first place. Thus Theognis’ figure of the warrior who is
trustworthy in times of faction nicely makes the transition from the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

102 Commentary: Book 1

awkward assumption that prowess in war is, after all, the legislator’s
primary concern (see general note on 628e2–630d1) to the Athen-
ian’s main contention, that the legislator must aim at inculcating ‘all
of virtue’.
This is the first use in Laws of the noun aretê (virtue, excellence;
cognate with the adjective aristos, best) to characterize the focus of
the legislator. As in other works of Plato, aretê is used as a general
term for the traits of wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage, and
is not restricted (as in some Homeric contexts) to courage or military
prowess (see note on 629e9–630a2). Also in keeping with this
general usage (as at Laws 965d1–3, Protag. 325a1–2), the singular
aretê (rather than the plural aretai) is used to invoke the totality of the
virtues. Accordingly, justice, wisdom, etc. are not called ‘virtues’
(aretai—in contrast, for instance, with Arisototle’s usage: EN
1114b26, 1144b18) but ‘parts of virtue’ (630e1, 631a5, 633a8).
Unlike Socrates in Protagoras (329c–d), however, the Athenian will
later disavow interest in making precise the notion of a ‘part’ of virtue
(see note on 633a8–9).

630c2–4 ‘any legislator who is any good will set his primary sights
on nothing other than the greatest virtue (megistên aretên) when he
establishes laws’
That the legislator should aim at the ‘greatest virtue’, ‘the whole of
virtue’, or ‘virtue in its entirety’ (see note on 630b2–3), is repeated at
688a–b and 705d–706a. On virtue (aretê), see note on 629e9–630a2.

630c5–6 ‘which one might call complete justice (dikaiosunên . . .

telean)’
It is slightly odd that the trustworthiness invoked by Theognis is
called ‘complete justice’ here, when just a few lines above it is called
‘all of virtue’—a combination of justice with moderation, wisdom,
and temperance (630a7–b3). The oddity evaporates in the light of
631c7–8, where the Athenian explains that justice is a combination
of wisdom, moderation, and courage (rather than a trait that, like
courage, can exist both in isolation from, and blended with, the other
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 103

traits); see note on 630a7–b2. Aristotle’s too will invoke a notion of
justice that includes all the other virtues, and may be called ‘complete
virtue’ (teleia aretê, EN 1129b30).

630c6–d1 ‘The virtue that Tyrtaeus singles out for praise . . .

comes fourth’
A point repeated in Book 2, 667a2–5 in a context less circumspect
in its criticisms of Spartan institutions. There is even stronger criti-
cism of the poet in Book 9, 858e1–3. The virtue in question is
courage unmixed with moderation and wisdom (630b2; see note on
630a7–b2). The fourth place ranking is explained at 631c5–d1. See
note ad loc.

630c7 ‘although it is admirable (kalê)’

alternatively: ‘beautiful’, ‘noble’, ‘fine’
The thesis that virtue is something kalon (neuter adjective) is a
frequent motif in Plato (e.g. Charm. 160e, La. 192c–d; see Irwin
1995: 37–8); the kalon is the central notion in Plato’s Symposium,
and Aristotle identifies it as the characteristic goal of virtuous action
(EN 1115b12–13, EE 1230a26–33). On the meaning of the term in
Plato and Aristotle, see Cooper 1996; Lear 2006; Irwin 2010; Barney
2010; Moss 2012; and Kraut 2013. The term and its cognates have a
semantic range and force that are not captured by any single English
term, and the same goes for its opposite, aischron (shameful, ugly,
ignoble). In some contexts kalon simply means ‘good’ or ‘correct’ (see
notes on 637e5 and on 634d9–e1); this is especially so in its
adverbial form kalôs, which often means virtually the same as eu
(well), and in the idiom kalôs legeis (‘you are right’—627d6, 636e4,
646d1). In other contexts kalon has a strong expressive force, invok-
ing both ethical and aesthetic goodness. The only English term that
comes close to matching this range is ‘fine’; however, except in its
comparative and superlative forms, ‘fine’ in English can be a very
pallid term of approval, and so fails to capture the dynamic and
expressive force of the Greek term. The present translation therefore
deploys a variety of English terms to render kalon and its cognates
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

104 Commentary: Book 1

(with the author’s thanks to an anonymous referee for urging
this approach). It is occasionally rendered ‘fine’ (625a4), ‘nice’
(655a4), or ‘noble’ (645a4–6); ‘finer’ and ‘finest’ are retained for
the comparative and superlative forms of the adjective (regularly over
665d–668b); ‘admirable’ is typically used in contexts that are pre-
dominantly ethical or political, and thus ‘admirable’ is the typical
translation for kalon in Book 1 (although 634e2 is an exception);
‘beautiful’ is used in contexts concerning the arts (e.g. painting and
sculpture at 669a), and hence is the predominant rendering in Book
2. In cases where both the ethical and the aesthetic dimensions of
kalon are salient (either simultaneously, or in close succession, as at
654b–656a), or when the sense is not determinately one or the other
(e.g. 663e, 664b, 667c), the default translation is ‘beautiful’ (‘lovely’
at 660a). The reader is invited to take any linguistic oddity that
results as a reminder that the relevant notion of beauty encompasses
both aesthetic and ethical norms. See also notes on 654b6–7.

630d2–631b2
The goals and practice of the proper legislator
The proper legislator, the Athenian explains—still leaving it open
that the Dorian legislators fall into this category (630d–631a)—aims
at cultivating ‘virtue in its entirety’, not just the military courage
extolled by Tyrtaeus; the point is repeated at 688a–b without the
polite supposition.

630d4–7 ‘It is we who are doing poorly by supposing that Lycur-

gus and Minos had war in view’
Lycurgus is the legendary Spartan legislator (mentioned unfavourably
at 858e). Minos is identified as the legislator for Knossos at the
opening of Book 1. The Athenian’s generous assumption here
(630d4–e3) that the Dorian constitutions do in fact aim at virtue in
its entirety, not just military courage (repeated by implication at
632d1–4), will not be sustained in Book 2, where he will not mince
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 105

words in castigating their societies for being organized on exclusively
military principles (666e–667a). On the Athenian’s reasons for in-
sisting here on the authority of Minos, see Nightingale 1993: 283.

630d7 ‘when establishing the institutions (nomima)’

For consistency of translation, nomima is here and elsewhere ren-
dered by ‘institutions’ and nomoi by laws, but no distinction is
intended by the Athenian here between institutions, practices, and
laws. See Introduction and note on 626a6–8.

630d9–e1 ‘What is only right and true to say on behalf of a divine

lawgiver’
Translation following England, Schöpsdau, and Lisi. Although noth-
ing in the MSS corresponds to ‘lawgiver’ and the transmitted text
is problematic, it is clear from the context that the Athenian has
in mind the divinely inspired legislators invoked at 624a—either a
divine man (theiou andros) or divine legislation (theias nomothesias) or
divine constitution (theias politeias). Des Places conjectures euêthesias
(ingenuousness), followed by Saunders and Brisson/Pradeau.

630e1–3 ‘that he made the laws looking not to a part of virtue, and
the most trifling one at that, but to virtue in its entirety (pasan
aretên)’
A recapitulation of the conclusion about the proper goal of legislation
just drawn at 630c1–6, in light of the conceit at 630d4–7 that it is
the interlocutors rather than the Dorian legislators who have failed to
note that legislation must be aimed at ‘virtue as a whole’ (pasa aretê);
the latter locution is offered as equivalent to ‘all of virtue’ (sumpasa
aretê) in 630b2–3. See note ad loc.

630e3–4 ‘he worked out (zêtein) his laws according to different

categories (eidê) from the ones that guide legislators today’
The verb zêtein encompasses both seeking and inquiring; hence it is
translated ‘work out’ in the present context and ‘seek out’ at 630e5;
for stylistic variation it is rendered ‘formulate’ at 631a1.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

106 Commentary: Book 1

The Athenian here articulates a general methodological principle
licensed by the insight that legislation has virtue as its goal (630c1–5;
631a3–4). Current legislators devise laws piecemeal under heteroge-
neous categories (inheritances, assaults, etc.), which are introduced as
the need for them arises. Instead of being goal-directed, this legisla-
tive practice is reactive, responding to problem cases. (An ‘heiress’
(epiklêros) is a fatherless, brotherless woman—and hence poses a
problem for the typical Greek practice of passing on family wealth
through the male line; see Pomeroy 2002: 84 and Cox 1998.) Such a
reactive and disorderly procedure is contrasted with the type of
inquiry (zêtêsis) that underlies proper legislation. The latter takes
virtue as its focus, and devises laws with a view to what is required
to inculcate it in the citizens. The proper methodology is specified
more precisely at 632d8–e2 (see note ad loc): the legislator considers
each virtue in turn, devising laws and institutions suitable for incul-
cating each. The use of eidos (translated as ‘kind’) at 632e2, repeating
its occurrence here at 630e3, indicates that the different virtues
(called ‘parts of virtue’ at 633a8; cf. 630e1, 631a5) are the ‘categories’
under which proper legislative practice or inquiry is to be organized.
See note on 632d8–e2.

631a1–2 ‘to start where our present inquiry began’

literally: ‘to begin as we did (hôsper . . . êrxametha)’

631a3–4 ‘You were correct to begin with virtue (ap’ aretês) and say
that it was for its sake that the legislator framed his laws’
Clinias did not in fact begin by invoking virtue (aretê), a notion
which is introduced only by the Athenian, and not until 630b3,
where it captures the considerations about what sort of person is
‘good’, ‘better’, and ‘best’ that are invoked in the dialogue with
Tyrtaeus (629b3, 629e9–630a2); see note on 629e9–630a2. Clinias
did affirm at 626e2–3 that ‘victory over oneself’ is the greatest kind of
victory, a remark which the Athenian will later interpret as a proposal
about what makes a person good (644b6–7), but Clinias does not
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 107

himself use the vocabulary of virtue when affirming that ideal. It is
the Athenian who has redirected the conversation away from Clinias’
emphasis on external results (victory over the enemy in war,
625d–626b) to virtue, considered as a personal trait. This transition
prepares the way for the dialogue’s next topic: education, the project
of cultivating the virtues in the citizens.

631a5–7 ‘you were clearly incorrect . . . to suppose that it was only

to a part of virtue, and the smallest one at that, that he referred all his
laws’
See note on 630d4–7.

631a8–b1 ‘the sort of divisions (pêi dielomenon)’

alternatively: ‘the way I would have hoped to hear you expound’
(England)
One might suppose that in the sample speech that follows (631b–
632c), the distinction between divine and human goods is an ex-
ample of a ‘division’ that expresses the centrality of virtue to the
legislative enterprise. Alternatively, one might expect, on the basis of
Stsm. 262b–e, 285a–b, and Phdr. 273d–e, that the ‘categories’ (eidê)
mentioned above at 630e3 and below at 632e2 mark the relevant
divisions; see note on 630e3–4.

631b3–d1
Divine and human goods
The previous thesis that virtue is the focus of legislation (630d–631a)
is now subsumed under the more general thesis that worthy laws
benefit the community by ‘provid[ing] them with every good’
(631b6). The Athenian provides a taxonomy and ranking of goods
that accords a central place to virtue and is to inform the legislator’s
practice: wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage (ranked in that
order) are ‘divine goods’ on which all ‘human goods’ (wealth, health,
etc.) depend.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

108 Commentary: Book 1

631b5 ‘They are correct laws’
literally: ‘they are in correct condition (echousin . . . orthôs)’
Presumably a synonym for kalôs . . . echei (‘[they] are in admirable
condition’) at 634d9–e1; see note ad loc and on 667c6–7 and
668d1–2.

631b5–6 ‘and bring happiness to those who live by them, since

they provide them with every good’
On happiness, see also note on 628d5. The Athenian here moves
seamlessly from his prior claim that proper legislation aims at the
virtue of the citizens (630d–631a) to claiming here that it gives them
happiness. On legislation aiming at happiness, see also 662e.

Human goods depend on the divine

631b6–8 ‘Now goods are twofold—some of them human, others
divine—and the former depend (êrtêtai) on the divine’
In what sense do the ‘human goods’ (health, beauty, strength, and
wealth) depend on the ‘divine goods’ (wisdom, moderation, courage,
and justice)? To the extent that the divine goods depend on wisdom
(631c), one might find here an instance of the thesis, affirmed by
Socrates in Euthyd. 278e–282a and Meno 87d–89a, that such things as
health and wealth are good only if their use is directed by wisdom. For
discussion, see Bobonich 2002: 136–53; he finds a better explanation
in the theory of goods in the Philebus (2002: 153–79). On the relation
between the present thesis of ‘dependent goods’ (Bobonich’s term)
and the Athenian’s declaration in Book 2 that ‘so-called goods’ such as
health and wealth are good only to the good person (661b–d), see note
on 631c1–5 and general note on 660d11–661d5.

631b8–c1 ‘A city that receives (dechêtai) the greater ones acquires

the lesser as well; otherwise, it is bereft of both’
alternatively: ‘a city that welcomes the greater ones . . . ’
One might suppose that this sentence explains or elaborates the
dependence of human on divine goods affirmed in the previous
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 109

sentence, but the present sentence is in fact a conjunction of two
theses: a sufficiency thesis (possessing the divine goods suffices for
possessing the human ones) and a necessity thesis (possessing the
divine goods is necessary for possessing the human ones). Only the
latter affirms the dependence of human on divine goods. Moreover,
both theses concern a city, not an individual person, as the recipient
of the relevant goods. The latter fact has troubled many readers;
England (endorsed by Bobonich 1995: 137 and 2002: 509n42)
proposes to emend the MSS text to make a person the subject. Let
us call the MS version of the thesis the ‘political’ version, and the
emended version the ‘personal’ version.
While it is no doubt true, as England points out, that it is
individual persons, not cities, who are the ultimate recipients of the
divine and human goods here enumerated, it still makes sense for the
Athenian to talk about a city receiving these goods, since this speech
is supposed to articulate the goals with which a legislator devises laws
for a city (see 630d1–e3). Moreover, the personal version of the
sufficiency thesis is far stronger than any other claim affirmed in the
Laws (or indeed anywhere else in Plato) about the relationship
between virtue and the other goods. It would affirm that any person
who has the divine goods (the virtues) will also have the human
goods (health, wealth, etc.). But it is hardly plausible for the Athen-
ian (or Plato) to suppose that a person who is wise, moderate, and
courageous will never fall into illness and poverty.
The political version of the sufficiency thesis is considerably more
plausible. Consider first the corresponding version of the necessity
thesis: that without the divine goods, the city will lack the human
ones. Even if it is not strictly impossible for health, wealth, and the
like to be available in adequate quantity in a city whose inhabitants
are unwise, immoderate, cowardly, and unjust, a legislator devising
the basic institutions of a polity would be well advised to operate on
the assumption that neglecting to cultivate ‘complete justice’ in the
citizens will seriously impair their prospects for securing these
human goods (for reasons made memorable by Hobbes many
centuries later). The reason why the supply of human goods in a
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

110 Commentary: Book 1

city might reasonably be expected to depend on the extent of
wisdom, moderation, courage, and justice exercised by its inhabit-
ants is that these virtues concern the ways in which one engages with
the human goods. For example, moderation, courage, and justice
concern the ways one pursues, uses, safeguards, disposes of, or risks
losing such things as health, beauty, strength, wealth, and the like
(thus the idea that wisdom, which the Athenian here insists is
integral to ‘complete justice’, involves the correct ‘use’ (chrêsis) of
such ‘goods’ in Euthyd. 281a–b; Meno 88a–d). On such a concep-
tion, it is not unreasonable to suppose that a city whose citizens have
been taught to engage properly with the human goods will thereby
have the human goods to engage with (the sufficiency thesis). To be
sure, ‘engaging’ with the human goods extends to the limiting case
where a person loses, gives up, or refrains from pursuing such a
good, and thus it is conceivable that an individual person might, for
example, be perfectly just in poverty and ill health; indeed, one of the
legislator’s tasks will be to teach the citizens to respond appropriately
to such an eventuality (632a). But this is a problem for the personal
version of the sufficiency thesis, not for the political version. From
the perspective of a legislator aiming to inculcate the virtues in the
citizens, which is precisely the perspective invoked in this passage, it
is highly unlikely that the disposition to engage properly with the
human goods could be cultivated in and exercised by the citizenry at
large without there being an adequate supply of those goods. The
Athenian is entitled to assume that the legislator whose primary goal
is to inculcate complete virtue in the citizens will have to provide
them with an adequate level of human goods, and this may be all
there is to the sufficiency thesis. While supplying the city with the
human goods is an important objective of his, this will be achieved in
the course of carrying out his ultimate aim of supplying it with the
divine virtues. Thus the political versions of both the sufficiency
thesis and the necessity thesis are reasonable claims for the Athenian
to make in this context.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 111

The human goods

631c1–5 ‘Chief among the lesser goods is health, second beauty,
and third is strength for running and other physical activities. Fourth
is wealth that is not blind but clear-sighted, which comes from
following wisdom.’
Compare the more open-ended enumeration of the ‘so-called goods’
in 661a–c, and in 649d and 716a, as well as in the popular drinking
song reported at Gorg. 451e. Note that the goods listed in the present
passage are not entirely independent of each other; the second and
third items (beauty and strength) arguably depend on the first
(health), and the fourth item (‘wealth . . . clear-sighted to the extent
that it is guided by wisdom’) is explicitly marked as involving the
primary divine good, wisdom (which recalls Euthyd. 280b–282a).
Are we to understand a similar qualification implied for the other
human goods? If the human goods involve the divine goods (and in
this sense ‘depend’ on them), then they do not correspond to the ‘so-
called’ goods of 661a–c. See note on 661a5–b3. The phrase, ‘wealth
(ploutos) that is not blind’ invokes the familiar stereotype of the blind
god Plutus (literally ‘Wealth’).

631c5–d1
The divine goods
The four virtues enumerated (wisdom, moderation, justice, and
courage) recapitulate the four cardinal virtues enumerated in the
Republic (427e). They are here ranked in order of priority:
(1) wisdom (phronêsis);
(2) moderation (sôphrosunê) tempered by wisdom;
(3) justice (= moderation tempered by wisdom plus courage);
(4) courage on its own (i.e. unaccompanied by moderation and
wisdom).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

112 Commentary: Book 1

631c5–6 ‘Wisdom (phronêsis) itself is first and leader of the divine
goods’
‘Wisdom’ translates phronêsis, which the Athenian uses interchange-
ably with nous (translated as ‘intelligence’ at 631c7 and d5; see notes
on 631d5–6 and 640d6). (This marks a terminological difference
from the Republic, where the enumeration of the canonical four
virtues uses sophia (e.g. 428b1—although the guardians are regularly
descried as having phronêsis: 412c12, 431d1, 433d1). In Laws, the
term sophia rarely occurs, and when it does it is typically used in a
broad sense that applies to any learning or skill—e.g. 644a4, a context
where it is distinguished from virtue; cf. 677c, 701a, 732a. In the
Republic, sophia is the special province of the philosopher, but phil-
osophy is notably absent from Laws; see note on 632d4–5.) Wisdom
leads the divine goods not just in being the highest ranked, but in
giving direction to the others—at least in the case of the second and
the third divine goods, whose descriptions indicate that the third
(justice) involves the second, and that the second involves the first.
Perhaps wisdom leads the fourth, courage, in the same way that it
leads the ‘human goods’; see note on 631b6–8 and on 631c8–d1.

631c7 ‘a moderate (sôphrôn) disposition (hexis) of the soul involv-

ing intelligence (meta nou)’
Here, ‘intelligence’ (nous) stands for wisdom, the first of the divine
goods (see 631d5–6). The translation reads nou with Eusebius, for
the MSS’ noun, following Schanz, Burnet, England, des Places, and
Saunders. On the MS reading it would be ‘a moderate disposition
of the soul’ that is ‘second . . . after intelligence (meta noun)’; so
described, the moderate disposition need not be accompanied (or
informed) by intelligence, unlike the third-place divine good (just-
ice), of which intelligence is identified as a component. The kind of
moderation that is ranked second must therefore involve wisdom;
otherwise instances of moderation that are foolish or otherwise
lacking in wisdom (for instances of such moderation see Euthyd.
281c and Stsm. 306a–b; cf. 308b) would be divine goods second in
rank only to wisdom—a position the Athenian explicitly rejects in
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 113

later books (696d–e, 710a; see also note on 630a7–b2). It is still not
clear, however, why intelligent moderation is ranked higher than
justice (rather than, for example, equal to it). In any case, the
Athenian’s main point here (in support of his earlier assertions at
630b3–d1) is that justice is superior to the sort of courage lauded by
Tyrtaeus (see note on 631c8–d1).

631c7–8 ‘justice, which arises when these two are combined with
courage’
‘These two’ are the first two divine goods, wisdom and moderation
(c6–7). The courage that is combined with them is the disposition
that, when not so combined, is ranked fourth here at 631c8–d1 (see
note ad loc) and at 630c8. That justice consists of such a combin-
ation implies that the just person has appropriately tempered and
balanced the opposing dispositions of aggression (raw courage) and
restraint (raw moderation)—see notes on 630a7–b2 and 661d8–e1.
Thus justice arises from solving the problem articulated in Book 2 of
the Republic: how to balance in the city’s guardians the requisite but
opposing tendencies of ferocity and gentleness (375b–d, 441e; cf.
Laws 731b–d ). Similarly, in the Statesman, the statesman’s task
(analogous to that of the legislator in Laws) is to balance and
interweave the opposing tendencies of ‘courage’ and ‘moderation’
in the citizens (306a–308a). While in that dialogue true belief (doxa)
is said to provide the proper direction, here in Laws is it wisdom
(nous or phronêsis) that plays that role, although the Athenian seems
willing to allow in some contexts that true belief can do the job of
wisdom (632c5; see note on 630c5–6). In Republic 442a the means
by which the opposing traits are balanced are ‘harmony’ (harmonia)
and rhythm, which will loom large in the educational programme set
forth by the Athenian in Book 2 (653e, 661c–d, 669b–670e); see
note on 653e3–5.

631c8–d1 ‘fourth would be courage’

This is the courage ranked ‘fourth in rank and merit’ at 630c8–d1 in
the criticism of Tyrtaeus. Courage, as it figures as the fourth good, is
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

114 Commentary: Book 1

the ingredient added to wisdom and moderation in the recipe for
justice, the third good. When not so combined, it is the disposition
praised by Tyrtaeus and displayed by the mercenaries mentioned at
630b. On how wisdom ‘leads’ courage, see note on 631c5–6.

631d1–632d7
Legislating with a view to divine and human goods
The theory of divine and human goods just articulated (631b–d)
should inform the practice of the proper legislator, who will instruct
the citizens in this scheme of values, and monitor their compliance,
using the laws to commend ‘what is admirable and what is not’
(632b1) in their emotional responses to each other and to the
vicissitudes of life as well as in their financial dealings with each
other (631d–632b). After describing the ‘finishing touches’ to such a
legislative project (632c), the Athenian invites Clinias and Megillus
to explain how the laws of their own cities are structured according to
these priorities (632d).

631d2–4 ‘the lawgiver must rank (takteon) them thus as well . . .

[H]e must inform the citizens that all his other instructions to them
have these goods in view’
A suggestion that the legislator will deliver explicit instruction in this
scheme of values, perhaps in the preludes to the laws that are
mentioned in Book 4 (720a–724b); see also notes on 632b7–8 and
666a5–8 and Bobonich 2002: 97–118. On less didactic ways of
inculcating the scheme of values, see note on 631e4–632a1.

631d5–6 ‘the human goods directed at the divine, and the divine
ones directed at their leader, intelligence (noun)’
more literally: ‘the human goods have the divine in view . . . ’
‘Directed at’ translates blepein eis (with the verb understood from
d4). It is a visual metaphor (literally ‘looking at’) which the Athenian
regularly invokes over Books 1 and 2 to describe the goal or focus of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 115

the legislator (625e–626a, 628a–d, 630c–631d, 632a). In the pre-
sent context it captures two slightly different relationships of
dependence:
(i) The relationship of laws to the taxonomy of goods that they
implement (d3–4).
(ii) The dependence of human goods on the divine, and divine goods
on wisdom (b7–d1).
The expression recalls the language that identifies the goal or focus of
legislation at 625e, 626a, 628a, 630c–e; cf. 632e. The Athenian
indicates that he takes it to be interchangeable with ‘for the sake
of ’ (heneka or charin) (628c6, 628d6-e5, 631a4). Thus we may
understand the legislator to be instructing the citizens that the
human goods are to be pursued ‘for the sake of’ the divine. To use
or pursue wealth for the sake of the divine goods is to regulate one’s
pursuit and use of it via the standards of wisdom, justice, moder-
ation, and courage. This is to limit one’s pursuit or use of a ‘human
good’ by the standards of the virtues. Plato uses heneka in a similarly
limiting sense at Gorg. 506c9, where pleasure is to be pursued ‘for the
sake of’ (heneka) the good, rather than vice versa (similarly, Rep.
403b4–c2, Aristotle EN 1102a23–25; see Meyer 2011: 56).
The present passage confirms that ‘intelligence’ (nous) here stands
for wisdom (phronêsis), the first of the divine goods enumerated at
631c. The parallel passage at 688a–b identifies phronêsis as what the
laws are heneka or ‘directed at’. See note on 631c5–6.

631d6–e2 ‘When the citizens join together in marriage, when they

beget and raise children . . . and as they mature and reach old age’
The legislator’s concerns range widely over the lives of the citizens:
their private and family life, their financial dealings with each other
(632b), and their burial rites (632c). Note the omission of the
military matters that Clinias and Tyrtaeus have claimed to be the
most important, except for the oblique reference to war on the list of
misfortunes into which one might fall (632a6). Legislation concern-
ing military matters is outlined in Book 8.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

116 Commentary: Book 1

631e2–3 ‘he must take care to mete out honour and dishonour
correctly’
The point that the laws apportion honour (timê) and dishonour
(atimia) in connection with the proper ranking of goods is developed
at greater length at the end of Book 3, 696d–697c; cf. 711b–c, 862d;
the citizens are exhorted to give honour accordingly in the long
prelude that opens Book 5, 726a–728a. In the present context,
meting out honour and its opposite involves praising and blaming
(632a) and calling things ‘admirable (kalon) and not’ (632b1; cf.
635a8, 655d5–656a5). These are not legally mandated rewards and
sanctions, but expressions of praise and blame in the laws themselves,
as 632a2–3 makes explicit. Here the Athenian anticipates the meth-
odological point of Book 4 (720a–724b), that the laws will have
preludes that instruct and persuade citizens before giving them orders
backed up by threatened penalties. On persuasion, see note on
632b7–8. On the legislator’s use of praise and censure, see notes
on 648b8–c5 and 663c1–2; see also Morgan 2013.

631e4–632a1 ‘their pains and pleasures, their desires, and the

general intensity of their passions’
The legislator’s concern is not simply with the citizens’ behaviour,
but with their emotional responses and desires. It will later become
clear, in the accounts of education (643b–644b, 653a–c), that the
legislator’s goal is not just to evaluate these affective responses but to
train them, and that this training aims at inculcating the virtues,
which are the ‘divine goods’ invoked in the present context. The
emotions in question include anger, fear, and their opposites and are
responses to the gain and loss of the human goods (632a3–7; see note
ad loc). On the centrality of pleasure and pain to the legislator’s
concerns (a prominent theme in Book 2), see also 636d4–e3 and the
notes on 644c6–7 and 649d4–7. On emotional responses as pleas-
ures and pains, see note on 633c9–d2.

632a3–7 ‘As for their feelings of anger (orgais) and fear (phobois),
when their souls are disturbed on account of misfortune, and relief
from these in times of prosperity (eutuchiais)’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 117

alternatively: ‘ . . . and relief from these in times of good fortune’ (des
Places, Brisson/Pradeau, Pangle)
Anger, fear, and other ‘disturbances’ are further instances of the
citizens’ ‘pleasures and pains’ that the legislator is to scrutinize and
evaluate (631e4–632a1). Anger and fear are presented here as
responses to the loss of the ‘human goods’ (misfortune). Their
opposites are presumably joy in (anticipation of) the possession of
these goods (prosperity: eutuchia); see, for example, 649d6–7, where
the human goods, wealth, health, and strength are said to ‘make us
drunk with pleasure’. The mention here of disturbances (632a4)
recalls the account of pain and pleasure as disruption and restoration
in Philb. 31d–32b. See Frede 2010: 118, 124–6. Fear and its opposite
will be discussed in detail at 644c9–d3 and 646e–647e. It is linked to
judgement about misfortune at 647e1–4. See also note on 649d4–7.
On eutuchia (prosperity or good fortune), see Euthyd. 279d–280b.

632a7 ‘the sorts of feelings (pathêmata)’

While pathêma (plural, pathêmata) is not always a term for feeling or
emotion, and could mean simply ‘occurrence’ (thus England, fol-
lowed by des Places) or something that happens to one, it is used here
as a general term to capture the angers and fears mentioned at 632a3.
Thus Schöpsdau, Lisi, and Brisson/Pradeau translate.

632a7–b1 ‘he must define and teach what is admirable (kalon) and
what is not in different people’s responses (diatheseôs)’
more literally: ‘in each person’s condition’
The close connection between praising something and calling it
admirable (kalon) is displayed in Book 2 (655d–656b); see also
note on 631e2–3. Diathesis—used interchangeably with hexis at
791b1 and 792d3–4 (cf. Philb. 11d4, 32e3, Tim. 42d2)—could
mean either the occurrent condition of the soul (what a person is
feeling now), or a more settled disposition. Aristotle will reserve
diathesis for the occurrent condition and hexis for the settled dispos-
ition (Catg. 8b26–28; EN 1105b19–1106a12). The Stoics will
restrict diathesis to the latter—a usage that is reflected in the
pseudo-Platonic Definitiones 411d.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

118 Commentary: Book 1

632b2–3 ‘the lawgiver must safeguard (phulattein) the ways the
citizens acquire and dispose of property’
more idiomatically: ‘ . . . must look out for . . . ’
The Athenian here uses the military language of standing guard
(phulattein), originally invoked by Clinias, to apply instead to the
activities of peacetime; see note on 626a8–b1. The present context
uses that vocabulary to describe vigilance on behalf of the norms of
justice. In contrast to the preceding lines, there is no mention of
citizens’ pleasures and pains. This would make sense if courage and
moderation (the focus of the ensuing discussion in Book 1) are the
virtues concerned with pleasures and pains.

632b7–8 ‘those who are receptive (eupeithesin) to the laws, and . . .

those who are resistant to persuasion (duspeithesi)’
The resistant citizen is mentioned again at 648c2–3; see note ad loc.
A recurring theme in Laws is that the citizens must be ‘receptive to’
or (more literally) ‘easily persuaded by’ the laws (eupeitheis tois
nomois) (715c2, 718c8–10, 801e9, 880a6–9, 890c4; cf. 708c–d),
or ‘willing’ (hekontes, ethelontes) subjects to the laws (700a5, 701b5–6;
see notes on 663b4–6 and on 671d9–e1). That those who are not
‘persuaded’ by the laws are to be punished reflects the coercive aspect
that must be joined with the persuasive aspect of the law embodied in
the preludes mandated in Book 4 (711c, 718b, 722b–c). On what
such persuasion amounts to, see Stalley 1983: 42–4; Bobonich 2002:
93–119; Laks 2005: 93–163; Mouze 2005: 317–23; Annas 2010:
75–91, Fossheim 2013, and notes on 662c3–5, 663b2–3, 663c1–2.

632c1 ‘put the finishing touches on his constitution . . . ’

literally: ‘when he reaches the end (telos) of the entire constitution . . . ’—
a pun on the root telos, which occurs in teleutêsantôn 632c2 (‘when
they die’; more literally: ‘when they have reached their end’). The
legislation regarding ‘burial rites’ and ‘honours’ bestowed upon the
dead (c2–3) completes the treatment of life cycle milestones begun
at 631d6. Legislation about marriage and childbearing is detailed
in Book 4, 721a–d; 6, 771e–776b, 779e–785b; laws about
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 119

child-rearing and education occur throughout Book 7, and regula-
tion of burial rites is addressed in Book 12, 958d–960b.

632c4 ‘will appoint guardians (phulakas epistêsei) for them all’

This military language recalls Clinias’ original invocation of guards
(phulakes) on the watch for enemy attack (625e–626a). While Clin-
ias conceives of the laws as themselves standing guard (phulattein—
see note on 626a8–b1), the Athenian here points to the necessity of
guarding the laws themselves. That the laws require constant over-
sight and vigilance is a recurring theme later in Laws: see 769c–770a;
the office of ‘guardians of the laws’ (nomophulakes) will be one of
the most important in the constitutional legislation in Book 5
(752d–755b; cf. 961a–c); see Meyer 2006: 380–1.

632c5 ‘Some of them will operate with wisdom (phronêseôs), others

with true opinion (alêthous doxês)’
Both phronêsis and ‘stable true opinions’ are described as rare achieve-
ments in Book 2 at 653a7–9. On true opinion as a substitute for
wisdom see Stsm. 309c, a more optimistic assessment of true opinion
than Rep. 477b–480a; cf. Meno 97a–98a, Tim. 51d.
Presumably the members of the ‘nocturnal council’ outlined in
Book 12 (961a–b; 964e–969c) aspire to wisdom, but it is not made
clear who else in the city will have (or lack) it. The Athenian regularly
insists in Book 3 that phronêsis is a characteristic of the city (e.g.
693b), without specifying which citizens will possess it, or how it
differs from correct opinion. Perhaps his self-deprecating comment
at 859c relegates his own legislative competence into the latter
category. But if England is right taking the true opinions invoked
here to be cases of the ‘experience (empeiria) in the law’ resulting
from training or habituation (ethê) at 632d5–6 (see note ad loc), then
the Athenian’s remark at 630d4–7 would imply that he and his
interlocutors lack even the latter.

632c6–7 ‘intelligence (nous) will bind it all together to follow

moderation and justice rather than wealth and ambition’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

120 Commentary: Book 1

As at 631d5, nous is used as a substitute for phronêsis (wisdom),
which is here reaffirmed in its role as ‘leader’ of the divine goods
(631c6). The ‘moderation and justice’ in whose service it ‘binds’ the
law code are the ‘complete justice’ that is the focus of the proper
legislator (630c1–6). Courage, the only virtue of concern to Tyr-
taeus, and the focus of Dorian legislation, is not even mentioned
here. Instead, wealth and ‘ambition’ (philotimia: literally ‘love of
honour’) stand in for the goals of the state as conceived of by Clinias,
Megillus, and Tyrtaeus (see note on 626b3–4). On philotimia as
characteristic of militaristic constitutions like Sparta, see Rep. 545a–
b. On the connection between love of honour and love of wealth see
Rep. 548a–b and Brennan 2012: 112–14.

632d2–4 ‘how these features are present in those laws . . . ’

‘[T]hese features’ (literally: ‘all this’ (panta tauta—d4)) is a vague way
of referring to the burden of the Athenian’s speech at 631b–632c:
that laws should comply with and communicate the relative priority
of the divine and human goods (631b–d), and be organized into the
categories of legislation enumerated at 631e–632c.

632d4–5 ‘how it is that their order is obvious . . . ’

England takes the ‘order’ (taxis) to express a distinctively philosoph-
ical understanding of law. But there is no mention of philosophy in
the present context (and barely any at all in the dialogue as a whole:
857c–d, 967c–d; but cf. Zuckert 2009: 31–3). The order in question
is more likely the relative priority of divine and human goods
invoked at 631b–d; indeed, the Athenian uses language to that effect
(e.g. tetakta and takteon in 631d1–2).

632d5–6 ‘to anyone experienced in the law—whether this is due

to knowledge or results from some training (tôi . . . empeirôi technêi
eite kai tisin ethesin)’
alternatively: ‘or results from some habituation (tisin ethesin)’
The adjective ‘experienced’ (empeiros) has positive connotations here,
as well as at 692b3–4 and 741d7; so too the cognate noun empeiria at
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 121

659d4 (see note on 659d1–4). The non-pejorative use of the adjec-
tive is widespread in Plato: Gorg. 448b12, 465d5; Protag. 341a3;
Meno 89e8; Hipp. Min. 367d6; Rep. 527a2, 533a9; Parm. 133b7;
Stsm. 277e3, 291c4; Tht. 179e5, 206b5. This feature of Plato’s
idiom contrasts with his regularly pejorative use of the cognate
noun, empeiria, to mark a ‘knack’ (tribê) as distinct from genuine
knowledge (Gorg. 462c3–6, 463b4; Phdr. 270b5–6; Philb. 55e6;
Laws 11, 938a4; cf. Phdr. 260e4–5, Rep. 493b5).
On legislation as a skill (technê), see Book 4, 709b–d. Proper
legislators will be described as ‘experienced in legislating’ (nomothe-
sias empeiroi, 692b3–4). In the present context, those whose legal
experience comes from ‘training’ (alt: ‘habituation’—tisin ethesin) are
presumably those who have been, as the Athenian says, ‘raised under’
(êthesi tetraphthe, 625a5) the laws in question. Clinias’ ‘well-trained
(kalôs . . . gegumnasthai) understanding of Cretan institutions’ at
626b5–6 would be an instance of the latter, although the Athenian’s
remarks at 630d imply that Clinias has misconstrued the point of the
institutions under which he was raised. The Athenian’s main point in
the long exposition to which the present comment is a peroration is
that both parties to the legislative enterprise (lawgivers and the
citizens for whom they legislate) must recognize the hierarchy of
goods that structures the legislation in question. On the training
(ethos) that will cultivate the values affirmed by the citizens, see note
on 655d7–e1; on the alteration between ethos and êthos, see note on
625a5.

632d6 ‘completely obscure to the rest of us’

Schöpsdau and England construe as ironic the Athenian’s inclusion
of himself in the ‘rest of us’. But while the actual structuring
principle of the Dorian laws is no doubt evident to the Athenian,
as it is to Clinias and Megillus, that principle is not the doctrine of
divine and human goods, but a perversion of that ranking. The
Athenian here persists in the polite fiction that the Dorian laws
exemplify the highest legislative standards, as befitting their hypothe-
sized divine origin (630d9–e1), and that the fault lies simply with
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

122 Commentary: Book 1

those who fail to recognize these standards as structuring those laws
(630d4–7). The intended irony is that it is ‘evident’ to none of the
interlocutors, including those trained under Dorian laws, that those
laws exemplify the order of divine and human goods.

632d7 ‘how are we to go about doing that . . . ?’

more literally: ‘what are we to say next . . . ?’

I II
INSTITUTIO NS TO CULTIVATE COURAGE
AND MODERATION

632d8–643a1
Having established that the goal of correct legislation is to inculcate
the whole of virtue, not just one part (630e–632c), the Athenian now
invites his interlocutors to identify the Dorian institutions that train
citizens in this expanded range of virtue (632d–e). The discussion begins
with courage, conceived of initially as resistance to pain and fear (632e–
633c), then expands to include ‘resistance to pleasures’ (633d–634a)—
the latter eventually to be classified under the domain of moderation (see
note on 635e5–6). While Megillus easily enumerates a range of Spartan
institutions aimed at cultivating resistance to pains (633a–c), both he
and Clinias are at a loss to name any that cultivate resistance to pleasures
(634a–c). After an interlude about how best to conduct the delicate
enterprise of criticizing the laws or institutions of one’s own or another’s
city (634c–635a), the Athenian insists, against Megillus’ objections, that
exposure to the greatest pleasures is necessary for cultivating moderation
(635b–637b). In particular, he makes the provocative proposal that
drinking parties, condemned by Megillus as occasions for excessive indul-
gence (637a–b), in fact provide enormous social benefits (637b–e). As a
prelude to identifying these benefits—which he will eventually allege to
be the sought-after resistance to pleasures (649a–e)—the Athenian first
expounds the proper methodology for settling disputes about the value of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 123

particular institutions or practices (638a–641d). His interlocutors
respond by expressing their goodwill to the Athenian and to Athens
(641e–642e).

Fighting against pleasures and pains

In treating virtue as a matter of victory in a fight against pleasures and
pains (633c–d), the Athenian is appealing to the conception of virtue as
self-mastery (to kreittô heautou) that is endorsed by Clinias at 626e and
that will be modelled in the figure of the divine puppets at 644d–645c.
On whether this conception is one the Athenian endorses, see notes on
626e2–3 and 643b1–646e2. On the nature of the pains and pleasures
to be resisted or fought against, see notes on 633c9–d2, 633e1–2, and
634a6–8.

632d8–e2 ‘we need to return to our original starting point (ex

archês), and . . . we will then go through the next kind (eidos) of
virtue, and after that the next’
more literally: ‘ . . . another (heteron) kind of virtue, and then
another . . . ’
A reiteration of the agenda announced at 630e–631a (see note on
630e3–4): organize the legislative inquiry according to the appropri-
ate categories or kinds (eidê). Here the Athenian makes explicit a
point implicit in the former passage: that the relevant ‘categories’ are
the different virtues: courage, moderation, etc.

632e3–4 ‘Our exposition of the first will serve as a model for the
rest’
The first case will be courage, treated as resistance to pains. It
serves as a paradigm for the treatment of moderation, which will
be construed as resistance to pleasures (634a–b, 635e–636e; see note
on 635e5–6). On the alternative paradigm for virtue that will
dominate the discussion in later books, see notes on 626e2–3,
643b1–646e2.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

124 Commentary: Book 1

632e4–5 ‘we will lighten our journey (paramuthia poiêsasthai tês
hodou), so far as we can (peirasometha), with conversation
(diamuthologountes)’
A reiteration of the original proposal (625b6–7) that a conversation
about laws will lighten the burden (paramuthesthai) of the long
journey. Here the root muth- is repeated in diamuthologein (con-
verse), making a pun on the double sense of paramuthia as both
verbal exhortation and (derivatively) an alleviation. It is by filling up
the time with talk that their journey will be made less onerous. The
relevant notion of muthologia (storytelling) invoked here (and at
752a2) need not indicate that the content of the discussion will be
fanciful, but rather that its participants have leisure to ‘spin out the
tale’ at considerable length (as at Rep. 376d9; cf. Rep. 501e4). On the
terminology, see Brisson 1982: 184–95.

632e5–6 ‘we will have gone through virtue in its entirety (aretês
pasês), and shown it to be the focus (ekeise bleponta) of the things we
were just discussing—provided the god is willing’
more literally: ‘that it is what the things . . . are directed towards’
‘Virtue in its entirety’ (aretês pasês), in contrast to the narrow version
of courage extolled by Tyrtaeus, is the focus of proper legislation (see
note on 630b2–3). The ‘things we were just discussing’ are the
regulations that govern citizens’ personal lives, private property,
financial transactions, etc. (631d–632c). These, referred to in sum-
mary as ‘it all’ (panta tauta, 632c6) are supposed to ‘follow moder-
ation and justice’ (632c6–7), which are the elements of ‘virtue in its
entirety’ overlooked by Tyrtaeus (630b–c). Thus Schöpsdau. But
this does not mean that it is only the very general divisions of laws
that are here invoked. It is also, as England claims, the specific
instances of those laws that the Dorian legislators have ordained—
and hence the specific Cretan institutions enumerated at 625d–626a
and the Spartan ones about to be canvassed at 633a–d. To show that
these bodies of law are in fact aimed at virtue in its entirety is to show
that they adhere to the ‘order’ (taxis) invoked at 632d4–5 (see note
on 632d5–6). Of course this aspiration will be unfulfilled, as the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 125

ensuing discussion will identify no Spartan or Cretan institutions
that cultivate moderation, and indeed will invoke some that under-
mine it (636a–c)—hence the ironic proviso, ‘provided the god is
willing’.

633a1–2 ‘Let our admirer of Zeus here be the first one you set out
to examine’
Megillus acknowledges the Athenian’s control of the discussion. In
putting forward Clinias (who credits Zeus with the origin of Cretan
laws and institutions at 624a) to bear the brunt of the Athenian’s
questioning, Megillus shows that characteristic Spartan fortitude
does not extend to verbal engagements. He does, however, step
forward to answer the Athenian’s question at 633b–c.

633a3–4 ‘our discussion (logos) is a group effort (koinos)’

The discussion is also portrayed as a joint enterprise of the interlocu-
tors at 629a4. The motif of a group undertaking (koinônia) will be
important in the Athenian’s later discussion of drinking parties (see
note on 639c1).

Courage as resistance to pains

633a4 ‘So tell me (legete) . . . your communal meals and your re-
gime of athletic training (gumnasia)’
The Athenian addresses his question to both Clinias and Megillus
(second person plural), and the two institutions he mentions are
common to both Sparta and cities on Crete (cf. 625c6–8). Megillus
will answer first, citing specifically Spartan institutions (633a–c),
thus balancing the earlier focus (625d–626b) on specifically Cretan
norms. On ‘athletic training’ for gumnasia, see note on 673a8–10.

633a7 ‘And what practices shall we list third and fourth?’

That is, third and fourth examples of ‘practices (epitêdeumata) to do
with courage’ (632e1), specifically those devised ‘with war in mind’
(633a5).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

126 Commentary: Book 1

633a8–9 ‘for virtue’s other parts—or whatever we should call
them’
more literally: ‘in the case of the parts of the rest of virtue (peri tôn tês
allês arêtes . . . merôn) . . . ’
Courage, moderation, and justice are described as ‘parts’ (merê) of
virtue (630e1, 631a5, 705d8, 709e9–710a1, 936b5). The alternative
is to call them ‘kinds’ or ‘categories’ (eidê—630e3, 632e2); see note
on 630e3–4. On the terminology for the virtues, see also note on
630b2–3.

633b2 ‘the hunt’

On the importance of hunting in Spartan society, see Vidal–Naquet
1981: 169–75; Anderson 1985; and David 1993.

633b8 ‘raids that regularly involve a severe beating’

A ritual in which Spartan youth were supposed to ‘steal as many
cheeses as possible’ while others were supposed to apprehend and
whip them (Xenophon, Lac. 2.9.1–3; Plutarch, Aristides 17.10;
Isocrates Panathenaicus 211–212). See Kennell 1995: 79–82;
David 1993: 394–5; O. Murray 1993: 174.

633b9 ‘secret service (krupteia)’

On the Spartan krupteia, see Plutarch, Lycurgus 28.2–3. A version of
this institution is proposed in the legislation of Book 6, 762e–763b.
The Athenian will also commend the salutary effects of going bare-
foot and sleeping on the hard ground (942d).

633c4 ‘naked games (gumnopaidiais)’

These were not athletic but cultural competitions between choruses
of male citizens (Athenaeus, Deipnosophistai 15.22.18–24). Compe-
tition between choruses at religious festivals was a familiar feature of
life in Plato’s day: see Morrow 1960: 302–3 and the references to
choral competitions at 657d and 665e. Cultural competitions (fully
clothed) will be prevalent in the city of the Magnesians (8, 828c–d);
see Morgan 2013: 270–8.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 127

633c8–634c4
Courage as resistance to both pleasures and pains
The Athenian here expands the conception of courage, originally
construed as endurance of pains (633a–c), to include ‘resistance to
pleasures’. He challenges his interlocutors to identify Dorian insti-
tutions that cultivate the latter sort of resistance. Eventually the
discipline of resisting pleasures will be classified under moderation
(sôphrosunê) rather than courage (635e–637b). The Athenian’s intro-
duction of it here, under the rubric of courage, predisposes his
interlocutors to endorse it as an excellence, since they readily see
the importance of resisting pleasures that would distract one from the
pursuit of military objectives.

633c9–d2 ‘Does [courage] amount quite simply to a battle (dia-

machên) against fears and pains alone? Or does it also oppose yearn-
ings (pothous) and pleasures . . . ?’
Courage, on this expanded conception, involves fighting against two
sorts of opponents: ‘fears and pains’ on the one hand and ‘yearnings
and pleasures’ on the other (cf. La. 191d–e). Elsewhere (e.g.
633e–634b), the two kinds of opponents are more economically
classified as ‘pains’ and ‘pleasures’—most notably when these are
identified as ‘two opposite . . . advisors’ at 644c and as ‘two springs’
from which we must draw wisely (636d–e). Sometimes pain’s side of
the contrast is expanded to include fears (635b–d, 647a), or pain is
replaced with fear (647c, 648b–e); at other times pleasure’s side is
expanded to include appetite (epithumia), passion (erôs) (643c–d,
647d), daring (tharros) (644c–d), or yearnings (pothous), as in the
present passage; cf. 631e–632a.

An ambiguity in ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’

What is the significance of invoking fears in addition to pains, and
appetite or yearning in addition to pleasures? One might suppose
that the expanded enumeration reflects a more precise account of the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

128 Commentary: Book 1

motivational factors at play in the endurance or ‘battle’ that the
Athenian has in mind. For example, one might suppose:

(A) That pain and pleasure are pleasant and painful experiences—
e.g. the pleasures of food, drink, and sex and the ‘enjoyments’
(paidia) mentioned by the Athenian at 635b5, and the pains of
being cold and hungry, suffering in the heat, or receiving a
beating, listed by Megillus at 633b–c.
(B) And that fear and yearning are affective responses in the agent to
the prospect of the experiences in (A)—an aversion to pain, and
attraction to pleasure.

But this would be a mistake, for ‘pleasures’ and ‘pains’, in the

Athenian’s usage, range over both (A) and (B). At 636d5–7 he will
claim that ‘pleasures and pains . . . both in cities and in individual
characters’ constitute the ‘whole subject’ of legislative study. What he
understands there by ‘pleasures and pains . . . in cities’ (636d6–7)
may well be pleasant and painful experiences of the sort Megillus
has in mind at 633b–c and 636e–637a; however, those ‘in individual
characters’ (636d7) presumably include affective responses such as
those in (B). The latter are what he has in mind at 631e–632a when
he describes the legislator’s concern with the citizens’ ‘pains, pleas-
ures, desires, and . . . passions’, which include ‘feelings of anger and
fear’ (632a3); the latter are classified as ‘pains of the soul’ at Philb.
47e. Indeed, in the account of paideia at the beginning of Laws Book
2, he uses ‘pleasure and pain’ as a general term for affective response,
including such things as love (philia) and hate (misos) (653a–c; see
note on 653a6).
Thus ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ are ambiguous in the Athenian’s usage
between (A) pleasant and painful experiences of the sort that Megil-
lus has in mind, and (B) affective states (desires, fears, and other
emotions) that may have (A), or anything else, as their intentional
objects. The pleasures and pains that one ‘battles’ against in the
struggle for self-mastery described in the present context need only
be those of type (B); see notes on 633e1–2 and 634a6–8. (On a
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 129

further ambiguity concerning fear and pleasure, see notes on 647c3–
4 and 648b7–8.)

633d3 ‘melt the resolve (thumous)’

Note the similar use of the term glukuthumia (translated as ‘weakness
in the face of pleasure’) at 635c8, which shares the root for thumos
(here used in the plural). In the Republic, thumos (‘spirit’) invokes the
toughness and ferocity of the warrior who is neither deterred by the
pains he faces nor distracted by the prospect of pleasures (375a–b,
410d). The Athenian thus presents self-control in the face of pleas-
ures—which he will eventually classify as moderation (sôphrosunê; see
note on 635e5–6)—within the domain of the military values that his
interlocutors endorse.

633d5 ‘our previous discussion . . . spoke of a city being “defeated

by itself”, and likewise a man’
The notion of an individual person’s self-defeat is originally discussed
at 626d–e, and it is transferred, with some awkwardness, to the case
of a city at 627a–c. While Clinias proposes self-mastery (the opposite
of self-defeat) as the highest achievement (626e), the Athenian
criticizes that ideal at 627e–628d.

633e1–2 ‘the person defeated (hêttô) by pains . . . defeated by

pleasures’
On being ‘defeated’ by pleasures or pains cf. Protag. 352b–353a,
where the vanquishing force is more fully characterized as anger
(thumos), pleasure, pain, passion (erôs), or fear (352b7–8). At
635d1 the Athenian uses ‘defeated by fears’ instead of the present
‘defeated by pains’. There, as in the present context, the Athenian is
referring back to the condition that Clinias described as being
‘defeated by oneself’ (626e3–4). The defeat occurs in the sort of
struggle modelled in the figure of the divine puppets at 644d–645c.
As argued in the note on 633c9–d2, the Athenian uses ‘pleasure’
and ‘pain’ to refer both to (A) pleasant and painful experiences such
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

130 Commentary: Book 1

as sexual indulgence and bodily discomfort and to (B) pleasant and
painful affective states that may have (A) as their intentional objects.
One might reasonably ask which sort are the ones that can ‘defeat’ a
person (for it is to these that a person will need to be exposed in order
to develop the requisite resistance). The case can be made that it is,
strictly speaking, pleasures of type (B) that are relevant. The sort of
scenario Megillus describes at 633b–c under the heading ‘endurance
of pain’ might be one in which a person is simultaneously experien-
cing a pain of type (A) and a pain of type (B), e.g. an affective
response to flee the situation. But it might equally be one in which
the (A)-pain is only in prospect (the enemy is advancing with
gleaming swords, but one is as yet unscathed . . . ) and the only
pain the agent experiences is of type (B) (his fear and desire to
flee). Thus it need only be pains of type (B) that one struggles against
in the fight for self-mastery. Similarly, cases of being defeated by
pleasures need not be ones in which one is actually engaging in an
(A)-pleasure. All that is needed is that one experience a pleasure of
type (B): an affective pleasure at the prospect of, or a desire to engage
in, that (A)-pleasure. Indeed, in the case of many (A)-pleasures, the
battle has already been lost when the agent actually experiences them.
This is not to say that the (B)-pleasures and (B)-pains are not
themselves extremely pleasant and painful, respectively, and thus
possess strong motivational force. However, the distinction between
(A)-pleasures and (B)-pleasures will be important to appreciating the
Athenian’s insistence that one must have experience of pleasures in
order to learn to defeat them. See note on 634a6–8.

634a1 ‘the Pythian lawgiver’

Apollo, credited with the origin of Spartan laws at 624a and 632d.

634a2 ‘a lame form of courage (cholên tên andreian)’

An unflattering allusion to the poet Tyrtaeus (who is ‘interrogated’
at 629b–630c). Pausanias, in the second century ce, reports a story
that Tyrtaeus was a dim-witted Athenian schoolteacher ‘lame in one
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 131

foot’ (ton heteron tôn podôn cholos, 4.15.6 line 10) sent by Athens to
Sparta in grudging compliance with an oracle requiring that an
Athenian advisor be sent there. On ‘lame’ courage, see also note on
634b4.

634a6–8 ‘practices (epitêdeumata) that engage with pleasures

rather than flee them. Where pains are concerned your practice
isn’t to avoid them but to thrust a person into their midst’
‘Engaging (geuonta) with pleasures’ (more literally: ‘tasting pleas-
ures’) is presumably intended to be analogous to the ‘endurance
(karterêseis) of pain’ that Megillus cited at 633b6; cf. ‘endure in the
face of pleasures’ at 635d3. But ‘partaking of pleasures’ hardly sounds
like a feat of endurance or resistance—which the Athenian needs it to
be, if it is to count as a ‘battle against pleasures’ analogous to the
‘battle against pains’ at 633d1–2. Nor would it be plausible of him to
claim that one needs to partake of a given pleasure in order to
develop resistance to its appeal (given his condemnation of same-
sex intercourse at 636c–d as a pleasure that one must ‘master’). The
Athenian’s point can be made both precise and plausible by distin-
guishing between the different senses of ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ that he
employs ambiguously (see note on 633c9–d2). Cases of self-mastery
(and self-defeat) where pleasure is the opponent need only be ones in
which a person faces a situation in which inappropriate (A)-pleasures
(e.g. adulterous sex) are available to him and he experiences a
(B)-pleasure that urges him to indulge in those (A)-pleasures. Self-
mastery in such cases involves ‘defeating’ or ‘subjugating’ (kratein,
634b1) the (B)-pleasure—i.e. ‘enduring’ its pull without acting
on it. Thus it is reasonable for the Athenian to claim that one must
have experience ‘engaging with’ or ‘tasting’ (geuonta) (B)-pleasures,
not (A)-pleasures, in order to develop such self-mastery. Thus
the legislator needs to devise institutions that expose citizens to
situations that provoke those (B)-pleasures. Such training by expos-
ure is described more fully at 647c–649d; see notes on 647c3–4,
647c8–10.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

132 Commentary: Book 1

634a9 ‘where he is compelled and persuaded by honours’
The honours would include those meted out by the lawgiver at
632b–c, and would include the praises delivered by means of the
laws at 632a. On the interplay between compulsion and honours in
training, see notes on 648b8–c5 and 670c9. Once again, as at 632b,
the dual coercive and persuasive aspects of the law to be mandated in
Book 4 are foreshadowed. See note on 632b7–8.

634b4 ‘the same person’

more literally: ‘the same people’
A person must be ‘courageous’ in both the face of pleasures and the
face of pains; otherwise he will have the ‘lame form of courage’
invoked at 634a2. This would be either the courage that is not
combined with moderation (criticized as fourth-rate at 630c8),
or moderation unmixed with courage (as at 681b; see note on
630a7–b2).

634b4–5 ‘defeats (nikan) the ones he ought to (ha dei)’

Such a ‘defeat’ of pleasures or pains would be an instance of what
Clinias and the Athenian have been calling ‘self-mastery’ (kreittôn
hautou, 626e–627d). The qualification ‘[that] he ought to’ (ha dei,
b4) indicates that not all pleasures and pains should be resisted,
anticipating the point at 636d–e that pleasure and pains are
‘two springs’ from which a person must draw intelligently. Indeed,
646e–647b advocates cultivating certain pains (fears), and 643c–d
advocates cultivating certain pleasures. On the ambiguity in the
pleasures and pains to be resisted and indulged in, see note on
633c9–d2. Identifying which pleasures and pains to resist and
which to cultivate is the job for wisdom—hence the role of wisdom
in properly cultivated courage and moderation at 631c–d and the call
for ‘intelligent selection’ of pleasures and pains at 636d–e.

634b5–6 ‘the enemy that is hardest (chalepôtatôn)’

This description of pleasure invokes the previous characterization of
civil war as ‘the hardest conflict’ at 629d1–2 (see note ad loc and on
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 133

669c1). As at 633e1–2, the pleasure that defeats a person from
within need only be of type (B), an affective response, rather than
type (A), a pleasant experience that is the intentional object of the
former. See note on 633e1–2.

634b8 ‘a large number of laws (nomous) directed against pains’

As at 634d7–8 and 637c7, the ‘laws’ (nomoi) invoked here need not
be written statutes, but only practices and institutions (epitêdeumata,
as at 632e1, 634a6). See note on 634d8–9.

634c5–635b3
Etiquette and credentials for criticizing norms
Having exposed deficiencies in the home institutions of his Dorian
interlocutors, the Athenian now cautions his interlocutors not to
interpret this as an expression of hostility (634c–d). Indeed, he
proposes, such critical inquiry by men of their age is in fact author-
ized by Dorian norms (634d–e). The interlocutors agree to proceed
with both frankness and goodwill (635a–b).

