JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

PUBLICATIONS
under the direction of the
NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
JAPANtS COLONIALISM
AND INDONESIA
by

M. A. AZIZ
M. A. (Hist., Dacca), M. A. (Int. Relations, Dacca),
Ph. D. (Leyden)

•
MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE / 1955
The Netherlands Institute of International Affairs is an unofficia1 and
non-political body, founded in 1945 to encourage and facilitate thescien-
tific study of international questions. It is precluded by its rules from
expressing an opinion on any aspect of national or international affairs.
Any opinions expressed in this OOok are, therefore, purely individual.

Copyright I955 by Ma,tinus Nijho/l, The Hague. Holland.

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A II rights , eset'Ved, ;m;lud;ng the ,ight to t,anslate rw to , ept'oduce
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 Whoso writes the history of his own time
must expect to be attacked for everything he has said,
and for everything he has not said;
but those little drawbacks should not discourage a man
who loves truth and liberty,
expects nothing, fears nothing, asks nothing,
and limits his ambition
to the cultivation of letters.
VOLTAIRE
 PREFACE

The rise and fall of the Japanese empire constitutes one of the
most dramatic episodes of modern history. Within the short
span of fifty years Japan grew out of political backwardness into
a position of tremendous power. Japan's rise to power challenged
Europe's hegemony over Asia, but, paradoxically, it was Japan's
fall that caused the irreparable ruin of the colonial system over
Eastern lands.
Japan went to war against the West under the battlecry of
Asia's liberation from European colonialism. In reality, for forty
years, beginning with her first war against China, she had striven
to imitate this colonialism, as she had endeavoured to imitate
the political, military and economic achievements of Europe.
A thorough understanding of the imitative character of the
Japanese Empire might well have induced the leaders of the
nation to side with the conservative trend of political thought
in the Western world in order to maintain the existing world-wide
political system of which colonial rule was an accepted part. They
might have understood that an adventurous, revolutionary
policy was bound to result in grave dangers for their own state
and most conservative structure. Japan might have continued
to grow and to expand if she had succeeded to play the role of
the legitimate heir to Europe's decaying power in Asia. By
violently opposing that power, she undermined the very foun-
dations of her own rule outside the home-islands. The megalo-
mania of many of the Japanese leaders prevented them from
seeing the inner contradiction between their political aims and
the methods used to achieve these aims. They dreamt of and
planned the conquest of the modern world from an obsolete
point of view. The backwardness of their political thinking
fitted ill with the ultra-modern means of political action at their
disposal and the discrepancy became the cause of their de-
struction.
vIn PREFACE

In destroying European colonial power in Asia the super-

ficially modernised Japanese Empire destroyed itself. The fall
of Japan marked the beginning of a new period in the history
of the whole of Eastern Asia.
Many aspects of this dramatic episode in Asia's history have
been studied and described. Much more remains to be done,
especially on the period of 1941 to 1945 when temporarily Japan
ruled over most of East-Asia.

The archival material for this period is largely lost in the

turmoil of revolutions that everywhere followed upon the occu-
pation or, if still existant, is not yet available. On such material
as is available Mr M. A. Aziz, who is Lecturer on International
Relations at Dacca University, East-Pakistan, undertook the
difficult task to describe how the Japanese plans and policies
towards Indonesia grew out of the general Japanese colonial
concept and how these policies were put into practice.
With painstaking care he collected and compared the docu-
mentary material and wove them into a full and detailed narra-
tive of the events. The Netherlands Institute of International
Affairs feels happy to present the result of his work to the
reader as the first volume in a series of pUblications published
under its direction.
B. H. M. VLEKKE
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

lowe a special debt of gratitude to Dr B. H. M. Vlekke,

Director of the Netherlands Institute of International Affairs
and my teacher at the Institute of Social Studies, who first
inspired me to undertake this research project. Throughout
its prosecution, I have received his continuous help, guidance
and encouragement. His paternal care and advice enabled
me many a time to overcome temporary periods of distress.
I am particularly aware that without the interest taken by
him, the task I had undertaken would have remained unfulfilled.
I should therefore like to dedicate this book to him.
I am also deeply indebted to Prof. Dr T. H. Milo of Leiden
University who was kind enough to read my manuscript and
make valuable suggestions.
My sincere thanks are due to Mr G. van Veelo, English Master
at the Maerlant-Lyceum, The Hague, who patiently tutored me
in the Dutch language. I also have to thank Mrs o. Nooy van
der Kolff-Tellegen who spent countless hours in helping me
with the translations of the Dutch texts.
Mr H. Friedhoff has put me under a great obligation by
extending his generous help in all matters connected with the
publication of this work.
I am glad to take this opportunity to express my thanks in
particular to the authorities of the Netherlands Institute of
International Affairs, the Institute of Social Studies, the National
Institute of War Documentation at Amsterdam, the Peace Palace
Library and the Royal Library for their unfailing courtesy and
readiness to help in providing facilities and assistance.
I wish to record my deep appreciation to the Netherlands
Universities' Foundation for International Cooperation for
awarding the fellowship which enabled me to undertake and
complete this study, also to the Netherlands Institute of Inter-
national Affairs for supporting its publication.
x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authorities of Dacca University (East Pakistan) graciously

granted me leave of absence to pursue my studies in the Nether-
lands, for which I am grateful.
I have to thank my friends at the Institute of Social Studies
from whom I learnt a great deal and who helped me in many
ways, especially Miss Khurshid Hasan (Karachi) and Mr
William Howard (U.S.A.).
For the opinions expressed, I alone am responsible.

Institute of Social Studies, M. A. AZIZ

The Hague, February 1955
 CONTENTS

PART I

I. Japan starts conquering dependencies. 3

II. Policy in Formosa and Korea
Formosa . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
III. Plans for further conquest (1911-1930) 22
IV. Policy in Manchuria . . . . . . . . 30
V. Internal preparations for further expansion (1931-
1936). . . . . . . . . . . . 46
VI. Japanese blueprint (1937-1941) 57

PART II

I. Plans for Indonesia . 99

II. Preparations for conquest: negotiations 121
III. Conquest and occupation policy
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . 141
A. Military government. . . . . . 152
B. Elimination of Western influence 166
C. Economic reorganisation. . . 182
IV. Conquest and occupation policy II. Policy towards
the Indonesian people
Introduction. . . . . . . . . 194
A. Policy towards Islam 200
B. Policy towards nationalism. 208

Literature cited . 259

Index . . . . . 265
PART I
 SIBERIA

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 CHAPTER I

JAPAN STARTS CONQUERING DEPENDENCIES

During many centuries of her existence, as a nation and as

a state, Japan manifested a great interest in subjugating her
adjacent territories. With the Meiji Restoration in 1868 there
commenced a new chapter in the history of Japan. In a few
crowded years she was transformed from a weak medieval
empire into a modern powerful state. The rapid industrialisation
by means of state subsidies, the improvement in agriculture,
the abolition of feudalism, and the adoption of a parliamentary
but autocratic constitution on the Prussian model brought about
an unprecedented revolution in the economic, social and political
structure of the country. The military machine - an army after
the German style and a navy after the British - was quickly
perfected. Once the foundations of the state had been suc-
cessfully laid on the Western technical prerequisites of power,
Japan proceeded to embark on a policy of expansion. The
constant pressure of international power politics after the middle
of the nineteenth century also compelled her "to expand in
search of the foreign markets so desperately needed to realise
the profits which could not be obtained from the narrow market,
and in search of cheap essential raw materials which were denied
her through the accident of geography." 1
The desire to plunge into conquest was not new to the Japanese,
who, being the Chosen People, always believed in the divine
mission of Japan to conquer and rule other countries. Twenty-
six hundred years ago Jimmu Tenno, first Emperor of Japan,
is said to have given the divine command Hakko Ichiu, to bring
"the eight corners of the world under one Japanese roof". After
the Imperial Restoration his phrase was revived. Besides, "all
1 E. H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State (Institute of Pacific Re-
lations, New York 1946), p. 197.
4 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

through the eighteenth century the supporters of movements

for a restoration of the Imperial Power had consistently coupled
with this programme for a political revolution at home the idea
of aggression and expansion, and this was the policy recommended
by such teachers as Yoshida Shoin, who educated the Samurai
leaders of the clans that restored the Imperial Power in 1868." 1
The thoughts of new Japan turned once more to the empire
which Hideyoshi, often called the Napoleon of Japan, had set
out to conquer at the end of the sixteenth century. Hideyoshi
dreamt of subjugating China. In his reply to the letter from the
King of Korea, he said: "Since we cannot live in this world for
even one hundred years, how can we continue to confine ourselves
in this island? It has long been my ambition to conquer the
Ming Dynasty (China) by way of your country. Our Emperor
has expressed gratification at your readiness to establish re-
lations with us by sending a delegate to our nation. I hope you
will dispatch troops to help us when we mobilize our forces
against the Ming Dynasty." 2
Hideyoshi's plans actually extended far beyond the conquest
of China. His aim was to create a great Asiatic Empire with
China, Japan and Korea as the first unit and extending to other
Asiatic territories then known to the Japanese, such as India,
Persia, the islands of Uu Chiu, Formosa, the Philippines, and
the regions in the South Sea. 3
It is indeed amazing and significant that the new leaders
regarded the "unequal treaties", which Japan was forced to
conclude with foreign powers during the period 1853-1867, as a
means of promoting the country's great imperial ambitions.
Premier Baron Hotta, who submitted the text of the Townsend
Harris Treaty to the Emperor for his approval, defined the idea.
He pointed out that "among the rulers of the world at present,
there is none so noble and illustrious as to command universal
vassalage, or who can make his virtuous influence felt throughout
the length and breadth of the whole world .... " and that,

1 Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The World in March I939, ed. by

A. J. Toynbee and F. T. Ashton-Gwatkin (Oxford Univ. Press, London 1952), p. 118.

I Quoted in John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on International Affairs, I93il
(Oxford Univ. Press, London 1933), p. 358.
• See Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, Vol. I (Univ.
of California Press, Berkeley 1937), p. 143.
 JAPAN STARTS CONQUERING DEPENDENCIES 5

consequently, "in establishing relations with foreign countries'

the object should always be kept in view of laying a foundation
for securing the hegemony over all nations." Suitable alliances
should be "directed toward protecting harmless but powerless
nations." "Our national prestige and position thus secured",
continued Rotta, "the nations of the world will come to look
up to our Emperor as the Great Ruler of all nations, and they
will come to follow our policy and submit themselves to our
judgement." 1 The combination of emperor worship, the revival
of Shintoism as a national state religion and the spirit of Bushido
"made fertile ground in which to plant the seeds of an ideology
of expansion, such as modern Japan has witnessed." 2
Hardly had she set her feet on the path of modernisation when
Japan began her career of imperialist adventures. In 1875, only
seven years after the Meiji Restoration, the Kuriles were annexed.
Two years later the Bonin Islands were acquired. In 1879 het
Ryukyu (Liu Chiu) Islands were incorporated into Japan as a
prefecture under the name of Okinawa. The Volcano Islands
adjoining the Bonin Islands were annexed in 1891. Japan next
looked for expansion in the only direction taught by history and
geography, namely the Asiatic mainland where the Western
Powers had already begun to divide China, the Sick Man of the
Far East, into spheres of influence for themselves. Her eyes
naturally fell on China's tributary, Korea, for the Korean pe-
ninsula was "regarded as a dagger pointed at Japan's heart, a
source of constant irritation and menace to Japan's security." 3
In order to forestall the ambitions of other powers, particularly
those of Russia, in this Land of Morning Calm, Japan made a
successful war on China in 1894--1895. The war of 1894--1895
marked a definite turning point in Japan's policy along the
path of expansion. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895)
she acquired the rich island of Formosa, the Pescadores, and an
indemnity of 300 million taels 4. China had to recognise the
1 Quoted in Japan's Dream of World Empire. The Tanaka Memorial, ed. by Carl
Crow (Harper & Brothers, New York 1942), pp. 12-14. Japanese texts are usually
difficult to translate, as some words have a double meaning. Some authors suggest
'Great Arbiter' instead of 'Great Ruler'.
• Kurt London, Backgrounds of Conflict (The Macmillan Company, New York
1947), p.212.
• R. Hidelnichi Akagi, japan's Foreign Relations I54Z-I936 (The Hokuseido Press,
Tokyo 1936), p. 113.
• Chinese currency.
6 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

independence of Korea, which practically gave Japan a free

hand in the peninsula.
All these tangible results together with diplomatic prestige
which she had gained whetted Japan's appetite for further
conquests. The abolition of the extraterritorial system in 1899
gave her for the first time the full recognition as a power on equal
terms with other Western nations. Her participation in the
suppression of the famous Boxer Uprising in China in 1900
symbolised her entry into the ranks of the imperialist powers.
With her international position further fortified by the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance of 1902, she next proceeded to challenge her
great rival, Imperial Russia. The brilliant victory of the Land
of the Rising Sun over the Muscovite giant in the war of 1904-
1905 enabled Japan to achieve the status of a World Power.
Her gains were indeed significant. By the Treaty of Portsmouth
(September 5, 1905) she acquired Southern Sakhalin as well
as Russia's leaseholds to Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsu-
la, which she had to return to China in the face of the "demarche
of the East Asiatic Dreibund (Russia, France and Germany)" 1
after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Russian railway
and coal mining rights in South Manchuria and important
fishing rights in certain territorial waters of Siberia on the
Pacific were also ceded to Japan. Russia further acknowledged
that Japan possessed in Korea paramount political, military,
and economic interests, and undertook not to obstruct such
measures as Japan might deem it necessary to take there. The
defeat of Russia thus removed the last obstacle to Japanese
domination over the peninsula. Korea finally became a colony
of the Japanese Empire after her formal annexation in 1910.
Before the conquest of Manchuria in 1931 she remained by far
the largest possession of Japan with an area of 85,613 sq. miles
and a population of 13 million at that time. Thus ended the first
phase in the imperialist expansion of Japan.

t E. H. Norman, op. cit., p. 200.

 CHAPTER II

POLICY IN FORMOSA AND KOREA

A study of the salient features of Japanese colonial policy both

in Formosa and Korea is of more than historical interest, for
it sets the perspective to the period of Japanese occupation in
Indonesia.

FORMOSA

For nearly half a century Formosa had been under the rule
of Imperial Japan. Conscious of their new status as a colonial
power, acquired as a result of the country's first successful war
in modern times, the Japanese were eager to make their venture
a success, not only to serve the sole interests of Japan but also
"to satisfy their pride of possession and to gain repute among
the powers." 1 During the Japanese rule, this "beautiful" island
(the name Formosa is derived from the Portuguese word meaning
beautiful) "was a laboratory for the makers of colonial policy
in Tokyo." 2 Every effort was made to assimilate the island
politically, economically and culturally.
The administration of Formosa was under the direction of
the Central Government in Tokyo operating, first through the
Overseas Ministry and then through the Home Ministry. It was
highly centralised and autocratic, closely imitating that of Japan.
"The Government-General was a military regime, although
civilian titles were usually the rule." 3 The Governor-General,
who wielded wide and, to a great extent, autonomous powers,
was assisted in the supervision of the administration of the
1 Joseph W. Ballantine, Formosa (The Brookings Institution, Washington 1952),
p.25.
I "Formosa in Transition", The World Today, May I948, p. 210.

• Joseph S. Roucek, "Geopolitics of Formosa", World Affairs Interpreter, Winter

I95I, p.398.
8 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

five prefectures (provinces) and the three districts into which

Formosa was divided, by a Director General of Civil Adminis-
tration, an Advisory Council, and an Office of Imperial Affairs.
The Advisory Council, composed of high ranking officials and
prominent civilians, among whom were Japanese as well as
Formosans, "served largely the purpose of window dressing." 1
Legislation emanated entirely from Tokyo. 2
Local government was under the strict control of the central
administration. The provincial governors were aided by the
provincial assemblies and councils. Their functions were purely
advisory. All responsible positions were held by the Japanese.
In the lower ranks Formosans were employed, preference being
given to those who had undergone Japanese instruction in public
schools and who could speak Japanese. 3
It must be said to the credit of the Japanese rulers, however
severe their rule may have been, that Formosa, notorious for un-
rest and lawlessness under the Imperial Chinese Government, was
pacified in less than a decade and a stable government was estab-
lished, though the antipathy of the turbulent aborigines to Japanese
domination persisted. An elaborate police system was organised
not only for preserving peace and order but also for enforcing
censorship both in war and peace. During Japanese rule, political
and cultural movements could not assume great dimensions
owing to the policy of ruthless suppression, which "had as its
aim the complete elimination of native intellectual leadership. " 4
The result was that the Formosans could hardly acquire any
political education essential to self-government.
One of the main objectives of Japanese policy in Formosa was
to develop the island so as to serve the economic needs of Japan
and enhance her national power. That she succeeded in achieving
this end cannot be disputed. The island's economy was developed
as an integral part of the empire. Contrary to the expectation
of many that Formosa would prove to be a white elephant, she
became "entirely self-supporting" after 1904. She had been
valuable to Japan particularly because of her supply of foodstuffs
Joseph W. Ballantine, op. cit., p. 27.
1
• E. H. Dooman, H. Borton and C. Coville, "Formosa", The Department 01 State
Bulletin, June 3, I945, p. 1019.
• ibid., p. 1020.
• Joseph W. Ballantine, op. cit., p. 30.
 POLICY IN FORMOSA AND KOREA 9

and raw materials. She also provided Japan with markets for
industrial products.
Under Japanese rule, rice, the chief crop, more than doubled
in volume and about half was exported to Japan. "Japan took
in 1938 nearly 50% of the total yield, which amounted to
about 50,000,000 bu. or twice the yield of 1914." 1 The island
was turned into one of the most important sugar producing
areas of the world, and "except for about 200,000 tons of beet
sugar produced in Japan, Formosa has supplied the sugar needs
of the Japanese Empire, which normally run to about 1,500,000
tons a year." 2 As Professor Kenneth S. Latourette remarks:
"The increase in both rice and sugar was in consequence of the
desire of the Japanese government to make the empire self-
sufficient in its food supply." 3 The Japanese also encouraged
the export of superior varieties of bananas, pineapples and
oranges. Also they organised the production of oolong tea,
camphor, fish and they erected cement and paper-making
plants. The systematic development of communications was one
of the great achievements of the Japanese.
Another striking feature of Japanese rule in Formosa was the
control of private enterprise by the Japanese. Most of the hy-
droelectric power which had been developed on the island and
the mines were controlled by Japanese companies. "By 1941
the sugar manufacturing industry was almost entirely in the
hands of six Japanese companies." 4. The semi-official Bank of
Taiwan, opened in 1899, provided a system of currency. Opium,
tobacco, camphor, alcohol and salt were all monopolised by the
government. The extensive forest lands were owned almost
exclusively (91 per cent) by the government. The government
also administered the communications. In 1936 the Taiwan
Development Company was established to intensify the economic
exploitation of the island, the government providing half the
initial capital of 30 million yen. This company was even the
largest landholder in the island, which held 230,000 acres. 5
1 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 9 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Ltd., London 1951),
p.515.
• E. H. Dooman, H. Borton and C. Coville, op. cit., p. 1021.
• Kenneth S. Latourette. A Short History of the Far East (The Macmillan Com-
pany, New York, Revised Edition, Second Printing 1952), p. 511.
• Joseph W. Ballantine, op. cit., p. 41.
• Fred w. Riggs, Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule (Issued under the auspices
10 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

"Total corporate capital in Formosa amounted in 1939 to 357

million yen (83.5 million dollars), the Japanese-owned share,
which comprised 90 per cent, was in chief part the reinvestment
of profits made in Formosa. Total Japanese investments in
FormQsa reached nearly 800 million yen (216 million dollars)." 1
Thus there is little doubt that the Japanese dominated almost
every aspect of the island's economy.
The extent to which Japan succeeded in making Formosa
a constituent part of the Japanese Empire may be judged from
the foreign trade statistics. In 1939, 89.5 per cent of Taiwan's
exports went to Japan, and 9 per cent to Korea and Manchuria
under Japanese control. A similar situation existed with regard
to imports, Japan providing 83.4 per cent, and Korea and Man-
churia 12 per cent. 2
With characteristic perseverance the Japanese government
instituted a comprehensive system of public health and sanitation
supervised by the police. Plague, cholera and typhus were practi-
cally eliminated, and malaria and small pox were drastically
checked. "Though behind contemporary Western practice,
the medical and public health facilities of Formosa were in
advance of anything realised on the south and east Asian
mainland." 3
Though the purpose of Japanese colonial policy was certainly
not to develop the island for the benefit of the population, yet
their measures, incidentally, brought for the Formosans "the
highest material standard of living that is available to ordinary
citizens anywhere in the Far East, with the possible exception
of Japan itself." 4
No less attention was directed to oust foreign influence from
the island. Immediately after the occupation, the island which
is known to Occidentals as Formosa, was renamed Taiwan
(i.e. terraced fields). "Permission for foreigners to enter the island
was given reluctantly and only to very few persons." 5 Before
of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, The Macmillan Company, New York
1952), p. 67.
1 E. H. Dooman, H. Borton and C. Coville, op .cit., p. 1021.
• Fred W. Riggs, op. cit., p. 119.
• ilnd., p. 133.
• A. Ravenholt, "Formosa Today", Foreign Affairs, July I952, p. 616.
• A. J. Grajdanzev, "Formosa (Taiwan) under Japanese Rule", Pacific Aflairs,
September I942, p. 314.
 POLICY IN FORMOSA AND KOREA 11

Formosa was occupied by Japan a considerable part of British

exports to the island consisted of opium. This was declared a
government monopoly, as was the lucrative business in camphor,
salt and tobacco. Japanese steamship companies soon replaced
the foreign companies. The results of Japanese attempts to
exclude foreign influence were quite effective. This can be
corroborated from a study of the direction of the island's trade.
The share of Great Britain in Formosa's imports, which was
7.3 per cent in 1896-1900, ceased altogether in 1939. The share
of the U.S.A. for the corresponding years was 5.3 per cent and
0.4 per cent respectively, the share of China, 37.4 per cent and
0.5 per cent (1938). In 1896-1900, 63.1 per cent of the island's
exports went to China; in 1938 they fell to 1.7 per cent. 1
In sharp contrast to the above figures, the share of Japan in
1939, as has already been pointed out, was 83.4 per cent of the
imports and 89.5 per cent of the exports. There were no European
or American establishments on the island. Thus it may not be
too much of an exaggeration to say that "in 43 years the process
of economic assimilation was complete, the foreigners were
squeezed out and Taiwan became an exclusive preserve for the
Japanese industrialists and merchants." 1
Valuable as the island was to Japan, it was not congenial to
Japanese emigrants. Although the government put into force
an immigration plan for Formosa to reduce over-population
in the home islands, few Japanese wished to emigrate. In 1938
there were 309,000 Japanese in Taiwan, which was only 5.4 per
cent of the total population.
One of the major purposes of Japanese policy was to assimilate
the population to Japanese culture and to inculcate into the
people loyalty and obedience to Japanese rule. With this end
in view, they introduced elementary education and technical
training on an upper primary level for the natives, and restricted
the opportunities for advanced training to the Japanese residents.
Japanese was used as the medium of instruction, though Chinese
was taught as an advanced study. In 1927 Taihoku Imperial
University was set up to serve the needs of the ruling community.
In spite of religious toleration the people were urged to observe
Shintoism.
1 ibid.
12 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

The Japanese rulers also gradually adopted a policy of J apan-

isation towards the Formosan Chinese. The Chinese were in very
close contact with the mainland. Japan realised that it would
be suicidal to allow them to maintain their close ties with the
mainland as these might foster a Chinese consciousness in the
new subjects of her empire. Hence, Chinese immigration, except
for a quota of 10,000 coolies a year, was forbidden. Another
method that was adopted in 1898 to control the Formosan Chinese
was the pao-chia system of mutual responsibility and mutual
spying. 1 With the development of Chinese nationalism in the
mainland Japanese policy in Formosa took a new turn. Along
with the policy of repression, "conscious efforts were made to
wipe out Chinese influence in the cultural sphere. Primary
education was utilized as a principal means of denationalisation
and assimilation." 2
The strategical importance of Formosa owing to her geo-
graphical situation, led Japan, during the late thirties and the
war years, to develop and turn the island into a great military
base for the southward drive against the possessions of the
Western Powers. An important device that was adopted for
expansion outwards from Formosa was the recruitment and
training of Formosan Chinese, who were subservient to Japanese
interests for the purposes of espionage and other devious ac-
tivities in South China. 3 During the Second World War the
island made, according to the Japan Year Book, "invaluable
contributions toward the southward movement of the Imperial
Army and Navy." 4
With the formal inauguration of the Greater East Asia Ministry
on November 1, 1942, Formosa was placed under the Home
Ministry. The island was designated an integral part of Japan
proper and thus its colonial status was terminated. Only towards
the end of the war when Japan was confronted with a series of
military and political reverses, prudence forced her to relax
the rigorous features of the J apanisation policy to win the

1 ibid., p. 315. This system was first applied in China under the Chou dynasty and
perfected under the Sui and Fang dynasties.
• ibid., p. 316.
• Joseph W. Ballantine, op. cit., p. 45.
« Japan Year Book, I943-I944, p. 921. Quoted in Joseph W. Ballantine, op. cit.,
p.46.
 POLICY IN FORMOSA AND KOREA 13

goodwill and co-operation of the people in order to defend the

island against the Allied offensive. According to Tokyo broad-
casts on April 1, 1945, Emperor Hirohito issued a rescript granting
to Formosa representation in the Imperial Diet. This decree
provided that" .... three members from Taiwan will immedi-
ately be appointed to the House of Peers by the Imperial nomi-
nations for 7-year terms." 1 In addition Formosa was to be
represented by 5 members who were to be elected in 1946 in
the House of Representatives. It is quite obvious that the rescript
was "designed as part of the political scorched-earth policy and
as a method of political expediency rather than inspired by any
real desire upon the part of the Japanese government to grant
the Formosans any real status as Japanese subjects." 2

KOREA

Strategically situated and considerably rich in natural re-

sources, Korea was the second cornerstone of the imperial
structure. For more than three decades she was a source of
foodstuffs and raw materials, an outlet for manufactured goods,
and a base for further continental expansion for the Land of
the Rising Sun. During the period of her domination, Japan
steadily pursued, as in Formosa, a policy of integrating the
peninsula and its people into the political, cultural and economic
systems of her empire, and was able to turn towards the Asiatic
mainland the "dagger pointed at her heart."
Like Formosa, Korea was treated as a Japanese colony under
the supervision of the Overseas Ministry, but in November
1942, upon the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry,
she was "united" with Japan proper for greater control, and
responsibility was transferred to the Home Ministry.
The colonial government, which was set up after the annexation
in 1910, was based on a highly organised bureaucracy, with a
Governor-General "at the apex of Korea's pyramid of power." 3
"Although the post of Governor-General after 1919 was techni-

1 Quoted in E. H. Dooman, H. Borton and C. Coville, op. cit., p. 1020.

• E. H. Dooman, H. Borton and C. Coville, op. cit., p. 1020.

• George M. McCune, Korea Today (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge 1950), p. 23.
14 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

cally open to all, the office in fact was never occupied by a

civilian." 1 The Governor-General was bound by the laws of
Japan, but he had the power to issue decrees on a wide variety
of subjects outside the field of regular law. He was "virtually
an absolute monarch" 2 in the Korean peninsula. There was a
Central Advisory Council, composed of Koreans but nominated
by the Governor-General from the wealthy aristocracy and
business class for a three-year term. The Council did not possess
any authority and was "obviously a powerless puppet group
which did not represent the Korean people." 3
Local government was graded down from the province to the
village. The whole peninsula was divided into thirteen provinces,
each ruled by a governor. "The local organization in many
respects paralleled the set-up at the national level, the heads
of provinces, municipalities, and counties were all appointed
by the Governor-General." 4 As a result of the independence
movement of 1919, under the impact of President Wilson's
doctrine of national self-determination, the colonial adminis-
tration was forced to grant some degree of local autonomy.
Advisory Councils, which were to be elected in part by local
communities, were instituted. These councils, however, "served
the purposes of the Japanese administration by allying many
wealthy Koreans with the Japanese officialdom." 5 That the
Japanese attempted to govern the peninsula with the support
of the aristocracy is also borne out by the fact that upon annex-
ation, the Korean Emperor and Crown Prince were accorded
rank as Japanese Imperial Princes, grants were made to the
Royal Household, and titles conferred on many ex-Ministers
of State and former officials. 6
An important feature of the colonial administration in Korea,
as in her other possesions, was "the virtual monopoly by Japanese
of administrative positions on the higher levels .... More than
80 per cent of the highest ranking officials (Chokunin and Sonin),
1 Harley F. Macnair & Donald F. Lach, Modern Far Eastern International Relations

(D. van Nostrand Company, Inc., New York 1950), p. 623.

