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 Contents

12i Sentence Pattern 5A: subject + verb + direct object +

objective complement (adjective) 64
12j Sentence Pattern 5B: subject + verb + direct object +
objective complement (noun) 64
12k Sentence Pattern 6 (expletive): there or it + linking verb
(+ complement) + subject 65
12-l Other Elements: Structure Words 65
12m Independent (Main) Clauses 66
12n Subordinate (Dependent) Clauses 67
12-o Functions of Subordinate Clauses 67
12p Phrases 68
12q Appositives 70
12r Absolute Phrases 71
12s Order of Elements in Declarative Sentences 73
12t Order of Elements in Interrogative Sentences 74
12u The Structure of Imperative Sentences 77
12v What Is a Sentence? 77
12w Minor Sentences 79
12x Fragments 80
12y Major Sentences 81
12z Kinds of Major Sentences 81

III | Parts of Speech 85

13 | Nouns 88
13a Inflection of Nouns 89
13b Grammatical Function of Nouns 90
14 | Pronouns 91
14a Personal Pronouns 92
14b Impersonal Pronouns 94
14c Interrogative Pronouns 95
14d Relative Pronouns 96
14e Case 98
14f Demonstrative Pronouns 102
14g Indefinite Pronouns 103
14h Reflexive and Intensive Pronouns 104
14i Reciprocal Pronouns 106
15 | Agreement of Pronouns with Their Antecedents 106
15a Antecedents Joined by and 107
15b Antecedents Joined by or or nor 107
15c Indefinite Pronoun as Antecedent 108
15d Pronouns and Inclusive Language: Avoiding Gender Bias 109

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 Contents

15e Collective Noun as Antecedent 111

15f Agreement with Demonstrative Adjectives 112
16 | Reference of Pronouns 112
16a Remote Antecedent 113
16b Ambiguous Reference 113
16c Vague Reference 114
16d Missing Antecedent 115
16e Indefinite you, they, and it 116
17 | Verbs 117
17a Kinds of Verbs: Transitive, Intransitive, and Linking 118
17b Inflection of Verbs: Principal Parts 119
17c Irregular Verbs 121
17d Inflection for Person and Number 125
17e Auxiliary Verbs 125
17f Inflection of do, be, and have 128
17g Time and the Verb: Inflection for Tense 129
17h Sequence of Tenses 135
17i Verb Phrases in Compound Predicates 136
17j Tenses in Writing About Literature 137
17k Mood 137
17-l Voice: Active and Passive 139
18 | Agreement Between Subject and Verb 141
18a Words Intervening Between Subject and Verb 141
18b Compound Subject: Singular Nouns Joined by and 142
18c Compound Subject: Parts Joined by or or a Correlative 143
18d Agreement with Indefinite Pronouns 143
18e Subject Following Verb 144
18f Agreement with Collective Nouns 145
18g Nouns That Are Always Singular or Always Plural 146
18h Plurals: criteria, data, media, etc. 146
18i Agreement with Relative Pronouns 147
18j Titles of Works and Words Referred to as Words 148
19 | Adjectives 148
19a Kinds of Adjectives 148
19b Comparison of Descriptive Adjectives 150
19c Articles: a, an, and the 152
19d Placement of Adjectives 157
19e Order of Adjectives 159
19f Adjectives Functioning as Nouns 159
20 | Adverbs 160
20a Kinds and Functions of Adverbs 160

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 Contents

20b Forms of Adverbs 163

20c Comparison of Adverbs 166
20d Placement of Adverbs 167
21 | Verbals: Infinitives, Participles, and Gerunds 169
21a Infinitives 170
21b Tense and Voice of Infinitives 171
21c Split Infinitives 172
21d Participles 172
21e Tense and Voice of Participles 173
21f Gerunds 174
21g Tense and Voice of Gerunds 175
21h Possessives with Gerunds 175
21i Verbals in Absolute Phrases 177
22 | Prepositions 177
22a Functions of Prepositions and Prepositional Phrases 177
22b Placement of Prepositions 178
22c Common Prepositions 178
22d Two-part Verbs; Verb Idioms 179
23 | Conjunctions 181
23a Coordinating Conjunctions 181
23b Correlative Conjunctions 184
23c Subordinating Conjunctions 186
24 | Interjections 188

IV | Writing Effective Sentences 189

25 | Basic Sentence Elements: Subject, Verb, Object,
Complement 191
25a Subject 191
25b Finite Verb 192
25c Direct Object 192
25d Subjective Complement 193
26 | Modifiers 194
26a Adjectival Modifiers 194
26b Adverbial Modifiers 195
26c Overlapping Modifiers 196
26d Using Modifiers: A Sample Scenario 198

Length, Variety, and Emphasis 201

27 | Sentence Length 201
27a Short Sentences 201

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 Contents

27b Long Sentences 202

28 | Sentence Variety 202
28a Variety of Lengths 203
28b Variety of Kinds 203
28c Variety of Structures 203
29 | Emphasis in Sentences 204
29a Endings and Beginnings 204
29b Loose Sentences and Periodic Sentences 205
29c The Importance of the Final Position 206
29d Changing Word Order 207
29e Movable Modifiers 207
29f Using the Expletive and the Passive Voice for Emphasis 208
29g Emphasis by Repetition 208
29h Emphasis by Stylistic Contrast 209
29i Emphasis by Syntax 209
29j Emphasis by Punctuation 210
30 | Analyzing Sentences 211
30a The Chart Method 211
30b The Vertical Method 212

Common Sentence Problems 213

31 | Sentence Coherence 214
32 | Fragments 214
33 | Comma Splices 215
34 | Run-on (Fused) Sentences 215
35 | Misplaced Modifiers 216
35a Movability and Poor Placement 216
35b Only, almost, etc. 217
35c Squinting Modifiers 218
36 | Dangling Modifiers 218
36a Dangling Participial Phrases 219
36b Dangling Gerund Phrases 220
36c Dangling Infinitive Phrases 220
36d Dangling Elliptical Clauses 221
36e Dangling Prepositional Phrases and Appositives 221
37 | Mixed Constructions 222
38 | Faulty Alignment 223
39 | Shifts in Perspective: Inconsistent Point of View 225
39a Shifts in Tense 225

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 Contents

39b Shifts in Mood 225

39c Shifts in Voice 226
39d Shifts in Person of Pronoun 226
39e Shifts in Number of Pronoun 226
40 | Faulty Parallelism 227
40a With Coordinate Elements 227
40b With Correlative Conjunctions 228
40c In a Series 229
41 | Faulty Coordination: Logic, Emphasis, and Unity 230
42 | Faulty Logic 233

V | Punctuation 237
43 | Internal Punctuation: The Comma 239
43a The Comma with Independent Clauses Joined by a
Coordinating Conjunction 240
43b The Comma with Short Independent Clauses Not
Joined by a Coordinating Conjunction 242
43c The Comma Between Items in a Series 242
43d The Comma Between Parallel Adjectives 243
43e The Comma with Introductory or Concluding Words,
Phrases, and Clauses 244
43f The Comma with Nonrestrictive Elements 247
43g The Comma with Sentence Interrupters 251
44 | Internal Punctuation: The Semicolon 252
44a The Semicolon Between Independent Clauses 252
44b The Semicolon Between Items in a Series 254
45 | Internal Punctuation: The Colon 255
46 | Internal Punctuation: The Dash 256
47 | Parentheses 258
48 | Brackets 259
49 | End Punctuation: The Period 260
50 | End Punctuation: The Question Mark 262
51 | End Punctuation: The Exclamation Point 263
52 | Quotation Marks 264
52a Direct Speech 264
52b Direct Quotation from a Source 266
52c Quotation Within Quotation 267
52d Words Used in a Special Sense 267

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 Contents

52e Other Marks with Quotation Marks 268

53 | Ellipses for Omissions 268
54 | Avoiding Common Errors in Punctuation 270
54a Run-on (Fused) Sentences 270
54b Comma Splice 271
54c Unwanted Comma Between Subject and Verb 271
54d Unwanted Comma Between Verb and Object or
Complement 272
54e Unwanted Comma After Last Adjective of a Series 273
54f Unwanted Comma Between Coordinated Words and
Phrases 273
54g Commas with Emphatic Repetition 274
54h Unwanted Comma with Short Introductory or
Parenthetical Element 274
54i Unwanted Comma with Restrictive Appositive 275
54j Unwanted Comma with Indirect Quotation 276
54k Unwanted Question Mark After Indirect Question 276
54-l Unwanted Semicolon with Subordinate Element 276
54m Unwanted Colon After Incomplete Construction 277
54n Unwanted Double Punctuation: Comma or Semicolon
with a Dash 277