634c5 ‘That’s not surprising’

Translation following Schöpsdau, contra England, who reads this as
a tactful comment to the effect that no constitution is perfect. Both
Clinias and Megillus have proved unable to identify Dorian institu-
tions for cultivating an important part of virtue, and it is this that the
Athenian says is not surprising. His comment suggests, at least to the
dialogue’s audience, that there are no such institutions to be found in
the Dorian cities, and hence that they are imperfect. The Athenian
here begins to abandon the pretence that Dorian legislation is
unimpeachable (630d–e, 631b), and he begins to articulate direct
criticisms of those laws, although he will first adopt the pretence of
simply repeating ‘what is generally said’ (634d5–6). Compare the
direct and unmitigated criticism of Dorian educational institutions
in Book 2 at 666e–667a.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

134 Commentary: Book 1

634c7–8 ‘we should accept this criticism mildly (praiôs) rather
than harshly (chalepôs)’
A similar point is made at 635a6–b1. On the contrast between
chalepôs (harshly) and mildly (praiôs) or gently (êrema), see notes on
629a2, 629d2, 645a6. The aggression implied in chalepôs is connect-
ed to anger or defensiveness, hence its invocation in the present
context.

634c9 ‘a persuasive point (peisteon)’

Persuasion is the project in ‘gracious’ or ‘gentle’ (praiôs) discussion, in
contrast with the violent or coercive methods involved in aggressive
argument (on the aggression implicit in chalepôs, see note on
634c7–8). On the theme of coercion v. persuasion, see notes on
629a2, and 634a9.

634d5–7 ‘I would . . . find it easier than either of you to voice what

is generally said’
‘What is generally said’ (ta legomena . . . pros tôn pollôn) is presumably
what is generally said in criticism of Spartan and Cretan norms (thus
Schöpsdau). The Athenian is better placed to state these criticisms
than his Dorian interlocutors because they have been trained from
youth to reject any criticism of their own laws, as he is about to note.

634d8–9 ‘one of your finest (tôn kallistôn) is the law that . . . ’

For consistency, ‘law’ translates nomos, although ‘norms’ would be
more appropriate here, for it is unlikely that what is being reported
here is a written statute (see Wilamovitz 1920: vol I, 661). On the
translation of kallistôn, see note on 630c7.

634d9–e1 ‘what is and isn’t admirable (poia kalôs . . . ê mê kalôs

echei) among those arrangements’
Like kalôs keithai in the next line (634e2; see note ad loc), kalôs echei
recalls the expression orthôs echein (‘is correct’) used at 631b5; see note
ad loc and on 667c6–7. The Athenian has characterized the subject
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 135

of their present inquiry as ‘what is . . . correct and mistaken about
laws’ (627d3).

634e1–2 ‘everyone must join voices and sing out their agreement
(sumphônein)’
more literally: ‘with one voice and from a single mouth all must
agree’
While the dominant meaning of sumphônein is ‘agree’, sumphônia
also has musical connotations, which are probably latent in the
present passage, given the musical metaphor (‘striking a discordant
note’) at 635a5; the metaphor of ‘singing out agreement’ will be
given a concrete application in the institution of the three choruses in
Book 2 (664b–665c). The verb sumphônein in the sense of ‘agree-
ment’ can apply to (a) interpersonal ‘agreement’ (as in the present
context and likewise at 661d, 662b, 664a) as well as to (b) intraper-
sonal harmony, as in the conception of virtue articulated in Book 2: a
person’s pleasures and pains should sumphônein (‘agree’) with their
logos (653b; cf. 689d, 696c, and note on 653b4–5). These two kinds
of sumphônia are connected at 659d–e. On the differences between
conceiving of virtue as ‘agreement’ and Clinias’ conception of virtue
as victory over self, see notes on 626e2–3, 628c9–11, 643b1–646e2.
The unanimity described here is endorsed as a desirable effect of
education at 659d–e.

634e2 ‘that all the laws are beautifully arranged (hôs panta kalôs
keitai)’
alternatively: ‘that they are all admirably (kalôs) arranged’
This unanimous endorsement of the laws provides a direct answer to
the forbidden question: ‘which of the legal arrangements kalôs echei
[literally: are admirable or beautiful]?’, 634d9–e1. On the range of
the term kalon, see note on 630c7.

634e4 ‘An old man’

The advanced age of the interlocutors (cf. 625b, 635a) is here
invoked as a credential for engaging in the critical inquiry into the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

136 Commentary: Book 1

laws; cf. 635e1–3. On the corrupting effects of political criticism on
the young, cf. Rep. 538d–539c. On the special role for the elderly in
education, see Laws 664e–666c.

635a5 ‘without striking a discordant note’

Continues the choral metaphor of 634e1–2.

635b2–3 ‘not a criticism of your laws . . . I simply express my

puzzlement (aporôn)’
This disclaimer notwithstanding, the ensuing paragraph (635b2–d8)
provides the foundation for a trenchant criticism of those Dorian
institutions: their failure to train citizens at resisting pleasures makes
them ‘slavish’. What the Athenian finds puzzling can only be inter-
preted as a ‘puzzle’ on the strained assumption (implied at 632e, and
articulated explicitly at 635e) that the Dorian legislators do aim at
inculcating moderation as well as courage, and hence that they do
cultivate resistance to pleasures. The expression of puzzlement
(aporia) is a common trope in Plato’s portrait of Socrates in dialogues
such as Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, and Republic I.

635b4–e3
Cultivating resistance to pleasures requires exposure
to pleasures
Having expanded the range of courage to include not just resistance
to pains but also resistance to pleasures (633d–634a), and raised
doubts about whether Dorian institutions are equipped to train
citizens in the latter (634a–c), the Athenian now claims that such
training must involve exposing citizens to ‘the greatest pleasures’—
something that Dorian institutions do not allow.

635b5 ‘enjoyments (paidiôn)’

more literally: ‘recreations’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 137

Elsewhere in this translation the term paidia, here translated as
‘enjoyment’, is rendered ‘recreation’, although for stylistic or con-
textual reasons it and its compounds is occasionally translated as
‘play’ or ‘playful’ (as at 643b–d, 653e2–3, 659e4). The term in
Greek (
ÆØØ) is distinguishable only in accent from the term for
childhood (
ÆØÆ), both deriving from the root
ÆE (child); see
D’Angour 2013. Paidia will play a central role in the Athenian’s
account of education (paideia, another cognate term) at 643a–644b.
As in the present context, the term is closely associated with pleasure
(cf. 657c3–6, 667e5–8). Paidia is also regularly used in contrast with
spoudê (verb: spoudazein, ‘to be serious’ as at 636c, 659e, 667e, 673e,
732d; at 643b and 647d it is rendered ‘at work’). On this persistent
motif in Laws, see Jouët-Pastré 2006 and Stalley 1983: 130–1. A
striking claim of Book 7 is that singing and dancing at festivals to the
gods, which people normally think of as recreation (paidia), is in fact
a most serious undertaking (803b–804b). The kind of ‘recreation’
that is about to become the focus of the present context is the
drinking party (labelled paidia at 666b5, 671e5–6). The Athenian
will argue over the course of Books 1 and 2 that the drinking party is
an important educational institution (paideia) (641a–d, 653a), and
thus must be treated as a case of spoudê rather than mere paidia
(673e8; see note ad loc). See also note on 673a7–8.

635c1–2 ‘hardships, fears, and pains that are unavoidable

(anankaious)’
Alternatively: ‘ . . . fears and pains that are compelling’ (see note on
648d7–e1)
Most likely these are the fears and pains involved in battle. The
adjective anankaious conveys not only unavoidability but also force
and violence—the latter being consistently associated with military
contexts. Both senses may be active in the present passage, while the
latter predominates in its use at 648d7–e1, where it is translated as
‘compulsive’. On an ambiguity in the notion of pain and fear, see
notes on 633e1–2, 647c3–4, and 648b7–8.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

138 Commentary: Book 1

635c6–8 ‘they will have no practice at enduring in the face of
pleasures (en tois hêdonais karterein) and refusing to be compelled
(anankazesthai) into shameful conduct’
On what counts as ‘enduring in the face of pleasures’, see note on
634a6–8. Here the range of improper action to which one might be
led by the prospect of pleasures is broad—not just failures on the
battlefield (as implied at 633d) but any ‘shameful’ action one might
perform because of the prospect of pleasure—hence such endurance
is classified under moderation.

635c8–d1 ‘weakness (glukuthumias) in the face of pleasures’

Here glukuthumia is used to stand in for the analogue, in the case of
pleasures, of being ‘defeated by fears’ (635d1); thus it invokes what
Clinias has identified as the central and worst case of being ‘defeated
by oneself’ (633e3–6). On the connection with thumos (spirit,
resolve), see note on 633d3.

635d1 ‘defeated (hêttômenois) by fears’

An appeal to the notion of self-mastery and self-defeat originally
introduced at 626e and brought up again at 633d. Here ‘fears’ stands
in for ‘pains’ in the formulation at 633e1–2 (see note ad loc). On the
relationship between fear and pain, see note on 633c9–d2.

635d1–4 ‘their enslavement . . . will be to men who are both able

to endure in the face of pleasures and also well versed (kektêmenois) in
matters of pleasure—utterly bad people’
On enduring in the face of pleasures (katerein en tais hedonais, d3),
see note on 634a6–8. ‘[W]ell versed in matters of pleasure’ renders
the vague expression kektêmenois ta peri tas hêdonas (d3–4), which
might also be rendered ‘masters in the domain of pleasure’ (cf.
829c8). The ‘utterly bad people’ (d4) might be purveyors of illicit
pleasures. The Athenian’s point may be that lack of self-control in
the pursuit of pleasures puts one at the mercy of those who control
access to those pleasures (as in the figure of the besotted lover
sleeping on a doorstep (Symp. 203d, Phdr. 252a)), just as failure to
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 139

cultivate resistance to the pains and fears of battle may lead to one’s
capture and enslavement by foes met in battle. In any case, the sort of
enslavement and defeat of primary interest to the Athenian here is
not at the hands of another person, but by one’s own pleasures,
pains, desires, and fears—on which see 633e1–2 and note ad loc.

635d5 ‘slaves in one respect and free (eleutheran) in another’

They would be ‘slaves’ to pleasure (in the sense that they are ‘defeated’
by their desires for pleasures) but ‘free’ from compulsion by pains and
fears (in that they are not ‘defeated’ by the pains and fears that urge
them to cowardly behaviour). The adjective ‘free’ (eleutheros), intro-
duced here for the first time in the dialogue, has several senses:
(1) The ordinary political sense, in which it means not being a literal
slave or subject (Stsm. 298c, Lysis 208b, Gorg. 502d, Rep. 351d).
(2) An extended, social sense (whose opposite, aneleutheros, is often
translated ‘illiberal’ and applied to the status of the banausos
(mechanical worker or tradesman—Laws 644a5, 741e3; Aris-
totle, Pol. 1338b8–15).
(3) An extended psychological sense (where it means something like
self-possession or self-control; see Rep. 577d, Phdr. 256e, and
note on 635d1–4).
635d6 ‘courageous and free without qualification’
In contrast to the ‘lame form of courage’ (634a2) praised by Tyrtaeus,
courage ‘without qualification’ would be that involved in the ‘complete
virtue’ described at 631a–c. While freedom is not explicitly men-
tioned in that context, the Athenian here presents it as a kind of self-
mastery (kreittôn hautou) that is involved both in courage (resistance
to pains) and moderation (resistance to pleasures). ‘Qualified’ freedom
would mean self-mastery on one of these fronts together with self-
defeat on the other.

635e1–3 ‘rushing to judgement . . . like foolish adolescents’

The language recalls the Dorian prohibition against criticism of the
laws by young people (634d9–e1).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

140 Commentary: Book 1

635e4–636d4
Institutions that cultivate courage undermine moderation
The Athenian ostensibly switches the topic of conversation from
courage to moderation (although see note on 635e5–6) and invites
Megillus to name Spartan institutions that cultivate the latter virtue.
To Megillus’ hesitant proposal that the institutions that prepare a
city for war also cultivate moderation, the Athenian responds that, on
the contrary, they promote two kinds of excess that the legislator
needs to guard against: (1) a willingness to resort to force in political
contexts (civil strife), and (2) the readiness to indulge in unnatural
sexual pleasures. The implication (not drawn explicitly) is that insti-
tutions specifically designed for cultivating moderation are necessary
to counterbalance the immoderate side effects of the institutions that
cultivate courage.

635e5–6 ‘let us talk about moderation next after courage’

The ensuing treatment of moderation (sôphrosunê) indicates that
resistance to pleasure, originally introduced under the rubric of
courage (633c–d), is the domain of moderation (see ‘failure to control
one’s pleasures’, 636c7; cf. 647c7–d8). The strategy of presenting
moderation as a form of courage is a device, similar to that employed
in the discussion of Tyrtaeus (see note on 628e2–630d1), to intro-
duce a novel idea to the interlocutors in terms of values (e.g. courage)
that they already endorse.

635e6–636a1 ‘superior (diapheron) . . . as in the military matters we

were just discussing’
Note that it is superiority in war, not in courage, that the Athenian
attributes to Cretan and Spartan institutions.

636a2–3 ‘it seems (eoiken) that our communal meals and athletic
training (gumnasia) . . . achieve both effects (pros amphoteras)’
Megillus proposes that the same institutions that cultivate courage will
serve to cultivate moderation as well. On the verbal echoes of Megillus’
claim in the Athenian’s response, see notes on 636a4 and 636a5.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 141

636a4 ‘What really seems hard (eoiken dêta . . . chalepon einai) . . . ’
‘Hard’ (chalepon) is the opposite of rhadion, and responds to Megil-
lus’ use of the latter term at 636a2; ‘what really seems’ (eoiken dêta)
responds to his ‘it seems’ (eoiken) in the same line. The upshot of the
Athenian’s reply (on which see next note) is that the institutions
mentioned by Megillus, far from cultivating moderation, in fact
breed its opposite.

636a5 ‘as contradictory in their effects as they are controversial in

discussion’
more literally: ‘no less disputable in practice than they are in discus-
sion (anamphisbêtêtôs homoiôs ergôi kai logôi)’
A difficult phrase, in which the key term, anamphisbêtêtôs, is a verbal
echo of Megillus’ proposal that Spartan institutions achieve ‘both
effects’ (pros amphoteras, 636a3). The core notion invoked is amphis-
bêtêsis (literally: ‘going (bainein) in both (amphi) directions’). It is
used here in a sense broad enough to include both practical imple-
mentation (ergôi) and theoretical discussion (logôi). In the case of
discussion, argument, or theory, ‘going in both directions’ is dis-
agreement or dispute (as in the standard meaning of amphisbêtêsis).
In the case of practice or implementation, we may understand it as a
tendency to produce opposite effects, as in the example of a training
regime that has both good and bad effects on the body (636a6–b1).
England, by contrast, construes anamphisbêtêtôs . . . ergôi to concern
dissatisfaction with the results of implementation. Saunders’ use of
‘trouble free’ for anamphisbêtêtôs is preferable in this respect, as it
nicely reflects the Athenian’s concern with devising institutions that
are free from unwelcome side effects, and similarly for Schöpsdau’s
‘tadellos’ (irreproachable), although neither captures the connection
with Megillus’ pros amphoteras.

636a7 ‘hardly a single regimen (hen epitêdeuma)’

The emphasis on the ‘single’ suggests that the problem is to be solved
by multiple practices (epitêdeumata) that severally correct for the
undesirable effects of each other. To counter the side effect of
vigorous military training (which makes citizens eager to fight)
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

142 Commentary: Book 1

another set of practices is necessary to cultivate good relations among
the citizens. The Athenian will propose that the institution of the
sumposion (drinking party) performs this function (640c–d, 671e–
672a).

636b2–4 ‘a danger in times of faction (pros . . . tas staseis), as the

youth of Miletus, Boeotia, and Thurii have made clear’
alternatively: ‘pose the danger of faction’ (Saunders)
Faction is first mentioned at 628b2. The cities of Miletus and Thurii,
along with Thebes (in Boeotia), were famous in Plato’s day for their
civil strife (see Plutarch, Lysander VIII; Aristotle, Pol. 1307a27–b6;
Moore 2005: 175). The Athenian proposes that susceptibility to
faction (stasis) is exacerbated by the vigorous military training of
their youth, which makes them eager for a fight.

636b7–c2 ‘Your cities in particular are to be criticized for bringing

about this effect, yours and any others that put such great emphasis
on athletic training’
The link between athletic training (gumnasia) and sexual temptation
is more evident in Plato’s Greek. Gumnasia in the literal sense are
exercises for which one strips naked (hence the root gumnos,
naked)—paradigmatically, wrestling with a partner. All the wrestlers
would be male, and the communal meals (sussitia) were also all-male
affairs. For a good example of the sexual innuendo surrounding the
gymnasium see Charm. 153d–155d and Symp. 217c. On sexual
activity at gymnasia, see Ephorus of Kyme, FGrH 70 F 149. See
also O. Murray 1993: 175.

636c2–3 ‘Whether it is right to be playful or serious about such

matters . . . ’
Nussbaum 1994: 1630, citing correspondence with Dover, takes this
remark to signal that the condemnation of same-sex intercourse that
follows (c3–7) is not intended to be taken seriously. However, this is
unlikely to be what the Athenian intends, since a recurring theme in
his exposition is that the message affirmed in one’s playful and
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 143

serious activities must be the same; see 643b–d, 659d–e, and note on
635b5. For additional responses to Nussbaum, see Rist 1997 and
Moore 2005: 177–80. On Plato’s treatment of same-sex sexual
relations, see also Gould 1963 and Dover 1978.

636c5–6 ‘the pleasure of males coupling with males or of females

with females is unnatural’
A point reiterated in Book 8, 836c–837a, 838e–839b. For similarly
negative evaluations of sexual intercourse between males (but not
homoerotic attraction) see Phdr. 253d–256e, Rep. 402d–403c. On
sexual mores in Plato’s time, see Dover 1978; Foucault 1978;
Halperin et al. 1990; Cohen 1991; and Moore 2005: chapter 1.
See also note on 636c2–3.

636c6–7 ‘one of the greatest outrages arising from failure to con-

trol one’s pleasures (akrateian hedonês)’
‘Outrage’ (tolmêma; alt: brazenness) foreshadows the notion of thar-
ros (daring) that will be introduced at 644d1 and used at 649c8–d2
to characterize the impulse to pursue inappropriate gratifications (see
Nussbaum 1994: 1627–30). The locution akrateia hedonês (‘failure
to control one’s pleasures’) is used instead of hêttô . . . tôn hêdonôn
(‘defeated by pleasures’) which is used at 633e1–2 to describe defeat
in the struggle to be ‘master of oneself’ (kreittôn hautou—626e8).
The opposite adjective enkratês is used at 645e8, where it is translated
as ‘in control of himself’ (see note on 626e4). As argued in the note
on 634a6–8, the pleasures that one struggles against here must be
understood not as (A) those arising from homoerotic activity, but
rather (B) desires to engage in that activity.

636c8 ‘Ganymede’
The mythical boy cupbearer to the Olympian gods, abducted by
Zeus (Iliad 20.231–5), and in later versions of the story (e.g. Plato
Phdr. 255b–c) sexual partner of Zeus. The Athenian charges the
Cretans with introducing the homoerotic element into the story,
which is absent from the version in Homer. See Schöpsdau ad loc.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

144 Commentary: Book 1

636d2–4 ‘they saddle him with this tale so that they can be
following the god even when reaping this particular pleasure’
A cynical perspective on the stories of the ‘divine origin’ of the laws
introduced at 624a.

636d5–637c3
Happiness requires intelligent selection of pleasures and pains
From his preceding criticism of Dorian societies for indulging in
what he castigates as inappropriate sexual pleasures (636b–d), the
Athenian here draws a general moral that the law’s chief concern is
with pleasures and pains: these are ‘two springs’ from which one
must draw intelligently in order to live a happy life (636d–e). This
point requires an important qualification to the simple ‘resistance
model’ for virtue that has informed the discussion since 633b. The
challenge we face as human beings is more complicated than simply
resisting pleasures and pains: we must be intelligent in our selection
of which pleasures to resist and which to indulge in, and similarly
which pains to endure and which to avoid. When Megillus pro-
poses that drinking parties are an indulgence to be avoided (637a–
b), the Athenian comes to the defence of the practice (637b–c) and
thereby introduces the issue that will inform the rest of Books 1
and 2.

636d5–7 ‘virtually the whole subject concerns pleasures and pains,

those in cities and those in individual characters (en . . . idiois êthesin)’
A prescription about how the interlocutors are to conduct their
own inquiry (recalling the description of the proper legislator’s
attention to citizens’ pleasures and pains at 631e–632a), rather
than a description of actual legislative practice. The pleasures and
pains in ‘individual characters’ (d7) are presumably those already
mentioned at 631e–632a as the legislator’s concern; those ‘in cities’
would include the sorts of pleasant activities that are allowed (or
forbidden) to citizens, and the sorts of pain or hardship citizens
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 145

would be required or expected to endure (e.g. in military service).
Those ‘in individuals’ correspond to pleasures and pains of type
(B), and those ‘in cities’ to those of type (A), as distinguished in the
note on 633c9–d2. On the role of pleasures and pains in motiv-
ation see also 644c, 663b, 732e–733d. Aristotle makes a virtually
identical claim about the significance of pleasure and pain at EN
1104b8–9.

636d7–8 ‘These two springs flow freely by nature (metheintai

phusei rhein)’
alternatively: ‘these two springs flow naturally without restraint’
The point is that nature disposes us to follow the one and shun the
other, so restraint in either pursuit or avoidance must come from
some other source—later to be identified as training (ethos, ethismos;
see note on 655d7–e1). The term metheintai foreshadows the related
aneintai (practised without restraint) and anesis (lack of restraint) in
637c1–3.

636d8–e1 ‘the right one at the right time and to the right extent’
This recalls the doctrine of due measure at Stsm. 283c–284e and
illustrated at Laws 638c5–8—later made famous by Aristotle, EN
1106a26–b28. Figuring out the right time, extent, etc. for pleasures
and pains will require calculation (logismos, 644d2)—hence the
inopportune selection is ‘unintelligent’ (anepistêmonôs) at 636e2.

636e1 ‘lives a happy life (eudaimonei)’

On happiness (eudaimonia) as the legislator’s concern, see 628d and
631b. Here we are told that citizens’ happiness (alt: ‘well-being’—see
note on 628d5) depends on how well they select which pleasures to
endure, indulge in, or forgo (and similarly regarding which pains to
endure and which to avoid). Compare 631e–632a where the legisla-
tor, who provides happiness to the citizens (631b), scrutinizes the
pleasures and pains that are involved in their emotional responses.
On those pleasures and pains, see note on 636d5–7.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

146 Commentary: Book 1

The pleasures of drinking parties

636e4 ‘That’s more or less right’
more literally: ‘these things are admirably said, in a way (kalôs pôs)’
The expression kalôs legein typically means to be correct or right,
without invoking the ethical or aesthetic dimensions of the term
kalon (see note on 646d1).

636e6–7 ‘the lawgiver for the Spartans quite rightly commanded

us to avoid pleasures’
literally: ‘ . . . flee from (pheugein) pleasures’, as at 635b–d.
The blanket command to avoid pleasures violates the doctrine of due
measure just articulated by the Athenian (636d8–e3), which implies
that the right pleasures, at the right times, should be allowed by the
legislator.

637a5–6 ‘drinking parties (sumposia) with all that they involve’

The sumposion (pl. sumposia, root of the English ‘symposium’) was a
venerable institution in Athens and other non-Dorian Greek states:
an after-dinner ritual in which drinkers reclining on couches sing
songs and partake of entertainment ranging from exotic dancers and
prostitutes to more refined conversation. See Plato, Protag. 347c–d
and Symp. 176b–e for the range of possible entertainments, as well as
Xenophon, Symposium 2.1–23. Drinking to the point of drunken-
ness was an essential feature of the event, as the Athenian emphasizes
at 637d5–6. (Many features of the modern Jewish Passover seder
derive from the Greek symposium. In the Hellenized world in the
centuries after Alexander the Great’s conquests, which included the
land of the Israelites, the symposium was the epitome of leisured and
free entertainment among the ruling class.)

637b2 ‘even if he has the festival of Dionysus as his excuse’

Dionysus is the god of wine and his festivals in the Greek
world typically involved communal drunkenness. See Burkert
1985: 161–7 and Seaford 2006. Even Spartan colonists in the city
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 147

of Tarentum engaged in the practice, Megillus notes at 637b3–5—
hardly evidence, as England notes, for his earlier contention
(636a2–3) that Spartan austerity inculcates resistance to such temp-
tations. In Book 2 the Athenian will shock his interlocutors by
claiming that old men like themselves should sing and dance in
honour of Dionysus (665b).

637b7 ‘when practised with discipline (karterêseis)’

more literally: ‘when practised with endurance’
Endurance (karteria), here opposed to ‘lack of restraint’ (anesis), is a
recurring motif throughout the Laws, especially as a response to
pains: 633b, 727c, 840b, 942d. Here, as at 635d, 836d–e, 918c–d,
and 955c–d, the endurance is in the face of pleasures, desires, or
inducements; cf. the ‘battle . . . against yearnings and pleasures’
(633d1–2). For a more precise analysis of the restraint involved,
see note on 634a6–8. Saunders’ translation, ‘in men with a certain
strength of character’, wrongly implies that endurance here is a
character trait. The Athenian will soon make it clear, in the case of
drinking parties (647c–d), that such strength of character may be
cultivated by acts of endurance or restraint by people who do not yet
possess the corresponding character trait. At 639d–e the Athenian
will concede that the requisite restraint or endurance is lacking in the
drinking parties Megillus has observed.

637c2–3 ‘the lack of restraint in your women at home’

‘Lack of restraint’ (anesis) picks up on aneintai in the previous line
‘when practised without restraint (aneintai)’ (c1). The charge of
licence against Spartan women is elaborated by the Athenian in
Book 7, 806c. Aristotle elaborates on the charge, with language
echoing this passage, in Politics 1269b12–1270a15. In the cross-
cultural tit-for-tat envisaged here by the Athenian, a hypothetical
Athenian criticized for the abandon (anesis) of his own city’s drinking
practices responds by pointing out lack of restraint in certain Spartan
practices as well. There is no reason to suppose that it is specifically
the sexual mores of Spartan women that are invoked here (as in
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

148 Commentary: Book 1

Saunders’ translation ‘the easy virtue of your women’). On Spartan
women see Pomeroy 2002 and Millender 1999.

637c3–639a1
Principles for evaluating practices
Having identified conflicting practices in Sparta and Athens on the
regulation of drinking and women’s activities (637a–c), the Athenian
here canvasses a variety of different approaches one might take when
assessing the merits of practices or institutions. The first, dismissed out
of hand, is a version of cultural relativism: there are simply differing
cultural practices and none of them is incorrect (637c–d). The second
approach appeals to the previously discredited military ethic: the norms
of the society that prevails in war are best (637e–638b). The Athenian
here rejects it on empirical grounds, and also rejects the criterion of
popularity (638d). He proposes to explain a better approach (638c–e).

637c5 ‘that it is faulty (kakôs echein) rather than correct’

more literally: ‘that it is bad . . . ’
Here kakôs echein means the same as mê kalôs echein (isn’t admirable)
at 634d9–e1; see note ad loc and on 637e5.

637c6 ‘the stranger who is shocked at the unfamiliar ways that he

observes’
Since 636a, the Athenian and Megillus have each been playing the
part of the stranger (xenos) who is affronted by alien customs and
unreflectively partial to those of his home state—the Athenian in his
repugnance at Dorian homosexual practices (636b–d), and at the
licence of Spartan women (637c); the Spartan in his chauvinism for
his own city’s asceticism (636e–637a) and contempt for rituals
involving drunkenness in Athens and other cities (637a–b).

637c7–8 ‘This is our custom (nomos) here and no doubt you do

things differently where you come from’
alternatively: ‘this is our law here . . . ’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 149

This is the all-purpose method for diffusing criticism introduced at
637c4 as the ‘single reply’ to cross-cultural criticism; it echoes the
fifth-century view that law or convention (nomos) has no basis in
reality (phusis); for an especially clear articulation of such a view, see
Gorg. 482c–484c. The Athenian states unequivocally that the joint
project of the dialogue, an inquiry into the merits of different laws,
rejects this simple relativism. On the translation of nomos as ‘custom’
see Introduction.

637d2 ‘excellence or deficiency of their lawgivers’

more literally: ‘badness and excellence (kakias te kai aretês) in their
lawgivers’
The term aretê, translated as ‘virtue’ above (630b–631a,
632e–633a), here indicates accomplishment in the discipline of the
legislator; at 627e4 it indicates the excellence of a judge.

637e2–3 ‘While your people, as you say, abstain completely, the

Scythians . . . take their wine unmixed (akratôi . . . chrômenoi)’
It is from drunkenness, not wine drinking, that Megillus has said the
Spartans abstain (637a–b; see O. Murray 2013: 111–12). Greeks of
Plato’s day drank their wine diluted with water, even at drinking
parties. Some of the most beautiful relics of the material culture of
the era are the mixing bowls (kratêres) used for this purpose. Drink-
ing ‘unmixed’ wine was considered uncivilized, and would of course
lead more readily to inebriation.

637e5 ‘an admirable (kalon) and happy (eudaimon) practice’

‘Happy’ here, while not idiomatic in contemporary English, indi-
cates either that the practice is conducive to the good life, or is an
element or expression of such a good life. On happiness, see note on
628d5. The conjunction here of the adjective ‘admirable’ (kalon)
with ‘happy’ shows the close connection between the notions of
the admirable or beautiful (kalon) and the good (agathon). See
notes on 637c5, 641b8–c1, and 667c6–7. On the kalon, see note
on 630c7.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

150 Commentary: Book 1

638a1–2 ‘we put all these peoples to flight’
Megillus here reverts to Clinias’ original proposal that military suc-
cess is the standard of legislative excellence (626b5–c3), notwith-
standing the Athenian’s subsequent exposition of the deficiencies of
that standard (627c–628d).

638a4 ‘that tell us nothing (atekmartoi)’

Translation following Ast, with Brisson/Pradeau. Alternatively one
might render atekmartoi as ‘inexplicable’ or ‘mysterious’ (Bury,
Saunders, des Places, England, Schöpsdau, Lisi); however, the
Athenian’s point is that such cases provide no evidence or proof
(tekmêrion) that the victorious people’s practices are better.

638b1–3 ‘The Syracusans subjugated the Locrians, whose laws

were thought to be the best in that region, and the Athenians did
the same to the Ceians’
The Syracusans under the tyrant Dionysus II conquered the Lo-
crians in 352 bce—so this reference provides a terminus post quem
for dating the composition of the present text (five years before
Plato’s death in 347). In praise of Locrian laws, see Plato, Tim.
20a. The Ceians attempted to secede from the Athenian naval
confederacy in 364 bce, but were forcibly brought back into the
alliance. For details see Schöpsdau ad loc and Gehrke 1985: 76 ff.
Plato himself had visited Syracuse several times by the end of his
life and is reported to have made some (spectacularly unsuccessful)
efforts to educate Dionysus II in philosophy (DL 3.18–24; see also
Ep. VII); Vlastos 1981: 215–16 suggests that Plato’s experience
with Dionysus II led him to abandon the political philosophy of
the Republic and settle on the ‘second-best’ politics outlined in
Laws (739e).

638c5 ‘cheese’
Reading turous (cheese) for the MSS’ purous (wheat). Thus Saunders
1972, England, Lisi, and Brisson/Pradeau, but not des Places or
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 151

Schöpsdau. The Hippocratic corpus contains a similar example
involving cheese (On Ancient Medicine 20.17–22).

638c7–8 ‘how and to whom it is served, with what accompani-

ments and in what condition, as well as the condition of the person
who eats it’
These would be specific instances of the variables mentioned in the
doctrine of due measure at 636d8–e1 (see note ad loc).

638d4–5 ‘some thinking the large number on their side settles the
matter’
It is not obvious that any party to the present discussion has invoked
this consideration (by contrast, it is clearly invoked at Gorg. 471e and
criticized there and at La. 184d–e). Although the Athenian has just
pointed out the large number of societies with wine-drinking prac-
tices different from the Dorians’ (637d–e), he has not concluded
from this that their practices are superior, although he will do so in a
joking manner at 638e5–6.

639a2–641a3
Goals and leadership of a properly led drinking party
The Athenian proposes that a properly conducted drinking party
must have a sober leader. While the order of exposition in this
passage is not straightforward, the general line of argument is as
follows: a collective undertaking—whether it be a sea voyage, a
military campaign, or a drinking party—requires a leader if it is to
have any chance of achieving anything good (639a–c, 640a); thus to
find fault with a leaderless or ill-led collective enterprise is pointless
for those investigating the merits of social practices (639a, 639c,
640d–641a). The drinking parties criticized by Megillus, and indeed
all those in the Athenian’s experience, fall into the ill-led category
(639d–e). So to appreciate the benefits that might come from a
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

152 Commentary: Book 1

drinking party, one must consider what it can achieve under proper
leadership. In developing this point, the Athenian indicates without
fanfare that the goal of such an enterprise is to increase the bonds of
civic friendship among the drinkers (640c–d).

639a9 ‘Now, is someone a good ship’s captain (chrêstos . . . archôn)

as long as . . . ’
Picking up on the importance of having good masters in the example
of goat-keeping (639a2–7), the Athenian now turns to the criteria for
good leadership, switching the example from animal husbandry to
navigation and warfare. The two criteria identified here (639a9–b11)
will be applied to the leadership of a drinking party at 640a8–d9: (1)
knowledge of how to conduct the enterprise at hand; (2) immunity
to the naturally occurring disturbances that are occupational hazards
in the enterprise (e.g. seasickness in a naval voyage, fear in a military
campaign).

639b5 ‘leader of armies’

The term archon—translated as ‘leader’ here and at 639c—is ren-
dered by ‘master’ above in the example of the goats (639a6) and
‘captain’ in the example of the ships (639a9).

639c1 ‘gathering (koinônias)’

The term koinônia (also at 639c6) is used interchangeably with
koinônêma (639d1), sunousia (639d3, 640c1, c9, d2), and sunodos
(640a4), and is translated as either ‘gathering’, ‘social gathering’, or
‘assembly’ in those contexts. The extension of the term encompasses
group undertakings ‘of any kind’ (640a4–5); thus it applies equally
to the collective enterprises that the Athenian has just been discuss-
ing, sailors on a ship or soldiers on a military campaign, which are
fresh in the minds of his interlocutors (639a9–b11).

639d2–3 ‘drinking companions, or a drinking party, are one kind

of gathering (sunousian)’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 153

Here the Athenian makes the crucial move of subsuming drinking
parties under the general principle about group activities just articu-
lated at 639c1–6; see note on 640c10–d2. On the translation of
sunousia see note on 639c1.

639d9–e1 ‘pretty well none of those I have observed or heard of

was conducted properly’
The Athenian here concedes the criticism Megillus levelled at the
drinking parties in his experience (637b).

640a5 ‘the correct thing is for the participants to have a leader’

alternatively: ‘there is always a correct leader in each case’ (Pangle)
The Athenian’s extended point (639a–641a) is both that a drinking
party must have a leader (as on the present translation), and that the
leader must have the appropriate qualifications (as on the alternative
translation), but Pangle goes too far in proposing that the Athenian
here implies that the leader of a drinking party, like that of a political
community, must be an absolute ruler unlimited by law (Pangle
1980: 397). The Athenian indicates that there will be laws governing
drinking parties (671c). The credentials of the leaders of drinking
parties will be specified at length in Book 2 as expertise in the ‘finer
music’ of the Dionysian chorus (664b–666d).

640a8–9 ‘we were just saying that a leader of warriors has to be

courageous’
The reference is to 639b. ‘Courage’ is here understood in the sense of
fearlessness in battle. At 646e–649d courage will be presented as a
kind of fearlessness, and moderation a kind of fearfulness.

640b7–8 ‘in peacetime, he will lead friends gathered together in

mutual goodwill (philophrosunês)’
The link between peace and philophrosunê is first invoked at
628c10–11, where they, rather than war and conflict, are identified
as the ultimate focus of the legislator. The Athenian here presents the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

154 Commentary: Book 1

drinking party as an institution for achieving these social goals of the
legislator—a point reiterated more emphatically at 640c9–d2.

640c1–2 ‘not . . . without disturbances (athorubos)’

The adjective athorubos echoes the verb thorubein (disturb) at 640a12
and b3, where it concerns the fears to which the military commander
must be immune. The as yet unspecified disturbances that charac-
terize a drinking party are here portrayed as analogous to the fears
that assail the soldier in battle. In the present context, the require-
ment that the leader be ‘sober’ (640d4) implies that the disturbance
is drunkenness. The disruptive or unruly behaviour at a drinking
party is further described at 649a–b and 671a–b.

640c10–d2 ‘for his job is to safeguard the existing friendly relations

among the participants and . . . strengthen them for the future’
more literally: ‘for he is the guard (phulax) of . . . ’
In contrast to the sort of guarding that Clinias identified as central to
the goals of the Dorian state (see note on 626a8–b1), the Athenian
here talks about ‘guarding’ peaceful relations of friendship (philia)
among citizens. He thus implies that a properly led drinking party
furthers this civic goal. On friendship as a civic goal, see Book 3,
693b–c; cf. 695d, 698c.

640d4–5 ‘we must set up as ruler over our drinkers a leader who is
sober’
Compare the leadership of the drinkers in Plato’s Symp. 176c–177d.
By the end of that drinking party, Socrates is the only sober partici-
pant (223c–d).

640d6 ‘or by a young and inexpert leader’

‘Inexpert’ renders mê sophos. On the expertise (epistêmê, phronêsis) of
the leader, see 639b1, 640c9–10. On sophia and phronêsis, see note
on 631c5–6.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 155

641a4 –643a8
Drinking parties claimed to benefit education
Having granted at 640d–e that a collective undertaking is beneficial
only when properly led, Clinias now asks, with some impatience,
what benefits a city could possibly derive from drinking parties, even
if they are conducted by competent leaders (641a–b). The Athenian
answers that the benefit concerns education (paideia, 641b–d). He
warns that a full defence of this claim will require a rather lengthy
detour on the topic of education (641e–642a), but his interlocutors
reassure him (with uncharacteristic prolixity of their own) that they
are willing to hear him out in a speech of any length (642b–643a).

641b1–2 ‘a properly led (paidagôgêthentos kata tropon) drinking

party’
Clinias here employs the verb paidagôgein, which can be a general
term for leadership or guidance, as he uses it here. But it can also
mean ‘instruct’ or ‘train’ (and is the root for the English term
‘pedagogy’), as in the Athenian’s reply (b3). The educational conno-
tations of the term, and the use of it here in the passive voice,
switches the focus from the activity of the leader (leading, instruct-
ing) to the effects on those led, and hence to the notion of paideia
(education, b6), construed as a cultivated disposition in a person; the
latter is the topic to which the Athenian now turns. The related term
agôgê will be used to invoke the guidance or leadership of calculation
(logismos) in the figure of the divine puppets at 645a1; see note
ad loc.

641b3–4 ‘a single pupil (pais) or chorus properly trained

(paidagôgêthentos)’
more literally: ‘a single child . . . ’
The Athenian’s reply uses the same verb, paidagôgein, that Clinias
used in his question (641b1–2; see previous note), and singles out
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

156 Commentary: Book 1

from its compound elements pais (child, or in this case, pupil). The
institution of the chorus (which performs ensemble song and
dance—see note on 654a4–5) is mentioned here for the first time;
it will turn out to play an important role in education, as set forth in
Book 2 (653c–654b, 664b–d).

641b6–7 ‘what benefit a city derives from educating people (pai-

deian tôn paideuthentôn)’
Here the Athenian switches the verb from paidagôgein (lead, train,
guide) used by Clinias (see note on 641b1–2) to the related paideuein
(educate) and the cognate noun paideia (education), thus completing
the transition to the topic of education, which is next on his agenda
(642a).

641b8–c1 ‘those who are properly educated become good (agathoi)

men, and as a result do admirably (prattoien kalôs) in all things’
That is, education cultivates the virtues enumerated at 631c–d. A
more idiomatic translation of prattoien kalôs (‘do admirably’) would
be ‘do well’ or ‘succeed’ (thus des Places, Lisi, Saunders, Schöpsdau);
the sense of the expression here is indistinguishable from that of
‘doing one’s best’ (arista prattein) in 628d3, which stands in for
‘being happy’ (eudaimonein); see note on 628d5. As at 637e5 and
657c5–6, doing admirably and being happy (doing well) are very
closely connected; see notes ad loc. Brisson/Pradeau’s translation
(‘they conduct themselves as they should’) is too narrow to
capture the success implied by the term, which includes even victory
in war (641c1–2).

641c1–3 ‘They even defeat their enemies in battle! Education, you

see, delivers victory’
Education here includes the military training that cultivates resist-
ance to the pains and fears of battle (see 647b3–7); thus it can be
credited with the military success so prized by Clinias and Megillus
(626b–c). Of course, the Athenian recognizes that even the courage-
ous are sometimes defeated in battle, as for example when they are
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 157

outnumbered (638a–b), but his main point is that education is
necessary for such success; 643b4–7 makes a claim of necessity,
not sufficiency.

641c3–4 ‘although victory sometimes undermines education. For

many are made insolent by their victories in war’
Insolence (hubris) is closely connected to injustice (630b6, 661e2,
662a2). It is a form of shamelessness (anaideia 647a10), which
will be identified as the fault that training in the virtue of moderation
(sôphrosunê) seeks to ward off (647a–b, 649a–e). The Athenian
will later claim that one can develop hubris as a result of coming
into possession of wealth and other goods (649d4–7; see note ad loc),
which Clinias has noted are the spoils of military victory (626b2–4).

641c6 ‘Cadmean victories’

Like a ‘Pyrrhic victory’, a Cadmean victory sows the seeds of its own
undoing. In the founding legend of the city of Thebes, Cadmus
slayed a dragon and then planted its teeth in the ground, from which
twelve armed warriors sprang up. See Saunders 1972.

641d7–8 ‘if I am simply to say how things seem to me’

The Athenian’s epistemic reticence is repeated at 643a3–4 even as he
assumes leadership in the conversation.

641e2–4 ‘you are trying to figure out what my view (logon) is, and
I am doing what I can to present it clearly’
Here all pretence that the three interlocutors are on an equal footing
in the conversation is abandoned (see note on 625a7). From here on,
the Athenian takes charge of the discussion.

641e4–5 ‘my city’ (i.e. Athens)

On the association of Athens with intellectual acuity, see also 626d.
The Athenian here appeals to stereotypical intellectual characteristics
of the cities of the three interlocutors.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

158 Commentary: Book 1

641e7–8 ‘Sparta is brief of speech (brachulogon) and Crete more
given to extended thought (polunoian) than extended exposition
(polulogian)’
This slight difference in the stereotypes of Spartans and Cretans
flatters Clinias. Perhaps the latter’s confident assertions early in the
dialogue (625c–626b) display ‘extended thought’, but they also
arguably constitute polulogia.

642a4 ‘correctness in music’

Mousikê encompasses not only music in the narrow sense (instru-
mental and vocal music), but also dance, poetry, and drama (see
Peponi 2012: 4 and note on 666d3). ‘Correctness’ (orthotês) in music
will be a major preoccupation of Book 2 (655c–657b, 667b–670e),
where it is important to keep in mind that the ‘music’ in question
includes dance as well as song. I thank Greg Scott for stressing the
latter point.

The goodwill of the interlocutors

642b4 ‘proxenos’ (plural, proxenoi)
A proxenos represented in his own city the interests of a foreign state,
rather like a modern consul, except that a proxenos is not a citizen of
the city he represents (see Walbank 1978). The character Megillus in
Laws may have been modelled on the Megillus who led a delegation
of Spartan peace envoys to Athens during the Peloponnesian War
(circa 408–7 bce) and was probably a proxenos of Athens. Nothing
else is known of this Megillus (See Nails 2002: 197–8). Dusanic
1990: 365–6 proposes that the name of the Cretan interlocutor,
‘Clinias’, evokes the faction of Alcibiades, active at the time of the
embassy to Athens by the historical Megillus.

642c2–3 ‘treated us badly (ou kalôs . . . errexe)’

A Spartan locution.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 159

642c3–5 ‘From listening to this and always defending you against
those casting aspersions on your city, I acquired broad feelings of
goodwill towards you’
An instance of the kind of training (ethizesthai) that shapes feelings of
pleasure and pain in the account of education (paideia) that opens
Book 2 (653a–c).

642c8 ‘not by compulsion’

Megillus here prefigures the Athenian’s emphasis on persuasion (as
opposed to compulsion (anankê)) as the essential mode of education
(see notes on 632b7–8, 648b8–c5). The point (at least as it is
developed by the Athenian) is not that the Athenians, unlike for
instance the Dorians, are free to become bad (thus England ad loc),
but that their education uses gentle and persuasive means rather than
forcible and violent ones.

642d2–4 ‘don’t hold back . . . go ahead’

Both injunctions translate tharrôn—the verbal form of tharros (dar-
ing, confidence), which figures prominently in the Dorian ideal of
courage that will be one of the main elements of the moral psych-
ology introduced at 644c–d; the Athenian will explore the negative
and antisocial side of tharros at 647a–649a.

642d5 ‘divinely good man (anêr theios)’

A typically Spartan locution, applied to Tyrtaeus at 629b9.

642d5–7 ‘Epiminedes . . . visited your city . . . ten years before the

Persian war’
Epimenides of Knossos, legendary wonderworker and prophet from
the archaic age of Crete (see Morrow 1960: 18), was fabled to have
visited Athens during the time of Solon (Plutarch, Solon 12.7–12),
that is, in the late seventh/early sixth century bce. Clinias’ claim that
the visit took place ‘ten years before the Persian war’ (d6–7) would
date it circa 500 bce, nearly one hundred years later. If Plato’s
Athenian audience could be expected to notice the discrepancy in
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

160 Commentary: Book 1

dates, he is portraying Clinias as grossly ignorant of Athenian history.
Cf. 677d7–8, where the Athenian jokes to Clinias that Epimenides is
‘your friend . . . of practically yesterday’. For discussion of the histor-
ical evidence, see Schöpsdau ad loc and Dusanic 1991: 36–43.

642e4 ‘My ancestors formed ties of hospitality (exenôthêsan) with

you’
The verb exenôthêsan contains the root xenos (Stranger), which is
ubiquitous as a form of address between the interlocutors; see note
on 624a1. Strictly speaking, the ties Clinias mentions were between
families, not cities. So he is invoking a connection between the
families of Epimenides and the family of the Athenian. One might
note that Solon, the celebrated Athenian lawgiver at the time of
Epimenides’ visit, is Plato’s own ancestor (DL 3.1.1).

643a4 ‘As a first step in our argument (logon)’

That is, the argument that drinking parties benefit education
(641c8–d9), to which a definition of education has been identified
as a necessary preliminary (642a1–b2).

643a7 ‘the god that is its destination’

The phrase invokes the pilgrimage that the three travellers are mak-
ing to the cave of Zeus (625a–b) as a metaphor for the general
conversation about laws that they are undertaking along the way;
the destination of the former here stands in for that of the latter. By
contrast, des Places, Saunders, Taylor, England, Schöpsdau, Lisi, and
Brisson/Pradeau take the god in question to be the god of wine
(Dionysus). However, Dionysus has not been invoked in the imme-
diate context; cf. the similar phrase at 968b9–10, discussed by
Nightingale 1993: 283.

643a8 ‘if it pleases you’

After the Athenian has just placed the route of the discussion
in the context of the sacred journey to the god (643a7), Clinias’
good-natured response (picked up on by the Athenian at 643d3)
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 161

misses the point. It is not because it pleases the Athenian that it is
the right thing to do, but because the discussion itself requires it
(642a5–6). The notion that pleasure is the criterion of choice will
be subject to severe criticism in Book 2 (657c–659c, 667b–668b).
On pleasure as a motive for the conversation, see also 625a6 and note
ad loc.

IV
EDUCATION, VIRTUE, AND VICTORY
OVER ONESELF

643b1–646e2
Having claimed that the value of drinking parties is educational,
the Athenian turns now to give a preliminary account of education
(643b–644b). It is the process of training the ‘pleasures and desires’
(643c7–8) of children towards the virtues of citizenship (643e5). Next,
he provides a psychological analysis of self-mastery and self-defeat (ori-
ginally introduced at 626e) in the memorable image of the divine
puppets: we are moved by the ‘iron cords’ of pleasure, pain, and their
‘anticipations’ as well as by the ‘golden cord’ of calculation (logismos);
self-mastery is to be understood as the victory of the golden over the iron
cords (644b–645c). As the first step in his explanation of the educational
benefits of drinking parties, he claims that drunkenness, while it tem-
porarily lessens self-mastery, ultimately yields an important benefit
(645c–646e), later to be identified as the cultivation of moderation
(646e–650b).

Two paradigms for virtue

The account of education presented here (634b–644b) implies a con-
ception of virtue significantly different from the ‘victory over oneself’ that
is praised by Clinias at 626e and that has served as a paradigm for virtue
in the discussion of courage and moderation from 632e–636c. On the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

162 Commentary: Book 1

‘victory’ model, pleasures and pains are forces that the virtuous person
struggles against and overcomes; thus internal conflict and struggle is an
inevitable feature of virtuous experience. The account of education
presented at 643b–644b, however, in allowing that pleasures and
pains can be trained and therefore properly directed, implies that internal
conflict is not inevitable. It thus allows for a conception of virtue on
which all of a person’s internal motivations are harmonious—that is,
directed towards the activities required by justice. That virtue is to be
conceived in this way is an easy moral to draw from the Athenian’s
earlier argument that peace, not victory in war, is the greatest good
(627d–628d), although there the Athenian stops short of explicitly
drawing that moral (see note on 628c9–11). At the beginning of Book
2, he will explicitly articulate a conception of virtue as ‘agreement’
(sumphônia) between pleasures and pains on the one hand, and
reasoned judgements on the other (653a–c), and later in Book 1, when
explaining how drunkenness can be used to train citizens in moderation,
he will quietly deploy this conception of virtue in his construal of the goal
of such training (see notes on 647b9–c1, 648c2–3). However, he
nowhere explicitly renounces the ‘victory’ model espoused by Clinias. In
fact, the Athenian will continue to invoke it episodically over the rest of
Book 1, most notably in the psychology articulated at 644c–645c, where
he explicitly invokes self-mastery (victory in such internal conflict) as the
paradigm for virtue, illustrated in the figure of the divine puppets (see
note on 644b6–7); he will invoke both models in his concluding discus-
sion of drinking parties as a training ground for moderation (see note on
646e3–650b10).
In continuing to appeal to a paradigm for virtue that he has discredit-
ed, but that his opponents accept, the Athenian is pursuing a tactic
similar to one he deploys in his earlier discussion of Tyrtaeus, where,
even though he has renounced victory in battle as the ultimate good, he
argues for the importance of ‘virtue as a whole’ by appealing to the notion
of ‘victory’ in the ‘greatest battle’ (see note on 628e2–630d1). In both
cases, the Athenian appeals to normative assumptions that his interlocu-
tors endorse in order to lead them to conclusions that they are not initially
inclined to accept.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 163

The distinction and complicated transition between these two para-
digms for virtue in Laws 1 and 2 tends to be overlooked by commenta-
tors. Stalley (1983: 50–3, 58, 62) correctly notes the competing models
and observes that Book 1 concentrates on the ‘victory’ model and Book 2
on the ‘agreement’ model (but he does not note the full extent to which the
‘agreement’ model is advanced in Book 1). The two conceptions of
moderation identified in Bobonich (2002: 289–90) concern a different
distinction (whether the resistance to pleasures is guided by wisdom) and
Bobonich himself finds the Athenian endorsing a conception of virtue on
which residual conflict with recalcitrant desires is inevitable (Bobonich
2002: 289, 350, 546n122). Similarly, Belfiore (1986: 428–33) takes
the Laws, in contrast to the Republic, to allow that virtue necessarily
involves a struggle against conflicting desires; cf. North 1966: 189. By
contrast, Laks (2005: 47; 2000: 277), Jouët-Pastré (2006: 42), Frede
(2010: 117), Annas (1999: 144), Zuckert (2009: 69), and Wilburn
(2012) interpret the self-mastery involved in the puppet analogy as an
expression of the ‘agreement’ model. While there is no doubt that the
Athenian’s extended commentary on the figure of the divine puppets
leaves open the ‘agreement’ model of virtue, and indeed may be pregnant
with it (see note on 645b8–c1), it is equally clear that his initial and
explicit motivation for introducing it invokes the ‘victory’ model. See
further the note on 644d7–645c8.

643b1–644b5
Education (paideia) defined
The Athenian gives a preliminary definition of education that ex-
ploits the connections between the terms for education (paideia) and
play (paidia, paizein)—all with the same root, ‘pais’ (child—see note
on 635b5). The goal of education is to channel the pleasures and
desires of a child towards the activity that will be his adult occupa-
tion; it does so by employing child’s play that practises and rehearses
the activities of the adult occupation, suitably scaled down for a child
(643b–d). The definition is further refined to distinguish education
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

164 Commentary: Book 1

in a more precise and restricted sense, on which a person trained in a
trade does not count as ‘educated’. Education in this restricted sense
is training in virtue (643d–644b). On the conception of virtue thus
implied, see note on 643b1–646e2.

643b1–2 ‘Let me tell you how we should understand education’

more literally: ‘When I tell you just what we should call education (ti
pote chrê phanai paideian einai)’

643b5 ‘right from childhood (ek paidôn euthus)’

The reference to childhood picks up on the use of pais (child) at
641b3–4, where it is translated as ‘pupil’ (see note ad loc).

643b6 ‘both his playtime (paizonta) and his serious attention

(spoudazonta)’
On the contrast between playing and being serious, see note on
635b5. Children’s play is serious business, we are about to be told,
because it is the earliest stage of the education (paideia) that cultivates
a person’s adult dispositions. On the sort of play that cultivates virtue
(the goal of education in the strict sense to be identified in 643d–
644b), see note on 647d6–7.

643c7–9 ‘through playful activities . . . their caregivers try to direct

children’s pleasures and desires towards what they must do when
they are fully grown’
more literally: ‘ . . . towards the place they must reach (aphikomenous)
when they are fully grown (telos echein)’
A further definition of education will be given at the beginning
of Book 2 (653a–c), where it is said to shape a person’s ‘pleasures
and pains’ from an early age. On ‘pleasures and desires’ (hêdonas
kai epithumias) as opposed to ‘pleasures and pains’, see note on
633c9–d2. While the Athenian does not here specify the ‘playful
activities’ (paidiôn) that will train the requisite pleasures and desires
(analogous to the would-be carpenter learning to enjoy carpentry by
playing with toy hammer and saw), he will indicate in Book 2 that it
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 165

is the performance of choral music, in which citizens participate from
childhood (664b–d), and whose songs are presented as games
(659d–660a); see also note on 647d6–7. On the playful activities
in this passage, see Saunders 1972.

643c9 ‘it is of the utmost importance for education (kephalaion

paideias) . . . that one receives a correct upbringing (orthên trophên)’
Early upbringing of a child in the home (trophê) would ordinarily be
distinguished from the formal education (paideia) comprised of
musical and athletic training at the hands of teachers (see note on
642a4, Aristophanes Clouds 961–83, and Golden 1990). The Athen-
ian’s main point here is that those earlier activities form a necessary
foundation (‘the essential preliminary skills’, 643c4) for the later
formal training.

643d1–3 ‘since this inculcates . . . a passion (erôta) for the occupa-

tion in which the grown man will need to be completely good’
more literally: ‘ . . . in which the grown man will need to be complete
(teleion), in the excellence of the business in question (tês tou prag-
matos aretês)’
Passion (erôs) is one of the feelings that the legislator must supervise
in the citizens (‘pains, pleasures, desires, and the general intensity of
their passions’, 631e4–632a1). The qualification tês tou pragmatos
aretês (d2–3) limits the scope of teleion (thus England), and may be
understood to anticipate the distinction the Athenian is about to
make (643d6–644b4) between a broad and a narrow sense of edu-
cation. Education in the wider sense cultivates excellence (aretê)
in the pupil’s intended occupation (aretê is used in this sense at
627e3–4 and at 637d2). In the narrower sense, captured in the
translation ‘virtue’ at 643e4, and at 630e–631a, the relevant excel-
lence is restricted to accomplishment in the domain of citizenship. In
the present context, the ‘occupation at which the grown man will
need to be completely good’, in the cases of interest to the Athenian,
is that of the ‘perfect citizen (politên . . . teleon) . . . who knows how to
rule and be ruled with justice’ (643e5–6). The Athenian thus
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

166 Commentary: Book 1

envisages a condition in which well-educated citizens do not feel
conflicted about living up to the demands of justice, since their
desires and feelings are properly directed. This is to presuppose a
conception of virtue very different from the victory model espoused
by Clinias (626e, 633d–e); it evokes instead the harmonious internal
condition of ‘agreement’ (sumphônia) that the Athenian will identify
as virtue in Book 2, 653a–b. See note on 626e2–3 and general note
on 643b1–646e2.

643d6 ‘let’s be precise about what we are calling education’

more literally: ‘let’s not leave imprecise (aoriston) what we are saying
is education’

643e3 ‘our discussion (logos) . . . is not with those who consider

that sort of thing to be education . . . ’
The disparagement of ‘mechanical’ and commercial occupations is a
frequent theme in Plato and his contemporaries (Plato, Rep. 495d–e,
590c; Aristotle, Politics 1337b8–15; Xenophon, Oeconomicus 4.2,
6.5). The Athenian will later make the stronger claim that the
practice of manual crafts or retail trade are to be forbidden to citizens
(846d–e; 919d–e), whose full-time occupation is the cultivation of
virtue (806d–807e); see Meyer 2003.

643e3–4 ‘education . . . right from childhood, directs a person to-

wards virtue’
The virtue (aretê) that education in this strict sense cultivates is that
of a citizen, called ‘complete justice’ at 630c and comprising the
‘divine goods’: wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage (631c–d).

643e4–6 ‘giving him an appetite and passion to become a perfect

(teleon) citizen, one who knows (epistamenon) how to rule and be
ruled with justice (meta dikês)’
alternatively: ‘a complete (teleon) citizen’ (cf. 643d8, d2)
On appetite (epithumia) and passion (erôs), see also 631e4–632a1,
645d7. On the citizen’s knowledge (epistamenon, 643e6), see note on
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 167

644a3–4. Citizens ‘ruling and being ruled (archein te kai archesthai)
with justice’ would avoid the civil strife identified as the premier evil
in a city at 628a–d. The phrase also recalls the good brothers at
627d–e who are left to ‘rule themselves’. For more on self-rule, see
note on 644b6–7. (Note that the inclusion of ‘being ruled’ in the
object of the passion distinguishes the perfect citizen from the
timocratic person of Rep. VIII 549a, who loves ruling, not being
ruled.) The qualification ‘with justice’ (meta dikês) will be used again
to define shame as being ‘justly afraid’ (647c7–8). Used here in close
proximity to teleon (perfect; translated as ‘complete’ at 643c8 and
643d2), the phrase evokes the ‘complete justice’ (dikaiosu-
nên . . . teleian) at 630c6, used as a variant for ‘virtue in its entirety’
(630e2–3; see note on 630b2–3), which is the combination of
wisdom, moderation, and courage that amounts to justice (631c–
d), in contrast to the narrow conception of courage touted by the
Dorian apologists (630c).