• A. J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (The John Day Company for the Institute
of Pacific Relations, New York 1944), p.238.
• George M. McCune, op. cit., p. 24.
• ibid.
• ibid., p. 25.
• "Korea Past and Present", The World Today, April I946, p. 182.
 POLICY IN FORMOSA AND KOREA 15

60 per cent of the intermediary rank (Hannin) , and about 50

per cent of the clerks, secretaries and minor employees were
Japanese." 1 The Koreans were mostly appointed in the lower
ranks of the administration.
The police system enjoyed a unique position in the colonial
administration. It was as a whole "self-contained and centralised"
under the control of the Governor-General. Its task was not
limited to the maintenance of peace and order and the prevention
and detection of crimes but, surprisingly enough, extended into
the field of politics, economic activity, education, religion,
morals, health, public welfare and fire control. The police had
also the power to exercise summary jurisdiction. The laws
applied in Korea were, in the main, Japanese laws. Despite the
hostile attitude of the people towards police control and its
various methods, the police were, however, "generally successful
in forestalling overt action on the part of the Korean public." 2
It was indeed remarkable that "the preparation of the Koreans
for eventual self-government had no place in Japanese policy." 3
Every attempt was made to check the fires of Korean nationalism.
The Koreans hardly accepted with equanimity their subjection
to Japanese rule, and the colonial power had to govern the
peninsula until 1919 by military force and martial law. The
Japanese suppressed all political organisations. The outbreak
of the independence movement, following the presentation
to the Japanese authorities of a Declaration of Independence
on April 1, 1919, signed by 33 leading Korean nationalists,
resulted in further severe measures by the colonial authorities,
as a result of which many Koreans had to take shelter abroad.
Japanese repression failed, however, to destroy Korean nation-
alist spirit, and a self-styled Korean Provisional Government
established itself in exile at first in Shanghai and remained
in existence until 1945. But Japanese domination "did succeed
in suppressing Korean leadership and in weakening the latent
capacities of the Koreans for assuming responsibility in governing
their country," 4 and hence, Korea remained "politically imma-
ture, according to Western standards." It was in view of this
1 George M. McCune, op. cit., p. 25.
2 ibid., p. 26.
3 "Korea Past and Present", p. 190.
• George M. McCune, op. cit., p. 28.
16 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

that the Cairo Declaration of December 1943 provided that

Korea "in due course shall become free and independent."
Closely connected with the japanese attempts to suppress
Korean nationalism was the policy of j apanisation of the Korean
people. The purpose was to make the Koreans loyal and obedient
japanese subjects and to obliterate all vestiges of Korean culture
and national individuality. As soon as Korea became a Japanese
colony, the educational system was reorganised on the japanese
model. "All the schools of lower grade were closed on the pretext
that the teachers were not pedagogical experts! After an interval
during which common school education was almost wholly in
abeyance the Japanese started schools in which the japanese
language and history were prominent." 1 The teaching of Korean
history and literature was suppressed. All the Korean geographi-
cal names were changed to Japanese. Korea was named Chosen
and the old capital, Seoul, Keijo.
"Textbooks and pUblications of all kinds were issued in the
japanese language. Proficiency in that language was the only
door to preferment." 2 It may be stated that the percentage of
Koreans who understood the japanese language rose from 0.6
in 1913 to 13.9 in 1939. 3 That education under Japanese rule
was essentially meant to serve the ruling nation is evident from
the fact that "while there were 380 elementary schools solely
for japanese children, there were some four hundred for the
Koreans, although the Japanese constituted less than two
per cent of the total population." 4 Even in the Keijo Imperial
University japanese students were in a majority, the number
being 350 out of the total of 556. 5
The Japanese rulers were equally interested in eliminating
foreign influence from the peninsula in order to fully absorb
the Korean nation. The important matter of education, which
was almost entirely in the hands of Americans, Canadians,
Englishmen and Frenchmen, was immediately taken out of
these Western hands. After December 8, 1941 all American
1 Encyclopaedia B1'itannica, Vol. I3 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Ltd., London
1951), p. 488.
• ibid.
• Mode1'n K01'Ba, op. cit., p. 269.
• Harold M. Vinacke, A History of the Fa1' East in Modern Times (Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., New York 1950), p. 354.
• Modern K01'ea, op. cit., p. 263.
 POLICY IN FORMOSA AND KOREA 17

institutions were closed and Christians were compelled to compro-

mise themselves by doing homage before Japanese shrines. 1
Japan was also careful enough to destroy particularly the British
and American commercial interests in the peninsula.
In the field of colonisation, the colonial power achieved little
success, although emigration was strongly encouraged. In 1939
there were only 650,100 Japanese in the peninsula out of a total
population of 22,800,647.
The main efforts of the Japanese were, however, directed to
orientate Korea's entire economy in such fashion as would aid
the imperial economy and the homeland. When Japan acquired a
free hand in Korea in 1905, it was expected by the Western
Powers that she would fulfil the duties towards the "white
man's burden" in the Far East. But "in reality Japanese domi-
nation of Korea was no more beneficial for the Koreans, and
possibly less so, than were other colonial regimes for their
subjects. Exploitation was the keynote and virtually every
development was undertaken with the objective of maximizing
the benefits which would accrue either directly or indirectly
to Japan." 2
It is also true at the same time that the peninsula under
Japanese rule underwent a remarkable economic development
and the Koreans materially benefitted by many of the im-
provements made, which was far from the intention of the
Japanese. As in Formosa, the Japanese created entirely modern
communications, a railway system, second only to that of
Japan itself, an extensive postal system, telecommunications
and good roads. The hydro-electric resources were harnessed;
the agricultural system was improved; better hygienic methods
were adopted; the primitive barter economy was replaced by a
modern monetary system integrated with that of Japan. "A
financial and banking structure appropriate to the needs
of a modern colonial power" 3 was built up. Attention was also
directed to promote light and heavy industries for the exploitation
of the colony's resources.
It should, however, be remembered that much of the develop-

1 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. I3, p. 487.

• George M. McCune, op. cit., p. 30.
• ibid., p. 31.
18 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

ment of Korea was effected for serving the interests of Japan.

The peninsula "was developed as a rice bowl for Japan." 1 The
annexation of Korea was followed by a period of extreme
rice shortage in the homeland. Rice production was, therefore,
enormously increased under a 30-year plan applied by the
Japanese. The result was that "by the early 19305 Japan
had succeeded with the aid of Korean and Formosan rice in
making herself self-supporting in her staple foodstuff." \I As
much of Korean rice was exported to Japan, the Koreans
were forced to cut down on their own rice consumption and to
import millet from Manchuria. The following statement may
serve as evidence of this fact: .. Per capita domestic consumption
in the five-year period 1931-1935 was 45 per cent lower than
that in the years 1916--1920. Yet in the same period the per-
centage of the rice exported to Japan had increased from 14
per cent to 48 per cent." 3
Apart from rice, the cultivation of cotton and tobacco as
cash crops for export was also increased. Korea was responsible
for almost all the cotton grown in the Japanese Empire. Ginseng,
a distinctively Korean crop, was cultivated as a government
monopoly in the north, mainly for export to South China where
it was much valued for medical purposes. 4
Korea was of prime importance to Japan also for her con-
siderable mineral wealth - coal, iron ore, gold and alunite, and
also some magnesite barytes, copper, fluorspar, graphite, lead,
lithium, mercury, mica, molybdenum, nickel, tungsten and
zinc, some of which - as for instance alunite, from which alu-
minium is derived - are not to be found in Japan. The production
of all these minerals indeed increased very considerably under
Japanese control.
The same can be said of industrial development. Korea's
considerable sources of hydroelectric power combined with
cheap labour facilitated a rapid increase in the output of industri-
al production. "At the time of the seizure of control by Japan
85.6 per cent of the Korean working population was employed
1 L. K. Rosinger & Associates, The State 0/ Asia (Alfred A. Knopf for the American
Inslitute of Pacific Relations, New York 1953), p. 131.
• "Korea Past and Present", p. 190.
• George M. McCune, op. cit., p. 36.
, Chambers's Encyclopaedia, Vol. 8 (George Newnes Limited, London 1950), p. 257.
 POLICY IN FORMOSA AND KOREA 19

in agriculture. By 1939 this proportion had sunk to 68.3 per

cent, while the percentage employed in industry and mining
had risen from 2.2 to 5.3. The value of industrial production
increased over 80 per cent between 1933 and 1938." 1
In the internal development of the peninsula the predominance
of Japanese interests was firmly established. As a result "few
Koreans attained positions of responsibility or wealth." 2 Only
small-scale household industry remained in the hands of the
Koreans. This was considered even by the Japanese authorities
as undesirable. The colonial policy further made it possible for
the Japanese to acquire the ownership of enormous tracts of
land in Korea. The process of expropriation of the Korean
peasantry reached such an extent that" 1,000,000 Koreans had
emigrated to Siberia and Manchuria in search of a livelihood." 3
The "hegemony of Japanese self-interest" was clearly visible.
In 1938 there were 121 Japanese mining companies in Korea,
as against 29 Korean companies. 4 Almost all the large industrial
concerns were owned by the Japanese. The Oriental Development
Company was "backed by the whole power of Japan." 5 Statistics
of corporations show that "at the end of 1938 Korean capital
represented 11.3 per cent of the total paid-up capital, whereas
the paid-up capital of the average Japanese corporation was six
times as large as that of the average Korean." 6
There is thus little doubt that Japan "came into practically
full possession of the Korean economy in the years after 1905." 7
"Financially, Chosen was controlled by Japan through control
of investments as well as through the operation of the Bank of
Chosen which was an official bank of issue of Japanese currency
and the single effective instrument by which fiscal policies of
the Japanese Government were carried out in that territory.
So strong was the hold of Japan over the economic structure
of Chosen, that approximately 97% of all corporations (Kaisha)
doing business in Chosen were controlled by Japanese. When
one adds to the picture the fact that the Government of Chosen
1 "Korea Past and Present", p. 187.
• George M. McCune, op. cit., p. 33.
• Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. I3, p. 490.
• "Korea Past and Present", p. 187.
• Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. I3, p. 490.
• "Korea Past and Present", p. 187.
, George M. McCune, op. cit., p. 30.
20 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

was completely Japanese, one can understand the completeness

of the integration of the two economies under the control of
Japan." 1 Korea's external trade may also serve as an index
to illustrate, to a great extent, this fact. In 1939 her exports to
Japan formed 73.2 per cent, and to yen-bloc countries 96.9
per cent of the total. Imports from Japan in the same year
accounted for 88.6 per cent, and from Japan and countries
occupied by her, 95.1 per cent of the total. 2
Thus, Japan built up her position in the Land of Morning
Calm by her policy of systematically altering the framework
of the country's government, culture and economy to conform
to her own interests and needs, and there is hardly any doubt
that she used this vital pillar as a base for the conquest of
Manchuria in 1931, thus fulfilling one of the objectives of Hi-
deyoshi, her sixteenth century leader.
The establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo tre-
mendouslyenhanced Korea's role in the eyes of the Japanese.
The peninsula was now made not only to serve as a link between
the Home Islands and the continental exploitation but also to
satisfy the requirements for further Japanese preparations for
war. Tills brought about an intensified industrial development
in the colony. The heavy industries - the exploitation and
primary processing of iron and steel, copper, the light metals,
and chemicals-received special attention and consideration. Gold
production was given particular care in this immediate pre-war
period, for gold was a source of foreign exchange with which
strategic materials could be obtained from the United States.
The output of gold reached 20 tons in 1937. 3 During the war
years the colony served Japan's war needs. In short, it can be
said that during thirty-five years of colonial rule, a "vassal
economic relationship" was established with Imperial Japan.
The Korean economy was only a part of that of Japan.

This short survey of Japanese policy in Formosa and Korea

makes it abundantly clear that in the political structure the
pivot of colonial administration was the principle of centralised

1 IMTFE Proceedings, p. 8, 442.

• Modern Korea, op. cit., p. 228.

• "Korea Past and Present", p. 187.
 POLICY IN FORMOSA AND KOREA 21

autocratic bureaucracy on the model of the mother country.

Economic exploitation of these territories through the framework
of the Japanese monopolistic economy for the benefit of Japan
appears to have been a dominant element. This, however,
was co-ordinated with the material development of these areas
so far as it was consistent with her own interests. The promotion
of emigration, the elimination of foreign influence, and the
cultural domination of the subject races with the ulterior object
of Japanisation and assimilation were the other chief charac-
teristics. In brief, paramountcy of Japanese interests was the
keynote of her colonial policy. This is, as we shall see, also
amply demonstrated in her occupation regime in Indonesia.
 CHAPTER III

PLANS FOR FURTHER CONQUEST

(1911-1930)

The occupation of Formosa, the acquisition of vast economic

interests in Manchuria, and the annexation of Korea prepared
the ground for further expansion of the Japanese Empire. "The
dreams of Hideyoshi and the program outlined in Lord Hotta's
memorial to the Emperor appeared more and more possible of
realization." 1
After the annexation of Korea in 1910, the question of ex-
tending the lease of Kwantung Peninsula and the South Manchu-
rian Railway zone "became one of paramount importance in
domestic as well as foreign politics of the Island Empire." 2 As
Baron Kato, before leaving London to become the foreign minis-
ter in the third Katsura cabinet, remarked in January 1913
that "Japan entertained vital political and psychological concern
in the Kwantung Peninsula and the concessions of the South
Manchuria"; that "the Japanese people were determined to
maintain a permanent occupation of the Kwantung Province";
and that if a "psychological moment" arrived, Japan would
not hesitate to extend the lease and concessions in Manchuria. 3
"The opportunity for which Baron Kato was waiting came,
in his opinion, with the World War." 4 The outbreak of the
war in Europe was regarded by Japan as a great opportunity
not only to destroy the German influence in Eastern Asia in
retaliation of Germany's part in the three-Power intervention
after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, but also to make
the empire more secure on the continent. Ostensibly shielded
1 Japan's Dream of World Empire. The Tanaka Memorial, p. 17.
I T. Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (Doubleday, Doran &
Company, Inc., New York 1935), p. 183.
• ibid., p. 184.
• R. Hidemichi Akagi, op. cit., p. 338.
 PLANS FOR FURTHER CONQUEST (1911-1930) 23

by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan, therefore, declared

war on Germany on August 23, 1914, and occupied the Kiaochow
Leased Territory as well as the German islands north of the
equator, which included the Marianas (excepting Guam), the
Carolines, and the Marshalls. "By occupying these stepping
stones Japan extended her territorial conquests and influence
to a zone of the Pacific which previously had been controlled
exclusively by Europe and the United States." 1
The complete elimination of Germany as a military and politi-
cal force in the Far East thus paved the way for the "psycho-
logical moment", of which Baron Kato had spoken two years
ago, and in spite of the earlier declaration that Japan had no
territorial ambition and her entry into the war been "strictly
limited to the necessities of her own self-defence," 2 Japanese
Minister Hioki at Peking, on January 18, 1915, presented directly
to President Yuan Shih-kai, in disregard of the Chinese Foreign
Office, a document known as the Twenty-One Demands, divided
into five groups, which were to be accepted by China.
These Demands were, however, the clearest possible indication
of Japan's ambitions in China. When they are examined in
detail, one is inevitably led to the conclusion that Japan wanted
"to take advantage of this war to get control of China." 3 As
envisaged by the Demands, "there would be three centres from
which Japanese influence would be exercised - Manchuria,
Shantung, and Fukien. Manchuria was to be made more com-
pletely a reserved area for Japanese capital and colonization,
but with administrative control wielded through advisers and
through priority in the matter of loans. In Shantung, the interest
formerly belonging to Germany was to be taken over and ex-
panded. A priority of right in Fukien was demanded, both in
investment and development; this would effectively bar other
nations and would assimilate this province to Manchuria. The
northern sphere of Japan was to be expanded by including
Inner Mongolia. From the Shantung sphere, influence could

1 P. H. Clyde, The Far East (Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York 1952), pp.380-381.
• T. Takeuchi, op. cit., p. 173.
• President Yiian Shih-kai remarked to the American Minister to China in 1914:
"Japan is going to take advantage of this war to get control of China". Quoted in
Paul S. Reinsch. An American Diplomat in China (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.,
London 1922), p. 129.
24 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

be made to radiate to the interior by means of railway extensions

to Honan and Shansi. Similarly, from the Fukien sphere, railway
concessions would carry Japanese influence into the provinces
of Kiangsi, Hupei, and Kwantung. The Japanese interest already
existing in the Hanyehping iron and coal enterprise, which was
a mortgage with right to purchase pig iron at certain rates,
was to be consolidated into a Japanese-controlled company.
Added to these was the significant demand that outsiders be
denied the right to work any mines in the neighbourhood of
those owned by the Hanyehping company without its consent;
nor were they to be permitted, lacking such consent, to carry
out any undertaking that might directly or indirectly affect the
interests of that company. This astonishing proposal sought to
make the Japanese concern the arbiter of industrial enterprise
in the middle Yangtse Valley." 1 It is significant to note that any
interference with the formal "integrity, sovereignty, and inde-
pendence" of China was avoided; but "actually she would be
brought under the sway of Japan in the manner most approved
by modern imperialism." 2
The most far-reaching demands were, however, included in
Group V, "a full acceptance of which on the part of China would
have reduced her to mere protectorate of Japan." 3 As Reinsch
states: "Group V consisted of the sweeping demands which
would have virtually deprived the Chinese Government of the
substance of control over its own affairs. The employment of
effective Japanese advisers in political, financial, and military
affairs; the joint Chino-Japanese organization of the police
forces in important places; the purchase from Japan of a fixed
amount of munitions of war - 50 per cent, or more; and the
establishment of Chino-Japanese jointly worked arsenals, were
embraced in these demands. The latter involved effective control
over the armament and military organization of China." "
While presenting the Demands, Japan emphasized the im-
portance of keeping the whole affair secret, in order "not to arouse
the suspicion abroad that advantage was being taken of the
helpless situation in China and of the world war." 6 "Significantly,
1 Paul S. Reinsch, 01' cit., p. 133.
• Harold l'tf. Vinacke, op. cit., p. 368.
• T. Takeuchi, 01'. cit., p. 188.
• Paul S. Reinsch, op. cit., p. 134.
• T. Takeuchi, 01'. cit., p. 189.
 PLANS FOR FURTHER CONQUEST (1911-1930) 25

the paper upon which the Demands were recorded was water-
marked with dreadnoughts and machine guns." 1 It is evident
that Nippon aimed at fulfilling her ambition by a threat of force
without having recourse to actual military action. Faced with
an ultimatum, China had to yield. Many, though by no means
all owing to the pressure of Western Powers, of the demands
set forth in the original document were incorporated in treaties
and notes on May 25, 1915. 2 Thus "the temptation afforded by
the preoccupation of Europe and the expansionist pressure from
within the nation" 3 secured for the Empire a commanding
position in China.
At the Peace Conference of Paris, 1919, Japan succeeded to
a great extent in safeguarding her newly-acquired status in the
Far East on the basis of the secret agreements of February and
March 1917 (by which England, France, Italy, and Russia had
promised to support the Japanese claims), the Lansing-Ishii
agreement of November 2, 1917 (by which the United States
had recognised that "territorial propinquity" gave Japan
"special interests" in China), and the Mandates System. En-
couraged by the successes achieved during the war years and
taking advantage of the Allied Intervention in Russia in the
summer of 1918, Japanese Militarists clamoured for further
territorial acquisition. Even after the withdrawal of the American
troops in January 1920, Japan continued to occupy the Maritime
Provinces and Northern Sakhalin. This imperialist expansion
was simultaneously marked by an increase in economic power.
"The war had given Japan a virtual commercial monopoly in
the foreign trade of China, India, the Netherlands Indies, and
Australia. Japanese factories experienced an unprecedented
growth, and, together with war industries, made Japan a creditor
nation with surplus capital seeking investment abroad." 4
Further, she was given a permanent seat on the Council of the
League of Nations, "which was equivalent to the recognition
that Japan was one of the half-dozen great Powers of the world." 5
1 George W. Keeton, China, the Far East and the Future (Stevens & Sons Limited,
London 1949), p. 147.
• For details see Harold M. Vinacke, op. cit., pp. 368-371.
• Kenneth S. Latourette, op. cit., p. 540.
« P. H. Clyde, op. cit., pp. 403-404.
• J. Hampden Jackson, The Between-War World (Victor Gollancz Ltd., London
1947), p. 287.
26 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Thus the close of the First World War had left the Land of the
Rising sun the predominant power in the Far East.
The rapid expansion of Japanese power, however, caused a
serious alarm to the Western Powers, particularly the United
States, whose interests in Eastern Asia seemed to be at stake,
and Japan had to renounce her forward policy on the Asiatic
mainland in the face of their strong and combined opposition
at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, mainly designed
"to apply the brakes to policies which Japan had followed since
the Twenty-One Demands of 1915." 1 She had to become a
party to the several Washington Treaties - Four-Power Treaty
of December 13, 1921, Five-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922,
and Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, 2 which had the
effect of erecting a legal barrier to the expansion of Japanese
imperialism. As a result of the Four-Power Treaty, the old
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, considered to be a bulwark of Japan's
expansionist policy in Asia, was replaced by the Anglo-American
bloc, thus devising a new balance of power in the Far East.
Japan was not only diplomatically isolated but also reduced
to a status inferior to that of Great Britain and the United
States by fixing the naval strength of Japan at 60% of Anglo-
American figures by the Five-Power Treaty. Though the Four-
Power and Five-Power Treaties temporarily safeguarded her
position in a limited area in the Western Pacific, American
leadership in the Far East was firmly established, and in future
she had to be prepared to face the united opposition of the
entire West. Moreover, Japan had to return to China the Kiaochow
territory, ceded to her by the Treaty of Versailles, and to with-
draw completely the fifth and the most objectionable group of
the Twenty-One Demands. She had, on the contrary, to subscribe
to the doctrine of the Open Door and Chinese territorial and
administrative integrity by becoming a signatory to the Nine-
Power Treaty. Pressure was also exerted to withdraw the
Japanese military forces from the Maritime Provinces and
Northern Sakhalin, which were finally restored to the Soviet
1 P. H. Clyde, op. cit., p. 447.
• Four-Power Treaty between Great Britain, the United States, France and Japan;
Five-Power Treaty between Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France and
Italy; Nine-Power Treaty between Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France,
Italy, China, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal.
 PLANS FOR FURTHER CONQUEST (1911-1930) Zl

Union in 1925. Thus "intimidated by a firm Anglo-American

front and by the moral pressure of world opinion, japan had
accepted, if not an open defeat, at any rate a serious check to
her ambitions." 1
Although the Washington Settlement compelled japan to
abandon her continental policy, Nipponese Militarists still
"continued to speculate on Hideyoshi's dream and to make
plans for its accomplishment." 2 On March 31, 1922, an important
meeting of army and navy officers was held in Tokyo and new
plans for war were formulated. An account of the meeting was
published the following day in the Yomiuri Shimbttn (a Tokyo
daily paper), in which it was stated that the Supreme War
Council had decided that, in the event of war, japan should at
once "establish close communications with the Asiatic mainland
in an area commencing from Hankow, Shantung up to Harbin
and Karafuto (Sakhalin), which would constitute her first line
of defence."
Concerning the plan of military operations, the paper made
the following startling revelations: "To strengthen her own
defence, japan should first of all augment her garrison forces
in Formosa, Karafuto, and Korea. In order to be adequately
supplied with war materials for a long struggle and to ensure
ultimate victory, japan should at all costs establish unhampered
access to the coal and iron producing centres at Hanyang and
Pinghsiang (that is, in the heart of the Yangtse Valley). To
forestall swift changes in her international relations, japan
should take over Peking; and to assure herself of a ready supply
of provisions from Manchuria, Mukden and Changchun should
be placed under her occupation." 3
The influence of the Militarists was, however, greatly reduced
as a result of the loss of prestige involved in the Washington
Treaties, and the next few years japan observed a policy of
"commercial expansion" and "political goodneighbourliness." 4
But again forces were silently at work to undo such a policy.
1 E. H. Carr, International Relations Between the Two World Wars I9I9-I939
(Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London 1947), p. 21.
• japan's Dream of World Empire. The Tanaka Memorial, p. 19.
• Quoted in Documents on International Affairs I932, ed. by John W. Wheeler-
Bennett (Oxford Univ. Press, London 1933), p. 359.
• A. J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs I93I (Oxford Univ. Press, London
1932), p. 400.
28 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

The disastrous earthquake of 1923 followed the post-war slump

"as a crowning economic blow." 1 Japan was already feeling
the pressure of a rapidly growing population (1 million a year
during the twenties of the present century), a source of em-
barrassment to the meagre economic resources of the country.
The economic instability was further intensified by the pro-
tective policy of other nations and the increasing Chinese boycott,
which hit her international trade. In the field of foreign relations,
her position was gradually becoming unfavourable. The United
States Restriction of Immigration Act of 1924, which was imi-
tated by several of the British Dominions, came "as an overt
political humiliation." 2 The decision of the British Government
in 1925 to establish a first-class naval base at Singapore looked
like a further blow to Japanese aspirations. More ominous were
the rise of strong Chinese nationalism with its philosophy of
bringing about the unification of the whole of China and the
gradual consolidation of Russian power in the Far East. As Prof.
A. J. Toynbee remarks: "Japan - fast bound to the Far Eastern
mainland by an unalterable accident of geography, as Britain
was bound to the continent of Europe - could scarcely hope to
maintain her hardly won rank of a Great Power if the U.S.S.R.
and a militantly Nationalist China, reunited by Russian aid,
were to league themselves together against her. Poor as Japan
was in minerals, her economic interests in Manchuria were not
superfluities but vital necessities of her national life. On the
other hand, her political status in the leased territory of K wan-
tung and in the zone of the South Manchurian Railway was not
only an eyesore to Russia but was a servitude upon Chinese
national sovereignty which young China might be expected
to challenge so soon as it lay in her power.
"Thus the international position of Japan - with Nationalist
China, Soviet Russia, and the race-conscious English-speaking
peoples of the Pacific closing in upon her - had suddenly become
precarious again." 3
The result was that the conciliatory policy was discredited,
and General Baron Tanaka, a former war minister and a leading
1 A. J. Toynbee, Survey 0/ International A//airs I9Z6 (Oxford Univ. Press, London
1928), p. 386.
• ibid.
• ibid.
 PLANS FOR FURTHER CONQUEST (1911-1930) 29

figure of the Militarists, came to power in April 1927 with his

"strong" policy towards China. Premier Tanaka called an im-
portant conference of key officials (June 27-July 7, 1927),
which formulated "the positive policy towards China." A docu-
ment published a few months later in Chinese papers as the
Tanaka Memorial, and said to have been presented to the
Emperor on July 25, 1927, "purports to be the findings of
Tanaka's conference." 1
The Tanaka Memorial is, however, one of the most striking
documents dealing with Japan's far-reaching imperialistic aims.
Though the pUblication of this document caused a great deal of
surprise, "it did not contain anything that had not been con-
tained in Hideyoshi's letter, in Lord Hotta's memorial to the
Emperor, or in the writings or speeches of dozens of other Ja-
panese patriots and statesmen over a period of three centuries." 2
The Memorial says: "For the sake of self-protection as well as
the protection of others, Japan cannot remove the difficulties
in Eastern Asia unless she adopts a policy of Blood and Iron.
But in carrying out this policy we have to face the United States
which has been turned against us by China's policy of fighting
poison with poison. In the future if we want to control China,
we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had
to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But in order to conquer
China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order
to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we succeed
in conquering China the rest of the Asiatic countries and the
South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the
world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare
to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor
Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence." 3
"Having China's entire resources at our disposal", continues the
Memorial, "we shall proceed to conquer India, the Archipelago,
Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe." 4 Thus the docu-
ment clearly reveals Japan's dream of world empire. She was
now on the look out for an opportunity to push forward.
1 P. H. Clyde, op. cit., p. 495. The document "was frequently referred to in the
Japanese Press before the Manchurian situation arose in September 1931, without
ever raising any doubt as to its authenticity" - John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Documents
on International Affairs I932, p. 361.
• Japan's Dream of World Empire. The Tanaka Memorial, p. 20.
• ibid., pp. 28--29. • ibid., p. 33.
 CHAPTER IV

