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Adopting a Strategic Framework for

Transboundary Water Resources Management
in Afghanistan

Conference Paper · March 2017

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ID_2630
Adopting a Strategic Framework for Transboundary Water Resources
Management in Afghanistan
Ehsanullah Hayat1,2,a and ġebnem Elçi3
1. Helmand University, Department of Civil Engineering, Helmand, Afghanistan
2. Izmir Institute of Technology, Department of Civil Engineering Izmir, Turkey
3. Izmir Institute of Technology, Department of Civil Engineering, Izmir, Turkey
a
Corresponding author:[email protected]

ABSTRACT: This article first reviews the water resources potential and transboundary
rivers of Afghanistan with current endeavors that have been taken for transboundary water
resources management. The reasons why Afghanistan is in need of controlling its
transboundary waters and resolving current disputes with the neighboring countries over
transboundary waters are stated and some examples of successful international water
treaties are presented as well those might be considered as references by Afghanistan.
Then, concerns about the global warming resulting in rapid snowmelts that makes 80% of
the country‘s precipitation and the consequent possible flooding that may result not only in
some disasters and deterioration of the ecosystem, but also a serious scarcity of water
resources in such a landlocked country are discussed. Moreover, challenges and concerns
in terms of hydro-hegemony for such a late developing upstream country that is suffering
decades of war are also stated in this paper. Finally, an initial strategy framework is
proposed that how Afghanistan in current situation, can survive from conflicts with its
neighbors related to to transboundary waters. Also, how the country may continue its
hydraulic mission without any concerns and disruptions, which are signignificant
challenges for the time being.
Key words: Afghanistan, Amu Darya, climate change, international water treaties,
transboundary waters, water treaties negotiations strategy
1. INTRODUCTION:
In today‘s hydropolitics, dispute over transboundary water resources is one of the
international issues among the countries who share waters are not a new topic.
Transboundary water issues are unavoidable and the international conflicts are hard to
resolve due to sovereignty that implies a degree of exclusivity in the internal affairs
management [Matthews and Germain, 2007]. Some examples of conflicts on
transboundary waters between Israel and Jordan on the Jordan River, among the countries
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt in the Nile River Basin, among Turkey, Syria and Iraq in the
Tigris-Euphrates Basin, between India and Bangladesh on the Ganges River, between Peru
and Ecuador on the Cenepa River, the Aral Sea conflict among Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan are reported [Uprety and Salman, 2011; Draper, 2012].
Furthermore, Bilen [2000] states that many countries are suffering water related problems
in various forms due to the rapid population growth, industrialization, and urbanization
where water disputes are routine matters of life between countries those share waters.
Concerns about the climate change have compelled the upstream state to manage and
control waters within its territory, but the downstream state is in the effort of getting
enough water in order to satisfy its requirements. However, it is not just about the climate
change, it is about a sustainable livelihood and a stable economy as a whole, especially for
Afghanistan.

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Literature search indicated that there are more than 260 rivers shared by two or more
countries in the world [Wolf et al., 1999; Cooley et al., 2009; Cooley and Gleick, 2011;
Paisley and Henshaw, 2013; Sivakumar, 2013]. Since these shared waters create disputes
between riparian states frequently, there are solutions at this end, generally via diplomatic
negotiations such as agreements and treaties. About 300 agreements have been established
between riparian states [Cooley et al., 2009], but in the year 2000, there existed 217 water
related agreements including regional cooperation and water distributions as admitted by
Bilen [2000]. In Asia, there exist 41 transboundary treaties for shared water supply [Draper
and Kundell, 2007]. All these statistics about transboundary water agreements indicate that
how important water resources are. The necessity of guidance and procedures those can
enable the development of treaties providing a base for apportionment of available water
between sovereign states is recognized by Draper [2006]; Wolf [2006]; and Draper [2012].
Therefore, the transboundary water issues of Afghanistan with her neighbors, especially
Iran and Pakistan will be reviewed in this paper including analysis of Afghanistan‘s current
situation. Strategies are also proposed for dispute mitigation taking aspects of climate
change, environment, economy, politics and international laws and conventions into
account for maintaining sound relations with neighboring countries.
Afghanistan, a landlocked country with a total area of 652.000 km2 and 30 million
population is suffering lack of management of its water resources, especially
transboundary waters due to war and instability for more than three decades. Based on the
geography of the country, water of four river basins out of a total five, flows into
neighboring countries whilst Thomas et al. [2016] state that 90% of Afghanistan‘s surface
water is shared with downstream neighboring countries. Water from Amu Darya basin
flows into Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, Kabul river basin‘s water flows into
Pakistan, Helmand river basin‘s water flows into Iran, and Harirud-Murghab river basin‘s
water flows into Turkmenistan and Iran. Indeed, the sources of these four rivers are in the
high altitudes of Hindu Kush and Pamir mountains inside Afghanistan. In recent years,
Afghanistan has started some efforts for the management of the country‘s water resources
in order to generate hydropower energy, expand agriculture, improve economy, flood and
drought control, and control its transboundary waters. The Afghanistan National
Development Strategy [ANDS, 2008] emphasizes to ‗‗manage and develop water
resources so as to reduce poverty, increase sustainable economic and social development,
and improve quality of life for all Afghans and ensure an adequate supply of water for
future generations‘‘. The Afghan vision is about long term and a sustainable development
after waters are managed and used efficiently. On other hand, neighbor countries,
especially Iran and Pakistan are worried about the infrastructures activities for water
resources that may limit their access to water that they receive at the moment. Currently,
the only international transboundary water treaty that Afghanistan has entered into is the
1973 Helmand river water sharing treaty with Iran [Palau, 2013; Goes et al., 2015; Thomas
and Varzi, 2015]. Therefore, Afghanistan has to establish and maintain a balance between
its transboundary water resources management and the settlement of disputes with all the
riparian states, which obviously needs the establishment of a framework to be followed in
order to achieve the goals.

