THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 247982. April 28, 2021.]

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., * petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and

the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG),
respondents.

DECISION

DELOS SANTOS, J : p

Before the Court is a Petition for Prohibition 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
which seeks to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from further exercising jurisdiction over Civil
Case Nos. 0033-B, 0033-C, 0033-D, 0033-E, 0033-G, and 0033-H, involving complaints
for recovery of ill-gotten wealth filed by respondent Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) against petitioner Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (petitioner) and
other defendants, and for the Court to order the dismissal of the aforesaid cases on the
reason that the Sandiganbayan has unjustly allowed the same to be pending for more
than 32 years without commencing trial proper and without exerting any effort to
dispose them, in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights to due process and speedy
disposition of cases.
Antecedents
On February 28, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 1, 2 creating the PCGG which was tasked, among others, of assisting
the President in the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (former President Marcos), his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates, and close associates. In E.O. No. 2, 3 dated March 12, 1986, PCGG has
likewise been primarily charged with the responsibility of recovering the assets and
properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Marcos and/or
Imelda R. Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,
agents, or nominees. The jurisdiction to try and decide "ill-gotten wealth" cases of
former President Marcos and of the other cases under E.O. No. 1 and E.O. No. 2 was
vested in the Sandiganbayan under E.O. No. 14, 4 as amended by E.O. No. 14-A. 5
Section 2 of E.O. No. 14 provides that the PCGG shall file all such cases, whether civil
or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction
thereof. 6 Said jurisdiction remained with the Sandiganbayan even after the passing and
effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7975 7 and R.A. No. 8249. 8
On July 31, 1987, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), instituted before the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0033 against petitioner,
allegedly a close associate of former President Marcos, and other defendants for the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth under E.O. No. 1. The complaint filed in 1987 was
amended three times, the latest of which was on August 23, 1991.
In a Resolution dated March 24, 1999, the Sandiganbayan allowed the
subdivision of the complaint into eight complaints, 9 to wit:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com

 Case No. Subject Matter

Civil Case No. 0033-A Anomalous Purchase and Use of First United Bank
(now United Coconut Planters Bank)

Civil Case No. 0033-B Creation of Companies Out of Coco Levy Funds

Civil Case No. 0033-C Creation and Operation of Bugsuk Project and
Award of P998 Million Damages to Agricultural
Investors, Inc.

Civil Case No. 0033-D Disadvantageous Purchases and Settlement of the

Accounts of Oil Mills Out of Coco Levy Funds

Civil Case No. 0033-E Unlawful Disbursement and Dissipation of Coco

Levy Funds

Civil Case No. 0033-F Acquisition of SMC shares of stock

Civil Case No. 0033-G Acquisition of Pepsi-Cola

Civil Case No. 0033-H Behest Loans and Contracts

Of the eight subdivided cases mentioned above, petitioner alleged that Civil Case
Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F have been fully resolved insofar as he is concerned.
Accordingly, the subject of his petition are the six cases: Civil Case Nos. 0033-B, 0033-
C, 0033-D, 0033-E, 0033-G, and 0033-H (subject cases). Relevant thereto, the
following are the stages and the timeline in subject cases since the partition of Civil
Case No. 0033, starting from the filing of the PCGG's subdivided complaints, to wit: 10

Case Complaint Petitioner's PCGG Petitioner's Termination/

No. Answer Pre-Trial Pre-Trial Suspension/Last
Brief Brief Incident in the Pre-
Trial

0033-B February 28, June 23, June 9, February May 21, 2001
1995 1999 2000 11, 2000

0033-C April 28, 1995 July 5, July 31, February August 9, 2000
1999 2000 28, 2000

0033-D May 12, 1995 June 23, June 23, February July 5, 2000
1999 2000 17, 2000

0033-E February 28, June 23, July 24, March 8, October 27, 2000
1995 1999 2000 2000

0033-G May 12, 1995 June 23, January 16, March 8, September 30, 2003
1999 2004 2000

0033-H February 27, July 5, July 28, March 10, June 1, 2001
1995 1999 2000 2000

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com

 Subsequently, the respective pre-trial hearings in Civil Case Nos. 0033-C (in
2000), 0033-D (in 2000), and 0033-E (in 2003) were terminated. Meanwhile, while pre-
trial hearings were being conducted in the other cases, the PCGG filed, on various
dates, motions for partial summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings, in all of
the subject cases except in Civil Case No. 0033-H. As a result, pre-trial hearings were
halted and the proceedings were directed towards the resolution of the aforesaid
motions. The timeline of this incident, including the pertinent Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan, is as follows: 11

Case No. Motion for Partial Summary Sandiganbayan Resolutions

Judgment/Judgment on the
Pleadings

0033-B September 8, 2002 June 2, 2016 DENIED

0033-C October 31, 2013 September 10, 2016 DENIED

0033-D October 9, 2002 June 2, 2016 DENIED

0033-E January 25, 2006 June 17, 2011 DENIED

0033-G January 16, 2004 January 23, 2006 DENIED

0033-H None None None

Relatedly, as early as 2003, petitioner raised the issue of delay in the

proceedings of the cases against him, particularly the fact that trial has not yet
commenced therein. In his oppositions to PCGG's motions for partial summary
judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings, petitioner emphasized that the cases
against him have been pending since 1987 yet trial has not commenced. Thus,
petitioner prayed that rather dealing further with PCGG's motions for partial judgment
on the pleadings and/or partial summary judgment, the subject cases should be
scheduled for trial. 12
Sometime in 2013, petitioner reached out to PCGG reminding it of his right to
speedy disposition of cases. While initially agreeing to proceed to trial, the PCGG
retracted, explaining that to go directly to trial and to dispense with the filing of
interlocutory motions are not in the best interest of the Republic. 13 Thus, instead of
proceeding to trial and to present evidence, the PCGG filed separate motions for
reconsideration on the denial of its motions for partial summary judgment and/or
judgment on the pleadings. In response, petitioner reiterated the issue on delay and on
his right to speedy disposition of cases in his opposition to PCGG's aforesaid motions
for reconsideration. 14 The following is the timeline of the said incident, including the
relevant Sandiganbayan Resolutions: 15

Case No. Motion for Reconsideration Sandiganbayan Resolutions

(Re: Motions for Partial
Judgment and/or Judgment on
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 the Pleadings)

0033-B July 8, 2016 May 9, 2017 DENIED

0033-C October 20, 2015 March 8, 2016 DENIED

0033-D July 4, 2016 May 9, 2017 DENIED

0033-E July 18, 2011 July 20, 2012 DENIED

0033-G February 10, 2006 December 8, 2008 DENIED

0033-H None None None

On the other hand, petitioner filed motions to dismiss the subject cases, except in
Civil Case No. 0033-G, on the ground of violation of his constitutional rights to due
process and speedy disposition of cases. The same, however, were invariably denied
by the Sandiganbayan. 16 The timeline of this incident is as follows: 17