POLICY IN MANCHURIA

In Manchuria Japanese policy marked a significant departure

from that which she had followed in Formosa and Korea. She
here demonstrated a novel technique in imperialism, by avoiding
the cruder nineteenth century methods of open annexation or
the proclamation of a protectorate. Her dexterous manipulation
resulted in the creation of a political organisation, which assumed
the garb of an independent and sovereign state.
The expulsion of the regime of Chang Hsueh-liang after the
"incident" of September 18, 1931 was immediately followed by
the reorganization of local governments, "aided by the strength
of the Chinese sentiment of local particularism and of attachment
to particular leaders." 1 Having established suitably subservient
provincial administrations by January 1932, the Japanese then
proceeded to the next step of co-ordinating them into a single
state. They, therefore, organized a Self-Government Guiding
Board, the main purpose of which was to foster an independence
movement, directed and operated by the Kwantung Army
(which had been responsible for the conquest of Manchuria) but
headed by a Chinese, Yu Chung-han. This, in turn, gave birth
to a Northeastern Supreme Administrative Council for preparing
the foundations of the new state. On February 18, 1932 this
body issued a Declaration of Independence, and expressed its
intention of setting up the Republic of Manchukuo, with Henry
P'u Vi, ex-Emperor of China, as the Chief Executive. To give
the appearance of self-determination an All-Manchurian Con-
vention was held at Mukden on February 29. On March 9 an
Organic Law, providing a constitution, on the Japanese model,
was promulgated, and Henry P'u Vi, who had been in Japanese
1 F. C. Jones, Manchuria Since I93I (Royal Institute of Int. Affairs, London
1949), p. 20.
 POLICY IN MANCHURIA 31

custody, was formally installed as the Regent. Three days later

the foreign Powers were informed of the creation of the "inde-
pendent" and "sovereign" state of Manchukuo and were re-
quested to extend recognition to it. The constitution was reorga-
nized by the Organic Law of March I, 1934 when the Regency
was dropped, and an imperial system was established, with the
Regent becoming Emperor of Manchukuo.
Despite Japanese assertions, Manchukuo was far from being
either "independent" or "sovereign," and "was kept under
careful Japanese supervision and direction," 1 which was charac-
teristic of Japanese colonial administration. The puppet character
of Manchukuo was revealed by various methods of control
exercised by Japan. Although the Emperor of Manchukuo was
vested with executive, legislative and judicial powers, he, like
the Emperor of Japan, did nothing without the advice of his
ministers, who in turn were controlled by Japanese vice-minis-
ters. 2 The General Affairs Board of the State Council, which
was "the real director of poHcy and controller of all governmental
activities" 3 and which was, according to one Japanese officer
of the Kwantung Army's General Staff, "a steel frame" "holding
together the whole regime, was always headed by a Japanese;
while each of its six bureaux was also headed by a Japanese.
Although the highest posts were generally held by Manchus,
the actual administrative control was in the hands of Japanese
officials, who were placed in key positions, either as advisers or
direct officials. At the end of 1936, "taking the administrative
branches of the government as a whole, including the provincial
offices, the tendency was to approximate to a ratio of 40 per cent
Manchurians to 60 per cent Japanese in the three upper grades
of the Civil Service." 5 These figures show that the Manchukuo
regime was not only directed at the top by Japanese officials
"ensconced" in the General Affairs Board, but that routine
administration was principally carried on by Japanese civil
servants.
The direct authority of Japan itself was represented by (1) the
1 Kenneth S. Latourette, op. cit., p. 583.
• F. c. Jones, op. cit., p. 25.
• ibid.
• The Times, May I7, I932. Quoted in F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 25.
• T. A. Bisson, Japan in China (The Macmillan Company, New York 1938), p. 368.
32 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army; (2) the Governor

of the K wantung Leased Territory, "who had civil jurisdiction
in the territory, control of the police in the territory and in th~
Railway zone, and a measure of direction of the administration
of the South Manchurian Railway" 1; (3) the South Manchurian
Railway, which had been in many ways "an agent of Japanese
imperialism" 2 in Manchuria ever since its establishment in 1906;
and (4) the consular agents, who exercised extraterritorial
jurisdiction over Japanese subjects. In addition, an Ambassador
was appointed on October 1, 1932 to represent Japan. Moreover,
the combination of the three offices of Commander-in-Chief
of the Kwantung Army, Governor of the Kwantung Leased
Territory and Ambassador to Manchukuo in one person "had
the effect of extending the authority of the Japanese Army
itself over the civil advisers and administrators and thus over
the government of Manchukuo." 3 In Tokyo there was set up
the T aiman ] imukokyu or Manchurian Affairs Board, of which
the Minister of War was the President, "thus ensuring military
control of Manchurian policies." 4
That Manchukuo was a mere puppet of the Japanese is also
evident from the Protocol of Alliance, which was concluded on
September IS, 1932 between the two countries, but "which
had been drafted in Tokyo and approved by the Privy Council
and the Emperor." 5 Japan formally recognised Manchukuo as
an independent state "organised in accordance with the free
will of its inhabitants", and Manchukuo agreed to respect all
Japanese rights and interests within that territory acquired by
virtue of Sino-Japanese treaties, agreements or other arrange-
ments, whether public or private. Japan was further given the
right to station whatever forces she deemed necessary in Man-
chukuo. Thus the fiction was proclaimed that Manchukuo was
an independent state, while the Kwantung Army remained
stationed in the country.
A thorough reorganization was effected in provincial and
local governments. Manchuria was now divided into 19 provinces
1 Harold M. Vinacke, op. cit., p. 522.
2F. c. Jones, op. cit., p. 36.
• Harold M. Vinacke, op. cit., p. 522.
• F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 35.
• ibid., p. 24.
 POLICY IN MANCHURIA 33

besides the two special municipalities of Hsinking and Harbin,

which existed until July 1937. The provinces were subdivided
into hsien or prefectures, each headed by a prefect appointed
and controlled by the provincial governor. The Japanese made
no secret of the fact that these provincial and local administrions
were "as thoroughly under the direction and control of Japanese
'advisers' as was the Central Government in Hsinking." 1
The Japanese claimed to have provided Manchukuo with a
modernized judicial, legal, and police system, but in reality the
reforms had been devised by the Japanese and were an impo-
sition upon Manchuria of Japanese legal and judicial concepts
and methods. "They were part of the process of 'Nipponizing'
Manchuria and of making it in reality part of the Japanese
Empire. Furthermore, the law courts, police, and prisons in
Manchuria were staffed by Japanese nationals to an even greater
degree than was the case with other branches of the 'Manchukuo'
administration, so that what happened in reality in 1937 was not
the subjection of Japanese in Manchuria to a native Chinese
jurisdiction, but rather the imposition of Japanese courts and
police upon the whole Manchurian people." 2 Thus it is clear
that the Manchukuo Government was essentially a Japanese
one with a Chinese facade.
Since it was the policy of Japan to dominate Manchuria
through a puppet regime, isolating it from the rest of China,
the Japanese strove to foster a Manchurian national feeling to
counterbalance the idea of the common nationality of all Chinese
propagated by the Kuomintang. By naming the new state
Manchukuo, by terming the inhabitants Manchurians and by
selecting the last Manchu Emperor as her ostensible ruler, the
Japanese endeavoured to win over the Manchu minority through
an appeal to traditional sentiments and the memory of past
glories, and to make them instruments of Japanese imperialism.
They recruited Manchus for the administration.
In their treatment of other racial minorities - Mongols,
Koreans, Muslims, and White Russians, the Japanese adopted
the old Manchu policy of divide et impera in order to resist
Chinese efforts to assimilate them, while at the same time
1 ibid., p. 28.
• ibid., p. 32.
34 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

complete racial equality and harmony was proclaimed by

choosing a five-coloured flag, which symbolised the five races.
By a promise to the Mongols of local autonomy Japan hoped
to secure their support in order to be "well placed to penetrate
Inner Mongolia and eventually to undermine the Soviet
position in Outer Mongolia. She would thus obtain great political
and geographical advantages in the ultimate conflict with the
U.S.S.R. which the Japanese warlords reckoned was only a
matter of time. So Japan's Mongol policy was a vital part of her
whole expansionist drive on the Asiatic Continent." 1 Instead
of the Mongols being united politically into the Pan-Mongol
Empire, of which some of them dreamed, they were divided to
form four Hsingan (Mongol) provinces - east, west, north and
south.
The Japanese made extensive use of the Koreans in Manchuria
(who numbered some 800,000 in 1931), many of whom had ac-
quired a fluent knowledge of Chinese. Organized Korean emi-
gration to Manchuria was promoted particularly to offset the
largely Chinese character of the population and to make the
Koreans reliable agents of Japanese policy. An increase of the
Korean population in Manchuria was also desired to enhance
rice production. As a result, in August 1945 there were some
2 million Koreans or over 5 per cent of the total population of
the state. 2
The White Russians (30,322 in 1927) were "urged to believe
that Japanese domination in Manchuria would put an end to
the oppression from which they had suffered, and also that
one day Japan would aid in the overthrow of the Soviet regime
itself and in the restoration of the monarchy and of the Orthodox
Church in Russia." 3 The Japanese control, however, brought
little relief to these White Russians, and those who had
hoped for Japanese action against the Soviet Union saw their
hopes dashed by the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality
Pact of 1941.
The Japanese further endeavoured to use the Muslims in
Manchuria, who were vanously estimated at from about a

1 ibid., p. 61.
• ibid, p. 75-76.
• ibid., p. 77.
 POLICY IN MANCHURIA 35

quarter of a million to about two million, to spread pro-Japanese

feelings among the Muslims in China and the Far East in general.
A Manchukuo Islamic Society was organized in May 1939. This
body sent delegates to an East Asia Islamic Conference held
in Tokyo in September 1939. 1
The establishment of the new regime was immediately followed
by a thorough remodelling of the educational system so as to
make it an instrument of propaganda on behalf of the new state.
Most of the Chinese schools were closed. The Chinese universities
and colleges also shared the same fate, as these were considered
to be centres of nationalism and anti-Nipponism. On March 25,
1932 an ordinance was promulgated, in which it was stated that
"in the curriculum of every school should be embodied the
fundamental principle of Li Chiao or Confucianism, and any
text-book containing any hint of political investigation should
be abolished altogether." 2 The use of old text-books was thus
eliminated. All anti-Japanese teachers were dismissed and their
places filled by more pliable ones, who were given a three months'
course in a teachers' training school opened in Hsinking in April
1933. Many Japanese were also appointed. This Japanese-
dominated educational system was designed to inculcate into
the rising generation loyalty to the new regime and a feeling
of Manchukuo nationality, and to promote a belief in "the
indivisible relationship of Japan and Manchukuo." Special
attention was given to the teaching of Confucianism and the
doctrines of Wang Tao, or the Kingly Way, which somewhat
resembled the Japanese theory of Kodo, or the Imperial Way.
"It suited the Japanese to retain and to promote the teachings
of Confucianism and the concept of Wang Tao, in order to
counteract the spread of republicanism, democracy, and Marxism,
which threatened to disrupt the traditional basis of Oriental
Society." 3
Under the new system exclusive emphasis was laid on ele-
mentary education and vocational training. Vocational training
was stressed in an effort to ensure a ~upply of recruits to the
rapidly expanding industries of the new state, although the
1 ibid., p. 80.
• S.M.R. Fourth Report on Progress in Manchuria, I934, pp.227-8. Quoted in
F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 46.
• F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 47.
36 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Japanese themselves held all the higher managerial posts as

well as a good part of the subordinate ones. In 1938 there were
13,886 Primary schools, 108 Middle schools, 66 Vocational
schools, 8 Colleges and 1 University. The Colleges were all
agricultural, industrial or medical institutions. Japanese was
made compulsory in all institutions above the lower primary
grade. Manchu language was used as the medium of instruction
in the lower primary schools. It may be said that the educational
policy appeared "to have had some effect upon the susceptible
minds of the younger children, as the Japanese calculated that
it would." 1 The revival of Confucianist teachings was not
unwelcome to the conservative elements among the Chinese.
The propertied class also considered the Japanese control as
the most effective bulwark against the danger of Communism.
Ever since the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, which gave the
Land of the Rising Sun a firm footing in Manchuria, the Japanese
statesmen had cherished the dream of colonising that country
with large numbers of their countrymen, and this had been
prompted by strategic, political and economic considerations,
and was also regarded as a solution to the problem of surplus
population at home. The establishment of the Manchukuo
regime under the control of the Kwantung Army removed all
Chinese opposition to Japanese immigration, and finding that
the existing Japanese settlers, consisting mostly of ex-servicemen,
had done useful work in the conquest of Manchuria, the
Kwantung Army decided "to establish a series of strategic
settlements somewhat on the model of the Roman coloniae", 2
with a view to Nipponize the frontier regions of Manchuria.
Thus by 1936 there were 4,245 Japanese in the four Govern-
ment-controlled military settlements, located at Yungfengchen,
Hunanying (in eastern Manchuria), Sui Lang (north of Harbin)
and another in eastern Sanchiang province.
Encouraged by the records of these pioneer settlements,
semi-official concerns like the To-A Kangyo, or East Asia In-
dustrial Development Company, and later the Manshu Takus-
hoku Kabushiki Kaisha, or Manchuria Colonisation Company
undertook the task of Japanese rural settlement in Manchuria.
1 ibid., p. 53.
• ibid., p. 87.
 POLICY IN MANCHURIA 37

In September 1937 the Manchuria Colonisation Company was

replaced by a new organization, the Manshu Takushoku Kosha,
or Manchuria Colonial Development Company. A grandiose
scheme was prepared in June 1936 for the settlement of 5 million
Japanese over a twenty-year period.
An initial five-year plan, which envisaged the settlement of
100,000 Japanese families in Manchukuo by the end of 1941,
was incorporated in the first Manchukuo Five Year Industrial
Development Plan, launched in 1937. Training colleges and
institutes for preparing the selected colonists were set up in
Japan. In November 1937 an organisation was also formed in
Japan to inaugurate immigration into Manchuria of youths
from sixteen to nineteen. With the declaration of the policy
of a New Order in East Asia and of a Japan-Manchukuo-China
political, ideological, and economic bloc, a Basic Outline of
Colonisation Policy was promulgated in July 1939. The pro-
tracted conflict with China and the general preparations for war,
however, proved serious obstacles to the carrying out of the
scheme for colonisation. At the beginning of 1940 there were
just over 68,000 Japanese colonists in Manchuria, which was
far below the target set in 1936. 1
That the state of Manchukuo was only meant to serve Japan's
interests can be further illustrated by a study of the general
economic policy, whose aim was not only "to strengthen the
economic inter-dependent relations" 2 between the two countries
but also "to build up in Manchukuo an economic and military
base which will be as self-sufficient as possible." 3 Just as earlier
agreements had provided that "Manchuria should submit,
beforehand, all diplomatic and military matter to the Japanese
government for thorough and unreserved deliberation,'" an
agreement was concluded on July IS, 1935 for the establishment
of a Japanese-Manchukuo Joint Economic Committee, which
would provide "co-operative measures in the economic field
which plays a close and vital role in uniting the two countries." 5
1 ibid., p. 94.
• Fat' East Mil. Tt'ib., Exhibit No. 850, Record of Meeting of Privy Council, 3 July,
1935. Re: Conclusion of Agreement between Japan and Manchukuo on Establishment
of a Joint Economic Committee.
• Quoted in Harold M. Vinacke, op. cit., p. 530.
• Fat' East Mil. Tt'ib., Exhibit No. 850.
• ibid.
38 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

This agreement shows the limited extent of the independence

that Manchukuo enjoyed. The Joint Economic Committee, to
which all questions were submitted before either government
could take any action, was actually, if not in theory, dominated
by the Japanese members. Moreover, economic problems of
mutual interest, which could be handled directly by Japan,
were left entirely out of the scope of this committee and were
dealt with by "unilateral contracts binding only on the Manchu-
kuo government." 1
An important step towards an inseperable tie between the
two countries was taken in November 1935 when the Yen Bloc
was formally created, by which Manchukuo's currency was
legally cut off from its silver basis and stabilised at par with
the yen. "This action integrated the monies of the two countries,
Japan and Manchukuo." 2 "Manchukuo became virtually a part
of Japan's domestic market, since no foreign exchange trans-
actions were required to carry on trade between the areas." 3
As Manchuria is rich in mineral resources, raw materials and
foodstuffs, and as her conquest was considered to be a further
step towards the realization of Japanese hegemony in East Asia,
the Manchurian authorities, under the control of the K wantung
Army, embarked upon a policy of planned economic development,
so as to transform the country into a "continental war base."
This economic policy, which might be called "Quasi war-time
economy" (Junsenii Keizai), was defined on March 1, 1933 in the
Economic Construction Programme, which provided, among
other things, state control of industrialisation to conform to
strategic necessities. Consequently, the South Manchurian Rail-
way, which was "the first of the great semi-official companies
organized to promote Japanese economic and political interests
on the Asiatic continent" 4 and whose "capital was raised in
1933 to 800 million yen (half of which had been supplied by the
Japanese government)", 5 remained during the period 1932-1937
the principal instrument of the industrialisation programme

1 ilnd.
• Far East Mil. Trib. Proceedings, p. 8,435.
• Harley F. Macnair & Donald F. Lach, op. cit., p. 475.
• F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 103.
• J. B. Cohen, japan's Economy in War anti Reconstruction (Univ. of Miunesota
Press for the Institute of Pacific Relations, Minneapolis 1949), p. 38.
 POLICY IN MANCHURIA 39

in Manchuria. The most important achievement of this Railway

Company was the unification of the Manchurian railway system
and its extension, which, while primarly strategic in design,
made possible the intensive exploitation of the mineral and
agricultural resources of the country. The railways of the former
Chinese government and the Chinese Eastern, having been
purchased from Russia, were brought in 1935 under the manage-
ment of the South Manchurian Railway Company and thus
merged with the existing Japanese railway system. The extension
of the railway network resulted during 1932-1936 in a forty per
cent increase in mileage. Communications were further improved
by the construction of new highways and expansion of the
telephone and telegraph systems.
In order to furnish a means of financing the planned develop-
ment of Manchurian industry, the Industrial Bank of Manchuria
was created in December 1936 and was originally capitalised
at 60,000,000 yen but later increased to 100,000,000 yen. "The
facilities offered by this Bank provided easy financing for pre-
ferred industries named by government policy which, after all,
was Japanese dominated." 1
Along with the economic exploitation of Manchuria there
took place a significant development. The "young officer"
group, which was opposed to "monopoly capitalism", sought to
exclude the older Zaibatsu 2 from any direct participation in the
economic activity of Manchuria, and encouraged the growth of
what were termed Shinko-Zaibatsu (or New Zaibatsu). Their
enterprises "were almost entirely confined to the iron, steel,
light metal, and chemical industries, the very ones which the
Army desired to foster. They, therefore, gave wholehearted
support to the policy of militaristic expansion to which the Army
was committed." 3 Of the new capital groups that grew in strength
in consequence of this policy, the most important was the Nippon
Sangyo Kaisha, popularly known as Nissan. When the outbreak
ofthe Sino-Japanese conflict in July 1937 made it imperative for

1 Far East Mil. Trib. Proceedings, p. 8,435.

• The term Zaibatsu means literally 'money-cliques', and is used to signify certain
great japanese business concerns with widespread interests. The four major Zaibatsu
are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda. These groups played a vital role in
the economic development of japan.
3 F. C. jones, op. cit., p. 148.
 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

the Kwantung Army to establish, in December 1937, the Man-

churia Heavy Industry Company (Mangyo) , half the capital
was provided by Nissan and the remaining half by the Manchu-
kuo Government, which transferred to M angyo most of the
state-controlled industrial enterprises. Nissan also obtained
financial support from the special banks. 1
By 1936 the foundations of the ambitious political and eco-
nomic edifice had been successfully laid, and the way was felt
clear for the adoption of the first Five-Year Plan of Industrial
Development, similar to the Soviet Five-Year Plan. "The first
five-year development plan for Manchuria, adopted in 1937,
was a grandiose scheme for all-round development of Manchuria
with special emphasis upon exploitation of natural resources and
utilization of them in Manchuria in new war industries." 2 At
the same time in May 1937 a Special Industries Control Law was
promulgated, which specified twenty-one industries as coming
within the sphere of strict governmental control. The general
principle followed was that, to quote F. C. Jones, "each State-
controlled or State-supervised concern should be responsible
for one particular industry, while comprehensive planning and
direction should be exercised by the General Affairs Board of
the Manchukuo Government, in conjunction with the Economic
Research Bureau of the S.M.R. and the Headquarters of the
Kwantung Army, now located in Hsinking. Final decisions
undoubtedly rested with the last-named body." 3 A second
Manchurian Five-Year Plan was launched in 1942 "to stress
the importance of Manchuria as a vital part of the key inner
zone of defence."
Although adverse circumstances, such as the lack of adequate
capital, materials and labour prevented the full execution of these
plans, significant gains were made. In 1944 alone "there was a
probable production of 25 to 30 million tons of coal, 3 million
tons of pig iron and 1.5 million tons of steel ingots." " The pro-
duction of electric power, one of the prerequisites for industrial
progress, reached about three million KW. in 1944--45. /; In view
1 G. C. Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan (George Allen & Unwin

Ltd., London, Third Impression 1951), p. 149.

• J. B. Cohen, op. cit., p. 40.
• F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 147.
• ibid., p. 154.
• ibid., p. 158.
 POLICY IN MANCHURIA 41

of Japan's paucity in oil reserves the exploitation of oil from the

shale beds at Fushun was increased. The Japanese also expended
considerable energy and capital in the exploitation of other
minerals. Gold production occupied an important place in the
first Five-Year Plan. Emphasis was laid on the utilization of
alumina shale and fire-clay deposits owing to the lack of bauxite
in the Inner Zone. Every effort was made to increase the pro-
duction of aluminium for the aircraft industry. Manchuria
possesses one of the world's richest deposits of magnesite, and
a number of companies participated in the extraction and re-
fining of this material. The Japanese were equally active in
mining the lead, zinc, and copper deposits. It is believed that
in 1944 the figures of production rose to approximately 25,000
tons of lead, 20,000 tons of zinc, and 4,000 tons of copper. 1
Although Japan mainly devoted her attention to developing
Manchuria as an important supplier of minerals and metals to
Japanese manufacturing industries in her homeland, the period
of her domination also witnessed a remarkable development
in manufacturing, particularly in the chemical, metal and ma-
chinery industries in Manchuria itself. The manufacture of
munitions and aircraft for war purposes received priority. A
large scale cotton manufacturing industry was also developed.
In 1939 there were eleven large cotton mills in Manchuria.
This rapid industrialisation was made possible by the large
amount of Japanese capital, which "had the effect of making
Manchukuo the exclusive field for Japanese overseas in-
vestment." 2 "Japanese capital investment in Manchuria, which
had totaled 1.2 billion yen during the five years 1932-36, a-
mounted to 4.3 billion yen during the five years 1937-41. By
the end of 1941, the Japanese had poured 7.2 billion yen into
Manchuria in an unparalleled decade-long attempt to transform
an agricultural land into an industrial arsenal." 3
In their agrarian policy in Manchuria, the Japanese were also
motivated by the idea of promoting the quasi-war-time economy
and of furthering the development of the Japan-Manchukuo bloc
as a unit self-contained in raw materials useful for war purposes.

1 ibid., p. 162.
• Harold M. Vinacke, op. cit., p. 530.
• J. B. Cohen, op. cit., p. 41.
42 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

The production of soya beans, the principal Manchurian cash

crop and export commodity, declined; whereas attention was
devoted to the development of special crops, such as cotton,
rice, beet sugar, oats, barley, kenafe (Manchurian hemp) and
flax, as well as perilla and castor-beans for lubricating oil. The
increase of cotton planting and cotton production was given high
priority by the Manchukuo authorities, who, in 1933, prepared
an ambitious Twenty-Year Plan for the expansion of the cotton
area to 735,000 acres, and of production to 150 million kin
(1 kin = 1.32 lb.). 1 The net result of the various attempts was
that" the production of cotton in Manchuria for the modem
cotton textile industry was scarcely beyond the experimental
stage in 1937." 2 The same situation existed with regard to rice
and wheat output. Manchuria in 1937 was not entirely self-
sufficient in rice, much less an exporter of any significance.
Wheat production, which was about 1,000,000 metric tons in
1935, fell to 964,000 metric tons in 1938 and to 949,000 in 1939.
Of the other specialized crops, the output of beet sugar expanded
rapidly and was said to have reached 241,000 metric tons in
1939. The yield of tobacco had increased from 4,000 to 14,000
metric tons during 1935-39, and of flax from 5,800 to 48,000
metric tons during the same period. The production of castor
bean amounted to 20,600 metric tons in 1939, and that of perilla,
hempseed, and sesamum, all oil-bearing seeds, totalled 136,000
metric tons in the same year. 3 Many futile attempts were made
by the monopolistic official purchasing agencies, such as the
Manchuria Cereals Corporation, organised in 1938 to control
the purchase and distribution of wheat, flour and rice, and the
Manchurian Staple Purchase Corporation, which performed
similar functions for soya bean, bean cake, and bean oil, to
reach the desired goal. To remedy the situation new laws in
October 1940 extended the official control over an the organs
for the collection, marketing and distribution of farm products.
In the autumn of the same year a ten-year plan for food pro-
duction in East Asia was launched under which the Manchurian
exports of food and fertilizers were to supply the deficiencies

1 F. c. Jones, op. cit., p. 176.

• ibid., p. 178.
3 ibid., p. 180.
 POLICY IN MANCHURIA 43

of the rest of East Asia. The food production campaign was

intensified with the outbreak of the Pacific war in December
1941. Despite the introduction of a quota system for the pro-
duction of specified crops, assigned to specified localities, the
results were not specially impressive during 1940-1943. The last
years of the war were, however, "marked by improvement, the
1945 harvests were said to have been exceptionally good, and
there seems to have been no food shortage in the country as
a whole." 1
japan proceeded with caution in dealing with foreign rights
and interests in Manchukuo in order not to inflame foreign ani-
mosity further. But the whole economic policy of the Manchukuo
regime under japanese control had the effect of ousting foreign
influence from the country. The conclusion of the j apan-
Manchukuo Protocol of Alliance on September 15, 1932 was
accompanied by the announcement of the formal severance of
all ties with China, which was henceforth to be treated as a
foreign state in commercial and tariff matters. 2 The principle
of the Open Door, or the equality of commercial opportunity
for all nations was professed to be the policy of the new
state, since the japanese masters of Manchukuo hoped to get
foreign recognition for their creation. But the trade regulations
and tariff schedules that were devised to encourage the inflow
of japanese capital goods and to discourage lUXUry imports,
in pursuance with the Kwantung Army's aim of promoting
industrialisation for war purposes, practically compelled the
foreign powers to withdraw from Manchukuo. The Emergency
Trade Control Law of August 15, 1936, the Foreign Trade Control
Law of December 9, 1937, the Revised Exchange Control Law
of October 8, 1937, and the Provisional Capital Control Law of
1938 were all designed to further the creation of a japan-
Manchukuo economic bloc.
The institution of monopolies, in which only Manchurians
and japanese could participate, resulted in the complete with-
drawal of many American, British and German firms and
financial houses from Manchuria. Thus the Oil Monopoly Law
of November 14, 1934 gave the Manchukuo Government a
1 ibid., p. 183.
• ibid., p. 191.
44 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

monopoly of retail distribution of petroleum products, and

empowered it to establish quota control of production, refining
and import. This "could only result in the driving out of the
foreign companies which had been doing an extensive business
in Manchuria, and some of which had built up elaborate sales
organizations." 1 Foreign protests were blandly ignored. Foreign
concerns, like the British Jardine Engineering Company, the
Czech Skoda Steel Works, the German Siemens Schuckert
Company and the American firm of Andersen, Meyer and
Company, found it necessary to close their business in Manchuria.
The elimination of Russian interests, represented by the Chinese
Eastern Railway, from Northern Manchuria, was achieved by
the Agreement of March 23, 1935, which effected the sale by
Russia of that Railway to Manchukuo. Another significant
step in the direction of excluding foreign influence was taken
on November 5, 1937 when Japan apparently relinquished her
extraterritorial rights in Manchuria, and in announcing this
agreement it was explained that as an independent state, Man-
chukuo was not bound by the foreign extraterritorial treaties
with China, "consequently foreigners were deprived of their
special rights and made amenable to 'Manchukuo' laws and
law courts, which meant in reality that they were subjected
to Japanese jurisdiction." 2 One important consequence of this
was to subject foreigners to local taxation and increase Japanese
control over foreign educational and missionary institutions.
Japan's domination over Manchuria produced a marked
change in Manchurian external trade. Increased imports from
Japan completely altered the position in her trade with that
country. "While in 1932 Japan had an adverse balance of 26
million yuan in her trade with Manchuria, in 1936 she sold to
Manchukuo 270 million more than she bought." 3 With the cre-
ation of the yen bloc in 1935, trade between the two countries
became in a sense internal trade. This fact became more pro-
nounced with the outbreak of the Pacific War when Manchurian
trade was practically confined to the yen bloc. The expansion
of war-time controls and the abolition, in 1944, of customs

1 Harold M. Vinacke, op. cit., p. 523.

• F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 39.

• Harold M. Vinacke, op. cit., p. 532.
 POLICY IN MANCHURIA 45

duties in Japan-Manchukuo trade relations "completed the

amalgamation of the Japanese and Manchurian economies." 1
It meant the disappearance of the state of Manchukuo as an
independent entity.

This review of japanese policy makes it abundantly clear

that whereas in theory the state of Manchukuo was independent
and sovereign, in reality it was a vassal state controlled by
japan, which designed to transform it into a "continental war
base" for further expansion. As the Emperor of Manchukuo,
Henry P'u yi attempted to justify at the Tokyo War Crimes
Trials in the following words: "On paper, in order to fool the
people of the world, Manchukuo was made to look like an inde-
pendent state but in fact it was administered by the Kwantung
Army. Nominally there were Ministers and Vice-Ministers in
charge of the various departments of the government. Practically
every one of the Vice-Ministers was a japanese. Ministers were
Chinese. On the surface the Chinese were put in charge, but
underneath the japanese ran the show. There was a Fourth
Section in the K wantung Army in control of Manchurian affairs.
All ordinances and enactments would be proffered by the Vice-
Ministers who were all japanese, and then all had to be approved
by the Kwantung Army." 2 It was this form of government
which japan wanted to establish in the conquered territories,
except in the less-developed areas, such as New Guinea, during
the Second World War. Tojo in his statement to the Tokyo War
Crimes Trials substantiates this view: "We hoped for the es-
tablishment of governments which would be in accordance with
the desires of the inhabitants, as was the government of Man-
chukuo, in line with our East Asia policy. We also hoped to see
these governments independent as was that of Manchukuo and
co-operate with them on the basis of their being members of the
East Asia community and of mutual life and prosperity." 3

1 F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 204.

, Testimony of Henry P'u Yi at Tokyo Mil. Trib., August 16-27, 1946, in SCAP
Summation No. II, August 1946, pp.55-56. Quoted in J. B. Cohen, op. cit., p. 38.
Far East Mil. T,ib. P,oceedings, pp. 3, 992-3, 993.
• Fa, East Mil. T,ib. P,oceedings, p.36,775.
 CHAPTER V

INTERNAL PREPARATIONS FOR FURTHER

EXPANSION
(1931-1936)

To grasp the implications of the japanese blueprint (1937-1941)

it is necessary to examine the internal preparations which
followed the Manchurian Incident of September 18, 1931.
It seems that the World Economic Depression of 1929 that
particularly hit japan with its full force was the fortuitous
moment to the Militarists who were anxiously waiting to realise
their dreams of power. The country was in the throes of vast
social unrest, resulting from serious economic dislocation. "The
feeling of instability among the people and their bitter hatred
toward internal politics, dominated by conniving senior states-
men, zaibatsu and political parties, had reached its zenith." 1
The signing of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, which extended
limitations to cruisers and destroyers, as well as capital ships,
further provided an occasion for expressing "the indignation
of the people towards the corruption of party politics during
the period from 1925 to 1930." 2
This "restless temper of the times" 3 offered a golden oppor-
tunity for the Militarists, especially the young officers of the
Army and Navy, who had been fretting at the "humiliations"
imposed upon japan as a Power at Washington in 1921-1922
and at the London Naval Conference in 1930, to exploit the
situation to their own advantage. They "wished to prepare the
stage for a military government and drastically purge all liberals
in influential positions in the government and business. In their
1 Yoshio Kodama, I Was Defeated (Robert Booth & Taro Fukuda, Japan 1951),
p.21.
• ilnd., p. 48.
a T. Kase, Journey to the Missouri (Yale University Press, New Haven 1950),
p.27.
 INTERNAL PREPARATIONS FOR FURTHER EXPANSION 47

view all. the ills of the times were attributable to the corrupt
practices of the political parties and to monopolistic exploitation
by capitalists. They therefore wanted to put an end to parlia-
mentary government and severely curtail the capitalistic
enterprises. They had accepted the theories of state socialism
and verged on communism." 1 They organized a series of plots
and assassinations in order to overthrow the government and
secure drastic reforms. Premier Hamaguchi was shot in N ovem-
ber 1930. In 1931 alone two serious coups - the March Incident
and the October Incident 2 - were made in vain to seize power.
After the failure of the March Incident the Militarists engineered
the Manchurian Incident of September 18, 1931, as they thought
"an armed intervention on the continent would provide an
ideal opportunity for them to seize power and institute reforms.
Conquest abroad and totalitarian economy at home were in-
separable in their minds." 3
The Manchurian Incident was, however, followed by the
October Incident at home, which although it proved abortive,
had important consequences, and marked the beginning of
military ascendancy in Japan. As Kodama remarks: "The
October Incident (Kinki Kakumei Incident), which arose as a
domestic issue, dealt a big blow to the genro (elder statesmen),
the senior statesmen, the zaibatsu and the political parties and
served to silence completely the opposition and the criticism
of elder and senior statesmen and political parties against the
Manchurian Incident and its prosecution. In addition, the
dissatisfaction of the nation over domestic politics, which had
been daily increasing as a result of the London Naval Treaty,
served to swing the nation over to an unconditional support
of the advocacies of the militarists in their prosecution of the
war on the continent." 4 The Militarists further attempted to
strengthen their hold on the government by assassinating, on
February 9, 1932, Inouye, a former Finance Minister, who
"had strenuously opposed the Manchurian adventure." 5, and
again, on May 15, 1932, Premier Inukai, a moderate. Thus after
1 ibid., p. 28.
• For details see T. Kase, op. cit., p. 26.
• T. Kase, ibid., p. 27.
• Yoshio Kodama, op. cit., p. 32.
5 T. Kase, op. cit., p. 28.
48 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONE.SIA

the Manchurian Incident "the real power gradually became ves-

ted in a group of fiery officers who asserted themselves during
the following decade as the driving force of a reckless expansionist
policy." 1
The control of political power by the Militarists was at the
same time marked by a rapid transformation of the country's
economy, which would make japan an industrial power, strong
enough to sustain a policy of expansion. The growing influence
of the Militarists in the economy of japan can be seen from the
military expenditures which were sharply increasing. The total
Army and Navy budget, which was 434 million yen or 29.4
per cent of total expenditures in 1931, rose to 3,953 million yen
or 71.6 per cent of total expenditures in 1937. The economic
expansion under the Militarists reflected itself in the increasing
predominance of heavy industries. Light industry, which had
constituted 61.8 per cent of total industrial output in 1930,
had by 1937 shrunk to 42.2 per cent of the total, whereas heavy
industry, which had accounted for 38.2 per cent of total
industrial production in 1930, had by 1937 reached 57.8 per
cent of the total. In 1930 japan produced only a small number
of motor vehicles annually - in all 500 - and 400 planes. By 1941
these figures had increased to 48,000 and 5,000 respectively.
Steel production tripled, and coal production doubled in the
same period. In 1931 the production of merchant vessels was
92,093 gross tons. This had increased to 405,195 gross tons in
1937, making the mercantile fleet at that time the third largest
in the world. It is interesting to note that the industrial pro-
duction of japan during 1929-39 exceeded that of the United
States with her infinitely more powerful industrial organisation. 2
This progressive expansion of industrial capacity would not
have been possible by private enterprise alone. Direct measures
had to be taken and capital had to be provided by the govern-
ment. The inevitable consequence of this was to force the japa-
nese industry along the direction of state planning in the
lines followed in Manchukuo.
The Militarists were not, however, satisfied with their gradual
political and economic control of the country. Simultaneously,
1 and., p. 27.