VI | Mechanics and Spelling 279

55 | Formatting an Essay 281
56 | Abbreviations 284
56a Titles Before Proper Names 284
56b Titles and Degrees After Proper Names 285
56c Standard Words Used with Dates and Numerals 285
56d Agencies and Organizations Known by Their Initials 285
56e Scientific and Technical Terms Known by Their Initials 285
56f Latin Expressions Commonly Used in English 285
56g Terms in Official Titles 287
57 | Capitalization 287
57a Names and Nicknames 287
57b Professional and Honorific Titles 287
57c Words Designating Family Relationships 289
57d Place Names 289
57e Months, Days, Holidays 290
57f Religious Names 290
57g Names of Nationalities and Organizations 290

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 Contents

57h Names of Institutions, Sections of Government,

Historical Events, and Buildings 291
57i Academic Courses and Languages 291
57j Derivatives of Proper Nouns 291
57k Abbreviations of Proper Nouns 291
57-l I and 0 292
57m Titles of Written and Other Works 292
57n First Words 293
57-o With Personification and for Emphasis 294
58 | Titles 294
58a Italics for Whole or Major Works 294
58b Quotation Marks for Short Works and Parts of
Longer Works 295
58c Titles Within Titles 296
59 | Italics 297
59a Names of Ships, Trains, and Planes 297
59b Non-English Words and Phrases 297
59c Words Referred to as Words 298
59d For Emphasis 298
60 | Numerals 298
60a Time of Day 299
60b Dates 299
60c Addresses 300
60d Technical and Mathematical Numbers 300
60e Parts of a Written Work 300
60f Statistics and Numbers of More Than Two Words 300
60g Commas with Numerals 301
61 | Spelling Rules and Common Causes of Error 302
61a ie or ei 303
61b Prefixes 304
61c Suffixes 308
61d Final e Before a Suffix 311
61e Final y After a Consonant and Before a Suffix 313
61f Doubling of a Final Consonant Before a Suffix 313
61g Changes in Spelling of Roots 314
61h Confusion with Other Words 315
61i Homophones and Other Words That Are Similar 315
61j One Word or Two? 317
61k Hyphenation 318
61-l Plurals 321
61m Apostrophes to Indicate Omissions 326

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 Contents

61n Possessives 327

62 | Spelling List 330

VII | Diction 335

63 | About Dictionaries 337
63a Kinds of Dictionaries 337
63b Features of Dictionaries 339
63c Three Sample Dictionary Entries 342
64 | Level 344
64a Slang 344
64b Informal, Colloquial 345
64c “Fine Writing” 346
65 | Figurative Language 347
65a Inappropriate Metaphors 348
65b Overextended Metaphors 348
65c Dead Metaphors 349
65d Mixed Metaphors 349
66 | Concrete and Abstract Diction; Weak Generalizations 350
66a Concreteness and Specificity 350
66b Weak Generalizations 352
67 | Connotation and Denotation 354
68 | Euphemism 355
69 | Wrong Word 356
70 | Idiom 357
71 | Wordiness, Jargon, and Associated Problems 359
71a Wordiness 359
71b Repetition 361
71c Redundancy 361
71d Ready-made Phrases 362
71e Triteness, Clichés 363
71f Overuse of Nouns 365
71g Nouns Used as Adjectives 367
71h Jargon 367
72 | Usage: A Checklist of Troublesome Words and Phrases 370

VIII | Research, Writing, and

Documentation 395
73 | Finding Resources 397

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 Contents

73a Libraries 397

73b The Internet 399
74 | The Research Plan 400
74a Academic Proposals 401
74b A Preliminary Bibliography 401
74c A Working Bibliography 402
75 | Taking Notes 404
75a The Note Itself 405
75b The Source 407
75c The Slug 408
75d Recording Your Own Ideas 408
76 | Writing the Essay 409
76a Keeping Track of Notes in Your Drafts 409
77 | Acknowledging Sources 410
77a “Common Knowledge” 410
78 | Quotation, Paraphrase, Summary, and Plagiarism 411
78a Legitimate Paraphrase 413
78b Illegitimate Paraphrase 414
78c Paraphrase and Quotation Mixed 415
78d Summary 415
78e Maintaining Academic Integrity and Avoiding Plagiarism 416
78f Integrating and Contextualizing Quotations 417
79 | Documentation 419
79a The Name–Page Method (MLA Style) 420
79b The Name–Date Method (APA Style) 447
79c The Note Method (Chicago Style) 467
79d The Number Method 477

Appendix | Checklists for Use in

Revising, Editing, and Proofreading 483
Omnibus Checklist for Planning and Revising 485
Specialized Checklist for Writers with English as an
Additional Language 488

Index 493

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 Exercises in the Online
Student Workbook
Exercises are listed by the section of the textbook to which they correspond.

Part II | Understanding Sentences

12a Elemental two-word sentences (pattern 1)
12b Adding articles and modifiers
12c Sentence pattern 1, with more modifiers
12d Pattern 2A: with direct object
12e Pattern 2B: passive voice
12f Pattern 3: with indirect object
12g Pattern 4A: linking verb + predicate adjective
12h Pattern 4B: linking verb + predicate noun
12i Pattern 5A: with objective complement (adjective)
12j Pattern 5B: with objective complement (noun)
12k (1) Pattern 6: changing expletives
12k (2) Pattern 6: trying expletives
12c–k Identifying sentence elements and patterns
12m–p Recognizing phrases and clauses
12q (1) Writing appositives
12q (2) Using appositives
12r Writing absolute phrases
12s Using alternative word orders
12t Constructing interrogative sentences
12w–x Recognizing minor sentences and fragments
12z (1) Recognizing kinds of sentences
12z (2) Constructing different kinds of sentences

Part III | Parts of Speech

13b Recognizing nouns
14 Recognizing kinds of pronouns
14e (1) Using correct pronouns
14e (2) Problem pronouns
15 Correcting agreement errors
16 Correcting faulty pronoun reference
17a (1) Using transitive and intransitive verbs
17a (2) Recognizing subjective complements

xvi

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 Exercises in the Online Student Workbook

17a (3) Using subjective complements

17a (4) Using verbs
17h (1) Using verb tenses
17h (2) Using auxiliary verbs
17k Using subjunctives
17-l Revising passive voice
18 (1) Choosing correct verbs
18 (2) Correcting faulty subject–verb agreement
19b Comparing adjectives
19c Using articles
19–20 (1) Recognizing adjectives and adverbs
19–20 (2) Correcting misused adjectives and adverbs
19–20 (3) Using adjectival and adverbial modifiers
19–20 (4) Using adjectives and adverbs
21d–e Using participles
21 (1) Recognizing verbals
21 (2) Using verbals
21 (3) Reducing clauses to infinitive phrases
21 (4) Reducing clauses
21 (5) Using absolute phrases
22a–c (1) Recognizing prepositional phrases
22a–c (2) Using prepositional phrases
22d Using two-part verbs
23a Using coordinating conjunctions
23c (1) Recognizing subordinate clauses
23c (2) Writing subordinate clauses
Part III | Review: Recognizing and using parts of speech

Part IV | Writing Effective Sentences

26 Using modifiers
27–29 Sentence length, variety, and emphasis
30 Analyzing sentences
35 Correcting misplaced modifiers
36 Correcting dangling modifiers
37 Correcting mixed constructions
38 Improving alignment
40 Correcting faulty parallelism
41 (1) Using subordination
41 (2) Correcting faulty coordination
42 Improving logic
Parts II–IV | Review: Sentence errors and weaknesses

xvii

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 Exercises in the Online Student Workbook

Part V | Punctuation
43 Using commas
44–45 Using semicolons and colons
46–47 Using dashes and parentheses
49–51 Using periods, question marks, and exclamation points
52 Using quotation marks
Part V | Review: Using Punctuation

Part VI | Mechanics and Spelling

61k (1) Checking hyphenation
61k (2) Using hyphens
61-l Forming plurals
61m Using apostrophes
61n Using apostrophes to indicate possession

Part VII | Diction

64a Thinking about slang
64b Using formal diction
64c Thinking about “big” words
66 (1) Using specific diction
66 (2) Being concrete and specific
67 Recognizing connotation
68 Avoiding euphemisms
69 Avoiding wrong words
70 Correcting idioms
71c Cutting redundancy
71a–c (1) Removing wordiness
71a–c (2) Reducing wordiness by combining sentences
71g Evaluating nouns used as adjectives
Part VII | Review: Diction
Parts II–VII | Omnibus Review: Sentence errors and weaknesses

Part VIII | Research, Writing, and

Documentation
78 Paraphrasing and summarizing

xviii

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 Preface
The second concise edition of The Canadian Writer’s Handbook is
designed to help you in what we see as the ongoing (even lifelong)
project of improving written communication. We know that the
improvement of our own writing is a work in progress, and we believe
that the same may be true for our readers. Whether you are a longtime
writer of English seeking to refresh and refine your abilities or one
who is writing in English as an additional language, we hope that the
suggestions, examples, and guidelines in this new edition will provide
a trustworthy resource that will enable you to write with greater con-
fidence and skill.
This handbook has a three-part organization that opens and closes
with an emphasis on the larger units of writing.We begin with a section
on principles of composition, ranging from the design of paragraphs to
the design of the whole essay and the principles of effective planning
and argument; we close with a section on current practices in research-
based writing. In the middle parts of the book, we explore principles of
grammar, syntax, and usage at the word and sentence level. We devote
considerable space to examination of sentence patterns, parts of speech,
and sentence structure and variety; we also include parts devoted to
punctuation, mechanics and spelling, and diction. The appendix of this
book provides comprehensive checklists designed for use at the revis-
ing and editing stages of your writing projects.