Afghanistan’s Water Resources:

Afghanistan has an average annual precipitation of 227 mm [Ahamd and Wasiq, 2004], but
according to the Afghanistan‘s Water Sector Strategy [2008], it is 250 mm ranging from
1.200 mm in the higher altitudes of the northeast to 60 mm in the southwest. The annual

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potential of available renewable water resources are 75 billion m3, of which 57 billion m3
is surface water and 18 billion m3 is groundwater [Ahmad and Wasiq, 2004; Saffi and
Kohistani, 2013; Habib, 2014]. However, recent figures reported are higher than 75 billion
m3 by authorities from Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) of Afghanistan and Shroder
and Ahmadzai [2016]. In terms of use, Afghanistan only uses about 33% of its available
surface water for the time being [ANDS, 2008] with per capita availability of more than
2.000 m3 per year [Ragab and Prudhomme, 2002], where more than 80% of the country‘s
water resources come from snowmelt in the Hindu Kush [Ahmad and Wasiq, 2004; UNEP,
2009]. Data about annual water discharge by basin with its percentage and the area covered
by each river basin is briefly presented in (Table 1).
After the year 2001, the Afghan government has commenced some fundamental efforts
toward water resources management mainly for providing irrigation water and energy
generation to its population through the development of water resources infrastructures.
The Water Sector Strategy of Afghanistan [2008] explains its strategic vision as ‗‗To
manage the Nation’s water resources so as to reduce poverty, increase sustainable
economic and social development, and improve the quality of life for all Afghans and to
ensure an adequate supply of water for future generations.‘‘ as well. Therefore, an
important step has been taken for management of water resources, which is a critical factor
for the future development and sustainability of the country, especially at the time when
the international community stops its economic support. Considering all these needs, the
Afghan government has announced commencement of 21 large scale infrastructure
projects for water resources management of the country just in 2016, which is a significant
figure for such a country.
Table 1: Annual Discharge of Afghanistan's River Basins [modified from Favre and Kamal, 2004; and
Shroder and Ahmadzai, 2016].

River Basin Land Area (%) Total Annual Discharge Total Annual Flow
3
Amy Darya 14 (km
45.4 )
- 48.1 (%)
57
Harirud-Murghab 18 2.3 - 3.06 4
Helmand 43 9.13 - 17.66 11
Kabul (Indus) 12 18.2 - 20.9 26
Northern 13 1.67 - 1.81 2
Grand Total 100 80.3 - 87.93 100

Afghanistan’s Transboundary Rivers:

Afghanistan has five river basins, which are: Amu Darya River Basin, Harirud-Murghab
River Basin, Helmand River Basin, Kabul (Indus) River Basin, and the Northern River
Basin. The first four river basins are transboundary river basins and shared with the
neighboring countries. Favre and Kamal [2004], and Thomas et al. [2016] assert that 90%
of the Afghanistan‘s surface water resources are transboundary, and in most cases, it is the
upstream country. Some tensions on these transboundary rivers have been reported by
Favre and Kamal [2004] and King and Sturtewagen [2010] between Afghanistan and its
neighbors. Besides, due to lack of infrastructures on the rivers, about two-thirds of Afghan
rivers flow into Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and other neighbor countries as cited by
Dehgan et al. [2014]. Table 2 provides information about the transboundary basins that
Afghanistan is located in.