644a3–4 ‘any other skill (sophian) that does not involve intelli-
gence (nou) and justice’
Skill (sophia) here applies both to the knowledge of the ‘perfect
citizen’ (643e5) and to the technical expertise of the farmer, carpen-
ter, soldier, merchant, etc. invoked at 643b7–c6 and at 643e1–2.
Nous here is the wisdom (phronêsis) that informs the virtues. Both
justice and wisdom are integral to the virtues of the citizens (631c).
See notes on 631c5–6 and on 631d5–6.

644a8–b1 ‘education is never to be disparaged (atimazein)’

The first part of the long prologue at the beginning of Book 5
(726a–728a) indicates that disparaging or dishonouring (atimazein)
something need not involve speaking disrespectfully of it (as,
for instance, Callias does of philosophical education at Gorg.
484c–485d); the disrespect might consist simply in behaving
inappropriately towards it. The Spartan and Cretan constitutions
are charged with just such a disregard for education at 666e–667a,
given their narrow focus on military training. Note the Athenian’s
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

168 Commentary: Book 1

insistence that the lawgiver must ‘mete out honour and dishonour
correctly’ (631e2–3; 648c1–2).

644b1–2 ‘first of the very finest things bestowed upon the best of
men’
The sense in which education is ‘first’ is explained in the account that
begins Book 2, where education is described as the first step in the
cultivation of virtue (653a–c). For a similarly high estimate of the
value of education (paideia) and upbringing (trophê), see Plato, Phd.
107d and Aristotle, EN 1104b11–13, 1179b31–4.

644b2–3 ‘If it ever goes off course and there is the possibility of
correcting it’
At the beginning of Book 2, we are told that such deterioration is an
inevitable effect of daily life (653c7–9) and that the preservation
(sôtêria, 653a3) of a correct childhood education is a lifelong project
of maintenance and repair (653d–654a). Drinking parties, the
Athenian will argue in Book 2, play a crucial role in this project of
repair (671b–d).

644b6–c3
Virtue as victory in internal struggle
Having just identified education as the process of making citizens good
(644a7–8; cf. 641b8) by appropriately directing their pleasures and
pains (643c7–9, 643e5), the Athenian now takes the curious tack of
reverting to the very different model of goodness advocated by Clinias
at 626e and used as a paradigm for the discussions of courage and
moderation at 633d–636c. On this paradigm, goodness consists in
struggling against and defeating pleasures and pains; on the competing
paradigms for virtue, see notes on 626e2–3, 643b1–646e2.

644b6–7 ‘we previously agreed that those who are able to rule
themselves (archein hautôn) are good, while those who are unable
to do so are bad’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 169

An interestingly ambiguous statement. 645b2–3 indicates that the
Athenian evidently has in mind 626e, where Clinias invoked ‘victory
over oneself’ (626e2) or self-mastery (being kreittôn hautou, 626e8)
as the greatest achievement. Such ‘victory’ has functioned as a
paradigm for virtue in the treatment of courage and moderation at
633d–636c. However, it is misleading of the Athenian to represent
himself as having endorsed this conception of virtue. While he agreed
with Clinias that victory over oneself is preferable to self-defeat, he
objected that a far superior achievement to such victory is internal
harmony, where there are no conflicting forces to be defeated (627e–
628d). His objection explicitly addressed only the case of a city state
and drew no conclusions about an individual person; however, the
conception of virtue presupposed in the account of education that
the Athenian has just sketched (643b–644b) conforms to the con-
ception of virtue as internal harmony or ‘agreement’ articulated in
Book 2, 653a–c; see notes on 628c9–11, and general note on
643b1–646e2.
It is worth noting, furthermore, that the expression used here, ‘rule
themselves’ (archein hautôn), is an odd one to employ to invoke the
victory-over-oneself that Clinias considers to be a paradigm of virtue
(626e). The expression is not used with such a meaning anywhere
else in Laws. Rather, Clinias first invokes ‘victory over oneself’ (nikân
auton hauton, 626e2), and the Athenian subsequently calls the condition
being ‘master of oneself’ (kreittôn hautou, 626e8) and calls its op-
posite ‘being defeated by oneself’—hêttasthai auton huph’ heautou
(626e3–4) or hêttôn [hautou], (626e8). Later, the person who wins
the struggle will be called ‘in control of himself’ (enkratês) at 645e8,
and the opposite condition is described as ‘failure to control one’s
pleasures’ (akrateia hêdonês) at 636c7; see note on 626e4. Where the
expression ‘rule themselves’ (archein hautôn) does occur in Laws, its
sense is political or social, rather than psychological. It characterizes
the political autonomy of the good brothers in the warring family at
627e1, in contrast with the political subjugation of the wicked
brothers, who are ruled (archesthai) by their betters (627e3). The
expression is used again in this sense at the end of Book 2, where the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

170 Commentary: Book 1

inebriated participant in a drinking party is described as thinking
himself fit to rule (archein) his companions as well as himself
(671b5–6)—the latter being not victory over oneself (in the sense
of enkrateia or being kreittôn hautou), but autonomy (‘no one is
going to tell me what to do’).
When Plato employs the expression outside of the Laws, its
primary sense is also social/political; e.g. the young Lysis is not
allowed to ‘rule himself’ but is in the charge of a pedagogue (Lysis
208c; cf. La. 179a, Rep. 590e). On three occasions, Plato does have
Socrates use the expression in an extended psychological sense: he
accuses Meno of seeking to rule others before he is able even to ‘rule
himself’ (Meno 86d); he asks Callicles whether the rulers of cities
should be able to ‘rule themselves’ (Gorg. 491d–e); and in the
Republic, he characterizes the person with a just soul as ‘ruling
himself’ (arxanta auton hautou, 443d4; cf. basileuonta hautou,
580c2). But in none of these ‘psychological’ uses is it clear that the
expression is intended to capture Clinias’ ‘victory over oneself’ rather
than the internal harmony and agreement endorsed by the Athenian;
indeed, the relevant expression is clearly used in the latter sense at
Rep. 443d4 and 580c2. Bobonich (1994:18) wrongly implies that
‘rule oneself’ is one of Plato’s standard terms for enkratic action (on
enkrateia, see note on 626e4). To be sure, the metaphor of ruling is
ubiquitous in the tripartite psychology of the Republic, where parts of
the soul are described as ruling (archein) and being ruled (archesthai)
by each other, or as ruling or being ruled by the person (442c5–d1,
443b1–2, 558d4, 561b4, 590c2–d6, 606d5), and a person is said to
rule or be ruled by other persons (579c4–d2, 590e2–591a3). But
none of these texts uses the expression ‘ruling oneself’ (pace Dorion
2007: 135n48). We do find ‘rule over oneself’ (heautou archên) at
561b4 but the context does not attribute self-rule to any of the
parties involved. And where we would expect to find the locution,
as an elegant contrast with ‘rule others’ (allôn . . . archein) in a passage
parallel to Meno 86d and Gorg. 491d–e, we find instead heau-
tou . . . akratôr (Rep. 579c7–8), which suggests that archein heautou
is not the most natural expression to use to invoke the psychological
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 171

condition of self-control (whether on the ‘victory’ or the ‘agreement’
model). Indeed, in Gorg. 491d4–e1, Callicles’ initial incomprehen-
sion of Socrates’ question (491d9) marks the psychological sense as
one that would not be the first to occur to a native speaker, although
he has no objection when Socrates indicates that the expression
means the same as the familiar locutions sôphrona onta kai enkratê
auton heautou (491d11–12; by contrast, Irwin (1979: 190) construes
the lines as indicating that ‘the many’ use archein heautou in this
psychological sense, a construal that makes it hard to explain
Callicles’ initial incomprehension).
Thus the Athenian’s use here of the expression ‘rule themselves’
would be likely to strike Plato’s intended audience first in its primary,
political, sense. Although self-mastery (to kreittô heautou) is about to
become the topic of conversation, the extended context preceding
the present text is the account of paideia, from which that topic has
been quite absent (see general note on 643b1–646e2). Indeed, the
description there of the ‘perfect citizen’ as knowing how to ‘rule and
be ruled (archein te kai archesthai) with justice’ (643e6) deploys the
political sense of ‘ruling’; thus this sense of the term would be fresh in
the reader’s mind. Indeed, it is in this political sense of archein hautôn
(self-rule) that the Athenian can here legitimately represent himself as
having agreed that self-rule belongs to the good person, since it is the
citizens, possessing the virtues, who engage in the collective project
of ruling (archein) the polity. Of course it is in its extended, psycho-
logical sense that it applies to Clinias’ ideal of goodness as self-mas-
tery—and it is such self-mastery that the discussion will now turn to
analysing. The ambiguity might well be deliberate on Plato’s part, as it
allows the Athenian to appeal to the paradigm of virtue that resonates
with his interlocutors (the ‘victory’ model), but without endorsing it
himself. On a similar tactical strategy deployed in the discussion of
Tyrtaeus, see general notes on 628e2–630d1 and 643b1–646e2.

644b9–c1 ‘clarify further what we take it [ruling oneself] to be’

Clarification is called for because the earlier discussion of self-mastery
(626e–627d) did not address the phenomenon as it occurs within an
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

172 Commentary: Book 1

individual person. Mastery of a city or of a family ‘by itself’ was
explained in terms of the better party overmastering the worse
(627a7–11, c8–d1), but no attempt was made to identify the ‘better’
and ‘worse’ forces at war within a single person. The latter analysis is
the task at hand (644c–d); this ‘tale of virtue’ (as it is described at
645b2) identifies the better and worse parts in a person as, respect-
ively, the golden cord of calculation and the iron cords of pleasure,
pain, and anticipation.

644c4–d6
Pleasure, pain, anticipation, and calculation
Having just invoked victory over oneself as a paradigm for goodness
(644b; see note on 644b6–7), the Athenian now prepares to illu-
minate the internal structure of such ‘self-mastery’. He does so by
distinguishing various items within a single person. There is first of
all the distinction between the ‘opposing advisors’, pain and pleasure
(644c4–8). Next there is the distinction between these and their
respective ‘anticipations’ (elpides), fear and daring (c9–d1). Finally,
there is the distinction between all the preceding items and the
‘calculation’ (logismos) that evaluates them (d1–3). The Athenian
does not explicitly attribute these items as aspects to the soul (psuchê)
but his remarks at 645e5, 646b6, and 649b9 make it clear that he
thinks of them as such (cf. 632a4, 635d4, 643d1).

Parts of the soul?

How far does the picture presented here depart from the tripartite
theory of the soul of Republic 435c–441c? Bobonich (2002: 261–4)
correctly notes that the Athenian invokes not parts of a soul, but
impulses issuing from a unitary agent (for responses see Gerson
2003; Kahn 2004; Laks 2005: 85–92; Lorenz 2006: 26n18; Sassi
2008: 132; and Kamtekar 2010: 141–3). However, this leaves open
the question of whether the Athenian here diverges from the view
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 173

that there are three fundamentally different types of human motiv-
ation or impulse—‘appetitive’, ‘spirited’, and ‘rational’ (for this
construal of the tripartite theory of the Republic, see Cooper 1984).
Most commentators take the Athenian to recognize only a twofold
distinction: between rational and non-rational impulses (Müller
1951: 22; Rees 1957: 112–16; Graeser 1969: 102–5; Robinson
1970: 124–5, 145; Fortenbaugh 1975: 24; Schöpsdau 1994:
229–30; Bobonich 2002: 263–4; Sassi 2008: 133–8; Frede 2010:
18). The consensus is that Plato in Laws no longer recognizes a
distinct category of ‘spirited’ impulses; the contrary position has been
argued by Ritter 1923: 451 and Saunders 1962: 37–8, and a quali-
fied version is defended in Meyer 2012. See also Wilburn 2013a and
Renaut 2014.

644c6–7 ‘we each have inside ourselves two opposite and witless
(aphrone) advisors, which we call pleasure and pain’
alternatively: ‘foolish advisors’; aphrone indicates absence of wisdom
(phronêsis) at 630b7, 733e6, 734c4, 734d1
Pleasure and pain have been identified as the legislator’s concern
(631e–632a, 636d–e) and as forces to be resisted in moderation and
courage respectively (632e–636c). On an ambiguity in how these
terms are used, see note on 633c9–d2. The ‘pleasures and pains’ here
identified as internal advisors must be those ‘in individual characters’
(636d7), which is in keeping with the Athenian’s regular invocation
of ‘pleasures and pains’ as a general category (653a–c, 659d, 689a–b)
encompassing love and hate (653c), fear and anger and passion
(erôs, 631e–632a, 645d), yearnings (633d), and desires (epithumiai,
643c8). So construed, the category includes both positive and nega-
tive feelings about things that have happened (e.g. grief at a loss, joy
at a birth) as well as impulses that direct us towards or away from as
yet unrealized possibilities (e.g. a desire to retaliate). Here the epithet
‘witless advisors’ (aphrone sumboulô) is not applied to the ‘anticipa-
tions’, fear and daring, that will be introduced next (644c9–10);
however, in the parallel passage at Tim. 69d1–4 it is applied to them.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

174 Commentary: Book 1

On the relation between pleasures and pains, on the one hand, and
the anticipations, on the other, see note on 644c9–d1.

644c9 ‘Besides these two, we have opinions (doxas) about the

future’
This remark does not indicate whether doxa (belief or opinion) is
distinctive of the anticipations. Compare 645e1–2, where ‘opinions’
are listed along with ‘perceptions, memories . . . [and] cognitions
(phronêseis)’ as contrasted with ‘pleasures and pains and angry feelings
and passions’ (645d7). See note on 645e1–3. On opinion in fear and
daring, see note on 647e3–4.

644c9–d1 ‘whose common name is “anticipation” (elpis) and

whose particular names are “fear”, the anticipation before pain, and
“daring” (tharros), the anticipation before the opposite’
For parallel passages about elpis (anticipation), see Philb. 32b9–c5
and 39d1–5; Tim. 69d1–4: cf. Laws 864b6–c1. While in many
contexts the term elpis (plural: elpides) means ‘hope’ (as at Tim.
69d3–4 and in the story of Pandora’s box in Hesiod’s Works and
Days 60–99), it has a well-attested more general use for anticipation
or expectation, where the expected results may be either positive or
negative; thus it encompasses both hopes and fears. The Athenian
here uses elpis in that broader sense, hence the translation ‘anticipa-
tion’. The positive anticipation invoked here, however, is not hope,
but tharros (daring), a term that translators often render as ‘confi-
dence’ (thus Bury, Taylor, Saunders, Brisson/Pradeau and Schöps-
dau), but this is too weak to capture the Athenian’s point. As he will
soon make explicit, he considers tharros to be an aggressive impulse
for self-assertion in the face of opposition or adversity (647a–d; note
the cognate terms tharraleos (daring), (thrasus) (bold), and thrasutês
(audacity) at 649c8–10). Hence the translation ‘daring’ (Pangle:
boldness). Tharros thus performs some of the functions attributed
to the spirited part of the soul (thumos) in the Republic. The adver-
sarial context for a display of tharros gives a double meaning to
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 175

‘daring before the opposite (pro tou enantiou)’ (644d1), since enantios
can also be used for an opponent. See also note on 646e4.

The significance of anticipation?

Why does the Athenian here invoke anticipations in addition to
pleasures and pains? Elsewhere, he is content to use ‘pleasures and
pains’ as the general category of non-rational motivation (see note on
644c6–7). One might suppose that the present passage offers a more
precise psychological theory, on which pleasures and pains are con-
strued more narrowly as objects of pursuit and avoidance, while
daring and fear are the impulses to pursue the one and avoid the
other, respectively. Thus Frede (2010: 116–17) proposes that, strict-
ly speaking, what moves a person to act are not the pleasures and
pains, but their ‘anticipations’ (elpides). Such a hypothesis, however,
would be more plausible if the quartet was pleasure, pain, fear, and
desire (as at Phd. 83b6–7, La. 191d6–7, Rep. 430a7–b1, Symp.
207e2–3, Tht. 156b4–5); but here the Athenian invokes daring
(tharros) rather than desire. For further discussion see Meyer 2012.
Rather than supposing that fear and daring are generic impulses for
pursuit and avoidance in a general theory of non-rational motivation,
it makes more sense to suppose that the Athenian invokes these
specific impulses here because each has a role to play in the account
of courage and moderation that occupies the final pages of Book 1
and for which the present passage lays the groundwork. At
646e–649c he will explain that training in courage involves cultivat-
ing daring and eliminating certain kinds of fear, while training in
moderation involves cultivating a kind of fear (shame), and elimin-
ating inappropriate daring. For further reasons to doubt the theor-
etical aspirations of the Athenian’s comments here, see Frede 2010:
118–20. Bobonich (2002), by contrast, finds a highly developed
theory (chapter 3), although not one to which the distinction be-
tween pleasures or pains and ‘anticipation’ is central. Naddaf (2000:
343) finds here a hedonistic theory of motivation.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

176 Commentary: Book 1

644d1–2 ‘against all of these (epi de pasi toutois) . . . calculation
(logismos) as to which of them is better or worse’
‘Calculation’ (the translation preferred by most scholars today) is an
imperfect rendering of logismos, which is here contrasted with all
pleasures, pains, and anticipations invoked above. The contrast
recalls the distinction in the Republic between, on the one hand,
the rational part of the soul (dubbed the logistikon), whose activity is
logizein (calculation, reasoning, of which logismos is the cognate
noun—Rep. 439d–441c), and on the other hand, the non-rational
‘spirited’ and appetitive parts, which are characterized as alogiston
(439d, 441c, 604d). On what logismos amounts to in the Republic,
see Moss 2008, who argues that it involves figuring out how things
really are, as opposed to how they immediately appear, and may
appeal to a wide range of complex considerations. ‘Calculation’ may
be a misleading rendering insofar as it may seem to imply that only
quantitative considerations are involved in logismos; ‘reasoning’ is
better in this respect, but its natural referent in English is the process
of arriving at a verdict, rather than the verdict itself (and the verdict
seems to be at least part—or maybe even all—of what the Athenian
has in mind as logismos in the present context; it is a dogma, 644d3).
Similar problems arise for ‘reason’ as a translation, since idiomatic use
restricts this term to the reasons or explanations supporting a verdict.
‘Reason’ has the further disadvantage that, among scholars of Plato
today, it tends to be used for a part or faculty of the psyche (explicitly
so on the translation of Brisson/Pradeau), whereas the Athenian is
here talking about an activity of the psyche (logismos rather than the
logistikon). The translation ‘judgement’ (Taylor, des Places) allows
logismos to be a verdict, but depending on how one construes the
relationship of belief to judgement, the term ‘judgement’ may be too
weak to yield a contrast with the ‘anticipations’ (elpides), which were
described two sentences earlier as ‘opinions about the future’
(644c9).
The ‘calculations’ in question need not be restricted to quantitative
comparison, e.g. of short- and long-term pleasures, as Mouracade
(2005: 83–4) proposes. Bobonich construes logismos as ‘practical
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 177

deliberation’ that delivers ‘all things considered’ judgements about
what is ‘good or bad for the person in the long run’ (Bobonich 2002:
263–7 and passim ch. 3). Wilburn (2012) proposes that logismos is a
commitment to general principles of rational conduct, distinct from
any practical deliberations. However, all the Athenian says here to
characterize logismos is that it is an assessment of which of the
pleasures, pains, and anticipations in us is ‘better or worse’
(644d2). This suffices for his immediate purpose, which is to eluci-
date the notion of ruling oneself (644b7), construed as self-mastery
(cf. 645b2–3): the person engaged in a struggle to be master of
himself (kreittôn hautou) is struggling to resist feelings of attraction
of which he does not approve. We need not suppose that this is
intended as an exhaustive characterization of logismos, but we are also
given no further indication that a complete theoretical account is
intended or presupposed.

644d2–3 ‘When it [calculation] becomes the common view

(dogma) of a city, it is called “law” ’
more literally: ‘which (hos), when it becomes the common view . . . ’
It is implied here that ‘calculation’ (logismos) is a judgement or view
(dogma); so it is not (simply) a process of reasoning, and certainly not
a faculty of reasoning (see note on 644d1–2). The claim that law is
the common view of the city is repeated at 645a2 (cf. 645a4–5) and is
made again in slightly different language at 645b6–8 and 659d1–4.
In the latter passages it is not logismos, but logos that expresses the
common view. On the relation between logismos and logos, see note
on 645b4–5. See also Book 4, 713e–714a, where ‘law’ (nomos) is
invoked as the name for regulation by reason (nous). On logos as law,
see Moss 2014: 199.

644d4–6 ‘I am barely able to follow you’

Exactly what part of the preceding exposition poses the difficulty is
unclear. The Athenian has invoked (i) pleasures and pains, (ii)
anticipations, and (iii) ‘calculations’, and (iv) he has connected the
latter to law. Clinias has already assented to (i) at 644c8; (ii) does not
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

178 Commentary: Book 1

seem particularly arcane; and even (iii) is intelligible as one of the
forces at play in internal conflict. So it may only be (iv) that poses the
difficulty.

644d7–645c8
The divine puppets
To illuminate the psychological forces just distinguished (644c–d),
and fulfil his promise (644b) to explain the nature of ‘ruling oneself’,
the Athenian now invokes the figure of a ‘divine puppet’ pulled by
two different kinds of cords: those of ‘calculation’ on the one hand
(the ‘golden cord’), and those involving pleasure and pain and
anticipation on the other (the ‘iron cords’). Our task in life is to
live according to the golden cord, and ruling oneself is to be under-
stood as the victory of that golden cord in its struggle against
opposing iron cords. On the difference between such self-mastery
and the conception of virtue implied in the account of education at
643b–644b and 653a–c, see notes on 643b1–646e2 and on 645a1.

644d7–8 ‘Consider each of us, living beings that we are, to be a

divine puppet (thauma . . . theion)’
Translation following England, with Kurke 2013: 124. Alternatively:
‘consider each of us living creatures as . . . ’ (Saunders, Pangle). The
Athenian’s point is not that the puppet model holds for all living
creatures, but that it holds for us, even though we are living creatures.
This is the ‘image’ (eikôn) promised by the Athenian at 644c1.
‘Puppet’ renders thauma (literally ‘marvel’ or ‘wonder’). In calling
human beings puppets, Frede (2010: 116) points out, the Athenian
is not intending to imply that that we are controlled from without,
but rather to emphasize the complexity of our inner workings (like
the marvel of a wind-up toy to a small child); see also Kurke 2013:
125–6. The image of a human being as a puppet (thauma) of the
gods is invoked again in Book 7, 804b. On the significance of the
image, see Laks 2005: 46–7.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 179

644d8–9 ‘whether constituted as . . . the gods’ plaything (paignion)
or for a serious purpose (spoudêi tini)’
The contrast between the serious (spoudaion) and the playful is a
motif throughout the Laws (636c, 643b, 647d, 659e, 667e, 673e,
732d), treated explicitly in Book 7 (803c–804b, 806d–808c),
where humans are again called ‘playthings’ (paignion) of the gods
(803c4–5). See note on 635b5 and Jouët-Pastré 2006.

644e1–2 ‘these various experiences (pathê) in us . . . ’

The experiences (pathê) in question are those just enumerated by the
Athenian at 644c6–d3. While the term pathos (pl. pathê) is often
translated as ‘emotion’ (Saunders; Annas 1999: 142) or ‘passion’
(Pangle), its scope here is broad enough to include not only the
pleasure, pain, and anticipations invoked at 644c6–d1, but also
instances of the ‘calculation’ (logismos) introduced at 644d1–2.
Megillus has just referred to his own incomprehension as a pathos
at 644d6 (‘that’s what I’m feeling too’). Compare the use of pathê-
mata in the parallel text at Tim. 69d1–4.

644e2–3 ‘are like cords or strings that tug at (spôsin) us and oppose
each other (enantiai ousai). They pull against each other (allêlais
anthelkousin) towards opposing actions (ep’ enantias praxeis) across
the field where virtue is marked off from vice . . . ’
In likening the pleasures, pains, anticipations, and calculations of
644c–d to ‘cords or strings that tug at us’ the Athenian indicates that
each of them is, or involves, an impulse that moves the agent to act
(thus Bobonich 2002: 261–4). The tug-of-war in which the strings
‘pull against each other towards opposing actions’ models the kind of
internal struggle Clinias has invoked as the universal human condi-
tion at 626d–e. The present ‘image’ (644c1) of the puppet is
explicitly intended by the Athenian as an elucidation of the self-
mastery that constitutes victory in such a struggle (626e; see note on
644b6–7). Demarcating the field of struggle as ‘where virtue is
marked off from vice’ indicates that the internal struggles of interest
to the Athenian are cases in which a person is torn between a virtuous
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

180 Commentary: Book 1

action and its vicious alternative. On alternative construals of the
struggle, see note on 645a1.

644e4–5 ‘our account (logos) singles out one of these pulls (helxeôn)
and says that each of us must follow it and pull against the other
cords (anthelkein tois allois neurois), never loosening our grip on it’
alternatively: ‘reason (logos) says . . . ’ (Annas 1999: 142); against the
translation of logos as ‘reason’, see Moss 2014
The discussion between the three interlocutors has consistently been
referred to as a logos, as at 633a4; the term is also used for an
argument or thesis as at 628e2 and 652a5, and for an evaluative
judgement at 653b4–5. The account (logos) in the present context
extends through ‘ . . . victorious over the others’ at 645b1; it identi-
fies self-mastery as the victory of the golden cord over the iron cords
and is presumably the ‘tale of virtue’ (muthos aretês) of 645b2, which
elaborates the ‘image’ (eikôn) promised at 644c1. ‘Pulls’ translates
helxeôn (genitive plural of helxis, cognate with the verb anthelkei’
(pull against) used at 644e3, e6). The Athenian uses it as a general
term for all the ‘experiences’ (pathê) of 644e1–2 (see note ad loc) that
‘pull against each other towards opposing actions (allêlais anthelk-
ousin . . . ep’ enantias praxeis)’ (644e2–6). It is here used equivalently
with the ‘cords or strings’ of 644e2.

645a1 ‘the sacred and golden guidance (agôgên) of calculation

(logismou)’
‘Guidance’ translates agôgê, which is here used by the Athenian to
indicate an instance of the ‘forces’ (helxeis) that have just been said to
‘pull against’ (anthelkein) each other (644e3, 6). The term can also
refer to education or training, and is used in this way by the Athenian
at 659d2 and 819a5; so too Stsm. 274b1 and EN 1179b31; it is used
for physical training at Laws 673a9. Later writers typically refer to the
Spartan educational system as an agôgê (Plutarch, Agesilaus 1.1.7–8,
Phocion 20.4.2–5.1; Athenaeus, Deipnosophistai 4.19.41–4,
11.66.13–15). However, Plato also uses the term to refer to psycho-
logical impulses or inclination, as he does in Republic in the case of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 181

the ‘conflicting impulse’ (enantias . . . agôgês) that marks the divided
soul (604b3–4), and in Phaedrus in the case of the forceful drive of
erôs (238c1–4). In the present context, the Athenian indicates that
the ‘golden agôgê of calculation’ is ‘one of these pulls’ (e5), since the
antecedent of tautên (645a1) is miai . . . tôn helxeôn (644e4–5).
England’s proposal that the ‘golden agôgê of calculation’ in the
present passage is the education (paideia) invoked at 659d2 is at odds
with the Athenian’s clear indication here that ‘calculation’—no less
than pleasure, pain, and anticipation—is one of the ‘experiences’
likened to ‘cords and strings’ (644e2) and construed as ‘pulls’ (helxeis,
644e5). Education, by contrast, is a matter of shaping a person’s
‘pleasures and pains’ to agree with a correct logos (653a–c, 659d).
Insofar as education is a causal process that redirects pleasures and
pains, the agent of that process is not calculation, but teachers,
trainers, etc. And insofar as education is the trained condition
resulting from that process, there is agreement rather than conflict
between calculation and the pleasures and pains. On neither alter-
native can calculation be a party to the sort of tug-of-war depicted in
the figure of the puppets.
A number of recent commentators have denied that logismos is a
party to that tug-of-war. Frede (2010: 217–20) proposes that, strictly
speaking, only the iron strings actually pull against each other, while
logismos plays the very different role of giving them their direction
and content. Annas (1999: 142–4) concludes that the ‘victory’ of the
golden string over the iron ones is the condition in which a person’s
pleasures, pains, desires, etc. are shaped by logismos, and similarly
Jouët-Pastré 2006: 42. Wilburn (2012: 32–3) proposes that the
‘guidance’ provided by logismos is a general commitment to follow
certain rational principles but does not pull an agent towards specific
actions.
Such interpretations are at odds with the most natural reading of
644e1–645b1, and appear to be motivated by the assumption that
the ‘victory’ of the golden over the iron cords at 645a–b is the same
condition as that of the educated person at 653a–c, whose pleasures
and pains agree (sumphônein) rather than conflict with logos.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

182 Commentary: Book 1

However, while the Athenian clearly takes such internal agreement to
be a feature of virtue (653a–c)—indeed, he has identified agreement
as a different, and better, achievement than the victory over oneself
(also called self-mastery) that Clinias has invoked at 626e—he expli-
citly offers the image of the puppets to elucidate Clinias’ and Me-
gillus’ very different conception of virtue as self-mastery (644b6–c2;
see note on 644b6–7). While the Athenian does not in the end
accept his interlocutors’ identification of virtue with self-mastery, the
point of the present passage is to elucidate what is involved in such
self-mastery or victory over oneself. In the divine puppet, the golden
agôgê of logismos is the victorious party in such a conflict. Thus it
must pull against, rather than inform, the iron pulls. (On the
Athenian’s reasons for continuing to elucidate his opponent’s victory
model of virtue, even after expositing its deficiencies, see general note
on 643b1–646e2.)

645a2 ‘also called (epikaloumenên) the city’s common law’

A reference back to 644d2–3. Nightingale (1999: 104) takes epika-
loumenên to be middle rather than passive, and proposes the alterna-
tive translation: ‘which summons as an ally the common law of the
city’. But 644d2–3 supports the present translation, which takes the
participle to be passive.

645a2–3 ‘The other pulls are hard as iron’

more literally: ‘the others are hard (sklêras) and iron (sidêras)’
The subsequent comment that these ‘resemble all kinds of different
material’ (literally: ‘resemble all variety of things’—pantodapois eide-
sin homoias, 645a3–4) allows that their shared ‘iron’ status might not
be a matter of having the same material composition. Thus Brisson/
Pradeau may go too far in finding here an allusion to the myth of the
metals in Rep. 414b–415c. The adjective sidêras here functions as a
synonym to sklêras (hard). Thus Saunders translates the phrase
‘tough and inflexible’.

645a6 ‘gentle (praiou) rather than violent (biaiou)’

 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 183

This characterization of calculation (logismos) continues the thematic
opposition between persuasion, on the one hand, and force or
violence (bia) on the other (see notes on 629a2, 629d2, 632b7–8).
Placing logismos and law in the gentle and persuasive camp highlights
the challenge of achieving self-mastery, which involves having calcu-
lation’s gentle ‘guidance’ (agôgê (645a7), repeating the term from
645a1) overcome the stronger pull of the iron cords. On the nature
of that guidance, see note on 645a1. On law as persuasive, see note
on 632b7–8.

645a6–7 ‘so its guidance requires helpers (hupêretôn) if our golden

element (genos) is to be victorious over the others’
The plural in ‘helpers’ fits the metaphor of the tug-of-war at
644e2–4, where multiple parties can pull on either side. The nature
of the helpers or of the assistance required is not elaborated on here,
although the repeated injunction in the preceding lines to ‘follow’
(sunepomenon, 644e5) the pull of logismos and ‘pitch in with it’
(sullambanein, 645a5), together with the explanatory gar at a5,
mark them as calls to the requisite assistance; thus ‘each of us’
(hekaston, 644e6) might be the helpers. Alternatively, the notion
of ‘helping’ or ‘assisting’ calculation recalls the doctrine of the
Republic, that the spirited part of the soul (thumos) functions as
an ally (summachos) of the logistikon against the appetites (Rep.
441e–442b). While the Athenian does not here avail himself of the
tripartite psychology of the Republic (on which see general note on
644c4–d6), his treatment of the ‘anticipations’, fear and daring, at
646e–647a invokes many features of thumos from the Republic—in
particular the task of resisting pleasures and pains. Thus the tharros
that enables a warrior to resist the pains and fears of battle, and the
sense of shame (aidôs) that enables the just citizen to resist the
temptations of illicit pleasures, are candidates for the ‘assistants’
mentioned here (see Meyer 2012: 358–60 and note on 644c9–d1).
These commendable instances of fear and daring play a role in the
training process that aims at inculcating moderation and courage
respectively, which the Athenian has classified under the general
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

184 Commentary: Book 1

heading of education (paideia) (see 642a). He will later characterize
education as a ‘pulling’ (holkê) and ‘guidance’ (agôgê) (659d2); thus
Schöpsdau and Brisson/Pradeau (2007: 32–3) propose that it pro-
vides the requisite assistance (although see note on 645a1). More
speculative hypotheses about the ‘helpers’ include the idea that it
involves the psychological activity of intention or decision (Bobonich
2002: 273–82) and the proposal by Wilburn (2012) that it is
deliberation implementing general principles espoused by logismos.
Nightingale (1999: 104), Klosko (2006: 221), and Renaut (2014:
304) propose that the law is the helper (see note on 645a2).

Conclusions about virtue and self-mastery

645b1–2 ‘Here is how (kai houtô dê) we may vindicate the tale of
virtue (muthos aretês) that likens us to puppets’
more literally: ‘In this way the tale of virtue that says we are puppets
would be preserved (sesôsmenos an eiê)’
alternatively: ‘the tale . . . would achieve its point’ (Brisson/Pradeau).
The ‘tale of virtue that likens us to puppets’ is the ‘illustrat[ion] by
means of an image’ promised at 644c1 and ‘our account’ (logos) at
644e5. A logos or muthos is ‘vindicated’ or ‘preserved’ (sesôsmenos)
when it can survive objections (as at Tht. 164a, 167d; Rep. 395b).
On the range of the expression, see England ad loc and Brisson 1982:
71–5. The present ‘tale’ might require vindication because of the
incomprehension expressed by the interlocutors at 644d4–6. The
vindication offered by the Athenian is given in the lines that follow
(645b2–c4), which list the salutary morals to be drawn from the tale.
On this reading, the emphatic ‘this is how’ (kai houtô dê, 645b1) is
forward looking, and is resumed, by the houtô kai in b8. On Saun-
ders’ reading (‘If we do give our help’), houtô in 645b1 refers to the
preceding lines.

645b2–5 ‘It makes clearer, in a way, what is meant by “self-

mastery” and “self-defeat”, as well as the manner in which a city
and an individual person ought to live’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 185

more literally: ‘that is (kai), it would become clearer in a way what is
meant by “self-mastery” . . . as well as that a city and an individual
person ought to live’
The translation takes kai . . . phaneron an gignoito (b2–3) to be ep-
exegetic of sesôsmenos an eiê (b2). The Athenian’s point is that we can
demonstrate the usefulness of the puppet metaphor by showing how
it sheds light on what is involved in self-mastery (a question raised at
644b9–c1; see note on 644b6–7), as well as on the broader question
of how we should live.

645b4–5 ‘a person must grasp within himself the true account (ton
men logon alêthê labonta) concerning these pulls (peri tôn helxeôn
toutôn) and live in accordance with (hepomenon) it’
alternatively: ‘ . . . and live following (hepomenon) it’
In using the locution ‘grasp the account’ (logon lambanein), the
Athenian is employing the vocabulary of the ‘agreement’ model of
virtue that he will articulate at the beginning of Book 2 (see note on
653b3–4). What is the relationship between the logos invoked here
(and at 653b4–5) and the logismos (‘calculation’) invoked at 644d2
and identified as the golden cord in the puppet? The logos is here
described as concerned with ‘these pulls’ (helxeôn toutôn, 645b5);
that is, about the pleasures, pains, etc. invoked at 644c–d. Thus the
logos may be the evaluative judgement ascribed to logismos in that
earlier context (‘which of the [pleasures, pains, and anticipations] is
better or worse’, 644d2). So construed, the logos (account) men-
tioned here would be an instance of logismos (calculation). On the
distinction between grasping (lambanein) and following (hepomenon)
the true logos, see Moss 2014: 199–200; on logos v. logismos see also
note on 644d2–3.
Note that there are two different ways in which a person might
‘live his life in accordance with’ a true logos/logismos: (1) by the victory
of one’s logismos in a struggle against any ‘pulls’ that it judges to be
inappropriate—as at 644e4–645b2; (2) by the absence of any ‘pulls’
that logismos disapproves of—as in the account of virtue articulated at
653a–c. Way (1) would amount to the ‘victory over self’ that Clinias
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

186 Commentary: Book 1

and Megillus conceive of as virtue. Way (2) would conform to the
‘agreement’ paradigm for virtue endorsed by the Athenian. On these
two models for virtue, see note on 643b1–646e2. As at 644b6–7 (see
note ad loc), the Athenian succeeds in articulating his message in a
form that both he and his interlocutors can endorse, even in the face
of their differing conceptions of virtue.

645b6–8 ‘a city, having received this account (logon) from a god or

from the person who understands these matters, must establish it as
law’
Assuming that logos here is an instance of logismos (see note on
645b4–5), the Athenian here applies the point he made at 644d2–3
that the logismos (‘calculation’) internal to a person is an expression of
law (nomos); on law as an expression of the divine, see 713e–714a and
note on 644d2–3.

645b8–c1 ‘In addition (houtô kai), the tale gives us a more lucid
articulation (saphesteron . . . diêrthrômenon) of virtue and vice’
alternatively: ‘it gives us a more evident [alt: clearer] distinction
between virtue and vice’
Houtô kai (b8) resumes the houtô dê of 645b1, indicating that the
Athenian here continues his list of the salutary morals that can be
drawn from the puppet metaphor. On what is saphes [clear, obvious,
evident], see note on 661e3–4; the Athenian’s language leaves it
ambiguous whether what is rendered more lucid (saphesteron) is (i)
the distinction between virtue and vice or (ii) the articulation or
composition intrinsic to virtue and vice alike. Clinias and Megillus
would incline to accept (i), since they think that the distinction
between self-mastery and self-defeat is the distinction between virtue
and vice (644b). The Athenian, however, rejects such a conception
(see notes on 643b1–646e2 and 644b6–7), and (ii) is perfectly
adequate to capture his present point: the internal components
involved in self-mastery are equally involved in the superior condi-
tion that the Athenian identifies as virtue.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 187

645c2–4 ‘education and . . . the drinking party’
The present discussion is part of the account of education (paideia)
begun at 643b, which has been proposed as the proper context to
demonstrate the value of the institution of drinking parties (642a).
Education will be defined more precisely in Book 2 at 653a–c.

645c7–8 ‘whatever in our present enterprise is worth the effort’

The patience Clinias professed at 642d–e appears to be wearing thin,
perhaps because, as the next exchange makes clear (645d1–3), he has
no idea what bearing any of the preceding discussion has on the issue
of drinking parties.

645d1–646e2
Drunkenness and self-mastery
The Athenian now brings to bear on the topic of drunkenness
his preceding discussion of self-mastery and the divine puppets
(644c–645c): the iron cords are strengthened by drink, and the
golden weakened, with a resulting loss of self-mastery (645d–646a).
This result is, however, only a temporary debility that is instrumental
to a longer-term benefit, just as vigorous exercise or medical treatment
weakens a body in the short term but benefits it in the long run
(646b–e). This sets the stage for the Athenian to argue in the next
section (646e–650b) that the longer-term benefit of properly super-
vised drunkenness is the cultivation of moderation.

645d6–8 ‘Doesn’t drinking wine make our pleasures and pains,

our angry feelings (thumous), and our passions (erôtas) more intense?’
If this remark is an application of the puppet analogy (as indicated by
645d1–2), the intensified items must figure among the puppet’s
‘iron cords’ (645a2–3), originally enumerated as ‘pleasures and
pains’ and their anticipations at 644c6–d1. See also general note
on 645d1–646e2.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

188 Commentary: Book 1

645e1–3 ‘perceptions, memories, opinions (doxas) and cognitions,
(phronêseis) . . . completely abandon a person who is full of drink’
An ascending order of cognitive activities, as at Tim. 37a–c; cf. Tim.
77b, Philb. 34a–c, 38b; for a similar use of phronêsis in the plural as a
term for episodes of mental activity, see Tim. 90b7. On the relation
between true opinions and phronêsis, see 653a7–9 and note on
632c5.
In the context of the puppet metaphor immediately preceding the
present passage (645d1–2), we must understand the present lines to
describe a weakening (or incapacitation) of the ‘golden cord’. How-
ever, it is difficult to construe the listed cognitive states as being
characteristic of the golden cord exclusively. For example, the
‘anticipations’ that figure among the iron cords are explicitly identi-
fied as ‘opinions about the future’ (644c9). And it would be odd if
the iron cords did not involve at least sense perception or some kind
of representation of content, to the extent that they have intentional
objects (cf. the ‘pictures in the soul’ of Philb. 39a–b); see Bobonich
2002: 295–330 and 2010; Lorenz 2006: 95–110; Sassi 2008: 131–3;
and Kamtekar 2010: 134–40 for different proposals about how they
have content. Thus the Athenian is not entitled to conclude (in the
absence of further argument) that a general loss of cognition tips the
balance in favour of the iron cords. See Bobonich 2002: 270 for a
proposal about how the two effects listed here might interact to yield
a loss of self-control. While the Athenian’s emphasis here on the
drinker’s cognitions fits awkwardly with the psychology illustrated by
the puppet metaphor (644d–645c), it fits better with the account of
education sketched at 643b–644b, on which education gives content
and direction to a person’s pleasures, desires, etc. A general impair-
ment of cognition would undo this educational effect. (On the
different paradigms for virtue implied in these two discussions, see
notes on 626e2–3 and 643b1–646e2.)

645e5–6 ‘his soul returns to the same condition as when he was a

young child’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 189

This is the uneducated juvenile condition described at the beginning
of Book 2, when a child’s pleasures and pains, desires, etc. have
not yet been shaped and given their content by musical training
(653a–654a) and a young person lacks both phronêsis and ‘stable
correct opinion’ (653a), which are two of the items just mentioned as
absent in drunkenness. While here the Athenian is about to describe
this condition as a lack of ‘self-control’ (enkrateia, 645e8), in Book 2
he describes it as a lack of order (taxis). On that juvenile state, see
note on 653d7–8. On the locution enkrateia, see note on 626e4.

645e8 ‘least in control (enkratês) of himself’

‘In control of himself’ (enkratês) here is used as a synonym for ‘master
of himself’ (kreittôn hautou at 626e8) and ‘victorious over oneself’ at
626e2. See notes on 626e4, 645e5–6, and on 644b6–7.

646a2 ‘Don’t we affirm that this sort of person is the worst

(ponêrotatos)?’
Inability to control (or master) oneself has been identified as ‘most
shameful (aischiston) and wretched (kakiston)’ at 626e4 and the
person in that condition is classifed as bad (kakos) at 644b7. On
the different question of whether the corresponding self-control is
best (cf. 628c–d), see note on 644b6–7.

646a10 ‘only a moment ago’—at 641d

The Athenian has now completed the account of paideia, which he
heralded at 642a (and 643a) as a lengthy but necessary preamble to
his explanation of the benefits of drinking parties. He is thus in a
position to return to the former question.

646b2 ‘the two of you have emphatically declared your willingness

to listen’—at 642b–e

646b10–c1 ‘if someone willingly (hekôn) brought such things

upon himself’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

190 Commentary: Book 1

The thesis that no one willingly or voluntarily (hekôn) brings bad
things upon himself is a central theme in Plato, and core to the so-
called ‘Socratic Paradox’ that ‘no one does wrong willingly’ (Protag.
345e, 358c–d, 358e; Gorg. 509e; Tim. 86e; Laws 731c, 734b, 860d–
e); for discussion see Santas 1964; O’Brien 1967; Saunders 1968;
and Segvic 2000.

646d1 ‘Precisely (kallista)’

A superlative and elliptical version of kalôs legeis, which generally
indicates agreement with the preceding statement (‘you are right’)
rather than an aesthetic or ethical assessment of the speaker’s words
(cf. Philb. 31d1, Tht. 148a5). Clinias here gives his strong endorse-
ment to the Athenian’s preceding statement. Pangle’s ‘that’s a very
noble (kalon) way of putting it’ wrongly implies that the ethical
dimensions of the kalon are operative here (as they are, for instance,
at 630c7, 637e5, 646e11, 654c4–d3). On the range of the kalon, see
note on 630c7.

V
D R I N K I N G P AR T I E S CU L T I V A T E
MODERATION

646e3–650b10

We are now told that drunkenness, precisely because it undermines self-

mastery, thereby provides an opportunity to battle against ‘pleasures and
desires’ (647d4–5). Indeed, properly supervised drunkenness is a forum
in which to cultivate resistance to pleasures and desires, just as the
battlefield is a venue for cultivating resistance to fears and pains. These
claims develop further the elaborate analogy between courage and mod-
eration originally deployed at 632e–636c, where the paradigm for virtue
is victory over self in internal conflict. Here, however, the Athenian
characterizes the virtuous condition to be cultivated in terms that fit
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 191

the alternative paradigm for virtue that is implicit in the account of
education at 643b–644b and that will explicitly inform the discussion of
virtue in Book 2 (see notes on 626e2–3 and 647b9–c1 and general note
on 643b1–646e2). On this new paradigm, virtue is a matter of having
appropriately directed pleasures, pains, desires, fears, and so forth (the
‘agreement model’) rather than being victorious over conflicting internal
impulses. On an ambiguity that masks the transition to the ‘agreement’
model of virtue, see note on 647c3–4.
The Athenian begins by identifying a variety of fear (shame) and of
daring (shamelessness) that apply to social contexts (646e–647c). He
then argues (on analogy with the case of courage) that shame is to be
cultivated by exposure to shamelessness and training against it (647c–d).
Drunkenness, he proposes, simulates the conditions in which we are
prone to shamelessness (647e–649d), which makes it a valuable method
for both testing and training moderation (649d–650b).

646e3–647c2
Varieties of fear and daring
The Athenian begins by invoking the two ‘anticipations’, fear and
‘daring’ (tharros), identified earlier in the puppet psychology of
644c–645c. He points out that there are appropriate and inappro-
priate versions of each. While the pair are ordinarily construed as
applying to military contexts, where the coward is afraid and the
courageous soldier is daring, they have an important application in
social contexts, where the just and moderate person has an appro-
priate fear (a sense of shame) and the shameless person is inappro-
priately daring. Thus, while a limited kind of daring should be
cultivated for military purposes, a far more important trait for the
legislator to cultivate in citizens is a sense of shame.

646e4 ‘two roughly opposing (enantia) kinds of fear’

These are the fear involved in cowardice and the sense of shame
(aidôs) involved in just and moderate behaviour. What the Athenian
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

192 Commentary: Book 1

means by calling them ‘opposing’ (enantia) is unclear. Perhaps it is
that the former kind motivates a person to flee the enemy and the
pains of battle, while the latter makes one stand one’s ground.
Compare the sense of enantios at 647a4–5 (see note on 647a4–6
and on 649a4–6).

646e11 ‘something that is ignoble’

more literally: ‘something that is not admirable (ti tôn mê kalôn)’
On the translation of kalon, see note on 630c7.

647a4–6 ‘The latter opposes (enantios) not only pains and other
fears but also the most prevalent and strongest pleasures’
Shame, so conceived, resists opposing impulses in the domains of
both courage and moderation (cf. 633c–636c). On an ambiguity in
the notion of resistance, see note on 647c3–4.

647a10–b1 ‘the daring (tharros) that is opposed (enantion) to

it . . . being . . . the greatest evil in private or public life’
This is the daring or brazenness involved in transgressing social
norms, as at 647c7–d8; cf. 641c2–7, 649d4–650a5.

647b3–5 ‘nothing is more effective [sc. than shame] . . . at securing

victory and safety in war itself’
Even in the military context, the fear touted by the Athenian out-
performs the daring (tharros) venerated in the military ethic of the
Dorians.

647b9–c1 ‘So each of us needs to become both fearless and afraid’

As at 648b8 and 649c4, the courageous person is presented as
‘fearless’ (aphobos) instead of tharraleos or thrasus (bold, daring,
649c8–10). The natural contrast between fear and daring might
make the substitution seem a mere stylistic variation. However, in
characterizing the courageous person as lacking fear, rather than as
victorious in the struggle against the fears in question, the Athenian
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 193

conforms to the ‘agreement’ model for virtue implied in the account
of education at 643b–644b, rather than the ‘victory’ model that
informs his interlocutors’ conception of virtue. For the analogous
point about resistance to pleasures, see note on 647c8–10. On the
two models for virtue see note on 643b1–646e2.

647c1 ‘for the reasons we have explained in the two cases’

more literally: ‘for the sake of what (hôn d’ hekateron heneka) we have
explained in each case’
The expression ‘for the sake of’ (heneka þ gen.) is familiar teleo-
logical language, used to characterize the legislator’s activity: just as
military matters are to be regulated ‘for the sake of’ peace, not vice
versa (628d8–e1), fearlessness is not an end in itself, to be cultivated
in the citizens as an ultimate goal; rather, it has a point or goal (peace)
that both limits and gives the point to its pursuit. And even fear has a
point, or goal, the Athenian insists, when it fulfils an important social
function.

647c3–d8
Cultivating shame by exposure to shamelessness
The Athenian now applies the preceding remarks about shame and
shamelessness (646e–647c) to his earlier contention that cultivating
moderation requires exposure to pleasures (634a–635d): just as
cultivating courage requires exposure to cowardly feelings and prac-
tice in fighting against them, cultivating moderation requires expos-
ure to ‘shamelessness’ and practice at battling against it (647c–d).

647c3–4 ‘make someone unafraid of various things . . . by exposing

him to fear (eis phobon)’
Note that the disposition to be cultivated is a kind of fearlessness
(aphobia; see note on 647b9–c1), not simply the strength to resist the
pull of the fears that one feels. We may thus understand as follows
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

194 Commentary: Book 1

how exposing a person to fear serves to cultivate such a disposition.
The trainee is:
(i) led into fearful (fear-provoking) situations, and as a result
(ii) experiences feelings of fear, and
(iii) struggles to resist acting on those feelings.
Repeated success at (i)–(iii) eventually cultivates in the trainee:
(iv) a disposition to not experience feelings of fear in those fearful
situations.
The trainee who engages in (iii) will be fighting against ‘fears and
pains’ in the way that Clinias and Megillus take to be central to
courage at 633b–e (see note on 633e1–2); thus he will experience
the internal conflict modelled by the divine puppets at 644d–645c.
By contrast, the courageous person who has achieved (iv) will not
experience such internal struggle when placed in situations like (i).
The virtue achieved in (iv) fits the Athenian’s paradigm of ‘agree-
ment’ rather than Clinias’ paradigm of ‘victory over oneself’. The
latter occurs at stage (iii) and is thus only an intermediary stage
on the way to the agreement in the soul that the Athenian takes to
be essential to virtue. On those two paradigms for virtue, see note
on 643b1–646e2. Later it will become clear that the ‘fears’ into
which the trainee is led are ambiguous between the fear-provoking
situations in (i) and the fearful feelings they provoke in (ii). Thus
it will be intelligible to say that a person displays courage by
being exposed to ‘fears’ of type (i) and not experiencing fears of
type (ii) when he is so exposed. See notes on 648b7–8, 649c4, and
649c8–10.

647c4 ‘in a controlled manner (meta nomou)’

literally: ‘with law’
As England notes, meta nomou here is parallel to the characterization
of the requisite fear as meta dikês in the next line (647c7–8, translated
as ‘in a just manner’) as well as with ‘by dint of argument’ (meta
logou) in 647d6.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 195

647c7–8 ‘justly afraid’
more literally: ‘afraid with justice (meta dikês)’
The expression meta dikês (parallel to meta nomou in 647c4) is
used again to characterize fear at 671d2 (translated as ‘fear with
justice’), and it recalls the goal of education at 643b–644b, which
is to cultivate citizens who ‘know how to rule and be ruled with
justice’ (643e6). The fear to be cultivated is shame. See note on
647c4.

647c8–10 ‘To make him victorious in the fight against his plea-
sures . . . we . . . throw him into the ring with shamelessness and make
him wrestle against it’
The shamelessness (anaischuntia) that the trainee is made to battle
against is manifest in the ‘many pleasures and desires that urge him to
commit shameless and unjust actions’ (d4–5). On analogy with
training to resist fears (which cultivates fearlessness—see note on
647c3–4), the present training has the goal of cultivating a dispos-
ition in which one is free of shamelessness; that is, one does not
experience such pleasures and desires in the situations that naturally
provoke them. At 649d–e we are given a sketch of the situations that
tend to provoke such feelings in the untrained; the Athenian’s point
will be that drunkenness simulates those situations.

647c10–d1 ‘face off against the cowardice within him and defeat it’
‘Cowardice’ (deilia) is often a term for a character trait, but here it is
used for a cowardly impulse or feeling (i.e. fear).

647d3 ‘even halfway towards virtue’

An indication that there can be different stages of achievement on the
way to the perfection in moderation (sôphrôn . . . teleôs, d4) or
courage (teleon . . . pros andreian, d1), which is the goal of this train-
ing regime. The people who have developed the sort of ‘victory over
self’ praised by Clinias at 626e might be ‘halfway’ towards virtue,
while the complete or perfect virtue of interest to the Athenian would
belong to those whose feelings have been trained to ‘agree’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

196 Commentary: Book 1

(sumphônein) with their rational judgements. On the difference
between victory and agreement as paradigms for virtue, see note on
626e2–3 and general note on 643b1–646e2.

647d6–7 ‘both in play and in earnest (en te paidiais kai en

spoudais)’
A reflection of the claim, implicit in the account of education at
643b–644b, that there is a kind of ‘play’ or ‘recreation’ (paidia) that
cultivates virtue. We are about to be told that drinking parties
(explicitly called paidia at 635b5, 666b5, and 671e6) provide a
forum for battling against shamefulness (i.e. for cultivating moder-
ation). In Book 2 we will be told that regular performance of choral
song and dance (also a kind of paidia—673d4) is the means by which
virtue is to be cultivated. On the distinction between play and
seriousness (spoudê, here translated as ‘in earnest’), see note on
635b5.

647e1–650b10
Wine as a drug to induce shamelessness
Having insisted that cultivating courage and moderation requires
exposure to the sorts of fears and desires that a person must learn
to resist, the Athenian now raises the possibility of using a drug to
stimulate such feelings. A drug that stimulated fear would provide a
safe and convenient way to train for courage, with many advantages
over conventional methods (647e–648e). While there is no such
drug, we do have wine to stimulate the sorts of shamelessness that
one must struggle against in order to cultivate moderation (649a–d).
Thus wine provides a safe and convenient alternative to conventional
training methods—since those conventional methods involve situ-
ations in which the ‘trainee’ is in a position to do serious harm to his
fellow citizens (649d–650b).

647e1–2 ‘has any god given humans a potion (pharmakon) for fear?’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 197

This hypothetical potion induces the fears that one must struggle
against when training for courage, just as wine (traditionally de-
scribed as a gift from the god Dionysus—672a5) induces the feelings
of fearlessness (shamelessness) to be battled against in training for
moderation.

647e3–4 ‘the more one comes to suppose (nomizein) . . . that he

has fallen into misfortune’
The Athenian here construes fear much more broadly than as a
response to bodily danger, expanding it to include all the feelings
responding to apparent misfortune (dustuchia) that are identified as
the legislator’s concern at 632a4–7. This broad characterization of
the fear to be combated suggests that the coordinate ‘daring’ to be
combated arises in response to good fortune or prosperity (eutuchia;
cf. 632a5). See note on 649d4–7. Note that fear, which is classified
as an opinion (doxa) at 644c9–d1, is here said to involve thinking
(nomizein) that one is unfortunate. On the connection between
feelings of pleasure and judgements that one is doing well, see
657c5–6.

648a4–5 ‘where in the world might one find such a drink . . . ?’

more literally: ‘which beverage found among humans should we say
is of this sort?’

648a6–7 ‘for inculcating courage (pros andreian)’

more literally: ‘towards courage’
The phrase also occurs in 647d1 (teleon . . . pros andreian), where it is
translated as ‘perfect in courage’.

648b1–2 ‘a test (basanon) for courage and cowardice’

A slight change of focus here, from training (the subject of discussion
above) to testing. The testing function will be emphasized below,
649d–650b, but the training function will reclaim the Athenian’s
attention at the start of Book 2. The shift of focus is understandable,
since the circumstances in which one trains to develop a trait
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

198 Commentary: Book 1

(whether courage, moderation, or any other skill) also reveal the
trainee’s level of proficiency in that endeavour. Indeed, the diagnostic
function will be bound up with the training function as a feedback
mechanism and as a motivation for improvement, as indicated by
648b7–c5 and 648d5–e1. See note on 650b7–8.

648b7–8 ‘lead your citizens into fears (eis tous phobous) and test
(elenchôn) their reactions (en tois pathêmasin)’
The Athenian indicates, in the very next clause, that the goal of such
exposure is to cultivate fearlessness (‘so that . . . you would compel
them to become fearless’, b8–c1; see note on 647b8–c5). At 649c4,
that goal is literally described as ‘fearlessness in the presence of fears
(aphobian en tois phobois)’. Thus the ‘fears’ into which the trainees are
led in the present context must be (i) fear-provoking situations,
rather than (ii) actual feelings of fear (see note on 647c3–4 and on
649c8–10). Accordingly, Schöpsdau translates: ‘Situations der
Furcht’. ‘Reactions’ (pathêmata) recalls the characterization of the
puppet’s strings as pathê at 644e1 (cf. the parallel passage in Tim.
69d1). England would translate it ‘disturbances’; however, while the
feeling of fear is indeed a disturbance (tarachê, 632a4), the present
passage leaves it open that not every person will experience that
disturbance in such a situation.

648b8–c5 ‘so that by exhorting, chastising, and bestowing honour

upon them, you would compel (anankazein) them to become fearless
(aphobon)’
On fearlessness, see previous note. The testing function of the drug
is here shown to play a role in its training function (see note on
648b1–2). The trainer is here invited to use exactly the same tools of
praise, blame, reward, and punishment that the Athenian attributed
to the legislator at 632a–b; here it is made explicit that these are tools
for shaping character, not just for evaluating it. We are presented
with a model in which a leader (like the coach, a drill sergeant, or a
ship’s captain 639b–640d) uses praise and blame and reward and
punishment to cultivate citizens’ character. This would be a case of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 199

being ‘compelled and persuaded by honours’ (634a9; see note ad loc).
On the legislator’s use of praise and censure, see notes on 631e2–3 and
634a9.

