WINNING WITHOUT The hybrid nature of China’s actions in the
FIGHTING: conflicts in East Asia is nothing new. It is an
CHINA’S GREY ZONE updating of a historical tradition based on
the philosophy of Sunzi and the revolutio-
STRATEGIES IN EAST nary past of the Chinese Communist Party
ASIA (CCP) to adapt to a reality defined by compe-
tition between major powers, technological
revolutions and the rise of computerised con-
texts. By acting in the grey zone, where the
boundaries of peace and conflict blur, China
pursues its interests while avoiding open
conflict with the United States (US) and other
regional actors.
I
n Unrestricted Warfare, published in 1999, Qiao
Liang and Wang Xiangsui, two colonels in
Inés China’s People’s Liberation Army, analysed US
Arco Escriche strategy during the first Gulf War and concluded
Research Fellow, that the age of using military force to induce the
CIDOB enemy to submit had come to an end. Instead,
contemporary warfare was characterised by an
amalgamation of political, economic, cultural,
diplomatic and military tactics used alongside
CIDOB REPORT armed and unconventional forces to bring
# 08- 2022 the enemy to heel – a definition similar to the
Western concept of hybrid warfare.
That book and its analysis have been seen as the
Chinese conceptualisation of hybrid conflict, but
some of the principles that govern contemporary
hybrid threats were described by Sun Tsu in The
Art of War (2019) over 2,000 years ago. For the
ancient philosopher, wars are characterised by
constant mutation and victory requires adaptive
responses to each situation in order to neutralise
the adversary through the constant search for
53
HYBRID THREATS, VULNERABLE ORDER • CIDOB REPORT # 08- 2022
relative advantage. This vision calls for an asymmetrical approach through
the unlimited use of tactics that are at once predictable and unpredictable
– for example, regular and irregular troops – with the aim of confusing,
demoralising and ultimately dissuading the enemy from going to war. For
Sunzi, «supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance
without fighting».
The implementation of those teachings is clearly visible in China’s history
and responses to conflicts. In the Imperial Era, the strategy to combat
external threats consisted of employing multiple unconventional tactics,
from using mercenaries of enemy origin against their own people in order
to divide them, to making offerings, tributes and bribes to the adversary,
and building fortifications, like the Great Wall, to deter attacks by northern
nomadic peoples. Only if these prior strategies failed was military action
deployed. More recently, the CCP achieved victory in the Chinese Civil
War (1945–1949) through a combination of propaganda, revolutionary
militias and information warfare aimed at exploiting the weaknesses of
the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) forces. The equivalent of these tactics
today might be cyber warfare, using militias, supporting local insurgencies,
signing lucrative business contracts and development aid packages, or
building artificial islands in the South China Sea (SCS) for – theoretically –
«defensive» reasons (Baker, 2015). So if the hybrid strategy is ancient, what’s
new?
First, China’s growing regional and international rivalry and competition
with the US, its military inferiority, and the need to maintain its «peaceful
development» narrative favour the proliferation of hybrid tactics. These
are assessed very precisely to stay short of open aggression, achieving
small victories while avoiding a head-on conflict with the US and its
allies in the region (Mazarr et al., 2018). Second, new technological
advances have allowed new information and cyber tactics to emerge,
like disinformation and cyber-attacks and, in the near future, innovative
forms of AI-led warfare. Third, the emerging need to respond to hybrid
wars given the certainty of this new type of conflict in which public
opinion, institutions and legal systems can be used as weapons. The
Chinese army has been preparing for this since 2003 in its «three
warfares» doctrine, which is based upon psychological, media and legal
warfare tactics that complement existing diplomatic, economic and
military measures – including the deployment of military force in times
of peace. The aim is to cultivate a favourable strategic environment in its
neighbourhood, and to promote and defend its fundamental interests
of sovereignty and territorial integrity in times of peace while preparing
for possible war (PLA Daily, 2004).