• J. B. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 1-5.

 INTERNAL PREPARATIONS FOR FURTHER EXPANSION 49

they made a determined effort to exploit "the tense atmosphere

of nationalism engendered by the Manchurian Incident", 1 so
that the whole nation might acquiesce in their "ideology of
expansion." The principle of Kodo, the Imperial Way, was ex-
pounded to signify the new political spirit in Japan. "This was
the concept of a totalitarian and divine state of which a divine
emperor following the Imperial Way was the living embodiment.
The instrument of this revival of divine dictatorship was ....
the military caste, not an individual." 2 The aim behind this
philosophy was clearly expressed in a speech of General Araki,
Minister of War (1931-1934) and "the spiritual leader and the
politico-ethical spokesman of a new Japan", 3 made in March
1933: "It is a veritable measure of Providence that the Man-
churian trouble has arisen - it is an alarm-bell for the awakening
of the Japanese people. If the nation is rekindled with the s~e
great spirit in which the country was founded, the time will
come when all the nations of the world will be made to look up
to our Kodo. Kodo, the great ideal of the Japanese nation, is
of such substance that it should be spread and expanded all over
the world, and every impediment to it brushed aside - even by
the sword." 4 Thus Kodo was obviously meant to assert the
superiority of the Japanese race under the divine emperor.
In 1935 the theory that the emperor was an organ of the state
and not the state itself, held by Professor T. Minobe of the
Imperial University of Tokyo, was declared to be a pernicious
doctrine, and he was condemned.
Special attention was devoted to win the youth of the nation
to the Militarists' ideology. Education was given a nationalist
and authoritarian complexion. The bureau of student control
(1929) was replaced by the bureau of "thought control" (1933).
Young Men's Associations (Nippon Seinendan) were formed
throughout the country to foster and spread the national spirit.
Patriotic Societies like the Ex-Service Men's Association (Zaigo
Gunjinkai), the Imperial League of Young Officers (Kokoku
Seinen Shoko Domei), and the Black Ocean Society (Genyosha)
1 Yoshio Kodama, GP. cit., p. 35.
• P. H. Clyde, op. cit., p. 602.
• ibid., p. 605.
• The Japanese Weekly Chronicle, May I6, I933. Quoted in J. Hampden Jackson,
op. cit., pp. 302-303.
50 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

"took a special interest in training the youth of the nation, and

supported militarism with vehemence." 1 Besides, there were
a number of secret societies, such as the notorious Black Dra-
gon with ultra-nationalistic programmes. These societies, which
had the backing of a large part of the Army and some officers
of the Navy, were "the prime movers of an aggressive imperialism
striving for world conquest." 2 It is said that Mitsuru Toyama,
who was the leader of the Black Dragon Society and who was
"looked upon by a large section of the public, including the
military, as a sort of superpatriot" 3, was mainly responsible
for the political assassinations of this period.
While Nipponese warlords were thus consolidating their
position within Japan, the Army continued to pursue its "posi-
tive" policy in the mainland of Asia. The conquest of Manchuria,
which was to be "the first step if the Yamato race wishes to
distinguish themselves on Continental Asia" 4 and which was
now successfully achieved in violation of the Covenant of the
League of Nations, the Pact of Paris of 1928, and the Nine-
Power Treaty of 1922, further emboldened the Japanese. Japan's
response to the recommendations of the Lytton Commission,
appointed by the League of Nations, was the invasion of Jehol
in January 1933 to be added to Manchukuo. As Great Britain
and the United States, which were regarded since the Washington
Conference of 1921-22 as an insuperable obstacle to the reali-
sation of her dream of world empire, were now in the grip of
an unprecedented economic depression, accompanied by grave
political unrest, she announced on March 27, 1933 her intention
to withdraw from the League of Nations, "deliberately choosing
a path of isolation." 5 As Kase says: "This was against the wish
of the Emperor, who preferred to maintain co-operation with the
democratic powers and in particular with Great Britain and the
United States." 6 The result was that her relations with these
powers steadily deteriorated due mainly to the growing conflict
of interest over Manchuria and China. "This naturally resulted",
1 P. H. Clyde, op. cit., p. 606.
• Kurt London, op. cit., p. 205.
• Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (Hammond, Hammond & Company Limited,
London 1944), p. 69.
• Quoted in japan's Dream of World Empire. The Tanaka Memorial, p. 33.
• T. Kase, op. cit., p. 30.
• ibid.
 INTERNAL PREPARATIONS FOR FURTHER EXPANSION 51

states Rase, "in hostility towards these powers among our

people, who suspected them of willfully obstructing the fulfill-
ment of our national destiny." 1 This feeling was quickly and
fully exploited by the Militarists. "Subtle propaganda was
intensified to discredit the liberal leaders friendly towards the
democratic powers." 2 This development coincided with the
utter failure of the League of Nations as well as the Western
Powers to impede the Japanese advance, the United States'
attitude of "non-recognition of Manchukuo", Russia's apparent
indifference in the Far East, and above all, the menacing rise
of Hitler in Europe, diverting the Western Powers from their
Far Eastern interests and resulting in Germany's withdrawal
from the Disarmament Conference and later from the League
on October 14, 1933.

Time was now ripe for Japan to assert her position as the
predominant power in Eastern Asia. In the spring of 1934 she
proclaimed what came to be known as the Japanese "Monroe
Doctrine for Eastern Asia" in a series of official speeches and semi-
official communiques. Already, on January 22, 1934, Foreign
Minister Hirota, while reviewing Japan's foreign relations before
the Diet, had emphasised Japan's special responsibility and
"mission" for the preservation of peace in Eastern Asia. After re-
ferring to the confused situation in China, he expressed the hope
that she would unite with Japan in their "obvious mission" to
contribute to the peaceful development of East Asia. Hirota
concluded his speech by remarking: "We should not for a moment
forget that Japan, serving as the only corner-stone for the edifice
of the peace of Eastern Asia, bears the entire burden of re-
sponsibility"; and he expressed his conviction that "eventually
this position.... will be rightly understood by the other
Powers." 3
Hirota's view was made explicitly clear by a further statement
issued on April 17, 1934 by Amau, Foreign Office spokesman.
This statement, after referring to Japan's "special responsibili-
ties in East Asia", declared emphatically that the Japanese
1 ibid.
• ibid.
• Quoted in A. J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs I934 (Oxford Univ.
Press, London 1935), p. 646.
52 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

"consider it only natural that to keep peace and order in East

Asia we must even act alone on our own responsibility, and it
is our duty to perform it. At the same time there is no country
but China which is in a position to share with Japan the responsi-
bility for maintenance of peace in East Asia."
"We oppose," continued the statement, "any attempt on the
part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country
in order to resist Japan; we also oppose any action taken by
China calculated to play [off] one Power against another. Any
joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers even in the name
of technical or financial assistance . . .. are bound to acquire
political significance . . .. Japan therefore must object to such
undertakings as a matter of principle . . .. Supplying China
with war aeroplanes, building aerodromes in China, and detailing
military instructors or military advisers to China or contracting
a loan to provide funds for political uses would obviously tend
to alienate friendly relations between Japan, China and other
countries and to disturb peace and order in Eastern Asia. Japan
will oppose such projects." 1
It is clear from this enunciation of Japanese policy that she
was intent upon extending her domination over the whole of
China. The declaration was obviously intended to serve as a
warning not only to China, which was receiving outside aid but
also to other Powers, which were now definitely asked to desist
from giving any assistance to China that would enable her to
stand against Japan. Thus Japan "delicately introduced to
Occidental minds - American as well as European" 2 the "un-
palatable notion" of a Japanese "Monroe Doctrine for Eastern
Asia."
As the first practical step towards the implementation of
this policy Japan, in December 1934, served notification of
abrogating the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, making herself
free to resume naval building. By 1935 her Army was attempting
to create a five-province autonomous North China, comprising
Chahar, Suiyan, Shansi, Hopei, and Shantung. In January 1936,
she withdrew, on refusal of her demand for a common upper
limit, or parity with the United States and Great Britain, from
1 ib~d., pp. 650-651.
I ib~d., p. 628.
 INTERNAL PREPARATIONS FOR FURTHER EXPANSION 53

the London Conference for Naval Disarmament, and dealt a

blow to the whole structure of international naval co-operation
so painstakingly erected since 1922.
The year 1936, however, opened with an important event at
home, which shaped her history for the next decade. On February
26, 1936, only four days after the announcement of the general
election returns, which indicated the popularity and the influence
of the liberals, the Militarists organized an uprising and killed
Takahashi, the moderate Finance Minister, Admiral Saito, then
Lord Privy Seal, and General Watanabe, Inspector General of
military training. Premier Okada escaped, but one of his rela-
tives, who resembled him, was murdered. The result was that
it "sealed the fate of liberal government in japan. It completely
stifled any effective opposition to the Army." 1 The Militarists
were now in full control of the government and began to guide
japan's destiny.
Once saddled with power, the Militarists began to dream not
only to extend the conquest to China Proper but also to "develop
the japanese Empire in the South Seas." The international
political conditions appeared to them favorable for realising
such a dream. Europe was in turmoil. Germany had repudiated
the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty and had an-
nounced her intention to rearm in March 1935. One year later,
on March 7, 1936 she had renounced the Locarno Pact by mar-
ching troops into the Rhineland. In july 1936 civil war broke
out in Spain. The League had ceased to be an instrument of
peace, following the collapse of the sanctions experiment against
Italy for her conquest of Abyssinia. The Western Powers were
too much involved in European affairs to direct their attention
to the Far East. In the Western Hemisphere public opinion
in the United States since 1933 had been insisting on the re-
linquishment rather than the strengthening of American outposts
in the Western Pacific - a fact clearly expressed by the passing
of the Philippine Independence Act of March 1934 and the
Neutrality Act of 1935. The Navy thought that it was time also
for taking steps for japan's further expansion towards the
South, where lay vast colonial possessions of the Western Powers,
but which were being transformed into a closed area for japan's
1 T. Rase, op. cit., p. 34.
54 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

trade and commerce by Ottawa Agreements, high tariffs, quotas

and other instruments of economic nationalism, following the
failure of the World Economic Conference of 1933. It was in these
circumstances that during the summer of 1936 the War and
Navy ministries proposed certain "basic" principles of Japan's
foreign policy, which were formulated in the "Fundamental
Principle of Our National Policy" and finally accepted on August
11, 1936 by the Five Ministers' Conference, including the Premier
and the War, Navy, Foreign, and Finance ministers as the
programme of new Japan. This fundamental policy, which was
not disclosed until a few years later, aimed at developing,
through the efforts of "national defense" and diplomacy, "the
Japanese Empire .... into the stabilisation Power .... in East
Asia, in order to achieve a strong footing in the Eastern continent
as well as develop the Japanese Empire in the South Seas."
It was decided: (1) Japan must correct the aggressive policies
of the great powers and realise the spirit of the Imperial Way
(Kodo) by a consistent policy of overseas expansion; (2) Japan
should complete her national defense and armament to secure
the position of the Empire as the stabilising power in East Asia;
(3) Japan should strive to eradicate the Russian menace on the
North in order to realize a steadfast development of Manchuria,
and for the solid defense of both Japan and Manchuria. Japan
should also be prepared against Great Britain and the United
States, attempting at the same time an economic development
by the close co-operation of Japan, China and Manchuria. "For
the achievement of such an object", Japan "should always be
careful to hold most amicable relations with the Powers."
It was further decided that "for the furtherance of our plan
to achieve racial and economic development of our Empire
towards the South Seas, especially on the Outer South Sea
Islands area, we should take a gradual and peaceful measure,
always avoiding to stimulate other nations and try to fulfil
our national strength correlative with the completion of Man-
churia." The South Seas Area had been described as "a key
point of the world commerce, and, as it is the sphere necessary
and indispensable in the industries and national defense of our
people, we must secure our footsteps for further advance." 1
1 Fat' East Mil. Tt'ib., Edilnt No. 979; Timetable No.6 (the "Timetable" prepared
 INTERNAL PREPARATIONS FOR FURTHER EXPANSION 55

With the decision of August 11, 1936 there opened a new

chapter in the history of Japan's policy of expansion. The
successful implementation of such a policy necessitated a strong
and powerful Japan. At home she now adopted the policy of
military economics - greater military expenditures and more
strict regimentation of economic life, based on the theory of
"wartime controlled economy." 1 More rapid expansion of
armament industries followed. The Manchurian Affairs Bureau,
which had been established earlier, adopted the First Manchurian
Five Year Industrial Plan on January 1, 1937. The Cabinet
Planning Board was established on May 14, 1937 to serve as an
agency, which would stimulate industrial mobilisation, economic
planning and control. Henceforth, an attempt was to be made
to reduce the Zaibatsu from "makers of policy to instruments
of policy."
At the same time an intensive campaign was carried on to
impress on the nation the necessity for a policy of expansion
abroad. "Japanese literature was steadily harnessed to the
conception of 'Japan's destiny,' and skilful use was made of the
glittering prospect of domination over an area extending from
the Arctic to Australia, and from Tokyo to Bombay." 2 In 1937
Addresses to Young Men by Hashimoto, obviously meant for the
youth of Japan as the title of the book suggests, was published.
This book demonstrated the necessity of expansion for Japan
to the North, South, East and West, and propagated the superi-
ority of the Japanese over the White race. It says: "Countries,
developed by Japan, and peoples, governed by such a superior
race as the Japanese, are fortunate, compared with those who
live under the tyrannical power of the Whites." 3
The Militarists further consolidated their position by modifying
existing regulations, so that ministers of the Army and Navy
could be appointed only from among the generals and admirals
on active service. As Kase remarks: "The Military's hold
on the government was now complete: they could make or un-

by the Neth. Division, Inter. Prosecution Section of the Inter. Mil. Trib. for the Far
East, on the basis of Japanese archives. This is referred to as the "Timetable"}.
1 "The Japanese call the period, February, 1936 - June, 1937, by the term
Junsenit Kdzai or quasi·war·time economy". - Jerome B. Cohen, op. cit., p. 9.
3 Far East Mil. Trib., Exhibit no. 1290 A; Timetable no. 7.

• George W. Keeton, op. cit., pp. 189-190.

56 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

make a cabinet at their pleasure by withdrawing, or refusing to

nominate, the service minister." 1
Abroad, Japan now favoured a policy which embraced plans
for an understanding with the Axis Powers of Europe, the aim
of which was not only to tame the Soviet Union's growing
"arrogance" in the Far East but also to discourage the Western
Democracies to interfere with her expansionist programme in
Eastern Asia as well as the South Seas regions. This culminated
in the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 25, 1936
with Germany. Italy joined a year later, followed by Hungary,
Manchukuo, and Franco's Spain. On November 28, 1936 both
Japan and Italy agreed to reciprocal recognition of the Japanese
puppet state of Manchukuo and the Italian conquest of Abyssinia.
Thus, as the year 1937 dawned, Japan's preparations appeared
to be well on their way and she was about to resume her
career of expansion in Eastern Asia.

1 T. Rase, op. cit., p. 36.

 CHAPTER VI

JAPANESE BLUEPRINT
(1937-1941)

The year 1937, "in which fascism and nazism became bolder
in their verbal and diplomatic attacks upon democracy, commu-
nism, the territorial status quo, and the system of collective
security as represented by the League of Nations", 1 seemed
to offer a determined effort to inaugurate the establishment of
Japanese hegemony in Eastern Asia. The incident at the Marco
Polo Bridge on the outskirts of Peiping on July 7, 1937 provided
the Land of the Rising Sun with the pretext to set off against
China a full-scale war, which was regarded as "a natural conse-
quence of fixed national policy calling for establishment of a
solid footing on the continent." 2 Japan decided to strike before
the Kuomintang-Communist Alliance, following the Sian kidnap-
ping episode of December 1936, could be developed into an
effective united front against her.
The preparative moves for waging such a war had already
been taken during the preceding decade. Japan now bluntly
rejected the invitation to attend the Brussels Conference of the
signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, held in November
1937 to discuss the China Incident, and described her action
in China as self-defence. She thus "smashed what was left of the
Nine-Power Treaty", 3 although it was not formally denounced.
The lessons provided by the failure of the Powers to adopt any
coercive measures against her at the Brussels Conference, which
had been preceded by their policy of Non-Intervention in the
Spanish Civil War, the Neutrality Legislation of the years 1935-
1 P. H. Clyde, 01>. cit., p. 658.
• Joseph W. Ballantine, "Mukden to Pearl Harbor. The Foreign Policies of Ja-
pan", Foreign Affairs, July I949, p. 654.
• Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton Univ. Press, New Jersey
1950), p. 9.
58 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

1937, eloquently expressing the United States' "prevalent

aversion to foreign involvement and the detennined opposition
to any fonn of political or military commitment", 1 and finally,
the policy of appeasement of the Western Powers towards the
Axis, which later culminated in the Munich settlement on
September 29, 1938, had undoubtedly the effect of encouraging
japan to adopt an increasingly defiant attitude. The absence of
any alliance between the Western Powers left them vulnerable
against the Axis, and this implied that none would commit itself
to war against japan in the Far East, so long as the European
situation remained threatening, especially when the lack of
preparedness of the Western Democracies was well known. Thus
while the war in China dragged on, she proceeded to convince
the Powers of the need of a tacit acceptance of a new japanese
order in Eastern Asia in place of the old international one.
On November 3, 1938 the japanese government (the first
Konoye Cabinet) officially declared that "the ultimate aim of
Imperial japan is to establish a New Order, which will secure
eternal peace in the Far East." 2 The main feature of this New
Order would be "the creation of a tripartite bloc, comprising
japan, Manchukuo and China, which was to be brought into
existence for mutual aid and co-operation in political, economic,
cultural and other fields. The bloc was to serve as a defence
against Communism, as the field for 'a new culture', and as a
means of procuring 'close economic cohesion throughout East
Asia'." 3 The other Powers were admonished "to appreciate
correctly japan's aims and policy and to adopt their attitude
to the new conditions existing in East Asia." 4 What actually
prompted japan to seek for a New Order in East Asia was
clearly brought out by the correspondent of The Times, who
observed: "The driving force that impels the japanese to build
a self-sustaining bloc in East Asia is the realization that, as the
World is organized, they are at the mercy of distant countries.
In an East Asian bloc japan hopes to acquire the security which

1 w. L. Langer & S. E. Gleason, The ChaUenge to Isolation I937-I940 (Royal

Institute of Int. Affairs, London 1952), p. 14.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Ed. No. 1291; Timetable No. 10.
I A. J. Toynbee, Su",ey of International Affairs I938, Vol. I (Oxford Univ. Press

London 1941), p. 498.

• Quoted in Su",ey of International Affairs I938, Vol I, p. 496.
 J APANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) S9

the British Empire and the United States enjoy .... They (the
Japanese) want raw materials which can be bought with their
own curreney at prices that they can afford to pay. They want
markets which embargoes, tariffs, or sanctions cannot close to
their trade.... They ask, therefore, for Chinese Govern-
ments willing to accept Japanese hegemony, courteously veiled
as co-operation." 1
The realization of this goal, however, demanded a speedy
settlement of the China Incident. But as "the China affair
could not be settled either by war or by diplomacy between
Tokyo and Chungking" 2 and the Japanese army had been
"marching into wilderness, fighting against unlimited space" 3,
the idea of solving the affair by developing the Anti-Comintern
Pact of 1936 into a full-blown political and military alliance
turned into a serious project in the summer of 1938. As Kase
remarks, "A solution must be sought by indirect means, that
is to say, through an alliance with Germany." 4 In spite of the
Anti-Comintern Pact, Germany at first did not approve of
Japan's forward policy in China, since she feared that China
would "drift farther and farther into the Russian orbit." 5 For
years Japan had enjoyed Italy's full moral support for her
adventures in Manchuria and China. Since 1933, however,
Germany had clung tight to her East Asian interests and had
even attempted to extend them. Berlin had not immediately
responded to Japan's request for recognition of the vassal state
of Manchukuo - it had, to the contrary, made economic demands.
Germany had an influence in the Kuomintang Government in
China, whose army leaders had German officers as advisers.
General von Falkenhausen was one of them and the Japanese
ascribed every setback suffered by their troops in China to him
and his colleagues. It was only when Hitler started his pressure
against Czechoslovakia and began to figure with the immediate
outbreak of a large-scale war that he ordered German military
1 The Times, February 16,1939. Quoted in Survey of International Affairs I938,
Vol. I, p. SOl.
• T. Kase, op. cit., p. 37.
• ibid.
• ibid.
• Documents on German Foreign Policy I9I8-I945 (From the Archives of the Ger-
man Foreign Ministry), Series D(I937-I945), Vol. I (His Majesty's Stationary Office,
London 1949), p. 827.
60 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

advisers to be recalled from China and the delivery of arms to

Chiang Kai-shek to cease. 1 Alarmed at the inclination which
Berlin had shown to retain its former rights and interests, the
Imperial Government at Tokyo privately ventured an attempt
to render legally impossible any eventual claims to the South
Sea islands lost by Germany in the War of 1914-1918. A formal
offer was made for the return of these islands to Germany and
then immediately afterwards japan was to buy them.
Hitler rejected this proposal also. 2 In the summer of 1938
when the military stalemate in China prompted the leaders of
the japanese Army to renew the suggestion of developing the
Anti-Comintern Pact into a triple alliance, Germany welcomed
the idea as it was well suited to "Hitler's grand design for iso-
lating Russia, for neutralising Great Britain and France, and for
forestalling American interference on behalf of the democracies."3
Germany desired a pact that would apply equally against Russia
and against both the United States and Great Britain. An
agreement, however, could not be reached owing to the conflict
within the japanese Government. "The Army resorted to all
sorts of intrigues in order to drag the government into a full
military alliance aimed at England and the United States as
well as the Soviet Union." 4 "The Imperial Court and the Navy,
as well as several high civilian officials, were opposed to anything
that might estrange or provoke Britain and the United States" 5
but were only willing to accept the principle of mutual aid in
the event of a war with the Soviet Union. japan's endeavour
to solve the China Incident "by indirect means" received a
further setback when Germany, to the great surprise of japan,
abruptly concluded a ten-year Pact of Non-Aggression and
Neutrality with the Soviet Union on August 23, 1939.

1 See Chapter IV: "Germany and the Far East, July 1937-5eptember 1938",

pp. 733-897 in Documents on Ge1'man Foreign Policy I9I8-I94S, Smes D(I937-I 94S) ,
Vol. I (U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington 1949). Japan made a series of protests
in 1937 against the continued stay of the German military advisers. In 1937 Germany
also furnished Chiang Kai·shek with weapons to the value of 82,788,000 marks.
• Japanese Naval Commander Maeda (well-known in Batavia in 1945 as Vice-
Admiral) suggested this transaction to the German Naval Attache of the German
Embassy in Tokyo on January 15, 1938 (Series D, Vol. I., pp. 818-819). Hitler, how-
ever, did not want to relinquish a single colonial trump.
• The Challenge to Isolation I937-I940, p. 65.
• T. Kase, op. cit., p. 38.
• The Challenge to Isolation I937-I940, p. 64.
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 61

Meanwhile, Japan "was going to keep on trying to beat China

into submission and cling to the aim of attaining a new order
in East Asia. 1 To control war supplies to Chungking through
JJ

the principal route via French Indo-China, the Japanese navy,

on February 10, 1939, occupied the island of Hainan, which lies
off the coast of Indo-China, and dominates the port of Haiphong.
This action was followed by the possession, on March 31, 1939,
of the strategic Spratly Islands in the midst of the South China
Sea, "equidistant from the Philippines, Indo-China, Siam,
Borneo, Java and Singapore." 2 In the same month was an-
nounced a six-year programme of expansion for the Japanese
navy, to cost over £ 120,000,000 in order to have sufficient power
to face any conflict arising over the construction of the New
Order in Eastern Asia. 3 These events clearly indicate the growing
supremacy of the Navy, which had always been in favour of a
policy of expansion towards the South, where lay the enormous
possessions of the Western Powers. The view was now expressed
that an advance to the South was preferable to a continuation
of the war in China. 4
The outbreak of the War in Europe on September 3, 1939,
followed by the spectacular victories of the German armies,
which overran in quick succession Poland, Denmark, Norway,
the Netherlands and Belgium, causing serious anxieties through-
out the Western World, offered a unique opportunity for the
Land of the Rising Sun to implement their policy of expansion.
"To the Japanese, the revolution of the European situation after
Munich and the ensuing war came as a divine wind richly laden
with further opportunities for lavish successes." 5 The prospects
not only of creating the tripartite bloc of Japan, Manchukuo
and China in Eastern Asia under Nipponese leadership, but
also expanding the Empire to the South, appeared to be very
bright. A fresh attempt was made to conclude the China Incident,
since it was thought that "so long as the Japansee armies were
tied up in China, it would be utterly impossible for the Tokyo
1 Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 37.
• S. F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (Henry Holt and Company,
New York 1950), p. 863.
• George W. Keeton, op. cit., p. 242.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 509; Timetable No. 12. Count Terauchi expressed
this opinion while visiting German General HQS in September 1939.
5 S. F. Bemis, op. cit., p. 863.
62 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Government to take advantage of opportunities presented by

the European war for further expansion." 1 Negotiations weer
at once started to come to an agreement with Wang Ching-wei,
who was a renegade associate of Chiang Kai-shek, and to set
up a puppet Chinese government under Japanese auspices and
protection, which resulted in the establishment of the Nanking
Government on March 30, 1940. Nippon's desire to exploit the
distress of the European Powers is clearly revealed in the follow-
ing statement made by the Director of Military Intelligence to
the British Military Attache in Tokyo on June 17, 1940, when
France, at the height of her crisis, was asking for armistice
terms from Germany. He stated that "the Japanese people would
be cowardly if they failed to take advantage of the opportunities
presented by the disasters suffered by the French and British.
Nothing could stop Japan from seizing French Indo-China, the
Netherlands Indies or Hongkong - anyone or all of them. The
United States was in no position to prevent Japan from taking
whatever action it liked in the Western Pacific. The only way
in which Britain could a void war would be by immediately
closing the Burma Road and the Hongkong frontier, and by
prompt withdrawal of British troops from Shanghai." 2 Japan
was not in any way slow to act. She had already (on June II,
1940) delivered a strongly-worded note to the British and French
Ambassadors giving their governments "friendly advice" to
withdraw all their troops stationed in China and recall their
ships from her territorial waters. On June 19, 1940 the French
Ambassador in Tokyo was presented with the two-fold demand
that the Indo-China frontier should be closed to the supply of
all war materials to China and that a Japanese Control Com-
mission should be received in Indo-China to supervise the
carrying out of this demand. Indo-China, deprived of any outside
help, had to yield to the 48-hour Japanese ultimatum. A treaty
of "amity and guarantee of territorial integrity" was concluded
with Thailand (Siam), "providing for the exchange of information
and mutual consultation on matters of common interest." The
closing of the Burma Road to Chinese traffic was demanded
on June 24, 1940, and was finally secured on July 18, 1940. All
this was achieved without the use of any armed forces.
1 The Challenge to Isolation I937-I940, p. 294.
• ibid., p. 596.
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 63