Case No. Motion to Dismiss Sandiganbayan Resolutions

0033-B April 30, 2015 April 18, 2017 DENIED

0033-C April 30, 2015 Unresolved -

0033-D April 30, 2015 April 18, 2017 DENIED

0033-E February 3, 2013 June 2, 2014 DENIED

0033-G None None -

0033-H April 30, 2015 April 18, 2017 DENIED

Despite the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan denying the PCGG's Motions for
Partial Summary Judgment and/or Judgment on the Pleadings and petitioner's motions
to dismiss, no significant movement in the subject cases took place. In particular, trial
proper in the subject cases never commenced.
On February 2, 2018, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to include the
subject cases in the court calendar of the Sandiganbayan. The same, however, were
not acted upon by the Sandiganbayan. 18 Accordingly, the subject cases remained idle
and trial therein never commenced.
Frustrated of the fact that trial proper in the subject cases never commenced and
of the slow or total absence of significant progress in the proceedings in the subject
cases, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Prohibition on July 18, 2019, anchored on
the following grounds:
I. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ALLOWED THE SUBJECT CASES TO BE
PENDING FOR MORE THAN 32 YEARS AND MUST NOW BE
PROHIBITED FROM ACTING ON THE SUBJECT CASES.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 II. THE COURT IS DUTY-BOUND TO DISMISS THE SUBJECT CASES
FOR VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO
DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES.
Petitioner argues that he availed the proper remedy of Petition for Prohibition in
asking the Court to prohibit the Sandiganbayan from acting on the subject cases, and
that all the requisites for the issuance of a writ of prohibition are present in this case,
namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising judicial and ministerial functions; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board, or
person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. 19 Petitioner further contends that when all the factors in
determining the violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases are balanced and
considered, there can be no other conclusion in that the Sandiganbayan is guilty of
violating his aforesaid right. In particular, petitioner highlighted the following
circumstances: the length of delay of more than 32 years without trial proper; no
justifiable reason in not allowing any of the subject cases to proceed to trial or at least
include the same in the Sandiganbayan calendar for trial despite petitioner's demand for
trial and despite invoking his right to speedy disposition of cases at the earliest
opportunity; the prejudice caused by the delay — difficulty in preparing his defense, i.e.,
witnesses and handling lawyers of petitioner may no longer be available; and financial
losses from the properties that have been subject of sequestration. 20
On the other hand, the PCGG filed its Comment 21 on February 13, 2020. It
posits that the instant petition was filed out of time, explaining that the issues raised
therein are essentially the same ones raised by petitioner in his motions to dismiss filed
before the Sandiganbayan which had already been denied in the Resolutions which
were not subject of any motion for reconsideration of an appeal to the Court. The
instant petition, according to the PCGG, is a belated attempt to question the denial of
petitioner's motions to dismiss and to cover-up his failure to file a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal. As such, the PCGG maintains that the instant Petition for
Prohibition should not be granted. Otherwise, the Court would be amending or
modifying the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan which had long become final. 22 Also,
by filing the present petition, petitioner is guilty of forum shopping as his motion to
dismiss, on the same ground of violation of petitioner's constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases, filed in Civil Case No. 0033-C is still pending resolution by the
Sandiganbayan. 23
As to the main issue in the present petition, the PCGG asserts that the elements
necessary to place petitioner in a situation where his right to speedy disposition of his
cases may have been violated are not present in this case. The PCGG claims that aside
from failing to seasonably assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case, petitioner
has not presented any concrete proof that the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan
have been marred by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays or unjustified
postponements of the trial. The PCGG also blames petitioner's act of filing dilatory
motions to dismiss which caused the delay in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. With the aforesaid factors and with the complexity of the issues
coupled with the voluminous records in the subject cases, the PCGG avers that the
Sandiganbayan should be afforded reasonable time to hear and decide said cases. 24
Anent the non-inclusion of the subject cases in the calendar of the Sandiganbayan, the
PCGG contends that the same is only consistent with the principle of judicial courtesy,
noting that there are pending petitions for certiorari filed by the Republic/PCGG before
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 the Court relating to the denial of its motions for summary judgment. It explains that the
resolution in the said certiorari petitions will be rendered moot if the Sandiganbayan will
proceed with the trial of the subject cases. 25
In his Reply 26 filed on March 13, 2020, petitioner rebuts the argument of the
PCGG that the present petition cannot be used to modify or amend the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions denying his motion to dismiss. He explains that said Resolutions are
interlocutory orders which do not become final and may be modified any time. 27
Petitioner also postulates that he is not guilty of forum shopping despite the pendency
of his motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 0033-C since the present petition is not
addressed to a specific Sandiganbayan Resolution but to its collective actions and
inactions, which if viewed together lead to the ineluctable conclusion that the
Sandiganbayan, as a court, had violated petitioner's constitutional rights to due process
and speedy disposition of cases. Petitioner adds that there is no identity of parties in the
motion to dismiss filed before the Sandiganbayan and the present petition. 28 Further,
petitioner insists that his constitutional rights involved in the instant petition are more
important than any of PCGG's procedural objections. 29 Finally, petitioner maintains his
position that all the circumstances and factors surrounding his cases, support his claim
that his rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases were violated.
Meanwhile, on July 15, 2020, counsel for petitioner filed a Manifestation 30
informing the Court that petitioner passed away on June 16, 2020.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The Court disposes first the procedural objections of the PCGG.
The PCGG argues that the instant petition for prohibition should be dismissed on
the ground that the same seeks to amend and modify the long final and immutable
Sandiganbayan Resolutions issued in 2014 and 2017 denying petitioner's motions to
dismiss which were anchored on the same ground of violation of his rights to due
process and speedy disposition of cases.
The Court disagrees.
In essence, the PCGG is saying that giving due course and granting the present
petition would be violative of the principle of immutability of judgment, which is premised
upon the existence of a final and executory judgment 31 and mandates that final
judgment may no longer be modified or amended by any court in any manner even if
the purpose of the modification or amendment is to correct perceived errors of law or
fact. 32 It failed to consider, however, that the said principle does not apply in this case
considering that the Sandiganbayan Resolutions, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss,
are indisputably in the form of interlocutory orders, which settles only some incidental,
subsidiary, or collateral matter arising in an action and there is something else that still
needs to be done by the concerned tribunal in the primary case — the rendition of the
final judgment, 33 as opposed to a final judgment, one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto. Being interlocutory
orders, the same may be subject to modification before final judgment in the main
cases. It is settled that an interlocutory order is always under the control of the Court
and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before
final judgment. 34 More so if there exists new developments, matter, or fact which may
warrant a different view, such as those alleged in the instant petition — the failure of the
Sandiganbayan to promptly dispose the petitioner's cases by proceeding to trial even
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 after the denial of petitioner's motions to dismiss and of the Republic/PCGG's motions
for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings and ignoring petitioner's
subsequent motion to include the subject cases in Sandiganbayan's trial calendar. 35
Relative thereto, rules of procedure should not be interpreted as to disadvantage a
party and deprive him or her of fundamental rights and liberties, 36 such as petitioner's
constitutionally-conferred rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases. A
judgment or order may be modified where its execution in its present form is impossible
or unjust in view of intervening facts or circumstances. 37
Moreover, the present petition is availed of by petitioner as a separate and
independent remedy from his motions to dismiss or from the denial of said motions. If
the intention of petitioner was otherwise, he could have filed a petition for certiorari
specifically assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions and not a petition for prohibition.
In this regard, it is necessary to point out that certiorari and prohibition differ as to
purpose. For while certiorari is aimed at "annulling or modifying" a proceeding,
prohibition is directed at "commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified in the petition." 38 Here, it is clear that the
instant petition for prohibition is not aimed at nullifying, modifying, or amending the
aforesaid Sandiganbayan Resolutions, but is particularly aimed at ousting the
Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction for being guilty of grave abuse of discretion in
abdicating its constitutional duty to dispose of petitioner's cases in relation to his rights
to due process and speedy disposition of cases. That the present petition and
petitioner's motions to dismiss filed before the Sandiganbayan both mention that his
rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases is more apparent than real and
should not be allowed to dilute the distinction between the remedies taken by petitioner.
To stress, the issue in the present petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan's