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WINNING WITHOUT FIGHTING: CHINA’S GREY ZONE STRATEGIES IN EAST ASIA • Inés Arco Escriche
In other settings, the rise of these methods is categorised as «hybrid conflict»
(see chapter by Bargués and Bourekba). Nevertheless, the absence, thus far,
of violence and direct military force places these operations in the grey
zone, although this is not a popular concept in China. The key difference
is that China feels comfortable testing the limits of peace and challenging
the status quo in grey zones in which the conflict drags on for years without
crossing the line into direct aggression – but it also implies no clear victory.
Geopolitics in the grey zone: from the South China Sea to Taiwan
Asia’s geography and the centrality of the seas for security and relations
between regional actors have allowed certain
indigenous forms of grey zone tactics to emerge.
DESPITE THE WIDE
In this light, China favours unconventional
RANGE OF TACTICS
strategies in sovereignty disputes in areas
DEPLOYED TO PURSUE
where the US casts its shadow, but projects
ITS GOALS, CHINA’S
military superiority to deter regional powers.
STRATEGY IN THE GREY
Such is the example of the SCS conflict and
ZONE HAS ACHIEVED
relations with Taiwan.
MIXED RESULTS. IT
HAS PROGRESSIVELY
China claims control of maritime territories
ADVANCED ITS
delimited by the «nine-dash line», which total
TERRITORIAL AIMS
around 90% of the South China Sea – including
IN THE SOUTH
the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands and the
CHINA SEA, BUT IT
Scarborough Shoal, which are disputed by
HAS ALSO ERODED
Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the
ITS LEGITIMACY IN
Philippines. In order to establish its historical
THE REGION WHILE
claims over the last decade, Beijing has rolled out
INCREASING THE RISK
a carefully designed grey zone strategy based
OF CONFLICT WITH THE
on using civil forces and maritime militias, the
US.
construction of dual-use infrastructure – civil
engineering works that can be re-purposed for
military enclaves such as ports and airfields – information tactics and the
reinterpretation of international laws.
First, by deploying civilian forces like the coast guard and oceanographic
vessels, as well as maritime militias made up of fishermen, alongside
the navy, China gradually surrounds islets to occupy territory in faits
accomplis, exemplified by the Scarborough Shoal standoff of 2012, or
the Ayungin Shoal in the Spratlys in 2013. Specifically, these Chinese
fishermen, ostensibly unlinked to the government or armed forces, have
been involved in harassing foreign vessels and preventing access to
territorial waters and commercial activities under the pretext that they
55
HYBRID THREATS, VULNERABLE ORDER • CIDOB REPORT # 08- 2022
are acting on their own initiative to «enforce the law» (Lendon, 2021).
These actions also serve to exert psychological pressure and progressively
test the limits and responses of rivals, as in March 2021, when 220 fishing
vessels anchored near Whitsun Reef, which belongs to the Philippines,
citing «rough weather». Once under its control, China has implemented
an Anti-Access/Area Denial strategy in the first chain of islands in the SCS,
pumping sand to construct artificial islands and dual use civil engineering
and military works in the occupied islets, which have allowed it to extend
its control in the region. This aims to deter access by rival military forces
and to increase the projection of Chinese power, while offering its armed
forces greater room for manoeuvre in the event of a military conflict
(CSIS, 2017). For instance, by installing anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles
on three reefs – Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief – China has exercised de
facto control over the Spratly Islands by being able to oppose all aerial or
maritime movements in the archipelago since 2018.
At the same time, China has sought to legitimise some of these claims via
information strategies, conducting campaigns supporting its territorial
claims by disseminating the map with the nine-dash line, including in
children’s movies (Reuters, 2019 ); and using international and national
jurisdiction in its favour. Although Beijing vigorously advocates compliance
with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), its
actions suggest that these rules are not fully enforced in the region. In
2016, China rejected the Hague Tribunal’s ruling in favour of the Philippines,
citing inconsistency with the principle of sovereignty and contesting part
of UNCLOS, defending the right to regulate, oppose or prevent navigation
in the waters under its jurisdiction. In the same vein, in 2021 China approved
two new national laws – the Coast Guard Law and a new maritime safety
law – that set out vessel control measures and the conditions under
which the Chinese coast guard may use force against foreign vessels in
«waters under Chinese jurisdiction». The lack of specificity about which
territory falls within Chinese jurisdiction, along with the other coercive and
psychological measures, has achieved the strategy’s primary objective of
deterring other regional players from acting in the area – although not
the US, which systematically carries out «free navigation operations» – and
securing effective control of the territory without using force.