648c2–3 ‘heap disgrace (atimazôn) upon the disobedient for failing

to be exactly as you command’
alternatively: ‘anyone who is not persuaded by you (hostis soi mê
peithoito) to be just as you instruct (einai toioutos hoion su tattois) in
every respect (en pasin)’
The recipient of disgrace would be an example of the citizen
‘resistant to persuasion’ (duspeithês) at 632b8. On the pairing of
persuasion here with compulsion just above (648b8), see note on
648b8–c5. Note that the trainer is not simply concerned with how
the trainee behaves in the circumstances, but with the latter’s frame
of mind and with the ‘sort he is’; this reflects the fact that feelings
and affective responses quite generally are being trained (as on the
‘agreement’ (sumphônia) model of virtue—on which see note on
643b1–646e2).

648c7 ‘method of training (gumnasia)’

Gumnasia (physical training or exercise, including military training)
is the cornerstone of Dorian education (see 625c). The related term
gumnastike is translated as ‘athletics’ at 672c6 and 673a10; see note
on 673a8–10.

648d7–e1 ‘to escape and overcome the compulsive shaking (ana-

nkaiai diaphorai) induced by the potion’
alternatively: ‘the inevitable shaking . . . ’
‘Shaking’ renders diaphora, here used in the medical sense (thus des
Places, Schöpsdau), and ‘compulsive’ renders anankaia (in contrast
to the more usual translation ‘necessary’ or ‘inevitable’ (England,
Saunders, Schöpsdau, Brisson/Pradeau, Lisi), which is the sense
of the term at 635c1–2. In the present context, however, the Athen-
ian claims that the effect (feeling fear) is avoidable by proper training
(see notes on 647c3–4, 648b7–8). Construing the effect as inevitable
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

200 Commentary: Book 1

fits the ‘victory’ model for virtue endorsed by Clinias, but not the
‘agreement’ (sumphônia) model espoused by the Athenian; on the
two models, see note on 643b1–646e2.

648e1–3 ‘His virtue would keep him from being seriously tripped
up or led astray by impropriety (hup’ aschêmosunês)’
That is, his virtue keeps him from responding inappropriately (either
in feeling or in action) to the frightening circumstances.

648e4–5 ‘since he would fear the drink’s power to defeat any

human being’
The fear named here would be an instance of the shame that
characterizes the good person (646e–647b), rather than the sorts of
fears induced by the hypothetical potion. The potion’s ‘power to
defeat any human being’ would be analogous to wine’s ability to
incapacitate any human drinker if taken in sufficient quantities—i.e.
if one continues drinking to the ‘final round’ (tên eschatên pôsin),
648e3.

649a4–6 ‘what about fearlessness, the excessive and untimely dar-

ing to do what we should not? Is there any drink for this . . . ?’
The Athenian now explicitly turns to make the parallel point that
wine induces the inappropriate ‘daring’ (tharros) that is ‘opposed’ to
shame at 647a10. The daring is ‘untimely’ (akairôs) because it
violates the doctrine of due measure at 636d–e (cf. ‘at the wrong
time’—ektos tôn kairôn—636e2).

649a9–b1 ‘The immediate effect of drinking wine is to make a

person more affable than he was before’
Cf. 671b3–4.

649b2–3 ‘filled with optimistic expectations and belief in his

abilities’
more literally: ‘filled with expectation of good things (elpidôn aga-
thôn) and ability, in his opinion (dunameôs eis doxan)’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 201

This reflects the initial description of ‘daring’ (tharros) as a kind of
elpis (expectation, anticipation), and elpis as a kind of opinion or
belief (doxa) at 644c9–d1. See notes on 644c9 and 647e3–4.

649b9–c1 ‘supremely daring (malista tharrêsomen)’ . . . ‘supremely

afraid (malista phobêsometha)’
The former is the tharros required for courage in battle (647b6–7),
the latter the sense of shame that characterizes the moderation
required in social/peaceful contexts (646e10–647a7). At 647b9–c1
these two desiderata are presented as fearlessness and fearfulness
respectively.

649c4 ‘it is in the presence of fears that we must practise being

courageous and fearless’
As is made explicit in the analogous point about moderation (see
note on 649c8–10), the ‘fears’ in whose presence the ‘practice’ takes
place must be (i) fear-provoking situations rather than (ii) actual
feelings of fear (see notes on 647c3–4 and on 648b7–8).

649c8–10 ‘it is in the presence of things that naturally make us

especially daring (tharraleoi) and bold (thraseis) that . . . we must
practise at not being shameless . . . ’
more literally: ‘ . . . in the presence of those things that, when we
experience them (ha pathontes), we are naturally (pephukamen) espe-
cially daring, we must practise being least shameless . . . ’
The Athenian here acknowledges a distinction between (i) the cir-
cumstances that naturally provoke inappropriate feelings of daring
and (ii) the inappropriate feelings that are provoked in those circum-
stances. As in the parallel case of training against fears just described
(649c3–4), it is (i) rather than (ii) that are the necessary context for
the exercise of the virtues (see notes on 647c3–4 and on 648b7–8).
The goal of practising is to eliminate as far as possible (hôs hêkista) the
inappropriate feelings of daring, not simply to defeat them when we
experience them.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

202 Commentary: Book 1

649d4–7 ‘all these things have such an effect on us: [a] anger
(thumos), passion (erôs), insolence (hubris), ignorance (amathia),
greed, and cowardice—along with [b] wealth, beauty, strength, and
everything that by making us drunk with pleasure drives us out of
our minds’
An enumeration of the ‘things’ whose ‘presence . . . naturally
makes us especially daring and bold’ (649c8; see note on 649c8–10).
The listed items are heterogeneous: [a] are psychological states or
conditions, which we might understand as either instances or causes
of boldness. Cowardice (deilia, used as at 647c10 for cowardly
feelings) might seem an odd item to find on the list, with its
suggestion of timidity, but consider for example a case where cow-
ardice leads to traitorous action. By contrast, those in [b] are among
the ‘human goods’ listed at 631c. As a rough approximation, [a] are
the pleasures and pains of the citizens that the legislator is supposed
to evaluate and shape (631d–632a) while [b] are items whose acqui-
sition or loss are the circumstances in which we ‘naturally’ (pephuka-
men, 649c8) experience [a]. This passage, taken together with
631d2–632b1, suggests the view that the pleasures and pains we
feel at apparent misfortune and good fortune are the causes of, or
constitute, the antisocial tharros that the legislator trains the citizens
to avoid (in particular, when we mistakenly believe that possessing
the human goods is the marker of good fortune, without recognizing
that the virtues are a precondition of deriving any benefit from
them). Thus we are given a reason here why the legislator is supposed
to supervise the pleasures that citizens feel in the face of apparent
good fortune (eutuchia) (632a5). See also note on 647e3–4. The
Athenian may also have in mind here a point he develops in later
books: that our desire for the human goods has no natural limit, and
satisfying it makes it stronger (831d–832b, 918d–919c; see Meyer
2003). Thus a person who acquires great wealth may feel embold-
ened to seek out more. Such a hypothesis would also explain
the previous claim that victory in war (where ‘the goods of the
vanquished go to the victors’—Clinias: 626b) leads to ‘insolence’
(hubris, 641c5) and hence undermines education. The examples in
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 1 203

the present context (649e2–650a7) indicate that the greed or inso-
lence in question concern the pursuit of financial gain or sexual
gratification, so we may suppose the latter also figures on the list in
[b]. On ‘driving us out of our minds’, see Bobonich 2002: 270.

Drunkenness as a test for character

649d7–9 ‘Now for an inexpensive and relatively harmless way, first
of all, to test ourselves, and second, get practice in these matters’
Note that both the testing function and the training function of the
drug are invoked. See note on 648b1–2.

649e1–2 ‘provided it is conducted with some care’

That is, under knowledgeable leadership; see 640a–e. The proper
leadership of drinking parties will be addressed further in Book 2,
671c–e.

649e3–650a5 ‘entering into a business deal with the man and

exposing oneself to the attendant risks . . . entrusting to [his] care
our own daughters, sons, and wives . . . endangering what is most
precious to us . . . ’
This explains why a ‘safe’ method of testing (and training) for
moderation is desirable. The situations in which it is a challenge to
act moderately are ones in which fellow citizens risk being harmed.

650b7–8 ‘the discipline (technêi) that cares for (therapeuein) these

matters’
more literally: ‘the discipline whose business it is to care for these
things’
That is, the discipline that cares for (therapeuein) the soul by culti-
vating the virtues (see 649b8–c1, where the verb is translated as
‘cultivate’). Here the testing function of the drinking party empha-
sized in 649e–650b is subsumed under the more general training
function; on education (paideia) as the process of such cultivation,
see 643b–644b; 653a–c; cf. Rep. 410c.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

204 Commentary: Book 1

650b8–9 ‘We agree . . . that this is the task of politics (politikês)?’
The legislator is referred to as a politikos (statesman) at 628d6, 657a4,
688a1, 693a6. The conception of politics (politikê technê) as care for
the citizens’ souls is developed at length in the Gorg. 464b–c; cf.
513e, 515a–e, and is taken up by Aristotle, EN 1102a5–12, who
remarks that the Cretan and Spartan legislators have a reputation for
making the citizens good and law-abiding.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Book 2

I
EDUCATION, VIRTUE, AND CHORAL
PERFORMANCE

(652a1–654d4)
After announcing that drinking parties are a ‘safeguard’ to education
(652a–653a), the Athenian defines education (paideia) as the condition
of having correctly trained ‘pleasures and pains’. He distinguishes this
condition from ‘virtue in its entirety’ (653b6). Choral song and dance at
festivals to the gods are the means by which such ‘education’ is inculcated
and repaired (653c–654b). Those who have been trained to sing and
dance well will take pleasure in what is beautiful or admirable (kalon)
and be pained at what is shameful or ugly (aischron), even if they cannot
articulate or understand it (654c–d).

652a1–653a4
Drinking parties are a safeguard for education
The Athenian has just claimed at the end of Book 1 that drunkenness
reveals a person’s true character (649d–650b)—a subordinate point
in the larger argument, begun at 636e, that drinking parties have
beneficial effects on education (paideia, 641b–d). His present re-
marks serve to redirect the discussion back to that larger benefit,
which concerns the shaping of character. The role that drinking
parties play as a ‘safeguard’ to that larger benefit will later be
explained in the context of the so-called Chorus of Dionysus
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

206 Commentary: Book 2

(665d–666c, 671a–672a; see notes on 664d1–2 and general note on
671a2–674c7).

652a3 ‘our natures’

More literally: ‘the condition of our natures (pôs echomen tas phuseis)’
A reference back to the ‘natures and dispositions of people’s souls’
(650b7).

652a3–4 ‘some great benefit, which we must take very seriously

(axion pollês spoudês)’
The Athenian will conclude at 673e that drinking parties are a
‘serious matter’ (spoudê) rather than recreation (paidia). On the
contrast between what is serious (spoudê) v. play or recreation (paidia),
see note on 635b5.

652a4 ‘properly conducted (en têi kat’ orthon chreiai) communal

drinking’
That is, under correct leadership; cf. 638c–641a, 671d–e.

652a5–6 ‘The present argument evidently aims to establish that

there is’
This goal of the argument was announced at 641c8–d3.

652b1 ‘if we are not to get tripped up by it (mê . . . parapodisthômen

hup’ autou)’
It is not obvious what potential confusion the Athenian has in mind.
Perhaps the caveat refers to the convoluted and oft-interrupted train
of argument in which the specific topic of drinking parties is not
addressed explicitly, beyond a brief mention at 666b–c, until the end
of Book 2. See general note on 671a2–674c7.

652b3–653a1 ‘recall what we said correct education is in our case

(hêmin)’
The qualification ‘in our case’ recalls 643d–644b in Book 1, where
education (paideia) in the strict sense is identified as training in the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 207

virtues of citizenship, as distinct from training in manual or technical
skills. See also 672e5.

653a3 ‘its safeguard (sôtêria)’

alternatively: ‘its preservation’
Sôtêria is used in this sense at Rep. 425e3. On the range of the term,
see England on the present passage. At 654d8 phulakê (guarding)
is used instead of sôtêria. That education (paideia) may require
‘preservation’ or ‘safeguarding’ was adumbrated in the account of
paideia in Book 1, which speaks of paideia ‘going off course’ (ex-
erchetai) and requiring ‘correction’ (epanorthousthai) (644b2–3). Just
ahead, at 653c8, the problem is described as a ‘slackening’.

653a5–c6
Education (paideia) is properly trained pleasures and pains
The Athenian now specifies the sort of education that is preserved
by drinking parties. While the term paideia (like ‘cultivation’ and its
cognates in English) can be used to describe both an educational
process and the cultivated disposition that results from such a
process, the latter sense is operative here, where we are given a
further refinement of the conception of education presented in
Book 1 (643d–644b). There, paideia in a strict sense was distin-
guished by its goal of inculcating the virtues of a citizen. Here,
virtue and paideia are defined more precisely and distinguished from
each other. Paideia consists in the proper cultivation of one’s
‘pleasures and pains’, while virtue ‘in its entirety’ consists in agree-
ment between those properly trained ‘pleasures and pains’ and one’s
logos (account).

653a6 ‘pleasure and pain’

These are the ‘witless advisors’ identified as ‘iron cords’ that move
a person, according to the metaphor of the puppets in Book 1
(644c–645c). Here they are evidently intended to include love
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

208 Commentary: Book 2

(philia) and hate (misos) (653b2–3, b7–c1). On the range of what is
included under pleasure and pain, see note on 633c9–d2.

653a7–9 ‘we are lucky if we have also developed wisdom (phronê-

sin) and stable true opinions (alêtheis doxas)’
On the distinction between phronêsis and correct belief or opinion
(doxa), see 632c–d and note on 632c5; cf. note on 632d5–6. Later, at
672c, phronêsis is linked to the order (taxis) associated with rhythm
and harmony which, in the present context, are about to be attrib-
uted a large role in paideia (653e–654a). In the present context both
phronêsis and ‘stable true opinions’ are distinguished from the pleas-
ures and pains that agree (sumphônein) with them. Presumably the
former are expressed in the ‘golden string’ in the puppet metaphor of
644c–645c. Note the Athenian’s pessimism here about the prospects
of either condition being widespread among the citizens.

653a9–b1 ‘these goods and all that they involve (ta en toutois)
complete a person (teleos . . . est’ anthrôpos)’
‘All that they involve’ might be a reference to the virtues, which at
631b–d are said to be ‘divine goods’ that ‘depend’ (êrtêtai, 631b7) on
phronêsis. These are the elements of ‘virtue in its entirety’ (sumpasa
aretê, 630b3; cf. 653b6); at 630c5–6 they are said to comprise
‘complete justice’ (dikaiosunê telea; cf. 631c7–8, and note on
630c5–6); thus here they are said to make a person ‘complete’
(teleos). At 631b–c possession of the ‘human goods’ (health, wealth,
etc.) is said to follow from possessing the virtues (see notes on
631b6–8, 631b8–c1, and 631c1–5), but it is unlikely that the
human goods are included in ‘all that these involve’ here, since the
notion of a ‘complete’ (teleos) person is strongly connected with the
aims of education (see 643d2 and 643e5, where teleos and its variant
teleion are translated as ‘completely’ and ‘perfect’; cf. 643c8–9).

653b3–4 ‘when we are not yet able to grasp the account (logon
lambanein), and when we do grasp the account (labontôn de ton
logon)’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 209

alternatively: ‘logon lambanein’ might be rendered ‘engage in argu-
ment’ (thus England)
Logos here (as at 645b4, 659d2, and 696c10) is best construed as
an evaluative judgement or verdict rather than as the faculty of
reason; thus the popular translation ‘reason’ is misleading; see the
masterful treatment by Moss (2014: 196–202), who notes
the parallel between the present passage and Rep. 401d–402a. The
phrase logon lambanein in the text of des Places as well as Burnet’s
alternative logôi lambanein are sometimes used by Plato to indicate a
kind of epistemic grasp (as at Laws 645b4, Parm. 135e3, Tht.
208d6–7, Rep. 402a2, 534b3)—hence the present translation. But
he also uses them with the weaker meaning of ‘discuss’, or ‘examine
by argument’ (Laws 638c2, Soph. 246c5–7, Protag. 348a2, Meno
75d2, Rep. 337e3)—hence the alternative translation. On either
alternative, the distinction is presumably between those who have
not yet reached the age of reason and those who have. These two
developmental stages will later be assigned, respectively, to the
chorus of the Muses and the chorus of Apollo (664c–d).

653b4–5 ‘agree with it’

literally: ‘agree with the account (sumphêsôsi tôi logoi)’
This agreement or concord (sumphônia, b6) is later described at
659d–e as holding between a child’s pleasures and pains, on the one
hand, and the ‘correct account (orthos logos) articulated by the law’ on
the other; cf. 696c. Here the agreement is an internal psychological
concord between one’s ‘pleasures and pains’ and one’s evaluative
judgement (logos)—when the latter reflects the views expressed in
the law (cf. 644d2–3, 645a2) and thus expresses the phronêsis or
‘stable true opinions’ of 653a8. The parties to the agreement are
presumably the iron and gold cords in the puppet metaphor of
644c–645c, with logos as a virtuous instance of the logismos of 644d
that is identified as the ‘golden cord’ at 645a (see note on 645b4–5).
An instance of the sumphônia invoked here is given at 654c: one takes
pleasure in the things one judges to be beautiful (kalon) and hates
those that one considers shameful (aischron). In Book 3 we are told
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

210 Commentary: Book 2

that, without such sumphônia, no one has wisdom (phronêsis,
689d4–6). Elsewhere, the verb sumphônein indicates agreement be-
tween persons (as at 661d4, 662b2, 686b3, and at 634e2 where it is
translated ‘sing out their agreement’) or logical consistency (662e9;
cf. Rep. 380c3). The verb and its cognates are regularly used in Rep.
to indicate the relationship between the parts of the virtuous city
(432a8, 463e3) and soul (441e9, 442c10).

653b5–6 ‘because they have been correctly trained (eithisthai) by

appropriate habits (ethôn)’
The translation follows the emendation (tôi logôi tôi) favoured by
Schöpsdau following Stallbaum; thus Kurke 2013: 164n28. The
MSS text lacks the second tôi and would be translated: ‘agree with
the account that they have been correctly trained’.
On MSS text, the Athenian would be claiming that our pleasures
and pains express reflexive normative assessments, and that such
assessments are the content of the sumphônia with logos that is
characteristic of virtue. Elsewhere, however, the requisite agreement
between one’s pleasures and plains, loves and hates, on the one hand,
and one’s logos on the other is not so restricted (as at 659d–e, 689d,
and 696c; cf. Rep. III 401e–402a). ‘Habit’ (ethos) is a term the
Athenian will use to describe the process of cultivating or training
pleasures and pains (see note on 655d7–e1).

653b6 ‘this agreement (sumphônia) is virtue in its entirety

(sumpasa . . . aretê)’
The agreement is between one’s ‘pleasures and pains’ on the one
hand, and one’s logos (evaluative judgement) on the other (see note
on 653b4–5). In identifying this concord with virtue, the Athenian
endorses the ‘agreement’ model of virtue, rather than the ‘conflict’
model espoused by his interlocutors in Book 1 (on those two models,
see general note on 643b1–646e2). The phrase ‘virtue in its entirety’
(sumpasa aretê) has a different sense here than it does in Book 1 at
630b3, where it refers to the combination of wisdom, moderation,
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 211

courage, and justice—also called ‘complete (telea) justice’ at 630c6.
Here, however, the ‘entirety’ is that of a whole, as distinct from one
of its constituents—paideia being a distinguishable feature (the
correctly trained pleasures and pains) that is ‘part’ of the condition
of agreement (those pleasures and pains agreeing with logos) that
constitutes virtue ‘in its entirety’.

653c1 ‘from beginning to end (mechri telous)’

This use of telos (end, goal) recalls the notion of a ‘complete’ (teleos)
person at 553a9, and suggests that the aspect of virtue here singled
out as paideia persists even in the complete form of virtue (‘virtue in
its entirety’, 653b6), not just in its early stages of development.

653c5–6 ‘Your earlier remarks about education’: at 643b–644b.

653c7–654a8
Choral performance is the medium of education
The Athenian here notes that correctly nurtured pleasures and pains,
i.e. education (paideia) in the sense just identified (653a–c), require
regular maintenance to withstand the stress of human life (653c7–9)
and that this maintenance is achieved through choral performance at
religious festivals (653c9–654a8). He explains the natural origins of
the choral arts: (1) all young animals are naturally exuberant, and
prone to voicing sounds and leaping about; and (2) humans naturally
enjoy harmony and rhythm (653d5–654a3). Thus choral perform-
ance (choreia), a combination of song (ôidê) and dance (orchêsis), is
something we are eager to engage in (654a3–5), at least when we are
young. Drinking parties, the Athenian will later argue (666b–c,
671a–c), will replicate this youthful condition in the elderly. He
does not explain how song and dance shape a person’s pleasures,
pains, loves, and hates, although some of his presuppositions will
emerge over the course of 655d–656b, 659e–660a.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

212 Commentary: Book 2

Choral performance at religious festivals

maintains education
653c8–9 ‘education . . . tends to slacken and be undone over the
course of human life’
more literally: ‘ . . . is loosened (chalatai) and destroyed (diaphtheir-
etai) in many respects (kata polla) . . . ’
The MSS text is difficult to construe, as it provides no explicit subject
for the verbs ‘slacken and be undone’. The present translation follows
England in taking paideia (in the sense of the cultivated condition) to
be the implied subject and kata polla to be adverbial. As England
points out, Ast’s emendation of kata polla to ta polla would make the
Athenian’s claim much stronger: that most of paideia is weakened
and undone by human life. The burdens of life are invoked again at
666a6. See also note on 653d4–5.

653d2–3 ‘ordained (etaxanto) intervals (amoibas) of respite from

their toils in the form of festivals to the gods’
alternatively: ‘ . . . respites from their toils in exchange for festivals (tas
tôn heortôn amoibas)’; parallel language at Symp. 202e5 invokes
rituals that the gods command (epitattein) mortals to perform, and
benefits that they promise in exchange (amoibas)
The immediate point in the present passage is that holding the
festivals commanded by the gods brings humans, in return, the
benefit of respite from their toils, in the sense of a holiday from
work. The larger point, about to be elaborated, is that these festivals
are occasions for the maintenance and repair of paideia, which the
grind of daily life has ‘slackened and undone’.

653d3–4 ‘the Muses, their leader Apollo, and Dionysus as fellow

celebrants’
The Muses are patrons of culture: poetry, song, and dance; the god
Apollo is also associated with music and Dionysus is the god of wine,
whose festivals involve drunkenness. On the Muses, see P. Murray
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 213

2004; on Apollo, see Burkert 1985 and Graf 2009; and on Dionysus,
see Burkert 1985, Seaford 2006, and Wildberg 2011. Later in
Book 2, these three will be the titular leaders of the three choruses
introduced at 664b–665d. They are ‘fellow celebrants’ (sunhêortas-
tai) at the festivals to the gods insofar as these festivals involve the
performance of song and dance in which these gods are ‘partners in
the dance’ (sunchoreutas, 654a1). The Athenian’s point is that by
involving the Muses, Apollo, and Dionysus in these festivals (that is,
by involving song, dance, and wine), the gods are giving humans a
way of restoring the paideia that has ‘slackened and been undone’
(653c8–9) over the course of daily life.

653d4–5 ‘To set them back on the correct course (epanorthôntai)’

literally: ‘in order that they be set back on the right course’; alterna-
tively: ‘in order that they set them up correctly’ (England)
This construal takes the verb epanorthôntai as passive rather than
middle (following Burnet), as it is in the parallel text at 644b2–3.
The subject of the verb, (the antecedent of ‘them’ in the translation)
is either humans (thus Brisson/Pradeau; Kurke 2013: 163n15) or
their education (paideia in the plural at 653c8). Either may be
construed as ‘set back on the right course’ in the sense that the
celebrants’ pleasures and pains (paideia) are cultivated anew during
these festivals. England, by contrast, takes the verb to be middle,
with the gods as its subject and the festivals as its object. Schöpsdau
agrees that this is the natural reading of the text, but prefers an
emendation that would make the ‘nurture during these festivals’ (d5)
the object of the verb. On neither of the latter readings, however,
does the verb have the restorative force that it has at 644b3 and that
is clearly relevant in the present context; nurture (trophê), unlike
education (paideia), does not extend to the cultivated condition.
Kurke (2013: 131) proposes that the verb may be understood quite
literally as ‘set upright again’, which, in conjunction with the ‘slack-
ening’ at 653c8, is intended to evoke the puppets on strings at
644d–645a.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

214 Commentary: Book 2

The natural basis of choral dance

653d5–6 ‘a hymn we hear (ha . . . hêmin . . . humneitai)’
more literally: ‘a thesis (logos) that is intoned (humneitai) to us these
days’;
alternatively: ‘a thesis that is intoned by us (hêmin)’ (Schöpsdau)
The verb humneitai continues the festival motif from above; it can
also be used of a frequently repeated statement, as at Laws 778d7,
Rep. 549e1, and Critias 118b3, as well as of ritual song (Rep. 617c3),
and of song invoking the Muses (Critias 108c4). At Laws 799a9 its
compound ephumneisthai is used of hymns sung at festivals to the
gods. On the message of the ‘hymn’, see note on 653d7–8. While the
Athenian stops short of endorsing it in the present context, he
invokes it at 672b8–c7 as something he knows.

653d7–8 ‘It says that every young creature is practically unable to

sit still or keep quiet’
Continuing until 654a5, this theory is the content of the ‘hymn’
invoked at 653d6. It is repeated at 664e3–665a3, 672c1–d4, and
673c9–d5. The two main components of the theory introduced
here are:
(i) Young animals are naturally inclined to motion (both of voice and
body)—and hence to a prototype of choral dance (cf. 673c–d).
(ii) Humans naturally take pleasure in the order of harmony and
rhythm—and hence in choral dance, which is about to be named
as the medium for cultivating paideia (654a).
Other statements of the theory make explicit what must be assumed
to be implicit here:
(iii) The natural juvenile motions are disorderly and indeed display a
kind of madness (664e, 666a, 672c).
(iv) The juvenile soul is pliable, receptive to being trained to acquire
various kinds of order (664b, 671b–c).
The educational function of drunkenness, eventually to be identified
at 666b–c and 671a–672d, is to replicate that pliable juvenile
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 215

condition (with all its disorderliness) in an adult soul whose educa-
tion has been ‘slackend and undone’ (653c8–9), thus preparing it to
be retrained in appropriate ‘harmonies’ and rhythms. Fire is a fre-
quent metaphor for the kinetic juvenile soul, invoking both the
latter’s frantic disorderliness (666a; cf. 664e) and its malleability:
like iron in the fire, capable of being shaped (or reshaped) by a
knowledgeable sculptor (671b–c). While the thesis of disorderly
juvenile motions recalls the degraded condition of the incarnated
soul in Tim. 43a–47e, as Schöpsdau notes (cf. Kamtekar 2010:
130–3), the Athenian here casts those motions in a very positive
light, taking them to mark the educability of youth, in contrast with
the stiffness (and corresponding resistance to education) in the
elderly (cf. 665d–e, 666b). Juvenile motions are not so much dis-
ordered (as in Tim.) as unordered—awaiting the shaping influence of
education.

653e1–3 ‘Some leap and bound as though they were dancing

(hoion orchoumena) in playful glee (meth’ hêdonês kai prospaizonta)’
more literally: ‘as though . . . dancing with pleasure and playing’
This youthful exuberance and its connection to dance is invoked
again at 673a7 with similar language (cf. 657c5–9). On play or
recreation (paidia), see note on 635b5.

653e3–5 ‘the other animals do not sense order and disorder in

movement (what we call rhythm and “harmony” (rhuthmos . . . kai
harmonia))’
alternatively: ‘ . . . do not perceive (echein aisthêsin) order and
disorder . . . ’
It is perception or sensation (aisthêsis) of such order (not just
pleasure in that perception) that is distinctive of humans, as
664e6–8 makes clear. On the significance of this natural affinity to
order, see Mouze 2005: 150; Laks 2000: 277. The harmonia invoked
by the Athenian is not harmony in the modern musical sense
(simultaneous notes of differing pitch), but something more like a
musical scale. The Athenian will later specify more precisely that
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

216 Commentary: Book 2

harmonia is an order (taxis) of vocal pitches, while rhythm is order of
movement (664e8–665a3)—both vocal movement and bodily
movement (672e8–673a1). Harmonia is sometimes translated as
‘mode’ (e.g. the Dorian, Phrygian, and Lydian modes mentioned
in the Republic—397b–400a; see A. Barker 1990: 14–17 and
Rocconi 2003); however, ‘mode’ won’t do as a translation here, so
‘harmony’ is used as a placeholder for want of a better English
counterpart (see England’s note on 653e5). Scott (1999: 20–33,
and in an unpublished work) argues that harmonia should be trans-
lated as ‘song’ or ‘music’ and rhuthmos translated as ‘dance’ when
they occur in the phrase rhuthmos kai harmonia; however, the Athen-
ian uses rhuthmos and harmonia to refer to the structure or order that
belongs to song and dance, not to song and dance themselves. Later
the Athenian will insist that the harmonia and rhuthmos in a choral
work must be appropriate to its words and gestures (669b–670e).

653e5–654a1 ‘the gods whom we said were given to us as partners

in the dance (sunchoreutas dedosthai)’
The gods described at 653d4 as ‘fellow celebrants’ (sunheortastas) are
now identified more precisely as fellow performers of choreia (choral
dance); this indicates that the specific medium of their educational
influence is choral dancing. The connection between paideia and
choral training has already been hinted at in Book 1, 641b3. On the
central role of dance in choral performance, see note on 654a4–5.

654a2–3 ‘gave us pleasure in rhythm and “harmony” ’

more literally: ‘gave us rhythmic and harmonious sensation with
pleasure (tên enrhuthmon te kai enharmonion aisthêsin meth’ hêdonês)’
The educational significance of this pleasure is further elucidated at
660a5–8: a composer can train us to take pleasure in words or
gestures simply by setting them into rhythm and ‘harmony’. On
appropriate rhythms and ‘harmonies’, see 670a–e.

654a3 ‘and that is how they set us in motion’

Reading hêi dê instead of the MSS êdê (with England, Burnet,
Saunders 1972, Brisson/Pradeau).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 217

The MSS reading would yield the alternative translation ‘and then
they set us in motion’; thus Schöpsdau, who nonetheless takes the
Athenian to mean that this is a further step made possible by the gift
of ‘pleasure in rhythm and “harmony” ’.

654a4–5 ‘When they link us together in song and dance we call it a

chorus (chorous)—from the name for delight (charas)’
A choros in Plato’s time involved both singing and dancing
(654b3–4)—unlike a chorus in the sense of the English term
today—although the connection to dance is retained in the contem-
porary notion of a ‘chorus line’. The cognate verb (choreuein) and
abstract noun (choreia) are generally rendered ‘choral dance’ or
‘choral performance’ in this translation; the concrete noun (choros),
which refers to the ensemble of performers or to the institution (as in
the three choruses of 664b–d), is rendered ‘chorus’. On choral song
and dance in Plato’s day, see Morrow 1960: 302–18; Lonsdale 1993;
Athanassaki and Bowie 2011; Peponi 2012: 4–5; Calame 2013; and
Billings et al. 2013. See also Prauscello 2014.

654a6–7 ‘our initial education is through the Muses and Apollo’

Dionysus is here omitted (although mentioned along with the Muses
and Apollo at 653d3–4) because the present comment concerns
initial (prôtê) education—i.e. that of children, who have a natural
propensity to engage in the choral activities that will educate them.
Dionysus will be invoked later to address the educational challenge
of encouraging the elderly to participate in the music that will renew
their education (653d4), even though they have lost that enthusiasm
for song and dance (665d–666c, 671a–672d).

654a9–d4
Choral training shapes pleasures and pains
Having identified choral performance (a combination of song and
dance, 654b3–4) as the medium of education, the Athenian com-
pletes his sketch of the properly educated person. Such a person, who
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

218 Commentary: Book 2

‘sings and dances well (kalôs)’ (654b6–7), will both (a) perform
beautiful (kala) choral works (654b11–c1), and (b) experience pleas-
ure in beautiful things and distress at ugly things (654c4–d4). While
(a) introduces a topic to be treated at length in the next section
(654e–660a), which investigates what makes choral works beautiful
(further developed at 667b–670e), the emphasis here is on (b), which
reflects the definition of education at 653a–c as the correct dispos-
ition of a person’s feelings of pleasure, pain, likes, and dislikes. On
‘beautiful’ and ‘admirable’ as alternative translations of kalon, see
note on 630c7 and notes below. In the present passage, the Athenian
will be moving seamlessly between the aesthetic and ethical senses of
kalon in a manner that is difficult to lay bare in the translation. The
reader is invited to keep in mind that the ‘beauty’ in question
encompasses both ethical and aesthetic quality.

654b6–7 ‘the well (kalôs) educated person would be able to sing

and dance well (kalôs)’
alternatively: ‘the beautifully [admirably] educated person would be
able to sing and dance beautifully [admirably]’
The alternative translations take the relevant sense of kalon to be
aesthetic or ethical. The printed translation construes the adverb
kalôs in the generic sense in which it is interchangeable with eu
(well); on the semantic range of kalon, see note on 630c7. While
‘beautifully’ might a defensible translation in the present context,
which concerns choral music and the fine arts more generally, and
while ‘admirably’ has the advantage of continuity with the typical
translation of kalon as ‘admirable’ in Book 1, both adverbs in English
tend to function as superlatives of ‘well’, and so would give the
misleading impression here that the Athenian is overstating the
implications of his preceding remark that a properly educated person
has received a ‘proper (hikanôs) choral training’ (654b1).

654b11–c1 ‘ “He sings well (kalôs)” . . . provided the things he

sings and . . . dances are beautiful (kala)’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 219

alternatively: ‘ . . . provided the things he sings and . . . dances are
admirable’
The surface plausibility of the Athenian’s suggestion is evident in
the Greek: ‘he sings kalôs (adverb) provided the things he sings are
kala (adjective)’. On the translation of the adjective, ‘beautiful’
would be appropriate here if ‘the things he sings’ are (a) songs and
dances (i.e. works of choral art); however, they might also be (b) the
gestures and utterances of the choral dancer who performs the song
and dance, or (c) the behaviour represented or imitated in such song
and dance. In the case of (c) and possibly also (b), the ethical sense of
the adjective, captured by ‘admirable’, would be operative. Since
either the aesthetic or the ethical dimension of the kalon may be
operative here (and quite possibly both, as at 654c4–d4), the trans-
lation ‘beautiful’ is used with the intention that it stand for both. The
reader should keep in mind that ‘beautiful’ is used in a wider sense
than is natural in English (see note on 630c7).
Later, at 654e–660a and 667b–670e, the Athenian will investigate
the criteria for the beautiful choral art. Here, however, his emphasis
is on the behaviour and psychology of the person who has received a
proper choral training. This is in keeping with his present focus on
education (paideia) as a cultivated condition of a person.

654c4–d4
The well-educated person takes pleasure
in beautiful things
In this difficult passage—where both the ethical and the aesthetic
aspects of the kalon are operative, and the translation ‘beautiful’ is
used to capture both (see note on 630c7)—the Athenian sketches
three different psychological profiles and asks which is the best
educated. While the details of the passage are difficult and disputed,
his main point is clearly that the most important educational result of
choral training is to have properly cultivated feelings of pleasures and
pain (i.e. education as defined at 653a–c).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

220 Commentary: Book 2

The three people are contrasted along the following dimensions:
(a) whether they have correct thoughts about what is beautiful and
ugly (or admirable and shameful);
(b) whether they have correct pleasures and pains concerning what is
beautiful and ugly (or admirable and shameful);
(c) whether they are able to ‘adequately render in voice and gesture’
what is thought to be beautiful and ugly (or admirable and
shameful).

It is clear that the first person is correct on (a), that the second is
correct on (c) but not (b), and that the third person is correct only on
(b). Difficulties arise because the Athenian begins by asking whether
the second is better educated than the first and implies that he is not,
but he concludes by proposing that the third is better educated than
the second, without indicating the relationship between the first and
the third.
England proposes that the second and third persons are instances
of the first (reading the first ‘than’ (ê, 654c6) as ‘whether’; rejected by
Schöpsdau). It makes more sense to suppose that the Athenian makes
two successively stronger assertions with the two comparisons:

(i) the second person is less well educated than the first, because he
lacks correct pleasures and pains;
(ii) indeed, he is less well educated than anyone who has correct
pleasures and pains (even if such a person lacks the first person’s
correct thoughts).

For a different interpretation, on which the third person is the same

as the first, see note on 654c9–d3.

654c4–5 ‘suppose that what he considers (hêgoumenos) beautiful

(kala) really is beautiful and what he considers ugly (aischra) really is
ugly, and he treats them as such (houtôs autois chrêtai)’
alternatively: ‘ . . . what he considers admirable . . . and what he con-
siders shameful . . . ’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 221

The first person is here characterized in terms of his beliefs about
what is beautiful and ugly (where these notions encompass the
admirable and shameful); it is left ambiguous whether the kala and
aischra things are the songs and dances—just invoked at c1—or the
actions they imitate. The Athenian thus indicates that choral training
cultivates not only one’s singing and dancing abilities, but also one’s
evaluative outlook (views about what is kalon and aischron). The
meaning of ‘treats them as such’ (houtôs autois chrêtai) is not obvious.
If the verb chrêtai is parallel to the chreian orthên at 657c4 (see note
ad loc), it might mean that this first person has the correct pleasures
and pains attributed to the third person at 654d1–3. Or it could
extend to all ways of conducting oneself properly regarding admir-
able/beautiful and shameful/ugly things, in which case it would
extend to correct behaviour, not just correct feelings.

654c5–9 ‘Do we hold him to be better educated in choral dance

and music (choreian te kai musikên) than a person who is able to
comply in particular cases with what is thought to be beautiful
(to dianoêthen einai kalon), using his body and his voice, but who
fails to enjoy beautiful things and fails to hate their opposites?’
The second person’s speech and actions conform to received
standards of the kalon, although the passive to dianoêthen (‘what is
thought to be beautiful’) leaves it open that this person does not
himself believe these standards, which would mark a contrast with
the first person. In any case, the salient defect of the second person
(as the contrast with the third will make clear) is his failure to feel
pleasures and pains in line with these standards. Here, as in the
description of the third person (c9–d3), ‘using his body and his
voice’ is ambiguous between performing choral dance, and the
speaking the words and doing the actions represented in choral
dance (cf. 654e–655a).

654c9–d3 ‘Or is the better educated person the one who gets it
right in his pleasures and pains, embracing what is beautiful
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

222 Commentary: Book 2

[alt: admirable] and offended by what is not, even if he is not quite
able to get it right in voice and body or to grasp it in his thought?’
The third person, in failing to ‘get it right’ (katorthoun) in voice and
body, contrasts with the second person’s success in this domain, but
in ‘getting it right’ in pleasures and pains, he contrasts with the
second’s failure. His inability ‘to grasp it in his thought’ (dianoeisthai)
contrasts with the first person’s correct conception (hêgoumenos, c4)
of what is kalon and aischron. On the emendation favoured by
England (rejected by Schöpsdau but reflected in the translation of
Brisson/Pradeau), the translation would not be ‘or to grasp it in his
thought’ but ‘in the way he thinks of it’ (hêi dianoeisthai); in that case
the third person, like the first, would have correct thoughts about
what is kalon. A different reason for supposing the third is a version
of the first, suggested by an anonymous reviewer for the press, is that
‘grasping it in his thought’ (dianoeisthai) may be stronger than
‘considering’ (hêgeisthai), in which case the Athenian’s point would
be that, regardless of the first’s failure to achieve dianoia of beautiful
things (a higher epistemic standard than mere true belief, perhaps
equivalent to ‘grasping the account’ (logon lambanein) at 652b4),
his pleasure in the beautiful makes him better educated than the
second person. He would be an instance of those in whom ‘pleasure
and . . . pain . . . develop correctly in [their] souls when [they] are not
yet able to grasp the account’ (652b2–4). It is not obvious, however,
that the Athenian accords such a higher epistemic status to
dianoeisthai.

II
VIRTUE, NOT PLEASURE, I S THE STANDARD
OF CHORAL ART

654d5–660a8
Having stated that beautiful song and dance are the medium by which
education is to be cultivated and maintained (654c), the Athenian now
asks what such beauty consists in (and indicates that beauty is a matter of
correctness). He rejects the popular view that music is beautiful simply
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 223

insofar as it is pleasant, and proposes instead a standard of virtue: choral
song and dance is beautiful insofar as it depicts the speech and actions of
virtue (654e3–655b8). Taking pleasure in the behaviour of wicked
characters shapes one’s own character accordingly (655b9–656b8).
Thus it is important for the legislator to establish and enforce standards
for appropriate music (656c1–657c2). The view that pleasure is the
criterion of correct music derives its apparent plausibility from the
intimate relationship between our feelings of pleasure and our evaluative
judgements (657c3–658a3). The Athenian urges, on the contrary, that:
different kinds of people find different kinds of music most pleasant
(658a4–d10); the most authoritative verdict is that of the best educated
(658e1–5); and in musical education, the pleasures endorsed by the best
educated should be used to shape those of the inferior (658e6–659c5).
Thus, he concludes, the proper task for the composers of choral song and
dance is to make pleasant the speech and actions of virtue by casting them
into the pleasant vehicles of beautiful language, harmony, and rhythm
(659c5–660a8).

654d7–e1 ‘Without this knowledge . . . we could never know

whether there is any safeguard (phulakê) for education, or where it
is to be found’
A reference to the Athenian’s stated intention at 653a3 to establish
that drinking parties are a safeguard (sôtêria) for education. While
drinking parties are not presently the focus of discussion, the present
question about beautiful song and dance will turn out to occupy (at
least some) participants in drinking parties (those members of the
chorus of Dionysus whose task is to identify which choral compos-
itions are appropriate for performance—670d–e).

654e3–655b8
Beautiful choral music depicts the speech
and actions of virtue
Having concluded that beautiful choral dancing is the medium for
education (654a9–c2), the Athenian now turns to consider what
kind of choral works are beautiful.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

224 Commentary: Book 2

654e3–4 ‘like hounds in the hunt’
The same image is used at Parm. 128c, where the hounds are
Spartan. On hunting as a signature Spartan activity, see 633b.
Thanks to Henry Newell for the euphony and the cross reference.

654e4–5 ‘beautiful (kalon) gesture (schêma), tune (melos), song

(ôidên), and dance (orchêsin)’
alternatively: ‘admirable gesture, tune . . . ’
Gesture (schêma) and tune (melos) are the material of dance and song
respectively, as is clear below at 655a5. See also 672e–673a.

655a1–2 ‘Will their gestures (schêmata) and utterances (phtheg-

mata) be alike . . . ?’
Here the Athenian is talking about the behaviour of a real person, not
the depiction of such behaviour in song and dance, hence his use of
‘gestures’ and ‘utterances’ instead of the more usual pair ‘gestures and
tunes’ (as at 654e4, e9, 655a5, a7; cf. 669c5–8). Strictly speaking,
melos (tune) is a combination of words (logos), ‘harmony’, and
rhythm (Rep. 398c11–d9; see also note on 669c3–8). Thus tunes
(melê) are conceived of as the utterances of a person, and the schêmata
as the movements of the person’s body. When these utterances and
movements are set into rhythms and ‘harmony’, the result is song
and dance (655a4–7).

655a3 ‘How could they, since not even their colouring is?’
The colours invoked by Clinias are presumably those of people’s
faces or complexions, e.g. the pallor of the coward (thus England).
But the Athenian will take the occasion (655a4–8) to introduce an
objection to the use of ‘good colour’ (euchrôn)—in a special musical
sense—to answer the question he has raised about beautiful choral
music at 654d–e.

655a4–8 ‘it is not correct to speak of gestures or tunes as having

“good colour” (euchrôn) . . . [but ]as having good rhythm (euruth-
mon) or good “harmony” (euarmoston)’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 225

The translation reorders the clauses of Plato’s sentence. The Athenian
objects here to using the expression ‘good colour’ (euchrôn) to
describe music, but he will later use the term ‘colour’ (chrôma) to
refer to a feature of music (669c4) in a context which, like the present
one, invokes the notions of having ‘good rhythm’ (eurhuthmon) and
‘good “harmony” ’ (euarmoston, 670b9); he explains that the latter
features are a matter of a choral work’s rhythm and ‘harmony’ being
appropriate to its gestures and tunes (669b–670d). The Athenian’s
focus in the present passage, by contrast, is on beautiful gestures and
tunes considered independently of their specifically musical features
(e.g. ‘harmony’ and rhythm): his concern is whether they represent the
actions and utterances of virtuous people (see 655b3–6 and note ad
loc). His objection is not so much to the use of colour to describe
music, but to the notion that ‘having good colour’ is a criterion of
‘what is beautiful (kalon) in song and dance’ (654d5).

655a8–b1 ‘As for the gesture or tune of the cowardly or courage-

ous person, the correct thing to say is that those of the courageous are
beautiful (kala) and those of the cowardly are ugly (aischra)’
more literally: ‘It is possible to speak correctly about the gesture or
tune of the cowardly and the courageous, and the correct thing to say
is that those of the courageous are beautiful . . . ’
alternatively: ‘those of the courageous are admirable and those of the
cowardly are shameful’
The appropriate term to invoke when characterizing the gestures
and tunes of the cowardly or brave men is not ‘good colour’ but kalon
and its opposite, aischron. The latter terms are used in the sense that
invokes both ethical norms (‘admirable’/‘shameful’) and aesthetic
norms (‘beautiful’/‘ugly’). Thus the Athenian’s proposal that the
actions of the virtuous are kala is completely uncontroversial to his
interlocutor, who endorses it without hesitation (655b7). On the
ethical and aesthetic dimensions of the kalon, see note on 630c7.
Bury, by contrast, construes the Athenian as conceding that it is
appropriate to invoke colour to describe the gestures and tunes of the
cowardly or couragous person—which poses the difficulty that the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

226 Commentary: Book 2

Athenian has just denied the appropriateness of such language for
gestures or tunes (655a6–7); against Bury’s construal, see Saunders
(1972 ad loc), followed by Schöpsdau. Moss (2012: 207) goes one
step further than Bury and translates 655b1–2: ‘the colours of a brave
man are kalon and those of the cowardly man are aischron’; but the
antecedents of ta men . . . ta de in 655b1–2 are the ‘gesture or tune’
(schêma ê melos) of the brave and the cowardly in 655a9.

655b2–3 ‘going on at great length about every case’

That is, about all the virtues, not just courage.

655b3–6 ‘all the gestures and tunes connected with virtue of soul
or of body are beautiful—whether this is the virtue itself or its
representation—while all those connected with vice are the opposite’
The Athenian will later claim that choral music is a representational
(eikastikê) or imitative (mimêtikê) art (667c10, e10, 668a6–7; cf.
Rep. 392d–397b). In particular, he is about to say, it imitates the
characters (tropoi) of different people (655d5; repeated in Book 7,
798d8–9). Thus we may take the representations of virtue men-
tioned in the present passage to be the gestures and tunes involved in
the song and dance of a choral performance. Beautiful tunes and
gestures are therefore those that represent the speech and actions of
virtuous people. See also Hatzistavrou 2011: 367–8.

655b9–656b8
Taking pleasure in wicked characters shapes
one’s own character accordingly
We now turn to the pleasures that choral dance elicits in its per-
formers and audience (a topic originally introduced into the discus-
sion at 654d2–3). The Athenian begins by noting that people vary
considerably in how pleasant they find different choral works
(655b9–c2). He then asks what accounts for this divergence
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 227

(655bc3). What follows is an extremely puzzling stretch of text,
which may be divided into three parts:
(1) 655c4–d4: questions and opinions about the pleasant and the
kalon;
(2) 655d5–656a6: an explanation of how a single person could come
to have pleasures opposed to what he thinks is kalon;
(3) 656a7–b8: an explanation of the dangers of taking pleasure in
music that portrays bad characters.
While the relevance of (1), (2), and (3) to the question that elicits
them is not immediately obvious, a thread that unites the entire
discussion is the assumption, made explicit at 655e1–5, that what we
experience as pleasant seems kalon (beautiful or admirable) to us.
The upshot for the discussion of education through choral music is
that choral music must train us to take pleasure in behaviour that is
genuinely kalon.

655c3 ‘what . . . is the cause of this divergence (to peplanêkos

hêmas)?’
alternatively: ‘What . . . causes us to stray?’ (Brisson/Pradeau)
The verb planan (participle: peplanêkos) is ambiguous between ‘vary’
and ‘go astray’ (i.e. err). When the verb is repeated at the end of this
paragraph (655d3), ‘go astray’ best captures its sense—with mallon
(‘even more’) implying that planan is on a continuum with the
unspeakable error mentioned in d2–3 (although the explanation
that follows (655d5–656a5), at least at the beginning, might explain
interpersonal, as opposed to intrapersonal variation; see Mouze
2005: 158–9). Here, however, the Athenian may be trading on the
ambiguity, saying at least that we stray from each other in what pleases
us, and perhaps also implying (what he will make clear later is his
view) that we thereby stray from the truth. Schöpsdau’s translation,
‘abweichen’, nicely straddles both senses of planan, but there is no
English term that does the same, although Saunders’ ‘confusion’
comes close.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

228 Commentary: Book 2

655c4–d4
(1) Opinions about the pleasant and the kalon
In this difficult and compressed stretch of dialectic, the Athenian
considers how to explain the interpersonal variation in musical
pleasures that he has just called to our attention. He asks whether
the observation that:
(A) what pleases us in choral performance varies from person to person
is to be explained by the hypothesis that
(B1) what is kalon [in choral performance] varies from person to person.
Or whether we should reject (B1) in favour of:
(B2) it is only what we think kalon, not what is kalon, that varies
from person to person.
His main opponents are those who endorse pleasure as the criterion
of kalon music:
(C) music is kalon insofar as it is pleasant—
a version of which he articulates at 655c8–d2 (see note ad loc).
Those who espouse (C) are licensed to infer (B1) from (A), so it is not
unreasonable for the Athenian to frame the issue, which is ultimately
about (C), as a question about (B1). However, he presents his
audience with the choice between (B1) and (B2) before he has
introduced (C), so it makes sense for him to offer his audience an
explanation of why (B1) and (B2) are reasonable options to consider
as explanations of (A). This he does at 655c5–8, where he notes two
things that ‘no one would say’. Together, these amount to a view that
the Athenian also clearly endorses:
(D) if something pleases us, we judge it to be kalon (see note on
655c5–8).
The combination of (A) and (D) entails that:
(E) what we judge kalon [in choral performance] varies from person
to person—
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 229

which is neutral between (B1) and (B2).
This makes it reasonable to frame the issue as a choice between
them.

655c4–5 ‘Is it that the same works (t’auta) are not beautiful (kala)
for everyone (hêmin pasin)? Or that they are, but they just don’t seem
(dokei) to be so?’
alternatively: ‘Is it that the same things (t’auta) are not beautiful for
everyone . . . ?’
The Athenian’s language is imprecise and colloquial. He asks his
interlocutors to choose between (B1) and (B2) (see general note on
655c4–d4). The antecedent of t’auta could be very general (as in the
alternative translation: ‘the same things’); but in the present context
it most likely invokes the choral works just mentioned in b9–c1
(hence the present translation ‘same works’). On the rarity of the
locution kalon þ dative in Plato, see Barney 2010: 367.

655c5–8 ‘Presumably no one would say that the choral dances

(choreumata) of vice are more beautiful (kalliona) than those of
virtue, or avow that he takes pleasure in the gestures of wickedness
while others find enjoyment in a contrary Muse’
As at 655b3–6, the ‘choral dances of vice’ and the ‘gestures’ of wicked-
ness are to be understood as depicting the actions of vicious people. The
Athenian here makes two claims about what people will affirm:
(1) No one would say that vice is more beautiful (admirable) than
virtue.
(2) No one would say that he takes pleasure in the gestures and
sounds of vice while those with the opposing pleasures take
pleasure in virtue.

He offers these as a pair to explain (gar, 655c5) why the dilemma he

has just posed between B1 and B2 is relevant to the question at hand.
(2) concerns precisely the situation in which the explanandum (A)
obtains: different people enjoy different choral performances; (2)
implies that those who notice the variance between their own pleas-
ures and those of others will affirm that the behaviour they
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

230 Commentary: Book 2

themselves enjoy is virtuous rather than vicious. (1) allows this claim
about virtue and vice in (2) to be translated into a claim about what is
beautiful/admirable (kalon) and ugly/shameful (aischron). Hence the
two claims together amount to the view that everyone thinks that
what they take pleasure in is kalon (a version of (D)). They leave
indeterminate what one would say about ‘those with the opposing
pleasures’—so Schöpsdau is wrong to take (1) and (2) as support for
(B2) over (B1). In support of (1) see Gorg. 482d–e.

655c8–d2 ‘most people do say (legousin ge) that the power to bring
about pleasure in the soul is what makes music correct’
Here the original question about beautiful (kalon) music is replaced
by a question about correct music. This third observation about
what people say concerns a doctrine which the Athenian is about
to classify as ‘impious to pronounce’ d2–3. As articulated here, the
doctrine is:
(3) Music is correct to the extent that it provides pleasure.
If the correctness (orthotês) is to be understood as being beautiful/
admirable (kalon) (as indicated by 667c6–7) then (3) amounts to:
(C) music is kalon insofar as it is pleasant, against which the Athenian
will later marshal a sustained attack (658e–659c). Thesis (C) is what
motivates the wrong choice between the options (B1) and (B2)
articulated above. See general note on 655c4–d4.

655d2–3 ‘but another doctrine is even more likely to lead us astray

(planan hêmas)’
What ‘leads us astray’ (planan hêmas) will also ‘cause . . . the diver-
gence’ (to peplanêkos hêmas) at 655c3. The Athenian does not expli-
citly identify the doctrine. What he goes on to describe as pernicious
(655d5–656b7) is the condition of being pleased by things that
one judges to be wicked. Although one might construe someone
with these attitudes as a case that illustrates the Athenian’s claim
that what is pleasant may diverge from what is kalon, he rejects this
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 231

way of construing the claim. On the translation of planan, see note
on 655c3.

655d5–656a6
(2) Enjoying what one calls shameful
We are given first a brief account of the psychological factors giving
rise to (i) our verdicts about what is kalon and aischron, and (ii) our
reactions of pleasure and pain. Then that account is employed to
explain how (iii) one could come to call something ‘pleasant but
wicked’.

655d5–6 ‘choral dances imitate different types of character

(tropôn) found in all kinds of actions and fortune’
A person’s tropos is his or her character, as at Rep. 329d3. The
language here recalls Rep. 399a5–c4, which describes the range of
vicissitudes in which imitative music will present a dramatic charac-
ter’s response, a theme developed at length in Laws 7, 814e6–815d5.
Music in general (including poetry and dance) is treated as an
imitative (mimêtikê) or representational (eikastikê) art at
667d–668c; cf. 669e. Imitation is also discussed in later Books: 4,
719c; 6, 764d–e; 7, 796b, 798d, 812b–c, 817b. On this passage, see
also general note on 669b5–670a3.

655d6–7 ‘the performers drawing both on their . . . characters and

on imitation (kai êthesi kai mimêsesi)’
That is, to perform song and dance characteristic of a courageous
person, one either draws on one’s own courageous character (êthos—
used here as an alternative for tropos in the previous line) if one has it,
or if one lacks such a character, one imitates the actions of a person
who has it. In the former case, the performance will be pleasant,
according to the account that follows (655d7–e5), but the latter will
not (at least for the reasons about to be given). Presumably the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

232 Commentary: Book 2

composer makes the behaviour pleasant in the latter case by attaching
to it the pleasant media of ‘harmony’ and rhythm (cf. 654a).

655d7–e1 ‘When the words . . . comport with a performer’s char-

acter (pros tropou)—either with his nature (kata phusin) or with his
training (kata ethos) or with both—’
On tropos as character, see note on 655d6–7. In allowing that some
aspects of a person’s character are according to nature, the Athenian
does not mean that they cannot be altered by training (ethos; alter-
natively, sunêtheia as at 655e4 and 655e6–7); he means only that
they do not arise from training.
The terms ethos and sunêtheia are systematically ambiguous be-
tween (i) a trained or educated disposition (658e3 and 666d9; cf.
632d6) and (ii) the process of training that yields such a disposition
(653b5–6, 663c1, and 656d8). Even the verb ethizesthai, which
usually invokes the process (659d5 and 660a3), can capture the
disposition (as at 673d1, where it is translated as ‘propensity’).
Both senses (i) and (ii) are operative in the use of ethos and ethizesthai
in Book 3, 681b1–3. These terms are often translated as ‘habit’ and
‘habituate’; however, the English terms have a strongly behavioural
connotation, and the Athenian often applies the Greek terms to
dispositions to feel, not just to act.
The translation ‘training’ is nicely ambiguous between senses
(i) and (ii), and is used in the present volume for all occurrences of
ethos, sunêtheia, and their cognates, except at 625a5 (see note ad loc).
This volume also uses ‘training’ to translate gumnazein (athletic or
physical training) at 635c2–3, 626b5, 647c9, 648c3, and 648d3, d7.
On the distinction between êthos and ethos, see note on 625a5.

655e2–5 ‘will necessarily enjoy them and praise them and call
them beautiful (kala). But if the choral components run contrary
to his nature, type, or training the inevitable result will be that he
cannot enjoy or praise them but will instead call them ugly (aischra)’
alternatively: ‘will . . . enjoy them . . . and call them admirable
(kala) . . . ’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 233

On nature, type, and training, see note on 655d7–e1. We are told
here that those choral works just described as ‘in accord’ with a
person’s character (pros tropou, d7) are pleasant to us, while those
that are contrary to our character (para tropon) are unpleasant.
Presumably this means that for a courageous person it is pleasant
to perform songs and dances that depict the words and actions
characteristic of courage, and unpleasant to perform songs depicting
cowardly actions or words (cf. 669c and Book 7, 802c–e where
different rhythms and ‘harmonies’ are appropriate to different
kinds of people). We are also told that such pleasure and pain goes
along with the behaviour of praising and calling kalon (‘beautiful’ or
‘admirable’) the thing that pleases one. This behaviour is the external
manifestation of the ‘appearance’ that the behaviour is kalon. Thus
here too, as in the dilemma posed above (see note on 655c4–d4), the
Athenian assumes that what pleases us seems kalon to us. At 657c5–6
the Athenian will state the connection between pleasure and evalu-
ative judgements more explicitly (see note ad loc).