The sudden and unexpected collapse of France, which pos-

sessed the second largest colonial empire in the world, fired the
imagination of the Nipponese warlords. On June 25, only three
days after the capitulation of France, General Hata, the Minister
of War, declared publicly: "We should not miss the present
opportunity or we shall be blamed by posterity." 1 A few days
later (June 29) Arita, the Japanese Foreign Minister, made a
significant speech in which he claimed that "the countries of
East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are geographically,
historically, racially and economically very closely related ....
The uniting of all these regions in a single sphere on a basis of
common existence, insuring thereby the stability of that sphere,
is a natural conclusion .... This system presupposes the ex-
istence of a stabilizing force in each region, with which as a
centre the peoples within that region will secure their co-existence
and co-prosperity as well as the stability of their sphere." 2 Arita
now openly advocated the idea of a Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere. Thus, Japan's territorial ambitions were
greatly increased. The goal was to be a "new order in Greater
East Asia", instead of the "new order for East Asia."
The prevailing position of the Powers and existing circum-
stances appeared to be favourable for the creation of such a
co-prosperity sphere. After the fall of France, England had been
left alone, as it were, to face the German onslaught, and Nipponese
warlords considered the chances of England's survival only
negligible. Now that England had to all practical purposes been
eliminated as the defender of the existing order in Asia, there
was only the United States left to support it. The Japanese leaders
were not, however, afraid of the United States. They did not
regard it as impossible to come to an agreement upon the delimi-
tation of spheres of influence with Washington, which, though
it had adamantly refused to recognise the expansion of Japanese
power since 1931, nevertheless, had done nothing to stop it.
But the danger of a war on two fronts owing to a Russo-American
alliance had to be avoided at all costs. The Japanese leaders,
however, thought that Russia was allied to Germany as a result
1 ibid., p. 603.
• New York Times, June 30, 1940; Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 529; Foreign
Relations ot the United States: Japan: I93I-I94I, Vol. II (U.S. Govt. Printing Office,
Washington 1943), pp. 93-94.
64 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

of the partition of Poland. They also counted upon the sharp

ideological clash between the "ideal state" of Communism and
the classical homeland of individual freedom to hinder a Russo-
American alliance.
One precautionary measure, however, was thought to be
necessary. Japan must guard against a possible German empire
in the Far East. Germany, soon to become the only ruling power
in a new Europe, must make a formal renunciation of the Asiatic
legacy of the defeated Western Powers, and signify her approval
of Japanese leadership in the area of Greater East Asia. That
she would not now oppose Japanese plans had been indicated
when the German Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, told Arita on
May 22, 1940 that Germany "was not interested in the problem
of the Netherlands East Indies." 1
It seemed that the time for the decision upon the construction
of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere had arrived. Army,
Navy and Foreign Office representatives expressed this opinion
after a four-day secret conference (July 12-16).2 This Conference
also discussed a Foreign Office plan to strengthen relations with
Germany and Italy. 3
With the formation of the Second Konoye 4 Cabinet (July
1940-July 1941) Japan's determination to expand in East and
South East Asia and to create a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere as had been envisaged in the Foreign Minister's speech
of June 29, 1940, obtained official sanction. At the very first
meeting of this Cabinet the foundations were laid for the building
up of this New Order. It was also decided that "Japan should
no longer waver between Germany and the democracies of the
West. A pact with the Axis was to be sought, to be extended
by a non-aggression pact with Russia." 5 This programme was
endorsed by the Liaison Conference between the representatives
of the Cabinet and of the Imperial Headquarters on July 27, 1940. 6
1 Timetable No. 29.
• Resolution of the Conference of representatives of the Army, Navy, and Foreign
Office, July 12-16, 1940; Timetable No. 35.
3 For details of this Foreign Office plan, see The Challenge to Isolation I937-I940,
pp. 605-606.
• Prince Konoye was at this time the leader of a movement aiming at an authori-
tarian regime and a one-party state on the model of Totalitarian Powers in Europe.
5 Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 112.
• Timetable Nos. 37 and38; 26 and 27 July 1940: "Resolution of the Second Konoye
Cabinet determining fundamental national policy aimed at establishing a New Order
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 65

Thereupon the aim of the new policy was officially made known
in vague and general terms to the world in a statement of policy,
issued on August 1, 1940. 1
On September 4, 1940 "when the great German bombing
squadrons were over London; when a German fleet was being
assembled for the invasion of Britain; when the press was telling
of the transfer of fifty old destroyers to Britain from the United
States, but at the same time warning that this did not mean
that the United States would enter the war," 2 Japan took an
important step in the realisation of an agreement with the Axis
Powers. On that day the Four Ministers' Conference (Prime
Minister, Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs) approved
a statement of policy, which was to provide the guide book in
the forthcoming negotiations with these Powers. 3 The Liaison
Conference of September 16, however, decided: "The time is
now ripe to start quickly talks to strengthen the Axis." 4 The
Policy statement of September 4 was also endorsed. It was
re-endorsed in another Liaison Conference on September 19,
when the Emperor gave his sanction to the conclusion of an
alliance with the Axis.
The Triple Alliance, 5 as agreed upon, was formally signed on
September 27, 1940. Japan undertook to recognize and respect
"the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of
a new order in Europe" (Article I), and both Germany and
Italy in return, promised to "recognize and respect the leadership
of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East
Asia" (Article II). Article III stated: "Germany, Italy and
Japan agree to co-operate in their efforts on aforesaid lines.
They further undertake to assist one another with all political,
economic and military means if one of the three Contracting
Powers is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the
European War or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." This stipu-

in Great East Asia", and "Resolution of the Liaison Conference about the Gist of
Main Points in regard to Dealing with the situation to meet the change in World
conditions;" Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 541 and 1310.
1 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1297; Timetable No. 39.
2 Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 113.

3 For details see Herbert Feis, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

• Quoted in Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 117.

• See Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. III, I94o-I94I (World Peace
Foundation, Boston 1941), pp. 304-311.
66 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

lation obviously referred to the United States though the par-

ties chose not to name it. As Foreign Minister Matsuoka explained
at the Imperial Conference on September 26: "Germany wants
to prevent American entry into the war, and Japan wants to
avoid a war with the United States." 1 Japan further agreed
that the Alliance "affects in no way the political status existing
at present between each of the three Contracting Parties and
Soviet Russia" (Article V), as it was thought to be "possible
eventually to bring the Soviet Union into the Tripartite Pact,
thus establishing a continental alliance between Germany, Italy,
the Soviet Union and Japan." 2 If such a grouping of Powers
were to result, it would, it was believed, go far towards restraining
the United States from declaring war against Japan in the Far
East. Japan was confident that in the face of the Tripartite
Agreement the United States would accede without any conflict
to the establishment of the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere rather than fight a Continental Alliance.
The nature of the New Order recognised in the Triple Alliance
was left undefined. As to the limit of the Japanese "sphere of
living", Foreign Minister Matsuoka, at the Privy Council meeting
of September 26, had said: " .... the area .... includes French
Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, the Straits Settlements, and the
Oceanic group comprising the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea,
New Caledonia, etc. Regarding this, we have made an under-
standing that this sphere could be automatically broadened in
the course of time." 3 Thus the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936
had been turned into an instrument of substituting Japanese
leadership for Western supremacy in East and Southeast Asia.
It is quite obvious that Japan still hoped to create the Co-
Prosperity Sphere without any war by means of diplomacy and
military prowess. Negotiations had already been started on
September 16, 1940 with the Netherlands Indies Government,
aiming at "peaceful penetration" into the Indies. Nipponese
forces had occupied without any opposition northern French
Indo-China at the end of September 1940. At Tokyo, work now
proceeded ceaselessly on the plans for the projected Co-Prosperity

1 Quoted in Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. III.

I T. Kase, op. cit., p. 41.
• Quoted in Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 120.
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 67

Sphere. It was envisaged that by closer contacts with Germany

and Italy and by adjusting relations with Soviet Russia, it
might be possible to pave the way for the pacification of China.
japan's allies and their dependants 1 would have to recognise the
pro-japanese government in Nanking. Germany would be asked
to mediate with Chiang Kai-shek to force him to realise the
hopelessness of his position and associate himself with the
general peace settlement. The Chinese Communist Party was
regarded as a greater obstacle to this plan than Chiang Kai-shek
and his associates. Amicable relations with the Soviet Union
were, therefore, thought to be necessary to neutralise the Chinese
Communists. 2
As soon as the pacification of China would be well underway,
political and economic ties with French Indo-China, the Dutch
East Indies, British Malaya, British Borneo, Siam and Burma
and possibly the Philippines would have to be drawn closer.
The pressure of the desired coalition between Germany,
Italy, the Soviet Union and japan, which was to be strengthened
in the meantime, would make it possible for the Imperial Govern-
ment at Tokyo to negotiate a peace between Great Britain and
Germany. The continued existence of the British Empire was
to be guaranteed - especially the integrity of Australia and
New Zealand. Finally, relations between japan and the United
States could then be normalised by the delimitation of their
mutual spheres of influence across the Pacific with the recogni-
tion, if need be, of a special position for the Philippines.
It appears that japanese political experts at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs were well aware that the chances of a peaceful
settlement of all these problems were very slight. In particular,
the peaceful surrender of Singapore and the cession of British
Malaya seemed unlikely. On the other hand, they counted on
little resistance from the Dutch East Indies once Singapore had
been occupied. 3
1 Rumania, Hungary, France (Vichy), Spain, etc.

• Hoover Doc. N 0.837 A of the "Prosecution Section, Inter. Mil.Trib. for the Far East"
present in the Hoover Library, California (cited in what follows as "Hoover Doc."):
"Outline of Japanese Foreign Policy" of September 28, 1940 with further elaboration
"Tentative Plan for Policy towards the Southern Regions" of October 4, 1940.
Summary in Timetable Nos. 51 and 53, referring to Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 628.
• Based on the text of Hoover Doc. No. 837A. In general these documents are
badly translated. Timetable No. 53 shows the occupation of the East Indies oilfields
68 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Provision had to be made, of course, for a number of other

eventualities - a successful German landing in England elimi-
nating her from the picture or, alternatively, the strengthening
of the British position by the absence of such a landing, or a
complete change in the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek.
It would be possible to decide the future status of each of the
countries of the projected Co-Prosperity Sphere separately and
according to the course of events. Details in the plan were,
however, flexible and variable. In French Indo-China, an inde-
pendence movement was to be inspired to cause France to
renounce her sovereign right. Apart from Tongking, which was
to be offered to Chiang Kai-shek in the case of an understanding
with him, Cambodia was to go to Thailand. Japanese military
advisers were to be appointed to key positions in these areas.
The rest of Indo-China was to become independent. A military
and economy alliance was to be devised so as to retain "the real
power" and "strategic points in every area" for the Japanese.
In Burma also an independence movement was to be en-
couraged and the country was to be detached from British
sovereignty. Specific areas in Upper Burma were to be given to
Chiang Kai-shek as part of the price for an agreement. The rest of
the country, or the whole of it if no agreement could be reached
with Chiang Kai-shek, was to be made independent with the
same military and economic alliance as foreseen in Indo-China.
Japan was to continue to demand the complete possession of
Singapore and the Straits Settlements and the conclusion of
a treaty advantageous to her, the final goal being the expulsion
of the British. In case of the start of military operations, they
were to coincide with the German invasion of England, or
failing that, with the peak of the German attack. A military
alliance was to be concluded with Thailand in order to use her
as "a rear base." She was to receive the territory formerly
belonging to her; the Straits Settlements were to be "placed
under the direct rule of Japan", and the remainder of Malaya
was to become a protectorate. The Plan also contained provisions
for the Netherlands East Indies 1. In all these territories the
as preceding that of Singapore in the plan, which, however, is in complete conflict
with the context of the document and is also not shown as such in Hoover Doc. No.
837A.
1 See Chapter I (Part II): "Plans for Indonesia".
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 69

right of enterprise for the nationals of third countries with which

Japan would be at peace was to be recognised, but they were
to follow the instructions of the Japanese Government.
How, when, in what form and on what scale the Japanese
Co-Prosperity Sphere was to come about still remained dependent
on the circumstances. However, the aim of the scheme was
already laid down in its main outlines. 1 In 1940 the decisions of
Japanese governments still only covered the narrower Prosperity
Sphere - Japan as the centre and driving force, Manchukuo as
prime collaborator, Northern China, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang
as collaborators of the second rank; Central and Southern China
as a supplementary economic force and the islands off the Chinese
coast, such as Hainan, as special units of strategic importance,
whose status and economy would have to be entirely subjected
to their role.
The main items concerning the distribution of functions to be
arranged among these areas were as follows:
1. Japan would be the financial centre supervising financial
affairs within the associated territories and controlling their
foreign finance.
2. Japan would be the centre for all specialized industries,
such as the production of "precision-machinery", arms, and
important chemical products.
3. Japan would have an actual monopoly in the shipping
industry and fisheries.
4. Japan would supply scientifically trained and the more
skilled technical labour and send it out to the mainland.
S. Japan would bring about a general agrarian reform in its
own and associated territories and co-ordinate agriculture and
forestry in the associated countries.
6. Japan would transfer a great part of her heavy industries
to Manchukuo and the greater part of her light industries to
Northern China, and a part, too, to Central and South China.
7. Manchukuo's mining, industry and agriculture would be
vigorously promoted with the aid of a labour force from Nor-
thern China.

1 "Outline for the Economic Construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China",

decided upon in the Cabinet meeting of October 3, 1940, Hoover Doc. No. 1611A;
Summary in Timetable No. 52, referring to Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 861.
70 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

8. Northern China, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang would

increase their production of raw materials, improve their trans-
port system by constructing railways, and build up widespread
industries.
9. Central and Southern China would contribute to Japan's
food supply as a result of the agrarian reforms.
10. In general, highly technical and strategical industries
would be located in Japan and Korea; heavy industries where
the raw materials were easily accessible, and light industries
where they were required. As far as possible, the collaborating
countries were to form a self-supporting unit.
The "South Sea Areas" were not yet mentioned in this plan.
According to the opinion prevailing at the time they formed
part of the outer ring of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The ties
linking them to Japan would be looser than those of the more
closely associated territories and their role still more subordinate.
In the summer and autumn of 1940 a very distinct political
group had come to power whose views differed from those
held by men who had so far been in power in Tokyo. All the
plans mentioned above were the work of the Second Konoye
Cabinet, which had come to power in July 1940 and in which
the radical Kwantung military group was highly influential.
General Tojo, former chief of the military police in Manchukuo
and later Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army,
was the War Minister in this Cabinet. Yosuke Matsuoka, former
Chairman of the South Manchurian Railway Company, educated
in America and closely associated with the military radicals
was the Foreign Minister. Naoki Hoshino, former Director of
the General Affairs Board of the State Council of Manchukuo, 1
had been included in the Second Konoye Cabinet as Chairman
of the Planning Board and Minister without Portfolio. 2 Hoshino,
who apparently saw further than most Japanese imperialists,
realized that a great Japanese empire, wholly under the influence
of the great financiers and industralists, who for decades had
controlled the entire economic life of the country, would always
1 See Chapter IV (Part I): "Policy in Manchuria".
• T. A. Bisson, Japan's War Economy (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York
1945), p. 18. Bisson's account of events confutes the theory he advances in his intro-
duction that Japan's war policy was the work of the Army and the Zaibatsu, working
in concord.
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 71

be a shaky structure, threatened not only by enemies outside

but also by the danger of revolution within. In order to ensure
a firm national basis for the new world empire, he considered
powerful state influence over private interests and the carrying
through of national socialist measures to benefit broad sections
of the population as necessary. He enjoyed the support of a
section of the officer corps especially among the occupation and
expeditionary troops on the mainland, but was openly and
implacably opposed by the Zaibatsu, for whom the ideal of a
Japanese world-empire coincided with the ideal of Japanese
mastery over Asian economy.
The resistance offered by the Zaibatsu forced the Konoye
Cabinet in December 1940 to abandon temporarily various
radical reforms. The continuing struggle over the issue of in-
dustrial control appeared to have ended in the triumph of the
business interests in April 1941 - Hoshino had to resign his
post as Minister, and in the reshuffle of the Cabinet again on
July IB, 1941 Matsuoka also disappeared from the government. 1
These changes "were clearly designed to establish unified Army-
Navy-business co-operation on a conservative program in which
the voice of the business groups would be supreme." 2
This success, however, later proved to be a Pyrrhic victory.
General Tojo remained a member of the second and third Konoye
Cabinets. During his tenure of office as Minister he remained in
active military service and gradually strengthened his hold on
the government until he succeeded in ousting his rivals on October
IB, 1941 and forming a cabinet under his own leadership. 3
General Tojo's dictatorship over both state and society after
he came to power was the logical consequence of the policy of
state planning as well as the increasing power of the Militarists
over the state authority, which had been a marked feature of
Japan's history since 1931, and which could only continue if
coupled with a large expansion of Japanese power.
Nevertheless, it was still very difficult to decide when and
1 ibid., pp.51-61. General Tojo brought his collaborator, Hoshino, back into

the government as the Cabinet Secretary (ibid., p. 76).

• ibid., pp. 54-55.
• A colourful account of Tojo's personal authority in the war years is given by a
Frenchman, R. Guillain (Le Peuple Japonais et la GUiffre, I939-I946, Paris 1947).
During the war Guillain was in Japan where he enjoyed a certain amount of freedom
of movement.
72 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

where the full military might of the Empire was to be employed

for the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
The Japanese leaders did not apparently want to be led by their
German ally in this matter but wished to keep the initiative
in their own hands. From the political and strategical point of
view, the obvious thing for Japan to do would have been to
attack the British possessions immediately after the defeat of
France in June 1940 in order to share in the process of delivering
to tottering England the coup de grace. But Japan was not
ready. 1
The military experts expressed their opinion that they still
needed several months to prepare for the campaign - nothing
could be undertaken before April 1941. 2 In the meantime they
hoped for a successful invasion of England by Germany. Ties
with Germany and Italy were drawn closer by the conclusion
of the Tripartite Alliance of September 27, 1940. The desire to
strike grew daily in Japan, but dissension within the government
and differences of opinion with regard to where action ought
first to begin, delayed the commencement of hostilities, as much
as did the state of unpreparedness of the military forces. No
action could be taken against Chiang Kai-shek who was receiving
aid from England and the United States. The French Vichy
Government was constrained through Berlin to allow increasing
Japanese intervention in Indo-China. Siam, now powerfully
dominated by Japan, was given a free hand to threaten Cambodia
and obtained help in coming to an advantageous peace with
an extension of Siam's territory, which peace, as the first outward
sign of Japan's hegemony, was initialled on board a Japanese
warship and finally concluded at Tokyo (March II, and May 9,
1941 respectively).
England's refusal to surrender in the winter of 1940-41
awakened new anxiety in some Japanese circles. It was becoming
increasingly apparent that the United States, which had begun
1 Report of the Chief of the General Staff of the Navy to the Mikado, August 10,

1940, Timetable No. 41; Far East Mill. Trib., Exh. No. 1298.
• ibid. Marquis Kido wrote in his Diary on August 10, 1940: "The Emperor told
me what he and Prince Fushimi, Chief of the Navy General Staff, had talked about.
The Prince said that 'The Navy at present want to avoid the use of force against
Singapore and the Netherlands Indies, and that, since at least eight months will be
required for preparations after a decision for war is made, the later war comes the
better'." - Quoted in Herbert Feis, o.p. cit., p. 105.
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (I 937-1941) 73

"to shake off the drowsiness of the isolationist sleep", was

determined to save Britain from having to fight to the last
ditch; and that good relations between Russia and Germany
could not survive another year. The United States was not only
converting herself to an arsenal and supplying arms to Allied
Powers under the Lend-Lease Act passed on March II, 1941
but also was sending more troops and planes to Hawaii and the
Philippines. The Japanese Government "seems to have become
sure that a definite military understanding had been conceived
between the United States and the British Commonwealth and
the Netherlands." 1 Tojo and Matsuoka, who had evidently
wanted to risk speedy action with less thorough military prepa-
rations, made only slow progress with their plans. The painful
question kept reappearing: Would a total German victory
really be to Japan's advantage? Despite all promises, might
not Hitler demand the entire heritage of the West, including
special economic privileges in East Asia? The Japanese Govern-
ment made an attempt at mediation between Great Britain and
Germany, which, however, had foundered at the first sounding
in London. 2
It was then decided to send Matsuoka to Europe "to be in
personal touch" with the Nazi leaders concerning the operation
of the Tripartite Pact, and the creation of the Japanese Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. On his way to Germany, the
Minister stopped for a short time in Moscow where, in a talk
with Stalin and Molotov, he suggested a settlement of all Russo-
Japanese differences. The Russians, however, were asked to
delay their reply until his return. On his arrival at Berlin he
revealed Japan's many difficulties in the course of the long
discussions held between March 27- April 4. The fears were
principally: Japan's apprehension of being attacked in the rear
by Soviet Russia or the United States in the event of a march
to the south; the Japanese leader's anxiety that the United
States might not risk her fleet in East Asiatic waters but might
allow a five or ten-year war to develop; the desirability of
including Russia as a fullscale partner in the Three-Power Pact

1 Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 190.

• February 20, 1941. Churchill's reply in the House of Commons, February 23,
1941.
74 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

by offering her an ice-free outlet to the sea by way of India

or Iran; and also the Japanese industrialists' fear that Germany
might later insist upon special rights in East Asia. Matsuoka
was careful, however, to keep concealed his private views about
what Japan might do in future.
What he heard in reply came as a rude shock. What Hitler and
Ribbentrop proposed to him was plausible enough: a direct
Japanese attack on Singapore, by-passing the Philippines, and
thereafter, that Japan should secure the territories she needed
for the New Order in Great East Asia. Hitler would protect
Japan's rear against Russian attack by placing 160 to 180 di-
visions along Russia's Western frontier. For reasons of ideology
it was impossible to accept Russia as a fourth ally. England
was still tottering, Hitler declared: one last blow and she would
be on her knees. Japan need not fear German competition. Asia
was for Japan, Europe and Africa for Germany and Italy. Both
countries would follow Japan's example and recognize the
Nanking government as the de jure government of China. But
Hitler did not pledge himself to an automatic declaration of
war on the United States if Japan was attacked in the rear.
Ribbentrop, however, went further than his Fuhrer, though
doubtlessly on his instructions, by saying quite clearly that
war with Russia was imminent. Within three months' time
Soviet Russia would have ceased to exist as a Great Power!
Matsuoka obviously did not feel satisfied. He repeatedly
insisted on accepting Russia as an ally, and when he failed to
achieve any results on this score in Berlin, he returned via Mos-
cow and concluded the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact on
April 13, 1941, abandoning all the extravagant claims Japan
had earlier made on Russia. 1
1 The details concerning Matsuoka's visit are still mainly known from the German
archives. See the U.S. Dept. of State: Nazi-Soviet Relations, I939-I94I (1948),
pp.280--324. See also William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared
War, I94o-I94I (Royal Institute of Int. Affairs, London 1953) pp.345-359;
Herbert Feis, op. cit., pp. 180--187.
Stalin's unusual, effusive display of friendliness towards Germany on the occasion
of Matsuoka's departure (Stalin embraced and kissed the German Military Attache,
saying: "We will remain friends with you - in any event.") can only be explained
by the fact of Matsuoka's warning. The Japanese Foreign Minister had been extre-
mely reserved in his attitude towards the German representatives during this second
visit to Moscow. For an eyewitness account see Toshikazu Kase, op. cit., p. 159.
See also W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. III, The Grand AUiance (Cassell
& Co. Ltd., London 1950), pp. 161-172.
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (I 937-1941) 75

In the light of later events Hitler's advice appeared to be

correct. Singapore could have been attacked and occupied
without Russia being able to move on account of the German
threat; the Dutch East Indies could have offered little resistance,
and it would not have been easy for Roosevelt to involve the
American people in a war for the sake of Singapore. The solidarity
of the American people which revealed itself after Pearl Harbour
and which lasted until the end of the war and made possible
their vast war production, would have been lacking. Japanese
military leaders, however, were of the opinion that they needed
three months in all eventualities to capture Singapore (later it
was occupied in ten weeks although the forces there had been
strengthened) but Matsuoka regarded their estimate as too
optimistic. If the struggle for Singapore were to last for six
months as he feared, all the political and strategical advantages
on which the plan was based would be lost. 1
On the basis of these and other considerations Japan at last
decided to wage the war of conquest for the New Order in Greater
East Asia in its own way without close co-ordination with her
allies. This was the fatal decision that caused her to direct her
main attack against the United States which Berlin and Tokyo
had first planned to exclude from the struggle until it had been
sufficiently isolated. Indeed, by the middle of 1941 it appeared
that wherever Japan had sought to penetrate by means of
diplomacy without any armed conflict, the resistance had
stiffened. A settlement in China could not be achieved. The U.S.
had intensified her policy of strangulation against Japan and
there was little evidence that she would accept Japan's
programme of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Negotiations conducted
by Yoshizawa in Batavia 2 had failed. The breaking off of these
negotiations on June 17, 1941 was a sign that a speedy resort
to arms for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere must now be reckoned with. The Chiefs
of both Army and Navy declared the occupation of Southern
Indo-China to be the first military action necessary. 3 There
1 Nazi-Soviet Relations, I939-I94I, p. 310.
• See Chapter II (Part II): "Preparations for Conquest: Negotiations".
• At the Staff Conference of February I, 1941 the military experts had already
insisted on this occupation, but Matsuoka had succeeded in getting this delayed in
order not to be bound to a plan of strategy during his talks in Berlin. The occupation
76 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

was still, however, little discussion as to what the second step

would be. The purely military-minded commanders were all
in favour of an attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbour.
A plan for this had been submitted to Imperial General Head-
quarters in january 1941 by the Commander of the Combined
Fleets, and carefully worked-out exercises for its execution
commenced in May of the same year. 1 This still did not mean
that it had definitely been decided to attack - it was necessary
to take all possibilities into account. It did, however, mean
that the Navy was determined to keep the leadership concerning
naval war strategy in its own hands. For the japanese Navy,
the U.S. became the principal national enemy. A last attempt to
preserve the co-ordination of war policy with Germany and
Italy had failed. The German invasion of Russia on june 22,
1941 induced some quarters to suggest a complete change of
strategy and the opening of a continental war with Russia.
Matsuoka, in particular, was of the opinion that "it was wiser
to concentrate attention on the north and remove the Russian
menace once for all by joining the German attack upon the
Soviet Union." 2 The joint Conference of the Government and
Military Commanders held on july 2, 1941 in the presence of
the Emperor, however, flatly rejected this proposal and definitely
committed japan to the "southern advance." 3 The Conference
decided that japan was determined to follow a policy which
would result in the establishment of the Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere, "no matter what international develop-
ments take place;" would hasten her advance into the Southern

was decided upon at the Liaison Conference between the Government and the Im-
perial Headquarters on June 25, 1941 (Fa,. East Mil. T,.ib., Exh. No. 1306; Time-
table No. 92).
1 Joseph W. Ballantine, "Mukden to Pearl Harbor. The Foreign Relations of
Japan", of> cit., p.660. Despite the promising title, this article is very brief and
incomplete.
• T. Kase, of>. cit., p. 48.
• Joseph W. Ballantine, of>. cit., p. 661; Herbert Feis, of>. cit., pp. 211-217; Far
East Mil. T,.ib., Exh. No. 588; Timetable No. 93. An urgent call on Japan by the
German Government to throw her troops into the battle against Russia came
too late (July 10). It is remarkable that though the Japanese Naval Commanders
desired rather than feared a rally by the American fleet to the Western side of
the Pacific Ocean, they all the same allowed themselves to be governed by
theoretical military thinking and decided to attack the Americans in their own
harbours, although they had no troops ready to occupy the harbours immediately
after the attack.
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 77

Regions and "remove all obstacles for the achievement of the

foregoing purpose." It was further decided that "first of all, the
plans which have been laid with reference to French Indo-
China and Thailand will be prosecuted with a view to consoli-
dating our position in the Southern territories", "even at the
risk of an armed conflict with Great Britain and the United
States." For this conflict "basic military preparations" would
be carried forward. Thus the decision had been taken. Both
the Army and Navy now united to embark upon the Southward
march, and there was still the slender hope that an open war
with the Anglo-American Powers might be avoided.
On July 16, 1941 the Second Konoye Cabinet resigned. The
formation of a new cabinet by the Prime Minister on July 18
without Matsuoka and a few other less willing elements in the
former government did not, however, mean a change in the
policy. The execution of the policy of advance to the South
remained as its main objective. Only five days later (July 23),
Japan secured the extension of Japanese occupation in Southern
Indo-China, and on July 26 General Sumita settled down in
Saigon with the spearhead of the Japanese Army. "Occupation
of Southern Indo-China in July 1941", remarks Bisson, "climaxed
the southward advance which Japan had been making step by
step as opportunity presented since the attack on China began
four years earlier.
"The sequence and timing of these steps are instructive.
Japanese forces occupied the Canton area in October 1938,
following the Munich Settlement. The growing European crisis
facilitated seizure of Hainan Island in February and the Spratly
Islands in March 1939. Northern Indo-China was occupied
during the Battle for Britain in September 1940. With Southern
Indo-China in their hands, the Japanese held the final operational
base required for the attack on Southeast Asia." 1
British and American counter-action to this latest Japanese
move followed at once, in the form of warnings, abrogation of
more treaties and freezing of Japanese assets, which meant a
clear break with the Western Powers and economic isolation for
Japan. Doubts were now expressed as to Japan's power of
1 T. A. Bisson, AmC1'ica's Far Eastern Policy (The Macmillan Company, for the
Intstitute of Pacific Relations, New York 1945), pp. 125-126.
78 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

endurance. Suzuki, President of the Planning Board, expressed

the view that if the embargo continued, Japan would collapse
within two years. 1 That the freezing-order had the effect of
making Japan more determined to move South was clearly
stated in a cable sent to Oshima, Japanese Ambassador in Berlin,
on July 31, 1941, and repeated to the Japanese Ambassador in
Washington, Admiral Nomura: "Commercial and economic
relations between Japan and other countries, led by England
and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly
strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently,
the Japanese Empire, to save its very life, must take measures
to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. It must take
immediate steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain
of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance of and
with the participation of England and the United States, acting
like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep." 2 Japan's stiffening
attitude was also noticed in her answer, on August 6, 1941, to
President Roosevelt's proposal that Indo-China be neutralized.
Following the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting on board a warship
in the Atlantic on August 14, which not only laid down the
principles of the Atlantic Charter (in a highly informal manner)
but also provided for the speedy announcement of a joint
declaration opposing Japanese plans of expansion, Konoye
addressed to Roosevelt his well-known letter of August 28, 1941,
in which he proposed for a Japanese-American conference at
sea. But the Military High Command demanded a quick decision
for war. Oil stocks were rapidly dwindling. "If Japan was to
fight, the longer it waited the greater the risk that the battle
might be lost for lack of oil or other essential raw materials." 3
Moreover, there was only a short time ahead of good fighting
weather. According to strategists, October and November were
the best months for landing operations in the Southern regions.
The Supreme Command further calculated, it seems, that
"should the beginning of the war be delayed beyond the spring
of the following year, the menace from the Soviet Union would
appreciably increase, as military operations in the north would

1 Deposition of Suzuki, Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 3605.

• Cable No. 708, Tokyo to Berlin, July 31, 1941. Herbert Feis, of>. cit., p. 249.
• Herbert Feis, of>. cit., p. 269.
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 79

become easier with the passing of winter." 1 Moreover, "as time

went by, the United States was bound to achieve air superiority
over Japan. The hostile encirclement would grow in strength as
time passed." 2
So, pressed by the Military High Command, the Imperial
Conference of September 6, 1941 decided to execute the policy
of marching towards the South by completing all military
preparations for a war with the United States, Great Britain
and the Netherlands by the end of October, should Japanese
demands for a British-American guarantee not to strengthen
their position in the South be rejected by the early part of
October. Japan would be willing, if necessary, to guarantee the
neutrality of the Philippines. 3 Although no date was thus fixed
for the commencement of hostilities, the Army and Navy secured
formal Imperial sanction to get ready for war. Measures followed
to speed up production of war materials. War plans for the
campaign against Southern Areas were carefully worked out and
made ready for action. The Navy War College in Tokyo held the
"Final War Games" of the Navy during September 2-13, 1941
when the naval operations against Pearl Harbour, the Philippines
Malaya, Hongkong, the Netherlands Indies, etc. were demon-
strated in detail. 4 Meanwhile, nothing came of Konoye's pro-
posal for a Japanese-American Conference or of the "informal
conversations", which had been conducted in Washington
between the two governments since March 1941. War Minister
Tojo now strongly insisted on the discontinuance of talks with
the United States which wanted Japan to renounce the policy of
expansion. He demanded a definite decision for war.
With the certainty of war in mind, a new change of cabinet
was decided upon in Tokyo - General Tojo himself took the reins
in hand on October 18, 1941, and the stage was set for the final
plunge. The Military High Command took complete control of
the government and the last resistance to a policy of aggression
was rudely disposed of. "Japan is standing at the crossroads",
declared the new Prime Minister, "the ways to her rise or fall".
All war preparations were now intensified. Invasion plans
1 T. Kase, op. cit., p. 50.