Overview
This handbook is intended for you to use as a reference work, to con-
sult on particular issues arising from the everyday writing activities,
challenges, and questions you encounter. It may also be used as a class
text for discussion and study in writing courses, programs, and work-
shops. We suggest that you begin by considering the ways you will be
using this book. Then, start to familiarize yourself with it by seeing
what it has to offer you. Browse through the table of contents and the
index. Look up some sections that arouse your interest. Flip through
the pages, pausing now and then for a closer look. Note the num-
bered running heads at the tops of pages and the tabbed inserts at the
xix

00_544708_Prelims.indd 19 13-02-04 12:33 PM

 Preface

beginning of each new part. These features, together with the guide at
the end of this preface, can help you find things in a hurry.

Organization
Notice how the material is arranged. Then, begin to think about how
you can best approach it. You may want to start at the beginning and
proceed carefully through the book; some points in later sections won’t
be clear to you unless you understand the material in the early sections.
But if you already understand basic grammar—the functions of the
parts of speech and the principles governing English sentences—you
may need only a quick review of parts II, III, and IV. Test yourself by
trying some of the exercises in the Online Student Workbook, available at
www.oupcanada.com/CCWH2e, and check your answers with your
instructor or on the online answer key.

For Readers and Writers of English as an

Additional Language
Our experience as university instructors has given us the opportunity
to work with a number of writers engaged in the challenging pro­
ject of reading and writing in English as an additional language (eal).
Because English is a third, fourth, or fifth language to many such
students, we have long felt that the term “esl” (English as a second
language), used to describe or even to label these writers, is something
of a misnomer. Still, at several points in this new textbook, we offer
information and direction of particular importance to those of you
who are approaching English as a relatively new language, and we have
designated those relevant sections with the symbol EAL .

Checking Your Work Before Submitting It

When you finish a piece of writing, go through the omnibus checklists
in the appendix. If you find you’re not sure about something, follow the
cross-references to the sections that will give you the help you need.

Correcting and Revising Returned Work

When you get a piece of writing back with marks and comments, first
look it over alongside the list of marking symbols and abbreviations on
xx

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 Preface

the book’s inside back cover. The information there may be enough
to help you make the appropriate changes. But if you need more than
a reminder about a specific issue or pattern—if you don’t understand
the fundamental principles—follow the cross-references and study the
sections that discuss and illustrate those principles in greater detail.You
should then be able to edit and revise your work with understanding
and confidence.
An important feature of this book is that it discusses and illustrates
various issues in several places: in the main discussions and in the exer-
cises on the website. If the information you find in one or another of
these places isn’t enough to clarify a point, remember that you may not
yet have exhausted the available resources: try the index to see if it will
lead you to still other relevant places.

Marking symbols

Marking Symbols and Abbreviations

Numbers refer to handbook sections.

abbr incorrect or inappropriate lev inappropriate level of diction #64

abbreviation #56 log illogical #10e–h, #38, #41, #42
ack acknowledgement of sources missing or mix mixed construction #37
40 Faulty Parallelism 40a
incorrect #77–79
mm misplaced modifier #35
ad misused adjective or adverb #19, #20
ms improper manuscript form #55
agr faulty agreement: pronoun–antecedent
nsw no such word
#15, subject–verb #18
num numeral needed or misused #60
al illogical or incongruous alignment #38

40 Faulty
org weak or faulty organization #4, #9e–j,
ambig ambiguous, clarity lacking #16b
#10d
(pronoun reference), #31–42, Pt. VII, EAL
Checklist p punctuation error Pt. V
apos missing or misused apostrophe #61m–n para, ¶ Parallelism
paragraph needed, or weak
paragraphing #1–7
art missing or misused article #19c
pas weak passive voice #17-l, #29f
awk awkward EAL Checklist
ca incorrect case of pronoun #14e
passim Parallelism,
an error occurs throughout the balanced and deliberate repetition of identical gram- fp,
pred matical structures
faulty predication (alignment) #38 (words, phrases, clauses) within a single sentence, can //
cap missing or faulty capitalization #57
pron error in pronoun use be
#14–16
a strong stylistic technique. Not only does it make for vigorous, bal-
cl clarity lacking #31–42, Pt. VII, EAL
Checklist pv inconsistent point of view #39
anced, and rhythmical sentences, but it can also help develop and tie
cliché cliché, trite #71e Q mishandled quotation or quotation
marks #52, #78 together paragraphs (see #5a). Like any other device, parallelism can be
coh coherence lacking #3–5, #8b, #31
colloq colloquial, too informal #64b
red redundant #71c overdone, but more commonly it is underused. Of course, if you’re writ-
ref weak or faulty pronouningreference
an especially
#15, serious piece, like a letter of condolence, you probably
comp faulty or incomplete comparison #42
#16
conc insufficient concreteness #66
rep
won’t want to use lively devices like parallelism and metaphor. But in
weak or awkward repetition #71b
coord coordination needed #23a, #41
run-on most#34,
run-on (fused) sentence writing,
#54a some parallel structure is appropriate. Build parallel ele-
cs comma splice #33, #54b ments
shift unwanted shift in point of viewinto
or your sentences, and now and then try making two or three
d weak or faulty diction Pt. VII perspective #39 successive sentences parallel with each other. Here is a sentence from a
dev development needed #1b, #4b, #7b, sp spelling error #61, #62 (and #63, on
#66 dictionaries)
paper on computer crime. Note how parallelism (along with allitera-
dm dangling modifier #36 split tion) #21c
unnecessary split infinitive strengthens the first part, thereby helping to set up the second part:
doc faulty documentation #78–79 squint squinting modifier #35c
emph weak or unclear emphasis #6, #8c, ss faulty sentence structure, Although one
or faulty sense can distinguish the malicious from the mischievous or the
#29, #41 #12, Pt. IV, EAL Checklist
euph weak euphemism #68
harmless hacker from the more dangerous computer criminal, security
stet let it stand as originally written
fc faulty coordination #41 officials take a dim view of anyone who romps through company files.
sub subordination needed #12n–o, #23c,
fig inappropriate or confusing figurative #29i, #41
language #65, #71e t Be careful
error in verb tense #17g–i as you experiment, for it is easy to set up a parallel structure
fp, // faulty parallelism #40 tr weak or missing transition #4, #5c–d,
and then lose track of it. Study the following examples of faulty par-
frag unacceptable fragment #12w–x, #32 #8b
fs fused (run-on) sentence #34, #54a trite trite, cliché #71e
allelism. (See also #23a–b.)
gen weak generalization #66b u weak unity #2, #8a, #41
id unidiomatic #70 uc
40a
uppercase letter needed #57
With Coordinate Elements
inc incomplete comparison #42 us incorrect usage #72
inf too informal, colloquial #64b var Coordinate
lack of variety #7c, #28 elements in a sentence should have the same grammatical
ital italics needed or incorrect #58, #59 vb incorrect verb form form.
#17 If they don’t, the sentence will lack parallelism and therefore be
jarg inappropriate or unnecessary jargon w wordiness #71 ineffective.
#71h wo awkward word order #12s–t, #19d–e,
lc no caps; lowercase letter needed #57 #20d, #22b, #35
leg illegible (handwritten work) ww wrong word #69, #72 fp: Reading should be engrossing, active, and a challenge.

The first two complements (engrossing, active) are predicate adjectives,

the third (a challenge) a predicate noun. Change a challenge to the adjec-
tive challenging so that it will be parallel.
Messenger_Cover_FNL.indd 3 31/01/13 11:09 AM
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 Preface

Numbering and Cross-Referencing

The Handbook is subdivided into sections and subsections that are num-
bered consecutively throughout, without regard to parts. Cross-references
are to section and subsections, or, occasionally, to parts. In the index, ref-
erences are to page numbers. Exercises in the Online Student Workbook are
numbered according to their corresponding sections.

Key Terms
The first one or two times an important term occurs, it is set in bold-
face. Pay attention to these terms, for they make up the basic vocabulary
necessary for the intelligent discussion of grammar, syntax, and style.

Key terms bolded

Section number and
on first use
subsection letter 25d PART IV Writing Effective Sentences

The linking verb be (and sometimes others) can also be followed by an

adverbial word or phrase (I am here; he is in his office).
Part number
and title These elements—subject, finite verb, and object or complement—
are the core elements of major sentences. They are closely linked in the
ways indicated above with the verb as the focal and uniting element.
(For a discussion of the order in which these elements occur, see #12s–u.)