655e5–656a2 ‘where a person’s nature is correct, but his training is

the opposite, or his training is correct but his nature the opposite, his
praises will conflict with his pleasures, and he will call such choral
dances “pleasant but wicked (ponêra)” ’
more literally: ‘ . . . he will call each of these works “pleasant but
wicked” ’
The works in question are those in which ‘his praises conflict with
his pleasures’—with ‘praises’ used broadly enough to include both
positive and negative evaluative judgements (such as the verdict
‘wicked’ in the next line). Having explained how one comes to
take pleasure in choral music and to think it kalon (655d5–e5), the
Athenian now explains how one can come to have pleasures opposed
to what one calls kalon. He thus accounts for how people arrive at the
view that he claimed at 655d3 is ‘even more likely to lead us astray’.
The harmful consequences of the straying will be explained next at
656a7–b8. Here we are given the cause of the ‘straying’: either one’s
‘nature’ or one’s training (sunêtheia) is incorrect. The Athenian does
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

234 Commentary: Book 2

not simply say that the nature and training are inconsistent, but that
one of the two is incorrect; thus he must reject the first horn of the
dilemma at 655c4–5.
Note that these remarks concern the experience of choral music;
they do not purport to be a general discussion of psychological
conflict. The inconsistent response here described (being pleased in
what one calls aischron) should be distinguished from the phenomena
of psychological conflict described in the puppets metaphor in
Book 1 (644d–645c), which Mouze (2005: 160) links to the present
passage. In the puppets passage, conflicting impulses issuing from the
golden and iron strings pull a person in opposing directions: one
struggles to do what one’s calculation (logismos) directs, against the
opposing pull of pleasures and pains. But the ‘nature’ and ‘training’
invoked here are both aspects of the iron strings; each is treated as
capable of giving rise either to the affective response (pleasure/dis-
pleasure) or to the evaluative assessment (praising, calling it kalon or
aischron). These evaluative responses are intimately bound up with
the pleasures and pains that, according to 653a–c, must be trained
(ethizesthai) to follow one’s logos.

656a4–5 ‘ashamed to sing out their hearty approval’

more literally: ‘ashamed to sing out a hearty declaration that these
things are beautiful/admirable (kala)’

656a5 ‘although they do enjoy doing so when they are on their

own (par’ hautois)’
alternatively: ‘ . . . enjoy doing so inside themselves’
Taking para þ dative like French chez (as at 656d6; more literally:
‘at their own homes’). The alternative, ‘ . . . inside themselves’ (Saun-
ders, Brisson/Pradeau, Schöpsdau) is not a standard meaning of para
þ dative, and the Athenian’s point is not that such imperfectly
educated agents hide the pleasure they feel while performing shame-
ful songs in the presence of their betters, but that their sense of shame
either restrains them from engaging in those activities in the presence
of better people (or makes them feel shame if discovered in the act),
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 235

but that when on their own (or among bad characters—cf. 656b3–4)
they enjoy performing them. NB: shame is a version of fear
(646e10–647a2), which is one of the iron strings in the puppet
image (644c9–d1).

656a7–b8
(3) benefits and harms from choral pleasures
Whereas above (655d–e) the Athenian explained the causes of our
being pleased with some choral works and displeased with others,
here he considers the effect of such pleasures and pains, with par-
ticular focus on the question of whether the choral works to be
performed on a regular basis, as part of the educational curriculum,
may include (contrary to 655b) songs and dances depicting vicious
people. He identifies two harmful consequences of enjoying such
performances (656b2–6): one’s censure of such people becomes
insincere, and one becomes like them oneself.

656b1–3 ‘It’s just like what happens to someone who associates

with bad men of wicked character (ponêrois êthesin) and comes to
enjoy and welcome their company instead of disliking them’
‘Character’ here translates êthos, used in place of tropos (‘type of
character’) in 655d5, e3.
We are here given an account of how a person whose nature
(phusis) is decent comes to have a sunêtheia (trained disposition)
that is incorrect (as at 655e5–6). Regularly performing (or experien-
cing) choral art that depicts vicious behaviour is like spending time
with vicious people and thereby coming to enjoy their company; the
point is repeated at 669b8–c1. See Mouze 2005: 161–4; Hatzistav-
rou 2011: 362–6.

656b3–4 ‘When he condemns their wickedness it is as if he is

playing a game (hôs en paidias moirai) or dreaming’
more literally: ‘When he condemns them it is as if he is playing a
game and only dreaming of its badness’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

236 Commentary: Book 2

Reading autou tên mochthêrian in b4, with England; Schöpsdau
favours the alternative reading hautou (reflexive), which would yield
the translation: ‘only a dreaming grasp of his own badness’.
In keeping with the general claim above that one’s praises and
censures go along with one’s feelings of pleasure and pain, respect-
ively (655d7–e5), the Athenian here betrays the assumption that
those feelings of pleasure and pain affect the security or depth of
those evaluations: the person who condemns a bad activity but also
enjoys it has an impaired grasp of its badness (on the alternative
reading: of his own badness in enjoying it). Thus the person who
fully grasps what is kalon and aischron must love and take pleasure in
the one and hate and be pained at the other. For a forceful articula-
tion of the epistemic significance of feeling the right pleasures and
pains, see Moss 2012. While proper pleasures and pains will not
suffice for wisdom (653a), the Athenian here indicates that they are
necessary for it. On ‘playing a game’ (en paidias, 656b3) v. being
serious (meta spoudês, 656a5), see note on 635b5.

656b7 ‘this absolutely necessary consequence’

An arrestingly strong claim, which underscores the importance that
the Athenian places on early education (644a–b), and choral training
in particular, which trains us to ‘enjoy’ good characters rather than
bad ones (654c–655b). See note on 644b1–2.

656c1–657c2
Choral composition must be strictly regulated
Having just established that choral song and dance depicting vicious
characters will make its performers vicious (and similarly for virtuous
characters), the Athenian now concludes that the legislator (whose
concern with making the citizens virtuous was made clear in Book 1,
630c, 631a–c) must exercise strict controls over the choral compos-
itions to be used in education (656c1–8). He hails Egypt as an
example of such successful control (656d1–657a2). Only ‘beautiful’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 237

(656d7) or ‘correct’ (657a8) works are to be performed by the youth
of the city, and once the standards of such correctness are determined
(a task addressed later at 667b–670e) no composer is to be allowed to
transgress them (656d5–657a2).

656c1 ‘where there are good laws’

more literally: ‘where laws have been admirably established
(kalôs . . . keimenoi)’
See note on 634d9–e1.

656c2–3 ‘education (paideian) and recreation (paidian)’

A play on the similar words for education and for play, amusement,
or recreation. The phrase is restated at 657c3–4 as ‘music and
recreation’. On the range of the term paidia, see note on 635b5. In
the present context, as at 635b5, 649d9, 650a6, 657c4, d3, and
685a7, its connection to pleasure is especially salient.

656c4–5 ‘whatever rhythm, tune, or phrases they please’

Rhythm (rhuthmos), tune or melody (melos), and words or phrases
(rhêmata) are the three elements of choral composition invoked at
669b2–3. On rhuthmos, see also note on 653e3–5. On the relation
between melos and harmonia, see note on 669c3–8.

656c5–6 ‘teach it to the youths and children . . . in their choruses’

These are choruses composed of youths and children (see 664b–d).
On choral performance, see note on 654a4–5.

656c6–7 ‘regardless of the effect it may have on their development

towards virtue or wickedness’
more literally: ‘bringing about whatever may chance regarding (pros)
virtue or wickedness’ (taking hoti as the subject of tuchêi in c6: thus
Schöpsdau, against England)
On England’s preferred reading, the effect on the children is to give
them whatever character (virtuous or vicious) the poet happens to
have. The educational role of choruses is first introduced in 641b.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

238 Commentary: Book 2

656d7–8 ‘the youth of the city must be trained to practise (meta-
cheirizesthai tais sunêtheiais) beautiful (kala) gestures and songs’
That properly educated youths must perform beautiful (kalon) song
and dance was asserted at 654b–655d, where both the ethical and
aesthetic dimensions of kalon are operative (see notes on 654b6–7
and 654b11–c1). On sunêtheia as training (as at 666d9–10), see note
on 655d7–e1. On choral performance as a way to shape character,
see note on 656b1–3.

656d8–9 ‘Having established which ones are beautiful, and what

they are like’
Identifying these standards for kalon choral music will be the Athen-
ian’s focus from 667b–670e; he will reject the standard of pleasure at
657c–659c; cf. 667b–668b. On what these standards consist in, see
note on 656d9–e3.

656d9–e3 ‘they put these on display in their temples, permitting

no painter or anyone else who depicts gestures to introduce new
forms (kainotomein) or to invent anything that departs from the
ancestral tradition’
Here control of the visual arts is used to illustrate the way in which
choral compositions are to be regulated. As D’Angour (2006) notes
of Rep. 424b3–c6, the prohibition is not against composing new
works (aismata nea, 424c1) but against introducing new musical
forms (tropon ôidês neon, 424c2); the latter is called kainotomein in
the present passage (656e2; cf. 657b4–7 and note ad loc). That new
songs and dances will be allowed, even encouraged, is indicated at
665c5–7 (see note ad loc). The point of the restrictions invoked here
by the Athenian is to make sure that any new compositions are as
beautiful (kalon) as the old ones (657a1–2). What the requisite
musical orthodoxy consists in is not further specified here. Note
that he has already given at least a preliminary answer to the question,
raised at 654b–e, of what makes songs and dances beautiful: they
depict the words and actions of virtuous people (655a–b), but this
answer does not identify the specifically musical forms (on analogy
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 239

with the styles of painting in the Egyptian example) in which such
behaviour is to be depicted.
His later discussion will require that the rhythms and ‘harmonies’
of the work be appropriate to the gestures and songs (669b–670e).
This requirement, in conjunction with the restriction to the depic-
tion of virtuous activities (655a–b), would (on the musical theory of
Damon) effectively require that choral works be in the Dorian and
Phrygian ‘harmonies’ (see note on 669c3–8). (These ‘harmonies’ and
rhythms may be the ‘kinds’ (tropoi) and ‘forms’ (eidê) of music
invoked at Rep. 424b3–c6.) While the Athenian here suggests that
it will suffice to display exemplars of the allowed forms, his later
discussion will require ‘wise judges’ to discern whether the appropri-
ate ‘harmonies’ and rhythms are employed (see general note
on 669b5–670a3). On what ‘putting on display’ consists in, see
Rutherford 2013: 72–4.

657a1–2 ‘exactly the same art (technên)’

alternatively: ‘exactly the same technique’
An exaggerated claim, according to Griffith 2013: 21–2 and Rutherford
2013: 74–9.

657a4 ‘An extreme (huperballontôs) feat of legislation and statecraft

indeed (men oun)’
The Athenian here endorses Clinias’ remark of 657a3—‘that’s amaz-
ing’ (thaumaston legeis)—which is not an expression of disbelief (as
des Places, England, Schöpsdau, and Saunders construe it), but a
confirmation of the Athenian’s own ‘[y]ou will be amazed to hear’
(thauma kai akousai, 656d5); thus Brisson/Pradeau. Denniston’s
citation of the passage does not select between affirmative and
adversative senses of men oun (Denniston 1950: 475).

657a6–8 ‘it is possible to provide enduring stability to songs (melê)

that have a natural correctness (tên orthotêta phusei parechomena),
provided the legislator is bold enough (tharrounta)’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

240 Commentary: Book 2

The transmitted text poses intractable difficulties (discussed by Eng-
land, Saunders 1972, and Schöpsdau), some of which are alleviated
by construing tharrounta as invoking boldness rather than confidence
(see note on 644c9–d1). Schöpsdau rightly draws our attention to
the threefold occurrence of the verb in this paragraph. On natural
‘correctness’ (orthotês), see note on 657b2–3. For another example of
legislative daring on musical matters, see 663d6–e2.

657b2–3 ‘the standards of correctness in these matters

(autôn . . . tên orthotêta)’
more literally: ‘the correctness in these matters’
The same term, orthotês, is used at 657a8. It is clear from the use of
‘beautiful’ (kalon) at 656d7 and 657a1 that the Athenian under-
stands correct music as beautiful (kalon) music. He will return to the
topic of correctness in music at 667b–670e, where he will assign to
the Chorus of Dionysus the task of grasping, or at least applying, the
standards of correctness.

657b4–7 ‘the pursuit (zêtêsis) of pleasure and pain in the constant

striving after novelty in music (kainêi . . . mousikêi chrêsthai) has little
power to undermine (diaphtheirai) sanctified choral dancing (kathier-
ôtheisan choreian)’
alternatively: ‘the constant striving of pleasure and pain to experience
novelty in music . . . ’
The phrase ‘pursuit of pleasure and pain’ must be shorthand for
‘pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain’ since pain is a natural
object of avoidance rather than pursuit (634a8, 792d1, 875b8–9),
hence its status as an ‘opposing advisor’ to pleasure at 644c6. The
‘novelty in music’ (kainê mousikê, alt: ‘new music’) must be what is
referred to as ‘introducing new forms’ (kainotomein) at 656e2 (see
note on 656d9–e3). [K]athierôtheisan (sanctified) recalls the connec-
tion of music to religious festivals at 653c–d and the verb is used
again for the officially sanctioned music in Book 7 (799a4, 809b6,
813a2). The Athenian’s point is that giving the correct musical forms
a solid (cf. bebaiôs, 657a7) institutional basis in religious rites is a
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 241

sufficient and powerful antidote to the natural craving for novelty.
On the power of religious norms to combat the attraction of pleas-
ures, see also Book 8, 838a–c. On the new music of Plato’s time, see
note on 669d2–3.

657c3–660a8
Why pleasure is not the standard for judging choral works
Having established that the goal of musical education is to shape
citizens’ pleasures and pains, and that therefore legislators must take
steps to ensure that only beautiful song and dance are to be per-
formed in the choral performance that is the medium for such
cultivation (656d–657b), the Athenian now turns to consider the
popular thesis that beauty in music consists simply in its ability to
give pleasure. After acknowledging the considerations that give the
thesis its apparent plausibility (657c3–658a3), he details at length its
specific consequences (658a4–d10), which conflict with the assump-
tion, shared among the three interlocutors, that the verdict of the
best educated (specifically the elders) is authoritative on the relative
merits of musical compositions (658e1–5). He concludes that the
proper procedure for identifying beautiful music is to have the
virtuous select the music that will improve the pleasures of the
spectators and performers (658e6–659c5).

657c3–658a3
The apparent plausibility of the pleasure criterion
The intimate relationship between feelings of pleasure, evaluative
judgements, and choral music gives initial plausibility to the thesis
that the best choral music is that which gives the most pleasure.

657c3–4 ‘correct use (chreian orthên) of music and recreation’

‘Recreation’ translates paidia, intended here in the sense of pleasure
or amusement, as is clear at 657e4. See 656c2–3 and general note on
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

242 Commentary: Book 2

paidia at 635b5; cf. 673a7–8 and note. The notion of ‘use’ (chrêia)
here is difficult to construe, as the explanation given in the immedi-
ately following lines (657c5–6; see note) cites the intimate relation-
ship between our feelings of pleasure and our judgements of value,
rather than a way of ‘using’ or ‘employing’ music. ‘Use’ here might
have the same sense as the cognate verb chrêtai at 654c5, where
someone who has correct views about what is kalon and aischron
‘treats (chrêtai) them as such’—where the latter involves feeling
pleasure in the things one thinks kalon, and distress at those one
thinks aischron (see note ad loc). Alternatively, it might be the use of
music and pleasure as educational media, in which case the account
of correct use extends from 657c5 to 660a8.

657c5–6 ‘When we think we are doing well (eu prattein) we are

pleased (chairômen) and . . . when we are pleased we think we are
doing well’
A more explicit statement of the relationship between feelings of
pleasure and evaluative judgements than the implications at 655e2–5
(see note ad loc). Not only does one praise and call (prosagoreuein)
‘beautiful’ what one enjoys (655e1–5), but one thinks it good. eu
prattein is a synonym for eudaimonia (happiness); see note on 628d5.
On the connection between the beautiful/admirable (kalon) and
the good (agathon—adverb: eu), see notes on 637e5, 641b8–c1,
667c6–7.

657c8–d2 ‘unable to keep quiet . . . eager to dance in a chorus’

‘Keeping quiet’ (hêsuchian . . . agein) encompasses both keeping silent
and keeping still, while choral performance (choreuein) involves both
singing and dancing. The inability to refrain from sound and move-
ment recalls the juvenile propensity to engage in both that is invoked
as the origin of choral dance at 653e1–3 and 673a7–8; see notes
ad loc.

657d5 ‘we [elders] set up competitions’

 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 243

Competitions between choruses were a regular feature of religious
festivals in Plato’s time (see Morrow 1960: 377–9) and will be an
institution in the city of Magnesia as well (764c–765c, 828b–c).
Participants in such contests were the ‘festival performers’ of 657e1.
On the training for such competitions, see 665e6–8. On the elders as
the proper judges of choral works see 658e–659a and 670a–b.

657d9–e3 ‘So we don’t find entirely off the mark . . . the

opinion . . . that the most accomplished and deserving of victory is
the one who gives us the greatest pleasure and delight’
It is because we take pleasure in the performances we think are
beautiful, and think beautiful those performances that please us
(657c5–6; see note ad loc), that we might think that pleasure is the
criterion of beautiful performance. Thus Clinias endorses pleasure as
the criterion at 658a3. The Athenian endorses a qualified version of
the principle at 658e6–659a1, but he rejects the criterion outright at
667e9–668a4; see notes on 668a9–10 and 658e6–9.

658a4–e5
The divergence of verdicts on the pleasure criterion
Those of different age, sex, and education would judge different
compositions most pleasant. However, the most authoritative judge-
ment would be from those with the best education, the elders. The
Athenian here sets out to raise problems for the pleasure criterion,
pointing out that it conflicts with his and his opponents’ view that
elders should be the judges of musical competitions in which young-
er performers compete.

658a4 ‘In these matters . . . “perhaps” is not good enough’

more literally: ‘let us not judge quickly (tachu) in such a matter’
Here tachu refers back to Clinias’ answer tach’ an (a3), translated as
‘perhaps’ (alternatively: ‘probably’).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

244 Commentary: Book 2

658a5 ‘divide (diairountes) the matter into its parts (kata merê)’
On the method of division (diairesis), see note on 631a8–b1. The
relevant parts invoked over 658a–e are the pleasures of different
kinds of people.

658c3 ‘which one is rightly (dikaiôs) the winner?’

Note the assumption that there is a rightful winner. It is to this
assumption that the Athenian will appeal in order to discredit the
pleasure criterion. Clinias, in taking this question to be ‘strange’ (c4),
as well as in his explanation of that strangeness (see note on 658c4–
6), shows that he has no idea that the pleasure criterion puts his own
judgements on a footing with those of every other person, a point the
Athenian is only about to make.

658c4–6 ‘How could anyone answer . . . without having listened to

each of the contestants himself?’
Clinias responds as if he is being asked which of the performers he
himself would find most pleasing, rather than which of them would
please the most spectators. In effect, he is adopting the criterion that
the Athenian will articulate below at 658e1–4.

658c7–8 ‘Shall I tell you the strange (atopon) reply?’

Clinias has evidently not considered the consequences of the pleasure
criterion, about to be drawn, which conflict with his assumptions
that the elders are the authoritative judges.

658c10–d8 ‘if the very small children are delivering the verdict,
won’t they select the puppeteer? . . . But we old men . . . would de-
clare [the rhapsode] to be the overwhelming winner’
The Athenian predicts that the audience members’ verdicts will differ
according to age, sex, and education. When he claims, subsequently,
that the verdict of his own age and sex class (old men) is the most
authoritative, since their training is the ‘best by far in any city
anywhere today’ (658e3–4), the comparison is presumably with
that of other age and sex groups. On the different verdicts, see
Folch 2013: 342–5.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 245

658e1–3 ‘you and I at any rate (ge) must declare the proper
winners to be those selected by our own age group’
One might suppose, given the restrictive ge, that this expresses the
psychological necessity noted above (655d–656a; cf. 657c) of taking
to be most beautiful whatever pleases one the most. But this would
not show that the elders’ verdict is more authoritative, which the
Athenian’s next sentence affirms (see note on 658e3–4); see also note
on 658c4–6. On the elders as proper judges of music, see Bartels
2012.

658e3–4 ‘For our training (ethos) seems to be the best by far in any
city anywhere today’
‘Training’ here translates ethos (see notes on 655d7–e1 and on
656b1–3). It refers to the cultivated disposition, alternatively re-
ferred to as sunêtheia at 655e4, where it is distinguished from one’s
phusis, as a distinct aspect of one’s character (tropos) (655d–656a). It
arises from musical training (656d7–8). The main force of the
present claim is that in any city today, the cultivated disposition of
the elders is superior to that of other age groups. The restriction of
the comparison to the present (nun) might, as England suggests,
leave room for the further expertise that members of the Chorus of
Dionysus will need (670a–e). At any rate, the Athenian is not seeking
to prove that the education of the elders is best; he simply appeals to
his interlocutors’ own assumption that they themselves are the
authoritative judges of musical compositions (cf. 657d5–7) to
show that this stance conflicts with the pleasure criterion. At
666d8–e1 he will allege that his interlocutors’ training was in fact
deficient.

658e6–659c8
Music should improve the pleasures of the audience
The judges of choral competitions should not be swayed by the
approval of the audience, since the function of music at those
festivals (as was said at 654a) is to shape the pleasures and pains of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

246 Commentary: Book 2

the mass audience, not to reinforce those they already have. Hence
the poets should take their standards from the qualified judges, not
from the audience.

658e6–9 ‘I agree with the majority this far at any rate: that music is
to be judged (krinesthai) by pleasure—not, however, the pleasure it
affords any random person. My view is, roughly, that the finest
(kallistên) Muse delights the best people’
The majority view is stated at 657d9–e3 and will be rejected at
668a9–10 (see note ad loc). Note that the Athenian’s positive
statement of his view (‘the finest Muse . . . ’) does not endorse pleas-
ure as the criterion by which the best people evaluate music; rather he
notes the extensional equivalence between the finest music and that
which pleases the best educated. When he says below that such
judges require wisdom and courage (659a3–4), he implies that
their verdict is an expression of wisdom. Thus there is no substantive
conflict between what he says here and his categorical rejection of the
pleasure criterion at 668a9–b2. See notes ad loc and Moss 2012:
213. The criteria by which the best educated will judge (krinein)
music will be detailed at length at 669b–670e. (Hatzistavrou (2011:
367) proposes to avoid the conflict by supposing that pleasure is a
criterion for the Athenian only in the sense that good music must be
pleasant to the young people it is intended to educate; however, the
present passage clearly tells against that proposal.)

659a3–4 ‘they must possess not only wisdom (phronêseôs) but

courage as well’
The requirement of wisdom (phronêsis) is explained at 659a4–6, and
that of courage at 659a6–b1. On the wisdom involved in complete
virtue, see note on 653a7–9. Presumably here it is understood to
include the expertise outlined at 668b–670e for evaluating musical
compositions.

659b4–5 ‘This used to be possible under the ancient law of the

Greeks’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 247

See Book 3, 700a–701e, where the view that music is to be judged by
the criterion of pleasure is also roundly rejected.

659b5–6 ‘the Sicilian and Italian law (nomos)’

Here, as in the previous line, nomos probably indicates a practice or
norm rather than a statute. See Introduction.

659c3–4 ‘better characters than their own’

‘Character’ here translates êthos—as at 656b1–3 (see note ad loc); it is
the ‘type’ (tropos) invoked at 655d5–e5.

659c9–660a8
Composers should present serious content
in pleasant media
The Athenian concludes his rejection of the pleasure criterion and
draws together the strands of his previous accounts of education and
music. The job of the poets is to put into pleasant vehicles (beautiful
phrases, ‘harmony’, and rhythm) the speech and actions of virtue.
Songs are ‘charms’ to make serious matters pleasant.

659c9 ‘the third or fourth time’

The account of education about to be recapitulated was first sketched
in Book 1 at 643b–644b and then set out more fully at the beginning
of Book 2, 653a–c. On the relationship between the three accounts,
see Mouze 2005: 113–19.

659d1–4 ‘education is the drawing (holkê) and guidance (agogê) of

children towards the correct account (logon) that is articulated by the
law and accepted as correct by the worthiest and eldest citizens on the
basis of their experience (di’ empeirian)’
Building on his previous statements that education trains a person’s
pleasures and pains to agree (sumphônein) with one’s account (logos,
653b–c), and that the elders are the authoritative judges of music
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

248 Commentary: Book 2

(658e), the Athenian here elaborates that the account (logos) in
question is:
(1) articulated in the law (cf. 644d2–3, 645a5, b4–8, and note on
644d2–3); and
(2) expressed in the judgements of those elders.
Thus the sumphônia (agreement) to be cultivated (659e3) is inter-
personal agreement across generations, obedience to the law, and to
the elders of the community, in contrast with the intrapersonal
sumphônia in the ‘complete virtue’ mentioned at 653b6. On ex-
perience (empeiria), see also 632d5 and 673c7. The language here
recalls the puppet metaphor in Book 1 where the gold and iron
cords are pulls (helxis, agôgê) that draw against each other (anthelk-
ein). On England’s proposal that education, as conceived in the
present passage, supplies the requisite ‘assistants’ to the golden cord,
see note on 645a1. On the translation of logos as ‘account’, see Moss
2014 and note on 653b3–4. It is also worth noting that nomos
(law) can also mean ‘song’ or ‘melody’ (700b5), and the message
‘articulated by the law’ (hupo tou nomou) in the present passage
(659d2–3) is equally the message of the songs about to be invoked
in 659e–660a.

659d5 ‘trained to feel pleasure or pain’

alternatively: ‘habituated (ethizêtai)’
The same verb is used at 660a3. The habituation or training is
what cultivates the ethos or sunêtheia which is part of a person’s
character type (tropos) (see 655d7–e1 and note ad loc). The culti-
vated disposition that results is called ‘education’ (paideia) at
653a–c, and it is inculcated by participation in choral song and
dance (654a).

659d6 ‘those who accept the law’

more literally: ‘those who are persuaded (pepeismenois) by the law’
On the significance of persuasion, see note on 632b7–8.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 249

659e1–3 ‘Bringing about this “agreement” . . . is the very serious
purpose (espoudasmenai) of the things that we call “songs” (ôidas)
(which are really charms (epôidai) for our souls)’
A playful etymology meant to make the point that the pleasure
afforded by song and dance attracts us to the words and gestures
set into these agreeable forms, even if we would not antecedently find
those words and gestures agreeable without this pleasant packaging.
On songs as charms, see also 664b, 665c, 666c, and Morrow 1960:
309–12; Helmig 2003; and Mouze 2005:165–8. On ‘agreement’
(sumphônia), see note on 653b4–5. On the serious v. the playful, see
note on 659e3–5.

659e3–5 ‘Children’s souls . . . can’t abide seriousness (spoudên), so

we perform these charms in the playful guise of songs’
more literally: ‘they are performed as play and songs (paidiai te kai
ôidai kaleisthai te kai prattesthai)’
On the contrast between paidia (play or recreation) with seriousness
(spoudê, e4), see note on 635b5.

659e5–660a1 ‘We are like those who care for the ill and infirm,
who deliberately use pleasant-tasting dishes and drinks to deliver
wholesome foods’
more literally: ‘ . . . who try to serve (peirôntai . . . prospherein) whole-
some food in pleasant dishes and beverages’
The songs or charms just mentioned are the medium by which the
young are to be trained to delight in what their elders recognize to be
good, on analogy with the way a child may be trained to take pleasure
in wholesome foods by getting used to eating them in pleasant-
tasting dishes. By contrast, Moss (2012: 218) implies that ‘those
who care for the ill and infirm’ deliver foods that are naturally
pleasant with no need of culinary art to make them appealing. But
the Athenian’s point here is that the ill and infirm do not find
nutritious food appealing, any more than children find appealing
the serious business involved in the actions and utterances of the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

250 Commentary: Book 2

virtuous. Moss’ main concern is to insist that the pleasure afforded by
kalon music is not contingently connected to the features that make
it kalon; however, the Athenian’s concern in the present passage is
not with the pleasantness of kalon music but with its message or
content, which he claims will not appeal to children or to improperly
educated adults. On what makes music kalon besides its message or
content, see 668e–670e and general note on 668b9–669b4.

660a5–6 ‘The . . . legislator will persuade the composers to do the

same thing with their lovely and laudable phrases (kalois rhêmasi kai
epainetois), and if he fails to persuade them he will compel them’
alternatively: ‘the legislator will use beautiful (alt: admirable) and
laudable phrases to persuade . . . ’ (Brisson/Pradeau)
The option of persuasion is omitted when the point is restated at
660e2. While it is important that the citizens be persuaded by the
legislator rather than simply forced (see note on 632b7–8; cf.
663e1–2), the Athenian does not hold the same scruples about the
poets. The ‘lovely and laudable phrases’ (660a5) are, with the ‘har-
mony’ and rhythms about to be mentioned (660a7), the pleasant
vehicles for the legislator’s message, analogous to the pleasant-tasting
dishes in the nutrition analogy (659e5–660a3). On Brisson/
Pradeau’s alternative construal of the syntax, it is the legislator, rather
than the poet, who functions analogously to the nutritionist.

I II
THE TEACHINGS OF BEAUTIFUL
CHORAL MUSIC

660b1–664b2
In response to Clinias’ claim that only Spartan and Cretan cities conform
to the standards of beautiful music articulated above (660b1–d10), the
Athenian articulates the doctrines that he expects beautiful music will
teach. The central teaching is that the just life is happy and pleasant,
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 251

while the unjust is unhappy and unpleasant, no matter how many
advantages the former lacks and the latter contains (660d11–662a8).
This thesis is, to the Athenian, as ‘obvious’ as that ‘Crete is an island ’
(662b4), but to Clinias and Megillus, who have been taught differently
in their Cretan and Spartan education, it is quite implausible. After
offering a battery of arguments for the thesis and for the importance of
persuading citizens to accept it (662c6–663e2), the Athenian concludes
with the optimistic assessment that, no matter how implausible a thesis is,
poets are capable of persuading children of its truth (663e3–664b2).

660b1–2 ‘is this how you think poets compose in other cities
today?’
more literally: ‘ . . . how they compose (poiein) . . . ’
‘Composing’ (poiein) here is broad enough to encompass the
creative activity of poets as well as of musical composers and chore-
ographers—that is, the producers of works in all the genres of art
encompassed by mousikê (see note on 642a4). Hence poiêtês is
translated as either ‘poet’ as at 659b8, 660e2, 662b5, or as ‘com-
poser’ 668c2, 669d2, 670b5 (and as both at 669c2); the related
poiêtikos is rendered ‘composer’ at 656c3 and 660a4.

660b2–5 ‘except in my own home and in Sparta, I don’t see that

things are done in the way you describe. Rather, there is always
something new (kaina) going on in dance and in the other branches
of music’
Clinias has in mind the Athenian’s claim that innovation in musical
forms (kainotomein) is not to be tolerated (656d–657b; see note on
656d9–e3), not his most recent point that the legislator must use this
pleasant medium to promulgate wholesome doctrines (659e–660a).
It is on the latter front that the Athenian will find Dorian music
deficient.

660b6–7 ‘with the changes guided not by law (hupo nomôn) but by
unregulated (ataktôn) pleasures’
On institutions that cater to the audience’s pleasures, see 659a–c.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

252 Commentary: Book 2

660c6–d1 ‘it is never pleasant to inveigh against errors . . . although
sometimes it is necessary to do so’
An anticipation of his own impending criticism of Spartan and
Knossan music (660d–663e).

660d6–7 ‘their practice would be more admirable (kallionôs houtôs)

than at present’
An instance of the ethical/political dimension of the kalon, prevalent
in the discussion of institutions in Book 1. See note on 630c7.

660d11–661d5
Music must teach that the just are happy
and the unjust unhappy
The Athenian here claims that poets must be compelled to affirm a
very strong pair of doctrines about the relationship between justice
and happiness (660e2–6). He illustrates this by revising a poem of
Tyrtaeus (criticized in Book 1, 629a–e) in line with the mandated
doctrines (660e7–661a4), and then articulates a further set of doc-
trines about ‘so-called goods’ (661a4–d5). On the relationship
between the two sets of doctrines, see general note on 661a4–d5.

660e1 ‘musical education’

more literally: ‘education (paideia) and music (mousikê)’
The two types of paideia (education) are ‘music’ (encompassing
poetry, drama, song, and dance) and athletics (gumnastikê); see
note on 642a4 and on 673a8–10.

660e2–6 ‘the good man, since he is moderate and just, is happy

and blessed—whether he is tall and strong or short and weak . . . [or]
wealthy— but . . . the unjust man, no matter whether he is “richer
than Cinyras and Midas”, is wretched and lives miserably’
‘Happy’ (eudaimôn) here means living well, not simply feeling
satisfied or content (see note on 628d5). ‘[R]icher than Cinyras
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 253

and Midas’ is a quotation from the poet Tyrtaeus (fr. 12.6 West),
which the Athenian is about to revise (660e7–661a4) to fit the
doctrines articulated here. Height, strength, and riches are invoked
as examples of the ‘so-called goods’ that the Athenian will enumerate
more fully below (661a5–b4). The doctrine that the poets are
supposed to promulgate is a combination of (1) a sufficiency thesis:
that the just person is happy no matter how many of these so-called
goods he lacks, and (2) a necessity thesis: that the unjust person is
unhappy, no matter how many of them he possesses (i.e. justice is
necessary for happiness). While Bobonich (2002: 213–14) correctly
notes that the Athenian’s literal statements here do not on their own
entail the sufficiency thesis (for they leave open that some minimal
level of so-called goods is required for happiness), they do entail it if
‘whether he is tall and strong . . . ’ is illustrative (meant to invoke all
the so-called goods) rather than exhaustive (thus Annas (1999: 45)
on the list of goods at 631b–d). For further discussion of the
sufficiency thesis, see general note on 661a4–d5.

Tyrtaeus rewritten
660e7–9 ‘Your poet says, if he speaks correctly, “I would not
memorialize . . . a man” who fails to accomplish with justice all his
so-called admirable (kala) achievements’
The poet is Tyrtaeus, whose central role in Dorian education has
been discussed in Book 1 (629a–630d). The ensuing pastiche of
quotation and paraphrase, which extends to 661a4, is manifestly not
what Tyrtaeus said. Thus the Athenian’s point is that the Dorian
poet does not ‘speak correctly’. (Only verbatim quotations from
Tyrtaeus are enclosed in quotation marks in the translation.)
Tyrtaeus himself wrote that he will not praise a person who (i)
‘outruns the North Wind of Thrace’ or is (ii) ‘richer than Cinyras or
Midas’ unless he (iii) ‘lays waste the enemy, assailing him at close
quarters and emboldened at the sight of bloody slaughter’ (fr. 12
West)—a stance that the Athenian criticizes in Book 1 for invoking
only a partial and impoverished conception of virtue (629a–630c).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

254 Commentary: Book 2

The Athenian here rewrites these verses to have the poet proclaim
that he will not praise anyone who accomplishes (i) or (iii) unless
they possess justice; he has just quoted from Tyrtaeus at 660e5 to
make the same claim about the person in (ii).
The unstated presupposition connecting these putative poetic
teachings (which concern who is worthy of praise) to the mandated
doctrines of 660e2–6 (which concern who is happy) is that a poet
who ‘memorializes’ or praises a person thereby declares him to be
happy.

660e9–661a2 ‘even one who (kai dê kai) in such a condition

(toioutos ôn) “lays waste the enemy and assails him at close quarters”,
but is unjust (adikos de ôn)’
A multiply ambiguous set of phrases. On the most natural reading of
the sentence (followed by Brisson/Pradeau), ‘in such condition’
(toioutos de ôn) means ‘without justice’—i.e. toioutos (661a1) refers
back to mê . . . meta dikaiosunês (660e8–9). So construed, these
lines are a straightforward application of the doctrine mandated at
660e2–6. However, it is also natural to read the participial phrase,
‘but is unjust’ (adikos de ôn, 661a2), as parallel to and contrastive
with toioutos ôn—in which case ‘in such a condition’ would mean
‘with justice’ and toioutos would refer back to meta dikaiosunês
(660e9). However, the sentence as a whole makes more sense if we
construe ‘toioutos’ in the first way, in which case the contrast marked
by de in adikos de ôn would not be with toioutos ôn (since this too
means he is unjust) but with the immediately preceding phrase
directly quoted from Tyrtaeus (‘assails (oregoito) him at close quar-
ters . . . ’, 661a1). So construed, the participial phrase modifies the
subject of oregoito in a1.

661a2–4 ‘or who is “emboldened (mête tolmôi) by the sight of

bloody slaughter”, or “outruns (mête nikôi) the North Wind of
Thrace”, or achieves (mête autôi . . . gignoito) any other of the so-
called goods’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 255

more literally: ‘or one who does not [sc. with justice] feel embolde-
ned . . . or outrun . . . or achieve . . . ’
This unwieldy continuation of the relative clause begun at 660e8
(hos mê . . . meta dikaiosunês prattoi—‘who fails to accomplish with
justice . . . ’) risks saying the opposite of the message (660e4–6) that
the sentence is intended to illustrate. The present translation takes
the mê in mête tolmôi . . . mête nikôi . . . mête gignoito to apply not to
the verb but to an implicit predicate phrase meta dikaoisunês, which is
explicit in the original hos mê clause. Without some such implicit
supplement, the rewritten Tyrtaeus will be refusing to praise anyone
who fails to be emboldened, win races, or acquire other so-called
goods. But such a declaration would fail to express the doctrine that
the Athenian has just announced the poet will affirm (660e4–6).
Matters are even worse if one takes adikos de ôn in a2 to modify the
subject of the optatives in 661a2–4 (as do Schöpsdau, Brisson/
Pradeau, Saunders, Taylor, des Places, Pangle, and apparently
England), for then we are faced with the embarrassment that the
revised Tyrtaeus is refusing to praise any unjust person who fails to
be emboldened . . . etc. Following England, these translators solve
the problem by treating the optatives as expressing the poet’s wish
(that the unjust person not be emboldened, outrun, etc.). This is a
desperate measure, since those optatives are syntactically parallel to
the optatives in the original hos mê clause in 660e8, and thus should
be construed as within the scope of that relative clause. Schöpsdau
glosses the wish as based on the view (to be articulated below at
661b–d) that such things are not good for an unjust person to have.
However, we have not been told that poets will be compelled to wish
their subjects well, and the intrusion of such a suggestion here is an
unhelpful distraction from the Athenian’s clear message. While Plato
could have avoided this confusion by writing
h n 
ºfiH . . . etc.,
instead of  
ºfiH . . . , he is probably attracted to the latter
because it replicates Tyrtaeus’ own N c ºÆÅ (fr 12.11 West),
and yields the superficially parallel structure: n c . . . æ 
Ø . . . ,
 
ºfiH . . . ,  ØŒfiH . . . ). As England laments of another
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

256 Commentary: Book 2

passage (632b6): ‘It is impossible not to wish that Plato had lived to
rewrite this whole passage.’

661a4–d5
So-called goods and bads
Having insisted (660e5–661a4) that the unjust person must be
proclaimed unhappy, no matter how many ‘so-called goods’
(661a4) he has, the Athenian now turns his attention to these so-
called goods. While most people call ‘good’ such things as wealth,
strength, keen senses, military prowess, and the like, such things are
in fact only good for the good person, and are positively bad for the
unjust person. Indeed, their opposites (‘so-called bad things’) are
good for such a person; they are bad only for the just person.

Justice, happiness, and so-called goods

It is worthwhile to consider the relationship between the theses
introduced here about about so-called goods and bads, and the theses
of necessity and sufficiency that are identified, at 660e2–6, as the
message to be promulgated by correct poetry:
Sufficiency:

(1) Anyone who is just is happy

Necessity:

(2) Anyone who is not just is unhappy

The doctrines expounded here (661a4–d5) are:
So-called goods: such things as health, good looks, wealth, etc. are:

(3) good to the just person;

(4) bad to the unjust person.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 257

So-called bads: losing or lacking such things as health, good looks, wealth,
etc. are in fact:

(5) good for the unjust person;

(6) bad for the just person.
Bobonich takes the so-called goods to be the ‘human goods’ that are
distinguished from divine goods in Book 1 (631b–d), and he pro-
poses that (3), (4), (5), and (6) are intended to elucidate the thesis,
articulated in that earlier context, that the human goods depend on
the divine (Bobonich 2002: 89, 123–7):
Dependent Goods thesis (631b–d):
Human goods (health, strength, wealth, etc.) depend on the divine goods
(wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage), which themselves all stem
from wisdom.

A problem for this hypothesis, as Bobonich notes, is that theses (4)

and (5) are considerably stronger than the Dependent Goods thesis
(thus he takes them to be hyperbolic overstatements by the Athenian;
Bobonich 2002: 126–7, 183–4). Moreover, we might add, the
Athenian gives no indication that the Dependent Goods thesis is
under discussion in the present context (see note on 661a5–b3). If
anything, (3), (4), (5), and (6) are invoked here in elucidation of the
Sufficiency and Necessity theses—i.e. (1) and (2). But while (4)
provides some support for (2), by addressing the main consideration
that might appear to count against it, it is hard to see what relevance
(3), (5), and (6) have to either (1) or (2). Indeed, (6) might well be
invoked to mount a challenge against (1)—e.g. how could a just
person who is suffering the afflictions of Job be considered happy?
Perhaps, however, it is a mistake to construe (3), (4), (5), and (6)
as providing philosophical grounding for (1) and (2). After all, these
are supposed to be attitudes inculcated by poets in musical compos-
itions, the performance of which shapes citizens’ feelings of pleasure
and pain, starting right from childhood (654a, 659d–660a).
In shaping citizens’ feelings of pleasure, we are told, music cultivates
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

258 Commentary: Book 2

their judgements about what is beautiful or admirable (kalon) and
good (see notes on 655e2–5 and on 657c5–6). We may accordingly
suppose that poetic compositions inculcate (1) and (2) in the citizens
by training them to be pleased with virtuous people and displeased
with vicious people, no matter what vicissitudes of life befall those
characters. Similarly, the attitudes expressed in (3) and (4) will be
inculcated by musical training that cultivates a disposition to be
pleased by the so-called goods only if the virtuous person receives
them, and to be repelled by the thought of the vicious person
receiving them. And correspondingly for (5) and (6), which concern
attitudes towards the so-called bads: proper musical education will
train the citizens to be pleased when the bad person incurs them, and
sorrowful when they happen to the good person. So construed, (1)
through (6) express a psychologically coherent set of evaluative
attitudes (towards virtue, vice, and the so-called goods and bads)
whose polarities and symmetries make it well suited to a medium
that paints in broad strokes and has a limited normative vocabulary.
Such a scheme of values is philosophically unrefined. For example,
it lacks the resources to answer definitively such questions as
whether the good person can be happy on the rack (a question
debated by later philosophers), whether happiness admits of degree,
whether the so-called goods are components of happiness, or whether
a person can be virtuous without possessing a certain level of so-called
goods. The latter are questions raised by philosophical readers of
Plato today, in a debate over whether Plato actually endorses the
Sufficiency thesis (for example, Bobonich 2002: 209–15; Annas
1999: 31–51; Irwin 1995: 343–7). However, if we keep in mind
the medium that is supposed to be delivering this scheme of values,
and its intended audience, we should be wary of taking the present
passage to furnish the materials for identifying Plato’s own
nuanced answer to these philosophical questions. See also note on
662a7.

661a5–b3 ‘They say that being healthy is the best, having good
looks is second, and wealth is third’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 259

This list of ‘so-called goods’ (legomen’ agatha) is not presented as
exhaustive. One might suppose, with Bobonich (2002: 123–7), that
they coincide with the ‘human goods’ that are said to depend on the
‘divine goods’ (the virtues) at 631c. However, it is possible to
construe the ‘dependence’ of the human on the divine goods as
involving the possession of the virtues (e.g. wealth is characterized
as a ‘human good’ in terms that suggest it involves wisdom—see note
on 631c1–5). On such a construal, the human goods would be the
‘so-called’ goods conjoined with the virtues. The ranking of the
so-called goods in the present passage is not precisely the same as
that of the human goods at 631c (which inserts physical prowess
before wealth), but it does coincide precisely with the ranking in the
popular drinking song (skolion) that is quoted at Gorg. 451e (see note
on 631c1–5). Thus even the present remarks, no less than the
preceding attack on Tyrtaeus, are a criticism of popular poetry.

661b3–4 ‘achieving immortality upon acquiring all these goods’

Note that immortality is not a so-called good in the same way as the
other items on the list; its goodness, as presented here, seems to
consist in prolonging the goodness of the other so-called goods, if
one has them. This is why it is an evil to someone whose life is
unhappy (661c4–5); cf. Bobonich 2002: 181. On the striving for
immortality, see Symp. 207a.

661b5 ‘you and I on the other hand presumably say’

The ‘presumably’ is ironic, as the Athenian evidently expects his
interlocutors to balk at affirming these doctrines (cf. 661d7–e4).
Note that the Athenian switches seamlessly here from the question
of what the poets should affirm in their musical compositions to
the views of people who have been educated by those compositions.
It is because the doctrines that the Athenian has just articulated
are not promulgated in the musical education in Knossos and
Sparta that Clinias and Megillus do not take them to be ‘obvious’
in the way that the Athenian will affirm that he finds them obvious
(662b3–4).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

260 Commentary: Book 2

661c4 ‘virtue as a whole (aretês hapasês)’
The combination of wisdom, moderation, and courage that amounts
to justice at 631c–d; see note on 630b2–3.

661c7–8 ‘cast into corresponding (hepomenous) rhythms and

harmonies’
An anticipation of the requirement at 669b–670e that the rhythms
and ‘harmonies’ in a musical composition must fit its words and
gestures. See note on 670b2–4.

661d1 ‘my obvious (saphôs) point’

The Athenian will use the same language at 662b4 to describe the
‘obviousness’ of the point that Crete is an island. See Mouze 2005:
188–90, and note on 662b3–4.

This is not what Clinias and Megillus have been taught

661d8–e1 ‘superlative strength and courage’
‘Courage’, here and at e7, refers to the trait that in Book 1 is specified
not to involve wisdom (630c, 631d; see notes on 630a7–b2 and on
630c6–d1); thus it counts as one of the ‘so-called goods’ at 661b–d
that are not good unless possessed along with virtue.

661e3–4 ‘I fail to persuade you (humas) that a person living like

this is obviously (saphôs) wretched rather than happy?’
Persuasion (peithein) is a recurrent motif in what follows
(661e6–664b2). ‘You’ is here plural, as it is throughout the rest of
this section. Even though Clinias first voiced his dissent in his own
individual voice (emoige, 661d6), both he and the Athenian under-
stand his dissent to be characteristic of the outlook of both Clinias
and Megillus. The ‘obviously’ (saphôs) recalls the Athenian’s use of
the same term at 661d1, to be repeated at 662b3–4 (see notes ad loc).
What is obvious to the Athenian is not so to Clinias and Megillus, or
in general to those raised under Dorian constitutions.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 261

662a1–3 ‘If he is unjust and insolent, don’t you think it necessary
(ex anankês) that he lives shamefully (aischrôs)?’
alternatively: ‘ . . . don’t you necessarily think he lives shamefully?’
The ‘necessary’ (ex anankês) here is ambiguous. While it is natural
to read it as part of the content of thought (as on the present
translation), it is also possible to read it as governing ‘you think’
(humin dokein . . . ex anankês): ‘doesn’t it necessarily seem that . . . ?’.
The former is suggested by the use of ‘necessity’ at 662b3–4, on
which see note ad loc.

662a7 ‘Would you at least agree that his life is unpleasant and of
no benefit to him?’
Clinias, who has agreed that the unjust live shameful lives (662a2–4),
but refused to agree that they also live badly (a5–6), refuses to assent
to these further affirmations, both of which concern the alleged
unhappiness (badness) of the unjust life: (1) the unjust life is not
good for the person who leads it; (2) it is miserable, in the sense that
it is painful. ‘Of no benefit’ (mê sumpherontôs; alt. ‘of no advantage’)
here is used as a synonym for ‘bad’ (kakos). The Athenian’s later
argument (addressed to the mythical legislators at 662e8–663a7,
especially the second horn to the dilemma) will allege a difficulty
in separating the questions of whether a life is good or bad from
whether it is pleasant or painful. His present strategy, by contrast, is
strongly evocative of the argument that Plato has Socrates present to
Polus in the Gorgias for the conclusion that committing injustice is
worse than being treated unjustly (474c–475e). There the crucial
move is from the premise that injustice is shameful to the conclusion
that it is bad, via a premise that appeals to considerations of pleasure
and pain. Here Clinias, like Polus, agrees that injustice is shameful,
but denies that it is bad, and the Athenian responds by invoking
considerations of pleasure and pain. However, in contrast to Socrates
in the Gorgias, the Athenian does not offer Clinias an argument from
the premise about shamefulness to the conclusion about badness.
Rather, he simply tries to elicit the conclusion that injustice is
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

262 Commentary: Book 2

unpleasant and bad. The absence of argument here would be striking
to any reader familiar with the Gorgias, and this would reinforce the
point the Athenian is making: that it is not by argument, but by
the affective training of a person’s basic evaluative attitudes, that the
citizens are to be persuaded of such conclusions; see the end of the
note on 661a4–d5.

662b1–664b2
Pleasure, injustice, and persuasion
Clinias’ disagreement with the Athenian about whether the just person
is always happy, and the unjust person unhappy (661d7–e5) is ex-
plained by the fact that Dorian musical education has inculcated in
Clinias (and Megillus) the view that injustice is shameful, but not that
it is unpleasant and bad (661e6–662a8), whereas the Athenian’s edu-
cation has made it ‘obvious’ to him that injustice is both unpleasant
and bad (662b2–4). In support of his contention that the latter view is
what the citizens must be taught (662b4–c5), he offers a battery of
arguments (662c6–664b2), on which see general note ad loc.

662b1–2 ‘We are so badly out of tune with one another that it
would take a god to bring us into agreement (sumphônian)!’
This responds to Clinias’ rhetorical question, ‘How could we pos-
sibly concede’ that injustice is unpleasant and unprofitable?’ (662a8).
The Athenian’s answer is that the views in question are fundamental
to a person’s ethical outlook, and must be inculcated by musical
education. On sumphônia (agreement) as a result of musical educa-
tion, see 659e and notes on 653b4–5, 659d1–4, and 659e1–3. Here,
as at 634e, the ‘agreement’ is interpersonal.

662b3–4 ‘these things appear so necessary . . . that not even “Crete

is an island” is as obvious (saphôs)’
The use of ‘necessary’ here recalls that at 662a1–2, and is connected
here to the notion of what seems obvious (saphôs). One’s musical
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 263

education has the effect of making certain normative views seem
obvious. The example here, ‘Crete is an island’, would be one that
Clinias’ own experience growing up on the island would make
obvious to him. See also note on 661e3–4. By contrast, Mouze
(2005: 180) interprets this bedrock principle of the Athenian’s as
distinctively philosophical.

662b4 ‘If I were a lawmaker’

At the end of Book 3, the Athenian will assume the role of lawmaker
for a new city, in conjunction with his two interlocutors. In Book 7
he will outline legislation of the sort he describes here.

662b6 ‘I would mete out . . . the highest penalty’

This legal penalty is the coercion or compulsion (anankazein, 662b5)
that accompanies the ‘persuasion’ (662c5) that the laws also address
to the citizens (on which, see notes on 632b7–8 and 662c3–5).

662b7–c1 ‘to anyone in the land who spread word that there are
wicked (ponêroi) people who live pleasantly’
That is, anyone who promulgates the pernicious view described at
655d3, 656a1–2 (thinking some things are ‘pleasant but wicked’);
Clinias in effect expresses such an attitude at 662a.

662c1–2 ‘or that while some things are beneficial (lusitelounta) and
profitable (kerdalea), others are more just’
The Athenian here expands the list of considerations to which
one might appeal in deciding whether to act justly. To the notion
of the beneficial (sumpheron) already mentioned at 662a7 (see note
ad loc), he adds the advantageous (lusitelounta) and the profitable
(kerdalea).

662c3–5 ‘I would persuade (peithoim’ an) the citizens to proclaim

the opposite’
That the legislator uses the laws to persuade the citizens is a theme
hinted at in Book 1, 634a9 (cf. 632b7–8), and developed in detail in
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

264 Commentary: Book 2

Book 4, where preludes to the laws are aimed at persuading citizens
to comply with the mandated behaviour (see note on 632b7–8).
The persuasion need not be verbal argument, but can proceed by
habituation (ethê), praises (epainoi), or speeches (logoi), as 663c1–2
makes explicit (see note ad loc, as well as note on 663b2–3). This
is in keeping with Greek usage, which makes it possible to say that
gifts or gold persuade (Euripides, Medea 964–5). The persuasion
invoked in the present context proceeds via the educational medium
of music.

662c6–664b2
Four arguments addressed to the legislator
The Athenian now offers a battery of arguments to establish that the
legislator must persuade the citizens that the just life is the most
pleasant.
The First Argument (662c–663a): A legislator who fails to teach this
doctrine is giving an inconsistent message to citizens.
The Second Argument (663b–c): A legislator who fails to teach this
doctrine cannot persuade citizens to be just.
The Third Argument (663c–d): The doctrine is true.
The Fourth Argument (663d–e): Even if the doctrine were not true,
it would be the most beneficial for the citizens to believe.
He concludes by noting that music is perfectly capable of convincing
the citizens of this, or any other, doctrine (664a–b).

662c6–663a8
The First Argument
The argument is structured as a reductio ad absurdum of the thesis,
introduced at 662d1–3, that an unjust life can be more pleasant than
a just life. It is structured as a dilemma about the relationship
between justice and happiness (662d4–6): either (a) the most just
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 265

life is not the happiest—in which case the legislator, who urges
justice upon the citizens, is not fulfilling his mandate of making
them as happy as possible (662d7–e9); or (b) the most just life is the
happiest—in which case there must be some good that makes it
happier than any unjust alternative, without at the same time making
it more pleasant, an implication that the Athenian purports to
disprove by enumeration of cases (662e9–663a7).
(By contrast, the construal of the argument in Stalley (1983: 62–4)
conflates the two horns of the dilemma, while that of Mouze (2005:
181–5) construes the two horns as independent arguments for the
conclusion that the just life is most pleasant. Schöpsdau (298–300)
correctly identifies the argument’s structure.)

662c6–7 ‘In the name of Zeus and Apollo, my excellent friends’

Zeus and Apollo are the legendary divine lawgivers of Crete and
Sparta, respectively (624a). The polite address, ‘my excellent friends’
(literally: you best (aristoi) of men’) must at this point be ironic, since
the Athenian has now disproved his initial assumption (625a) that
his interlocutors were raised under the institutions that are adequate
for cultivating virtue (excellence).

662d1–3 ‘Is the most just life the most pleasant, or are there two
lives, one of them the most pleasant, the other the most just?’
The second disjunct is the thesis to be reduced to absurdity. The
superlatives are a change to the formulation of the disputed thesis
(and may be anticipating the superlative in the exhortation described
at 662e6). However, the thesis the Athenian has set out to establish is
not simply that the most just life is the most pleasant life, but that the
unjust life is unpleasant (662a7). While the present formulation
leaves open the possibility that there may be unjust lives that are
more pleasant than lives that are less than maximally just, the
Athenian has given no indication earlier (nor will he later) that he
thinks justice admits of degree. On the significance of this issue, see
Bobonich 2002: 213.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

266 Commentary: Book 2

662d3–e9
(a) The first horn of the dilemma
A legislator who supposes that the just life and the pleasant life
diverge (the thesis to be disproved) here accepts, in addition, the
first horn of the dilemma: that the most just life is not the happiest.
But then, on the unstated assumption that the legislator exhorts the
citizens to live justly (the message of paideia—643e), he is open to
the charge of legislative misconduct: he has exhorted the citizens to
lead lives that are less happy than they would otherwise be. On the
assumption that the legislator is supposed to aim at the happiness of
the citizens, reflected in the reference to him as ‘father’ at 662e4 and
e7, see 631b3–6. The implication, left unstated, is that a proper
legislator is not entitled to this horn of the dilemma.

662d3–4 ‘the right question to ask next would be’

more literally: ‘presumably (isôs) we would ask next, if we were
questioning correctly (orthôs)’
The following question, about the happiest life, is the correct ques-
tion to ask because it reintroduces the notion of happiness (eudai-
monia) into the issue, which at present is articulated simply in terms
of pleasure. The Athenian’s seamless transition here between the
issue about whether the just life is happy (660e–661d) and the
issue of whether it is pleasant is in keeping with the close connection
he has noted between the judgements about goodness and feelings of
pleasure (657c).

662d7–e1 ‘their position (logos) would be very strange (atopos);

however, I would prefer not to attribute such a position to the
gods, but rather to our ancestral legislators’
It would be impious to charge the gods with the kind of neglect and
malfeasance that such an admission would invite (as argued at length
in Book 10). Thus it is not the legendary divine lawgivers, Zeus and
Apollo, but the human legislator, Minos or Lycurgus (624a, 630d,
632d), to whom this question should be addressed.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 267

662e4–5 ‘Didn’t you wish for me to live the happiest life?’
Legislation aims at the happiness of the citizens (631b).

662e6–9 ‘A legislator or father who took such a position would be

very strange (atopos) and quite at a loss (aporos) to stay in agreement
(sumphônountôs) with himself’
The verb ‘agree’ (sumphônein) recalls both (a) the internal agreement
(sumphônia) between feelings and evaluative judgements that
belongs to fully developed virtue (653a–c) as well as (b) the inter-
personal agreement between citizens (634e, 662b). Here, however,
lack of agreement is the internal inconsistency typically elicited in
a Socratic-style cross-examination, portrayed in dialogues such as
Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches, Gorgias, and Republic I (e.g. Gorg.
482b–c); in such contexts, the resulting condition of the inquirers
is typically described as aporia, which is recalled here by the
adjective aporos.

662e9–663a7
(b) The second horn of the dilemma
Here the legislator who proposes to divorce the just from the pleasant
takes the second horn of the dilemma introduced at 662d1–3: the
most just life is happiest. This presents him with the challenge of
identifying the feature(s) of the just life that recommend it over all
others (since it is, ex hypothesei, happiest—i.e. best) without contra-
dicting his original contention that an unjust life may be more
pleasant. The Athenian invokes two examples of the sorts of features
that the law will recommend in such a life, and points out the
absurdity of denying that they also make the just life pleasant.
Presumably he intends to generalize the point to all such features.
While the Athenian does not draw the moral explicitly, his point is
probably that we are left without a reason to deny that the just life is
the most pleasant.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

268 Commentary: Book 2

662e11–663a1 ‘what good (agathon) and admirable (kalon) thing
the law commends (epainei) in such a life that outstrips pleasure’
more literally: ‘ . . . that is superior (kreitton) to pleasure’
A difficult phrase in a compressed argument. ‘[O]utstrips [alt: super-
ior to] pleasure’ (tês hêdonês kreitton) is immediately glossed as
‘separated (chorizomenon) from pleasure’ (663a2). Perhaps the idea
is that if (as the opponent alleges) the just life is best but not the most
pleasant, then there must be things that make it good but that are not
pleasant. That the laws commend or praise (epainei) was stated in
Book 1 at 632a, and the close connection between praises, judge-
ments of goodness, and feelings of pleasure is affirmed at 655c–656b
and 657c (see general note on 655c4–d4).