assailed action or inaction is without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion which warrants its desistance from taking further proceedings in the subject
cases. It is in light of this issue that the petition should be resolved. Certainly, the said
issue was never the subject of petitioner's motions to dismiss filed in the
Sandiganbayan. More important, petitioner alleges new developments, matter or fact,
as mentioned earlier, which were not considered in his motions to dismiss nor in the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions denying the same — that petitioner wants the Court to
consider in resolving the present petition for prohibition. This stresses further that the
present petition is not meant as a continuation or a belated attempt to assail, modify, or
amend the 2014 and 2017 Sandiganbayan Resolutions so as for the PCGG to claim
that the said petition is filed out of time or that it would violate the doctrine of
immutability.
In the same vein that the instant petition should be viewed as an independent
and separate remedy from petitioner's motions to dismiss filed in the Sandiganbayan,
the PCGG's claim that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping, in view of the pendency in
Civil Case No. 0033-C of his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to
dismiss, should likewise fail. To reiterate, the present petition does not primarily aim to
modify and nullify any of the Sandiganbayan Resolutions; it presents a different issue
than what was raised in petitioner's motion to dismiss; and that petitioner alleges an
additional or new fact, matter, or development — that the Sandiganbayan failed to act
on his motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 0033-C and on his motion to include
the subject cases in the court calendar — to support his claim that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in not performing its constitutional duty to dispose
of the subject cases with reasonable dispatch and that it should be prohibited from
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 taking further proceedings in the subject cases.
Forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded
on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court. 39
In determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to consider is whether the elements of litis pendentia concur,
namely: (a) [there is] identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) [there is] identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) [that] the identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered
in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case. 40 Of the above-mentioned elements of forum shopping, what
strikes this Court the most is the absence of the second element.
Hornbook is the rule that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute
identity; otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing
the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both
actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance
of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions
are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent
action. Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the
same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their
privies. Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a
single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence would support
and sustain both the first and second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in
one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. 41
In this case, the Court cannot help but re-emphasize that petitioner is alleging a
new fact, matter, or circumstance subsequent to the denial of his motions to dismiss,
which he is asking for the Court to consider in appreciating his claim that the
Sandiganbayan is guilty of grave abuse of discretion in relation to its failure to perform
its constitutional duty of and for violation of petitioner's rights to due process and
speedy disposition of cases. At the risk of being repetitive, this includes the failure of the
Sandiganbayan to proceed to trial even after the denial of petitioner's motions to
dismiss and of the Republic/PCGG's motions for summary judgment and/or judgment
on the pleadings, failure to resolve petitioner's motions to dismiss in Civil Case No.
0033-C, and not acting on petitioner's motion to include the subject cases in
Sandiganbayan's trial calendar. For sure, these matters involve different evidence and
vary the facts previously considered by the Sandiganbayan in its 2014 and 2017
Resolutions, thereby negating the presence of forum shopping. Collorarily, the same
allows the Court to take a new and fresh prospective in appreciating and evaluating the
claim of petitioner that his constitutional rights were indeed violated, and that the
Sandiganbayan, through this petition, may be declared to have committed grave abuse
of discretion by abdicating its constitutional duty to live up with and protect the aforesaid
constitutional rights of petitioner and should be prohibited from taking further
proceedings in the subject cases.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 Having disposed of the procedural objections of the PCGG, the Court now comes
to the substantive issue in this case.
Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available to compel any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions, to desist from
further proceedings in an action or matter when the proceedings in such tribunal,
corporation, board, or person are without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 42 It is the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of
jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance, the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law. 43 Concomitantly, the cardinal
precept is that, where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted
from their jurisdiction. 44 The reason being is that constitutional rights can be protected
under the "grave abuse clause" through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. 45
For writs of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) it must be directed against a
tribunal, corporation, board, or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (2) the
tribunal, corporation, board, or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion; and (3) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 46
Notably, of the elements mentioned above, the PCGG asserts that the second
requisite is absent in this case. It is of the position that petitioner's rights to due process
and speedy disposition of cases have not been violated, thus, petitioner failed to
demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in handling the subject cases.
The Court rules otherwise.
Before all else, the Court finds it fitting to briefly elucidate on the right to speedy
disposition of cases and the jurisprudence relevant thereto.
The constitutional guarantee to speedy disposition of cases was first introduced
in the 1973 Philippine Constitution 47 and was reproduced verbatim in Section 16,
Article III of the 1987 version. 48 Presently, the provision pertinently provides:
SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The aforesaid constitutional guarantee is one of the three provisions mandating
speedier dispensation of justice. 49 Though they are subsumed under the more basic
tenet of procedural due process, the right to speedy disposition of cases — which
includes within its contemplation the periods before, during, and after trial — affords
broader protection than Section 14 (2), 50 Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which
guarantees just the right to a speedy trial, and is more embracing than the protection
under Section 15, Article VIII, 51 which covers only the period after the submission of the
case. 52
Moreover, the right to a speedy disposition of cases sweeps more broadly as it is
not confined with criminal cases; it extends even to other adversarial proceedings
before any judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative tribunals, 53 be it civil or
administrative in nature, 54 and may be invoked by all citizens, including those in the
military. 55 No branch of government is, therefore, exempt from duly observing the
constitutional safeguard and the right confirms immunity from arbitrary delay. Hence,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all
officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. 56 For sure, the right may be
invoked in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. In fact, the Court declared in its
En Banc Resolution in Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan 57
that "the Sandiganbayan as the nation's anti-graft court must be the first to avert
opportunities for graft, uphold the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their
cases, and avert the precipitate loss of their rights." 58
It must be stressed, though, that the right to a speedy disposition of cases is a
relative and flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. 59 Otherwise stated, the right must be consistent with reasonable delay 60 as
the same is deemed violated only when there is inordinate delay, such as when the
proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried. 61
The concept of inordinate delay that defeats one's right to speedy disposition of
cases was first highlighted in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan . 62 In that case, the Court
explained that it would not hesitate to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare the
accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear
that he has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed
rights which may be determined from the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case. The Court then proceeded to dismiss the criminal cases against the accused
therein after finding that there was a delay of three years in the termination of the
preliminary investigation and subsequent filing of the information, and such delay was
attended by several circumstances, such as (1) political motivations that play a vital role
in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; (2) blatant departure from the
established procedural rules; and (3) the unjustified delay attending the investigation.
The Court held that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and
filing the information in the said case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right
of the accused to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
Stressing that the concept of speedy disposition is relative, subsequent
jurisprudence adopted the "balancing test" which provides four factors as a guide in the
determination of inordinate delay and on whether the defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy disposition of cases. This test, first mentioned in the cases of Martin v.
Gen. Ver 63 and Caballero v. Judge Alfonso, Jr. , 64 both citing the American case of
Barker v. Wingo, 65 necessarily compels the courts to approach such cases on an ad
hoc basis, the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed apropos
the four-fold factors, to wit: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3)
defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to defendant