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Amu Darya River: This river is about 2.574 km long with a total drainage area of
1.327.000 km2 [McKinney 2004; Rahaman 2012], with 1.100 km length in Afghanistan
[Yıldız, 2015]. The Amu Darya River is shared among Afghanistan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan [McKinney, 2004; King and Sturtewagen, 2010;
Yıldız, 2015]. Afghanistan is the second largest source of water for the Amu Darya River
[Palau, 2013; Habib, 2014], where this river is one of the major contributors to the Aral
Sea in Central Asia. McKinney [2004] confirms 10% of the inflow to the Aral Sea Basin is
Afghanistan‘s contribution, but it is not a party to the Aral Sea Basin management and has
not participated in any of the basin management discussions yet due to its political
instability [Favre and Kamal, 2004; McKinney, 2004; Horsman, 2008]. Amu Darya covers
14% of the Afghan territory [Favre and Kamal, 2004] and irrigates 23% of the total
agricultural land with an estimated annual discharge of about 20,76 billion m3 [DURAN,
2015]. As per Ahmad and Wasiq [2004], about 17 billion m3 of Afghanistan‘s water is
flowing into Amu Daray. Covering relatively less land, the Amu Darya with a large
potential of hydropower, extracts about 57% of the total annual flow of Afghanistan [Favre
and Kamal, 2004]. This is believed that once Afghanistan undertakes its major
infrastructure projects that will affect central Asia‘s water supplies significantly [Habib,
2014].
Harirud-Murghab River: Harirud Basin is shared between Afghanistan, Turkmenistan
and Iran that originates in the Koh-i-Baba located in central Afghanistan. The length of the
river in Afghanistan is 1.300 km, which represents 12% of Afghanistan‘s available water
resources [Yıldız, 2015]. However, as per Thomas et al. [2015], the length of Harirud is
1.124 km in the location where it is shared by Afghanistan, Iran and Turkmenistan, and the
annual water flow represents 4% of the country‘s total annual flow [Favre and Kamal,
2004]. Afghanistan recommenced construction of the Salma Dam on Harirud river basin in
2004 [Thomas and Warner, 2015], which had been started in 1976 while the Soviet
invasion interrupted its construction at a very early stage [Favre and Kamal, 2004].
Construction of the Salam Dam is completed now where its inauguration ceremony took
place on June 4, 2016 as reported by Kohistani [2016]. According to Thomas and Warner
[2015], the distribution of Harirud water at the moment is around 40% for Afghanistan,
30% each for Turkmenistan and Iran, but completion of Salma Dam will change the
amount of water to 74% for Afghanistan, 13% each for Turkmenistan and Iran. Hence, Iran
has tried to disrupt the construction of any water diversion project including the Salma
Dam that controls water flow into Iran because Iran thinks that these projects will cause
water scarcity in the eastern part of the country [Dehgan et al., 2014]. Currently, there is no
treaty between Afghanistan and Iran or Afghanistan and Turkmenistan on the mechanism
of water distribution and cooperation on the basin. In 2005, Iran and Turkmenistan
constructed the Doosti Dam on Harirude river close to their borders without any
consultation or involvement of Afghanistan that created concerns in Kabul [King and
Sturtewagen, 2010].
Helmand River: Also known as Hirmand River, is 1.300 km long [King and Sturtewagen,
2010; Thomas and Varzi, 2015; Yıldız, 2015; Thomas et al., 2016], one of the longest
rivers in Afghanistan that originates from Hindu Kush mountains in the North-East of the
country. The river then ends at the Sistan depression or Delta in Iran, largely dependent on
Afghanistan‘s surface water [Meijer and Hajiamiri, 2007; Thomas and Varzi, 2015]. The
1973 Helmand River Water Treaty (HRWT) that was signed in 13th of March 1973 is the
only valid transboundary agreement that Afghanistan has with Iran on the apportionment
of Helmand river‘s water. However, the Iran side has always complained about the treaty

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arguing the amount of water specified in treaty is not enough for its needs, which is 22 m3
per second in average, with an additional amount of 4 m3 per second as an illustration of
friendliness between these two countries with a total amount of 820 million m3 water per
year. Still, these two countries have a long history of disputes over the Helmand River
water sharing since the nineteenth century [Thomas and Varzi, 2015]. But this is very
surprising that Meijer and Hajiamiri [2007] confirm the amount of water to be around
5.000 million m3 per year that reaches to Iran via Hirmand (Helmand) river. Also, Meijer
and Hajiamiri acknowledge that in addition to Helmand river‘s water, another 2.500
million m3 per year reaches to Iran from Afghanistan‘s other rivers. The amount of water
just from Helmand river is 6 times more than what the 1973 treaty stipulates, which is 820
million m3 per year at maximum. In addition to all these, Iran has not stopped its efforts to
destabilize the western provinces of Afghanistan even supporting insurgents in order to
prevent water resources activities as reported by Dehgan et al. [2014]. Dehgan et al. study
the transboundary water relations and hydropolitics between Afghanistan and Iran in a
book chapter where the authors further explain the political and economic interest of Iran
in the Afghan water resources infrastructures in details advising that these disputes can be
mitigated through negotiations and agreements under the circumstances of international
water law and international supports in order to create transboundary commission between
the two countries. Still, with the support of the United Nations Environment Program,
between 2003 and 2005, Iran and Afghanistan had exchanged information on the Sistan;
most recently, from at least 2010 to 2013, a joint Afghani-Iranian Helmand River
Commission has met quarterly to share information on flood control of the Helmand River
[Shroder and Ahmadzai, 2016].
Kabul (Indus) River: The main tributaries of the Kabul River are the glaciers and snow of
the Hindu Kush mountains that are a part of the Himalayas [Vick, 2014]. The river
represents 26% of Afghanistan‘s water resources [Favre and Kamal, 2004; Yıldız, 2015].
The Kabul river is about 560 km long inside Afghanistan [King and Sturtewagen, 2010;
Yıldız, 2015] to which, the Kunar River is a tributary that flows in the eastern part of
Afghanistan and the northwestern part of Pakistan. Talking about the total length of this
river that ends in the Indus River in Pakistan is stated to be 700 km long as per
Ahmadullah and Dongshik [2015] and Lashkaripour and Hussaini [2008]. Afghanistan and
Pakistan are the riparian states of this river in such a way that both are upstream and
downstream of each other [Vick, 2014]. Moreover, the Kabul River is the only river in
Afghanistan that joins the Indus system in Pakistan and which leads to the sea in Karachi
[Yıldız, 2015]. The water inflow to the Indus river in Pakistan from Afghanistan is about
20,07 million m3, while 19,81 million m3 of that come from the Kabul and Kunar rivers
[Thomas et al., 2016]. Currently, the Kabul river basin with a 35% population density that
largely depends on agriculture [Ahmadullah and Dongshik, 2015] and making remarkable
percentage of the country‘s water resources, its undetermined amount of water still flows
into Pakistan without any agreement or treaty, which directly affects livelihood in the basin
in many ways, especially the eastern provinces. Although a technical committee was
established in 2003 by Afghanistan and Pakistan, its efforts failed due to lack of river flow
data that was provided by Afghanistan [Yıldız, 2015]. However, government of
Afghanistan has begun some efforts to construct some dams along the Kabul river for the
water control, which may cause concerns downstream.