Section number
26 Modifiers
Modifiers add to the core grammatical elements.They limit or describe
Online Student other elements so as to modify—that is, to change—a listener’s or
Workbook reader’s idea of them. The two principal kinds of modifiers are adjectives
(see #19) and adverbs (see #20). Also useful, but less frequent, are apposi-
exercise symbol tives (see #12q) and absolute phrases (see #12r and #21i). An adjectival
or adverbial modifier may even be part of the core of a sentence if it
completes the predicate after a linking verb (Recycling is vital; Ziad is
home). An adverb may also be essential if it modifies an intransitive verb
that would otherwise seem incomplete (Ziad lives in a condominium).
But generally modifiers do their work by adding to—enriching—a
central core of thought.
Subsection number
26a Adjectival Modifiers (see #19–19b and #19e–f)
Adjectival modifiers modify nouns, pronouns, and phrases or clauses
Cross-reference functioning as nouns. They commonly answer the questions which? what
kind of? how many? and how much? An adjectival modifier may be a single-
word adjective, a series of adjectives, a participle or participial phrase, an
infinitive or infinitive phrase, a prepositional phrase, or a relative clause:

Early settlers of western Canada encountered sudden floods,

prolonged droughts, and early frosts. (single words modifying nouns
immediately following)

194

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 Preface

Other Features

9 The Process of Planning, Writing, and Revising 9-l

Numerous boxes to
WRITING TIP
PROOFREADING TIP
P
highlight important
On Managing the Number of Subheadings information
in an Outline
As with the major sections of an essay, having more than six or seven
subheadings under any one heading risks being unwieldy.

9k Writing the First Draft

Once you have a good outline to follow, the work of drafting becomes
smoother and more purposeful. With the shape of the whole essay
laid out, you can concentrate on the main tasks of drafting: finding
the right words, generating effective sentences, and constructing good
transitions and strong paragraphs.

WRITING TIP
PROOFREADING TIP
P
Canadian advice for
On Going from an Outline to a Draft Canadian users
(1) Sometimes a main heading and its subheading from the outline
will become a single paragraph in the essay; sometimes each
subheading will become a paragraph; and so on. The nature and
density of your material will determine its treatment.
(2) It may be possible to transfer the thesis statement from your
outline to the essay unchanged, but more likely you will want to
change it (perhaps several times) to fit the actual essay. The the-
sis is the statement of your purpose or of the position you intend
to defend in the essay, so it should be as polished as possible.
The kind of basic or mechanical statement that is61c suitablePART
in an VI Mechanics and Spelling
outline may be inappropriate in the essay itself.

PROOFREADING TIP
9-l Notes on Beginnings PROOFREADING TIP
P
practice, practise; licence, license
1. Postponing the Beginning
Canadian writers tend to follow the British practice of using the -ce
Starting the actual writing can be a challenge: most writersforms
ha practice
have had and licence as nouns and the -se forms practise and
the experience of staring at a computer screen
een while trying license
to thinkasofverbs:

We will practise our fielding at today’s slo-pitch practice.

35
Are you licensed to drive?
Yes, I’ve had my driver’s licence since I was sixteen.

American writers tend to favour the -ce spelling of practice and the
-se spelling of license regardless of whether each is being used as a
noun or a verb.
Note also that Canadian as well as British writers generally prefer
the -ce spelling for offence and defence, while American writers tend
to use the -se spellings of these words

ative; itive

-ative -itive
affirmative informative additive positive
comparative negative competitive repetitive
imaginative restorative genitive sensitive

ly
When ly is added to an adjective already ending in a single l, that final
l is retained, resulting in an adverb ending in lly: accidentally, coolly,
incidentally, mentally, naturally, politically. (If you pronounce such words
carefully you will be less likely to misspell them.) If the root ends in a
double ll, one l is dropped: full + ly = fully, chill + ly = chilly, droll + ly
= drolly.

310

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 Preface

79 Documentation 79b

APA STYLE
Detailed, up-to-date
On Citing Electronic Sources
When you cite an electronic source in the APA system, include the
guidelines for
work’s digital object identifier (DOI) or, if there is no DOI assigned to
the work, the uniform resource locator (URL) of the site where you documenting in MLA,
found the work. For a journal article with no DOI, include the URL for
the journal’s homepage. If you need to break a DOI or URL across two APA, Chicago, and
or more lines, do so before a punctuation mark; do not add a hyphen.
Note that you do not need to include the date you accessed the site. CSE (number) styles

A Work with No Identified Author

If no person or group is identified as the author or editor, use the title
of the work in place of the author’s name:

How to end needless strikes? Start with good faith offers.

(2012, April 2). Maclean’s, 125(12), 4–5.

A Book in Translation Checklists for

Add the name of the translator and the abbreviation Trans. enclosed in
parentheses after the title: planning and
Benjamin, W. (2006). Berlin childhood around 1900 (H. Eiland, revising your work
Trans.). London, England: Belknap Press.

An Edition Other Than the First

For a second or subsequent edition, include the edition number after
the title:

Newman, J., & White, L. A. (2012). Women,

omen, politics, and public
policy: The political struggles of Canadian women (2nd ed.).
Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press.

A Multivolume Work
For a work published in multiple volumes, include the number(s) of
the volume or volumes you have referenced:
Appendix
Dutch, S.I. (Ed.). (2010). Encyclopedia of global warming (V
Pasadena, CA: Salem Press.
Omnibus Checklist for
(Vols.
ols. 1–3).

453
Planning and Revising

As you begin to prepare a piece of your writing for final submission

to your reader(s), it is good strategy to ask yourself a series of ques-
tions designed to ensure that you have polished your work to the point
where you can consider it a finished and appealing discourse. What we
have listed here are the kinds of questions we ask ourselves in reading
and evaluating students’ writing. If you can ask and answer all of the
questions we have listed here in the affirmative, your essay should be
not just adequate, but very good.

1. During and after planning the essay, ask yourself these

questions:

 Have I chosen a subject that sustains my interest? (#9a)

 If I am doing research, have I formulated a researchable
Subject
question? (#74)
 Have I sufficiently limited my subject? (#9b)
 Have I thought about audience and purpose?
Audience
 Have I written down a statement of purpose and a profile of
and Purpose
my audience? (#9c)
 Have I collected or generated more than enough material/
Evidence
evidence to develop and support my topic well? (#9d)
 Does my thesis offer a focused, substantive, analytical claim
about the subject?
 Is my plan or outline for the essay logical in its content and
arrangement? (#9e–j)
 Considering my plan or outline, do I have the right number of
Organization
main ideas—neither too few nor too many—for the purpose
and Plan
of my essay?
 Are my main ideas reasonably parallel in content and
development?
 Have I chosen the best arrangement for the main parts? Does
it coincide with the arrangement of ideas in the thesis?