• ibid.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 588; Timetable No. 100.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 809; Timetable Nos. 101 and 102.
80 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

entered their final phase. An agreement was reached between

the Army and Navy, dividing the duties and command in joint
operation in the coming campaign. Terauchi was appointed as
the commander-in-chief of the newly-organised Southern Army
with headquarters at Saigon, which had been acquired in July
1941. 1 Between October 23 and November 2 a Liaison Conference
between the Government and the Supreme Command was held
"in order to conduct a searching analysis of the situation at home
and abroad." 2 The arguments for and against embarking on a
war were discussed for the last time. The final opinion was that
the war must be started before the end of 1941. 3 Indeed, the
difficulties would be great and the power-relations uncertain;
what military forces would have to be maintained in China and
on the Russian frontier was difficult to plan, and what military
achievements the U.S. might be capable of in reaction to a
Japanese attack was still unknown. Moreover, Great Britain
seemed on the way to recovery from the blows she had sustained
in 1940 and Hitler's war policy was quite unpredictable. At the
end of October it still looked as if Russia would be defeated before
the New Year, 1942 and the Japanese seriously reckoned with
the German forces making a right-about-turn and marching
from captured Moscow back to the French embarkation ports,
from which an invasion of England might be directed. England
would probably then sue for peace, which could be granted on
fairly tolerable conditions.
The final decision to launch a war against the United States,
Great Britain and the Netherlands was, however, taken at an
Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941. Military forces were
to be ready for an attack by the beginning of December, thus
amending the decision of September 6 to go to war at the end of
October. Germany and Italy were to be notified to this effect
and asked to declare war at the same time. Nippon would
maintain peace with Russia. An attempt was to be made to
acquire transcontinental connections between Japan and Ger-
many by encouraging Russia to expand in the direction of
British India and Persia. Until the commencement of hostilities,

1 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 809 and 1252; Timetable No. 103.
• T. Kase, op. cit., p. 57.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 1328 and 1329; Timetable No. 106.
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 81

Japan was to maintain "peaceful" negotiations, in order to

conceal her real intentions. It was further decided that im-
mediately before the advance into Siam, free passage for Ja-
panese troops and all facilities connected with it were to be
demanded of that country and a common defense pact was to be
concluded. After the opening of the war the pressure on the
Chiang regime was to be strengthened by cutting off the Burma
and Hongkong routes and by making use of the Chinese in the
Southern Regions. In judging later events it is also important
to remember that it was decided at this Conference - in the
presence of Emperor Hirohito, and thus with the sanction of the
highest, unimpeachable authority - to grant "independence" to
Burma and the Philippines as soon as possible after their conquest,
and later to a part of Indonesia as well. The independence move-
ment in British India was to be supported. 1
Immediately after this Imperial Conference there was issued
by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets the "Com-
bined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No.1 in the war against
the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands", which
contained (in the Chapter on "the Outbreak of War and the use
of Arms thereto") full instructions for the starting of operations.
Two days later (November 7) the "Combined Fleet Top Secret
Operation Order No.2" was issued, in which it was definitely
stated that December 8, 1941 would be the day of attack on
Pearl Harbour, Malaya, Hongkong, the Philippines, etc. 2
To conceal the Southward march which was now beginning
and perhaps with a last ray of hope that the Western Powers
would capitulate without a war, Saburu Kurusu was despatched
as Ambassador Extraordinary to negotiate with Washington - on
the same day as the Japanese forces received their marching
orders. On November 10, the fleet which was to attack Pearl
Harbour assembled east of the Kuriles. On November 26, it
started on its fateful journey to Hawaii. The American proposal
of the same day, which appeared to the Japanese to tum their
calendar back to 1937, provided the pretext for the formal
confirmation of December 8, 1941 as the date for starting a war
with the Western Powers, which was done at the Imperial
1 Far East Mil. Tl'ib., Exh. Nos. 878, 1169 and 1176; Timetable No. 108.

• Fa!' East Mil. T!'ib., Exh. No. 1252; Timetable Nos. \09 end 110.
82 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Conference on December I, 1941. 1 While simultaneous attacks

were made on Pearl Harbour, Hongkong, Malaya, etc. on Decem-
ber 8, Admiral Nomura and Kurusu in Washington delivered to
Secretary of State Hull the final Japanese memorandum,
accusing the United States at every tum of conspiring "with
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts
towards the establishment of peace through the creation of a
New Order in East Asia". As with China in 1894, and Russia
in 1904, Japan thus chose to declare peaceful methods no longer
possible after her forces had already launched a war of aggression.
When war plans for the creation of a Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere had reached their final stages, it was felt
necessary to elaborate the policies to be followed in the occupied
territories. Therefore, the Liaison Conference of November 20,
1941 decided 2 that in the aforesaid areas military administrations
were to be set up, and existing administrative organs were to be
utilised as much as possible for the conduct of these military
administrations. All social and national customs were to be
respected. The occupation authorities should, on the one hand,
aim at the acquisition of all materials and products vital for the
prosecution of the war, and on the other, strive after the self-
sufficiency of the needs of the occupation troops from local
resources. Special attention was to be given for the control of
exploitation, communication, commercial and financial facilities.
As a means of transaction the occupation authorities were to
make use of valid and available local currency; "occupation
money" was to be circulated only when it could not be done
otherwise. 3 The securing of all products necessary for the
prosecution of the war and for the maintenance of the occupation
forces would certainly not be possible without exerting some
"pressure" on the native population. "Natives will have to
reconcile themselves to such pressure as is unavoidably involved
for them in our acquisition of resources" - runs the instruction
of the Liaison Conference. Thus the interests of the local popu-
1 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 588; Timetable No. 116.

• Hoover Doc. No. 1448, "Details of the Execution of Administration in the

Southern Occupied Territories", Decisions of Liaison Conference, November 20,
1941; Summary in Timetable No. 112, referring to Far East Mil. Trib., Ex". No. 877.
3 The instruction for the printing of occupation money for the Dutch East Indies
and other regions had already been given in January 1941. See Timetable No. 72
(Inter Prosec. Section, Doc. 9022, see Ex". No. 840).
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 83

lation were to be subordinated to those of Japan. American,

British and Dutch nationals would have to be directed "to
co-operate" with the military administration. Measures, such
as deportation and other "suitable means", would be taken
against the unwilling. The existing rights and interests of Ger-
mans, Italians and other allies would be respected but "any
future extension of them will be restricted as far as possible".
Distrust was, however, still working in the minds of the Japanese:
the Chinese would be dealt with more drastically. They were to
be made "to renounce allegiance" to the government of Chiang
Kai-shek and "sympathize and co-operate with" the military
administration. Evidently, voluntary co-operation was not
expected of them.
Characteristic are the restrictions which were to be imposed
also on their own compatriots: the Japanese should first be
examined for their "reliability" before they would be allowed to
go to the new territories; preference would be given to those who
had already lived in the country concerned.
I t was further decided that the administration in the occupied
areas would strictly remain in the hands of the military au-
thorities: all problems connected with the administration would
be laid before the Government through the General Headquarters
and along the same way directives of the Government would be
sent out. Only "gradually" the functions of the military ad-
ministration would be transferred to the organisation set up by
the Government. These broad principles were obviously meant
to be applied to war-time conditions which demanded maximum
possible aid to Japan's war efforts.
For the preparation of a more permanent system for the
newly-conquered territories of East and South East Asia, a
Cabinet Commission called the Sixth Committee was instituted
by a decision of the cabinet on November 28, 1941, under the
chairmanship of the President of the Planning Board, Suzuki,
and composed of the members of that Board, the departments
of Foreign Affairs, Finance, War and Navy. 1 This Committee
presented an elaborate document on December 12, 1941,2 which
1 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1331; Timetable No. 114. The Sixth Committee

came into being on December 2, 1941 and was modified on January 23, 1942.
2 Hoover Doc. No. 1492: "Outline of the Economic Counter-Plans for the Southern
Area", December 12, 1941; Summary in Timetable No. 124, referring to Far East
Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1332.
84 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

outlined the measures for the economic re-organisation of the

Southern Areas, comprising the Dutch East Indies, British
Malaya, Borneo, and the Philippines (which were to form Area
A); and French Indo-China and Thailand (to form Area B).
In regard to Area A, the measures to be adopted were contained
in two plans: "the first counter-plan, and the second counter-
plan." The purpose of the first counter-plan was to secure
resources for carrying on the war. Every means was to be applied
"to prevent outflow of special resources of the Southern areas to
enemy countries." Existing enterprises were to be made to
co-operate for the acquisition of resources and efforts were to
be directed "to lighten to the minimum the burdens on our
Imperial economic strength." The second counter-plan aimed
at the completion of a system of autarchy in the Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the economic development of the
Japanese people in the Co-Prosperity Area, and the promotion of
economic exchange between areas within the Co-Prosperity
Sphere.
The first counter-plan went into great details. Self-sufficiency
of the different regions for daily necessities of life was to be the
aim. Japan was to be relied upon only for such materials as were
not to be found or substituted locally. In the development of
natural resources oil was to be given priority. At the beginning
the petroleum industry was to be managed by the military and
as soon as conditions would permit, it was to be transferred to
private enterprise. Special attention was to be directed towards
the acquisition of oil, suitable for aviation gasoline.
Of the mineral resources, nickel, copper, bauxite, chromium,
manganese, mica, phosphate or other ores for special steel and
non-ferrous metal (tin excepted) were to be exploited. Tin and
iron production was to be temporarily suspended. For the
exploitation of these resources private entrepreneurs were to be
selected as far as possible. The exploitation of resources in one
place was to be left as much as possible to one entrepreneur of
local experience and ability; and throughout the Southern area
the same variety of resources was to be divided and shared by
two or more entrepreneurs, so as to avoid the danger of monopoly.
No new entrepreneurs, except in urgent cases, were to be
admitted for the time being in the field of agriculture, forestry
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 85

and marine products. Each region was to endeavour to attain

self-sufficiency in food. Manufacturing industries were not to be
set up "as a rule", except special ones, for example, shipbuilding,
repair shops, necessary for the equipment and exploitation of
natural resources.
With regard to the monetary system the plan stated that
military currency, to be expressed in the local currency of each
area, was to be circulated at par with the local currency. En-
forcing measures were to be issued for that purpose. In the end
the local system of currency was to be controlled and military
currency withdrawn. To that end such means were to be used as
borrowing money from, and floating loans through, the note
issuing banks, appropriation of confiscated enemy property,
and forced contributions of local governments. A general control
of currencies was to be organised. It was further stated in the
plan that ships of more than 500 tons, seized in the area, were
to be transferred to the Central Authorities in Tokyo, but those
under 500 tons were to be used in the area under the direction
of the Central Authorities. The local army and navy forces were
to strive for the attainment of local self-sufficiency in food, fuel,
supplementary clothing and building materials. It is important
to bear in mind that the economic measures taken by Japan in
the Southern Regions after their occupation closely followed the
programme outlined in this document.
It is necessary here to discuss the political set up in which the
Japanese envisaged the scheme of economic re-organisation. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that of War lost no time in
drafting memoranda for this purpose. The former, however,
submitted relatively moderate proposals. 1 The basic principles
were to be: the establishment of military bases throughout the
Co-Prosperity Sphere; co-operation with Japan in foreign policy
and national defence by the newly-created states; pernlanent
economic co-operation; and the driving out of European and
American influence from the whole of the Area. The right of the
native population to independence was, according to this Plan,
rather generously recognised ("respecting to the utmost the

1 Hoover Doc. No. 1112A: "Summarized Plan for Management of the South Sea

Area", December 14, 1941; Summary in Timetable No. 125 referring to Far Eas
Mil. Trib .• Exh. No. 1333A.
86 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

desire of the Southern people for emancipation and independence")

but always with the reservation of Japan's right to annex any
territory, especially those of backward people. The Philippines
would become "quickly" independent. An "Indonesian Feder-
ation", excluding less developed areas which were to be under
the direct control of Japan, was to be established. 1 Singapore
and the Straits Settlements were to be Japanese territories and
administered by a Japanese Governor-General at Singapore. A
new federation, consisting of the former Federated and non-
Federated States of Malaya, was to be set up, and the adminis-
tration was to be directed and controlled by the Japanese
Governor-General at Singapore. A "treaty of protection" was
to be concluded with the Federation as well as its component
states in order to safeguard japan's "right of protectorate" over
them. The Kingdom of Brunei was to be made a separate J a-
panese protectorate with a similar treaty and controlled by the
Governor-General at Singapore. British North Borneo and
Sarawak, where the monarchy was to be abolished, were to be
organised as Japanese territories and governed by the Governor-
General at Singapore. The disposition of Hongkong was to
depend on the settlement of the China Incident.
Thus the experts of Foreign Affairs tried to follow closely the
instructions of the Imperial Conference of November 5, 1941
with great caution. "Further problems", runs the memorandum,
would "be dealt with according to circumstances." Evidently,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had little sympathy for fantastic
plans of the Army; for these were really appalling!
The Research Section of the Ministry of War presented also in
December 1941 two documents. The one contained the funda-
mental principles of the re-organisation of the South Sea Area,
the other a further elaboration with a detailed political division
of the world empire to be founded. 2
As part of the Japanese policy, the War Ministry also reiterated
the extermination of the Anglo-American domination and the

1 See Chapter I (Part II): "Plans for Indonesia".

• Hoover Doc. No. 1987B: "The Fundamental Principles of the Remedial Measures
for Southern Regions to be occupied as a Result of the Great East Asia War" and
"Plan for Land Disposal within the Greater Asiatic Co-Prosperity Sphere", December
1941. Summary in Timetable Nos. 126 and 127, referring to Far East Mil. Trib.,
Ex". No. 1334.
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 87

elimination of all British, American and Dutch influence in

South East Asia. The second purpose would be the re-organisation
of natural resources of the area by the native population under
the direction of the Japanese for the benefit of the Japanese
Empire and the national defence. This re-organisation, according
to the Plan, was also of "vital necessity" for the promotion of the
well-being of the population within the region, considering the
fact that the whole economy of the Co-Prosperity Sphere would
be harnessed in such a way that it would lead to the reduction
of overproduction of those resources for which the demand inside
the area would remain below the existing production. Rubber,
tin and sugar were specially mentioned in this connection. 1
After the war all occupied areas, with the exception of certain
military bases, would get "freedom" and be made "independent
monarchies." In determining the new states, the degree of
development of their inhabitants would be taken into consider-
ation, but the dictum "one race, one state" would not necessarily
be observed. A combination of several states was also foreseen
"in case of necessity." 2 In any event Japanese control of foreign
and military affairs of all states of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was
to be regarded as a sine qua non to the peace and stability in the
whole area. Thus Japan was to retain full freedom of action and
complete supervision in the re-organised scheme.
And how far this supreme authority of Japan would extend?
The plan of December indicated also the limits, which sounds so
fantastic, that some amount of doubt arises about the authen-
ticity or at least of the official character of this document. To
the West, Goa on India's West coast would be the farthest point;
to the North, the Arctic Sea till the north of Alaska; to the East,
it would extend till the eastern islands of Caribbean Sea, where
the new Japanese Colonial Empire would touch the Western
border of the future German sphere of influence. More to the
south than the projected Southern border was impossible: the
South Pole itself would be the terminus. This was the way in
which some of the Japanese planners imagined themselves" Asia
1 Thus the maintenance of the production of these materials for trade with areas
outside the Co-Prosperity Sphere was in principle rejected.
• This may be understood to mean the translation (perhaps defective) of the Japa-
nese text in Hoover Doc. 1987B, which runs thus: "In case of necessity these monar-
chies shall be organized as Coalition monarchies".
88 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

for the Asiatics!" It appears that the basic idea of the expulsion
of the Anglo-Saxons from the Co-Prosperity Sphere had a sinister
significance, for Australia and New Zealand were to be included
in the sphere. The plan envisaged a series of "Governments-
General" - Formosa, South Sea Islands (Guam, Nauru, Ocean
Island, Gilbert Islands, Wake), Melanesia, East Pacific, Australia,
New Zealand, Ceylon, Alaska, and Central America - which
would form the outer ring of the Japanese sphere of influence.
Inside this, there would be the group of "independent states" -
East Indian Kingdom (embracing the Dutch East Indies and
British Borneo), Kingdoms of Burma (including "the whole of
British Burma, Assam Province [India], the portion of Bengal
Province from the left bank of the River Ganges to the eastern
part of the Shahappur Canal from the confluence of the River
Brahmaputra; with Thailand the boundaries shall be established
separately")' Malaya (the Federated States of Malaya), Siam,
Cambodia, Annam (with Tongking), and, of course, China and
Manchukuo, although not mentioned in this connection. Hainan,
Hongkong and the Philippines would be the directly-governed
Japanese territories.
The extravagant ideas of the Ministry of War were only
partially approved by General Tojo's own "Total War Research
Institute." 1 It was this Institute that openly pointed out the
desirability of making the attack on Pearl Harbour, the beginning
of a series of wars to be waged over a period of more than twenty
years with the purpose of a systemetic expansion of East Asia to
a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and later on, to the
Japanese world domination. The plan-makers of the Institute
were wholly seized with the mythical world of thought, which
considered Japanese role in world events as a divine mission and
for whom the "new order" in Asia should be not only economic
and political but also moral and intellectual. Their ideas were
those of the radical military reformers, not those of the power-
loving Japanese financiers. Their plans had influence on the
course of events and proved that the regime of General Tojo and
1 Far East Mil. Tl'ib., Ed. No. 868; Timetable No. 128. The "Total War Research
Institute" was established by a law in October 1940 under the direct supervision
of the Premier in order to make a profound study of the needs of the total national
war as well as to lead and control in this respect the education and training of official
personalities.
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 89

his supporters had been really revolutionary in its intentions.

They betrayed a fanaticism for which probably nothing was
sacred and which found a final expression in an officers' uprising
against the Imperial commandment that enjoined the surrender.
For them Japan and Japan's structure was the manifestation
of true morality in social forms. 1 The Co-Prosperity Sphere
would thus serve for spreading the moral principles which were
based on "the original spirit of the Imperial influence" and
would promote East Asiatic culture through the moral unification
of that area.
This was the language and trend of thought of the group which
had formed itself from the officers, attached to the K wantung
Army and working in Manchukuo. In his talk with Hitler in the
spring of 1941 Matsuoka had told of his conversation with Stalin.
Many minutes of his valuable time, he said, he had spent to
explain to Stalin that "the Japanese were moral communists",
and that this ideal had lived among the people since time imme-
morial. "Moral communism" was no political or economic
communism, Matsuoka had argued, which the Japanese had
much earlier tried and rejected. Liberalism, individualism, and
egoism introduced from the West had overthrown the Japanese
ideal of moral communism but there was now a minority which
was strong enough to fight successfully for the restoration of the
Old Ego (alten lehs) of the Japanese. This ideological struggle in
Japan was extremely bitter. But the group that was fighting for
the restoration of the old ideals was convinced that it would be
finally victorious, and the fight against the Anglo-Saxons who
were mainly responsible for the entry of false principles of life
into Japan would also represent the fight and victory of the
revived national ideal. 2
The Japanese Empire would be the centre and the champion
of an Eastern moral and cultural revival, and, therefore, people
and rulers should return to a true understanding of the spirit
and morality of the national character. The Emperor, who was

1 Hoover Doc. No. 2402B: "Draft of Basic Plan for Establishment of Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (Total War Research Institute), January 27, 1942;
Summary in Timetable No. 129 referring to Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1336.
• Nazi-Soviet Relations, I939-I94I, op. cit., p.297. See also The Undeclared Wal',
I94o-I94I, op cit., p. 348; W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. III, pp. 166-
167.
90 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

in an exalted way the pivot of everything and the source of all

moral principles, would make Japan the touchstone of the world.
On the basis of this conception the Japanese should work and
their historical mission would be to create a moral order in the
world. As if in Matsuoka's own words, the Draft of January 27,
1942 of the Total War Research Institute continued: Europe and
America, employing their material civilization, had penetrated
into the East. The East had consequently become a "Europe-
anised Asia." It had been the divine country of Japan that had
resisted this intrusion, and now she would put an end to this
Western penetration.
So, this was the world of thought of the radical military
circles which had placed Japan in her seat of power through
Tojo's premiership. Such a state and such a government could
think itself bound to nothing but to the self-imposed divine
mission. The elimination of all Western influence and penetration,
including the physical extermination of Western "intruders",
not only of a few thousands in the Philippines, or some tens of
thousands in Singapore or hundreds of thousands in Indonesia
but also of millions in Australia and New Zealand, was their firm
determination. Insight into the mentality and position of Tojo's
followers both in government and military power is, therefore, a
necessary condition for a proper understanding of the Japanese
occupation policy in Indonesia - her aims, methods and failure.
The plan-makers of the Total War Research Institute were so
strongly influenced by ideological motives that they did not feel
diffident to leave Russia out of consideration, as the expects of
Foreign Affairs and the political advisers of the Ministry of War
did. For them it was a foregone conclusion that war with the
Soviets and their expUlsion from East Asia should be the first
objective after the chief enemy of the New Order, Great Britain,
would be eliminated. If possible, war against Russia should be
postponed till that with America was ended. Otherwise, the risk
of a war on two fronts was to be ventured. For, without the
conquest of the Russian Maritime Province in East Siberia and
without the reunion of Inner and Outer Mongolia, Japan would
not be able to fulfil her mission. Indeed, the Institute admitted
that "the worst thing that might happen" was that Great
Britain, the U.S., China and Soviet Russia "might form an
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 91

alliance", and Japan "be forced to fight them all at once." Even
in this case, an attempt was to "be made to crush them separately
even if only from the strategic point of view." About the outcome
of such a war the Institute dared not give any self-assured
statement. Japanese planners evidently did not suspect that the
worst of everything would happen only after four years and that
Japan would be struck powerless.
The Institute did not aim at the expansion of the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to the Western Hemisphere as
the Ministry of War dreamt. Their aim was that this Sphere
should be built up in three stages: an Inner Sphere of firm unity
formed by Japan, Manchukuo, North China, the Lower Yangtze
Area and the Russian Maritime Province with Kamchatka; a
Smaller Sphere in which, besides the Inner Sphere, Eastern
Siberia, the rest of China, Indo-China and the South Seas would
be included; and then the Greater Sphere, which would embrace
Australia, India and the islands in the Pacific, besides the Smaller
Sphere. The last one would be the sphere of influence, the glacis
of the Japanese fortress, of which the border of the Smaller
Sphere would form the battlement and the Inner Sphere would
be the main bulwark. On a large scale freedom and independence
would be promised, not that the peoples of Asia would organise
themselves freely according to the "objectionable" Western-
liberal idea of self-determination but after Japan's example of
true spiritual culture, so that they would support voluntarily
the Empire and through that each other. Those peoples who
had no cultural formation or significance, such as Dajaks,
Papuans, South Sea Islanders, Siberians, would have no claim
to training for self-government. fhe less developed would have
to find their way to absolute independence more or less under
Japanese guardianship. Two areas which would give the Japanese
ship, like anchors, safe riding, would be specially linked to the
Central Country (Japan): Manchukuo in the north and the
Malayas in the south. Two other sheet anchors of the new
Kingdom would be the military power of Japan and the unity
of mentality to be created throughout the whole area.
The latter point is of great interest since the Plan of January
27, 1942 emphasised on the desirability of a mutual cultural
exchange between the territories of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
92 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

As a general vehicle of intellectual intercourse, the japanese

language would have to be employed in place of English that had
dominated till 1941. Therefore, education should be imparted in
the japanese language in all schools of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
The Draft expressed its strong opposition against two cultural
influences: first, "Occidental individualism and materialism",
and secondly, "the negative and conservative" characteristics
of the Indian and Chinese civilizations. On the other hand, the
"good points of Western culture" would be accepted. An Eastern
"moral" culture would have to be created, based on "the nucleus
of the Eastern tradition", for which the "Imperial Way" would
serve as an example. All peoples of the East would have to be
taught to worship and follow the "Imperial Way" for the
creation of a New Order, "not based on exploitation but on true
co-operation", not on formal rule of equality but on "just
classification", "not on a belief in rights but in duties", not on
several world conceptions but "on one unified spiritual foun-
dation."
The cultural programme was further detailed in a second
document of the same Institute, dated February 18, 1942.1
This document argued that the Southern peoples, who are
mild in nature and not unfavourably disposed towards japan,
knew too little of her. Propaganda for japan by all suitable
means was, therefore, thought to be of prime necessity. In doing
so, the peculiarities of the different peoples should be taken into
account and the result of the work should be continually watched.
The japanese should, therefore, occupy the most important
posts in the propaganda organisation.
The fundamental aim of the propaganda would be to influence
the intellectuals; for the ignorant masses special methods would
have to be employed. The Chinese were to be influenced through
their secret associations. As soon as the situation would permit,
the intellectuals would be given the opportunity to visit japan,
which would convince them that it was not necessary to depend
on America or Europe.
American, British and Dutch methods should disappear from