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Table 2: International River Basins of Afghanistan and the Riparian Countries

Basin Name Total Area of Riparian Area (km2) % of Basin Area in a
[modified from
2 Wolf et al., 1999; and Favre and Kamal, 2004].
Basin (km ) Countries
Kazakhstan 424000 Country
34.4
Uzbekistan 383000 31.1
Aral Sea Tajikistan 136000 11.04
(includes both Amu Kyrgyzstan 112000 9.1
12322000
Darya and Northern
Afghanistan 105000 8.5
river basins)
Turkmenistan 70000 5.68
China 2000 0.16
Pakistan 200 0.02
Afghanistan 41100 44.38
Harirud-Murghab 92600 Iran 35400 38.22
Turkmenistan 16200 17.49
Afghanistan 288000 81.59
Helmand 353000 Iran 55000 15.58
Pakistan 10000 2.83
Pakistan 598000 53.01
Indus
1128 India 382000 33.86
(Kabul river basin) China 76000 6.74
Afghanistan 72000 6.38

Attempts for Management of Transboundary Water Resources:

The Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) of Afghanistan has recently declared the
demand to control the country‘s water in any case. Additionally, the President‘s office and
the MEW has announced the construction or repairing of 29 water related projects
including dams/reservoirs and canals to be started in the country in 2016, which shows
seriousness of the government for controlling and managing its water resources after
decades. These projects include Salma and Pashdan dams in the Harirud basin, Bakshabad
and Kamal Khan dams in the Helmand basin. The Salma Dam project on Harirud with
capacity of 1.015 million m3 [Thomas and Warner, 2015] completed in June 2016. These
projects are clear indicators of the government‘s strong intentions for development of its
water resources. Besides, Afghanistan is pushing for unilateral resource capture adopting
hegemonic mechanisms [Thomas and Warner, 2015]. According to Thomas et al. [2016],
many of the Afghan parliament members who play important role in transboundary waters
decision-making, think that delaying negotiations with neighbors and continuing
constructions of dams for water resources development would be in the best interest of
Afghanistan until the country come to the table with a hydro-hegemony status. Thus, it can
be said that the country is reluctant to make negotiations due to its current position.
Furthermore, the Water Sector Strategy of Afghanistan [2008] insists on the storage and
control of water so that the country can be prepared for the periods of drought due to the
climate change. Also, Afghanistan thinks that managing water resources will significantly
help poverty reduction in the country as well, which is the biggest challenge for the
country at the time being. Thus, Afghanistan is in a serious need of managing its water
resources whether it is for irrigation, hydropower generation, poverty reduction,
sustainability, future needs during drought or even drinking water. Currently, the MEW
has prepared a draft of the Trans-Boundary Water Policy as well, which is at the Ministry

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of Foreign Affairs (MFA) at the moment [DURAN, 2015]. The draft of the policy was not
accessable during the preparation of this article.

An Overview of the Afghan Constitution Related to Water Resources Management:

The diagram in (Figure 1), explains the relation of Afghan Constitution, Water Law, and
public institutions to the transboundary water management. The influence diagram shows
how the constitution is framed for the water resources management strategy in the country.

Afghan Constitution
(Article 9)

Supreme Council for Water Affairs Water Law Environmental Law

Management (SCWAM) Article 8 (9) Articles 5(1.18), 39, and 40

MEW Responsible for

Ministry of Energy and Water Transboundary Water Management
(MEW) and Planning with Agreement of
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of
Border and Tribal Affairs

Water Sector
Strategy

Figure 1: A diagram of the Afghan Constitution related to transboundary water resources management.