485

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 Another Random Document on
Scribd Without Any Related Topics
fixity of empirical co-existences and sequences depends. Is not Kant
practically assuming a pre-established harmony in asserting that as the mind
creates the form of nature it can legislate a priori for all possible
experience?
As regards the first assumption Kant would seem to have been
influenced by the ambiguities of the term transcendental. It means, as we
have already noted,[929] either the science of the a priori, or the a priori
itself, or the conditions which render experience possible. Even the two
latter meanings by no means coincide. The conditions of the possibility of
experience are not in all cases a priori. The manifold of outer sense is as
indispensable a precondition of experience as are the forms of
understanding, and yet is not a priori in any valid sense of that term. It does
not, therefore, follow that because the activities of productive imagination
“transcendentally” condition experience, they must themselves be a priori,
and must, as Kant also maintains,[930] deal with a pure a priori manifold.
Further, the separation between transcendental and empirical activities of
the mind must defeat the very purpose for which the productive imagination
is postulated, namely, in order to account for the generation of a complex
consciousness in which no one element can temporally precede any of the
others. If the productive imagination generates only schemata, it will not
account for that complex experience in which consciousness of self and
consciousness of objects are indissolubly united. The introduction of the
productive imagination seems at first sight to promise recognition of the
dynamical aspect of our temporally sequent experience, and of that aspect
in which as appearance it refers us beyond itself to non-experienced
conditions. As employed, however, in the doctrines of schematism and of
objective affinity, the imagination exhibits a formalism hardly less extreme
than that of the understanding whose shortcomings it is supposed to make
good.
In his second assumption Kant, as so often in the Critique, is allowing
his old-time rationalistic leanings to influence him in underestimating the
large part which the purely empirical must always occupy in human
experience, and in exaggerating the scope of the inferences which can be
drawn from the presence of the formal, relational factors. But this is a point
which we are not yet in a position to discuss.[931]
 Fortunately, if Vaihinger’s theory be accepted,[932] section A 98-104
enables us to follow the movement of Kant’s mind in the interval between
the formulating of the doctrine of productive imagination and the
publication of the Critique. He himself would seem to have recognised the
unsatisfactoriness of dividing up the total conditions of experience into
transcendental activities that issue in schemata, and supplementary
empirical processes which transform them into concrete, specific
consciousness. The alternative theory which he proceeds to propound is at
first sight much more satisfactory. It consists in duplicating each of the
various empirical processes with a transcendental faculty. There are, he now
declares, three transcendental powers—a transcendental faculty of
apprehension, a transcendental faculty of reproduction (=imagination), and
a transcendental faculty of recognition. Thus Kant’s previous view that
transcendental imagination has a special and unique activity, namely, the
productive, altogether different in type from any of its empirical processes,
is now allowed to drop; in place of it Kant develops the view that the
transcendental functions run exactly parallel with the empirical processes.
[933] But though such a position may at first seem more promising than that
which it displaces, it soon reveals its unsatisfactoriness. The two types of
mental activity, transcendental and empirical, no longer, indeed, fall apart;
but the difficulty now arises of distinguishing in apprehension,
reproduction, and recognition any genuinely transcendental aspect.[934]
Apprehension, reproduction, and recognition are so essentially conscious
processes that to view them as also transcendental does not seem helpful.
They contain elements that are transcendental in the logical sense, but
cannot be shown to presuppose in any analogous fashion mental powers
that are transcendental in the dynamical sense. This is especially evident in
regard to recognition, which is described as being “the consciousness that
what we are thinking is the same as what we thought a moment before.” In
dealing with apprehension and reproduction the only real difference which
Kant is able to suggest, as existing between their transcendental and their
empirical activities, is that the former synthesise the pure a priori manifolds
of space and time, and the latter the contingent manifold of sense. But even
this unsatisfactory distinction he does not attempt to apply in the case of
recognition. Nor can we hold that by the transcendental synthesis of
recognition Kant means transcendental apperception. That is, of course, the
suggestion which at once occurs to the reader. But however possible it
might be to inject such a meaning into kindred passages elsewhere, it
cannot be made to fit the context of this particular section.
Vaihinger’s theory seems to be the only thread which will guide us
through this labyrinth. Kant, on the eve of the publication of the Critique,
recognising the unsatisfactoriness of his hard and fast separation of
transcendental from empirical processes, adopted the view that some form
of transcendental activity corresponds to every fundamental form of
empirical activity and vice versa. Hastily developing this theory, he
incorporated it into the Critique alongside his older doctrine. It does not,
however, reappear in the Prolegomena, and its teaching is explicitly
withdrawn in the second edition of the Critique. Its plausibility had
entrapped him into its temporary adoption, but the defects which it very
soon revealed speedily led him to reject it.
One feature of great significance calls for special notice. The breakdown
of this doctrine of a threefold transcendental synthesis did not, as might
naturally have been expected from what is stated in the prefaces to the
Critique regarding the unessential and seemingly conjectural character of
the subjective deduction, lead Kant to despair of developing a
transcendental psychology. Though in the second edition he cuts away the
sections containing the earlier stages of the subjective deduction,[935] and in
recasting the other sections gives greater prominence to the more purely
logical analyses, the older doctrine of productive imagination is reinstated
in full force,[936] and is again developed in[937] connection with the
doctrine of pure a priori manifolds. Evidently, therefore, Kant was not
disheartened by the various difficulties which lie in the path of a
transcendental psychology, and it seems reasonable to conclude that there
were powerful reasons inclining him to its retention. I shall now attempt, to
the best of my powers, to explain—the task is a delicate and difficult one—
what we may believe these reasons to have been.[938]
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHENOMENALISM AND SUBJECTIVISM
A wider set of considerations than we have yet taken into account must
be borne in mind if certain broader and really vital implications of Kant’s
enquiry are to be properly viewed. The self has a twofold aspect. It is at
once animal in its conditions and potentially universal in its powers of
apprehension. Though man’s natural existence is that of an animal
organism, he can have consciousness of the spatial world out of which his
organism has arisen, and of the wider periods within which his transitory
existence falls. Ultimately such consciousness would seem to connect man
cognitively with reality as a whole. Now it is to this universal or absolutist
aspect of our consciousness, to its transcendence of the embodied and
separate self, that Kant is seeking to do justice in his transcendental
deductions, especially in his doctrine of the transcendental unity of
apperception. For he views that apperception as conditioned by, and the
correlate of, the consciousness of objectivity. It involves the consciousness
of a single cosmical time and of a single cosmical space within which all
events fall and within which they form a whole of causally interdependent
existences. That is why he names it the objective unity of apperception. It is
that aspect in which the self correlates with a wider reality, and through
which it stands in fundamental contrast to the merely subjective states and
to the individual conditions of its animal existence. The transcendental self,
so far from being identical with the empirical self, would seem to be of
directly opposite nature. The one would seem to point beyond the realm of
appearance, the other to be in its existence merely natural. The fact that they
are inextricably bound up with one another, and co-operate in rendering
experience possible, only makes the more indispensable the duty of
recognising their differing characters. Even should they prove to be
inseparable aspects of sense-experience, without metaphysical implications,
that would not obviate the necessity of clearly distinguishing them. The
distinction remains, whatever explanation may be adopted of its speculative
or other significance.
Now obviously in so fundamental an enquiry, dealing as it does with the
most complicated and difficult problem in the entire field of metaphysics,
no brief and compendious answer can cover all the various considerations
which are relevant and determining. The problem of the deduction being
what it is, the section dealing with it can hardly fail to be the most difficult
portion of the whole Critique. The conclusions at which it arrives rest not
merely upon the argument which it contains but also upon the results more
or less independently reached in the other sections. The doctrine of the
empirical object as appearance requires for its development the various
discussions contained in the Aesthetic, in the sections on Inner Sense and on
the Refutation of Idealism, in the chapters on Phenomena and Noumena and
on the Antinomies. The metaphysical consequences and implications of
Kant’s teaching in regard to the transcendental unity of apperception are
first revealed in the chapter on the Paralogisms. The view taken of
productive imagination is expanded in the section on Schematism. In a
word, the whole antecedent teaching of the Critique is focussed, and the
entire subsequent development of the Critical doctrine is anticipated, in this
brief chapter.
But there are, of course, additional causes of the difficulty and obscurity
of the argument. One such cause has already been noted, namely, that the
Critique is not a unitary work, developed from a previously thought-out
standpoint, but in large part consists of manuscripts of very various dates,
artificially pieced together by the addition of connecting links. In no part of
the Critique is this so obvious as in the Analytic of Concepts. Until this is
recognised all attempts to interpret the text in any impersonal fashion are
doomed to failure. For this reason I have prefaced our discussion by a