1 Hoover Doc. No. 1621 C: "Establishment of East Asia. Manmuvers for the First

Period of Total War", February 18, 1942. Summary in Timetable No. 128 referring
to Far East Mil. Trw., E~h. No. 1335.
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 93

education, although it might not be possible for the time being

to dispense with the existing educational institutions. Education
was to be based on the ideal of the Greater East Asia Co-Pros-
perity Sphere. Native teachers should be retrained and scholars
and leading educationists from Japan would be sent to important
places. From the associated states teachers and students should
be sent to Japan in order to get acquainted with Japanese
universities and Japanese science, not, however, out of pure
cultural motives, for in Japan they would be housed and in-
doctrinated in special institutions, and after completion of their
studies "practical use shall be made of them under a certain
definite policy."
European and American liberalism and communistic ideas
would be banned. Movements for independence, resulting from
"narrow-minded racialism or what tends to be racial egoism"
should be "corrected" and converted to "Oriental moralism."
At the beginning a "powerful thought movement" should be
directed to strengthen the support for Japan's war efforts.
Leading minds and intellectuals were to be brought together
from different parts for the realization of the idea of East Asiatic
unity. The "Co-Prosperity idea" would have to find its expression
in the very attitude of every individual.
Interesting were the directives for political training of the
people. The freedom of expression of the natives in the political
field should be respected as much as possible. Economic hardship
that was expected to appear should be mitigated to the best
ability, and the political measures to be taken should in no case
weaken their hope for the future. Therefore, the existing rights
of the natives to participate in the government should be extended.
The "bad" laws repugnant to the natives which had been
introduced by the Westerners should be abolished. Native
leaders should be appointed in important posts, thereby stimu-
lating the hope and enthusiasm of the natives. Also their tradition
should be respected, particularly the old legend and the worship
of national heroes.
Undoubtedly, great difficulties in the daily life of the natives
were expected to be inevitable but for the sake of war they were
to be borne. Because of war situation no complaint should be
considered, except by distributing lands belonging to the Wester-
94 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

ners, abolishing or reducing taxes and providing for the extension

of the possibilities of intellectual development of the masses.
The "compassion" which, according to the former paragraph,
should be shown towards the distress of the natives, did not
apply to the Chinese. The unwilling should be expelled from the
Sphere, others should severe relations with the Chungking
Government and become good collaborators.
The document continued - in some short passages - with
advice for respecting native customs, for assistance in the
restoration of war damage and hygienic conditions. It seems that
the dissemination of the Japanese language was nearer to the
hearts of the composers of this memorandum: the Japanese
language should be taught everywhere, so that it might become
the "common language" of East Asia. English and Dutch were
to be banned without further ado.
All these beautiful plans might easily be spoiled by the inju-
dicious behaviour of the Japanese on the spot. Therefore, the
document demanded strict selection and discipline among the
Japanese, who would be sent to the new areas. They were to be
considered as the pioneers of a later emigration. The great
majority of the emigrants would be directed to Australia, but
nowhere the members of the ruling nation should lose their
identity. Wherever the Japanese would migrate, there should
be Japanese schools for their children. The experts of the Institute
understood, however, - what the Western people have understood
too little - that officials and enterprisers were not the best
suitable medium to spread the ruling culture. A Protestant or
Catholic mission, as had been sent out from Europe and America
for the spreading of Christianity and Christian Civili<;ation by
unselfish men and women who desired to give a personal example
of their life, would certainly not, by the very nature of the
Japanese religious ideas, be able to operate spontaneously
from the mother country. Therefore, the Institute proposed
that "spiritual and cultural leaders" in Japan would be selected
and trained for the missionary work. These missionaries, by
their very spiritual riches, would be able to come into close
contact with the actual life of the natives without the support
of any power or authority as a background and become "teachers
as well as friends of the natives through the reality of their
 JAPANESE BLUEPRINT (1937-1941) 95

spiritual and cultural living" and thus make known True Japan
to the new countries.
Indeed, a fine idea - in so far as True Japan was concerned.
But the Japanese planners had little trust in the strength of the
good without the suppression of the evil. Therefore, "injurious
elements" would be "removed". Where, it was not said. Western
propaganda should not be tolerated, hence strict censorship over
the press and radio. Soviet propaganda - here we notice a re-
markable difference - would be prevented and communistic
movements be under "strict control." So, not to be suppressed
forcibly? The solution was usually offered in a short paragraph:
anti-Japanese movements that might not be "converted"
should be simply "crushed".
In this connection the experts of the Institute were faced
with the problems of admitting Christian evangelism. It seems
they were not against Christendom, but "hostile English and
American missionaries" (catholic or protestant) would be
substituted by the natives. Moreover, a plan would be drawn up
to send out Japanese missionaries.
Finally, "literary works of art and publications tending to
imply the adoration of Europe and America" should be "strictly
banned." A strong advice was also given for "a clean sweep" of
the Sphere of all spiritUal and intellectual personalities (also
natives) who would not give up "their European and American
feelings" (meaning thereby - mentality).
The same plan of February 18, 1942 also indicated what
strategy, occupation and administrative policy should be followed
during the first phase of the war for world empire. The directions
can easily be deduced from the document quoted before: con-
centration on the destruction of the British power, co-operation
with the Nanking regime in China and crushing the power of
resistance of the Chungking Government, if the Generalissimo
refused to come to an agreement, and temporarily utmost
caution with regard to Russia. Evidently, the Institute foresaw
the elimination of the United States after the success at Pearl
Harbour for a considerable time, which, however, later on
appeared to be the greatest miscalculation in the war of conquests.
A few other passages in the document engage our attention: in
the occupied areas auxiliary forces would be armed in a limited
96 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

number; these armies would be widely dispersed and the Japanese

should remain concentrated; everywhere, in the territories to
be annexed later (and these were to be treated less gently),
native customs were to be respected.
A typical example of Japanese thinking on the construction
of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is provided by an
article published by Hashimoto in the Taiyo Dai Nippon on
January 5, 1942. According to the writer of this article, Hong-
kong, Malacca, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, Ceylon, Australia,
New Guinea, New Zealand and the Middle Pacific Islands were
to become Japanese territories. Manchuria, China, French
Indo-China, British India, the Philippines, Afghanistan (with
Baluchistan added), Burma (with Bengal added), Siam (with
added parts of Burma and Malaya), and Java were to become
so-called independent areas. The "independent" areas were to be
supervised by Japanese advisers, military and diplomatic affairs
remaining entirely in the hands of Tokyo.
The whole area, further stated by Hashimoto, was to be
governed by an Upper Council of the Greater East Asia Sphere
under Imperial leadership. The people of the Sphere were to be
made thoroughly aware of its ideology. There was to be freedom
of religion but Christianity was to be eliminated step by step,
and the Tenno-cult to be vigorously introduced. The Japanese
language was to become the leading language in the Sphere. 1
When the organisation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere would be complete and a larger military force built up:
10,000,000 frontline troops as well as reserves, a war fleet of
5,300,000 tons, a frontline air force of at least 60,000 and at most
200,000 aircraft and a total strength, including reserves, of
possibly 600,000 aircraft, 2 the second round could be begun,
which would lead to the total and final defeat of England, the
United States and Soviet Russia.
As soon as this result would be achieved (it might require
twenty years), preparations could be commenced for the third
round - the war of the hemispheres. And the only enemy left
would be Germany - though it was not said so.

Far East Mil. Trib., Ezh. No. 675A; Timetable No. 130.
1

• "Draft of Basic Plan for Establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity

Sphere", January 27, 1942, op. cit.
PART II
 'YAP

PACIFIC

- - - - - - ~ANUS

INDONESIA AUSTRALIA
 CHAPTER I

PLANS FOR INDONESIA

Long before she launched an aggressive war in the Pacific

in December 1941, Japan had cast her greedy eyes on the Nether-
lands East Indies, which occupy a position of striking importance
- economically, strategically and politically in the whole of East
and South East Asia. With an enormous area of 733,000 sq. miles
or about five times as large as Japan proper, the East Indies were
considered to be extremely valuable to Japan, particularly for
the former's rich raw materials, such as oil, rubber, tin, bauxite,
nickel, manganese and many others. 1 The supplies of these
materials "were of such transcendent importance to Japan,
especially for war purposes, that the military and other extremists
in Tokyo had long since developed schemes for securing economic,
if not political, control of these rich islands." 2
Even during the First World War there were indications that
the Japanese "were beginning to direct their thoughts south-
ward." 3 "Articles began to appear in the Japanese press broadly
hinting at the desirability of expansion in the East Indian
archipelago, and the imperialistic policy Japan displayed toward
China was not reassuring." 4 The acquisition by her of the
former German colonies in the South West Pacific as mandates
1 For an excellent analysis of the economic importance of the Indies see R. Emer-
son: "The Dutch East Indies Adrift", Foreign Affairs, July I940, pp. 735-41. The
Netherlands Indies "supplied about 31 per cent of the world's copra, 17 per cent of
its tin, 33 per cent of its rubber, over 20 per cent of its sisal, and 29 per cent of its
palm oil, in addition to large supplies of tea, cane sugar, and coffee, together with
85 per cent of the world's pepper, and practically all of its requirements in quinine".-
The World in March I939 (Survey of Int. Affairs, 1939-1946), ed. by A. J. Toynbee &
F. T. Ashton-Gwatkin, p. 94. The Indies stand fifth among the world's petroleum
producers. Their 1939 output was 61,580,000 barrels -. "The Dutch East Indies
Adrift", op. cit., p. 738.
• The Challenge to I solation I937-I940, p. 584.
S The Netherlands, ed. by B. Landheer (The U.N. Series, Univ. of California Press,
Berkeley 1946), p. 343.
• Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies (Univ. of California Press, Berkeley
1944), p. 395.
100 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

of the League of Nations brought the Land of the Rising Sun

nearer the East Indies Archipelago. In the intense international
controversy that arose over the exploitation of the oil resources
of the Indies after the First World War, the Japanese Govern-
ment took keen interest and demanded, in a brief note, "for
its nationals equality of opportunity if in the future they should
apply for concessions." 1 All this coupled with Nippon's desire
to increase her navy created suspicion among the Dutch as to
her real intentions. Dutch fears had reached such an extent that
Japan thought it necessary to allay the anxiety of the Dutch by
extending the principles of the Four Power Treaty of December
13, 1921 to the Pacific possessions of the Netherlands, although
the latter was not a party to this treaty. 2
This, however, did not mean that Japan had given up her
thoughts about the Netherlands East Indies. During the period
of the expansion of inter-Pacific trade following the First World
War, she had been able to acquire a substantial position in the
Indies' import trade 3. The economic disaster suffered by the
Indies after the World Crisis of 1929 provided a further oppor-
tunity for Japan to establish her economic supremacy in the
Archipelago. As Victor Purcell remarks: "The Japanese com-
mercial penetration of the Netherlands Indies became a reality
during the trade depression .... " 4 The devaluation of the yen
in December 1931, the continued adherence by the Indies to
the gold florin and above all, the policy of the Open Door pursued
for sixty years by the Netherlands Government when nearly
all other nations had abandoned it, seemed to serve Japan's
1 ibid., p. 396.
• On February 4, 1922 a solemn declaration was issued by each of the contracting
Powers (The U.S.A., England, France and Japan) to the Washington Four-Power
Treaty of December 13, 1921 that "the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their
insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean" would be respected. The notes
thus addressed to the Netherlands Government by the four governments were word
for word identical. The Netherlands Government received such official communication
from the Japanese Government on February 5,1922 (published on August 17, 1923)-
Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 26; Timetable No.2; See also Amry Vandenbosch,
op. cit., pp. 396-397.
• Imports from Japan to the Indies had increased from 1.25 per cent during
1909-1913 to 10.2 per cent during 1925-1929 of the total - J. van Gelderen, The
Recent Development of Economic Foreign Policy in the Netherlands East Indies (Long-
mans, Green and Co., London 1939), p. 17. See also A. Neytzeil de Wilde and J. Th.
Moll, The Netherlands Indies during the Depression (J. M. Meulenhoff, Amsterdam
1936), p. 57.
• The World in March I939, op. cit., p. 98.
 PLANS FOR INDONESIA 101

interests well. Immediately after 1930 she began to flood the

Indies with her cheap products. Before the economic crisis
only ten items were imported from Japan; in 1934 it was "prac-
tically impossible to name any category of goods in which
European and American industry could compete with that of
Japan." 1 In the same year "the imports of the Indies from
Japan exceeded the exports to Japan by seventy-four million
guilders; or, in proportional figures, 31 per cent of the imports
came from Japan and only 5 per cent of the exports went to
that country." 2 The Dutch share of the Indies' total imports,
which was over 32 per cent in the years immediately preceding
1913, had dropped to 9.5 per cent in 1933. 3 Thus it is not wholly
an exaggeration to say that the Open Door, as a high East Indian
official remarked, became "the entrance to the Japanese house!" 4
The Japanese commercial invasion of the Indies, moreover,
aimed at capturing the distribution business. The Japanese
export trade formed only "a part of an all-Japanese business
system to create" which had been "the declared purpose, both
of commercial circles and of the Government of Japan." 5 Japan
tried to consolidate her economic hold in the Indies through her
nationals who had migrated there (7,195 according to the 1930
census) as a result of the propaganda carried out by organisations
subsidized by the Japanese Government. The nature and extent
of Japanese peaceful penetration into the Netherlands East
Indies during the period of economic crisis is best described by
Van Mook in the following words: "In the thirties penetration
became definitely organized, and was pushed from behind by
those semi-official, Government-sibsidized corporations like the
Nanyo Kohatsu, whose ultimate aims were revealed by naval
1 Report of Java Bank, I933-34, p.51. Quoted in J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands
India (University Press, Cambridge, Gr. Britain 1944), p. 432. Furnivall gives a list of
Japanese products imported into the Indies, both before and after the depression. Van
Gelderen also remarks: "The Japanese goods were exceedingly cheap, often but not
always, bad, but cheap, and therefore within the reach of the masses with their very
limited income. By the low price of their wares, which was their sharpest weapon,
as well as by their intimate knowledge of the market and of the psychology of the
buyers, the Japanese succeeded in ousting the European goods from the local
market" - p. 20.
I B. H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara, A History of the East Indian Archipelago (Harvard
Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1945), p. 363.
• Amry Vandenbosch, op. cit., p. 398.
• J. van Gelderen, op. cit., p. 22.
• ibid., pp. 20-21.
102 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

and military participation. The rising flood of imports carried

Japanese goods of Japanese importers in Japanese ships, financed
by Japanese banks, to Japanese warehouses in the coastal towns
of Java, to be sold directly to the consumers through Japanese
retailers far in the interior. Japanese middlemen penetrated in
East Java, South-East Borneo, and North Celebes to buy native
products - maize, rubber, and copra - for export to Japan,
Japanese fisheries started operations in the strategically im-
portant seas North of Batavia and around the Northern peninsula
of Celebes, continually trespassing into territorial waters and
causing several incidents. Mining, agricultural, and lumber
rights, mostly of doubtful economic value, were bought or
applied for in localities of military importance, e.g. the East and
West coasts of Borneo and the Northern part of New Guinea.
Small craft began to penetrate into coastal shipping." 1
When a number of protective measures, such as licensing
ordinances for imports and import business, a law on foreign
labour, a law for the regulation of trade, a law on marine fisheries,
immigration quota, shipping law, etc. were devised to restore
the economic stability of the Indies, they "were decried in
Tokyo as the instruments of an anti-Japanese policy." 2 Japan
hoped to follow up her commercial penetration by a political one.
That she had such ends in view is evident from the fact that she
attempted to exploit the commercial conference, which was held
at Batavia in 1934 at the request of the Japanese Government,
for political purposes. N ago aka, the chief of the Japanese
delegation, wanted the negotiations to be conducted primarily
in the interests of the native population. After six months of
fruitless discussions negotiations had to be dropped because of
the exaggerated Japanese demands for a share in the exploration
and exploitation of the Outer Territories. A shipping conference
at Kobe in 1935 likewise proved abortive owing to Japanese
insistence that the Japanese language should be the official
language of the conference. It is significant to note that all this
1 H. J. van Mook, The Netherlands Indus and Japan, Their Relations, I940-I94I
(George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London 1944), p. 19. Furnivall also states: "They
(the Japanese) have invaded the sea-fisheries, obtained a concession in Borneo for
oil, taken over a few sugar factories (though ceasing to work them, even before the
crisis), established two silk factories, and have undermined the Dutch monopoly
of cinchona by buying up native produce" - J. S. Furnivall, op. cit., pp.432-433.
• H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 20.
 PLANS FOR INDONESIA 103

was in line with the general schemes of expansion fostered by

the Nipponese Militarists. As early as 1932 Y osuke Matsuoka
had expressed the view that New Guinea was to become aNew
Japan. 1 Japan did not give up her ambitions in spite of the stiff
opposition, offered by the East Indies authorities. In March
1937 Heigoro Sakurai, of the Minseito Party, stated in one of the
committees of the House of Representatives that New Guinea,
which is more extensive in area than Japan proper, was in an
undeveloped state and inquired whether the Japanese Govern-
ment did not think it advisable to open negotiations with the
Netherlands Government in order to obtain a perpetual lease of
the territory. 2 As a result, "an atmosphere of nervousness was
created, rumours of espionage were in the air." 3
In view of the widespread suspicion created by her moves
Japan decided in 1936 that" as for our development in the Dutch
Indies, it is of the first necessity to eliminate her apprehension
towards us and make her take a tum for pro-Japan. For this end,
we must adopt suitable measures, and, if necessary, we shall not
refuse to conclude a non-aggressive treaty with Holland." 4 This
decision was in agreement with the Japanese-Dutch Treaty
of Judicial Settlement, Arbitration and Mediation of April 19,
1933, which was ratified by Japan on August 12, 1935, and
according to which a Permanent Reconciliation Commission
was instituted on October 31, 1935. 5 This policy explains why
Japan suddenly agreed to solve the shipping controversy and
concluded in 1936 an agreement which provided for the division
of the shipping business between the two countries. It was again
in pursuance of this policy that in January 1937, Tanichiro
Yoshida of the Japanese Foreign Office visited the Indies,
"apparently in an attempt to dispel Dutch fears that there was
a secret clause in the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact of
1936 providing for the division of the Netherlands Indies into
spheres of influence". 6 Japan further agreed to the Hart-Ishizawa
1 B. H. M. Vlekke, op. cit., p. 374; Amry Vandenbosch, op. cit., pp. 399-401.
• Amry Vandenbosch, op. cit., p. 404; The World in March I939, op. cit., pp. 98-99.
3 J. van Gelderen, op. cit., p. 22.
• Qnoted in Dissenting Judgment oj Mr. Justice Roling, member jar the Netherlands,
Far East Military Tribunal, p. 124.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 52 and 1307A; Timetable Nos. 3, 4 & 5.
8 The World in March I939, op. cit., p. 99. See also Survey oj IntemationalAjjairs,
I936, p.387, note - "There were rumours of a secret German-Japanese under-
104 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

agreement of April 9, 1937, although it definitely meant to

check Japanese peaceful penetration into the Indies. By that
year Japan's share in the Indies' imports had fallen to 15 per
cent. 1
While it was thus the professed policy of Nippon to maintain
friendly relations with the Netherlands Indies, a subversive
policy, opposed to her official assurances which were designed
only to eliminate Dutch fears, was deliberately pursued in order
to undermine the Dutch Authority.2 As Japan's policy of
expansion towards the South was assuming a reality with the
occupation of Hainan and the Spratly Islands in the beginning of
1939, this policy was intensified. A large part of the Japanese
population in the Indies, held closely under the control and
supervision of the Japanese consular authorities through numer-
ous organisations, took an active part in the gathering of infor-
mation of military and economic importance. The collection and
dispatch of this information to Tokyo was one of the main tasks
of Japanese consuls and consular agents in the Indies. Japanese
spies were attached as consular personnel to Japanese consulates.
Besides, the Japanese army and navy each had its own agents in
the more important places in the East Indies. 3
Japanese nationals who were engaged particularly in the
fishing industry in the Indies acted "as forerunners of Japanese
expansionism and as auxiliaries to the Japanese Navy." 4 Those
who operated at various key points throughout the Archipelago,
were frequently found fishing in prohibited areas. They were
found to be operating in waters in Northern Celebes near Manado,
Southern Celebes near Makassar, New Guinea, East of Sumatra,
the Western Coast of Borneo and in the area of Tarakan. Japanese
government-controlled "developing companies" also started
working in the strategic areas of the Indies.
The aim of inaugurating two oil tank installations on May 21,
standing for a partition of oceania and Indonesia, in which Germany was to be
compensated at the expense of the Netherlands for the retention by Japan of
Germany's former insular possessions in the Pacific north of the Equator".
1 H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 22.
• For a detailed account of Japanese subversive activities in the Indies Archi-
pelago during the decade preceding the invasion, see Ten Yea,s 0/ Japanese BU1"1"owing
in tke Nethe,lands East Indies (Official report of the Netherlands East Indies Govern-
ment, New York 1942).
• Fa, East Mil. T,ibunal Rec01"ds, pp. 11649-11650.
• Ten Yea,s 0/ Japanese BU1"1"owing, op. cit., p. 36.
 PLANS FOR INDONESIA 105

1939 in the island of Molucca (Paloa group) was to expand the

Japanese oil industry in Dutch New Guinea. 1
An extensive propaganda was also at the same time launched
towards winning over the native population of the Indies to the
Japanese side. With the help of consular officials, the Japanese
directed their attention to enlist the support of Indonesian and
Chinese publishers and expended large sums in the form of
advertising contracts to papers in the Indonesian, Dutch, or
Chinese languages that were willing to accept Japanese propa-
ganda material. 2 A Plan was even prepared by the Third Section
of the Bureau for European and Asiatic affairs of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, dated May 30, 1938 for the publica-
tion by the Japanese of a paper in the Malay language in the
Netherlands Indies. The Plan envisaged that the capital advance
of Fl. 3 1,000 was to be considered as lost funds and a monthly
deficit expected. The paper was to spread the Japanese pro-
paganda among the native population. 3 Many Chinese were
brought over from the Japanese-occupied parts of China for
carrying on propaganda among the Chinese population in the
Archipelago. Indonesian students were encouraged to go to
Japan for study, so that they might be induced to give support
to the Japanese Pan-Asiatic movement. Certain groups in Japan
even began an Islamic movement and the theory was advocated
that "Japan was going to save Islam"! 4 A close reading of the
Japanese activities in the Indies during the thirties amply
demonstrate Japan's intense desire to establish her domination
over the Archipelago.
Hitler's resounding victories in Europe following the outbreak
of the war in September 1939 "stirred the Japanese expansionists
as nothing before . . .. As against the dreary outlook in China,
alluring vistas opened before the Japanese in southern Asia and
the Pacific." 5 Japan's eyes naturally fell on the rich Netherlands
Indies, from which she "could hope to secure oil and other much-
1 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1326D; Timetable No. II; Ten Years ot Japanese
Burrowing, op. cit., p. 42.
• B. H. M. Vlekke, op. cit., p. 370.
3 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1326A; Timetable No.9; Ten Years ot Japanese
Burrowing, op. cit., p. 30.
• B. H. M. Vlekke, op. cit., p.371. See also Ten Years ot Japanese Burrowing,
op. cit., pp. 25-26.
• The Undeclared War, I940-I94I, op. cit., p. 3.
106 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

needed strategic materials." 1 Thus far she had been largely

dependent on the U.S.A. for the supply of vital materials. 2 But
since the abrogation of the Japanese-American Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation of 1911 by the United States in July
1939 and the consequent termination of that treaty on January
26, 1940, Japan had been on the lookout for alternative sources
of raw materials needed by her. She now thought that the Nether-
lands, faced with imminent German invasion, would be hardly
in a position to obstruct her plans. "To many Japanese it
seemed almost criminal to let slip so golden an opportunity for
assuring the present and future needs of the national economy." 3
Japan, therefore, endeavoured, "through mingled cajolery and
threats, to draw the Netherlands East Indies into her political
and economic orbit." 4
This attempt began on February 2, 1940, when the Japanese
Government through her Minister at the Hague, presented a note
to the Netherlands Government, requesting the latter to enter
into discussions for the abolition or modification of restrictions
on the existing Japanese import and export trade with the East
Indies, on immigration, for granting Japan a greater share in
the development of the Archipelago, and also for controlling the
press and publications of anti-Japanese nature so as to create
friendly relations between the two countries. 5 She had already
(January 12, 1940) served notice on the Dutch Government of
the denunciation of the arbitration treaty of 1933 between the
two countries, which as a result expired in August. This action
was obviously prompted by a desire on the part of the Japanese
Government to free her hands for possible action against the
Indies in order to take advantage of the rapidly-changing
international situation. 8
As events developed during the spring of 1940 it seemed that
Tokyo was "genuinely apprehensive lest the United States, with
1 ibid.
• In 1938 the U.S.A. accounted for the single highest percentage: 34.4 and 15.9
of Japan's total imports and exports respectively - Chambers's Encyclopaedia, Volume
VIII (George Newnes Limited, London 1950), p. 27.
• The Undeclared War, I94o-I94I, op. cit., p. 3.
• F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia, Its rise and taU, I937-45 (Oxford
University Press for R.LLA., London 1954), p. 239.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1309A, p. 6; Timetable No. 14; H. J. van Mook, op.
cit., pp. 24-26; The Challenge to Isolation, I937-I940, p. 585.
e Amry Vandenbosch, op. cit., p. 406.
 PLANS FOR INDONESIA 107

British approval and support, attempt to forestall possible

Japanese action by assuming protection of the Indies at the
behest of the Dutch Government." 1 Since Great Britain had
retaliated to the German attack in Denmark on April 9 by
landing troops in Iceland, Japan feared that a German invasion
of the Netherlands might "lead to similar action with respect to
the infinitely more valuable Dutch possessions in the Far East." 2
No sooner had Germany launched her aggression against Den-
mark and Norway than it was reported in the press that in the
event of a Nazi attack on Holland, the East Indies would be
placed under the protection of a great power which should be
neither Great Britain nor Germany. 3 Japan at once took ad-
vantage of this report even though it was promptly denied in
Washington. The report gave an opportunity to Foreign Minister
Arita to emphasise Japan's interests, especially in the Nether-
lands East Indies and indicate in the veiled but significant
language of diplomacy her policy towards the Indies in case
Holland became involved in the European war. In a statement
issued on April 15, 1940 Arita said: "With the South Seas region,
especially the Netherlands East Indies, Japan is economically
bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in ministering
to one another's needs. Similarly, other countries of East Asia
maintain close economic relations with these regions. That is to
say, Japan, these countries and these regions together are
contributing to the prosperity of East Asia through mutual aid
and interdependence.
"Should hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands
and produce repercussions in the Netherlands East Indies, it
would not only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance
of the above-mentioned relations of economic interdependence
and of co-existence and co-prosperity, but would also give rise
to an undesirable situation from the standpoint of the peace and
stability of East Asia. In view of these considerations, the
Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over
any development accompanying an aggravation of the war in
Europe that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East
1 The Challenge to Isolation I937-I940, p. 585.
• ibid.
• New York Times, April 9, I94o; Amry Vandenbosch, op. cit., p. 406; B. H. M.
Vlekke, op. cit., p. 375.
108 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Indies." 1 On the same day the Foreign Minister informed the

Dutch Minister in Tokyo, Van Pabst, of Japan's deep concern over
a possible change in the political status of the Indies. This view
was also expressed the following day (April 16) by the Japanese
Minister in the Hague to Van Kleffens, Netherlands Minister of
Foreign Affairs. The whole procedure was clearly meant to
advance Japan's claim to the Indies.
In spite of Van Kleffens' categorical assurance that his
government neither had asked in the past nor would ask in the
future for the assistance of any other power or powers in the
defence of the Dutch East Indies and that it would refuse any
such offer 2 and Secretary Hull's statement on April 17 3 , calling
the attention of the Japanese Government to existing inter-
national agreements which explicitly recognised the rights of the
Netherlands to her insular possessions in the Pacific area, the
Japanese press started a campaign against the Netherlands and
Netherlands Indies. The real Japanese views were now bluntly
expressed. In a letter published in the Kokumin Shimbun (the
Army organ at Tokyo) on April 24, the Netherlands were called
"a rotten spot on earth"; and the Hoehi Shimbun of Tokyo even
demanded that Japan should take the initiative and invade the
Indies without any delay. 4
The German invasion of the Low Countries on May 10, 1940
had its immediate effects on Far Eastern affairs. Japan at once
intensified her diplomatic offensive. The next day Arita once
more reiterated the view that events in Europe had accentuated
the deep Japanese anxiety over the status of the East Indies. 5
The landing of British and French forces, at the request of the
Netherlands Government, in the Dutch Caribbean islands of
Curacao and Aruba for safeguarding the important oil centres
from acts of sabotage, aroused fresh suspicion in Japan. The
action of the United States by ordering her fleet to Hawaii for
manreuvers in April 1940 had already caused great resentment
among the Japanese who took it to be an effort to bring pressure
1 Foreign Relations of the U.S.: Japan, II, p. 281; Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No.

1284; Timetable No. 15; Amry Vandenbosch, op. cit., p. 406.