Examples of Successful Transboundary Water Treaties:

The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) is a good example of settling transboundary water disputes,
which can be referred to, for a detailed study. The treaty was signed between India and
Pakistan in 1960 after years of negotiations where the World Bank played an important
role as a mediator between these two countries. The IWT is evaluated by some authors
such as Kirmani and Moigne [1997]; Nakayama [1997]; Wolf [1997]; Bilen [2000];
Wescoat et al. [2000]; Zawahri [2008]; Sinha [2010]; Biswas [2011]; Rahaman [2012];
Sarfraz [2013]; and Gander [2014] to be relatively a successful treaty that has lasted for
more than 50 years despite some concerns and complains from both states. Although India
and Pakistan have history of wars with each other and still some serious political tensions
exist between these two countries, the IWT has proven to be one of the successful cases of
water sharing treaties in its context. IWT case worths discussing and provides a benchmark
since Afghanistan is the upstream state for Pakistan in the Kabul-Indus river likewise India
in the Indus river.
The case of Orontes river shared by Turkey, Lebanon, and Syria analyzed by Comair et al.
[2013] is another example of a good cooperation in international rivers among the co-
riparians to be considered. The new agreement of 2002 between the two states (Syria and
Lebanon) was based on the principles of the 1997 UN Watercourse Convention. Even there
exists just a bilateral agreement between Syria and Lebanon, the agreement is said to be the
way for disputes resolutions, which‘s purpose is not just the water, but security as well that

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can be framed as the same case for Afghanistan. Thus, settling the disputes between
Afghanistan and Iran over the waters of Helmand and Harirud rivers may play a substantial
role in providing security of Helamd and Harirud river basins. Comair et al. [2013] explain
that the 1994 agreement between Syria and Lebanon on the water distribution of the
Orontes river shows the hegemony of Syria. Based on negotiations that happened between
Syria and Lebanon, a new agreement comprised of the 1994 agreement, 1997 addendum
and the approved minutes of the joint Syrian-Lebanese meeting was signed in 2002.
Furthermore, Paisley and Henshaw [2013] insist that the large part of the literature
confirms avoidance of conflicts over transboundary waters through international treaties
among the riparian states, which gives a signal that a treaty in any scenario is better than
the absence of any bilateral agreement or official discussions between or among the states
sharing waters.
Wolf [1997] offers lessons learned from transboundary freshwater treaty negotiations
through 14 case studies of 140 transboundary water treaties around the world, which were
collected at the three Forums of the International Water Resources Association (IWRA)
Committee on International Waters and on the University of Alabama Transboundary
Freshwater Dispute Database. In this study, the lower Mekong river basin agreement
among Thailand, Lao PDR, Vietnam and Cambodia is evaluated as a ‗‗good example of
resilience of agreement‘‘, which was re-ratified in 1995 by the 1957 Mekong Committee as
1995 Mekong Commission. Likewise, Biswas [1999] has also accepted the Mekong river
basin agreement among the four lower co-riparian states (Thailand, Lao PDR, Vietnam and
Cambodia) as a good example of a transboundary water treaty.
Model Agreements for the shared use of transboundary water resources are prepared by the
American Society of Civil Engineers [ASCE, 2004], as guidelines and procedures for
focusing on how to establish agreements for shared transboundary waters in order to assure
that all applicable factors are considered by sovereign parties in their negotiations [Phelps,
2007]. These are based on four guiding principles; a) negotiations must be conducted with
a commitment to coordination and cooperation; b) the agreement should provide for
management on the basis of watersheds and/or river basins; c) adaptive management and
flexible provisions should be included in the agreement, to overcome the inherent obstacles
facing effective water sharing; and d) an interdisciplinary approach to water allocation
among parties must be used, which grant a strong base for countries to start from. This
might also be beneficial that Afghanistan scrutinize these guidelines for the initial startup
of its transboundary water sharing negotiations with its neighbors. This is also important to
harmonize water sharing accords based on political, functional, environmental,
hydrological, and geographical concerns from which, political issues are the important
ones [Draper, 2012]. Hence, Draper further concludes that in addition to the need of a
formal water sharing agreement, the participation of state and non-state actors is also
important and is one of the major factors for a successful water distribution treaty.
Considering the involvement international community by assisting riparian states in the
development of cooperative management networks, Wolf [2006] states that international
community might assess the specific institutional needs that take into account the key
factors such as: adaptable management structure, clear and flexible criteria for water
allocations and water quality management, equitable distribution of benefits, concrete
mechanisms to enforce treaty provisions, and detailed conflict resolution mechanisms.
Moreover, the best way for disputes resolution over transboundary water sharing is
described as involvement of international community or organizations as a third party
[Nakayama, 1997; Sinha, 2010; Tanzi and Milano, 2013] and via entering into treaties