statement of Vaihinger’s analysis. No one who can accept it is any longer in
danger of underestimating this particular cause of the obscurity of Kant’s
deduction.
But the chief reason is one to which I have thus far made only passing
reference, and to which we may now give the attention which its
importance demands, namely, the tentative and experimental character of
Kant’s own final solutions. The arguments of the deduction are only
intelligible if viewed as an expression of the conflicting tendencies to which
Kant’s thought remained subject. He sought to allow due weight to each of
the divergent aspects of the experience which he was analysing, and in so
doing proceeded, as it would seem, simultaneously along the parallel lines
of what appeared to be the possible, alternative methods of explanation.
And to the end these opposing tendencies continued side by side, to the
confusion of those readers who seek for a single unified teaching, but to the
great illumination of those who are looking to Kant, not for clear-cut or
final solutions, but for helpful analysis and for partial disentanglement of
the complicated issues which go to constitute these baffling problems.
The two chief tendencies which thus conflicted in Kant’s mind may be
named the subjectivist and the phenomenalist respectively. This conflict
remained, so to speak, underground, influencing the argument at every
point, but seldom itself becoming the subject of direct discussion. As we
shall find, it caused Kant to develop a twofold view of inner sense, of
causality, of the object of knowledge, and of the unity of apperception. One
of the few sections in the Critique where it seems on the point of emerging
into clear consciousness is the section, added in the second edition, on the
Refutation of Idealism. But this section owes its origin to polemical causes.
It represents a position peculiar to the maturer portions of the Analytic; the
rest of the Critique is not rewritten so as to harmonise with it, or to develop
the consequences which consistent holding to it must involve.
I shall use the term subjectivism (and its equivalent subjective idealism)
in the wide sense[939] which makes it applicable to the teaching of
Descartes and Locke, of Leibniz and Wolff, no less than to that of Berkeley
and Hume. A common element in all these philosophies is the belief that
subjective or mental states, “ideas” in the Lockean sense, are the objects of
consciousness, and further are the sole possible objects of which it can have
any direct or immediate awareness. Knowledge is viewed as a process
entirely internal to the individual mind, and as carrying us further only in
virtue of some additional supervening process, inferential, conjectural, or
instinctive. This subjectivism also tends to combine with a view of
consciousness as an ultimate self-revealing property of a merely individual
existence.[940] For Descartes consciousness is the very essence, both of the
mind and of the self. It is indeed asserted to be exhaustive of the nature of
both. Though the self is described as possessing a faculty of will as well as
a power of thinking, all its activities are taken as being disclosed to the
mind through the revealing power of its fundamental attribute. The
individual mind is thus viewed as an existence in which everything takes
place in the open light of an all-pervasive consciousness. Leibniz, it is true,
taught the existence of subconscious perceptions, and so far may seem to
have anticipated Kant’s recognition of non-conscious processes; but as
formulated by Leibniz that doctrine has the defect which frequently vitiates
its modern counterpart, namely that it represents the subconscious as
analogous in nature to the conscious, and as differing from it only in the
accidental features of intensity and clearness, or through temporary lack of
control over the machinery of reproductive association. The subconscious,
as thus represented, merely enlarges the private content of the individual
mind; it in no respect transcends it.
The genuinely Critical view of the generative conditions of experience is
radically different from this Leibnizian doctrine of petites perceptions. It
connects rather with Leibniz’s mode of conceiving the origin of a priori
concepts. But even that teaching it restates in such fashion as to free it from
subjectivist implications. Leibniz’s contention that the mind is conscious of
its fundamental activities, and that it is by reflection upon them that it gains
all ultimate a priori concepts, is no longer tenable in view of the
conclusions established in the objective deduction. Mental processes, in so
far as they are generative of experience, must fall outside the field of
consciousness, and as activities dynamically creative cannot be of the
nature of ideas or contents. They are not subconscious ideas but non-
conscious processes. They are not the submerged content of experience, but
its conditioning grounds. Their most significant characteristic has still,
however, to be mentioned. They must no longer be interpreted in
subjectivist terms, as originating in the separate existence of an individual
self. In conditioning experience they generate the only self for which
experience can vouch, and consequently, in the absence of full and
independent proof, must not be conceived as individually circumscribed.
The problem of knowledge, properly conceived, is no longer how
consciousness, individually conditioned, can lead us beyond its own
bounds, but what a consciousness, which is at once consciousness of objects
and also consciousness of a self, must imply for its possibility. Kant thus
obtains what is an almost invariable concomitant of scientific and
philosophical advance, namely a more correct and scientific formulation of
the problem to be solved. The older formulation assumes the truth of the
subjectivist standpoint; the Critical problem, when thus stated, is at least
free from preconceptions of that particular brand. Assumptions which
hitherto had been quite unconsciously held, or else, if reflected upon, had
been regarded as axiomatic and self-evident, are now brought within the
field of investigation. Kant thereby achieves a veritable revolution; and with
it many of the most far-reaching consequences of the Critical teaching are
closely bound up.
This new standpoint, in contrast to subjective idealism, may be named
Critical, or to employ the term which Kant himself applies both to his
transcendental deduction and to the unity of apperception, objective
idealism. But as the distinction between appearance and reality is no less
fundamental to the Critical attitude, we shall perhaps be less likely to be
misunderstood, or to seem to be identifying Kant’s standpoint with the very
different teaching of Hegel, if by preference we employ the title
phenomenalism.
 In the transcendental deduction Kant, as above noted, is seeking to do
justice to the universal or absolutist aspect of our consciousness, to its
transcendence of the embodied and separate self. The unity of apperception
is entitled objective, because it is regarded as the counterpart of a single
cosmical time and of a single cosmical space within which all events fall.
Its objects are not mental states peculiar to itself, nor even ideal contents
numerically distinct from those in other minds. It looks out upon a common
world of genuinely independent existence. In developing this position Kant
is constrained to revise and indeed completely to recast his previous views
both as to the nature of the synthetic processes, through which experience is
constructed, and of the given manifold, upon which they are supposed to
act. From the subjectivist point of view the synthetic activities consist of the
various cognitive processes of the individual mind, and the given manifold
consists of the sensations aroused by material bodies acting upon the special
senses. From the objective or phenomenalist standpoint the synthetic
processes are of a noumenal character, and the given manifold is similarly
viewed as being due to noumenal agencies acting, not upon the sense-
organs, which as appearances are themselves noumenally conditioned, but
upon what may be called “outer sense.” These distinctions may first be
made clear.
Sensations, Kant holds, have a twofold origin, noumenal and
mechanical. They are due in the first place to the action of things in
themselves upon the noumenal conditions of the self, and also in the second
place to the action of material bodies upon the sense-organs and the brain.
To take the latter first. Light reflected from objects, and acting on the retina,
gives rise to sensations of colour. For such causal interrelations there exists,
Kant teaches, the same kind of empirical evidence as for the causal
interaction of material bodies.[941] Our sensational experiences are as truly
events in time as are mechanical happenings in space. In this way, however,
we can account only for the existence of our sensations and for the order in
which they make their appearance in or to consciousness, not for our
awareness of them. To state the point by means of an illustration. The
impinging of one billiard ball upon another accounts causally for the motion
which then appears in the second ball. But no one would dream of asserting
that by itself it accounts for our consciousness of that second motion. We
may contend that in an exactly similar manner, to the same extent, no more
and no less, the action of an object upon the brain accounts only for the
occurrence of a visual sensation as an event in the empirical time sequence.
A sensation just as little as a motion can carry its own consciousness with it.
To regard that as ever possible is ultimately to endow events in time with
the capacity of apprehending objects in space. In dealing with causal
connections in space and time we do not require to discuss the problem of
knowledge proper, namely, how it is possible to have or acquire knowledge,
whether of a motion in space or of a sensation in time. When we raise that
further question we have to adopt a very different standpoint, and to take
into account a much greater complexity of conditions.
Kant applies this point of view no less rigorously to feelings, emotions,
and desires than to the sensations of the special senses. All of them, he
teaches, are ‘animal’[942] in character. They are one and all conditioned by,
and explicable only in terms of, the particular constitution of the animal
organism. They one and all belong to the realm of appearance.[943]
The term ‘sensation’ may also, however, be applied in a wider sense to
signify the material of knowledge in so far as it is noumenally conditioned.
Thus viewed, sensations are due, not to the action of physical stimuli upon
the bodily organs, but to the affection by things in themselves of those
factors in the noumenal conditions of the self which correspond to
“sensibility.” Kant is culpably careless in failing to distinguish those two
very different meanings of the phrase ‘given manifold.’ The language which
he employs is thoroughly ambiguous. Just as he frequently speaks as if the
synthetic processes were conscious activities exerted by the self, so also he
frequently uses language which implies that the manifold upon which these
processes act is identical with the sensations of the special senses. But the