resulting from the delay. None of these elements, however, is either a necessary or
sufficient condition; they are related and must be considered together with other
relevant circumstances. These factors have no talismanic qualities as courts must still
engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. 66 The balancing test was applied,
reiterated, and expounded in the cases of Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan , 67 Alvizo v.
Sandiganbayan, 68 Cadalin v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration , 69 Binay
v. Sandiganbayan, 70 and recently in the cases of Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, 71 People
v. Sandiganbayan, 72 and Magante v. Sandiganbayan. 73
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 Still, quite recently, through the well-written and elaborate ponencia of the Court's
esteemed member, Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the Court En Banc in Cagang v.
Sandiganbayan 74 found it imperative to set a mode of analysis in situations where the
right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial is invoked. As such, the
introduction to our jurisprudence of the Cagang guidelines, to wit:
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to
speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy
trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The
right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any
tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is [important] is that the
accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy
disposition of cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint
prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges,
however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary
investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case.
Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period
taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint
shall not be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate
delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof.
If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current
Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be
promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of
proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the
given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of
justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the
case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended
by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the
delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must
p r o v e first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of
preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the
complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable;
and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the
delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts
must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be
weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.
An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of
the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically
motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of
evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution
throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and
substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need
of further analysis of the delay.
Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that
the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be
invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the
delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial
must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate
motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they
are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.
The foregoing discussion considered, the Court now proceeds to consider the
facts and circumstances in this case and determine whether the petitioner's rights to
due process and speedy disposition of cases has been violated.
Following the Cagang guidelines, it must be determined first as to who has the
burden of proof. If the delay is beyond the time periods provided in the rules, the burden
of proof shifts to the State 75 or, in this case, the Republic.
As recited in the antecedents of this petition, Civil Case No. 0033 was filed on
July 31, 1987 and was subdivided into eight complaints in 1995. Petitioner filed his
Answers to the complaints in 1999. Thereafter, pre-trial hearings commenced and were
essentially terminated with regard to Civil Case Nos. 0033-C (in 2000), 0033-D (in
2000), and 0033-E (in 2003). Meanwhile, pre-trial hearings in Civil Case Nos. 0033-B
and 0033-H were halted in 2001, while pre-trial hearings in Civil Case No. 0033-G was
suspended in 2003. Fast forward to almost two decades upon the filing of the instant
petition in 2019, the Sandiganbayan has not concluded pre-trial hearings in Civil Case
Nos. 0033-B, 0033-G, and 0033-H. Neither did the Sandiganbayan include in its trial
calendar nor has exert any effort to require petitioner to make an initial presentation of
his evidence in any of the subject cases. In total, upon the filing of the present petition,
the subject cases have been pending with the Sandiganbayan for 32 years from the
time of the filing of the original complaint and 24 years from the subdivision thereof, yet,
trial proper has not commenced.
The Sandiganbayan was originally empowered to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. However, on March 30, 1995, the Congress repealed the Sandiganbayan's
power to promulgate its own rules of procedure and instead prescribed that the Rules of
Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed
with the Sandiganbayan. 76 The Court acknowledges that under the applicable rules,
there is no specific period mandated for the Sandiganbayan to commence trial from the
time the complaint in a civil case is filed. The same, however, does not give the
Sandiganbayan an unbridled discretion as to when to terminate pre-trial and proceed to
trial. It is still subject to the party's constitutionally-protected rights to due process and
speedy disposition of cases vis-à-vis its relative and flexible nature. Otherwise, the
parties would be held hostage and open to oppressive and prejudicial delays which the
Constitution proscribes. It may be remembered that the right to a speedy disposition of
a case is deemed violated when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 77 Relative thereto, the
Court finds that it should be the Republic who carries the burden of proof that there was
no violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases for several reasons. First, the fact
that 32 years has elapsed from the time of the filing of the original complaint and 24
years from the subdivision thereof without trial proper being commenced, on its face,
constitutes delay by any reasonable standard. Second, the parties do not dispute that
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 there is delay in this case; they only differ in their arguments as to whether such delay
is unjustified. Third, under Cagang, the defendant would only carry the burden of proof if
the right is invoked within the given time periods. The defendant's burden of proof is
premised on a circumstance where he invokes his right while the time limits set by the
rules has not expired yet, hence, he must prove that the case took much longer than
was reasonably necessary to resolve. 78 Without a given period set by the rules as to
when the Sandiganbayan should terminate pre-trial and commence trial proper from the
time the complaint is filed, and in view of the delay of 32 years from the time of the filing
of the complaint and 24 years from the subdivision thereof without having his case tried,
the Court cannot reasonably place the burden of proof on petitioner. Fourth, a survey of
jurisprudence reveals that most of the complaints dismissed for violation of the right to
speedy disposition of a case stems from the failure of the State, or the Republic in this
case, to satisfactorily explain the inordinate delay, 79 except when there is a clear case
of waiver in asserting the right to a speedy disposition of cases or when there is
acquiescence to the delay. 80
Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that from the time respective pre-trial in Civil Case
Nos. 0033-C (in 2000), 0033-D (in 2000), and 0033-E (in 2003) were terminated, almost
two decades had already passed by and yet the Sandiganbayan never bothered to
issue a pre-trial order and set the trial dates to begin the presentation of petitioner's
evidence. On this point, it must be stressed that under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Section 7, Rule 18 thereof provides that the courts are mandated to issue a
pre-trial order "upon termination" of the pre-trial. In 2004, the Court issued A.M. No. 03-
01-09-SC, 81 which provides, among others, that the judge shall issue the required pre-
trial order "within 10 days after the termination of the pre-trial." This Court's issuance is
deemed to apply to the 2002 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan which states
that "Rules of Court, resolutions, circulars, and other issuances promulgated by the
Supreme Court relating to or affecting the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, insofar as applicable, shall govern all actions and proceedings filed with the
Sandiganbayan." Subsequently, the 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
provides that it shall strictly observe A.M. No. 03-01-09-SC, which provides, among
others, that the judge shall issue the required pre-trial order "within 10 days after the
termination of the pre-trial." 82 And presently, Section 2, Rule 18 of the 2019 Proposed
Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 83 provides that pre-trial should be
terminated promptly, while Section 7 thereof mandates that "upon termination of the
pre-trial, the court shall issue an order within 10 calendar days which shall recite in
detail the matters taken up" in the pre-trial. 84
In this case, as mentioned earlier, two decades had already passed by from the
time the respective pre-trial in Civil Case Nos. 0033-C, 0033-D, and 0033-E were
terminated, and yet no pre-trial order has been issued as to set or schedule the trial
dates, much less to commence trial and begin the presentation of petitioner's evidence.
Needless to say, the delay is beyond the time periods provided in any of the rules
applicable to the Sandiganbayan at any given point in time since the termination of the
pre-trial hearings. Thus, the burden of proof that there was no violation of the right to
speedy disposition of cases clearly lies with the Republic.
One can only imagine that if no trial has been commenced yet in the subject
cases for more than 30 years of being pending and 20 years since the termination or
suspension of pre-trial, how long would the trial proper take and for the cases to be
decided and put the issues and dispute therein to end. Absent any justifiable excuse,
these incidents in the Sandiganbayan proceedings depict more than a perfect picture of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 an inordinate delay which is violative of one's right to speedy disposition of cases. It