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[Wescoat et al., 2000; Matthews and Germain, 2007; Zawahri, 2008; Rieu-Clarke, 2010;
Brochmann, 2012; Rahaman, 2012; Paisley and Henshaw, 2013; Sarfraz, 2013].
Zawahri [2008] argues that in addition to a signed treaty between states for water rights,
there should be a permanent commission that can regularly oversees the full
implementation of a treaty and whenever a conflict arises, the commissioners can settle
conflicts via direct communications and negotiations. Zawahri mainly refers to the
Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) that was established in 1960 by the IWT for observing
the treaty‘s implementation, which is a good example that has succeeded in management
and disputes elimination of the Indus River between India and Pakistan. Additionally,
Bilen [2000] argues that the success of Indus Agreement is because of the technical
approach adoption where these kind of methods have effective determinations in
transboundary water disputes rather than a political approach. Furthermore, Grover and
Krantzberg [2015] and Norman and Bakker [2015] also confirm the success of a
commission in transboundary water treaties such as the International Joint Commission
(IJC) created under 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty (BWT) between the United States and
Canada, which has proved an effective way for settling water sharing, environmental, and
ecosystem problems that is regarded as a good transboundary water governance. Still,
some others insist that hydropolitical approach is one of significant factors playing central
role in water conflicts resolutions among countries as examined by Sivakumar [2013] and
Zeitoun and Warner [2006].

Effects of the Possible Climate Change:

Afghanistan‘s climate is arid to semi-arid, with cold winters and hot summers [Broshears
et al., 2005]. However, Uhl [2006] defines Afghanistan‘s climate as a dry continental
climate with most precipitation in snow form. Temperature in Hindu Kush mountains
reaches -50°C in winter, in the desert areas, especially in Dasht-e-Margo, it reaches to
more than +50°C in summer [Ahmad and Wasiq 2004], while Banks and Soldal [2002] use
a range of -10°C to +50°C for Afghanistan‘s temperature. A reasonable range of -20°C to
+45°C is reported by Mahmoodi [2008], and by Water Sector Strategy of Afghanistan
[2008].
Afghanistan experienced four sequential years of drought from 1998 to 2001 [Ahmad and
Wasiq, 2004] raising concerns about the consequences of a possible climate change. Also,
from the last five decades, a period of drought in every three years is reported by
Afghanistan while the 2011 drought record was the worst one that plagued 14 provinces
out of 34 of the country affecting 2,6 million people [Miyan, 2015]. Since 1960, the mean
annual temperature in Afghanistan has been increased by 0.6°C, at a 0.13°C average rate in
each decade, resulting changes in the amount of rainfall and snow that are the main sources
of surface water [UNEP, 2013]. Moreover, Vining and Vecchia [2007] anticipate a 10%
reduction in the total annual precipitation during the upcoming 50 years in Afghanistan.
Also, snowmelts will happen earlier in the year because of reduction in the snowpack‘s in
case of increase surface temperatures in mountainous regions [Mack et al., 2010].
Furthermore, based on the suggestions of the regional climate models for arid regions in
south and central Asia, the average annual precipitation would decrease whereas, the
average annual temperature would increase [Ragab and Prudhomme, 2002; World Bank,
2010]. According to Afghanistan‘s Water Sector Strategy [2008], extreme flooding and
droughts may happen in the forthcoming decades triggering social and environmental
disasters. Hence, at the time whilst temperature increase and variation in precipitation‘s

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time and amount may affect the potential and availability of water resources in the country,
it is necessary for the country to take serious steps for preventing such events, especially in
a country, where more than 80% of its population is just relied on Agriculture and
livestock.
There is no doubt that a possible global warming will affect a country‘s hydrological
cycle, temperature and environment, resulting some disasters such as droughts, floods,
early ice melting, and water scarcity. Afghanistan is more vulnerable to water resources
scarcity due to climate changes as far as Afghanistan‘s 80% of water resources come from
the snowmelt. Thus, if the snowmelt occurs early, that means the country will not be able
to provide required water resources to its population. According to Draper and Kundell
[2007], water availability and runoff may decrease in arid and semiarid Asia due to the
climate change, which means Afghanistan‘s water availability, even snowfall will likely
decrease in the forthcoming years.

Challenges, Concerns and Disputes Related to Transboundary Waters:

The water resources activities in Afghanistan have raised concerns among neighbors and
international organizations such as UN, USAID, and the World Bank [Thomas et al.,
2016]. It is also well known that Afghanistan has problems with its neighboring countries
about these activities. According to Dehgan et al. [2014] and Thomas et al. [2016], the
country is experiencing threats from Iran related to its reconstruction of water related
works. But the political reasons of the disputes between the country and its neighbors are
out of scope of this article. Therefore, it is essential for Afghanistan to overcome the
disputes through a sound and stable strategy in order to concentrate on the development of
the country rather than involving in conflicts. Afghanistan‘s Water Sector Strategy [2008]
has not mentioned anything about transboundary waters to be used as a reference for how
to take further actions. However, the revised 2009 Water Law of Afghanistan in section 9
of article 8 explains that ‗‗Management and Planning for the transboundary waters
between Afghanistan and its neighboring countries and changes of watercourses are the
responsibility of the Ministry of Energy and Water with agreements from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs‘‘. Thus,
it is clear that main and key responsible institution for the transboundary water resources
management in the country is the MEW, which should be analyzing all the challenges and
concerns that exist regarding transboundary waters.
The main concern of good transboundary water governance for Afghanistan may be the
fact of being a late developer state due to wars and instability for more than three decades
in the country. Obviously, the power status of Afghanistan over the control and
management of its transboundary waters is under question as well, while Thomas et al.
[2016] confirm that the power, trade dependence and capacity indicators, these all prove
Afghanistan‘s weak position comparing it with its neighbors. Now, the question is that
how Afghanistan, as a late upstream developer state, can convince its neighbors to develop
its water resources with out their disruptions. According to Koff and Maganda [2012],
Goulden, Tickner, and Zeitoun [2013] have recognized four particular challenges facing
transboundary river basin management: (1) the politics of reconciling international political
borders and basin boundaries; (2) the expanding pressure on governance from competing
water uses and users; (3) the different states of management methods and policy that have
not kept pace with evolving governance systems; and (4) the direct and indirect influence

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of climate change. Thus, all these challenges should be analyzed carefully and one by one
in order to adopt a better strategy for their solutions.
The effects of climate change and security concerns shouldn‘t be underestimated at the
same time because Afghanistan should be also concerned and make necessary preparations
for the periods of droughts where Miyan [2015] indicates that in the last five decades,
drought in Afghanistan is reported once in each three-year period. The climate effects on
the water resources availability are explained in brief earlier. Therefore, most of the water
resources projects in the country are delayed due to insecurity and inaccessibility to project
sites or some projects can even not be started at the moment.

Framing an Initial Strategy:

Instead of a unilateral strategy that might arise more problems to such a fragile country in
terms of security, power, sustainability, and economy like Afghanistan, a sound and wise
strategy achieving the same objective may eliminate the chances of acrimony and mistrust
between Afghanistan and its neighbors over transboundary waters. So, this article proposes
an initial strategic framework that may effective for disputes settlement rather than
accelerating disputes and further acrimonies to a stage where there might be not any
resolution to. In Figure 2, the diagram and the influence and relationships of the Afghan
institutions together with the steps on how to proceed on a legal way for entering into
transboundary water treaties with downstream countries is formulated in a very simple
way. This initial strategic framework is recommended for the sake of ease to see that what
are the options and processes to be considered in the existing legal framework of
Afghanistan and the international community for solving transboundary water sharing
issues.
Due to the instable situation in Afghanistan and the position of the present government, it
would be viable that Afghanistan becomes a party to the 1997 UN Watercourse
Convention (UNWC) so that to get support from the international community because
Uprety and Salman [2011] insist that the problem with the lack of cooperation in South
Asian countries over transboundary waters is that none of these countries are a party to the
UN Watercourse Convention, the only international ‗‗'framework law‘‘ applicable to
transboundary waters. The UNWC is discussed by many authors such as Biswas [1999];
Bilen [2000]; Salman [2007]; Wegerich and Olsson [2010]; Biswas [2011]; Rahaman
[2012]; Sarfraz [2013] Gander [2014]; Zeitoun [2015]; and Salman [2015] that has come
into force on 17 August 2014. The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses was firstly adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on 21 May 1997, which has 7 Parts, 37 Articles, and an
annex of Arbitration having 14 Articles. It is also important to be mentioned that
Afghanistan was an absent country during the convention. The most critical principles in
the UNWC among the authors are the principles of ‗‗equitable and reasonable utilization
and participation‘‘ (Article 5) and ‗‗obligation not to cause significant harm‘‘ (Article 7).
Some of the authors say that these two principles have no much clear explanation and
understanding as they are vague in interpretation because as per Salman [2015], the
upstream states are complaining that the convention is biased in support of downstream
riparians, especially while it comes to the principle of the ‗‗obligation not to cause
significant harm‘‘, and that is why Turkey, China, and Burundi voted against this
convention. If Afghanistan accepts to ratify the UNWC, the above mentioned two articles
should be overviewed carefully whether it will settle current disputes with neighbors or