663a3–4 ‘are renown and praise good (agathon) and admirable

(kalon) but unpleasant, while ill repute is the opposite?’
In Republic II, renown and praise are identified as two of the ‘prizes’
for justice, and ill repute as one of the wages of injustice, according to
popular opinion and poetry (362e–363e). There, Socrates is charged
with arguing that justice is preferable to injustice even without these
rewards; here, however, the Athenian voices no objection to having
the legally sanctioned poetry invoke these as attractive features of
justice (on this see Mouze 2005: 184). His point is that such features
are not unpleasant.

663a5–7 ‘what about neither wronging (adikein) anyone nor being

wronged (adikeisthai) by anyone? It is surely not the case that this is
unpleasant but good and admirable (kalon), while the contrary is
pleasant but shameful (aischron) and bad (kaka)?’
Neither doing wrong nor being wronged is invoked again in Book 7
(829a), and is another of the benefits of justice invoked in Republic II
(358e–359b). The Athenian here claims that this situation is not
‘separated from pleasure’ (663a2). His point is most effective if the
contrast is between (a) the conjunction of wronging no one and
being wronged by no one and (b) the conjunction of wronging others
and being wronged by others; (a) is the benefit one gets from living
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 269

under institutions of justice, which saves us from the miseries of (b).
One might worry that these considerations do not address the
objections of a would-be free rider or the possessor of a ring of
Gyges, but once again, as with the first feature (reputation), the
question is what general set of attitudes the laws (via legally sanc-
tioned musical training) must inculcate in the populace. The man-
dated songs and dances will not articulate philosophical arguments
(like those Socrates offers in Republic) to the effect that justice is
preferable to injustice. Rather, they will make the populace
favourably disposed to justice, and antagonistic to injustice. Note
that the argument in the present passage is addressed to the legislator,
not to the citizens.

663b1–6
The Second Argument
The Athenian now gives a second set of reasons why legislators must
teach the citizens that the just life is most pleasant. He points to the
good consequences of promulgating the doctrine. He invokes the
legislator’s goal of making the citizens willing (hekontes) adherents to
the life of justice, together with the psychological thesis that we do
willingly only what is, on balance, pleasant.

663b1–2 ‘the doctrine (logos) that does not divorce the pleasant
and the just or the good (agathon) and the admirable (kalon)’
Clinias endorses the contrary doctrine when he allows that injustice
is shameful (aischron—opposite of kalon), but he balks at saying it is
bad (kakos—opposite of agathon) (662a1–8). On the connection
between the good and the admirable, see note on 637e5.

663b2–3 ‘even if it accomplishes nothing else, can persuade a

person to be willing to live a just and pious life’
more literally: ‘ . . . is persuasive (pithanos) towards being willing
(ethelein) to live a just and pious life’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

270 Commentary: Book 2

Note that persuasiveness here includes success at forming motivation
(willingness), not just at instilling belief. On the connection between
persuasion and willingness, and the translation of ethelein by ‘willing’,
see note on 663b4–6.

663b3–4 ‘any doctrine that denies this’

Examples of such denials would include Clinias’ refusal to assent to
the thesis at 661e6–662a8, as well as, by the principles of 655d–656b
and 657c, any music that portrayed injustice in a favourable light
(thereby making it pleasant).

663b4–6 ‘since nobody would willingly be persuaded to do (hekôn

etheloi peithesthai prattein) anything that failed to yield more pleasure
than pain’
The Athenian’s claim is not that we can never be persuaded to take a
course of action that we believe will be unpleasant on balance (contra
Stalley 1983: 64), but rather that we will not agree to do such an
action willingly or wholeheartedly (hekôn). While sometimes the
distinction between acting hekôn and acting akôn corresponds to
the difference between intentional and unintentional behaviour (as
at 700e1, 734b2–4, 860d–e, 862a4, 865a–b, d, 866b7, 866c7,
879a9–b1, 943e1), at other times it marks a distinction within
intentional behaviour between those actions performed willingly or
gladly and those performed under constraint or without consent (as
in the examples of the ‘unwilling (akontôn) subjects’ at 832c4; the
property owner who does not consent to the destruction of his
belongings at 846a5; the family members who refrain from incest
‘perfectly willingly’ (ouk akontes) at 838a6; and those who are prev-
ented akôn by unforeseen circumstances from fulfilling their con-
tracts at 920d4; see also 846a5). In contrast to 627e2–3, where hekontas
marks the former distinction (see note ad loc), the present context
uses hekôn to mark the latter distinction. ‘Willingly’ translates the
phrase hekôn etheloi, whose component terms have roughly the same
sense—the latter verb tending to function as the verbal version of the
former adverb. In the context of persuasion (peithesthai), hekôn or
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 271

ethelein indicates that the agent’s action is not simply what he does
under constraint or for want of a better alternative (as at 663e2), but
is what he has been persuaded to do wholeheartedly (as at 671c7).
Thus Plato will pair ethelein with prothumoteron (eager, enthusiastic,
as opposed to reluctant) at 666c4, where it indicates a person’s
willingness to sing in public (cf. 697d8); hekontes is used to the
same effect at 670c9. Book 4 develops the theme that the citizens
must be willing (ethelein) to be obedient to the rulers of the city
(701b5)—alternatively stated with the adverb hekôn (700a5)—or
‘easily persuaded (eupeitheis) by the laws’: 715c; cf. 718c. The
present passage should be compared with 732e–734e in Book 5—
which also connects what one would choose willingly (hekousion—
733d8) to what is more pleasant; cf. Laks 2005: 45–7; Stalley 1983:
66–70; and notes on 632b7–8 and on 663c2. On the distinction
between hekôn and akôn, see Meyer 1993: 9–14.
‘Pleasure’ and ‘pain’ here are ambiguous between (a) the affective
states cultivated by paideia (pleasures and pains such as love and hate,
etc.) and (b) the bodily sensations and experiences one could get
from engaging in certain actions. It is in virtue of the latter that
Clinias and others might think the life of justice can be less pleasant
than a life of successful injustice. But it is pleasures and pains of the
former sort that the Athenian has connected with judgements of
goodness at 654c–d. On the conflation of these two types of pleas-
ure, see note on 633c9–d2.

The distortions of distance and perspective

663b6–c1 ‘Now objects viewed from a distance appear hazy to
most people, especially to children, but the legislator will dispel the
haze and clarify our judgement’
more literally: ‘objects viewed from a distance make most people
dizzy (skotodinian . . . parechei) . . . but the legislator will bring our
opinion (doxan) into the opposite condition, dispelling the darkness
(to skotos aphelôn)’ (reading d’ hêmin at b7–8, following des Places
and Schöpsdau, in place of the MSS d ’ ei mê)
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

272 Commentary: Book 2

The object in the distance is a metaphor for the expected pleasures
just mentioned at 663b5–7. Unlike the observation in Protag. that
future pleasures may appear smaller than they really are (356a–c), the
Athenian here indicates simply that they are indistinct. The task of
the legislator, therefore, will be to provide us with the clear and
unambiguous expectation that living justly will be pleasant and living
unjustly unpleasant. On the means by which he does so, see note on
663c1–2. Mouze (2005: 188) proposes that the ‘perspective from
afar’ is that of the unjust soul mentioned below at 663c2–4 (so too
Moss 2012: 215–16); however, the mention of children here makes
it more likely that the perspective is that of the uneducated soul.
Keuls (1978: 85–6), by contrast, proposes that the view from afar is
the correct view.

663c1–2 ‘He will persuade (peisei) us, however he can, by means

of [1] training (ethesin), [2] praises (epainois), and [3] doctrines
(logois)’
A specification of the means by which the citizens are to be ‘per-
suaded’ to act justly; peisei here explains peithesthai at 663b4. (1) The
‘training’ (ethesin; alt: ‘habits’; see note on 655d7–e1) is the musical
training invoked at 655d–656b and 656d; for discussion, see Mouze
2005: 181–8. (2) On the legislator’s use of ‘praises’, see 632a. Praises
are also expressed in poetry, such as that of Tyrtaeus (660e–661a).
(3) The doctrines would include those that the poets are required to
promulgate at 660e–661c. On the wide range of what can count as
‘persuasion’ (peithein) in Greek, see note on 662c3–5. On the
significance of persuasion in the Laws, see note on 632b7–8.

663c2 ‘because (hôs) matters of justice and injustice are subject to

perspective (eskiagraphêmena)’
alternatively: ‘that (hôs) matters . . . are subject to perspective’
On the alternative construal, taken by England, Taylor, Saunders,
Brisson/Pradeau, Pangle, and Schöpsdau, the clause hôs
eskiagraphêmena . . . states what the legislator will persuade (peithein)
the citizens to believe (which lines c1–5 explain in greater detail).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 273

However, nowhere else in Laws does Plato use hôs þ participle to
indicate the content one is persuaded to believe. Rather, the verb
takes an accusative þ infinitive construction (661e4, 710c2,
906b8–c1) or hôs þ indicative (646a8, 885d2, 903b4, 905c4–6,
913c1–2, 933a3–7). It makes more sense to suppose that the present
construction (hôs þ participle) gives the legislator’s reason for
persuading the citizens, which is a psychological observation that
belongs to legislative inquiry; it is not the content or message to be
imparted by legislation or education (the latter is what is affirmed
unanimously by ‘the whole community, all their lives long, in their
songs . . . stories, and . . . judgements’—664a3–6). The upshot for
the legislator is that the way to instil in the citizens a clear and
unambiguous impression that the just course of action is more
pleasant is to cultivate justice in the citizens.
Shadow-painting (skiagraphia) is a painter’s technique that gives
the illusion of depth to a two-dimensional picture observed from a
distance (see Keuls 1978 and Pemberton 1976). Thus the metaphor
may invoke either deception or perspective; the latter is emphasized
in the following lines (663c2–5). See Schöpsdau ad loc.

663c2–d5
The Third Argument
The argument takes as its first premise the psychological observation
made at 663c2–5. It may be summarized as follows:
(1) Unjust things appear pleasant to the unjust person but unpleas-
ant to the just person. (663c2–5)
(2) A better soul is more authoritative in its judgements than an
inferior soul. (663c7–d1)
(3) The just person has a better soul and the unjust person a worse
soul. [unstated]
(4) Therefore, the unjust life is really the way it appears to the just
person. [unstated; from 2, 3]
(5) Therefore, the unjust life really is unpleasant. (663d3–4; from 1, 4)
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

274 Commentary: Book 2

One might worry that the argument equivocates on the understand-
ing of pleasure and pain. To the extent that (1) has been established
so far (e.g. at 655d–656b), it concerns the pleasures and pains that
are within the scope of paideia: affective states with intentional
objects, such as those that good people experience when observing
virtuous behaviour depicted in choral song and dance (or when
engaging in such behaviour themselves). But the pleasures and
pains that Clinias had in mind when he balked at affirming (5) at
662a7–8 presumably include (predominantly) those of human ex-
perience, e.g. bodily pleasures from eating, drinking, and sex, as well
as pains of various bodily afflictions. Is the Athenian here conflating
the pleasures and pains of these two sorts? A similar ambiguity occurs
in Book 1; see note on 633c9–d2.

663c2–5 ‘When considered from the perspective opposite to the

just person’s—that is, from the standpoint of one’s own injustice and
wickedness’
more literally: ‘when appearing (phainomena) to someone who is in
the opposite condition to the just person (tôi tou dikaiou enantiôs [sc.
echomenôi]), that is, considered (theôroumena) from the standpoint of
one’s own injustice and wickedness (ek men adikou kai kakou
heautou)’
alternatively: ‘appearing in the opposite manner to what is just’
(Schöpsdau and Brisson/Pradeau, following England’s construal of
the MSS text) or ‘manifestly opposed to the opinion of the just
person’ (Lisi, Allameda), or ‘to the enemy of justice’ (Saunders,
with a textual emendation)
The MSS text poses several difficulties (see Saunders 1972), but on
any of these construals, the Athenian’s main point in these lines is
that from the perspective of the just person, just things are pleasant,
while from that of the unjust person, they are unpleasant. This is
premise (1) in the argument that continues through 663d5. See note
on 663c2–d5.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 275

663c7–9 ‘Now which judgement shall we say is more authorita-
tively true (tên d’ alêtheian . . . kuriôteran)—that of the worse soul or
that of the better?’
Clinias’ answer (663d1) opts for the latter. It functions as premise
(2) in the argument of 663c2–d5; see note ad loc.

663d2–4 ‘So it is necessary that the unjust life is not only more
shameful . . . but also in truth more unpleasant than the just . . . life’
Strictly speaking, only the second conjunct is the conclusion (5) of
the present argument (663c2–d5). But Clinias conceded the first
conjunct at 662a2–8, where he also rejected the second.

663d5 ‘So it would seem . . . at least as far as the present argument

goes’
Clinias is not convinced by the argument, which is insufficient to
convince a person who has not received a proper musical education
that justice is more pleasant than injustice (see note on 662b3–4 and
general note on 662b1–664b2); his own Dorian upbringing has
failed to expose him to the ‘training, praises, and doctrines’
(663c1–2) that will make him find justice more pleasant than
injustice.

663d6–e2
The Fourth Argument
Having just given an argument for the truth of the doctrine that the
just life is the most pleasant, the Athenian now claims that, regardless
of its truth, there is no doctrine that is more beneficial for the citizens
to believe.

663d6–e1 ‘even if matters were not as the present argument main-

tains, could any halfway decent legislator . . . tell a lie more beneficial
than this?’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

276 Commentary: Book 2

One might compare the legislator’s hypothetical appeal to falsehood
here with a similar use of falsehood ‘for the sake of the good’ at Rep.
382c–d and 414b–e. On how pernicious the ‘lie’ would be, see note
on 664a2–3.

663e1–2 ‘not because they are forced, but willingly (hekontas)’

On ‘willingly’, see note on 663b4–6.

The persuasive power of music

663e4 ‘persuasion, it seems, is not an easy matter’
This remark by Clinias might indicate his own failure to be per-
suaded by the Athenian’s third argument (663c2–d5). The Athenian
will respond (663e5–664a8) by pointing to the ease with which
music (broadly construed to include poetry and fables) can cultivate
belief in even the most implausible doctrines.

663e5 ‘the Sidonian’s tale (to men tou Sidôniou muthologêma)’

alternatively: ‘the tale about the Sidonian’
The tale concerns Cadmus, legendary founder of Thebes (invoked in
Book 1 at 641c), of whom the story is told below (663e8–9) that he
sowed dragon’s teeth in the ground, from which armed warriors
sprouted. The story is a foundation myth for the city of Thebes,
and thus the sort a legislator might incorporate into the official
musical education of a city. Sidon is a coastal city in modern-day
Lebanon, just to the north of Tyre, the legendary birthplace of
Cadmus. ‘The Sidonian’ might refer to Cadmus himself or to the
source of the far-fetched tale; England proposes that ‘Sidonian’ may
be standing in for ‘Phoenician’ (both Sidon and Tyre were Phoen-
ician cities), and notes the use of the latter adjective at Rep. 414c4 to
mark a fanciful or false tale.

663e10–664a1 ‘he can persuade the souls of the young of whatever

he wants’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 277

Recall that it is the condition of youth that is the primary focus of
education, for it is the souls of the young that are open to being
shaped by music (see note on 671b8–c2). These are trained to have
the requisite attitudes before they are capable of employing argu-
ments (logoi; see 653b). The task of the legislator is to design
institutions that will maintain these attitudes over the course of a
life. On these institutions, see note on 664a3–6.

664a2–3 ‘All he needs to figure out (skopounta aneuriskein) is what

doctrine will deliver the greatest good to the city should he convince
them of it’
The same combination of verbs is used at 626a5–6 and 656e4 to
characterize the inquiry into the goals and methods of proper legis-
lation begun in Book 1; skopein alone or its cognates is used of that
endeavour throughout Book 1 and into 2: 635d7, 636d5, 638b9,
645d3, 649e2, 658a5. Thus we may suppose that the discovery to
which the Athenian here refers is that of the order of divine and
human goods from Book 1, 631b–d, where all goods depend on the
possession of justice (there conceived as a combination of wisdom,
moderation, and courage). There is no suggestion that the city will be
benefited at the expense of the citizens—for all the benefits to the
city enumerated at 631b–d are possessed by individuals. Note that
the claim whose truth is said to be irrelevant to the question at hand
is not whether justice is good for the citizens, but rather whether it is
pleasant and injustice unpleasant.

664a3–6 ‘use every means . . . to ensure that the whole community

(sunoikia), all their lives long, are of one voice on this topic—in their
songs (ôidais), in their stories (muthois), and in their judgements
(logois; alt: doctrines, arguments)’
The ‘means’ of achieving this unanimity ‘all their lives long’ will be
the institution of the three choruses, to which the Athenian will turn
next (664b–d). He here makes more precise the claim in Book 1 that
the whole community must ‘sing out their agreement’ (sumphônein,
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

278 Commentary: Book 2

634e1–2; cf. 659d–e). The community consensus will be expressed
in the songs sung, the stories told, and in the logoi (here translated
as ‘judgements’) affirmed by its members. So construed, the latter
are instances of the logos translated ‘account’ at 645b and 653b
(cf. 696c); see Moss 2014. Alternatively, the logoi could be the
doctrines mentioned along with ‘training [and] praises’ as the legis-
lator’s means of persuasion at 663c1–2 (thus Saunders, Brisson/
Pradeau, and Schöpsdau). They are also the contents of the laws
(see note on 659d1–4). On songs: 654a–b, 656d, 659e; on stories:
636c–d, 645b, 663e, 664d, 682a.

664b1–2 ‘I don’t see either of us as capable of disputing these

points’
A reflection of the Dorian’s lack of facility in argument, mentioned
also at 641e.

IV
THE INSTITUTIONS O F CORRECT
EDUCATION: THE THREE CHORUSES

(664b3–666d2)
Having established that a proper legislator will ensure that the musical
works used in education (paideia) depict the just life as happy and
pleasant (660e–664a), the Athenian now specifies the institutions that
will structure the lifelong programme of musical education by which ‘the
whole community, all their lives long’ will be ‘of one voice on this topic’
(664a4–6). In keeping with his pronouncement that it is by regular
performance of choral music that the citizens will receive their initial
education and that education will require subsequent maintainance and
repair to undo the corrosive effects of everyday life (653c–654a), he now
specifies three different types of chorus in which citizens will participate,
at different times of their life, each dedicated to one of the three deities
identified as the patrons of musical education at 653d. When citizens are
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 279

children (under 18 years old) they will sing in the chorus of the Muses; as
young adults (from 18 to 30 years old) they will sing in the chorus of
Apollo; and those beyond 30 will perform in the chorus of Dionysus. The
latter chorus, which will occupy most of the Athenian’s attention for the
rest of Book 2, turns out not to be a chorus in the strict sense that involves
performing ensemble song and dance in public at religious festivals;
rather, it is a drinking party (665d9–666d2). Thus it is with his
account of the chorus of Dionysus that the Athenian makes good on his
promise to specify an important educational role for drinking parties
(652b–653a).

The three choruses introduced

664b4–5 ‘all choruses (and there are three of them) should direct
their charms (epaidein) at the souls of children, which are still young
and pliable’
The three choruses are specified further at 664c4–d4. See Prauscello
2014: 152–9. This is the first mention that there will be three of them,
but the number does not seem to surprise Clinias, perhaps because
there were known to be three choruses at Spartan festivals. (Plutarch,
Lycurgus 21.2 says a chorus of old men would lead, followed by a chorus
of young men in their prime, then a chorus of children.) Clinias’
question at 664d5–7 concerns the nature of the third chorus, not
their number or composition. On songs as charms for the souls of
children, see 659e (repeated at 665c, 666c). On the plasticity of young
souls (which will figure in the final account of the benefit of drinking
parties), see 666b–c, 671b–c, and note on 653d7–8.

664b6 ‘all the beautiful (kala) doctrines we’ve gone through’

alternatively: ‘all the admirable [or splendid] doctrines . . . ’
Presumably these are the doctrines articulated at 660e–663e (about
justice, happiness, and pleasure), as well as those at 631b–632d
(about divine and human goods). On the translation of kala see
note on 630c7.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

280 Commentary: Book 2

664b7–8 ‘that the gods call the same life both most pleasant and
most excellent’
A restatement of the thesis insisted on at 662b–663e as central to the
message of musical education—with the substitution here of ‘most
excellent’ (aristos) for ‘most just’ (dikaiotatos) in the former context
(662d2–3), a minor variation given the gloss on justice as ‘virtue as a
whole’ (aretês hapasês, 661c4; see note ad loc). An additional change
in the present context is the specification that the gods affirm the
thesis in question (as at 634e2), perhaps indicating, as England notes,
that such an attribution is supposed to have especial force with
children (although compare a similar invocation of divine authority
at 838b–c).

664c1–2 ‘speaking truth to the highest degree and . . . more likely

to persuade . . . than if we were to proclaim any other doctrine’
Recalls 663b2–3. See note ad loc.

664c3 ‘What you say must be conceded (sunchôrêteon)’

A surprising concession, given Clinias’ earlier refusal to make such an
admission at 662a and his grudging response to the argument
that concludes at 663d5. Perhaps the Athenian’s substitution at
(664b7–8) of the ‘most excellent’ (aristos) life for ‘most just’ at
662d2–3 allows Clinias to interpret the claim in light of his own,
Dorian, conception of excellence (cf. Tyrtaeus fr. 12.13). Or perhaps
the argument at 663c–d has been more convincing than his response
at 663d5 would appear to indicate. Clinias’ inability to mount a
defence of the contrary position (664b1–2) might also be relevant.

The chorus of the Muses

664c4 ‘the chorus dedicated to the Muses and consisting of
children’
The age range is specified more precisely at 666a4 as those up to 18
years old. On the Muses as patrons of culture, see note on 653d3–4.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 281

664c5–6 ‘take the stage, singing out such doctrines (ta toiauta) . . .
before the entire city’
The choruses are conceived of as performing in a theatre before the
general public assembled for a festival performance (665e; cf. 653d–
654a), as was typical of choral performances in Plato’s day. See
Morrow 1960: 302–18. ‘Such doctrines’ (literally: ‘such things’—
ta toiauta) are presumably the doctrines just mentioned at 664b3–8.

The chorus of Apollo

664c6–d1 ‘the chorus of those up to 30 years old, calling upon
Paean Apollo as witness for the truth of what they affirm (tôn
legomenôn), and praying that he grace the youth with persuasion’
These young adults are at a later developmental stage than the
children in the chorus of the Muses. On the developmental psych-
ology of 653a–c, they would be at the stage of ‘grasping the account’
or ‘engaging in argument’ (logon lambanein, 654b4; see note on
653b3–4). How far these adult singers go towards understanding
the doctrines they affirm in their songs is not addressed here; calling
on Apollo as a witness is an appeal to authority, not to reasons. In any
case, as choral performers, they will be singing and dancing to a set
text, not engaging in the give and take of rational argument. The
‘youths’ (neoi) to be persuaded might be the children in the first
chorus (as neoi is used at 653d7, 664e4), but the adjective can also be
used to distinguish younger adults from the elderly, as at 631e1 and
666b2 (see note ad loc).

The chorus of Dionysus

664d1–2 ‘a third chorus . . . will consist of those over 30 and up to
60 years of age’
This will be called the chorus of Dionysus at 665a8–b2. It will be
assigned two main functions: (A) it performs a ‘finer music’, which
evaluates musical compositions and selects those that are beautiful
and appropriate for use in education (668b, 670a–e). (B) It is a
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

282 Commentary: Book 2

drinking party in which inebriation replicates, in adults, the juvenile
condition of educability by music invoked at 653d–654a, thus
allowing the music performed on these occasions to restore their
‘education’ (666b–c and 671a–671e). (A) and (B) are developed in
largely independent treatments and the Athenian makes no explicit
attempt to connect them (although see notes on 667b1–3 and
on 671e1; cf. Schöpsdau on 671a1–672a4). See also Prauscello
2014: 160–72.
Note the very wide range of ages for this chorus, which encom-
passes what the Hippocratic writer of De Hebdomadibus 5 identifies
as three distinct ‘seasons’ of life: that of ‘man’ (anêr) (28–49 years),
‘elder’ (presbutês) (50–56 years), and ‘old man’ (gerôn) (over 56
years). In developing functions (A) and (B), the Athenian will be
almost exclusively interested in the ‘elders’ and ‘old men’ in this
chorus, as much of what he says about their stiffness and other signs
of old age (e.g. 666b–c) are unlikely to be general characteristics of
those only recently over the 30-year mark—not to mention their
position of authority (665d, 670d–e)—although even those at the
younger end of the age range will have lost the juvenile volatility that,
as he will explain in 671a–672d, is replicated in drunkenness.
Note that the three interlocutors refer to themselves both as ‘elders’
(presbutai) (685a, 712b–c, 769a) and as ‘old men’ (gerontes) (634e–
635a, 658d, 715d–e). On the age range of the chorus, see also notes
on 665d1–4, 670a7–b2, and 671e1, and O. Murray 2013: 115.

664d2–4 ‘those who are beyond all that (tous meta tauta) and no
longer up to the challenge of singing will be allotted the role of
storytellers (muthologous) . . . about these same characters (êthôn)’
‘Beyond all that’ (meta tauta) might mean beyond the age of 30 to 60
(thus England, Brisson/Pradeau, Saunders, Schöpsdau), in which
case this is a fourth age group, distinct from the membership of the
chorus of Dionysus. But, as England notes, this would be an unusual
use of the expression, and there is no reason to suppose that the
ability to sing is coextensive with the age range of the three choruses;
after all, the Athenian implies at 670a–b that some 50-year-olds will
not be ‘fit to sing’—hence ‘beyond the ability to sing’ is a more likely
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 283

meaning (thus Morrow 1960: 314). At 671e1 the Athenian assigns
to those ‘over 60 years old’ the role of supervising the conduct of
drinking parties; however, the inability to sing cited in the present
passage is hardly a credential for the office of exercising that wise
leadership; see note on 671e1. Alternatively, Pangle translates tous
meta tauta as ‘those who come on after these’ (i.e. those who perform
after the third chorus). In any case, the Athenian’s concern in the
present context is to have all citizens participate in the collective
affirmation of the ‘beautiful doctrines’ of 664b5–6, regardless of
their ability to sing; ‘about these same characters’ (664d4) indicates
that the content of the stories told by this group will be the same as
that of the songs performed by the choruses.

664d5–6 ‘the third choruses’

The plural reflects the assumption that there will be multiple chor-
uses for each age group.

664e3–5 ‘At the beginning of our discussion . . . we said that all

young creatures have a fiery nature’
A recapitulation of the theory introduced at 653d5–654a5, with the
addition that the young have a ‘fiery’ (diapuros) nature, a detail
repeated at 666a–c and 671b–c; the latter points to the malleability
of the young (cf. 664b5) and their unique susceptibility to the
influence of education. For fuller discussion of the theory, see note
on 653d7–8. Belfiore (1986: 425–6), by contrast, construes the
fieriness as the lack of self-control attributed to the young at 645e.

665a2 ‘the combination of the two (to sunamphoteron) is called a

chorus’
The combination of ordered bodily movement (dance) and ordered
vocal movement (song) is what constitutes a chorus; see 654a–b and
672e–673a.

665a4 ‘to join and lead our choral dance’

more literally: ‘to be fellow choral dancers (sunchoreutas), and lead
the chorus (chorêgous)’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

284 Commentary: Book 2

This repeats claims made at 654a1–5. On the role of dance in choral
performance, see note on 654a4–5.

665b3–4 ‘A Dionysian chorus of elders sounds exceedingly

strange, on first hearing’
The Athenian has just given his first indication, in the previous line,
that the third chorus is dedicated to Dionysus, the god of wine and
drunken revelry (see 637b and note on 637b2). On the oddness of
the suggestion that a chorus of elders should dance in honour of
Dionysus, see O. Murray 2013: 114–15.

665b7–8 ‘an account (logou), I think, of the way in which it would

be reasonable (eulogon) for this to take place’
The ‘way’, it turns out, will involve a drinking party rather than a
public choral performance (666b–c).

665c2–5 ‘That every man (andra) and child (paida), free person
and slave, female and male . . . should perpetually sing to itself those
charms that we discussed’
‘[M]an and child’ marks the contrast between adult and juvenile,
with emphasis on stage of life, rather than gender (since both ‘female
and male’ are included). The Athenian here indicates that commu-
nity members of any age, social status, or gender will be involved in
affirming the ‘beautiful doctrines’ of 664b. That the whole city must
give voice to the same opinions: 634e, 662b–c; that the songs
inculcating this unanimity are charms: 659e, 664b, 666c.

665c5–7 ‘with some alteration (aei metaballomena) or other and at

any rate with sufficient variety to please the singers’
The Athenian here acknowledges the powerful attraction of the
pleasure provided by variety. Earlier, he inveighed against alterations
to the basic forms of musical compositions (656d–657b). The vari-
ation he endorses here must therefore involve variation within the
sanctioned forms so that the citizens will not have to sing over and
over ad nauseam a limited menu of songs; thus new songs can be
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 285

introduced into the canon over time (cf. Rep. 424b–c). It is not to
variety as such that the Athenian objects, but to the pursuit of variety
that leads to abandonment of those features essential to making the
music beautiful and appropriate for education. Thus Rutherford
2013: 72 and Kowalzig 2004: 47. See also Rep. 424b–c and note
on 656d9–e3.

665d1–4 ‘whose collective age and wisdom (phronêsesin) makes it

the most persuasive (pithanôtaton) group of citizens . . . those with
the greatest command (kuriôtaton) of the finest and most beneficial
songs’
This description, like ‘divine men’ at 666d6, would seem to fit the
oldest members of the Dionysian chorus—those for whom the label
‘elder’ would be appropriate, rather than those at the younger end of
the spectrum (see note on 664d1–2). On wisdom (phronêsis) coming
with age (if it comes at all), see 653a7–9 and note ad loc. ‘[M]ost
persuasive’ (pithanôtaton) recalls the concerns of 663b–664c. On the
laws embodying the wisdom of the elders, and citizens being per-
suaded by the laws, see 659d–e. The characterization of the music
performed by this chorus as ‘the finest songs’ will be repeated at
667b1–3 and reflects the invocation of the ‘finest music’ (mousa
kallistê) at 658e8. On the relation between this characterization of
the elders’ music and the Athenian’s later claim that it is ‘finer than
that of choruses’ (667a10), see notes on 666d11–e1, 667b1–3, and
670e3–4.

Drinking parties are the forum for the chorus of Dionysus

665d9–e1 ‘As a person advances in age (gignomenos presbuteros),
doesn’t he become increasingly reluctant to sing?’
This reticence of the elders contrasts with the characteristic eagerness
of youth to sing and dance (653d–654a, 657d, 664e–665a, 672c,
673c–d). The function of drunkenness, to be invoked at 666b–c,
will be to restore that eagerness.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

286 Commentary: Book 2

665e2–3 ‘feels especially embarrassed (aischunoit’ an)—the more
so the older (presbuteros) and more moderate (sôphronesteros) he has
become’
more literally: ‘feels especially ashamed . . . ’
In Book 1, shame (aischunê or aidôs) is the kind of fear that the
legislator must cultivate in the citizens (647a–c; cf. 671d). Here, as in
that earlier context, it is associated with the virtue of moderation
(sôphrosunê). Earlier in Book 2 shame is what one feels when
performing actions that one thinks pleasant but wicked (ponêros)
(656a–b). Here we see the feeling is associated with a natural self-
consciousness—thus the translation ‘embarrassed’. The term presbu-
teros, unlike the English ‘elderly’, connotes not just advanced years
but seniority and greater respectability. While these senior perform-
ers are not performing songs or dances representing shameful behav-
iour, and thus have no reason to feel ashamed on those grounds (cf.
656a), they are no doubt aware of the technical imperfections of their
performance resulting from age-related loss of agility and vocal range.
While there is nothing unseemly about the behaviour their song and
dance would imitate, it might well be unseemly (aschêmôn—cf.
666c9) for stiff-limbed or rough-voiced elders to imitate it via the
very public medium of choral dance.

666a5–8 ‘We would explain (didaskontes) that one should not pour
additional fire into the bodies or souls of our youth, but rather be
mindful of their excitable condition (emmanên . . . hexin)’
more literally: ‘their maddened [alt: frantic] condition’
Such explanation (or more literally, instruction) would presumably
be in a legislative preamble addressed to the parents of children (or to
those charged with carrying out the law). One would not need to
convince the children themselves of the reason for the restriction. On
the madness of youth, as expressed in the impulse to disordered
movement and sound, and the connection between fire, madness,
and drunkenness, see 672b–d. On legislative preambles, see note on
632b7–8.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 287

666a6–7 ‘the burdensome toils (ponous) of life’
See 653c–d and note on 653d2–3.

666b1–2 ‘the young must abstain completely from drunkenness’

‘Young’ (neos) here is contrasted with ‘children’ (paides at 666a4)—
even though the latter can also be referred to as neoi, as at 666a8 (see
note on 664c6–d1). The young who may partake of wine but not in
drunkenness are the young adults between 18 and 30 years old, as
contrasted with the older adults in the chorus of Dionysus.

666b2 ‘a person approaching (epibainonta) 40’; that is, in one’s

third decade
alternatively: ‘upon reaching 40’ (Belfiore: 425; LSJ)
The present translation, like that of Saunders, Brisson/Pradeau, and
Taylor, follows England, whose case is strengthened by Schöpsdau.
The alternative rendering would leave those between 30 and 40 years
old unaccounted for in the drinking regulations. On the lack of
precision with which the Athenian notes the age range of the chorus
of Dionysus, see notes on 664d1–2, 671e1, as well as Morrow 1960:
318, Schöpsdau on 664d5–665d6, and O. Murray 2013.

666b3 ‘at the end of a communal dinner’

literally: ‘in the communal meals (en tois sussitiois)’
On the communal meals (sussitia) in Dorian society, see Book 1,
625c–626b. The Athenian will include the sussitia among the insti-
tutions he legislates for the new colony of Magnesia (see note on
625e2–7). Such establishments for communal eating will also be
venues for communal drinking, and the drunkenness that is integral
to the Dionysian function of the third chorus. On the question of
whether women will participate in such rituals, see Schöpsdau 2003.

666b4–5 ‘that rite (teletên) and recreation (paidian) for the elders
(presbutôn)’
There is some variation in the MSS as to whether it is the elders
(presbutôn) or the ‘more elderly’ (presbuterôn). Those ‘approaching
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

288 Commentary: Book 2

40’ (666b2) would not be classified as presbutai (elders) according to
the age classifications of De Hebdomadibus (see note on 664d1–2).
On age classes more generally, see Davidson 2006. On paidia (re-
creation, play) see note on 635b5.

666c1–2 ‘like iron that becomes pliable when placed in the fire’
The image is repeated at 671b–c; see note on 653d7–8.

666c3–6 ‘Wouldn’t he be more willing to sing with enthusiasm

(an etheloi prothumoteron . . . aidein) . . . ?’
On being willing (ethelein; alt: hekôn) and being enthusiastic (prothu-
môs), see note on 663b4–6.

666c6 ‘those songs that we have repeatedly said are charms’

At 659e, 664b, 665c.

V
T H E F I N E R M U S I C OF TH E
D ION YS I A N CHOR US

666d3–671a1
Having established that the chorus of Dionysus will not sing publicly in
choral competitions at religious festivals, but privately in drinking parties
(665d–666c), the Athenian now proposes that the music it is to ‘sing’
will be ‘finer’ than that performed in choruses (666d–667b; cf. 665d–e);
indeed, he will argue (670b–e) that it requires an education more
advanced than mere choral training. He proposes first that the faults of
Dorian musical education can be attributed to the absence of such music
(666d–667a), and then proceeds to give a detailed account of that ‘finer
music’ (667a–670e). The latter is revealed to be the expertise for judging
choral works, which the Athenian elaborates in considerable detail
(667b–670a) and distinguishes both from the expertise of composers
and from that of choral performers (670a–e). While these expert
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 289

evaluations by the elders are not ‘song’ or music in the narrow sense
(words set to ‘harmony’ and rhythm), the Athenian is prepared to say that
the elders ‘sing’ this music (670d).

666d3 ‘what kind of sound (phônên), or music (mousan)’

‘Sound’ here is broad enough in scope to include not just song or
speech but utterance more generally, leaving it open that it will not
be song, strictly conceived, that the elders engage in. This fits the
requirement, articulated at 670d, that the members of the third
chorus are in the business of judging which songs are beautiful.
The term mousa (repeated in a similar context at 667a10–b1; see
note ad loc) can mean ‘song’ (as at 829d6), but admits of the broad
scope of the cognate mousikê, which includes music, dance, and
literature, and can encompass learning broadly conceived (see note
on 642a4)—so that philosophy can be called a kind of ‘music’ at Phd.
60e–61a; cf. Tim. 88c (see Morrow 1960: 313–14). Saunders (1972:
10) proposes that this ‘music’ will be the philosophical inquiries of the
Nocturnal Council introduced in Book 12 (961a–b; 964e–969c).

666d8–10 ‘the only type of song (ôidên) we are capable of is what

we learned to sing in our own choral training (sunêtheis . . .
genomenoi)’
‘Training’ (sunêtheis) might also be translated as ‘accustoming’ or
‘habituation’; the related noun sunêtheia is used at 655e4 and 6 and is
translated ‘training’. On training, habituation, and music, see notes
on 653b5–6 and 655d7–e1. The Athenian’s point here is that his
interlocutors are able to sing the songs they were trained to sing in
their youth, but, lacking the ‘music finer than that of the choruses
and the public theatres’ (667a10–b1) whose nature is detailed at
670a–b, they lack the resources to reflect critically on the adequacy of
those songs. Note his earlier comment that Clinias’ understanding of
Cretan institutions is ‘well trained’ (gegumnasthai) (626b5, see note
ad loc). Such a training allows Clinias to identify the goal of Cretan
institutions, but it does not enable him to see the deficiency in the
choral compositions that communicate this message.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

290 Commentary: Book 2

666d11–667b4
Dorian musical education fails to employ
the finest kind of song
The Athenian charges that the Dorian societies in Crete and Sparta
lack the ‘finest kind of music’ (666e1) that belongs to the chorus of
Dionysus (cf. 665d); and that this has resulted in educational prac-
tices that cultivate the impoverished range of virtue criticized in Book
1 (see 628c–630c). Tyrtaeus is once again singled out as a poet who
expresses that impoverished conception. The finest kind of ‘song’
will later be identified as expertise in discriminating which choral
or poetic compositions are beautiful, and which are not (668b,
670b–e). Presumably we are meant to conclude that it would reject
the poetry of Tyrtaeus as unsuitable for use in education.

666d11–e1 ‘you are missing out on the finest kind of song’

Perhaps an allusion to Pindar Paean 6.181–3 (see Rutherford 2013:
82n32). The ‘finest kind of song’ is ambiguous. In the context of the
immediately preceding lines, it must be the music that will be
identified as ‘finer than that of choruses’, indeed as ‘the finest variety’
(667a10–b3). This ‘music’ (assigned to the chorus of Dionysus at
670d–e) is the expertise that judges musical compositions (see notes
on 670a3–6 and 670e3–4). However, the criticism of Dorian edu-
cational practices in the present paragraph, and especially the invo-
cation of the poetry of Tyrtaeus (whose educational inadequacy is
emphasized at 629a–630c in Book 1 and 660d–661d in Book 2)
imply that the musical compositions used in Dorian education
themselves fall well short of the ‘finest’. Likewise, the ‘finest song
and music’ invoked at 668b4–6 must be musical compositions rather
than the expertise that evaluates them. On this ambiguity, see also
the notes on 667b1–3 and 670e7–8.

666e1 ‘your legal systems are fit for an army camp’

As Clinias in effect claimed at 625c–e.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 291

666e2 ‘the inhabitants of a city’
The notion of a city (astu) contrasts both with the army camp just
mentioned, and with the rural context about to be invoked. It
connotes both peace and refinement.

666e6 ‘stroke him and tame him (psêchôn te kai hêmerôn)’

‘Tame him’ (hêmerôn, e6) recalls the goals of musical education
(mousikê) as articulated in Rep. 441e–442a, 554d; in contrast with
military or athletic training (gumnastikê), which rouses spirited fer-
ocity, mousikê soothes and gentles the spirit to make it suitable for
the peaceful, cooperative project of civic life; cf. Laws 935a.

667a1–2 ‘a capable participant in the affairs of a city or town-

. . . even more warlike than the warriors of Tyrtaeus’
more literally: ‘someone capable of governing (dioikein) a city or
town . . . ’
This is the citizen who ‘knows how to rule and be ruled with justice’
(643e6). The earlier reference to Tyrtaeus is at 630a–c.

667a3–4 ‘courage as fourth in virtue, not first’

The ranking is explained in Book 1 at 630c–d and 631c–d.

667a6–7 ‘again casting aspersions on our lawgivers’

As at 630d, where the Athenian politely deflects the charge; cf. 634c,
635a–b.

667a10–b1 ‘if there is a kind of ‘music’ (mousan) finer than that of

choruses and public theatres’
The nature of the ‘music’ that is ‘finer’ (kalliô; alt: ‘more beautiful’)
than what one learns by being trained to perform in a chorus is
delineated at 667b5–671a1 (summarized at 670e5–8; cf. 669a7–b3
and in notes on 670a3–6, 670e3–4). That finer music is ‘music’ in
the broader sense, which includes learning more generally; see note
on 666d3. The music ‘of choruses and public theatres’ is music in the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

292 Commentary: Book 2

narrower sense of song and dance. On an ambiguity between these
two domains of comparison, see notes on 667b1–3 and 666d11–e1.
On the range of the related term mousikê, see note on 642a4. On the
translation of kaliô, see note on 630c7.

667b1–3 ‘let us try to assign it to those whom we said were

embarrassed by the latter kind but eager to partake of the finest
variety’
A reference back to 665e–666c, where the Athenian says that the
elderly members of the chorus of Dionysus would be embarrassed to
sing in public choral performance, but willing to sing in drinking
parties, where wine will loosen their age-induced stiffness. That
earlier passage, however, does not indicate that the singers’ eagerness
or lack thereof has anything to do with the kind or calibre of the
music to be performed, although, in the passage immediately before
it, the Athenian does indicate that the chorus of elders will sing
‘the finest songs’ (665d1–4; see note ad loc). In the present context,
the ‘finest variety’ (667b2–3) is the music ‘finer than that of chor-
uses’ just mentioned at 667a10–b1, whereas in the earlier passage,
wine is said to renew the elders’ enthusiasm for singing the ‘charms’
to be sung by the whole population (665c4; cf. 666c6)—which is the
Athenian’s general characterization of choral song (659e1–5). On the
ambiguity in the notion of ‘finer music’, see note on 666d11–e1.
Perhaps Plato here trades on that ambiguity in order to connect the
largely self-contained account of
(A) the ‘finer music’ (666d3–671a1)
with what would otherwise be a continuous discussion of
(B) the use of drunkenness by the Dionysian chorus.
The latter resumes at 671a2 as if it were continuous with the
discussion that ends at 666d2. On the connection between (A) and
(B), see notes on 664d1–2, 671e1.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 293

667b5–668b8
Pleasure, correctness, and the evaluation
of representational art
Having just proposed that the chorus of Dionysus will practise a kind
of music that is ‘finer than that of the choruses and the public
theatres’ (667a10–b1), the Athenian now begins to elucidate the
nature of that ‘finer music’. He here takes the preliminary step of
revisiting the issue, originally raised in 657c–659c, of whether pleas-
ure is the criterion of correct music. He sketches a general account of
the (very limited) conditions in which anything is to be judged by the
criterion of pleasure (667b–668a), and gives specific reasons for
supposing that music, as a representational art, is not to be judged
by the pleasure it provides (668a–b). Rather, it is to be judged by
how accurately it represents its intended object (668b).

Correctness
The Athenian appeals frequently in this discussion to the notion of
correctness (orthotês) or what is correct (orthos), and the notion will
be especially important in the sequel, where the musical expertise of
the Dionysian chorus is specified (668c–669b, 670b). As he deploys
the notion here, correctness applies to any activity or object that has a
goal (a good or worthwhile objective—see note on 667d9–e3), and it
consists in success at achieving that goal. Thus correctness of food
consists in its being healthy, correctness of learning consists in its
reaching truth (667b–c), and correctness of a likeness consists in
accurately depicting its intended object (667c–d). It is only in the
case of things that yield only harmless pleasures and occur for the
sake of these that pleasure is the criterion of correctness. Where more
significant benefits (and their corresponding harms) are at stake, it is
those benefits, rather than pleasure, that provide the standard for
correctness.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

294 Commentary: Book 2

So conceived, correctness is a matter of goodness, of successfully
living up to the standards that apply to the activity or object in
question. The correctness of music has been a preoccupation of the
Athenian since early in Book 2. While his original question (654e–
655c), what kinds of song and dance are beautiful (kalon), does not
invoke the vocabulary of correctness, he restates the issues as the
question of what kind of music is correct (655d1, 657a8, b3).
Accordingly, in the present context, the Athenian identifies the
‘correctness and benefit’ of something as ‘what is good and beautiful
in it’ (667c7), and indicates that the search to identify the music that
is ‘finest’ must seek ‘the kind that is correct’ (668b5–6). (Matters are
more complicated by 669b1–3; on which see note on 669a9–b3.)

667b5–6 ‘anything that brings us enjoyment (hosois sumparepetai

tis charis)’
more literally: ‘what is accompanied by enjoyment’
The verb sumparepesthai (repeated at 667e2 and used interchange-
ably with forms of parakolouthein in 667c5 and parepesthai in 667d2)
means to accompany or follow closely.

667b6–8 ‘Either this very feature on its own [sc. enjoyment] is the
most important (spoudaiotaton) thing about it, or else what is most
important is a certain correctness (orthotêta) or, third, a benefit
(ôphelian)?’
What is spoudaion—often contrasted with what is ‘in play’ (paizonta,
see note on 635b5)—is translated as ‘serious’ in other contexts. Here
the superlative form of the term is used to pick out the proper
criterion of evaluation and is translated as ‘most important’. While
the Athenian distinguishes correctness from benefit as the second and
third items on the list, he will treat the two as a unit (‘its correctness
and benefit’, 667c1) in the examples of food and learning (667b8–
c8). Presumably these are cases in which correctness consists in
providing a benefit. (In other cases, e.g. representation, correctness
consists in likeness rather than benefit—cf. 667d9–10.) By contrast,
Hatzistavrou (2011: 368–371) proposes that correctness and benefit
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 295

coincide even in the case of musical representations. On correctness,
see also note on 667d9–e3 and general note on 667b5–668b8.

667b9–c1 ‘enjoyment (charin), which we might call “pleasure”

(hêdonên)’
‘Pleasure’ (hêdonê) seems to be the generic term here, with ‘enjoy-
ment’ (charis) indicating the type of pleasure that comes from some
other worthwhile feature of an activity. See also 667c6, d1–3, e3–4,
and note on 667e2–4.

667c6–7 ‘But its correctness (orthotêta) and benefit (ôphelian),

what is good and beautiful in it (to eu kai to kalôs)’
alternatively: ‘ . . . what is good and admirable in it’
The Athenian here indicates that correctness is an instance of being
good and kalon (eu kai kalôs [sc. echein]). This is in keeping with his
restatement, as an issue about ‘correctness of music’ (655d1, 657a8,
b3), of the issue that he originally articulates (654e–655c) by asking
what kinds of song and dance are beautiful (kalon). On the relation-
ship between correctness and goodness (‘to eu’), cf. 668d1–2 and
notes on 631b5 and 634d9–e1. On the alternative translation, see
note on 630c7.

667c10–d1 ‘Now consider the representational arts (technai eikas-

tikai). Their business is to produce likenesses (homoiôn ergasiai)’
more literally: ‘ . . . those arts that are representational in that they
produce likenesses’
This representational activity will later be described as ‘imitation’
(mimêsis) at 667e10; music is identified as a representational art at
668a6–7.

667d1–3 ‘any pleasure that accompanies their product, should any

pleasure arise, is appropriately called “enjoyment” (charin)’
more literally: ‘the concomitant occurrence of pleasure in them
(to . . . gignesthai), if it should occur (ean gignêtai), is most rightly
(dikaiotaton) called enjoyment’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

296 Commentary: Book 2

A difficult phrase. While the Athenian here invokes the representa-
tional arts as instances of the things that ‘bring us enjoyment’
(667b5–6), the qualification ‘should any arise’ (ean gignêtai, d2)
indicates that he is not claiming that such arts always produce
pleasure when they succeed in producing a likeness. Moss (2012:
218) takes this passage together with 667e4 to express the view that
accurate representations of human virtue are naturally pleasant.
However, the Athenian simply makes a distinction between (a)
pleasures that arise in conjunction with representational success (or
other forms of correctness) and (b) pleasures that are not so accom-
panied. He reserves the label ‘enjoyment’ (charis) for the former; see
also note on 667e2–4.

667d5–7 ‘the correctness in such cases would be produced (exer-

gazoito), roughly speaking (hôs epi to pan eipein), by accuracy (isotês)
in quantity and quality’
Accuracy (more literally: ‘equality’, isotês) is invoked as a specific kind
of correctness (orthotês); an accurate picture of a house need not have
the dimensions equal to those of the house, but it will preserve the
same relative proportions (cf. 668b7 and the example at 668d7–e5).
At 668a3 such accuracy is referred to as truth (alêtheia). See also
Hatzistavrou 2011: 371–2.
The qualification ‘roughly speaking’ (hôs epi to pan eipein) indi-
cates that the statement is rough or approximate. The locution is rare
in Plato (cf. Laws 917a4–5, Euthyd. 279e6) and occurs only occa-
sionally in Aristotle (e.g. GA 732a20, HA 573a28) as a variation on
his more regular locution ‘hôs epi to polu’ (e.g. GA 725b17, Phys.
196b11, An. Pr. 32b10); the latter is also used by Plato (Stsm. 294e1,
295a4, Rep. 377b7, Laws 792b1, 875d4–5); in both authors it
typically marks a claim as rough in the sense of admitting of excep-
tion (see Jones 2013: 7n16). Here, however, it is unlikely that the
Athenian means to allow that, in some exceptional cases, correctness
in representative arts is not a matter of accuracy. The qualification
might acknowledge that ‘isotês’ (literally equality) does not perfectly
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 297

capture the target phenomenon: it is the terminology rather than the
generalization that the Athenian marks as rough.

667d9–e3 ‘the only thing that would be correctly judged (hêdonêi

krinoit’ an . . . orthôs) by pleasure is what provides neither benefit nor
truth nor likeness . . . Rather, it comes to be solely for the sake
(heneka) of this very thing’
‘[B]enefit . . . truth . . . likeness’ are the different criteria for correct-
ness (orthotês) just canvassed at 667b–d. The teleological language
here (‘for the sake of’) reveals that correctness is a matter of success in
achieving a goal, such as truth, likeness, etc. See general note on
667b5–668b8.

667e2–4 ‘enjoyment (charitos), which those other things bring in

their wake, but when it occurs without them, is best called “pleasure”
(hêdonên)’
more literally: ‘the very thing that follows in the wake of the others
(sumparepomenou tois allois), enjoyment, which, when none of them
accompanies it (hotan mêden autêi toutôn epakolouthêi), is best
called . . . ’
The ‘other things’ (tois allois) are the benefit, truth, and likeness just
mentioned (667d10). The pleasures that accompany such results
merit the specific label ‘enjoyment’ (charis); but those that arise
independently of them receive only the generic label, hêdonê; see
note on 667d1–3.

667e6–8 ‘I also call it “recreation” (paidian) when it produces

neither harm nor benefit worthy of serious mention (spoudês ê logou
axion)’
This demarcation of paidia is recalled at 668a10–b1. On the range of
the notion, see note on 635b5. Here its connection to pleasure, as
well as the contrast with the serious matters (spoudê), are to the fore.
The restrictive definition of the term articulated here underlies the
claim at 673e8 that drinking parties must not be treated as mere
recreation.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

298 Commentary: Book 2

667e10–668a1 ‘no imitation is to be judged by pleasure and false
opinion’
‘[B]y false opinion’ (kai doxêi mê alêthei) explains ‘by pleasure’
(hêdonêi). The explanation makes sense in the light of 655c–656b,
where the Athenian has indicated that what we experience as pleasant
thereby appears (dokein) to us to be beautiful, and vice versa (see note
on 655e2–5 and general note on 655c4–d4).

668a1 ‘In particular, accuracy should never be’

more literally: ‘in particular, no equality should be (kai dê kai pasan
isotêta)’
On the translation of isotês by ‘accuracy’, see note on 667d5–7.

668a1–2 ‘simply because someone thinks so, or fails to enjoy

something’
These would be instances, respectively, of judging imitations by the
criteria of ‘false opinion’ and ‘pleasure’ just invoked (see note on
667e10–668a1). In keeping with the principles articulated in
665c4–d4 (see note ad loc), failing to enjoy an imitation would
amount to thinking (dokein) that it is not beautiful (kalon). But the
Athenian has just argued in the present context (667a8 ff.) that the
beauty or correctness of a representation is a matter of its accuracy,
which does not depend on what people think or feel about it.

668a3 ‘an imitation is to be judged in terms of its truth above all

else’
Here ‘truth’ is used instead of ‘equality’ (isotês; alt: ‘accuracy’) for the
correctness characteristic of representational art. Cf. 667c5–8, where
truth is said to be the standard of correctness for learning (mathêsis).

668a6–7 ‘music, we say, is representational (eikastikên) and imita-

tive (mimêtikên)’
The two adjectives are used equivalently here (cf. 668b10–c1).
Choral songs and dances were described as ‘imitations (mimêmata)
of characters’ at 655d5; also in Book 7, 798d9. The notion of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 299

‘representation’ (eikastikê) is invoked for the first time at 667c10–d1,
and its product is called mimêsis at 667e10. On music that (scandal-
ously, to the Athenian) is not representational, see 669e5–670a3.

668a9–10 ‘So we should be least prepared to accept it when

someone says that music is to be judged (krinesthai) by the pleasure
it gives’
The Athenian’s remark here is in superficial tension with his limited
endorsement of the principle at 658e6–659a1, but in the present
context he continues to believe that the elders will enjoy the music
that they identify as best (670d7–e1), and in the former context he
indicates that their judgement is an expression of knowledge (see
note on 658e6–9). The former passage does not credit the elders
with a judgement based on unreasoned intuition. They will enjoy the
music that in their wisdom they recognize to be beautiful, and it is
their grasp of its beauty that is the basis of their discrimination.

668a10–b1 ‘unworthy of our serious attention’

That is, it would count as mere recreation or play (paidia), as defined
at 667e6–8.

668b2 ‘the kind [of music] that achieves likeness (echousan tên
homoiotêta) in imitating what is beautiful (tôi tou kalou mimêmati).’
alternatively: ‘ . . . achieves likeness to an imitation of what is
beautiful’
Following Schöpsdau, the present translation takes the dative
(tôi . . . mimêmati) not as object of ‘homoiotêta’ (likeness), but as
instrumental, indicating the means by which the likeness is achieved.
The alternative construal of the dative yields the alternative transla-
tion (thus Brisson/Pradeau, des Places, Saunders, Taylor, Pangle;
rejected by England). Against the latter construal, there is no indi-
cation in the surrounding context that the likenesses produced by
representational arts (cf. 667c10–d1) are likenesses of imitations,
rather than of originals. The Athenian has earlier implied that the
gestures and tunes of beautiful choral music are representations of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

300 Commentary: Book 2

beautiful (alt: ‘admirable’) actions and utterances (655b2–6); on
representation and imitation of the beautiful, see also note on
669a9–b3. On ‘beautiful’ as a translation of kalon, see note on 630c7.

668b4–6 ‘those who seek out the finest song and music
must . . . search for the kind . . . that is correct’
The ‘finest music’ here must be music in the narrower sense of song
and dance; however, the ‘finest music’ under discussion over this
whole passage (667a–670e) is music in a different sense: the expertise
by which the elders will identify correct song and dance. On ambi-
guities in the notion of the ‘finest’ or ‘finer’ music, see notes on
666d11–e1, 667a10–b1, and 667b1–3.

668b9–669b4
Evaluating representational works of art
Having just argued at some length (667b–668b) that music is a
representational art which is to be evaluated (krineisthai) in terms
of its representational accuracy, the Athenian here turns to consider
what a wise judge must know in order in order to apply those
standards to a particular work of art. He begins (668c4–e5) by
distinguishing two questions:
(1) What is the object being represented?
(2) How accurately does the work of art represent it?
In keeping with the immediately preceding discussion (667b–668b),
he refers to (2) as a matter of the ‘correctness’ of the artwork (668c7,
d1, d9). Thus we may understand him to be introducing (1) as a
prior question that must be addressed in order to answer (2).
He concludes (668e7–669b3) by refining the criteria of evaluation
captured in questions (1) and (2), and stating that they are insuffi-
cient to determine whether a work of art is beautiful. At least in the
case of choral music, a wise judge must also know a third thing:
(3) how well the representation employs ‘phrases, tunes, and
rhythms’ (669b2–3).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 301

This third criterion will be elaborated at some length at 669b–670e,
where knowledge of it, characterized generally as knowledge of what
is ‘harmonious and well rhythmed’ (670b9) is identified as the ‘finer
music’ or ‘superior education’ characteristic of the Dionysian chorus.
Most commentators, however, construe (3) as a specifically moral
assessment of the work of art—against which, see the notes on
669a9–b3 and 669c3–8.

Assessing representational accuracy

668c4–6 ‘in order not to misjudge a particular composition’
more literally: ‘he who will not to be mistaken about a . . .
composition’
The judgement in question is the verdict of the ‘true judge’ of music
at 659a5 and the ‘wise judge’ of art at 669a9–b3. As noted by
Schöpsdau, the Athenian here shifts from arguing that music is to
be evaluated by its representational accuracy (667b5–668c3) to
asking what one needs to know in order to make such an evaluation.

668c5–7 ‘one must recognize just what it is (ho ti pot’ estin) . . . its
nature (tên ousian)—just what it intends (ti pote bouletai), what it
actually represents (hotou pot’ estin eikôn ontôs)’
The repeated ‘pote’ gives intensive force to the questions, a colloquial
use that is ubiquitous in Plato. At 669a9 ‘what it is’ (ho te esti) is
listed as the first of three things that the wise judge must know. Here
it is explained by the rest of the quoted phrase. The ‘nature’ (or
substance, ousia, c6) could either be the nature of the object repre-
sented (i.e. a sufficiently determinate conception to allow one to
determine the accuracy of the representation) or it could be the
nature of the representation (e.g. that it is a representation of a
horse); in the latter case, ‘nature’ is explained by the following clause
‘ti pote bouletai . . . ontôs’ (c6–7). ‘[W]hat it intends’ (ti . . . bouletai)
indicates that representation (eikastikê) or imitation (mimêsis,
667e10, 668a6) is a goal-directed activity; it has a target object of
which it intends to produce a likeness (Halliwell 2002: 69), and its
success is to be judged on how similar its product is to that target
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

302 Commentary: Book 2

object. (On the relationship between goal-directedness and correct-
ness, see note on 667d9–e3.)