might not be amiss to point out that for shorter delays — three years in Tatad; 85 four
years in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan ; 86 five years in Magante; 87 six years in
Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman ; 88 six years in Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman ; 89
six years in Remulla; 90 seven years in Inocentes v. People ; 91 10 years in Licaros v.
Sandiganbayan; 92 and 15 years in People v. Sandiganbayan 93 — the Court has
directed the dismissal of cases for violation of the constitutional rights to due process
and speedy disposition of cases. These cited cases pale in comparison to what
transpired in the subject cases thereby warranting a stronger reason for the Court to
uphold the rights that petitioner invoked herein.
Bearing the burden of proof that there was no violation of petitioner's right to
speedy disposition of cases, the Republic, as represented herein by the PCGG, must
now show that the delay in disposing the subject cases, particularly in proceeding to
trial, is justified. In particular, the Republic must prove that it followed the prescribed
procedure; that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay
inevitable; and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
Based on the allegations of the PCGG, which are mostly based on the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions denying petitioner's motions to dismiss, the justifications for
the delay can be summarized into the following: the dilatory motions filed by petitioner;
the need to resolve numerous pending motions; the complexity of the issues involved
coupled with voluminous records of the cases; extraordinary number of parties; frequent
resort to the Court seeking review of the Sandiganbayan orders or resolutions; and
observance of judicial courtesy.
The Court is not convinced that the above reasons justify the delay.
As to the allegation of petitioner's dilatory motions, it is noteworthy that the same
is not proven or at least supported. The PCGG did not even bother to cite one particular
motion to illustrate its claim. In addition, the Sandiganbayan did not even mention in its
relevant resolutions that petitioner's motions are of such character. At its best, that
petitioner contributed to the delay remains to be an allegation which does not warrant
the Court's consideration. The same can be said to the alleged "complexities of the
issues involved" and "voluminous records." The Court observes that there is no
elucidation in the PCGG's pleadings or in the Sandiganbayan's resolutions as to what
specific issue is too complex or what voluminous records are involved with what
particular motions that justify the delay and failure or refusal of the Sandiganbayan to
proceed to trial for three decades from the filing of the main complaint and two decades
from the termination or suspension of pre-trial. The Court notes that what are involved
up to this point are interlocutory motions and the subject cases are not yet submitted for
decision so as to require such meticulous and much prolonged disposition by the
Sandiganbayan. It would appear that the PCGG principally referred to the then pending
motions for partial summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings and motions to
dismiss as a major cause for the delay. It failed, however, to show that the delay in the
resolution of those motions were due to issues so complex and evidence so
voluminous, which render the delay inevitable. More, it must be noted that said motions,
absent any extraordinary circumstances that effectively stymied Sandiganbayan's
normal time table to resolve, do not involve a meticulous calibration of the evidence nor
heavy review of records of the cases so as to warrant long delay to resolve. In a motion
for summary judgment, courts merely determine if answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. 94
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 Furthermore, in a motion for summary judgment, what needs to be determined is
whether there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 95 To be sure, matters not involving complex
factual or legal issues should not take long to resolve. Meanwhile, in the motions to
dismiss, the matters raised therein do not necessitate extraordinarily demanding review
of the records nor involve issues so complex, as they point out a simple, straightforward
and easily determinable issue on whether or not petitioner's right to speedy disposition
of cases has been violated. It must be stressed that considering that the subject cases
have been pending for decades already, the Sandiganbayan ought to have resolved the
pending motions therein with dispatch and should have proceeded to trial immediately.
Interestingly, the Court observes that the Sandiganbayan has the intolerable habit to
delay in the resolution of motions pending before it. For the PCGG's motions for partial
summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings, it took the Sandiganbayan 14
years to solve the same in Civil Case Nos. 0033-B and 0033-D, five years in Civil Case
No. 0033-E, and two years in Civil Case Nos. 0033-C and 0033-G; while the motions for
reconsideration thereof were resolved from 5 to 34 months. On the other hand,
petitioner's motions to dismiss were resolved invariably from 16 to 24 months, except
for Civil Case No. 0033-C which was filed in 2015 and remain unresolved. Notably, the
belated resolution and failure to resolve the aforesaid motions patently and miserably
failed to meet the period to resolve pending matters in three months espoused in
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 96 and Section 3 of the 1984 Sandiganbayan
Rules. 97 Obviously, this grave indiscretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan has chiefly
contributed to the delay in the disposition of the subject cases.
Even then, the Sandiganbayan could have proceeded to trial after it has finally
resolved the PCGG's motions for partial summary judgment and/or judgment on the
pleadings and petitioner's motions to dismiss. Yet, it did not do so since 2008 in Civil
Case No. 0033-G; since 2014 in Civil Case No. 0033-E; since 2016 in Civil Case No.
0033-C; and since 2017 in Civil Case Nos. 0033-B, 0033-D, and 0033-H. It even had
the audacity to ignore petitioner's plea to include the subject cases in its trial calendar,
as if taking a blind eye to the fact that the said cases have been pending for three
decades. To recall, the Sandiganbayan has failed to act on petitioner's motion to
include the subject cases in the trial calendar which was filed on February 2, 2018.
These incidents turned out to be, on the part of petitioner, "the final straw that broke the
camel's back" which compelled him to seek redress before the Court, feeling hopeless
that his grievances anent the violation of his constitutional rights would forever be
ignored by the tribunal concerned. Indeed, the Court cannot fault petitioner in doing and
feeling so. Said latest indifference of the Sandiganbayan actually confirms its gross
disregard and violation of petitioner's rights. Taken in its entirety, the acts of the
Sandiganbayan pertaining to the subject cases shows a pattern constituting an
abominable example of vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay in the dispensation
of justice that greatly prejudiced the constitutional rights of petitioner to due process and
speedy disposition of cases. These acts tantamount to grave abuse of discretion which
is defined as "an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law" or that the
tribunal, board or officer with judicial or quasi-judicial powers "exercised its power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility." 98
The Court cannot also agree with the PCGG that the act of the Sandiganbayan in
not proceeding with the trial is consistent with the principle of judicial courtesy in view of
the certiorari petitions pending before the Court assailing the denial of the motions for
partial summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings and the other
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 Sandiganbayan resolutions. In fact, this is a violation of the prescribed and established
procedure, as will be explained hereinafter.
Judicial courtesy is exercised by suspending a lower court's proceedings
although there is no injunction or an order from a higher court. 99
I n Republic v. Sandiganbayan , 100 the Court rejected the idea that judicial
courtesy applies and trial should be suspended when there are pending certiorari
petitions assailing the Sandiganbayan interlocutory resolutions. In that case, the Court
held that setting the case for trial would not have the effect of rendering the certiorari
petition assailing the denial of a motion for partial summary judgment moot. It went
further in reminding the Sandiganbayan that it should proceed with its proceedings
when its interlocutory orders are on challenge before the Court, but no Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction has been issued and there is
no strong probability that the issues raised before the Court would be rendered moot
and moribund. Thus:
The earlier quoted Section 7 of Rule 65 provides the general rule that
the mere pendency of a special civil action for Certiorari commenced in relation
to a case pending before a lower court or court of origin does not stay the
proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order.
There are of course instances where even if there is no writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it
would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings
on the precept of judicial courtesy. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
x x x No parity of circumstances obtains in the present case, however,
where merely setting the case for trial would not have the effect of rendering
the present petition moot.
This Court explained, however, that the rule on "judicial courtesy" applies
where "there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court
would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the
proceedings in the lower court [or court of origin]."
A final word. This Court takes notice that in most cases where its
interlocutory orders are challenged before this Court, public respondent,
Sandiganbayan, suspends proceedings in the cases in which these assailed
interlocutory orders are issued despite the non-issuance by this Court of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction and the absence of
a strong probability that the issues raised before this Court would be rendered
moot by a continuation of the proceedings before it (Sandiganbayan).
WHEREFORE, the URGENT MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION filed by petitioner REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES is DENIED.
The SANDIGANBAYAN is, however, ORDERED, in light of the foregoing
discussion, to continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. 0033-F, as well as in
all other cases where its interlocutory orders are on challenge before this Court
but no Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction has been
issued and there is no strong probability that the issues raised before this Court
would be rendered moot and moribund.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com