sensations of the bodily senses, even if reducible to it, can at most form
only part of it. The synthetic processes, interpreting the manifold in
accordance with the fixed forms, space, time, and the categories, generate
the spatial world within which objects are apprehended as causally
interacting and as giving rise through their action upon the sense-organs to
the various special sensations as events in time. Sensations, as mechanically
caused, are thus on the same plane as other appearances. They depend upon
the same generating conditions as the motions which produce them. As
minor incidents within a more comprehensive totality they cannot possibly
represent the material out of which the whole has been constructed. To
explain the phenomenal world as constructed out of the sensations of the
special senses is virtually to equate it with a small selection of its
constituent parts. Such professed explanation also commits the further
absurdity of attempting to account for the origin of the phenomenal world
by means of events which can exist only under the conditions which it itself
supplies. The manifold of the special senses and the primary manifold are
radically distinct. The former is due to material bodies acting upon the
material sense-organs. The latter is the product of noumenal agencies acting
upon “outer sense,” i.e. upon those noumenal conditions of the self which
constitute our “sensibility”; it is much more comprehensive than the former;
it must contain the material for all modes of objective existence, including
many that are usually regarded as purely mental.[944]
To turn, now, to the other aspect of experience. What are the factors
which condition its form? What must we postulate in order to account for
the existence of consciousness and for the unitary form in which alone it
can appear? Kant’s answer is again ambiguous. He fails sufficiently to insist
upon distinctions which yet are absolutely vital to any genuine
understanding of the new and revolutionary positions towards which he is
feeling his way. The synthetic processes which in the subjective and
objective deductions are proved to condition all experience may be
interpreted either as conscious or as non-conscious activities, and may be
ascribed either to the agency of the individual self or to noumenal
conditions which fall outside the realm of possible definition. Now, though
Kant’s own expositions remain thoroughly ambiguous, the results of the
Critical enquiry would seem—at least so long as the fundamental
distinction between matter and form is held to and the temporally sequent
aspect of experience is kept in view—to be decisive in favour of the latter
alternative in each case. The synthetic processes must take place and
complete themselves before any consciousness can exist at all. And as they
thus precondition consciousness, they cannot themselves be known to be
conscious; and not being known to be conscious, it is not even certain that
they may legitimately be described as mental. We have, indeed, to conceive
them on the analogy of our mental processes, but that may only be because
of the limitation of our knowledge to the data of experience. Further, we
have no right to conceive them as the activities of a noumenal self. We
know the self only as conscious, and the synthetic processes, being the
generating conditions of consciousness, are also the generating conditions
of the only self for which our experience can vouch. Kant, viewing as he
does the temporal aspect of human experience as fundamental, would seem
to be justified in naming these processes “synthetic.” For consciousness in
its very nature would seem to involve the carrying over of content from one
time to other times, and the construction of a more comprehensive total
consciousness from the elements thus combined. Kant is here analysing in
its simplest and most fundamental form that aspect of consciousness which
William James has described in the Principles of Psychology,[945] and
which we may entitle the telescoping of earlier mental states into the
successive experiences that include them. They telescope in a manner
which can never befall the successive events in a causal series, and which is
not explicable by any scheme of relations derivable from the physical
sphere.
Obviously, what Kant does is to apply to the interpretation of the
noumenal conditions of our conscious experience a distinction derived by
analogy from conscious experience itself—the distinction, namely, between
our mental processes and the sensuous material with which they deal. The
application of such a distinction may be inevitable in any attempt to explain
human experience; but it can very easily, unless carefully guarded, prove a
source of serious misunderstanding. Just as the synthetic processes which
generate consciousness are not known to be themselves conscious, so also
the manifold cannot be identified with the sensations of the bodily senses.
These last are events in time, and are effects not of noumenal but of
mechanical causes.
Kant’s conclusion when developed on consistent Critical lines, and
therefore in phenomenalist terms, is twofold: positive, to the effect that
consciousness, for all that our analysis can prove to the contrary, may be
merely a resultant, derivative from and dependent upon a complexity of
conditions; and negative, to the effect that though these conditions may by
analogy be described as consisting of synthetic processes acting upon a
given material, they are in their real nature unknowable by us. Even their
bare possibility we cannot profess to comprehend. We postulate them only
because given experience is demonstrably not self-explanatory and would
seem to refer us for explanation to some such antecedent generative
grounds.
Kant, as we have already emphasised, obscures his position by the way
in which he frequently speaks of the transcendental unity of apperception as
the supreme condition of our experience. At times he even speaks as if it
were the source of the synthetic processes. That cannot, however, be
regarded as his real teaching. Self-consciousness (and the unity of
apperception, in so far as it finds expression through self-consciousness)
rests upon the same complexity of conditions as does outer experience, and
therefore may be merely a product or resultant. It is, as he insists in the
Paralogisms, the emptiest of all our concepts, and can afford no sufficient
ground for asserting the self to be an abiding personality. We cannot by
theoretical analysis of the facts of experience or of the nature of self-
consciousness prove anything whatsoever in regard to the ultimate nature of
the self.
Now Kant is here giving a new, and quite revolutionary, interpretation of
the distinction between the subjective and the objective. The objective is for
the Cartesians the independently real;[946] the subjective is that which has
an altogether different kind of existence in what is entitled the field of
consciousness. Kant, on the other hand, from his phenomenalist standpoint,
views existences as objective when they are determined by purely physical
causes, and as subjective when they also depend upon physiological and
psychological conditions. On this latter view the difference between the two
is no longer a difference of kind; it becomes a difference merely of degree.
Objective existences, owing to the simplicity and recurrent character of
their conditions, are uniform. Subjective existences resting upon conditions
which are too complex to be frequently recurrent, are by contrast extremely
variable. But both types of existence are objective in the sense that they are
objects, and immediate objects, for consciousness. Subjective states do not
run parallel with the objective system of natural existences, nor are they
additional to it. For they do not constitute our consciousness of nature; they
are themselves part of the natural order which consciousness reveals. That
they contrast with physical existences in being unextended and incapable of
location in space is what Kant would seem by implication to assert, but he
challenges Descartes’ right to infer from this particular difference a
complete diversity in their whole nature. Sensations, feelings, emotions, and
desires, so far as they are experienced by us, constitute the empirical self
which is an objective existence, integrally connected with the material
environment, in terms of which alone it can be understood. In other words,
the distinction between the subjective and the objective is now made to fall
within the system of natural law. The subjective is not opposite in nature to
the objective, but is a subspecies within it.
The revolutionary character of this reformulation of Cartesian
distinctions may perhaps be expressed by saying that what Kant is really
doing is to substitute the distinction between appearance and reality for the
Cartesian dualism of the mental and the material. The psychical is a title for
a certain class of known existences, i.e. of appearances; and they form
together with the physical a single system. But underlying this entire
system, conditioning both physical and psychical phenomena, is the realm
of noumenal existence; and when the question of the possibility of
knowledge, that is, of the experiencing of such a comprehensive natural
system, is raised, it is to this noumenal sphere that we are referred.
Everything experienced, even a sensation or desire, is an event; but the
experiencing of it is an act of awareness, and calls for an explanation of an
altogether different kind.
Thus Kant completely restates the problem of knowledge. The problem
is not how, starting from the subjective, the individual can come to
knowledge of the independently real; but how, if a common world is alone
immediately apprehended, the inner private life of the self-conscious being
can be possible, and how such inner experience is to be interpreted. How
does it come about that though sensations, feelings, etc., are events no less
mechanically conditioned than motions in space, and constitute with the
latter a single system conformed to natural law, they yet differ from all
other classes of natural events in that they can be experienced only by a
single consciousness. To this question Kant replies in terms of his
fundamental distinction between appearance and reality. Though everything
of which we are conscious may legitimately be studied in terms of the
natural system to which it belongs, consciousness itself cannot be so
regarded. In attempting to define it we are carried beyond the phenomenal
to its noumenal conditions. In other words, it constitutes a problem, the
complete data of which are not at our disposal. This is by itself a sufficient
reason for our incapacity to explain why the states of each empirical self
can never be apprehended save by a single consciousness, or otherwise
stated, why each consciousness is limited, as regards sensations and
feelings, exclusively to those which arise in connection with some one
animal organism. It at least precludes us from dogmatically asserting that
this is due to their being subjective in the dualistic and Cartesian sense of
that term—namely, as constituting, or being states of, the knowing self.
A diagram may serve, though very crudely, to illustrate Kant’s
phenomenalist interpretation of the cognitive situation.