668c7–8 ‘one will hardly discern whether the intention is carried

out correctly (tên orthotêta tês boulêseôs) or misses the mark’
more literally: ‘ . . . the correctness or error of its intention’
It is ambiguous whether the ‘correctness’ of the intention is the
correctness of having such an intention, or success in carrying it
out. One might note, in favour of the latter (endorsed by England
and Schöpsdau), that orthotês has consistently been used to refer to
representational accuracy (667c–668b), and the immediately follow-
ing comment (668d1) uses ‘to orthôs’ (‘whether it is correct’) in that
sense. The simple point here, as illustrated at 668d8–e5, is that in
order to tell whether a work of art achieves representational accuracy,
one needs to know what it purports to represent: ‘what it is’. In
effect, 668c4–8 affirms that knowing the second of the three things
required of the wise judge at 669a9–b3 (‘how correct it is’) requires
knowing the first (‘what it is’).

668d1–2 ‘if one fails to recognize whether it is correct (to orthôs),

will one ever be able to discern (diagnônai) whether it is good or bad
(to ge eu kai to kakôs)?’
The question ‘whether it is correct’ (to orthôs) concerns the correct-
ness just invoked at 668c7–8, that is, how accurately the artwork
represents its intended object. ‘[W]hether it is good or bad’ (to ge eu
kai to kakôs) is (pace England) the same question raised at 667c6–7
with the phrase ‘what is good and beautiful/admirable (to eu kai to
kalôs)’; it is the overall evaluative question addressed by the ‘wise
judge’ of 669a9. Thus the present passage summarizes the message of
667b5–668b8: a work is to be evaluated or judged (krineisthai)
according to whether it is correct, and the standard of correctness
in the case of representational arts is accurate representation. The
main difference between the two passages is that the former presents
the evaluation of the work as being simply a matter of assessing its
representational accuracy (see note on 667c6–7), whereas in the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 303

present passage, by contrast, knowing whether the work is an accur-
ate representation is identified only as necessary for answering the
evaluative question. Indeed, at 668e7–669a4, the Athenian will
indicate that it is not sufficient (see note on 669a5–6). A wise
judge of choral art needs to know, in addition, a third thing: ‘how
well worked’ the composition is (hôs eu . . . eirgastai, 669b1–3). Eng-
land and Schöpsdau, on the basis of construing that third question as
a specifically moral evaluation of the work of art, identify it with the
question about ‘good or bad’ (to ge eu kai to kakôs) in the present
passage. Whatever the merits of their interpretation of the third
criterion (criticized in the note on 669a9–b3), Saunders oversteps
in translating to ge eu kai to kakôs in the present passage as ‘its moral
goodness or badness’. In any case, if the intended object of represen-
tation in choral art is beautiful or virtuous behaviour (see notes on
669a9–b3 and 669c3–8), then the representational accuracy of a
work will entail its moral adequacy; thus there would be no reason to
suppose the third criterion is the specifically moral requirement.

668d8–e5 ‘Suppose . . . a person did not know the bodies being

imitated’
An example to support the claim at 668c4–8 that one must know
what is being represented (e.g. a spider or a horse) in order to assess
the accuracy of the representation.

669a2–4 ‘Is it necessarily the case that someone who recognizes

these things (tauta) is thereby (êdê) in a position to recognize whether
the work of art is beautiful (kalon), or whether it falls short of beauty
(kallous) in some way?’
‘These things’ (tauta) are (1) what the intended object of represen-
tation is and (2) how accurately the work represents that object; these
are about to be identified as the first and second items of knowledge
required of the wise judge at 669a9–b3. The Athenian here switches
his focus, without warning, from the necessity of answering (1) and
(2) if one is to evaluate a work of art as good or bad (668c4–e5) to
the insufficiency of (1) and (2) for grounding such evaluations.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

304 Commentary: Book 2

‘[W]hether the work of art is beautiful (kalon), or . . . falls short of
beauty (tou kallous) in some way’ concerns the same general evalu-
ative question as the phrase to eu kai to kalôs at 667c6–7 (see note ad
loc), and the phrase to ge eu kai to kakôs at 668d1–2; beauty (to kallos)
is the cognate noun of the adjective kalon (beautiful, noble, admirable;
on the range of the term, see note on 630c7). On the general evaluative
question addressed by the ‘wise judge’, see note on 669a7–9. (By
contrast, Ferrari (1989: 105) takes the Athenian to be implying that
(1) and (2) are sufficient grounding for such evaluations in the case of
paintings; however, the Athenian will endorse Clinias’ negative an-
swer to this question; see note on 669a5–6.)

669a5–6 ‘But then, virtually all of us would recognize which

pictures are beautiful (ta kala tôn zôiôn)!’
Clinias answers the Athenian’s question of 669a2–4 in the negative,
and the Athenian will endorse that answer at 669a7 (orthotata legeis).
As noted by Schöpsdau, those who construe Clinias’ answer as
affirmative (e.g. Pelosi 2010: 56 and Hatzistavrou 2011: 377) over-
look the significance of the construction ‘an’ þ imperfect, which
marks Clinias’ remark as counterfactual. Not everyone, Clinias here
implies, is a good judge of the merits of a work of visual art, but we all
would be if such judgements simply amounted to an assessment of
how accurately the works depict their objects (e.g. if evaluating the
merits of a Rembrandt self-portrait was simply a matter of judging
how accurately it depicted the painter’s face). Such judgements of
representational accuracy involve the first and second things a ‘wise
judge’ will be required to know at 669a7–b3; thus the current point
provides a premise in the argument for the conclusion there that such
a judge must also know a third thing. See note on 669a9–b3.
‘Pictures’ here translates zôiôn, whose primary meaning is ‘animals’
(and is translated thus by des Places, Taylor, and England, following
Ast). However, the term also has an established use (esp. in the
plural) for pictures or paintings (LSJ s.v. II; cf. Aristotle Catg. 1a2–3)
and is translated accordingly by Saunders, Schöpsdau, and Brisson/
Pradeau in the present passage. See Saunders 1972: 10.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 305

Three things a wise judge of art must know

669a7–9 ‘So, for each representation (eikona), whether in painting
or in music as a whole, doesn’t a wise judge (emphrona kritên) need to
have the following three things?’
Having just endorsed (orthotata legeis, 669a7) Clinias’ reply (669a5–6)
that knowing (1) what object is being represented by a work of art
and (2) how accurately it depicts that object does not thereby put one
in a position to judge whether that work of art is beautiful (kalon),
the Athenian here concludes that there is, in addition, a third thing
that a ‘wise judge’ must know. The wise judge must be one who
pronounces on the question for which (1) and (2) have just been
declared insufficient—that is, whether a work of art is beautiful
(669a3–4); this is what the ‘true judge’ of 659a5 does, who, like
the the unqualified judges with whom he is contrasted (the verb
‘krinein’ is ubiquitous through 657e–659a), addresses the question
that has occupied the Athenian’s attention since early in Book 2,
654e: what sort of choral song and dance is beautiful? That question
is variously expressed in the present context as a concern with ‘the
good and beautiful’ (to eu kai to kalôs, 667c7) in a work of art, or
‘whether it is good or bad’ (to ge eu kai to kakôs, 668d1–2), or
whether the work is ‘beautiful (kalon), or . . . falls short of beauty’
(669a3). Making such a judgement will be identified as the task of
the chorus of Dionysus, which ‘selects’ the musical work that is ‘most
beautiful’ (eklogês . . . tou kallistou, 670e7–8).

669a9–b3 ‘One must know [1] first of all what it is (ho te estin),
next [2] how correctly it is rendered (hôs orthôs . . . eirgastai), and [3]
third, how well the particular representation is rendered (hôs eu . . .
eirgastai) in phrases (rhêmasin), tunes (melesi), and rhythms
(rhuthmois)’
The first two criteria have been expounded in 668c4–e5. They
concern (1) the work’s intended object of representation and
(2) the accuracy of its representation (regularly described as a kind
of ‘correctness’, 667b5–668a5). The Athenian claimed earlier
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

306 Commentary: Book 2

(668a6–c3) that representational accuracy, rather than pleasure, is
the proper basis for evaluating works of representational art. Here
that position is refined. In addition to representational accuracy as
expressed in (1) and (2), a beautiful work of art must also satisfy a
third criterion: (3) that it be ‘well . . . rendered in phrases, tunes, and
rhythms’.
There is a tendency among commentators to disregard the signifi-
cance in (3) of the qualification ‘in phrases, tunes, and rhythms’,
which invokes the same three media of choral composition originally
invoked at 656c4–5. (Hatzistavrou (2011: 375), for example, trans-
lates the passage as if it qualifies all three criteria, and Janaway (1995:
178) omits the qualifying phrase altogether in his translation.) Ques-
tion (3) is then conflated with the general evaluative question faced
by the wise critic of a work of art. The latter, for example, is
articulated at 668d1–2 as to ge eu kai to kakôs (‘whether [the work]
is good or bad’), where it is distinguished from the ‘correctness’ of the
work; and one might suppose (with Schöpsdau and England) that in
that passage the Athenian makes the the same distinction between (2)
and (3) as in the present passage. Similarly, in 668e7–669a4, imme-
diately preceding the present passage, the Athenian has distinguished
between, on the one hand, the representational accuracy of a work
(which he has been consistently calling its ‘correctness’—667c–
668b) and, on the other hand, its beauty (to kalon)—the latter
term being used to articulate (3) at 670e6. Thus it might seem that
in 668e7–669a4 the same distinction is captured as the difference
between (2) and (3) in the present passage. On this basis one might
conclude that (3) concerns the beauty of a work of art (thus Hatzis-
tavrou 2011: 376 and A. Barker 2013: 397–8). However, this
interpretation of (3) makes no sense of the fact that 668e7–669b3
amounts to an argument from the premise that knowing (1) and (2) is
insufficient to determine whether a work of art is beautiful, to the
conclusion that some third thing must also be known—sc. in order to
answer that question. On pain of irrelevance, the third thing a wise
judge needs to have must be the answer to a question distinct from
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 307

whether the work of art is beautiful, although necessary for answer-
ing that question.
England would bracket as an interpolation the phrase ‘in phrases,
tunes, and rhythms’ (669b2–3; rejected by Schöpsdau), since it
articulates (3) in terms specific to music in the narrow sense, while
the three criteria have been introduced as applying to all representa-
tional art (‘whether in painting or in music as a whole’, 669a7–8).
However, an abrupt shift from generic to specific would not be out of
character for the Athenian’s exposition. In any case, if the interpret-
ation of (3) defended below is correct, (3) is easy to reformulate at the
requisite level of generality. Roughly, in any work of representational
art, the media of representation must be consistent with each other
and with the object that is represented.

669b5–670a3
The third criterion explained
There is considerable disarray among commentators as to how to
understand (3), the third criterion invoked at 699b2–3. On the
most natural way of reading the text, (3) concerns how well the
composer has employed the various musical elements in the com-
position, how well rendered (eu . . . eirgastai) it is ‘in phrases, tunes,
and rhythms’ (669b1–3; cf. 656c4–5). What counts as being well
rendered in this respect is explained in the following passage
(669b5–670b7), which details the particular ‘difficulties’ presented
by music (669b5–6). The passage, which catalogues errors in
musical composition, makes specific and repeated mention of
tunes, rhythms, and words; it requires that the ‘harmonies’ and
rhythms in a choral work be compatible with each other and with
the melodies (melê) and gestures (schêmata) that are set in those
structures (see note on 669c3–8). Thus we may conclude that (3)
in the present text, being ‘well . . . rendered in phrases, tunes, and
rhythms’, is a matter of such internal consistency—a supposition
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

308 Commentary: Book 2

confirmed by the Athenian’s identification of expertise at assessing
such rhythmic and harmonious appropriateness as the specialized
competence of the Dionysian chorus at 670b8–671a1 (see notes
below and 812b9–c8). We might call such internal consistency in a
work of art its ‘integrity’. So interpreted, the third criterion may be
construed as a general requirement, of any work of representational
art, that the media of representation be consistent with each other
and with the object of representation; on the generality of (3) see
note on 669a7–9.
Most commentators, by contrast (e.g. England, Saunders, Schöps-
dau, and most recently Pelosi 2010: 56–7; Hatzistavrou 2011:
380–1; and A. Barker 2013: 400), construe the ensuing discussion
of fitting ‘harmonies’ and rhythms (669b5–670b7) as pertaining to
criterion (2)—the representational accuracy of the composition—
and they interpret (3) as a moral or ethical assessment of the artwork,
variously understood to concern its suitability for inculcating virtue
(Schöpsdau; England; Halliwell 2002: 67–8; Mouze 2005: 198–
205) or the moral quality of the behaviour it represents (Morrow
314; Stalley 1983: 126–7, 129; Hatzistavrou 376; Pelosi 56–7; A.
Barker 2013: 401; see also Ferrari 1989: 104–5). However, while it is
evident that the Athenian takes the question of whether a work of art
is beautiful or admirable (kalon) to involve a moral or ethical assess-
ment (witness his requirement at 655a–b that beautiful songs and
dances be those ‘of virtue’—see note on 655b3–6), it is a mistake to
suppose that criterion (3) expresses that moral requirement. Call this
supposition the ‘moral interpretation’ of (3).
The obvious embarrassment faced by the moral interpretation of
(3) is that the long catalogue of mistakes made in musical compos-
itions (669b5–670b7), which follows immediately upon the intro-
duction of (3), does not concern the moral defects of those
compositions, but rather their failure to use appropriate ‘harmonies’
and rhythms in the songs and dances. We are to suppose that having
stated the inadequacy of judging a work of art on (1) and (2) alone—
its representational features—the Athenian announces that (3), its
moral adequacy, must also be taken into account, but then proceeds
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 309

to ignore the question of moral adequacy and give a lengthy discus-
sion of additional considerations that go into the assessment of (2).
Moreover, the Dionysian chorus’ signature expertise in ‘harmonies’
and rhythms (670b–d) would be irrelevant to the criterion (3) here
introduced—even though expertise in the ‘third thing’ is attributed
to them at 670e3–5 (see note ad loc and on 670e5–6). The proposal
by Halliwell (2002: 68) that (2) and (3) respectively concern the
correctness and benefit invoked in the argument against the pleasure
criterion at 667b is open to a similar objection.
This ‘moral’ interpretation of (3) is nonetheless preferred by
commentators as the price of avoiding a variety of problems. For
example, it is sometimes supposed that the alternative to the ‘moral’
interpretation of (3) is a narrowly technical reading—as on the
translations of Jowett and Taylor—according to which (3) is a matter
of how well the words, songs, and gestures in a choral work succeed
in representing their intended object (thus Morrow 1960: 314n55).
On such a narrowly technical reading, (3) would collapse into
(2)—which is at odds with the Athenian’s clear message that (3) is
an additional consideration not captured by (2). Schöpsdau, by
contrast, supposes that the alternative to the ‘moral’ interpretation
is to suppose that (3) concerns the quality of the composition’s
workmanship; so construed, (3) would be distinct from (2), the
work’s strictly representational adequacy. But this alternative, he
claims (p. 324), has the unacceptable consequence, given the Athen-
ian’s claim at 670e5 that the poets need not know ‘the third thing’,
that the expertise of the poet does not extend to assessing the
technical workmanship of poetic compositions. Thus, Schöpsdau
concludes, (3) must concern a higher expertise than the poet’s
technical expertise. However (as will be argued in the note on
670e6–7), it is perfectly intelligible for the Athenian to distinguish
between the poet’s knowledge of ‘harmonies’ and rhythms (which
is knowledge of how to produce them, that is, to set words
and gestures into ‘harmonies’ and rhythms) from expertise as to
whether the ‘harmonies’ and rhythms so employed are appropriate
to the words and gestures. On the ‘integrity’ interpretation it is the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

310 Commentary: Book 2

latter expertise that pertains to (3) and is the special province of the
Dionysian chorus.
Once we distinguish the question addressed by the third criterion
from the question of whether the work of art is beautiful (which will
depend on all three criteria), it is intelligible to ask which of the three
criteria identified in the present passage (669b1–3) expresses a spe-
cifically moral requirement for beautiful works of art. The evidence
for supposing that there is such a requirement points clearly towards
the first criterion as the locus of the moral restriction, for it asks what
object is being represented (or imitated) by the work. Choral music,
we are told, imitates or depicts actions and characters (655d5; cf.
798d9), and the Athenian states emphatically, early in Book 2, that
the words and gestures portrayed in beautiful choral music must be
those of virtuous people (655b; see note on 655b3–6). Accordingly
he indicates closer to the present context that serious music, unlike
the trifling sort that aims only at harmless pleasure, is engaged in the
business of ‘imitating what is beautiful’ (668a9–b2; see note on
668b2). Thus we may conclude that the reason why a ‘wise judge’
of music must know ‘the first thing’ (what the work represents) is not
simply in order to know the second thing (how accurate the repre-
sentation is), but more importantly because the answer to that first
question will disqualify those works that imitate behaviour or char-
acter that is not kalon (admirable, beautiful).
Thus it is criterion (1) that expresses the moral requirement on
beautiful music: that the object of representation in beautiful music
must be virtuous behaviour. Criterion (2), by contrast, requires that
such behaviour be represented accurately. Criterion (3) introduces a
consideration in addition to (1) and (2). As an examination of the
next paragraph (669b5–670b6) will reveal, the first two criteria ask
whether the gestures and words in a choral work accurately represent
the behaviour of virtuous people, while the third criterion asks
whether the ‘harmonies’ and rhythms employed in the work are
appropriate to the behaviour depicted (see note on 669c3–8). (By
contrast, Schipper (1963) denies that (1) and (2) concern represen-
tational features of music, and construes (3) as pertaining to intrinsic
features of ‘harmony’ and rhythm, rather than to the fit between
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 311

these and the words and gestures. Hatzistavrou (2011) also under-
estimates the significance of the question of fit.) It may be argued
that the ‘harmonies’ and rhythms are themselves representations of
character (thus Hatzistavrou 2011: 382–3; A. Barker 2013: 399–
400); if that is correct, then (3) as well as (2) will concern represen-
tational properties of music. But (3) and (2) would still be verdicts of
different kinds of expertise. On the interpretation of (3) defended
here, we may say that (2) concerns the representational aspects of the
work (words and gestures) whose ‘correctness’ is more generally
accessible to the ordinary person (parallel to the ordinary person’s
ability to judge whether a painting is an accurate picture of an
animal—cf. 668e7–669a4), while (3) concerns aspects of the work
(‘harmony’ and rhythm) whose representational properties are
grasped only by specialized musical expertise. On such a construal,
the Athenian distinguishes between the second and third items of the
competent judge’s knowledge not because only the former concerns
the representational accuracy of the musical composition, but rather
because assessing the representational adequacy of ‘harmonies’ and
rhythms (as opposed, for instance, to words and figures) is a matter of
specialized knowledge. In particular, the analogy with painting em-
phasizes that (2) concerns how well the choral work has represented
the external manifestation of virtue, while (3) concerns how well its
‘harmonies’ and rhythms replicate the internal psychic structure of
virtue. Assessing (2) will be within the competence of a well-edu-
cated person, while assessing (3) requires the specialized training of
the Dionysian chorus. The special expertise of the composers con-
cerns none of (1), (2), or (3).

Mistakes made by human composers

To elucidate the ‘third thing’ that a wise judge of art must know
(669ab2–3), the Athenian enumerates a variety of mistakes made by
human composers:
(A) They employ mutually inconsistent compositional elements
(phrases, melodies, gestures, rhythms) in their imitation of
human beings (669c3–8).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

312 Commentary: Book 2

(B) They attempt to represent multiple distinct objects as if they
were a single thing (669c8–d5).
(C) They employ compositional elements without any representa-
tional intent (669d5–670a3).
(A), (B), and (C) constitute a series of increasingly severe deviations
from the principle of correct composition that is stated more suc-
cinctly at the end of the paragraph (670b2–6). This is the view that a
tune (melos) has ‘correctness’ (orthotês, 670b4) or is ‘well rhythmed’
(euruthmon) and ‘harmonious’ (euarmoston, 670b9) if it employs the
‘harmony’/mode (harmonia—see note on 653e3–5) or rhythm that
is appropriate to its words or phrases (rhêmata) and its gestures
(schêmata). In effect, the principle requires that the distinctively
musical aspects of the work—‘harmony’ and rhythm—be in keeping
with its more narrowly representational features—the words and
gestures (see note on 669c3–8). Expertise in assessing whether this
is the case is identified as the ‘finer music’ to be practised by the elderly
judges (a point repeated at Book 7, 812b–c), and this, the Athenian
claims, requires training beyond that of the ordinary citizen who is
drilled in choral performance (670b8–671a1).

669b5–6 ‘let us not omit to state the difficulties we face in the case
of music’
The difficulties or challenges in the present context may be those
faced by judges of music who might, for example, find amusing
(gelôta, 669d4) rather than pernicious the musical practices about
to be denounced as mistaken (669c3–670a3). Or they may be
difficulties faced by people who indulge in the wrong kind of
music. The latter is suggested by 669b8–c1, and the former by the
repetition of ‘difficult’ (chalepon) in the superlative at 669c1, where
mistakes in music are ‘extremely difficult to notice’ (aisthesthai); see
note on 669a9–b3. On either construal, the difficulty would stem
from the fact that music is pleasant, and pleasure, as discussed in
Book 1, is an extremely ‘difficult’ or ‘hard’ opponent (tôn . . . chale-
pôtatôn, 634b5–6; see note ad loc). On the range of the term chalepon
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 313

(hard, difficult) see note on 629d2. On the wide scope of ‘music’, see
note on 642a4.

669b8–c1 ‘Not only is making a mistake here (hamartôn) extreme-

ly harmful, since one will come to welcome evil characters (êthê kaka
philophronoumenos)’
That is, by participating in the wrong sort of song and dance. The
harms are detailed at 656b1–4.

669c1 ‘but it is extremely difficult (chalepôtaton) to notice

(aisthesthai)’
What is difficult to notice is that one is making a mistake, perhaps
because even the mistaken varieties of music about to be enumerated
(669c3–670a3) are pleasant to the uneducated. See also the note on
669b5–6.

669c3–8 ‘the blunder (examartoien) of composing words (rhêmata)

suitable for men and then giving them the colour (chrôma) or tune
(melos) of women, or attaching rhythms of the servile and slavish to
the tune and gestures of the free’
On rhythms and tunes appropriate to women, men, slaves, etc., see
802d–e. On their relationship to different character types, see Rep.
398c–400a and Hatzistavrou 2011: 382–3.
The alleged ‘blunders’ illuminate, by negative contrast, the
third criterion to be used by the wise judge of representational art
(669b1–3). A positive exposition of the criterion is given at 670b2–6:
the rhythm and the harmonia of a tune (melos) must be appropriate to
it. The present passage, by contrast, substitutes ‘melos’ (tune) for
‘harmonia’: it is not a composition’s ‘ “harmony” and rhythm’, but
its ‘tune (melos) and rhythm’ that must be appropriate to its words
and gestures, as well as to each other. This slight variation reflects the
conception of melos as a compound of harmonia, rhythm, and logoi
(Rep. 398d); any given melos involves a specific harmonia. The
additional mention, in the present passage, of gestures (schêmata)
ensures that the requirement of fit applies not just to song, but to
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

314 Commentary: Book 2

dance as well. On gestures and tunes (or gestures and words) as
the material of dance and song respectively, see notes on 654e4–5
and 655a1–2. On ‘colour’, see note on 655a4–8. On harmonia
(mode), see note on 653e3–5; on melos (tune), see also note on
670c2–3.

669c8–d2 ‘they would never mix together animal and human

voices, the sounds of instruments, and every kind of noise, yet
purport to be imitating a single thing’
This second poetic ‘blunder’ involves an even greater deviation than
the first from the principle that a musical work must provide a
consistent representation of a single entity. While the first mistake
is that of combining opposing elements (slavish and free) in the
representation of a single person, this second error involves the
incoherence of imitating different types of animate and inanimate
entities as if they were a single entity. Thus Hatzistavrou 2011: 381–2;
compare Rep. 397a–b. The Athenian makes a different complaint
about ‘mixing’ musical styles at 700a–701e.

669d2–3 ‘Human composers . . . spin these elements into a great

jumble’
more literally: ‘ . . . weave such things together (emplekontes) and pour
them together (sugkukôntes)’
The Athenian is mixing his metaphors. The ‘human composers’ are
the practitioners of the so-called ‘new music’ of Plato’s time, on
which see A. Barker 1984: ch. 7; Csapo 2004; and D’Angour 2006.

669d4–5 ‘a source of laughter (gelôta) for people who are in what

Orpheus calls the “prime season of delight” ’
alternatively: ‘providing objects of derision to men who . . . ’
(England)
Orpheus is a legendary musician and poet (see R. Edmonds 2013
and Brisson 1993), mentioned by Plato at Philb. 66c, Ion 533b,
536b. See Kern 1922: 86 fr. 10 and Brisson/Pradeau v1, 358n90.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 315

669d5–6 ‘It is not enough that composers confound these things,
they also wrench them apart’
more literally: ‘The composers both see all these things jumbled
together (horôsi panta kukômena) and they wrench them apart’
alternatively: ‘they see these things . . . and the poets tear them apart’
‘Composers’ (poêtai, d2) is the subject of the previous sentence, and
so is naturally construed as the subject of horôsi in the present phrase.
The alternative is to take the verb’s subject to be the ‘men . . . in the
prime season of delight’ (d4–5) in the immediately preceding sub-
ordinate clause (thus Brisson/Pradeau and Pangle), or (less plausibly)
the subject of ‘gignôskein’ (recognize) in e3 (England, following
Stallbaum). Pangle is wrong to construe kai eti diaspôsin . . . (d6) to
be within the scope of horôsi (‘they see . . . that the poets are guilty of
separating . . . ’).

669d7–e2 ‘bare speech (logous psilous) . . . bare lyre or reed pipe

(psilêi kitharisei te kai aulêsei)’
While ‘psilos’ when applied to logoi (words, speech) often means
‘prose’, here it indicates words not set to music—i.e. not structured
by harmonia and rhythm (thus England; cf. Hatzistavrou 2011:
380n18; Martin (2013: 316–18) takes the present passage to forbid
the performance of the Homeric poems). When applied to the
playing of musical instruments ‘psilos’ means ‘without words’. The
instruments invoked here are the kithara (a small lyre) and the aulos
(a double-reed pipe). The latter’s name is commonly translated
‘flute’, which is unfortunate in that a flute is not a reed instrument;
‘reed pipe’ is also imperfect, in that it does not distinguish the aulos
from the syringx (Panspipe). Greg Scott has suggested ‘double-oboe’,
for lack of an equivalent modern instrument.

669e2–4 ‘This makes it extremely difficult to recognize what the

wordless rhythm and “harmony” intends (ho ti te bouletai)’
While the previous musical errors catalogued since 669b5 consist in
making inconsistent representations (see note on 669c8–d2), this
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

316 Commentary: Book 2

third error is to fail to use music as a representational medium at all.
What it ‘intends’ (ho ti te bouletai, e4) is the object imitated or
represented by a work of art (see note on 668c5–7).

670a1 ‘other than to accompany dance and song’

more literally: ‘other than as subordinate (hupo þ accusative) to
dance and song’
This indictment of non-choral music reflects the requirement that
music be used as a representational medium. See 668a–c and note on
669c8–d2.

670a1–3 ‘The bare employment of either instrument (psilôi de

hekaterôi . . . chrêseôs) is completely unmusical showmanship (pasa
tis amousia kai thaumatourgia)’
It is ‘unmusical’ in the sense that it displays an absence of learning
(mousikê in the broad sense; see note on 666d3). In this case it
displays ignorance of the representational function of music. See
note on 670a1. On ‘bare’ (psilos), see note on 669d7–e2.

670a3–671a1
The elders’ expertise in ‘harmony’ and rhythm
The ‘finer music’ of the Dionysian chorus (invoked at 667a10; see
note on 667b1–3) is expertise in the appropriateness of ‘harmonies’
and rhythms. This is distinct from the expertise of the composers,
and from that of trained choral performers.

670a3–6 ‘our inquiry is not into what we shouldn’t do when we

have reached our thirties or gone past 50 and are availing ourselves of
the Muses, but rather what we should do’
The present inquiry answers the question posed at 666d3–4: what
kind of music will be sung by the chorus of Dionysus, whose
membership is specified as ‘those over 30 and up to 60 years of
age’ (664d2). The Athenian has answered that their music must be
‘finer than that of choruses’ (667a10), and he demarcates the scope of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 317

that finer music by detailing the ‘three things’ a wise judge of music
must know (667b5–669b4). The catalogue of musical errors starting
at 669b5 begins as an elucidation of the ‘third thing’. The present
comment notes that the catalogue has gone beyond what is necessary
to fulfil this function. Only the initial mistake listed violates the third
criterion—see note on 669c3–8—while the second and third are
increasingly egregious violations of the first and second. On the age
range of the chorus of Dionysus, see also notes on 664d1–2 and
671e1.

670a7–b2 ‘those who have reached 50 and are fit to sing (aidein

prosêkêi) must have received an education better than that of the
choral Muse’
At 812b9–10, the age given for those who receive this superior
education is 60. The question of being ‘fit to sing’ recalls those ‘no
longer up to the challenge of singing’ (ou gar eti dunatoi pherein ôidas,
664d3; see note on 664d2–4).

670b2–4 ‘They must have keen perception and knowledge of

rhythms and “harmonies”. How else could one recognize the cor-
rectness of tunes (orthotêta . . . tôn melôn) . . . ?’
This is what is taught by the ‘education better than that of the choral
muse’ just mentioned (670a7–b1). As discussed in the lines imme-
diately following, it is knowledge that discerns which tunes are
‘harmonious and well-rhythmed’ (670b9), which is to say that they
‘have the appropriate features’ (670c2–3)—viz. the appropriate ‘har-
mony’ and rhythm. As elaborated in 669c3–8, the ‘harmony’ and
rhythm in a song or dance must be appropriate to the words and
gestures and to each other. Thus a wise judge of a choral work
must be able (a) to identify its ‘harmony’ and rhythm (‘keenly
perceptive’—euaisthêtôs, 670b3); and (b) know what character type
each of these fits (male, female, free, slavish, etc.). On ‘harmonies’
and rhythms, see note on 653e3–5. (On the difference between this
knowledge of ‘harmonies’ and rhythms and the expertise attributed
to the poets or composers at 670e6–7, see note ad loc.)
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

318 Commentary: Book 2

The term orthotês here, in contrast to the cognate term used in
669b1–3, does not invoke representational accuracy. There, the
correctness of a representation consists in its accuracy; here the
correctness of a tune consists in its having ‘harmony’ and rhythm
appropriate to its message.

670b4–6 ‘which of them should be in the Dorian “harmony”, and

whether the rhythm the composer has attached to a tune is correct or
not’
The Dorian is one of the four harmoniai (‘harmonies’ or ‘modes’)
discussed at Rep. III 398c–399c (cf. La. 188d,193d–e), but which are
not named or enumerated elsewhere in Laws, even in the discussion
of harmony and rhythm in Book 7, 802c–e; see note on 669c3–8.
Even if England is right to bracket these phrases as a later gloss not
written by Plato, the explanation they provide is surely correct. See
also note on 653e3–5.

670b8–9 ‘able to recognize (gignôskein) what is and isn’t harmoni-

ous (euarmoston) and well rhythmed (euruthmon)’
This is specialized expertise in the appropriateness of specific ‘har-
monies’ and rhythms (the third criterion of 699b1–3), not the
universal human capacity to take pleasure in the perception of
‘harmony’ and rhythm invoked at 654a2–3. See notes on 669c3–8
and on 670c2–3.

670b9–c1 ‘simply from having been drilled at singing to the reed

pipe and marching in rhythm’
A reference to the sort of education Clinias and Megillus have
received (666d8–10; cf. 667a8–b3).

670c2–3 ‘the tune (melos) with the appropriate features is correct’

The features are ‘harmony’ and rhythm, which must be appropriate
to the behaviour represented by its words (see note on 669c3–8). A
melos here is not a ‘tune’ in the narrow sense that excludes lyrics, but
a combination of words, ‘harmony’, and rhythm (Rep. 398c11–d9).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 319

On ‘correct’ as applied to tunes, see note on 670b2–4. On the range
of the term melos see Calame 1998: 107–9.

670c5–6 ‘Suppose a person does not even recognize what features

a tune has. Will he ever be able to do what we said—that is, recognize
whether it is correct (hôs orthôs) in any given case?’
alternatively: ‘correct in any respect (hotôioun)’ (Saunders)
Such a person does not recognize what ‘harmony’ and rhythm a tune
(melos) has, and hence is not in a position to assess ‘whether it is
correct’ (hôs orthôs, 670c6) as deployed in a particular composition (v.
erroneous in one of the ways catalogued at 669b–d); ‘what we said’
refers back to the questions about correctness raised at 667b–668e.
On what such correctness consists in, see note on 670c2–3.

670c9 ‘Those singers . . . whom we encourage and in a way even

compel (anankazomen) to sing willingly (hekontas)’
On the willingness of the singers, see notes on 663b4–6, 665d9–e1,
and 665e2–3. On the contrast between willingness and compulsion
(anankê) or force (bia), see 663e1–2 and note on 632b7–8. On
persuasion v. compulsion see note on 634a9.

670d5–6 ‘they will be able to select what is appropriate (ta prosê-

konta). This is what is fitting (prepon) for people of their age and
character to sing’
more literally: ‘ . . . the appropriate ones, which (ha) it is fitting for
people of their age . . . to sing’ (Schöpsdau)
alternatively: ‘ . . . select the songs that are appropriate for people of
their age and character to sing’ (Brisson/Pradeau and Saunders)
‘[W]hat is appropriate’ (ta prosêkonta) are songs that have appropriate
‘harmonies’ and rhythms (cf. the same term at 670c2). Thus the
elders are applying the third criterion of the wise judge of 669b1–3
and they do so in fulfilment of their general mandate to select the
beautiful songs and dances to be performed by the choruses of
citizens. Against the alternative translation, which construes the
relative pronoun ‘ha’ as restrictive rather than attributive, the task
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

320 Commentary: Book 2

the Athenian has set for the chorus of Dionysus is not simply to
identify songs that are appropriate (prepon) for their own age and
nature. All the citizens, young and old, must sing songs with appro-
priate (prosêkonta) ‘harmonies’ and rhythms, and it is the business of
the elders to select the songs with these features.

670d6–7 ‘and when they do, they not only enjoy the harmless
pleasures of the moment’
more literally: ‘singing thus, they not only enjoy . . . ’
On harmless pleasures, see 667d9–e5. ‘Singing thus’ (houtôs . . .
aidontes) encompasses both the ‘finer music’ that selects the songs
that are appropriate for choral performance, and the actual singing of
those songs—the latter apparently being the method by which the
younger singers are taught the selected songs.

670e1–2 ‘they also guide the younger singers towards the appro-
priate embrace (aspasmou prosêkontos) of worthy characters’
alternatively: ‘ . . . set an example in the appropriate embrace . . . ’
A reminder that music trains a person’s affective responses. The term
aspasmos (embrace; alt: liking, loving), whose verbal form is em-
ployed at 654d2, belongs to the ‘pleasures and pains’ whose proper
training constitutes education (paideia), in which an educated person
‘hate[s] what one should hate (misein) and love[s] what one should
love (stergein)’ (653c1–2); cf. 919e5 where aspasmos is substituted for
philia as the opposite of misein (hate).
The ‘younger singers’ here might be members of the choruses of the
Muses and of Apollo (664b–d). They might also be the younger
members of the chorus of Dionysus, whose age range begins just
after 30 (664d1–2; see note ad loc). The Athenian has just assigned
the discriminatory expertise in ‘harmonies’ and rhythms to ‘those who
have reached the age of 50 and are fit to sing’ (670b1–2). Given that
the performance context of the Dionysian chorus is a drinking party
(666b–c), the leadership here would be that of the ‘sober leaders’ who
lead their juniors in a properly conducted drinking party at 640d.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 321

670e3–4 ‘the skill they practise (paideian . . . metakecheirismenoi) is
more exact (akribesteran) than that of the common run, and even
that of the composers themselves’
more literally: ‘the education (paideia) they practise . . . ’ (on paideia
as the result of training, see general note on 653a5–c6)
This ‘more exact’ education is the ‘finer music’ of the Dionysian
chorus (667a10–b3), which allows one to discern whether a tune is
‘harmonious and well-rhythmed’ (670b8–9; see note ad loc). On the
comparison with the choral training of the ordinary person, cf.
666d8–e2, 670a7–b2, 670e2–3. On the comparison with the train-
ing of the composers, see note on 670e5–6. On specialized musical
knowledge, see also Tht. 178d, Rep. 398e, 400b.

670e5–6 ‘there is no need for a composer to recognize the third

thing, whether the imitation is beautiful or not’
The ‘third thing’ is probably the third of the ‘three things’ that a
‘wise judge’ must know, enumerated at 669b1–3: ‘how well ren-
dered (eu . . . eirgastai) the particular representation (hêtisoun eiko-
nôn) is’. In the present restatement, ‘imitation’ (mimêma) is
substituted for ‘representation’ (eikôn) in the original locution (as
licensed by 668a6–7) and ‘beautiful’ (kalon) is substituted for ‘well
rendered’ (eu . . . eirgastai); on the close connection between the
good and the beautiful (kalon) evident, for instance, at 667c7, see
note on 637e5. Alternatively, since the third thing is here glossed as
‘whether the imitation is beautiful’, one might take it to be the
general evaluative question about the work of art articulated at
669a3–4: whether the work of art is ‘beautiful, or . . . falls short of
beauty’; thus Ferrari 1989: 107 and Hatzistavrou 2011: 383–4.
However, that question is answered in the ranking of choral com-
positions as ‘finest’, ‘second’, and so on at 670e7–8, where know-
ledge of ‘all three’ things is identified as necessary for making the
ranking. (On the difference between the three criteria, and the
question of whether the work of art is beautiful, see note on
669a9–b3.)
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

322 Commentary: Book 2

670e6–7 ‘All [a composer] needs to know, basically (schedon), are
“harmony” and rhythm’
The composer’s knowledge ‘about “harmony” and rhythm’ (to de
harmonias kai rhuthmou, e6)—marked as an imprecise phrase by
schedon (‘basically’)—must concern different matters than the ex-
pertise that allows the wise judges to discern which choral works have
appropriate ‘harmonies’ and rhythms (670b8–c3, 670d1–5). We
may understand the difference as follows: the composer’s expertise
is in setting words and gestures into ‘harmonies’ and rhythms, but
does not extend to discerning which ‘harmonies’ and rhythms are
appropriate to which words and gestures (witness the mixing and
matching decried at 669c3–8). Thus the composers are unable to
perform the task assigned to the wise judges of music: to select which
choral works are ‘harmonious (euarmoston) and well-rhythmed
(eurhythmon)’ (670b8–9). The higher expertise of the judges will
involve not simply discriminating one ‘harmony’ from another (the
Dorian from the Lydian, for example, which a composer is compe-
tent to do), but also discerning the sort of character to which each
‘harmony’ is appropriate (e.g. that the Dorian is appropriate to
courage). The latter discrimination involves knowing that the Dorian
‘harmony’ replicates the psychic structure of courage (see note on
669c3–8), an expertise distinct from the composer’s knowledge of
how to produce a tune in the Dorian ‘harmony’. To deny such
discriminatory expertise to composers is thus not to deny them
competence in their craft—as Schöpsdau worries, p. 324; see note
on 669a9–b3. Hatzistavrou proposes that the composers know the
same things about ‘harmony’ and rhythm as the wise judges know,
only less expertly; i.e. they know which ‘harmonies’ and rhythms go
together (Hatzistavrou 2011: 382–3). However, the Athenian has
just said that composers make serious blunders on this front (669b–
670b). The composers are skilled in composing song and dance (by
setting words and gestures into ‘harmonies’ and rhythms), while the
judges are skilled in assessing whether the ‘harmonies’ and rhythms
employed are suitable to their subject matter. A different error is
attributed to the composers in Book 7, 801b9–c7.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 323

670e7–8 ‘These people (tois de), by contrast, must know all three,
in order to select (tês eklogês heneka) what is most beautiful (kallistou)
as well as what is second (deuterou)’
alternatively: ‘ . . . what is finest (kallistou) as well as what is second’
‘These people’ are the elderly singers invoked at the beginning of the
paragraph (670c8–9), who are also the wise judges of 669a9, who the
Athenian has said must know ‘three things’ in order to determine
whether a work of art is beautiful (669a9–b3). Here that determin-
ation is expressed in the ranking of musical works as ‘most beautiful’
(kalliston), ‘second’, etc.; on the significance of this ranking, see also
note on 670e5–6. England and Brisson/Pradeau (359n94), by con-
trast, suppose that ‘what is second’ is to be understood as the second
of three stages of education that they find sketched at 670d1–5. On
this interpretation, ‘what is kalliston’ would be the ‘finer music’
invoked at 667a and attributed to the Dionysian chorus, which
selects the musical compositions that are fit for educational purposes.
In support of the former interpretation against the latter: tois de (e7)
is governed by the expression anankê . . . gignôskein (e5)— so ‘all
three’ (e7) are what the wise judges know, just like the ‘three things’
of 669b1–3. Still, there has been a persistent ambiguity in the
Athenian’s use of the ‘finer/finest music’: whether it concerns the
ranking of choral music against a better variety practised by the
Dionysian chorus, or whether it concerns the ranking of choral
compositions, as in the competitive context reflected at 657d–659c.
See note on 666d11–e1. On the translation of kalon by ‘beautiful’,
see note on 630c7.

VI
DRINKING PARTIES

671a2–674c7
The Athenian now fulfils his long-deferred promise to explain his pro-
vocative assertion that drinking parties have important educational
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

324 Commentary: Book 2

benefits (641a–d, 652b–653a). His strategy for defending that claim in
Book 2 has been to introduce the so-called chorus of Dionysus (664c–
665b), about which he has made two main claims:
(A) Its members will perform in drinking parties, rather than in public
choral competitions (665c–666c).
(B) The music they will perform is ‘finer than that of choruses’ (667a10–
b1) and amounts to the expertise that discriminates which choral
compositions are fit to play a role in education (666d–670e).
While (B) clearly identifies an important educational function, it bears
no obvious relation to the specifically Dionysian aspect of the chorus that
is specified in (A) (see note on 667b1–3). Thus the Athenian now turns
to focus on the benefits that arise from (A). He has already stated that
drinking wine on such occasions will loosen up the older members of that
chorus, and overcome their embarrassment at singing (666b–c). Here, he
connects that point to the general theory of the natural basis of choral
music introduced at the beginning of Book 2, 653d–654a: drunkenness
returns the adult soul to the kinetic youthful state that makes it amenable
to the cultivating effects of music (671a–672d). Thus properly conducted
drinking parties have the important function of renewing the education
that, from the beginning, the Athenian has said ‘tends to slacken and be
undone over the course of human life’ (653c8–9). Pulling together the
strands of his discussion of drunkenness in Book 1, he characterizes the
goal of education as the cultivation of shame (671c–d; cf. 646e–647b),
and insists that drinking parties will have this educational benefit only if
the drinkers are supervised by capable leaders (671d–e; cf. 640c–e). This
raises the question of whether those capable leaders are to be identified
with the elders who, in narrative (B) above, discriminate what music is
fit to sing, in which case the two main claims the Athenian makes about
the chorus of Dionysus are linked (on which see note on 671e1).
Finally, after a brief excursus on the necessity of including a discussion
of athletic training in a complete account of education (672e–673d), the
Athenian concludes his treatment of drinking parties by noting that they
are serious business rather than recreation, and that in fact the consump-
tion of wine should play an extremely limited role in the life of a city
(673d–674c).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 325

671a3 ‘we were right (kalôs) in our earlier defence (boêtheian) of
the chorus of Dionysus’
more literally: ‘that we did well (kalôs) to defend the chorus . . . ’
At 665b the Athenian surprised his interlocutors by claiming that the
chorus of older citizens will be dedicated to Dionysus. At 666b–c the
activities of that chorus are revealed to be those of a drinking party,
the institution disparaged by Megillus in Book 1 (637a–b), so the
Athenian’s ‘defence’ of the chorus of Dionysus in effect defends
drinking parties against the criticisms of Megillus.

671a5–b1 ‘a gathering (sullogos) of this sort inevitably becomes

more boisterous as the drinking proceeds—an unavoidable feature,
we originally supposed, of these events as they take place nowadays’
(reading the MSS’ gignomenôn instead of des Places’ legomenôn in b1)
A ‘gathering (sullogos) of this sort’ is a drinking party (sumposion),
discussed in Book 1 at 637a–641d, with the growing boisterousness
described at 649a–b. ‘As they take place nowadays’ (peri tôn nun
gignomenôn) reflects the Athenian’s concession at 639d–e that such
parties, as they are currently conducted, are largely indefensible.

671b5–6 ‘fit to rule both himself (archôn . . . heautou) and the rest
of the company’
more literally: ‘sufficient (hikanos) to rule both himself . . . ’
This description (a doublet of 649a9–b3) captures both the lack of
self-restraint on the part of individual drinkers, and the incipient
conflict and hostility between drinkers (671e7–672a2) that arises in
the absence of a sober leader (cf. 640e5) directing the proceedings.
On the expression ‘ruling oneself’, see note on 644b6–7.

671b8–672d10
The benefits of drunkenness
Having recapitulated (671a2–b7) the incipient lawlessness and lack
of restraint in drinking parties that led Megillus to deride the practice
in Book 1 (637a), the Athenian now casts those same features of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

326 Commentary: Book 2

drunkenness in a favourable light. The disorderly condition of the
drinkers replicates in those no longer young the juvenile volatility
that makes the young amenable to the shaping influence of musical
training.

The restorative function of drunkenness

The specifically restorative education role identified here for drunk-
enness has been under-appreciated by commentators, so it is worth
stressing that the argument of 671b8–672d10 presents drinking
parties as an institution for restoring shame and self-control in
adults, not for cultivating that condition in the first place. While
the depiction of drinking parties in Book 1 as forums for battling
and detecting shamelessness (649a–650b) mentions no age restric-
tions, the detailed account of paideia over the course of Book 2 has
made it clear that those under 30 years old will be educated by
participating in the chorus of the Muses and of Apollo. It is only
those old enough to have lost their natural juvenile eagerness to
participate in song and dance who will be ‘softened up’ and made
educable again in drinking parties (see note on 671b8–c2). Thus
England on 671e2; Stalley 1983: 55; and Morrow 1960: 442
(discussed by Schöpsdau: 337) are wrong to suppose that the Athen-
ian is proposing drinking parties for the young as well as for the old.
A failure to appreciate the restorative function of the drinking
parties, and hence the central role of drunkenness in its activities
leads Morrow (1960: 316–17) to propose that they are forums for
cultivating the ‘finer music’ attributed to the Dionysian chorus (and
similarly Wilamowitz (1920: Vol. 1, 210) supposes that its activities
are analogous to that of Plato’s Academy)—endorsed in part by
Schöpsdau: 337. If there is to be a role for that ‘finer music’ in the
drinking parties here endorsed by the Athenian, it will have to play a
role in securing educational benefits from drunkenness. That role
will be the same as it plays for the chorus of the Muses and of
Apollo: to select the music that is fit to be sung in these choruses
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 327

(and hence in the drinking parties that are the venue of the chorus of
Dionysus). See note on 671e1.

671b8–c2 ‘Didn’t we say that when this happens the souls of the
drinkers are like iron in the fire? They become softer and more
youthful, receptive to the influence of a skilful educator who can
shape (plattein) them’
A reference to the theory of youthful volatility and the human
susceptibility to the pleasures of ‘harmony’ and rhythm introduced
at 653d5–654a5 and repeated at 664e3–665a3, 672c1–d4, and
673c9–d6 (see note on 653d7–8), as well as to the Athenian’s
observation at 666b5–7 that wine lessens the crabbedness and in-
hibitions of old age. While the youthful soul has previously been
described as pliable (664b5) and fiery (666a5), those previous pas-
sages do not state explicitly the claim of the present passage: that the
condition of juvenile volatility is also a condition of plasticity, and
hence of educability.

671c7–8 ‘and make him willing to do (ethelein poein) just the

opposite’
On ethelein as ‘being willing’ see note on 663b4–6.

671c8–d2 ‘Against the shameful boldness that is filling him they

can send in the finest opponent: fear with justice (meta dikês)’
This fear, also called shame (671d2–3), is first mentioned in Book 1
and recommended as a means to combat the boldness (tharros) of
antisocial behaviour (646e–647b). It is described as ‘involving just-
ice’ (meta dikês) at 647c7–8.

671d5–7 ‘As guardians and assistants of these laws, there will be

undisturbed (athoruboıs) and sober commanders for the inebriated’
A reference back to the sober leaders of drinking parties invoked in
Book 1 at 640b–641a as analogues to the military leader who is
undisturbed (mê thoruboumenos) by fear (640b3; cf. 672a3); the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

328 Commentary: Book 2

office of ‘guardians of the laws’ (nomophulakes) will be introduced at
752d–755b; see also note on 632c4.

671d9–e1 ‘he who cannot willingly obey (ethelein peithesthai) his

leaders’
On willingness and persuasion, see note on 663b4–6. Here
peithesthai, which encompasses both persuasion and obedience, has
the latter sense, while at 663b5 the same locution ethelein peithesthai
is translated by ‘willingly be persuaded’.

671e1 ‘those over 60 years old’

This age designation would put the ‘sober commanders’ of the
drinking party beyond the upper age specified for the chorus of
Dionysus at 664d1–2: ‘those over 30 and up to 60’, whose perform-
ance context has been identified as a drinking party (666a–c, 671a–d).
This would imply that the all-important role of providing wise
supervision to drinking parties does not belong to members of the
chorus of Dionysus. Thus Schöpsdau identifies these ‘over 60-year-
old’ leaders with ‘those beyond that’ (tous de meta tauta) at 664d2–3
who are assigned the task of telling stories, rather than singing in the
chorus of Dionysus. However, the Athenian nowhere explicitly
marks 60 as an upper age limit for that chorus. At 664c–d, his
concern is to include all citizens in the communal project of affirm-
ing the doctrines of beneficial music, and ‘those beyond that’ at
664d2–4 are specified in terms of their inability, not their age (see
note on 664d2–4). Clinias’ question at 665b4–6, ‘will those over
30 . . . and even up to 60 . . . really perform a chorus in his honour?’,
expresses surprise at the extension of Dionysian activities to include
60 year olds, and would be equally applicable to those even older.
At 670a–b no upper limit is given to the age range, only an indication
that the membership goes ‘beyond 50’, which is consistent with
the age designation in the present passage. On the variation with
which the Athenian specifies the age range of that chorus, see
Morrow 1960: 318; Schöpsdau at 664d5–665d6; O. Murray
2013: 114.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 329

While England (seconded by Schöpsdau at 671d5–e3) rightly
notes that the sober leaders of the unsober first mentioned in Book
1 at 640d4–7 are implied to be older than the drinkers they super-
vise, this poses no obstacle to supposing that both the drinkers and
their sober leaders are members of the chorus of Dionysus. The age
range of that chorus is unusually broad (see note on 664d1–2) and
the Athenian has already made discriminations within it, singling out
the older members as the practitioners of the ‘finer music’ specified
in 667b–670e; the wise judges who select the compositions that are
suitable for choral performance must have ‘reached 50’ (pentêkontou-
tas, 670b1), alternatively specified as ‘having reached 60’ (hexêkon-
toutas, 812b9–10). These passages imply a leadership role within the
chorus for its older members (cf. ‘leaders of the younger singers’,
670e1), and one might reasonably ask whether the leadership func-
tion extends to acting as the sober superintendents of the drinking
parties in which other members of this chorus perform. The Athen-
ian never says so, and indeed, has done practically nothing to
integrate the accounts of the Dionysian chorus as (A) participants
in a drinking party and (B) practitioners of that finer music (see notes
on 664d1–2 and on 667b1–3). Still, an affirmative answer to this
question would connect (A) and (B), and provide a rationale (other-
wise missing) for identifying (B) as distinctively Dionysian: the older
members who, according to (B) select the music to be performed by
younger members would be eo ipso providing the requisite guidance
to the drinking party in (A). If, on the other hand, the sober leaders
of the inebriated are even older than the members of the Dionysian
chorus, we must suppose that inebriated wise judges are in need of an
even wiser leadership, a point for which the Athenian has not
prepared his audience. (Against Schöpsdau’s proposal to identify
that leadership with those described at 664d2–4 as too old to sing:
the latter are hardly specified in terms that imply superior wisdom.)
It is entirely possible that the designation ‘over 60’ in the present
context is simply a misremembering by the Athenian (or by Plato) of
the designation ‘gone past 50’ at 670a5 for the age of the practi-
tioners of (B), just as their designation as having ‘reached 50’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

330 Commentary: Book 2

(pentêkontoutas) at 670b1 is later misreported at 812b9–10 as having
‘reached 60’ (hexêkontoutas).
In any case, the Athenian’s emphasis in the present context is not
on the credentials of the leaders of drinking parties, but on the
benefits to the inebriated of a properly conducted drinking party.
Nor is he here concerned, as he is concerned in 664b–d, to specify
the age range of the three choruses.

671e5–6 ‘this sort of drunkenness and recreation (paidia)’

Here, as at 666b5, drunkenness at a drinking party is described as a
kind of recreation (paidia); however, at 667e6–8 the paidia is con-
strued more narrowly for pleasures with no significant benefit or
harm at stake (see note ad loc), and at 673e8 wine is forbidden to be
used for recreation (hôs paidiai). On the range of the term, see note
on 635b5.

671e7–672a1 ‘unlike today, when they part as enemies’

Such hostility arises from the loss of self-restraint in individual
drinkers, each of whom thinks himself fit to rule over the others
(671b3–6; see note on 671b5–6).

672a5–6 ‘roundly (haplôs) condemn the gift of Dionysus’

Megillus gave such an unqualified condemnation at 637a–b. The
blanket nature of the condemnation is criticized by the Athenian on
methodological grounds at 638c–640e.

672a7–8 ‘Indeed, I could go on and recount the greatest good he

has given us—only I am hesitant to do so’
more literally: ‘ . . . one could say more on the subject, although . . . I
am hesitant to recount the greatest good . . . ’

672b4–5 ‘driven out of his mind’

more literally: ‘had the mind (gnômê) of his soul (psuchê) destroyed’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 331

The condition contrasts with the intelligence (nous and phronêsis)
invoked in 672c and recalls the ‘manic’ (emmanê) condition of youth
at 666a7. See note on 671b8–c2.

672b7–8 ‘I leave it to those who think they have sound judgement

about the gods to pronounce on such matters’
In Book 10 the Athenian will reject all stories about the gods that fail
to portray them as good and beneficent (885b; cf. Rep. 379a–383c).

672c2–5 ‘before it possesses its proper intelligence (phronêsin), it

raves and shouts at random (ataktôs) and . . . jumps about in disorder
(ataktôs)’
The Athenian here connects the madness associated with drunken-
ness and the cult of Dionysus to the juvenile volatility originally
invoked at 653d5–654a3. With this new emphasis, he stresses the
lack of orderliness (664e6) and apparent madness (666a7) in the
natural juvenile motions, which contrast with the order (taxis) em-
bodied in ‘harmony’ and rhythm. Here order is linked to phronêsis,
on which see note on 653a7–9. On Dionysus see note on 637b2.

672c6–7 ‘we called these the origins (archas) of music (mousikês)

and athletics (gumnastikês)’
The reference is back to 653d5–654a3, which identifies our natural
affinity for ‘harmony’ and rhythm and our natural juvenile volatility
as the two roots of choral dance. ‘Athletics’ (gumnastikê) is not in fact
mentioned in the earlier passage. Its mention here anticipates the
Athenian’s upcoming introduction of the topic (672e). He will soon
state that dance is a kind of ‘athletics’ (673a), and will identify the
natural juvenile impulse to bodily movement (invoked at 653d) as
the origin of athletics (673c9–d6). On the translation of gumnastikê
as ‘athletics’, see note on 673a8–10.

672c9–d3 ‘that in the case of us humans, this origin (tên archên

tautên) gives rise to (endedôkenai) a sense of rhythm and ‘harmony’,
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

332 Commentary: Book 2

and that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus among the gods are
responsible for this?’
alternatively: ‘ . . . that a sense of rhythm and harmony yields this
origin . . . ’ (Schöpsdau)
A difficult sentence, which continues to elaborate the theory of
653d5–654a3 (cf. 673c9–d5 and note on 672c2–5). This ‘origin’
(tên archên tautên) is the condition of disorderly juvenile movement
referred to in the previous paragraph (672c6) as the (plural) ‘origins’
of music and gymnastics. Schöpsdau’s alternative is motivated by the
worry that the juvenile condition cannot be the origin of the sense of
rhythm etc., since all animals have the former, while only humans
have the latter; thus he proposes that ‘this origin’ (tên archên tautên)
is the object rather than the subject of ‘gives rise to’ (endedôkenai),
with ‘the sense of rhythm’ (tên aisthêsin) as the subject. But then the
Athenian would be claiming that the sense of rhythm is the source of
the juvenile propensity to disorderly movement. The worry is better
addressed by allowing that the expression ‘A gives rise to (endedôke-
nai) B’ need not mean that A is causally sufficient for B (thus
England: the juvenile condition is like the field in which the later
sense of rhythm grows). So construed, the sentence fits the Athen-
ian’s larger point in the present context, which is to identify the
educational benefits of drunkenness by noting that it replicates the
juvenile condition of disorderly motion. The educational significance
of that juvenile condition is not that it inevitably gives rise to our
sense of ‘harmony’ and rhythm, but that it is a crucial feature of the
conditions in which music cultivates the human soul.

672d5–7 ‘The story other people tell (ho tôn allôn logos) . . . the
story we are telling now (ho de nun legomenos)’
more literally: ‘the account (logos) other people give . . . the one we are
giving’

672d8–9 ‘given to us as a potion for instilling shame (aidous) in the

soul and health and strength in the body’
The Athenian has explicitly argued only for the claim about the soul.
The mention of effects on the body (cf. its use for ‘bodily training’ at
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 333

674b4) may anticipate the discussion of athletic training that he is
about to introduce (672e1–673d9).