 SO ORDERED. 101 (Underscoring supplied)
In view of the above ruling, the Court need not belabor on the subject argument of
the PCGG. Here, no TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction has been issued in the
subject cases, and the PCGG is not able to prove that there is strong probability that the
issues raised before the Court would be rendered moot and moribund other than its
speculative allegation that trial proceedings before the Sandiganbayan would prove
futile in the event that its certiorari petitions pending before the Court would be decided
in its favor. At the very least, the PCGG should have offered some explanation as to
why or how the Sandiganbayan's resumption of proceedings will render the issues in
the certiorari petitions pending before the Court moot or moribund. However, not even a
single issue out of the alleged complex issues was pleaded by the PCGG to justify the
application of the principle of judicial courtesy.
At this point, the Court sees a need to reiterate for the guidance of the Bench and
the Bar that the rules on judicial courtesy apply where "there is a strong probability that
the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of
the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court [or court of origin]." 102 However,
such principle remains to be the exception rather than the rule. 103 Although practical
and ethical considerations may justify the suspension of proceedings in unusual
circumstances and in the absence of any injunctive writ from a superior court, the
precept of judicial courtesy should not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if we
are to maintain the relevance of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court 104 which
provides for the general rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for
certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of
origin does not dismiss the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary
injunction or TRO.
Moving on, the Court finds that petitioner did not fail to assert his rights nor was
there a delay in asserting them.
After the subdivision of Civil Case No. 0033 into eight complaints in 1995,
petitioner filed his Answers in 1999 and Pre-Trial Brief in 2000, sufficient for the subject
cases to move forward. Thereafter and in response to the subsequent incidents in the
said cases, petitioner has ceaselessly reminded the Sandiganbayan of his constitutional
right to speedy disposition of cases and moved that the case be set for trial in every
chance he got. As early as in 2003, petitioner, in his oppositions to the PCGG's motions
for partial summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings, already highlighted the
delay in the subject cases and the prejudice he suffered by the fact that no trial has
been conducted. 105 Meanwhile, in 2008, in his opposition to PCGG's motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dismissing Civil Case No. 0033-C,
petitioner alleged that the dismissal should be confirmed not only on the ground of
failure to prosecute, but also on the justification that the long delay in the termination of
the case violated his rights to due process and speedy disposition of case. 106 In 2013
and 2015, petitioner filed motions to dismiss on the ground of inordinate delay which
violates his constitutional rights. 107 Later, when the PCGG filed motions for
reconsideration of Sandiganbayan's resolutions denying its motion for partial summary
judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings, petitioner continuously raised the issue of
delay in his oppositions thereof filed in 2015 and 2016. 108 And the latest, in 2018,
petitioner filed a motion to include the subject cases in the Sandiganbayan's trial
calendar.
The foregoing considered, the Court finds that petitioner has not been neglectful
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 in asserting his right so as to say that he has already waived the same. As correctly
pointed out by petitioner, while he did not raise the issue of delay in every pleading he
filed, nor on a daily, weekly or monthly basis, to say that he has not done so is to be
completely blind to the records of the subject cases. Here, the Court finds that petitioner
did not acquiesce to the delay so clear and evident so as to conclude that there is a
waiver on his part of his right to speedy disposition of cases or to say that the same
should bar him from asserting his constitutional rights at this point of the proceedings.
Lastly, the PCGG failed to prove that no prejudice was suffered by the petitioner
as a result of the delay.
"Prejudice," as a criterion in the speedy disposition of cases, has been discussed
in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan 109 in the following manner:
Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that
the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to
limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious
is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense
witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if
the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by
restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and
often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is
curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.
In this case, petitioner accentuated that there are properties attached and
sequestered in the subject cases. As the delay continues in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan, financial losses suffered by petitioner and of their current respective
owners continue to pile up at an accelerating rate. He added that during the pendency
of the subject cases for more than 30 years, many of the defendants and witnesses
have passed away and those who are still alive may not be competent to remember
with precision the matters that took place more than three decades ago. Too, with the
considerable passage of time, gathering object or documentary evidence in regard to
the properties involved in the subject cases may already be futile.
At this point, the Court recognizes that the inaction of the Sandiganbayan for
more than 30 years has placed petitioner at a disadvantage in fully preparing and
presenting his case. For the subject cases to proceed to trial at this point in time would
certainly result to a very tilted judicial system against petitioner and would skew the
fairness in hearing the subject matter of the cases, and in the course thereof, petitioner
would be deprived of his right to property without due process. Moreover, at the time of
the filing of the instant petition, the health condition of petitioner has already
deteriorated. In fact, he has passed away before the petition is resolved. That he is not
in the position to defend himself now or that his defense has been greatly prejudiced by
the delay or passage of time is very obvious.
Remarkably, the PCGG did not dispute that the delay in the disposition of the
subject cases has prejudiced petitioner. Need it be emphasized that under the Cagang
guidelines, once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, or to the plaintiff in this
case, it must prove that no prejudice was suffered by the accused [or defendant] as a
result of the delay. On this score, the Court sees no reason not to rule in favor of
petitioner.
In sum, the Court finds that petitioner's constitutional rights to due process and
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 speedy disposition of cases have been violated in the subject cases, in which petitioner
is the principal defendant, thereby necessitating the dismissal of the same. Notably, the
inordinate delay attending the cases is primarily due to the Sandiganbayan's vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays in the resolution of pending motions in the subject
cases 110 and to its patently unreasonable and baseless refusal to proceed to trial in
utter disregard of petitioner's constitutional rights. 111 It appears that there is no intention
on the part of the Sandiganbayan to put a stop to this seemingly unending litigation.
Such travesty of the Bill of Rights cannot continue if we are to give life and meaning to
the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." An unwarranted slow down in
the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary,
lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. 112 Accordingly, such actions of the
Sandiganbayan constitute grave abuse of discretion and as a result, the said hearing
tribunal loses its jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings in the subject cases, 113
which petitioner rightly prayed for in the present Petition for Prohibition.
Lastly, the Court has no doubt that the Republic, through the generations of
leadership that had the duty and privilege to handle these cases, had all the resources
to pursue cases of corruption and ill-gotten wealth. Also, the Court is not so naive to
know that these cases are met with various challenges given that those who may be its
defendants are not ordinary individuals without their own share of immense resources
and power. However, the inordinate delay in this case — especially the long periods
where no pre-trial orders were issued or no trial was calendared — may have made the
situation worse for the respondents. Memories fade, documents and other exhibits can
be lost and vulnerability of those who are tasked to decide increase with the passing of
years. All these pales in comparison to the infringement of rights; the resources — of
the government especially and also of the respondents — that have been wasted; and
significantly, the faith of our people in the ability of the respondents to identify, prove,
and recover alleged ill-gotten wealth.
What is expected of US in this case is to exercise the cold impartiality of a Court
concerned with enabling government to ensure accountability, but at the same time
within the hardened frame of the rights enshrined by our most fundamental law.
Unanimously, We do not shrink from that responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. A Writ of Prohibition is hereby issued
ENJOINING the Sandiganbayan from taking further proceedings in Civil Case Nos.
0033-B, 0033-C, 0033-D, 0033-E, 0033-G, and 0033-H. An ORDER is hereby issued
DISMISSING the said cases for violation of the constitutional rights to due process and
speedy disposition of cases of petitioner Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., the principal
defendant therein.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, Hernando, Inting and J.Y. Lopez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Petitioner died on June 16, 2020 per Manifestation filed by his counsel on July 15, 2020,
rollo, pp. 230-232.