ESA = Empirical self of the conscious Being A.

ESA = Empirical self of the conscious Being A.
ESB = Empirical self of the conscious Being B.
NCA = Noumenal conditions of the conscious Being A.
NCB = Noumenal conditions of the conscious Being B.
l, m, n = Objects in space.
x1, y1, z1 = Sensations caused by objects l, m, n acting on the
sense-organs of the empirical self A.
x2, y2, z2= Sensations caused by 1, m, n acting on the sense-
organs of the empirical self B.
NCEW = Noumenal conditions of the empirical world.
Everything in this empirical world is equally open to the consciousness
of both A and B, save only certain psychical events that are conditioned by
physiological and psychological factors. x1, y1, z1 can be apprehended only
by A; x2, y2, z2 can be apprehended only by B. Otherwise A and B
experience one and the same world; the body of B is perceived by A in the
same manner in which he perceives his own body. This is true a fortiori of
all other material existences. Further, these material existences are known
with the same immediacy as the subjective states. As regards the relation in
which NCA, NCB, and NCEW stand to one another, no assertions can be
made, save, as above indicated,[947] such conjectural statements as may
precariously be derived through argument by analogy from distinctions that
fall within our human experience.[948]
Kant’s phenomenalism thus involves an objectivist view of individual
selves and of their interrelations. They fall within the single common world
of space. Within this phenomenal world they stand in external, mechanical
relations to one another. They are apprehended as embodied, with known
contents, sensations, feelings, and desires, composing their inner
experience. There is, from this point of view, no problem of knowledge. On
this plane we have to deal only with events known, not with any process of
apprehension. Even the components of the empirical self, the subject-matter
of empirical psychology, are not processes of apprehension, but
apprehended existences. It is only when we make a regress beyond the
phenomenal as such to the conditions which render it possible, that the
problem of knowledge arises at all. And with this regress we are brought to
the real crux of the whole question—the reconciliation of this
phenomenalism with the conditions of our self-consciousness. For we have
then to take into account the fundamental fact that each self is not only an
animal existence within the phenomenal world, but also in its powers of
apprehension coequal with it. The self known is external to the objects
known; the self that knows is conscious of itself as comprehending within
the field of its consciousness the wider universe in infinite space.
Such considerations would, at first sight, seem to force us to modify our
phenomenalist standpoint in the direction of subjectivism. For in what other
manner can we hope to unite the two aspects of the self, the known
conditions of its finite existence and the consciousness through which it
correlates with the universe as a whole? In the one aspect it is a part of
appearance; in the other it connects with that which makes appearance
possible at all.
Quite frequently it is the subjectivist solution which Kant seems to
adopt. Objects known are “mere representations,” “states of the identical
self.” Everything outside the individual mind is real; appearances are purely
individual in origin. But such a position is inconsistent with the deeper
implications of Kant’s Critical teaching, and would involve the entire
ignoring of the many suggestions which point to a fundamentally different
and much more adequate standpoint. The individual is himself known only
as appearance, and cannot, therefore, be the medium in and through which
appearances exist. Though appearances exist only in and through
consciousness, they are not due to any causes which can legitimately be
described as individual. From this standpoint Kant would seem to
distinguish between the grounds and conditions of phenomenal existence
and the special determining causes of individual consciousness.
Transcendental conditions generate consciousness of the relatively
permanent and objective world in space and time; empirical conditions
within this space and time world determine the sensuous modes through
which special portions of this infinite and uniform world appear diversely to
different minds.
This, however, is a point of view which is only suggested, and, as we
have already observed,[949] the form in which it is outlined suggests many
objections and difficulties. Consciousness of the objective world in space
and time does not exist complete with one portion of it more specifically
determined in terms of actual sense-perceptions. Rather the consciousness
of the single world in space and time is gradually developed through and
out of sense experience of limited portions of it. We have still to consider
the various sections in the Analytic of Principles (especially the section
added in the second edition on the Refutation of Idealism) and in the
Dialectic, in which Kant further develops this standpoint. But even after
doing so, we shall be forced to recognise that Kant leaves undiscussed
many of the most obvious objections to which his phenomenalism lies
open. To the very last he fails to state in any really adequate manner how
from the phenomenalist standpoint he would regard the world described in
mechanical terms by science as being related to the world of ordinary
sense-experience,[950] or how different individual consciousnesses are
related to one another. The new form, however, in which these old-time
problems here emerge is the best possible proof of the revolutionary
character of Kant’s Critical enquiries. For these problems are no longer
formulated in terms of the individualistic presuppositions which govern the
thinking of all Kant’s predecessors, even that of Hume. The concealed
presuppositions are now called in question, and are made the subject of
explicit discussion. But further comment must meantime be deferred.[951]
 TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES, IN THE SECOND
EDITION
The argument of the second edition transcendental deduction can be
reduced to the following eight points:
(1)[952] It opens with the statement of a fundamental assumption which
Kant does not dream of questioning and of which he nowhere attempts to
offer proof. The representation of combination is the one kind of
representation which can never be given through sense. It is not so given
even in the pure forms of space and time yielded by outer and inner sense.
[953] It is due to an act of spontaneity, which as such must be performed by
the understanding. As it is one and the same for every kind of combination,
it may be called by the general name of synthesis. And as all combination,
without exception, is due to this source, its dissolution, that is, analysis,
which seems to be its opposite, always presupposes it.
(2)[954] Besides the manifold and its synthesis a further factor is
involved in the conception of combination, namely, the representation of
the unity of the manifold. The combination which is necessary to and
constitutes knowledge is representation of the synthetical unity of the
manifold. This is a factor additional to synthesis and to the manifold
synthesised. For such representation cannot arise out of any antecedent
consciousness of synthesis. On the contrary, it is only through supervention
upon the unitary synthesis that the conception of the combination becomes
possible. In other words, the representation of unity conditions
consciousness of synthesis, and therefore cannot be the outcome or product
of it. This is an application, or rather generalisation, of a position which in
the first edition is developed only in reference to the empirical process of
recognition. Recognition preconditions consciousness, and therefore cannot
be subsequent upon it.
(3)[955] The unity thus represented is not, however, that which is
expressed through the category of unity. The consciousness of unity which
is involved in the conception of synthesis is that of apperception or
transcendental self-consciousness. This is the highest and most universal
form of unity, for it is a presupposition of the unity of all possible concepts,
whether analytic or synthetic, in the various forms of judgment.
(4)[956] A manifold though given is not for that reason also represented.
It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany it and all my other
representations:
 “...for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not
be thought at all; and that is equivalent to saying that the representation
would be impossible or at least would be nothing to me.”[957]
But to ascribe a manifold as my representations to the identical self is to
comprehend them, as synthetically connected, in one apperception.[958]
Only what can be combined in one consciousness can be related to the ‘I
think.’ The analytic unity of self-consciousness presupposes the synthetic
unity of the manifold.
(5)[959] The unity of apperception is analytic or self-identical. It
expresses itself through the proposition, I am I. But being thus pure identity
without content of its own, it cannot be conscious of itself in and by itself.
Its unity and constancy can have meaning only through contrast to the
variety and changeableness of its specific experiences; and yet, at the same
time, it is also true that such manifoldness will destroy all possibility of
unity unless it be reconcileable with it. The variety can contribute to the
conditioning of apperception only in so far as it is capable of being
combined into a single consciousness. Through synthetic unifying of the
manifold the self comes to consciousness both of itself and of the manifold.
(6)[960] The transcendental original unity of apperception is an objective,
not a merely subjective, unity. Its conditions are also the conditions in and
through which we acquire consciousness of objects. An object is that in the
conception of which the manifold of given intuitions is combined. (This
point, though central to the argument, is more adequately developed in the
first than in the second edition.) Such combination requires unity of
consciousness. Thus the same unity which conditions apperception likewise
conditions the relation of representations to an object. The unity of pure
apperception may therefore be described as an objective unity for two
reasons: first, because it can apprehend its own analytical unity only
through discovery of unity in the given, and secondly, for the reason that
such synthetical unifying of the manifold is also the process whereby
representations acquire reference to objects.
(7)[961] Kant reinforces this conclusion, and shows its further
significance, by analysis of the act of judgment. The logical definition of
judgment, as the representation of a relation between two concepts, has
many defects. These, however, are all traceable to its initial failure to
explain, or even to recognise, the nature of the assertion which judgment as
such claims to make. Judgment asserts relations of a quite unique kind,
altogether different from those which exist between ideas connected
through association. If, for instance, on seeing a body the sensations of
weight due to the attempt to raise it are suggested by association, there is
nothing but subjective sequence; but if we form the judgment that the body
is heavy, the two representations are then connected together in the object.
This is what is intended by the copula ‘is.’ It is a relational term through
which the objective unity of given representations is distinguished from the
subjective. It indicates that the representations stand in objective relation
under the pure unity of apperception, and not merely in subjective relation
owing to the play of association in the individual mind. “Judgment is
nothing but the mode of bringing cognitions to the objective unity of
apperception,” i.e. of giving to them a validity which holds independently
of the subjective processes through which it is apprehended. Objective
relations are not, of course, all necessary or universal; and a judgment may,
therefore, assert a relation which is empirical and contingent. None the less
the fundamental distinction between it and any mere relation of association
still persists. The empirical relation is still in the judgment asserted to be
objective. The subject and the predicate are asserted, in the particular case
or cases to which the judgment refers, to be connected in the object and not
merely in the mind of the subject. Or otherwise stated, though subject and
predicate are not themselves declared to be necessarily and universally
related to one another, their contingent relation has to be viewed as
objectively, and therefore necessarily, grounded. Judgment always
presupposes the existence of necessary relations even when it is not
concerned to assert them. Judgment is the organ of objective knowledge,
and is therefore bound up, indirectly when not directly, with the universality
and necessity which are the sole criteria of knowledge. The judgment
expressive of contingency is still judgment, and is therefore no less
necessary in its conditions, and no less objective in its validity, than is a
universal judgment of the scientific type. To use Kant’s own terminology,
judgment acquires objective validity through participation in the necessary
unity of apperception. In so doing it is made to embody those principles of
the objective determination of all representations through which alone
cognition is possible.
 (8)[962] As judgment is nothing but the mode of bringing cognitions to
the objective unity of apperception, it follows that the categories, which in
the metaphysical deduction have been proved to be the possible functions in
judging, are the conditions in and through which such pure apperception
becomes possible. Apperception conditions experience, and the unity which
both demand for their possibility is that of the categories.

Before passing to the remaining sections of the deduction,[963] which are

supplementary rather than essential, I may add comment upon the above
points. Only (7) and (8) call for special consideration. They represent a
form of argument which has no counterpart in the first edition. As we noted,
[964] the first edition argument is defective owing to its failure to
demonstrate that the categories constitute the unity which is necessary to
knowledge. By introducing in the second edition this analysis of judgment,
and by showing the inseparable connection between pure apperception,
objective consciousness and judgment, this defect is in some degree
removed. As the categories correspond to the possible functions of
judgment, their objective validity is thereby established. By this means also
the connection which in Kant’s view exists between the metaphysical and
the transcendental deductions receives for the first time proper recognition.
The categories which in the former deduction are discovered and
systematised through logical analysis of the form of judgment, are in the
latter deduction, through transcendental analysis of the function of
judgment, shown to be just those forms of relation which are necessary to
the possibility of knowledge. It must, however, be noted that the
transcendental argument is brought to completion only through assumption
of the adequacy of the metaphysical deduction. No independent attempt is
made to show that the particular categories obtained in the metaphysical
deduction are those which are required, that there are no others, or that all
the twelve are indispensable.
(7) is a development of an argument which first appears in the
Prolegomena. The statement of it there given is, however, extremely
confused, owing to the distinction which Kant most unfortunately
introduces[965] between judgments of experience and judgments of
perception. That distinction is entirely worthless and can only serve to
mislead the reader. It cuts at the very root of Kant’s Critical teaching.
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