Its contested sovereignty, complex identity issues, US support and its history
and ties to mainland China make Taiwan a unique case. This translates into
the deployment of other tactics to exploit specific weaknesses. Beijing uses
economics, diplomacy, the press and disinformation to attract, coerce and
unsettle Taiwanese society thus fuelling further polarisation in regards to its
future and relations with the mainland.
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WINNING WITHOUT FIGHTING: CHINA’S GREY ZONE STRATEGIES IN EAST ASIA • Inés Arco Escriche
In the economic field, China has introduced a package of measures to
attract Taiwanese citizens to study, invest and work in mainland China,
with the specific aim of garnering support from sections of society, as
well as from politicians, businesspeople and prominent public figures.
However, during electoral periods or times of heightened tension, China
does not hesitate to resort to tactics of trade coercion to influence the
island’s politics and foment the rivalry between the two main parties, the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the KMT. The most recent case
was the import ban on Taiwanese pineapples in 2021 for «food safety»
reasons. A familiar tactic for Lithuania, on whom Beijing imposed similar
trade restrictions after Taiwan was allowed to open a de facto embassy in
Vilnius in November 2021.
These tactics have been complemented by information warfare strategies
ongoing since the 1950s. Via propaganda, financing Taiwanese media
outlets to publish news favourable to China.
More recently, the spread of fake news and
CHINA FAVOURS
disinformation campaigns over social networks
UNCONVENTIONAL
even managed to tip the balance in favour of
STRATEGIES IN
pro-China candidates like the populist Han
SOVEREIGNTY
Kuo-yu in 2018 (Huang, 2020).
DISPUTES IN AREAS
WHERE THE US CASTS
The best possible strategy is to continue using
ITS SHADOW, BUT
the grey zone as a «a better alternative to a
PROJECTS MILITARY
military strike», according to Cui Lei (2021).
SUPERIORITY TO DETER
Nonetheless, the rise to power of Tsai Ing-wen
REGIONAL POWERS.
(DPP) in 2016 has brought a more assertive
position by the mainland, with threats of
«reunification by force», military drills around Fujian and incursions into
Taiwan’s air defence zone aimed at discouraging any secessionist moves.
Where grey may become black
Despite the wide range of tactics deployed to pursue its goals, China’s
strategy in the grey zone has achieved mixed results. It has progressively
advanced its territorial aims in the SCS, but it has also eroded its legitimacy
in the region while increasing the risk of conflict with the US. In Taiwan,
success also remains elusive: at the end of 2021, over 62% of Taiwan’s
population defined themselves as Taiwanese, compared to 2% as Chinese;
while more than 80% opposed reunification (NCCU, 2022). This shows that
the results remain nuanced, even if hybrid tactics and grey zone conflicts
have been considered especially effective in advancing certain actors’
interests and goals.
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HYBRID THREATS, VULNERABLE ORDER • CIDOB REPORT # 08- 2022
Hence, it is necessary to consider the circumstances under which China
could take the leap into the “black zone” and embark on a conventional war.
One would be China voluntarily raising tensions and using military force, for
example, by invading Taiwan – a case with parallels with the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. This remains unlikely at present. A more realistic possibility is
an increase in strategic tensions in either of the two conflicts that brings a
simple miscalculation and ends up provoking a direct confrontation or an
open conflict due to the accumulation of activities that skirt the boundaries
between peace and war, as we saw in the tensions on the border with India
in the summer of 2020. For the time being, Sunzi’s influence continues to
guide China’s strategy.
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