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not. Still, the UNWC is a global framework, which might be a reliable source for states
entering into treaties on transboundary waters [Salman, 2015]. Furthermore, cooperation
over water resources development on any transboundary river in Afghanistan is suggested
by international organizations and community [Thomas et al., 2016]. Afghanistan‘s
position as an upstream state is what can be counted on. But it doesn‘t mean that the
current strategy of resources capturing and not discussing with downstream states will
work sufficiently because it will still pay the price somehow. Thus, reviewing and
considering to ratify the UNWC may be a step forward for the current disputes resolution
with downstream riparians as the country is not in the position of Turkey or China in order
to be fully against the convention.
A very good article written by Zeitoun [2015] exploring the relevance of the hydraulic
development projects of late developing upstream countries with the main tools of
International Water Law (IWL) for a non-legal audience. In this paper, Zeitoun argues that
the IWL is completely relevant to the later-developing, upstream states that undertake
hydraulic development projects. While the upstream countries are incautious proceeding
their own hydraulic missions, concerns are raised by the downstream countries for
example: the planned or under construction dams in Turkey, Ethiopia, and Lebanon have
raised concerns downstream in Iraq, Israel, and Egypt [Zeitoun, 2015]. This later-
developing upstream case is the same for Afghanistan where its hydraulic mission has
caused worries in downstream states, especially in Iran and Pakistan. Hence, Afghanistan,
keeping distance from the IWL and UNWC might not be a long term solution while
downstream states are trying to disrupt these projects with a reasonably high power and
economy in comparison to Afghanistan.
Analyzing the challenges and concerns based on the current disputes with neighbors,
especially Iran and Pakistan, this article offers an initial strategic framework (Figure 2) in
order that Afghanistan can eliminate the acrimony that exists with these two countries in
relation to transboundary waters, convincing them via formal discussion and negotiations
and entering into legal treaties with a third party mediation. Just signing a treaty may not
be sufficient in case if there isn‘t an oversee on the full implementation of the agreement.
Establishment of commissions including at least one-one member from technical,
environmental, judicial, and political area of expertise for each single treaty is essential so
that these commissions can discuss any kind of dispute and mitigate them while arise.
Sharing of data related to any activity that happens upstream or downstream with a prior
notice and respect for concerns of the parties may convey to a peaceful environment where
the needs of both upstream and downstream states will be satisfied rather than being
doubtful on each other. Therefore, the key institutions, the MEW in particular, to embrace
this initial strategic framework so that to overcome the current disputes that are escalating
day by day with neighbors over transboundary waters in Afghanistan.

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Consider: Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW)

1. Constitution of Afghanistan. with reconciliation of
2. Water Law of Afghanistan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
3. Environmental Law of Afghanistan. Ministry of Interior (MI)
4. Afghanistan's National Development Strategy/Water Ministry of Borders and Tribal Affairs
Sector Strategy. (MBTA).

Consider & Review: Take all perspectives that exist related to

1. International Water Law. transboundary waters into account inside the
2.The UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational country and the countries with whom waters are
Uses of International Watercourses (1997). shared. Review all technical, economical,
3. The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of environmental, and political issues. Explain
4. International Rivers (1966). Afghanistan's need for water resources for the
The Berlin Rules on Water Resources (2004). overall development of the country including energy
and agriculture, which are the most critical ones.

Is it viable to be adopted by Afghanistan? Yes - No

Become a party to 1997 UN Convention of Review similar transboundary dispute cases around
Watercourse and start negotiations for the framing of the world that best fit for Afghanistan. See what has
treaties with countries that Afghanistan shares waters been carried out for conflicts resolutions, and then
with, taking the convention into account. start negotiations.

Ready to enter into treaties with all countries that

Afghanistan shares waters with/Receive third party
mediation/support during the preparation of agreements.

Establish permanent commissions with each country

Oversee the full that a treaty is signed with. The commission should be Regular meetings
implementation for disputes
of the treaty composed of at least technical (water resources expert), resolution
environmental, judicial, and political members.

MEW to share actual data and coordinate through

commissions with countries that treaties are signed
with on a timely base for preventing any acrimony,
mistrust, and dispute.

Figure 2: An initial strategic framework for Afghanistan on how to settle disputes over its transboundary
waters.

2. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

The analysis of Afghanistan‘s transboundary water issues is still difficult and complicated
due to the political situation of the region and the current instable status of the country.
Yet, Afghanistan seems to be serious in the control and management of its transboundary
water resources for the future prosperity of itself acting on a unilateral base. These
strategies of downstream states trying to disturb the hydraulic mission in the upstream
state, and the upstream state moving its hydraulic mission ahead without any discussion or
consultation with its downstream states, have caused mistrusts and disputes, which should
be treated based on a legitimate way because these problems on a long term will for sure

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affect social, political, economical and even environmental facets in the region. Therefore,
this article proposed an initial strategic framework for Afghanistan on how to proceed
bilateral strategy to overcome the current disputes with its downstream riparian states and
achieve its long term goals as well.
Hence, taking all political, environmental, and economical aspects into account, this article
mentioned some popular and successful examples of transboundary water treaties as
references for further review and analysis that might work as a baseline for the case in
Afghanistan. Further, a primary strategic framework for current disputes settlement is
proposed as a guidance showing where to start and end successfully. Becoming a party to
the UNWC is recommended as Afghanistan may not be in the state as other upstream states
in the world. Afghanistan in any case needs a third party facilitator for entering into water
sharing treaties with its neighboring countries due to its weak and unstable position in the
region. Still, everything depends on Afghanistan on how to present its concerns and needs
for the water resources development and management so that to convince the states
involved in water sharing treaties. Finally, the proposed strategic framework might work
well for solving acrimonies and disputes once it is fully adopted.
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