672e1–673d9
Athletics distinguished from music
The Athenian here notes that ‘athletics’ (gumnastikê) is a topic that
must still be discussed. It is ‘one half’ of choral performance insofar as
the latter involves the motion of the body (dance); however, the
preceding discussion of choral music has focused on its vocal aspects,
and its role in cultivating the soul. The physical aspects of dance
make it a kind of athletic training, like the military training that
Book 1 notes is the focus of Dorian education (625c–626b, 666e).
These two types of athletics will be treated at length only in Book 7
(dance) and 8 (military training). On the translation of gumnastikê as
‘athletics’, see note on 673a8–10.

672e5 ‘choral performance (choreia) as a whole is pretty much

(pou) the whole process of education (paideusis)’
A theme of Book 2 has been that education (paideia) is the condition
of having correctly nurtured pleasures and pains (653a–c) and that it
is produced by a process that centrally involves choral performance, a
combination of song and dance. Here that educational process is
called paideusis (educating).

672e9 ‘its distinctive feature (idion) is gesture (schêma). The other

part, vocal movement, has tune (melos) as its distinctive feature’
On dance as manifest in gesture (schêma) while song is manifest in
tune (melos), see 654e–655b.

673a3–5 ‘vocal activities that reach the soul and cultivate virtue’
more literally: ‘ . . . that reach the soul, since they are [a kind of]
education in virtue (hôs aretês paideian)’
Reading hôs aretês paideian, with des Places and Schöpsdau, instead
of the MSS pros aretês paideian. The phrase perhaps reflects the
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

334 Commentary: Book 2

restricted scope of ‘education’ (paideia) demarcated in Book 1,
643d–644b, which excludes training in trade skills, and includes
only the training that is directed ‘towards virtue’ (pros aretên,
643e3–5; see note on 652b3–653a1). On music as what cultivates
paideia, the ‘initial virtue’, see 653b2, 654a6–7.

673a7–8 ‘bodily movements, which we call “dance” when they are

performed as recreation (ha paizontôn orchêsin eipomen)’
alternatively: ‘which we called recreational dance’ (Brisson/Pradeau,
Saunders, Bury)
The implicit contrast is between bodily movements done in play or
recreation (paidia), here given the label ‘dance’ (orchêsis), and those
done for a more serious (or painful) purpose (see Schöpsdau on
672e1–673d9). The former are the ‘playful’ juvenile movements
described as ‘leap[ing] and bound[ing] . . . in playful glee (prospai-
zonta)’ at 653e1–3; the ‘recreation’ involved in dance is also invoked
at 657c3–d7, where paidia is translated as ‘recreation’ (see note on
667e6–8). The seriously intended bodily movements will include the
athletic training and military exercises that dominate Dorian educa-
tion; their painfulness is emphasized at 633b–c. The Athenian, who
allows that dance is a part of music insofar as it involves rhythm
(672e8–9; cf. 655a5–6), here points out the features that it has in
common with military training, and thus make it a part of gumnas-
tikê. Alternatively, Brisson/Pradeau (361n114) propose that the pai-
zontôn orchêsin (‘la danse de ceux qui s’amusent’) is dance that is not
joined with choral song—i.e. playful movement that is not necessar-
ily rhythmic. On such a construal, the Athenian is classifying gum-
nastikê as a kind of dance. On the present construal, by contrast
(taken also by Pangle), the general category is bodily movement, with
dance and gumnastikê as subcategories.

673a8–10 ‘let us call the skilled guidance (entechnon agôgên) to-

wards that bodily condition (epi to toiouton autou) “athletics”
(gumnastikê)’
alternatively: ‘let us call the skilled guidance . . . “physical training” ’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 335

The term ‘athletics’—used here to translate gumnastikê—should
be understood as encompassing all physical training (as in North
American English usage); the English term ‘gymnastics’ is no longer
a suitable translation, since it typically refers to a single sport (tum-
bling, vaulting, etc.) whereas the Greek term is much broader and
includes military training (Rep. 404b7; cf. the close synonym gym-
nasia at Laws 625c7, 636b1). The present definition of gumnastikê as
training that cultivates bodily excellence (sômatos aretês, a8) serves to
distinguish it from mousikê, which has just been defined as cultivation
of the soul (aretês paideian, a4). See notes on 672c6–7, 673a7–8. The
Athenian has no use here for the point made in Rep. III that
gumnastikê also cultivates the soul (410b–c).

673b5 ‘Sir, you are talking to Cretans and Spartans here!’

On the importance placed on athletics in Cretan and Spartan insti-
tutions, see Book 1 625c–d, 633a–d.

673c6–7 ‘considerably more experienced in it than in the previous

one’
The antecedent of ‘it’ is ‘this discipline’ (tautêi têi technêi, c6). The
Athenian’s comment recalls his criticism in Book 1 that the Dorian
states lack adequate institutions for training pleasures (635b–d),
which makes them deficient at education, conceived of as the train-
ing of pleasures and pains (643b–d). The use here of technê (discip-
line; alt: ‘skill’) to refer to both music and athletics reflects the
reference to the latter as a ‘discipline leading’ (entechnon agôgên) to
virtue at 673a9.

673c9–d1 ‘Now this kind of recreation (paidias) has its origin in

the natural propensity (eithisthai) of all animals to jump about’
‘Natural propensity’ translates eithisthai (alt: habit), elsewhere trans-
lated by ‘training’; see notes on 632d5–6 and on 655d7–e1. The
recreation (paidia) in question must be athletics (gumnastikê), which
has just been announced as the topic of discussion (thus Schöpsdau;
see also note on 673d7–8). Against this, one might worry that in
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

336 Commentary: Book 2

673a7–8 only one kind of athletics—dance—has been identified as a
recreation (in the phrase paizontôn orchêsin), while the other kind
involves hard, often painful, work (see note on 673a7–8). However,
the Athenian has earlier shown his willingness to count the frolicking
movements of young animals as a kind of play and dance (653e6, a
passage that gives the context for 673a7–8). Even though such
movements do not count as a dance (orchêsis) in the strict sense
here identified (as involving rhythm, which only humans have), they
are clearly instances of the kind of bodily movement distinct both
from non-recreational hard physical training and from rhythmic
dance. It is these juvenile movements that the Athenian here invokes
as the origin (archê) of all athletics.
While the present paragraph (673c9–d5) invokes the two ‘parts’ of
choral performance (choreia), mousikê and gymnastikê, that are al-
ready distinguished at some length at 672e1–673b4, it does not (as
Schöpsdau claims) merely recapitulate those earlier remarks, for the
Athenian goes beyond that earlier discussion by identifying the
juvenile animal impulse to movement as the origin of gymnastikê.
By contrast, 672c–d treats the disorderly manifestation of that im-
pulse as a necessary preliminary to the introduction of order through
song and dance.

673d7–8 ‘Having gone through the one part of the subject . . . we

will next try to go through the other’
These ‘parts’ are the two halves of choral performance (choreia)
identified at 672e1–673b4 as (1) music, the subject of the previous
discussion, and (2) athletics, (gumnastikê), still to be discussed. This
gives additional support to construing ‘this kind of recreation’ in
673c9 as athletics (see note on 673c9–d1).
The Athenian will not in fact address the topic of athletics until
Books 7 and 8 (dance: 795d–796e, 813b–816d; hunting: 823b–
824a; military training and athletic competition: 829b–c, 830a–
835b). On the range of activities included in gumnastikê (athletics),
see note on 673a7–8.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 337

673d10–674c7
The limited role of wine in social life
The Athenian here adds the ‘finishing touches’ (ton kolophôna,
673d10) to the discussion of drunkenness that has been the enduring
(if often submerged) focus of his discussion since the topic was
introduced in Book 1 (637a). While at 671a–672d he made good
on his promise to identify the educational benefits of drinking
parties, he here rounds off that discussion by noting the very limited
extent to which the practice of drunkenness (or even the consump-
tion of wine) will be a part of the social life of a well-governed polity.

673e3 ‘as a serious matter (hôs ousês spoudês)’

In contrast with ‘as a form of recreation’ (hôs paidiai) at 673e8. On the
recurring contrast between play and seriousness, see note on 635b5.

673e5 ‘to practise and cultivate moderation (tou sôphronein heneka

meletês)’
In Book 1, drinking parties are presented as a forum for cultivating
moderation, analogous to the battlefield as a forum for cultivating
courage (647c–649c).

673e6–7 ‘does not abstain from them but cultivates mastery over
them’
In Book 1 the Dorian societies are characterized as ‘abstaining’ from
pleasures (635b–c, 636e–637b).

673e8 ‘it treats the activity as a form of recreation (hôs paidiai)’

(Rather than a serious matter, as at 673e3.) At 666b5, drinking wine
in a symposium is referred to as recreation (paidia), but the definition
of paidia at 667e6–8 requires that no great harm or benefit be at
stake, and the burden of the argument throughout Book 2 has been
that drinking parties provide a ‘great benefit, which we must take
very seriously’ (652a3–4). On paidia, see note on 635b5.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

338 Commentary: Book 2

673e9–674a1 ‘anyone who wishes to drink whenever and with
whomever he wishes and in conjunction with any activity
whatsoever’
In contrast with the drinking parties led by sober leaders who will
direct the proceedings, as prescribed at 640c–d; a reflection of the
methodological point at 638c–e.

674a3–4 ‘I would go beyond even the Cretan and Spartan practice’

The practice of forbidding drunkenness (637a), but not banning
wine altogether (see note on 637e2–3).

674a4–5 ‘and vote for the Carthaginian law that prohibits all wine
drinking to soldiers on campaign’
Translation following Saunders 1972, Schöpsdau and Brisson/Pra-
deau, against England’s alternative: ‘to the Carthaginian law . . . I
would add . . . ’. Presumably the long list of prohibitions down to
674b6 exceeds what one might reasonably understand the Cartha-
ginian law to encompass (cf. [Aristotle], Oikonimika, 1344a33,
which corroborates the authenticity of the ban on drinking while
on campaign); however, the grammar of the sentence includes all the
prohibitions within the scope of that law: ‘to a short Carthaginian
law the Athenian attaches a long Platonic tail’ (Saunders 1972: 12).
Morrow (1960: 442n150) proposes that the Athenian intends the
prohibitions to apply only in a city that, contrary to 673e3–5, treats
wine as a recreation rather than a serious matter. However, the
prohibitions are consistent with the restrictions on wine-drinking
and drunkenness articulated in the description of the three choruses
at 666a–b, and the end of the present paragraph infers from the
prohibitions a conclusion that applies to ‘any city’ (674c2).

674a7–b3 ‘even in the city itself, no slave . . .

nor . . . any . . . officials . . . ship captains . . . jurors . . . on active duty,
nor . . . any person who is about to participate in important
deliberations’
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Commentary: Book 2 339

This list of participants in the civic life of the community contrasts
with the military context just discussed (674a5–7). All those listed
have a function to perform within the city, which presumably
depends on their possessing the alert senses and unimpaired judge-
ment that, as the Athenian has emphasized at 645e1–3, are com-
promised by drinking wine.

674b7 ‘no one in their right and lawful mind (tois noun te kai
nomon echousin orthon)’
more literally: ‘no one with a correct (orthos) mind (nous) and law
(nomos)’
A play on the common expression ‘have sense’ or ‘be in one’s right
mind’ (noun echein), perhaps reflecting the connection between
rational judgement (logismos or logos) and law (nomos) invoked at
1, 644c–d, 645a–b. On correctness of law, see 627d3, 657b3,
659d2, d4.

674c2–3 ‘Once all agricultural and dietary matters have been

arranged (takta)’
These arrangements are discussed in Book 8 (842b–848c), with no
mention of wine.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Bibliography

Texts, translations, and commentaries

AMMENDOLA, G. (1953). Platone: Nomoi, Scelta e Commento [selection and

commentary]. Naples: Loffredo.
AST, D. F., ed. (1814). Platonis Leges et Epinomis [edition and commen-
tary], 2 vols. Leipzig: Weidmann.
BRISSON, L. and Pradeau, J.-F. (2006). Platon: Les Lois, traduction, intro-
duction, et notes, 2 vols. Paris: Flammarion.
BURNET, J., ed. (1907). Platonis Opera. Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
BURY, R. G. (1926). Plato, with an English Translation. Loeb Classical
Library, Vols. IX and X, Laws. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
ENGLAND, E. B. (1921). The Laws of Plato, the Text edited with Introduc-
tion, Notes, etc., 2 vols. London and Manchester: Longmans, Green &
Co. and University of Manchester Press.
JOWETT, B. (1924). The Dialogues of Plato, translated into English, with
analyses and introductions, Volume 5: Laws, Index. New York: Oxford
University Press.
LISI, F. L. (1999). Platón, Diálogos, vol. VIII et IX. Translation into
Spanish. Madrid: Gredos.
PANGLE, T. (1980). The Laws of Plato, translated with Notes and an Inter-
pretive Essay. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
PLACES, E. DES (1951). Platon: Les Lois Livres I et II. Greek text and
translation; introduction by A. Diès and L. Gernet. Paris: Belles Lettres;
repr. 2006 (6th printing).
PLACES, E. des and Diès, A. (1951–6). Platon: Oeuvres Complètes XI–XII. Les
Lois, texte établit et traduit, 4 vols. Paris: Belles Lettres.
RITTER, C. (1896). Platons Gesetze: Kommentar sum griechischen Text.
Leipzig: Teubner; repr. 1985.
SAUNDERS, T. (1970). Plato: The Laws, translated with an Introduction.
London: Penguin Books.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

342 Bibliography
SAUNDERS, T. (1972). Notes on the Laws of Plato. London: University of
London Institute of Classical Studies. Bulletin Supplement 28.
SCHANZ, M., ed. (1879). Platonis opera quae feruntur omnia ad codices denuo
collato, Vol XII.1: Leges I–VI. Leipzig: Tauchnitz.
SCHÖPSDAU, K. (1994). Platon: Nomoi (Gesetze): Buch I–III. Übersetzung
und Kommentar. Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht.
SCHÖPSDAU, K. (2003). Platon: Nomoi (Gesetze): Buch IV–VII. Übersetzung
und Kommentar. Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht.
SCHÖPSDAU, K. (2011). Platon: Nomoi (Gesetze): Buch VIII–XII. Über-
setzung und Kommentar. Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht.
S TALLBAUM , G. (1859–60). Platonis Leges et Epinomis, Vol. X, sec.
i–iii. Platonis opera onmia [edition with annotations]. Gotha /
Erfurt: Hennings.
TAYLOR, A. E. (1934). Plato: Laws, translated with an Introduction.
London: J. M. Dent and Sons.

Books and articles

ANDERSON, J. K. (1985). Hunting in the Classical World. Berkeley: Univer-

sity of California Press.
ANNAS, J. (1993). The Morality of Happiness. New York: Oxford University
Press.
ANNAS, J. (1999). Platonic Ethics Old and New. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
ANNAS, J. (2010). ‘Virtue and Law in Plato’ in Bobonich, ed. 2010,
71–91.
ATHANASSAKI, L. and BOWIE, E. (2011). Archaic and Classical Choral Song:
Performance, Politics, and Dissemination. Berlin: de Gruyter.
BARKER, A. (1984). Greek Musical Writings, Vol. 1: The Musician and his
Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
BARKER, A. (1990). Greek Musical Writings, Vol. 2: Harmonic and Acoustic
Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
BARKER, A. (2013). ‘The Laws and Aristoxenus on the Criteria of Musical
Judgment’ in A.-E. Peponi, ed. 2013b, 392–416.
BARKER, E. (1918). Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors. Lon-
don: Methuen.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Bibliography 343
BARNEY, R. (2010). ‘Notes on Plato on the Kalon and the Good’. Classical
Philology (Special Issue: Beauty, Harmony and the Good ) 105: 363–77.
BARNEY, R., BRENNAN, T., and BRITTAIN, C., eds. (2012). Plato and the
Divided Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
BARTELS, M. (2012). ‘Senex Mensura: an Objective Aesthetic of Seniors in
Plato’s Laws’ in Aesthetic Value in Classical Antiquity, Proceedings of the
Penn-Leiden Colloquium 2010. Leiden: Brill, 133–58.
BELFIORE, E. (1986). ‘Wine and the Catharsis of Emotions in Plato’s Laws’.
Classical Quarterly 36 (2): 421–37.
BENARDETE, S. (2000). Plato’s ‘Laws’: the discovery of being. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
BICCHIERI, C. (2006). The Grammar of Society: the Nature and Dynamics of
Social Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
BILLINGS, J., BUDELMANN, F., and MACINTOSH, F., eds. (2013). Choruses,
Ancient and Modern. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
BOBONICH, C. (1994). ‘Akrasia and Agency in Plato’s Laws and Republic’.
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 76: 3–36.
BOBONICH, C. (1995). ‘Plato’s Theory of Goods in the Laws and the
Philebus’. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy
11: 101–39.
BOBONICH, C. (2002). Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics.
New York: Oxford University Press.
BOBONICH, C., ed. (2010). Plato’s Laws: a Critical Guide. Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press.
BOLOT, R. (2006). Greek Political Theory. Oxford: Blackwell.
BRANDWOOD, L. (1990). The Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
BRENNAN, T. (2012). ‘The Nature of the Spirited Part of the Soul and its
Object’ in Barney et al., eds. 2012, 102–27.
BRILL, S. (2010). ‘Psychology and legislation in Plato’s Laws’. Proceedings of
the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 26: 211–51.
BRISSON, L. (1982). Platon: les mots et les mythes. Paris: La Decouverte,
2nd ed. 1994.
BRISSON, L. (1993). Orphée: poèmes magiques et cosmologiques. Paris: Belles
Lettres.
BRISSON, L. (2012). ‘Soul and State in Plato’s Laws’ in Barney et al., eds.
2012: 281–308.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

344 Bibliography
BRISSON, L. and PRADEAU, J. F. (2007). Les Lois de Platon. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France.
BURKERT, W. (1985). Greek Religion. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
CAIRNS, D. (1993). Aidôs: the Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in
Ancient Greek Literature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
CALAME, C. (1998). ‘La poésie lyrique grecque, un genre inexistant?’.
Littérature 111: 87–110.
CALAME, C. (2013). ‘Choral Practices in Plato’s Laws: Itineraries of Initi-
ation’ in A.-E. Peponi, ed. 2013b, 87–108.
CARONE, G. (2002). ‘Pleasure, Virtue, Externals, and Happiness in Plato’s
Laws’. History of Philosophy Quarterly 19 (4): 327–44.
CARTLEDGE, P. (1979). Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History. London:
Routledge.
CARTLEDGE, P. (2002). Hellenistic and Roman Sparta: a Tale of Two Cities,
2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
COHEN, D. (1991). Law, Sexuality, and Society; the Enforcement of Morals in
Classical Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
COOPER, J. M. (1984). ‘Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation’. History of
Philosophy Quarterly 1: 3–21.
COOPER, J. M. (1996). ‘Reason, Moral Virtue and Moral Value’ in M.
Frede and G. Striker, eds., Rationality in Greek Thought. Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 81–114.
COX, C. A. (1998). Household Interests, Property, Marriage Strategies, and Family
Dynamics in Ancient Athens. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
CSAPO, E. (2004). ‘The Politics of the new Music’ in P. Murray and
P. Wilson, eds. 2004, 207–48.
D’ANGOUR, A. (2006). ‘The New Music: So What’s New?’ in S. Goldhill
and R. Osborne, eds., Rethinking Revolutions through Ancient Greece.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 264–83.
D’ANGOUR, A. (2013). ‘Plato and Play: Taking Education Seriously in
Ancient Greece’. American Journal of Play 5 (3): 293–307.
DAVID, E. (1978). ‘The Spartan Sussitia and Plato’s Laws’. American Journal
of Philology 99: 486–95.
DAVID, E. (1993). ‘Hunting in Spartan Society and Consciousness’. Échos
du monde classique/Classical Views 37: 393–414.
DAVIDSON, J. (2006). ‘Revolutions in Time: Age-class in Athens and the
Greekness of Greek Revolutions’ in S. Goldhill and R. Osborne, eds.,
Rethinking Revolutions through Ancient Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 29–68.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Bibliography 345
DENNISTON, J. D. (1950). The Greek Particles, 2nd ed. Revised by
K. J. Dover. London: Duckworth; repr. 1996 Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing.
DESTRÉE, P. and HERMANN, F.-G., eds. (2011). Plato and the Poets. Leiden:
Brill.
DIEHL, E. (1971). Theognis, 2nd ed., revised by D. Young. Leipzig:
Teubner.
DORANDI, T. (2013). Diogenes Laertius: Lives, Teachings, and Sayings of
Famous Philosophers. Cambridge classical texts and commentaries 50.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
DORION, L.-A. (2007). ‘Plato and Enkrateia’ in C. Bobonich and
P. Destrée, eds., Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: from Socrates to Plotinus.
Leiden and Boston: Brill, 119–38.
DOVER, K. J. (1974). Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and
Aristotle. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; repr. with corrections 1994 Indian-
apolis: Hackett.
DOVER, K. J. (1978). Greek Homosexuality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
DUSANIC, S. (1990). History and Politics in Plato’s Laws [monograph in
Serbian with English Summary pp. 359–89]. Belgrade: The Serbian
Academy of Arts and Sciences.
DUSANIC, S. (1991). ‘Epimenide le Cnossien et les thèmes historico-
politiques des Lois de Platon’. Epigraphica 53: 25–57.
EDMONDS, J. M. (1931). Elegy and Iambus, 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library.
London: Heinemann.
EDMONDS, R. (2013). Redefining Ancient Orphism. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
FERRARI, G. R. F. (1989). ‘Plato on Poetry’ in G. A. Kennedy, ed., The
Cambridge History of Literary Criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 92–148.
FOLCH, M. (2013). ‘Unideal Genres and the Ideal City: Comedy, Thren-
ody, and the Making of Citizens in Plato’s Laws’ in A.-E. Peponi, ed.
2013b, 339–67.
FORTENBAUGH, W. (1975). Aristotle on Emotion. London: Duckworth.
FOSSHEIM, H. (2013). ‘The Prooimia: Types of Motivation, and Moral
Psychology’ in Horn, ed. 2013, 87–104.
FOUCAULT, M. (1978). The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, translated by R.
Hurley. New York: Vintage Books.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

346 Bibliography
FREDE, D. (2010). ‘Puppets on Strings: Moral Psychology in Laws Books 1
and 2’ in C. Bobonich, ed. 2010, 108–26.
FREEMAN, K. (1950). Greek City States. London: Macdonald.
GEHRKE, H.-J. (1985). Stasis: Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den
grieschen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jhr. v. Chr. München: Beck.
GERSON, L. P. (2003). Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
GOLDEN, M. (1990). Childhood and Children in Classical Athens. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
GÖRGEMANNS, H. (1960). Beiträge zur Interpretation von Platons Nomoi.
Munich: Beck. (Zetemata 25)
GOULD, T. (1963). Platonic Love. London: Routledge.
GRAESER, A. (1969). Probleme der platonischen Seelenteilungslehre. Munich:
Beck. (Zetemata 47: 102–5)
GRAF, F. (2009). Apollo. New York: Routledge.
GRIFFITH, M. (2013). ‘Cretan Harmonies and Universal Morals: Early Music
and Migrations of Wisdom in Plato’s Laws’ in Peponi, ed. 2013b, 15–66.
GROTE, G. (1846–56). History of Greece, from the Earliest Period to the Close of
the Generation contemporary with Alexander the Great. London: J. Muray.
GUTHRIE, W. K. C. (1978). A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. V: The Later
Plato and the Academy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
HALLIWELL, S. (2002). The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern
Interpretations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
HALPERIN, D., WINKLER, J., and ZEITLIN, F., eds. (1990). Before Sexuality:
the Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.
HATZISTAVROU, A. (2011). ‘Correctness and Poetic Knowledge: Choric
Poetry in the Laws’ in P. Destrée and F.-G. Herman, eds., Plato and
the Poets. Leiden: Brill, 361–85.
HELMIG, C. (2003). ‘Die Bedeutung and Funcktion von Kø fi  in Platons
Nomoi’ in S. Scolnicov and Brisson, eds., 2003, 75–80.
HODKINSON, S., POWELL, A., CARTLEDGE, P., eds. (1999). Sparta: New
Perspectives. London: Duckworth.
HOOKER, J. T. (1980). The Ancient Spartans. London: Dent.
HORN, C., ed. (2013). Platon: Gesetze/NOMOI. Klassiker Auslegen 55.
Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Bibliography 347
IRWIN, T. H. (1979). Plato: Gorgias, Translated with Notes. The Clarendon
Plato Series. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
IRWIN, T. H. (1995). Plato’s Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
IRWIN T. H. (2010). ‘The Sense and Reference of kalon in Aristotle’.
Classical Philology (Special Issue: Beauty, Harmony and the Good ) 105:
381–96.
IRWIN, T. H. (2011). The Development of Ethics, vol. 1: From Socrates to the
Reformation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
JANAWAY, C. (1995). Images of Excellence: Plato’s Critique of the Arts. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
JONES, R. E. (2013). ‘Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278–282’.
Philosophers’ Imprint 13 (4): 1–21.
JOUËT-PASTRÉ, E. (2006). Le jeu et le sérieux dans les LOIS de Platon. Sankt
Augustin: Academia Verlag.
JOUËT-PASTRÉ, E. (2012). ‘Les Lois, un paradigme politique possible’ in Lisi,
ed. 2012, 113–26.
KAHN, C. H. (2002). ‘On Platonic Chronology’ in J. Annas and C. Rowe,
eds., New Perspectives on Plato, Modern and Ancient. Washington, DC:
Center for Hellenic Studies, 93–127.
KAHN, C. H. (2004). ‘From Republic to Laws’ [review essay on Bobonich
2002]. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26: 337–62.
KAMTEKAR, R. (2010). ‘Psychology and the Inculcation of Virtue in Plato’s
Laws’ in Bobonich, ed. 2010, 127–48.
KENNELL, N. (1995). The Gymnasium of Virtue: Education and Culture in
Ancient Sparta. Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press.
KENNELL, N. (2009). Spartans: A New History. Malden, MA and Chiches-
ter, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
KERN, O. (1922). Orphicorum Fragmenta. Berlin: Weidmann.
KEULS, E. C. (1978). Plato and Greek Painting. Leiden: Brill.
KLOSKO, G. (2006). The Development of Plato’s Political Theory, 2nd ed.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
KOWALZIG, B. (2004). ‘Changing Choral Words: Song-dance and Soci-
ety in Athens and Beyond’ in P. Murray and P. Wilson eds. 2004,
39–65.
KRAUT, R. (1979). ‘Two Conceptions of Happiness’. The Philosophical
Review 88: 167–97.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

348 Bibliography
KRAUT, R. (2013). ‘An Aesthetic Reading of Aristotle’s Ethics’ in Verity
Harte and Melissa Lane, eds., Politeia: Essays in Honour of Malcolm
Schofield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 231–50.
KURKE, L. (2013). ‘Imagining Chorality: Wonder, Plato’s Puppets, and
Moving Statues’ in Peponi, ed. 2013b, 123–70.
LAKS, A. (2000). ‘The Laws’ in C. Rowe and M. Schofield, eds., The
Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 258–92.
LAKS, A. (2005). Médiation et coercition: Pour une lecture des Lois de Platon.
Villneuve d’Asq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
LANE, M. (1998). Method and Politics in Plato’s Statesman. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
LAWLER, L. B. (1964). The Dance in Ancient Greece. London: A & C Black.
LEAR, G. R. (2006). ‘Plato on Learning to Love Beauty’ in G. Santas, ed., The
Blackwell Guide to Plato’s Republic. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing,
104–22.
LISI, F., ed. (2001). Plato’s Laws and its Historical Significance. Sankt
Augustin: Academia Verlag.
LISI, F., ed. (2012). Utopia, Ancient and Modern: Contributions to the History
of a Political Dream. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
LONSDALE, S. (1993). Dance and Ritual Play in Greek Religion. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
LORENZ, H. (2006). The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and
Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MARTIN, R. (2013). ‘The Rhetoric of Rhapsody in Plato’s Laws’ in Peponi,
ed. 2013b, 313–38.
MATHIESEN, T. J. (1999). Apollo’s Lyre: Greek Music and Music Theory in
Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska
Press.
MEYER, S. S. (1993). Aristotle on Moral Responsibility. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell; reissued with a new introduction (2011), Oxford University
Press.
MEYER, S. S. (2003). ‘Plato on the Moral Dangers of Labour and Com-
merce’ in Scolnicov and Brisson, eds. 2003, 207–14.
MEYER, S. S. (2006). ‘Plato on the Law’ in H. Benson, ed., A Companion to
Plato. Oxford and Malden MA: Basil Blackwell.
MEYER, S. S. (2008). Ancient Ethics. New York: Routledge.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Bibliography 349
MEYER, S. S. (2011). ‘Living for the sake of an Ultimate End’ in Jon Miller,
ed., Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: a critical guide. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 47–65.
MEYER, S. S. (2012). ‘Pleasure, Pain and “Anticipation” in Laws I’ in
Patterson et al., eds. 2012, 311–28.
MILLENDER, E. G. (1999). ‘Athenian Ideology and the Empowered Spartan
Woman’ in S. Hodkinson, A. Powell, and P. Cartledge, eds., Sparta:
New Perspectives. London: Duckworth, 355–92.
MOORE, K. R. (2005). Sex and the Second-best City: Sex and Society in the
Laws of Plato. London: Routledge.
MORGAN, K. (2013). ‘Praise and Performance in Plato’s Laws’ in Peponi,
ed. 2013b, 265–93.
MORROW, G. (1960). Plato’s Cretan City: An Historical Interpretation of the
Laws. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
MOSS, J. (2008). ‘Appearances and Calculations: Plato’s Division of the
Soul’. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 34: 35–86.
MOSS, J. (2012). ‘Art and Ethical Perspective: Notes on the kalon in Plato’s
Laws’ in A. E. Denham, ed., Plato on Art and Beauty. London: MacMil-
lan, 205–20.
MOSS, J. (2014). ‘Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: on the Meaning of
logos’. Phronesis 59: 181–230.
MOURACADE, J. (2005). ‘Virtue and Pleasure in Plato’s Laws’. Apeiron 38
(1): 73–85.
MOUZE, L. (2005). Le législateur et le poète: une interprétation des Lois de
Platon. Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires de Septentrion.
MÜLLER, G. (1951). Studien zu den platonischen Nomoi. Munich: Beck.
(Zetemata 3).
MURRAY, O. (1993). Early Greece, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
MURRAY, O., ed. (1999). Sumpotika: a Symposium on the Sumposion.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
MURRAY, O. (2013). ‘The Chorus of Dionysus: Alcohol and old age in the
Laws’ in Peponi, ed. 2013b, 109–22.
MURRAY, P. (2004). ‘The Muses and their Arts’ in P. Murray and
P. Wilson, eds. 2004, 365–98.
MURRAY, P. (2013). ‘Paides Malakôn Musôn: Tragedy in Plato’s Laws’ in
Peponi, ed. 2013b, 294–312.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

350 Bibliography
MURRAY, P. and WILSON, P., eds. (2004). Music and the Muses: The Culture
of Mousike in the Classical Athenian City. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
NADDAF, G. (2000). ‘Literacy and Poetic Performance in Plato’s Laws’.
Ancient Philosophy 20: 339–50.
NAILS, D. (2002). The People of Plato: a Prosopography of Plato and other
Socratics. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
NAILS, D. and THESLEFF, H. (2003). ‘Early Academic Editing: Plato’s Laws’
in Scolnicov and Brisson, eds. 2003, 14–29.
NIGHTINGALE, A. (1993). ‘Writing/reading a Sacred Text: a Literary Inter-
pretation of Plato’s Laws’. Classical Philology 88 (4): 279–300.
NIGHTINGALE, A. (1999). ‘Plato’s Lawcode in Context: Rule by written law
in Athens and Magnesia’. Classical Quarterly 49: 100–22.
NORTH, H. (1966). Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek
Literature. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
NUSSBAUM, M. C. (1994). ‘Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The relevance
of Ancient Greek Norms to Modern Controversies’. Virginia Law Review
80 (7): 1515–1651.
O’BRIEN, M. M. (1967). The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind. Chapel
Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
OSTWALD, M. (1962). ‘Review of Görgemans (1960)’. Gnomon 34: 231–41.
OSTWALD, M. (1986). From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
PATTERSON, R., KARASMANIS, V., and HERMANN, A., eds. (2012). Presocratics
and Plato. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
PELOSI, F. (2010). Plato on Music, Soul, and Body. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
PEMBERTON, E. (1976). ‘A Note on Skigraphia’. American Journal of Aes-
thetics 80: 82–4.
PEPONI, A.-E. (2012). Frontiers of Pleasure: Models of aesthetic response in
archaic and classical Greek thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
PEPONI, A.-E. (2013a). ‘Choral Ant-Aesthetics’ in Peponi, ed. 2013b,
212–39.
PEPONI, A.-E., ed. (2013b). Performance and Culture in Plato’s Laws.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
PODLECKI, A. (1984). The Early Greek Poets and their Times. Vancouver,
BC: University of British Columbia Press.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Bibliography 351
POMEROY, S. B. (2002). Spartan Women. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
PRAUSCELLO, L. (2014). Performing Citizenship in Plato’s Laws. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
REES, D. A. (1957). ‘Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy’. Journal
of Hellenic Studies 77 (1): 112–18.
RENAUT, O. (2014). Platon: la médiation des émotions: l’éducation de thymos
dans les dialogues. Paris: Vrin.
RIST, J. M. (1997). ‘Plato and Professor Nussbaum on Acts “contrary to
nature” ’ in M. Joyal, ed., Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition.
Aldershot: Ashgate, 65–82.
RITTER, C. (1923). Platon: sein Leben, seine Schriften, seine Lehre, vol 2.
Munich: Beck.
ROBERTS, J. (1987). ‘Plato on the Causes of Wrongdoing in the Laws’.
Ancient Philosophy 7: 23–37.
ROBINSON, T. M. (1970). Plato’s Psychology. Toronto: University of To-
ronto Press; 2nd ed. 1995.
ROCCONI, E. (2003). La parole delle Muse: la formazione del lessico tecnico
musicale nella Grecia antica. Rome: Quasar.
ROWE, C. (2012). ‘Socrates in the Laws’ in Patterson et al., eds. 2012,
329–48.
ROWE, C. and SCHOFIELD, M. (2008). The Cambridge History of Greek and
Roman Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
RUTHERFORD, I. (2001). Pindar’s Paeans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
RUTHERFORD, I. (2013). ‘Strictly Ballroom: Egyptian Mousikê and Plato’s
Comparative Poetics’ in Peponi, ed. 2013b, 67–83.
SAMARAS, T. (2010). ‘Family and the Question of Women in the Laws’ in
Bobonich, ed. 2010, 172–96.
SANDAY, E., ed. (2013). Plato’s Laws: Force and Truth in Politics. Studies in
Continental Thought. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
SANTAS, G. (1964). ‘The Socratic Paradoxes’. The Philosophical Review 73
(2): 147–64.
SASSI, M. (2008). ‘The Self, the Soul, and the Individual in the City of the
Laws’. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 35: 125–48.
SAUNDERS, T. (1962). ‘The Structure of Soul and State in Plato’s Laws’.
Eranos 60: 37–55.
SAUNDERS, T. (1968). ‘The Socratic Paradoxes in Plato’s Laws’. Hermes 96:
421–34.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

352 Bibliography
SAUNDERS, T. and BRISSON, L. (2000). Bibliography on Plato’s Laws by
T. Saunders. Revised and completed with an additional bibliography
on the Epinomis by L. Brisson. International Plato Studies 12. Sankt
Augustin: Academia Verlag.
SCHIPPER, E. W. (1963). ‘Mimesis in the Arts in Plato’s Laws’. The Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 22: 199–202.
SCHOFIELD, M. (1999). ‘The Disappearance of the Philosopher-King’.
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 13:
213–41.
SCHOFIELD, M. (2006). Plato: Political philosophy. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
SCHÖPSDAU, K. (2003). ‘Sussitien für Frauen: eine platonische Utopie’ in
Scolnicov and Brisson, eds. 2003, 243–56.
SCOLNICOV, S. and BRISSON, L. (2003). Plato’s Laws: from Theory into
Practice. Proceedings of the VI Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin:
Academia Verlag.
SCOTT, G. L. (1999). ‘The Poetics of Performance’ in S. Kemal and
I. Gaskell, eds., Performance and Authenticity in the Arts. Cambridge
Series on Philosophy and the Arts. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 15–48.
SCOTT, G. L. (unpublished). ‘Plato’s Well-educated Men, the Dancers:
harmonia kai rhuthmos as “Music and Dance” ’, Chapter 2 of Aristotle
on Dramatic Musical Theatre: The Real Role of Literature, Catharsis,
Music, and Dance in the Poetics.
SEAFORD, R. (2006). Dionysos. London and New York: Routledge.
SEGVIG, H. (2000). ‘No one Errs Willingly: the meaning of Socratic
Intellectualism’. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 19: 1–45.
SHOREY, P. (1922). ‘Review of England’. Classical Philology 17: 153–5.
STALLEY, R. F. (1983). An Introduction to Plato’s Laws. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
STALLEY, R. F. (1994). ‘Persuasion in Plato’s Laws’. History of Political
Thought 15: 157–77.
STRAUSS, L. (1975). The Argument and the Action of Plato’s Laws. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
TIGERSTEDT, E. N. (1965–74). The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity, 2
vols. Stockholm and Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Bibliography 353
VANHOUTTE, M. (1954). La philosophie politique de Platon dans les ‘Lois’.
Louvain: Publications Universitaires.
VIDAL-NAQUET, P. (1981). Le chasseur noir. Paris: La Découverte.
VLASTOS, G. (1981). ‘Socratic Knowledge and Platonic Pessimism’ in
Platonic Studies, 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 204–17;
originally printed in The Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 226–38.
WALBANK, M. (1978). Athenian Proxenies of the 5th Century BC. Toronto:
Stevens.
WEST, M. L. (1993). Greek Lyric Poetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF, U. VON (1920). Platon, 2 vols. Berlin:
Weidmann.
WILBURN, J. (2012). ‘Akrasia and Self-Rule in Plato’s Laws’. Oxford Studies
in Ancient Philosophy 43: 25–53.
WILBURN, J. (2013a). ‘Moral Education and the Spirited Part of the Soul in
Plato’s Laws’. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 45: 63–102.
WILBURN, J. (2013b). ‘Tripartition and the Causes of Criminal Behavior in
Laws IX’. Ancient Philosophy 33: 11–134.
WILDBERG, C. (2011). ‘Dionysos in the Mirror of Philosophy: Heraclitus,
Plato, Plotinus’ in R. Schlesier, ed., A Different God? Dionysos and
Ancient Polytheism. Berlin: De Gruyter, 205–32.
ZUCKERT, C. (2009). Plato’s Philosophers: the Coherence of the Dialogues.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
ZUOLO, F. (2012). ‘Plato’s Political Idealism and Utopia in the Republic, the
Laws, and the Timaeus-Critias’ in Lisi, ed. 2012, 39–60.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Index

Entries in bold indicate page numbers in the translation.

admirable, see kalon 175–7, 179, 184, 188, 203, 253,

agathon, see good 257–9, 265
agôgê bravery, see courage
as education, see education Brisson, Luc 7, 124, 184, 314
as pull 180–4, 247–8 Brisson and Pradeau passim
agreement (sumphônia) Burnet, John 112, 209, 213
among citizens 29, 57, 59, 92, 135, Bury, R. G. 99, 150, 174, 225–6, 334
248–9, 262, 277
virtue as 49, 85–6, 94, 162–3, 166, Cadmus 276
181, 185, 191, 194, 199, 207–11 calculation, see logos
passim, 267 Categories (Aristotle) 117, 304
Annas, Julia 95, 118, 163, 179–81, category (eidos) 25, 105–7, 120, 123,
253, 258 126
anticipation (elpis) 40, 117, 161, 172–9, censorship 53, 63, 238–41, 284–5;
181, 183, 185, 187–8, 191, 201; see also judges
see also pleasure and pain character, see virtue
Apollo 19, 27, 59, 71, 130, 212–13, Charmides (Plato) 103, 136, 142, 267
217, 265–6, 332 charms 57, 61, 63–4, 249, 279,
chorus of 50, 62, 209, 279, 281, 284, 292
320, 326 chorus, choral performance 37, 52–4,
Apology (Plato) 88 61–5, 80, 126, 155–6, 165, 205,
aretê, see virtue 242–3, 218–19, 221, 223, 226,
art, see music 235, 274, 277–81, 283
Athena 21, 84 natural origins of 50, 71–2, 211–14,
athletics (gumnastikê) 20, 27, 31, 42, 216–17, 242, 331–2, 335–6;
55, 81, 83, 142, 165, 199, 232, see also Apollo; dance; Dionysus;
252, 291 imitation; Muses; song
dance as 71–2, 331, 333–4, 336 colour, see music
authenticity of dialogue 1 composers
as poets 251
Barker, Andrew 1, 216, 306, 308, expertise compared to judges’ 288,
311, 314 307, 311, 314–18, 321–2
beautiful, see kalon of choral works 53, 57, 66, 68–9,
Belfiore, Elizabeth 163, 283, 287 216, 223, 232, 237, 247, 250-1
Bobonich, Christopher 79, 98, 101, courage 27–30, 35, 44–6, 51, 57, 59,
108–9, 114, 118, 163, 170, 172–3, 99, 109–10, 115, 118, 122–7,
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

356 Index
courage (cont.) 130–2, 136, 139–40, education (paideia) 37–9, 113, 156–7,
153, 159, 175, 225, 231, 233, 165–8, 252, 290, 318
246, 260, 322 agôgê as 41, 180–1, 184, 247–8
analogous to moderation 31, 190–8, through choral performance 51,
201, 337 53, 58, 68, 71, 211–19,
as fourth in virtue 26, 65, 107–8, 227, 235–7, 278–83, 288,
111–14, 291 301, 317, 321, 323–4,
without wisdom 25, 56, 81, 96–7, 326, 332–5
100–4, 167 slackening of 50, 207, 212–13, 324
Crete 19–20, 37, 44, 59, 82, 95, 125, as training of pleasures and pains
135, 158–9, 251, 260, 262–3, 49–50, 56, 94, 116, 128,
265, 290 137, 155, 159, 161–4, 188,
custom, see law 205–8, 245, 258, 262, 271,
274–5, 320;
dance 50–2, 54, 57, 62, 68, 71–2, 99, see also myth
147, 156, 158, 196, 205, 211–52 Egypt 53–4, 57, 236, 239
passim, 269, 274, 279, 283–300 elders, elderly 54, 62, 282, 284–8
passim, 305, 308, 313–317, 319, as authoritative judges 57, 241–3,
322, 326, 331, 333–4, 336; 245, 248–9, 299–300, 319–20,
see also chorus 323–4
D’Angour, Armand 137, 238, 314 credentials for legislative inquiry
daring (tharros) 40, 44, 46, 127, 143, 29–30, 133–6
159, 172–5, 183, 191–2, 197, difficulty with song and dance 64,
200–2, 240 215, 292, 327;
Dionysus 32, 47, 50, 71, 146, 160, see also Dionysus, chorus of
197, 330–2 elpis, see anticipation
chorus of 60, 69–70, 205, 212–13, England, E. B. passim
217, 223, 240, 245, 279, 281–2, Epimenides 38, 159–60
284, 305 ethos, êthos, ethismos, see training
finer/finest music of 63–6, 285, 288–94, eudaimonia, see happiness
312, 316–17, 320–1, 323–6, 328–9 Eudemian Ethics (Aristotle) 103
Dorian(s) Euthydemus (Plato) 95, 97, 101, 108,
culture and education 2–4, 64, 110–12, 117, 296
81–2, 89, 133, 136, 148, 167, 199, Euthyphro (Plato) 77, 136, 267
262, 275, 278, 287, 290–1, 337 excellence, see virtue
harmony or mode 68, 216, 239,
318, 322 falsehood, lie 61, 251, 275–6
historical basis of the label 78 fear 26, 28, 30, 34–5, 40, 70, 116–17,
law codes 121–2, 139 127–30, 137–9, 172–5, 235,
military ethic 85, 93, 96, 104–5, 286, 327
159, 192; cultivation of 43–6, 190–201;
see also sussitia see also anticipation; pain; shame
Dorion, Louis–André 88, 170 Ferrari, G. R. F. 304, 308, 321
drinking parties, see symposia Frede, Dorothea 117, 163, 173, 175,
drunkenness, see symposia 178, 181
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Index 357
Ganymede 31, 143 harmonia 50–1, 62, 68–9, 71, 113,
Generation of Animals (Aristotle) 296 208, 211, 214, 224–5, 237,
Gerson, Lloyd 172 310–319, 322, 331–2
gestures 51–3, 57, 68, 72, 216, v. harmony 215–216;
219–20, 224–6, 229, 238–9, see also Dorian(s); rhythm
249, 299, 307, 309–14, 317, Hatzistavrou, Anthony 226, 235, 246,
322, 333; 294, 296, 304, 306, 308, 311,
see also dance 313–15, 321–2
god(s) 38, 44, 46, 61–2, 111, 143–4, Hippias Minor (Plato) 121
280, 331 History of Animals (Aristotle) 296
arbiters of music 54, 56 homosexuality 31, 142–143
festivals to 50, 137, 212–16 passim
oracles of, pilgrimage to 19, 38, imitation (mimêsis) 52, 66–9
71, 160 accuracy as criterion of 298–301, 303
playthings of 40, 178–9, music as 226, 231, 295, 310–11,
and reason 41, 77 314, 321
as source of law 19, 29–30, 41, intelligence (nous) 26, 27, 39, 71, 77,
59–60, 77, 186, 266 177, 339
good (agathon) 25, 99, 268–9 alternation of nous and phronêsis
relation to happiness 23, 95, 149, 112–15, 119–20, 167, 331
156, 242; Irwin, T. H. 101, 103, 171, 258
see also kalon
goods Jouët–Pastré, Emmanuelle 137, 163,
divine and human 20, 26, 179, 181
58, 83, 100–1, 106–17, judges
120–2, 166, 202, 208, of music 56, 66–8, 243–8, 300–6,
252–60, 277 310–13, 317, 322–3, 329
so–called 58, 108, 111, 253, of warring brothers 22, 79, 88, 90–2;
256–9, 260 see also elders
make us drunk with pleasure 46, justice 22, 27, 39, 70, 83, 87–8, 107–10,
117, 202 119–20, 126, 157, 195, 327
Gorgias (Plato) 88, 111, 115, 121, as happiest and most pleasant life
139, 149, 151, 167, 170–1, 190, 58–61, 252–8, 261–80
204, 230, 259, 261–2, 267 includes other virtues 25–6, 100–3,
Graeser, Andreas 173 111–14, 165–7, 260
guardians of the law 27, 70, 82–3,
112–13, 119, 327–8 kalon 25, 27, 29–30, 33, 50–3, 58,
gymnastics, see athletics 60–1, 63–7, 69, 146, 190, 250,
294–5, 298
habituation, see training as admirable/beautiful 116–17,
Halliwell, Stephen 301, 308–9 135, 148, 192, 205, 209, 218–9,
happiness (eudaimonia) 23, 26, 32, 221–2, 224–29, 238, 240,
58–60, 94–5, 242, 144–5, 149, 252, 268, 302–6, 308,
156, 242 310, 323
and justice 250–4, 256–62, 264–6 as fine 79, 246, 288–94, 323
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

358 Index
kalon (cont.) Megillus as historical person 3–4, 78, 158
as good (agathon) 149, 269, 321 mimêsis, see imitation; representation
translation of 103–4 moderation (sôphrosunê) 25, 27, 44,
v. shameful (aischron) 221–2, 73, 83, 96, 100–3, 120, 157, 161–3
225–6, 230–4, 236, 242 analogous to courage 122–7, 129,
Kamtekar, Rachana 172, 188, 215 132, 138–41, 153, 190–8, 201,
Keuls, Eva C. 272–3 286, 337
Kraut, Richard 95, 103 in ranking of virtues 111–14
Kurke, Leslie 178, 210, 213 Morrow, Glenn 78, 126, 159, 217,
243, 249, 281, 283, 287, 289,
Laches (Plato) 103, 127, 136, 151, 170, 309, 326, 328, 338
175, 267, 318 Moss, Jessica 103, 176–7, 180, 185,
Laks, André 90, 118, 163, 172, 178, 209, 226, 236, 246, 248–50, 272,
215, 271 278, 296
law (nomos) 77–84, 119–20, 132, 136, Mouracade, John 176
177, 186, 194, 209, 251, 267–8, 339 Mouze, Létitia 118, 215, 227, 234–5,
as norm, institution, practice 2–4, 247, 249, 260, 263, 265, 268,
79–80, 82, 105, 133–4, 148–9, 272, 308
246–8, 338 Müller, Gerhard 173
goal of 82, 84, 92–3, 104–7, 153–4 Murray, O. 78, 82, 126, 142, 149,
preludes to 114, 116, 118, 264; 212, 282, 284, 287, 328
see also legislator Muses 50, 62, 68, 71, 212–14, 217,
leader 34–6, 70, 151–5, 198, 203, 279–81, 320, 326
206, 324–5, 327–30 music (mousikê) 64–5, 72, 83, 135,
legislator 25–7, 30, 44–6, 54, 57, 60–1, 165, 216–18, 221, 231, 245–6,
145–6, 202, 236, 250, 263–78 250–2, 262, 270, 272, 276–8,
aim of 84–5, 92–4, 96, 104–6, 284–5, 288–92, 321–4, 331–6
109–10, 113–17, 153–4, 193, 204 aesthetic v. ethical standards
skill of 102, 120–21, 149 for 56–8, 66–8, 222–3,
Lisi, Francisco 83, 92, 99, 105, 117, 226–8, 238–9, 241–3, 305,
150, 156, 160, 199, 274 307, 310–17
logos, logismos 90, 145, 155, 161, 172, colour in 51, 68, 224–6, 313–14
176–81, 183–6, 214, 224, 234, correctness of 37, 52–5, 158, 230,
266, 269, 332, 339 240, 292–5, 298–301
agreement with 41, 49, 57, 135, new music 238, 240, 314;
180–1, 207, 209–11, 234, 247–8 see also Dionysus
as calculation 6, 40–1, 90, 145, 155, myth, tale 31, 61, 71, 124, 180, 276
161, 172, 176–7, 179, 181–6, in education 62, 277
209, 234 vindication of 41, 184;
translation of 176–7, 180–1,
185–6, 278 Naddaf, Gerard 175
Lorenz, Hendrik 172, 188 Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle) 79, 86,
Lycurgus 25, 27, 78, 104, 266 90, 93, 95, 102–3, 115, 117, 145,
Lysis (Plato) 97, 139, 170 168, 180, 204
Nightingale, Andrea 3, 78, 105, 160,
madness 46–7, 71, 241, 286, 331 182, 184
Magnesia 2, 79, 126, 243, 287 norm, see law
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Index 359
nous, see intelligence 179, 196, 206, 235–6, 249, 297,
Nussbaum, Martha 142–3 299, 334, 337–8
pleasure 26, 31–2, 41, 73, 79, 116–17,
opinion (doxa) 40, 41, 174, 188–9, 146, 202, 233–6, 272, 295, 310,
197, 200–1 312, 320, 337
false 66, 298 and divine puppets 40–1, 172–9
true 27, 49, 119, 208, 209, 271 and education 39, 49–52, 56–7,
161–5, 181, 188–9, 205,
paideia, see education 207–11, 213–22, 237,
pain 26, 40–1, 49–51, 57, 60, 247–50, 333
116–17, 144–5, 161–2, 172–9, and justice 60, 262, 266, 268
207–11, 217–22, 240, 261, 271, and pain 231, 240, 261,
274, 334 270–1, 274
relation to fear 127–32, 137–9 resistance to 28–30, 44, 46–7,
resistance to 28–31, 43, 122–3, 94, 122–3, 127–33, 136–40,
125, 147, 183, 194; 143, 147, 168–9, 183,
see also pleasure 190–3, 195
painting 53, 67, 238–9, 273, as standard of music 54–6, 65–6,
304–5, 311 222–3, 226–30, 238, 241–6, 251,
Pangle, Thomas 7, 117, 153, 174, 293, 296–99, 306, 309
178–9, 190, 255, 272, 283, 299, ‘two springs’ of pleasure and
315, 334 pain 31–2, 127, 132, 144–5
Parmenides (Plato) 121, 209, 224 Plutarch 126, 142, 159, 180, 279
Pelosi, Francesco 304, 308 poet, see composers
Persia 32–3, 38 poetry, see music
persuasion 29, 59–63, 116, 248, 260, Politics (Aristotle) 1, 81–2, 139, 142,
276, 280–1, 285 147, 166
v. compulsion 27, 57–8, 97, Pradeau, Jean–Francois, see Brisson,
118, 132, 134, 159, 183, Luc
199, 250–1, 263–4, 269–73, Prauscello, Lucia viii
319, 328 prelude, see law
Phaedo (Plato) 168, 175, 289 Prior Analytics (Aristotle) 296
Phaedrus (Plato) 107, 121, 138–9, Protagoras (Plato) 86, 100–2, 121,
143, 181 129, 146, 190, 209, 272
Philebus (Plato) 108, 117, 121, 128, puppets, divine 40–1, 161–3, 178–9,
174, 188, 190, 314 181–2, 184–8, 234–5, 248
Philip of Opus 1
phronêsis, see wisdom reason, see logos, logismos
Physics (Aristotle) 296 representation (eikastikê) 52, 65–8,
Pindar 290 226, 231, 293, 296–318, 321
Places, Édouard des passim Republic (Plato) 79, 83, 86, 88,
play (paidia) 128, 237, 241, 287–8, 94–5, 97, 115, 119–21, 124,
330, 335–6 136, 139, 143, 166–7, 170,
and childhood 39, 50, 57, 175–6, 180, 182, 184, 203,
163, 215 214, 216, 224, 226, 238–9,
v. seriousness 31, 39–40, 44, 49, 267, 276, 285, 296, 313–14,
57, 66, 73, 137, 142–3, 164–5, 321, 331
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

360 Index
Republic (cont.) 273–4, 277–9, 281, 283–6,
relation to Laws 1, 81, 87, 111–13, 288–90, 292, 294–5, 298, 300,
129, 150, 163, 170, 172–4, 176, 305, 308–9, 313–14, 316–17,
183, 207, 209–10, 231, 268–9, 319–20, 322, 333–4, 336;
291, 318, 335 see also chorus
rhythm (rhuthmos) 50–3, 57–8, 67–9, Sophist (Plato) 97, 209
72, 113, 211, 224–5, 232–3, 237, sôphrosunê, see moderation
239, 247, 260, 300–36 passim Sparta 1–7, 19, 23–5, 29, 32, 37–8,
and harmony as order 50, 62, 71, 57, 64, 73, 77–9, 81, 95–8,
214–16, 283, 331–2 103–4, 120, 125–6, 130–1,
Ritter, Constantin 173 140–1, 146–9, 158, 180,
Rutherford, Ian 239, 285, 290 204, 224, 250–2, 259, 290,
335, 338
Saunders, Trevor passim Stalley, R. F. 79, 94, 118, 137, 163,
Schipper, Edith Watson 310 265, 270–1, 308, 326
Schofield, Malcolm 1 Statesman (Plato) 97, 101, 107, 112–3,
Schöpsdau, Klaus passim 119, 121, 139, 145, 180, 296
Scott, Greg 158, 216, 315 stranger (xenos) 78, 148, 160
self–control, see self–mastery translation of 4–5
self–mastery (to kreittô heautou) 21–2, Strauss, Leo 7, 91
28–30, 41, 44–5, 73, 85, 88, sussitia (common meals) 20, 27, 31,
93–4, 106–7, 123, 128–32, 64, 142, 287
138–9, 161–3, 166, 168–72, origin of 81–2
177–8, 180, 182–7, 193–6 symposia 32–6, 41, 43, 45–6, 64,
v. internal harmony 85–6, 89, 94, 151–4, 190–1, 284, 292, 320
135, 166, 168–72, 181–2, 185–6, educational function of 37, 49, 70,
191, 193–4, 196, 199–200, 207, 155, 161–2, 168, 187, 203, 205–6,
209–11 223, 282, 285–7, 323–30, 337
v. self–rule (archein heautou) 170–1 forbidden in Crete and Sparta 33,
seriousness (spoudê) 24, 65, 97–8, 73, 146–9, 338
249, 294; Symposium (Plato) 103, 138, 142, 146,
see also play 154, 175, 212, 259
Seventh Letter (Plato) 150
shame (aidôs) 43–4, 46, 52–3, 70–1, Taylor, A. E. 91–2, 160, 174, 176,
103, 157, 183, 234–5, 326, 332 255, 272, 287, 299, 304
as a kind of fear 43, 175, 286, temperance, see moderation
191–3, 195, 200–1, 327 tharros, see daring
shameful (aischron) 21, 30, 59–61 Theaetetus (Plato) 121, 175, 184, 190,
v. kalon 103, 138, 189, 205, 209, 209, 321
220–1, 225, 230–1, 236, 242, Theognis 25, 99–101
261–2, 268–9, 275, 286 Timaeus (Plato) 117, 119, 150, 173–4,
Socrates 3, 79, 88, 100–2, 108, 136, 179, 188, 190, 198, 215, 289
154, 170–1, 261, 268–9 training (ethos, ethismos) 19, 27, 30–1,
song 50–4, 57, 61, 63–4, 66, 68, 158, 49, 52, 56, 145, 210, 245, 248
196, 205, 211–49 passim, 269, ethos v. êthos 79, 121, 232
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/9/2015, SPi

Index 361
truth 37, 54, 61–2, 65–6, 97, 280, as ‘victory over oneself’,
293, 296–8 passim; see self–mastery
see also falsehood voluntary (hekousion) 22, 42, 60–1,
tune (melos) 51–3, 57, 67–9, 72, 64, 69–70, 90, 118, 189–90,
224–6, 237, 305–7, 312–14, 269–71, 276, 288, 319;
317–19, 333 see also persuasion
Tyrtaeus 24–25, 65, 113–14, 130,
252–5, 290–1 wealth 26, 27, 46, 58–9, 98, 106, 111;
military ethic 83, 95–100, 103–4, see also goods
120 Wilburn, Joshua 163, 173, 177,
181, 184
virtue 39–41, 44–5, 49, 53, 56, 65, willing, see voluntary
69, 72, 85–7, 91, 93–100, 122–3, wine, see symposia
149, 156–7, 161–5, 168–9, 171–2, wisdom (phronêsis) 25–7, 40–1, 49,
182, 184–6, 200–3, 259, 267 56, 63, 71, 77, 111–13, 115,
and choral performance 222–3, 119–20, 173, 188–9, 208–10,
229–30, 247, 296, 308, 311, 246, 285, 331
333–5 v. sophia 36, 39, 111, 154, 167
as ‘agreement’, see self–mastery see also intelligence
as a whole 25–8, 52, 58, 101–12,
124, 126, 139, 166–7, 195, 205, Xenophon 126, 146, 166
207–8, 210–11, 246, 248,
260, 280 Zeus 19, 25, 27, 29, 31, 59, 78, 125,
as goal of legislation 102, 104–8, 143, 160, 265–6
110, 115–16, 118, 136, 266 Zuckert, Catherine 3, 120, 163