1. Id. at 7-41.

2. Creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com

 3. Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated
by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, Their Close
Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees.

4. Defining the Jurisdiction over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Members of Their Immediate Family,
Close Relatives, Subordinates, Close and/or Business Associates, Dummies, Agents
and Nominees, dated May 7, 1986.

5. Dated August 18, 1986.

6. See Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 255 Phil. 71, 79 (1989).

7. An act to Strengthen the functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan,

Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, dated March
30, 1995.

8. An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes, dated February 5, 1997.

9. Rollo, pp. 13-14.

10. Id. at 16.

11. Id. at 17.

12. Id. at 17-18.

13. Id. at 26-27.

14. Id. at 18-19.

15. Id. at 28.

16. Id. at 29.

17. Id.

18. Id. at 30.

19. Id. at 31.

20. Id. at 33-37.

21. Id. at 81-112.

22. Id. at 88-89.

23. Id. at 92.

24. Id. at 94, 103-104.

25. Id. at 107.

26. Id. at 216-227.

27. Id. at 218.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 28. Id. at 219.

29. Id. at 222.

30. Id. at 230-234.

31. Mercury Drug Corporation v. Spouses Huang, 817 Phil. 434, 452 (2017).

32. National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals, 731 Phil. 400, 405 (2014).

33. People v. Escobar, 814 Phil. 840, 860 (2017).

34. Ley Construction and Development Corporation v. Union Bank, 389 Phil. 788, 795 (2000).

35. Rollo, pp. 9-10, 28.

36. People v. Escobar, supra note 33, at 862.

37. Id.

38. Pamana, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 499 Phil. 125, 133 (2005).

39. Heirs of Marcelo Sotto v. Palicte, 726 Phil. 651, 653-654 (2014).

40. Daswani v. Banco De Oro Universal Bank, 765 Phil. 88, 99 (2015).

41. Yap v. Chua, 687 Phil. 392, 401 (2012).

42. Delfin v. Court of Appeals, 121 Phil. 346, 348-349 (1965).

43. David v. Rivera, 464 Phil. 1006, 1017 (2004).

44. Apo Cement Corporation v. Mingson Mining Industries Corporation, 746 Phil. 1010, 1016
(2014).

45. See Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1, 40 (2008).

46. See Montes v. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 98, 107 (2006); see also Rivera v. Espiritu, 425
Phil. 169, 179-180 (2002).

47. Art. IV, Sec. 16 reads, "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."

48. Magante v. Sandiganbayan, 836 Phil. 1108, 1118 (2018).

49. Dansal v. Hon. Fernandez, Sr., 383 Phil. 897, 905 (2000), citing Bernas, Joaquin G. (1996),
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 489.

50. Art. III, Sec. 14 (2). In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied).
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 51. CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of
submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

52. See Dansal v. Hon. Fernandez, Sr., supra note 49.

53. Magante v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 48, at 1118-1119.

54. Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, 714 Phil. 55, 61 (2013).

55. Lt. Gen. Abadia v. Court of Appeals, 306 Phil. 690, 699 (1994).

56. Magante v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 48, at 1119.

57. 422 Phil. 246 (2001).

58. Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, id. at 280, citing Yuchengco v.
Republic, 388 Phil. 1039, 1062 (2000).

59. People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 233063, February 11, 2019.

60. Dansal v. Hon. Fernandez, Sr., supra note 49, at 906.

61. Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan, 424 Phil. 945, 950-951 (2002).

62. 242 Phil. 563 (1988).

63. 208 Phil. 658 (1983).

64. 237 Phil. 154 (1987).
65. 407 U.S. 514 (1972), <http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/407/514/> (visited
February 26, 2021).

66. Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, 808 Phil. 739, 748 (2017).

67. 276 Phil. 323 (1991).

68. 292-A Phil. 144 (1993).
69. 308 Phil. 728 (1994).

70. 374 Phil. 413 (1999).

71. G.R. Nos. 238579-80, July 24, 2019.

72. Supra note 59.

73. Supra note 48.

74. G.R. No. 206438, July 31, 2018.

75. "If it has been alleged that there was delay beyond the given time periods, the burden of
proof shifts." (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, id.)

76. Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, supra note 57, at 257, citing
Republic Act No. 7975, Sec. 4.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com

 77. Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 67, at 333-334; Andres v. Hon. Cacdac, Jr., 198
Phil. 600, 608 (1982); Acebedo v. Hon. Sarmiento, 146 Phil. 820, 824 (1970); and Kalaw
v. Apostol, 64 Phil. 852, 858-859 (1937).
78. "These time limits must be strictly complied with. If it has been alleged that there was delay
within the stated time periods, the burden of proof is on the defense to show that there
has been a violation of their right to speedy trial or their right to speedy disposition of
cases. The defense must be able to prove first, that the case took much longer than was
reasonably necessary to resolve, and second, that efforts were exerted to protect their
constitutional rights." (Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 74.)

79. Magante v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 48, at 1133, citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, supra
note 62, Angchangco v. Ombudsman, 335 Phil. 766 (1997); Roque v. Ombudsman, 366
Phil. 368 (1999); Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 54; and People v.
Sandiganbayan, 723 Phil. 444 (2013).

80. See Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 932 (2001); Salcedo v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 223869-960, February 13, 2019.

81. Dated July 13, 2004 and took effect on August 16, 2004.
82. A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC directed, among others, that during pre-trial, the judge shall ask
parties to agree on specific trial dates, and to adhere to the case flow chart which shall
contain the different stages of the proceedings and use the time frame for each stage in
setting the trial dates. Thereafter, the judge shall issue pre-trial order within ten (10)
days after the termination of the pre-trial. Said Order shall bind the parties, limit the trial
to matters not disposed of and control the course of the action during trial.
83. Effective May 1, 2020.

84. Section 7. Pre-Trial Order. — Upon termination of the pre-trial, the court shall issue an
order within ten (10) calendar days which shall recite in detail the matters taken up. The
order shall include:
xxx xxx xxx

(f) The specific trial dates for continuous trial, which shall be within the period provided
by the Rules;
(g) The case flowchart to be determined by the court, which shall contain the different
stages of the proceedings up to the promulgation of the decision and the use of time
frames for each stage in setting the trial dates[.]

85. Supra note 62.

86. 352 Phil. 557 (1998).

87. Supra note 48.

88. Supra note 79.

89. Supra note 79.

90. Supra note 66.

91. 789 Phil. 318 (2016).

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
 92. 421 Phil. 1075 (2001).
93. 791 Phil. 37 (2016).

94. See Adolfo v. Adolfo, 756 Phil. 325, 341-342 (2015).

95. Id. at 335.

96. Sec. 6. Maximum period for termination of cases. — As far as practicable, the trial of cases
before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous until terminated and
the judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was
submitted for decision.

97. Sec. 3. Maximum Period to Decide Cases. — The judgment or final order of a division of
the Sandiganbayan shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case
was submitted for decision.

Under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution "Rules of procedure ofspecial courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court." (See Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, supra note 58,
at 258).

98. Philippine National Bank v. Gregorio, 818 Phil. 321, 337 (2017).

99. Bro. Oca v. Custodio, 814 Phil. 641, 675 (2017).

100. 525 Phil. 804 (2006).

101. Id. at 808-810.

102. Id. at 810.

103. Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, 736 Phil. 264, 278 (2014).

104. De Leon v. Public Estates Authority, 640 Phil. 594, 609 (2010); and Re: Complaint of
Leonardo A. Velasco, 701 Phil. 455 (2013).

105. Supra note 12.

106. Rollo, pp. 19-24.

107. Id. at 29-30.

108. Supra note 14.

109. 484 Phil. 899, 918 (2004).
110. See discussion anent the "reasons for the delay."

111. Id.

112. Marcelo-Mendoza v. Peroxide Philippines, Inc., 809 Phil. 248, 262 (2017).

113. See Martin v. Gen. Ver, supra note 63, at 663. It was declared therein that for denial of a
constitutional right to the accused, the hearing tribunal may lose its jurisdiction to
conduct further proceedings; see also Apo Cement Corporation v. Mingson Mining
Industries Corporation, supra note 44.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2025 cdasiaonline.com