• April 16, 1940. Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1284; Timetable No. 16.
• Foreign Relations of the U.S.: Japan, II, pp.281-282; Far East Mil. Trib.,
Exh. No. 1013; Timetable No. 17; Amry Vandenbosch, op. cit., p. 407.
• Ten Years of Japanese Burrowing, op. cit., p. 58; B. H. M. Vlekke, op. cit., p. 375.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1285; Timetable No. 19.
 PLANS FOR INDONESIA 109

on them. 1 Japan drew the conclusion that the Allied forces

would occupy the East Indies and might jeopardize the flow
of vital materials to her. 2 She now plainly asserted that she
would not permit the Indies to change hands. On May 12, 1940
at the moment when the Netherlands were still in the midst of a
life-and-death struggle with Nazi Germany, the Japanese Minister
in the Hague presented a fresh memorandum, insisting on a
speedy reply of the Japanese note of February 2, 1940 and
demanding a guarantee that the Netherlands Indies would in the
future continue to supply Japan with special war materials. 3
The governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France,
fearing that this might presage some Japanese military move,
informed Tokyo that they all would respect the status quo in the
Dutch East Indies and had no intention of intervening in the
Archipelago. 4 On May 15 the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo
also told Arita that Great Britain, the U.S.A. and France had no
intention of intervening in the East Indies. The next day Arita
was further informed of the Indies Government's view not to
place any restrictions in future on the exportation of mineral oil,
tin, rubber and other raw materials which were of vital im-
portance to Japan. 5
Although the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, in a
conversation with Cordell Hull on May 16, 1940, declared that
his government was entirely satisfied with the identical decla-
rations of the Powers with regard to the maintenance of the
status quo of the Indies and that there was no purpose in raising
this controversy any longer 6, the Japanese Government "cannot
be acquitted of a design to bring the economic and political life
of the Indies within its orbit." 7 Japan's insistence on the
maintenance of the status quo there was undoubtedly inspired
by her desire to keep everybody else out of the East Indies until
she was in control of them. On May 18, 1940, three days after
the capitulation of Holland, the Japanese Consul-General at
1 The Challenge to Isolation, I937-I940, p. 588.
• Herbert Feis, op. cit., pp. 56-59; The Challenge to Isolation, I937-I940, p. 590.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1309A; Timetable No. 21.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 1286 & 1288; Timetable Nos. 22, 24 & 25; Foreign
Relations of the U.S.: Japan, II, pp. 285-288.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1309A; Timetable No. 26.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1288; Timetable No. 25.
, Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 58.
110 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Batavia paid a visit to the Director of Economic Affairs, Dr. van

Mook and delivered, in the words of the latter, "condolences,
requests, and veiled threats almost in one and the same breath." 1
This was followed by fresh Japanese demands upon the East
Indies. On May 20, 1940, Arita handed a note to the Dutch
Minister in Tokyo, demanding a categorical promise that the
specified minimum quantities of 13 vital raw materials should
be exported to Japan annually from the Netherlands East Indies
"under any circumstances that may arise in future" 2. Among
them demands for bauxite and oil were in far larger quantities
than Japan had ever obtained from the Indies. She asked
for 200,000 tons of bauxite, "all that the Indies produced and
almost all Japan needed"; oil, 1 million tons, "almost double
Japan's previous imports from the Indies. This was, however,
only about one-seventh of the total production of the Indies and
about one-fifth of what Japan needed." 3 More ominous still
was the fact that Japan wanted the Netherlands Government
to undertake to export the specified quantities of the specified
materials to her under any circumstances. Obviously, she "was
seeking to obligate the Indies to supply oil even if the United
States stopped doing so. Should this happen, the American
measure would be nullified. Even worse, the United States and
the Indies would be separated from each other." 4
In Japan there was great enthusiasm after the fall of the Ne-
therlands, especially when Germany informed Tokyo on May 22,
1940 that she "was not interested in the problem of the Nether-
lands East Indies", which was considered as a carte blanche for
Japan. 5 The German Government "seemed to waive any claim
that it might have to the Indies as a result of the conquest of the
Netherlands and to agree to any action that Japan might take." 6

1 H.]. van Mook, op. cit., p. 27.

• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1309A: Timetable No. 28; H. ]. van Mook, op. cit.,
pp. 27-28. The specified quantities of thirteen raw materials were as follows: Tin
(including ore) 3,000 tons; Rubber 20,000 tons; Mineral oil 1,000,000 tons; Bauxite
200,000 tons; Nickel ore 150,000 tons; Manganese ore 50,000 tons; Wolfram 1,000
tons; Scrap iron 100,000 tons; Chrome iron ore 5,000 tons; Salt 100,000 tons; Caster
seeds 4,000 tons; Quinine bark 600 tons; and Molybdenum 1,000 tons - See H. ].
van Mook, op. cit., p. 28.
• Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 58.
• ibid., p. 68.
• ibid., p. 59; The Challenge to Isolation I937-I940, p. 590; Timetable No. 29.
• Amry Vandenbosch, op. cit., p. 409.
 PLANS FOR INDONESIA III

In other words, the Indies "were to be the private hunting ground

of the Mikado." 1 A reading of the correspondence between Von
Ribbentrop and his Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, reveals that
Germany thereby intended to prompt Japan to take over the
Indies, in the hope that the United States would intervene in the
Far East and thus be unable to exert her pressure on European
affairs.
Japan, however, did not strike at the Indies at once as was
expected by Germany. She was not yet ready for any military
action against the Archipelago. Moreover, she hoped, it seems,
that the "orphaned" Indies, now deprived of any effective help
from the exiled Dutch Government in London, would have no
other alternative but to yield to her pressure. She, therefore,
demanded, on May 28, 1940, for an immediate reply to her notes
of February 2 and May 20. As the policy of the Netherlands
Government was to avoid a direct rebuff to Japan necessitated
by circumstances, their answer of June 6 was extremely cautious. 2
The Netherlands offered to provide essential raw materials but
"refused to let the Japanese obtain a larger place in the economic
life of the Indies, or control of a larger part of its resources." 3
That Japan did not at all feel satisfied with the conciliatory
Dutch answer of June 6 and was waiting for a more opportune
moment seemed to be quite obvious. She rejected the secret
American proposal of June 24, 1940 that Japan and the United
States should once more affirm their intention to maintain the
status quo of the Pacific territories of the European Powers by
means of a special pact. She was, however, prepared, if necessary,
to guarantee the status quo of the Philippines. 4 This action of
Japan was, in reality, motivated by her desire to hold her hands
free in the Southern Regions, especially in the Dutch East Indies.
As soon as the French Indo-Chinese authorities yielded to
Japanese demands, she renewed her pressure on the Indies. On
June 28, 1940 she once again asked for a definite undertaking by
the Dutch Government and the Governor-General of the Indies
to export annually to Japan, under any circumstances, at least
the specified quantities of materials. 5 The next day came
1 B. H. M. Vlekke, op. cit., p. 376.
• See H. J. van Mook, op. cit., pp. 29-36.
• Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 68.
• Timetable No. 34.
• H. J. van Mook, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
112 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Foreign Minister Arita's open declaration, which clearly revealed

Japan's ambition to establish a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere, consisting of East and South East Asian countries.
"J apan apparently was resolved to make full use of the oppor-
tunities created by the defeat of Holland, the downfall of France,
the seemingly hopeless position of Great Britain, and the internal
dissensions in the United States." 1
The moment for action appeared to have arrived, as expressed
by the Army, Navy and Foreign Office representatives after a
four-day secret conference (July 12-16). Hitler had already
declared his disinterestedness in the Indies. This prompted
Japan to inform the Dutch Ambassador in Tokyo on July 16,
1940 that the Imperial Government desired to send a delegation
to Batavia to negotiate a comprehensive settlement. 2 After
the surrender of Holland, Japan did not send her diplomatic
representative there to London, where the Netherlands Govern-
ment had moved, since she eagerly awaited the capitulation of
England. The aim of entering into political as well as economic
talks in Batavia was obviously to detach the East Indies from
the Netherlands Government in London and bring the islands
under complete Japanese control by piecemeal infiltration. 3
This is borne out by the fact that Consul-General Saito in
Batavia was instructed by Matsuoka, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, that negotiations were to be entered upon directly with
the Netherlands Indies Government and that all efforts of
obstruction from Great Britain and the United States were to
be carefully observed. 4 That Japan wanted to use the negoti-
ations to further her own selfish interests in the Netherlands
East Indies is also clear from the statement of General Koiso,
who was a vigorous advocate of expansion and who was at first
proposed by the Konoye Cabinet as the head of the Japanese
delegation. In an interview with the Japanese press on August 3 he
said that the indigenous population of the Indies had long been
oppressed and exploited by the Dutch regime. "We cannot", he

1 B. H. M. Vlekke, op. cit., p. 376.

• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1309A; Timetable No. 36; Herbert Feis, op. cit.,
p.96.
• H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 39.
• Far East M~l. Trib., Exh. No. 1314; Timetable No. 45 - Telegram from Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Matsuoka to Consul-General Saito, Batavia, September 3, 1940.
 PLANS FOR INDONESIA 113

declared, "tolerate such a condition-it is necessary to emancipate

the oriental races." 1
Before the negotiations started in Batavia on September 16,
1940 the Japanese had already prepared (on August 14, 1940)
the draft of their demands to the Netherlands East Indies,
which doubtless reveals that they would have been satisfied with
nothing less than complete tutelage over the Dutch possessions.
The Netherlands Indies were to cut off all relations with Europe,
recognise Japan's predominant political influence and economic
interests and become a member of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere to be established under the leadership of
Japan. 2
While the talks were in progress in Batavia 3, Japanese
planners in Tokyo were busy in their work on the plans for the
projected Co-Prosperity Sphere. The rich prize had been promised
to them under the Tripartite Alliance, and in 1940 they still
hoped that it might be possible to bring the East Indies within
the Co-Prosperity Sphere without war by means of diplomacy
and display of power. They, however, did not rule out the
possibility of military action in case a peaceful attempt failed.
But they anticipated little resistance from the Dutch East Indies
once Singapore had been occupied. It would then be possible to
determine the future status of the Indies as a member of the
Co-Prosperity Sphere. The area would declare its independence
and "announce an appropriate name for itself", based on the
plea that the Dutch Government in London dit not exist ac-
cording to international law. The government and constitution
were to be set up by a committee composed of Japanese, Dutch
people born there, natives and Chinese. But the committee was
to be formed in such a ratio that the total number of Japanese
and native representatives would comprise more than half of the
total. The Governor-General and all Dutch officials of the highest
rank would keep their official titles, honours and pay. If any of
the important natural resources were destroyed, all persons
connected with that, including ten government-officials, would
1 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1309A; Timetable No. 40; H. J. van Mook, op. cit.,
p. 39; Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 96.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1311; Timetable No. 42, August 14, 1940 (Draft
of Japanese Demands regarding the Dutch East Indies).
• See next Chapter: "Preparations for Conquest: Negotiations".
114 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

be most severely punished, which would be announced in advance

as widely as possible by the radio. If possible, a timely inde-
pendence movement was to be encouraged among the natives
before the above-mentioned change in the status of the Indies
could be brought about.
After the declaration of independence, a protective treaty
under the name of military alliance was to be concluded. Japanese
military and economic advisers were to be appointed in key po-
sitions and strategically-important places to be leased. 1 Japanese
domination was thus to be established in the Netherlands Indies.
Japanese leaders believed that they would be able to bring
the Indies into their Co-Existence and Co-Prosperity Sphere
by means short of war and that Japan should be ready for this.
In a telegram to Foreign Minister Matsuoka on October 18,
1940, Kobayashi, leader of the Japanese delegation in Batavia,
said: Because the Netherlands Indies should be brought inside
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under the leadership
of Japan, it was necessary to provide in the budget for the next
fiscal year, for instance, for the complete equipment of overseas
organisations, the foundation of a training centre for the Southern
Areas and the propaganda among Japanese nationals and the
peoples of the Indies (including secret funds) 2.
A few days later, on October 2S, 1940, the Japanese Cabinet
approved a IS-point programme for Japan's participation in the
economic development of the Indies, the subject of which the
Japanese delegation was then negotiating in Batavia. This
programme known as "Measures for the Economic Development
of the Netherlands East Indies" was an elaboration of the rough
draft of initial demands, which had been drawn up on August
14, 1940, going into greater details as to the various measures
to be taken. According to this cabinet decision all economic
measures would be formulated from the broader viewpoint of
establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and
from the recognition of Japan's dominant position in the Indies
by virtue of the Tripartite Pact. It was approved that measures
would be taken:
1 Hoover Doc. No. 837A, op. cit. ("Outline of Japanese Foreign Policy", Sept.

28, 1940 with further elaboration "Tentative Plan for Policy towards Southern
Regions", October 4, 1940. Summary in Timetable Nos. 51 and 53).
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1313; Timetable No. 57.
 PLANS FOR INDONESIA 115

1. to liquidate the Netherlands Indies' economic relations with

European and American continents so that she might become a
member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere;
2. to remove the various existing restrictions on the economic
activities of Japan so as to enable her to secure preferential
treatment for herself;
3. to arrange for the joint development by Japan and the
Netherlands of the Netherlands Indies in order to supply the
Empire with the necessary raw materials; if necessary, to lease
or purchase suitable islands or regions;
4. to increase the allotments of important materials already
promised to the Empire and to place the supervision of merchan-
dise especially tin, rubber, quinine, etc. in Japanese hands;
5. to purchase as far as possible those agricultural products,
which were sources of income to the natives and to stimulate
their purchasing power in order to translate co-existence and
co-prosperity into reality;
6. to increase the export of Japanese merchandise to the
Indies;
7. to make the Netherlands Indies a part of the monetary
sphere of the Greater East Asia area under Japanese leadership.
This should be achieved not by absorption of the yen bloc, but
by placing the Exchange Control under Japanese supervision
and granting credits as well as other financial facilities by the
Netherlands Indies' banks to the Japanese;
8. to secure the following special rights and interests with
regard to traffic and communications:
a. the right of coastal trade, the right of entering unopened
ports and the right of administering and using port facilities,
b. the landing and operating right of submarine cables, the
right of participating in the management of inland communi-
cation enterprises,
c. the inauguration of regular air services and the right of
instituting air safety equipment;
9. to build a stable fishery position in the South by increasing
the number of fishing boats, abolishing restrictions at ports of
import of fish, establishing fishery bases and acquiring other
rights and interests pertaining to the conducting of the marine
product industry;
116 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

10. to prohibit the establishment of new rights and interests

of third Powers in the Netherlands Indies and to endeavour to
oust those already in existence likely to obstruct the expansion
of the Japanese Empire;
11. to make the Indies institute an Economic Constructional
Commission in which Japanese would be included and which
would formulate and execute internal and external economic
policies of the Dutch East Indies for strengthening economic
collaboration with the Empire with regard to trade, finance,
taxation, customs duties, economic agreements with third
countries, enterprises, traffic and communications, etc.;
12. to demand the strict control of anti-J apanese commentaries
by newspapers and other periodicals, at the same time ensuring
freedom to Japanese to publish newspapers;
13. to exercise rigid control over Chinese residents assuming
pro-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Japanese attitudes;
14. to invite the influential natives to Japan to whom the
"true aspect of the Empire" would be propagated to ensure the
economic development of the Empire.
15. Lastly, the economic policy should be based upon the
broad viewpoint of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere and efforts should be made towards expanding
the interests of the Empire in harmony with the natives. 1
The plan thus reveals the extent of Japan's ambitions in the
Netherlands Indies. It was "a diagram of the economic tendrils
by which Japan hoped to embrace the Indies within Greater
East Asia." 2 The interests of the Indies in the Co-Prosperity
Sphere were to be completely subordinated to those of the
Empire. In short, the plan essentially aimed at the expansion
of the Japanese Empire into the East Indies by ousting the
Dutch.
Japan's objective found further expression in an article
written by Oshima in the Yo-Miuri Shimbun, dated October 27,
1940, in which he stated that the Tripartite Pact was a clear
recognition to Japan's mission in the South and that Japan
must take concrete steps to establish her leadership in Greater

1 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1317; Timetable No. 62: "Measures for the Econo-

mic Development of the Netherlands East Indies", October 25, 1940.

• Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 131.
 PLANS FOR INDONESIA 117

East Asia by expanding to the South. This must be done by

diplomacy, or by war, if diplomacy fails. 1 That the Netherlands
East Indies formed a part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere was for the first time publicly declared by Japan on
January 21, 1941 2, and instructions were sent out on January
28 to the Japanese delegation in Batavia that in no case should
official statements deny this fact. 3 Japan further emphasised
that in future she would exercise exclusive authority in the
Indies and that even her Axis Partner, Germany, would not be
allowed to negotiate directly with them. 4
Japan's dream of bringing the East Indies, which were to the
Japanese "perhaps the finest pearl in the prospective colonial
booty", 5 within the Co-Prosperity Sphere through "peaceful"
means, however, ended in frustration with the formal breakdown
of the prolonged negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies
Government on June 17, 1941. But this did not divert the Land
of the Rising Sun from her fixed aims. Force now remained the
only alternative to solve the whole issue, and Japan accepted
this alternative on November 5, 1941 when the Imperial Con-
ference decided to start hostilities with the Western Powers for
the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It
is significant to note that this conference also decided, inter
alia, that after the occupation, a part of the Indies would be
made "independent", the remaining would be directly incorpo-
rated into the Japanese Empire. 8
The guiding principles to be followed in the administration of
the occupied areas were then approved at the Liaison Conference
held on November 20, 1941. 7 These principles, which provided
for military administrations in the areas, were also to be followed
in the Dutch East Indies. For the economic control and exploi-
tation of the occupied Indies, the economic measures, contained
in the Sixth Committee's Plan, called the "Outline of the Eco-

1 Far East Mil. Trib., E:teh. No. 1299-A; Timetable No. 63.
• Far East Mil. Trib., E:teh. No. 1300: Timetable No. 69; H. J. van Mook, op. cit.,
p. 71: Foreign Minister Matsuoka's speech in the Diet on January 21, 1941.
• Far East Mil. Trib., E:teh. No. 1302; Timetable No. 71: Telegram from Foreign
Minister Matsuoka to the Japanese delegate in Batavia, dated January 28, 1941.
• Far East Mil. Trib., E:teh. No. 1304; Timetable No. 78: March 21, 1941.
• Tile Undeclared War, I94o-I94I, op. cit., p. 52.
• Timetable No. 108.
7 See Chapter VI (Part. I).
118 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

nomic Counter-Plans for the Southern Area", of December 12,

1941, 1 were to be adopted. As to the future status of the Indies,
plans were prepared both by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the Ministry of War. It seems, however, that there existed
little unanimity between the two with regard to the ultimate
disposal of these territories.
As basic policies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs envisaged 2
the establishment of Japanese military bases in the area, co-
operation with Japan in foreign policy and national defence by
the state newly to be founded, close economic collaboration
with Japan and elimination of European and American influ-
ences from the whole of the area. The right of the native popu-
lation to independence was rather liberally recognised in this
plan ("respecting to the utmost the desire of the southern people
for emancipation and independence") but always with the
reservation of Japan's right to annex any region considered to be
necessary for the defence of the Empire or the backwardness of
the natives.
An Indonesian Federation was to be set up, composed of
three states (Java including Madura, Bali and Lombok; Suma-
tra; and Celebes including the Moluccas and the Lesser Sunda
Islands but excluding Timor) and three dependent areas: Borneo,
New Guinea and Timor, but the government of these areas was
to be entrusted to Japan. 3 Strategically important islands, such
as the Riouw and Lingga Archipelago, the Anambas and N atuna
Islands were to become Japanese colonies and administered by
the Japanese Governor-General at Singapore. It appears that
the Foreign Affairs experts had in view the instructions of the
Imperial Conference of November 5 and followed them closely
and cautiously.
The first of the two documents presented by the Research
Section of the Ministry of War, also in December 1941, 4 empha-
sised the expulsion of Anglo-Saxon rule, the elimination of all
British, American and Dutch influences in South East Asia and
the development of the natural resources of those areas by their

1 ibid.
• Hoover Doc. No. 1112A, op. cit.
• The English text speaks of "Dominions". This is undoubtedly a wrong translation.
• Hoover Doc. No. 1987B, op. cit.,
 PLANS FOR INDONESIA 119

inhabitants under Japanese guidance for the benefit and defence

of the Japanese Empire. The second document, which detailed
the political division of the Empire to be created, provided the
establishment of an "East Indian Kingdom", embracing all
Dutch possessions and the territories of British Borneo, Labuan
Island, Sarawak, Brunei, Cocos Island, Christmas Island,
Andaman Islands, Nicobar Islands and Portugese Timor. Thus
the Netherlands Indies, as conceived by the Ministry of War,
were to be a part of the larger East Indian Kingdom within the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This "independent"
kingdom was to enjoy self-government in internal affairs, 1
and Japan was to remain in control of defence and foreign
affairs.
It was the task of the Total War Research Institute to detail
the various measures in the field of strategy, policy, economy,
culture and propaganda for the consolidation and construction
of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 2 These measures
were also to be adopted in the East Indies.
It seems that the experts of the Research Institute were not
deeply interested in the political development of the East Indies
Archipelago. According to them, all other considerations were
to be subordinated to the economic exploitation of the area. A
firm grip on the islands was to be maintained. Steps were to be
taken to change gradually the attitude of the Indonesians
towards the Dutch. Japanese authorities and civilians were to
be instructed not to feel themselves superior to the Indonesians
and treat them with disdain. Neither should they spoil the
natives by showing too much eagerness to win their friendship.
The Indonesians would be given the hope of independence at
a "suitable time" after the end of the war. The new state, when
it materialised, would assume the form of an Indonesian
Federation and be placed under the protection of Japan. The
conception of this federation appear to be more Java-centred.
"The area centering around J avail, says the document of January
27, 1942, "has, it is recognised, a comparatively high standard
of culture, and also has carried on a rather intensive campaign

1 Article 6 of Hoover Doc. No. 1987B says: "self-government for internal affairs
will be gradually granted".
, See Chapter VI (Part I).
120 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

for independence. Culturally and politically (Javanese) inde-

pendence is recognised to be appropriate." The rest of the
Archipelago would require "considerable protection and inter-
ference", since it "is generally an area of primitive barbarity."
Thus, as to the nature of the federation, the Institute Plan was
not in complete agreement with that of the Foreign Ministry.
 CHAPTER II

PREPARATIONS FOR CONQUEST:

NEGOTIATIONS

It is indeed amazing that about sixteen months before the

invasion of the Dutch East Indies the shrewd Nipponese, in
pursuance of their policy of incorporating the Archipelago
within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by peaceful
means, resorted to an ingenuous technique of economic negoti-
ations. 1 It was only when they failed to persuade the Indies
Government to accept their conception of the Co-Prosperity Sphere
that they thought of military action against the Archipelago.
The Japanese delegation, composed of twenty-four "tech-
nicians", including one Army, one Air and two Naval officers 2
and headed by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Ichiro
Kobayashi reached Batavia on September 12, 1940. The Nether-
lands Government appointed Dr. van Mook, Director of Eco-
nomic Affairs, as Minister-Plenipotentiary to lead the Indies
delegation. Originally, the Japanese Government insisted that,
as Japan was sending a cabinet minister, the Governor-General
of the Indies should be invested with wide powers of discretion to
conduct the negotiations. The Dutch, however, firmly refused to
accede to this demand, since it was considered to be a hint that
they would be led to discuss political rather than technical
economic questions 3
During his very first audience with the Governor-General,
Jonkheer Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, Kobayashi
made the aim of his mission clear. He stressed "the necessity of
closer co-operation between the Netherlands Indies and Japan,
which he regarded as an inevitable consequence of the changed
1 For a full account of the negotiations during 1940-1941, see H. J. van Mook,
The Nethe,lands Indies and Japan, Thei, Relations, I94o-I94I (1944).
• ilnd., p. 39.
• ilnd., pp. 39-40.
122 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

circumstances." 1 In vain he attempted to force the conversation

to the political field.
It soon appeared that a fundamental difference of opinion
as to the character of the negotiations would hardly produce
any tangible results. Although the Dutch agreed to a confer-
ence, they had always objected to negotiations of a gener-
al or political nature. 2 The Japanese Government, however,
kept the subject-matter of the discussions deliberately vague
because of their far-reaching ambitions in the East Indies. The
first meeting of both delegations on September 16, 1940 revealed
that the Japanese had as yet little to propose for practical
discussion. They only emphasised that the Indies, realising her
"forlorn" condition, should recognise the need of close economic
and political co-operation with Nippon, and hence should now
"shake hands firmly" with her. It was also pointed out that if
agreement could be reached on this idea, the Japanese delegation
could have worked out the details of the relations between the
two countries. 3
As discussions progressed, Japanese demands became more
defined. About a week after the opening of the conference they
specified their demands for the purchase of oil. They asked for
3,150,000 tons annually, over and above the usual quota of
600,000 tons. A guarantee of a regular supply of these minimum
requirements for a period of five years was also demanded from
the East Indies Government. 4
It seems that the main objective of the Japanese delegation
lay elsewhere. They were particularly interested in securing oil
concessions and control of the oil companies in the Indies. What
Japan aimed at was to enlarge her foothold in the Archipelago,
which is revealed in a telegram of September 3, 1940 from
Foreign Minister Matsuoka to Consul-General Saito in Batavia
and another from Kobayashi to Matsuoka of September 18,
1940. 5 That the Japanese delegation attempted to conduct the
1 ibid., p. 42.
• ibid., p. 38; Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 96.
• H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 43.
• ibid., pp. 45-46; Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 104.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 1314 and 1315; Timetable Nos. 45 and 48; F. c.
Jones, op. cit., p. 244. Saito was instructed by Matsuoka that in the oil negotiations
with the Indies, emphasis should be laid on the acquisition of oil fields. In a telegram
of September 18 Kobayashi informed Matsuoka that an eventual failure of the nego-
 PREPARATIONS FOR CONQUEST: NEGOTIATIONS 123

negotiations with this end in view was quite obvious. In a letter

of September 24, 1940 Mukai 1, Japanese delegate in charge of
oil negotiations, requested the Indies delegation "to give me
and my party informations as minutely as possible and provide
us with useful pieces of reference, and furthermore, to afford
us opportunities for actual study of oil producing districts and
refineries, and to introduce me and my party to the concerned." 2
The Indies Government, however, could well understand
Japanese intentions. Since they did not themselves produce oil,
they "refused to be a broker between the Japanese buyer and
the oil companies." 3 The Royal Dutch Shell (British-Dutch)
and the Standard Vacuum (American) interest produced all the
oil of the East Indies, the former about three-fourths and the
latter one-fourth of the production. 4 Hence, the question of oil
purchases was referred to the oil-producing companies. With
regard to the request for granting all facilities to study oil-
producing districts and refineries, the Indies delegation explained
that "visits to the refineries and the oil fields can only be granted
by the respective owners and that the Government, although
its officers are free to inspect all the mining enterprises in the
Netherlands Indies, has no power to grant such a right to third
parties." I) The Japanese delegation was thus faced with a
strong Dutch attitude.
Meanwhile, the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact on September
27, 1940 had added further misgivings about Japanese aims in
the Indies. The Dutch delegation was, however, still prepared
to continue the negotiations provided Japan made a categorical
statement that she did not regard the Indies as falling within her
lebensraum and that she did not claim leadership in the East
Indies. A general meeting of both delegations was, therefore,
arranged between October 14-16, 1940 to clarify the situation.
There were rather "violent discussions" about the Japanese
contention that the Dutch delegation, especially in the matter of
tiations about the purchase of oil would be used to compel the Dutch East Indies to
grant oil concessions and also to sell the shares of the East Indies in the oil companies
to Japan.
1 T. Mukai was the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Mitsui Company.
2 From the text of the letter published in H. J. van Mook, op cit., p. 47.
• Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 130. See also The Undeclared War, I94o-I94I, op. cit., p. 7.
• Amry Vandenbosch, op. cit., p. 424.
• H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 48.
124 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

oil purchases, was acting on instructions from Washington.

Although it was true to some extent that "Washington had
tutored the oil companies", 1 which were negotiating with the
Japanese buyers, the Japanese delegation eventually subscribed
to a joint communique, issued on October 16 at Batavia, in
which, inter alia, it was said: "In spite of the tripartite treaty
recently concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy, the
strong desire of Japan for the maintenance and promotion of the
friendly relations between Japan and the Netherlands Indies is
not affected. All what is wished for by Japan is co-existence and
co-prosperity with neighbouring countries." 2
The reasons why Japan agreed to issue such a statement are
not far to seek. She felt it necessary to allay the Indies' suspicion
about her true intentions, delay the arming of the Indies, and
above all, ensure a continuous flow of raw materials from the
East Indies not only to accelerate her own war preparations but
also to provide Germany, her partner in the Tripartite Pact,
with materials essential for the prosecution of the European war.
Indeed, promises were made by Japan to Germany that rubber,
tin and other materials would be obtained for her from the
Southern Regions. That the former extended such an offer to
the latter is revealed in the memorandum of Wiehl 3 , dated
October 8, 1940, about an interview with the Japanese Ambassa-
dor in Berlin. The memorandum says: Germany would be pleased
to use the Japanese offer to buy raw materials from the Nether-
lands Indies for her and she had placed at the disposal of Japan
three million Reichsmark in foreign currency for tin, rubber and
castor oil and one million for spices. 4
The joint statement of October 16 was followed by an a-
greement on October 18, which was finally signed on November

1 Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 130.

• Text of the Joint Statement published in H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 44.
• Wiehl was the economic adviser of von Ribbentrop.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 597; Timetable No. 56. A telegram of February 9,
1941 from German Ambassador Ott in Tokyo to the German Minister of Foreign
Affairs in Berlin further confirms the Japanese desire to help the German war
efforts with raw materials from the Indies. It was stated in that telegram that Japan
was honestly willing to assist Germany with rubber and other raw materials of South
East Asia. She even asked what quantities of rubber would still be required by Ger-
many on top of 25,000 tons which had already been promised from Indo-China. Far
East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 631; Timetable No. 56. See also Far East Mil. Trib., Exh.
No. 1304; Timetable No. 78.
 PREPARATIONS FOR CONQUEST: NEGOTIATIONS 125

12. The oil-producing companies agreed to supply annually a

total of 1,800,000 tons of oil. Japan thus contented herself to
accept from the Indies about half of what she had asked, and
even in that half there was to be little aviation gasoline 1 which
she needed most, due to American restrictions. Moreover, the
demand for a guarantee had been dropped. The contract was to
be valid only for six months, although it was renewed in May
1941 for another six months. "Nothing came of their efforts to
secure a measure of control over the oil industry, while their
suggestions for friendly co-operation in the larger sphere were
politely ignored." 2
Kobayashi left for Japan on October 22, ostensibly because
he could no longer be spared from his Ministry; in reality,
because his mission of bringing the Netherlands East Indies into
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere had miserably
failed. Even before the commencement of the negotiations he
could anticipate his ultimate failure. While reporting to Matsuoka
on September 13, 1940 about his interview with the Governor-
General of the Indies, he said: "The Governor-General ....
openly tried to do his utmost to evade political problems. He
evinced not the slightest sign of fervour to try to sound out the
true intention of the Japanese Government towards the Dutch
East Indies .... It has made me feel that I have come all this
way in vain." 3
Foiled in their attempts at securing additional oil, the J apa-
nese now concentrated on their main objective: the acquisition
of rights to seek and develop oil in the Indies. Clearly empha-
sising that "the proposed quantity of supply of aviation gasoline
and aviation crude to Japan [in accordance with the Agreement
of October 18, 1940J to which Japan attaches a great importance,
is as good as nil" 4 the Japanese delegation insisted on granting
oil exploitation and exploration rights to Japan in the areas
which had already been explored and also which had been re-
served for the Indies Government. 5 The Japanese delegation
1 Of 1,800,000 tons, 1,040,000 tons were to be crude oil and 760,000 tons refined,
Amry Vandenbosch, op. cit., p. 424.
• The Undeclared War, I94o-I94I, op. cit., p. 8.
a Tel. from Kobayashi to Matsuoka, September 13, 1940, Far East Mil. Trib.,
Exh. No. 1312; Timetable No. 47.
• See the text of the Japanese Note of October 21, 1940 published in H. J. van Mook
op cit., pp. 60-61.
• ibid.
126 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

defined their wishes more explicitly in their notes of October

29, 1940. 1 They wanted to be allowed to carryon explorations
and exploitations in future in large areas of Borneo, Celebes,
Dutch New Guinea, the Aru Archipelago and Schouten Archipe-
lago. The following districts and areas, which had not yet been
"committed to any other party or parties", were to be "con-
sidered as an interest for Japan":

1. Borneo - the districts of Kaliorang

and Kutai about 1,300,000 ha. 2
2. Celebes - the district opposite to the
Pelang Island 163,000
"
3. Dutch New Guinea:
North-eastern Shoreland 1,200,000
"
Middle-eastern interior 3,500,000
"
South-eastern Shoreland 9,000,000
"
4. Aru Archipelago, south-east to
Dutch N. Guinea. 850,000
"
5. Schouten Archipelago, north-east to
Dutch N. Guinea. 350,000
" "
Total. about 16,363,000 ha.

The Indies Government was asked to acknowledge the whole of

these areas as Japan's sphere of interest.
Furthermore, "in view of the rapid increase in the demand of
petroleum in Japan", the undermentioned areas were to be
assigned to the Japanese interests in addition to the above-
mentioned regions:

1. Borneo:
An area, opposite to the Tarakan
Island, northward from the Ben-
gara River to the boundaries of
British North Borneo . . . . . about 400,000 ha.

1 Text published in H. J. van Mook, op. cit., pp. 61-63.

• ha = hectare = 2.471 acres.
 PREPARATIONS FOR CONQUEST: NEGOTIATIONS 127

2. Sumatra:
An area extending south-east-
wards from Medan and along the
River Asahan about 700,000 ha.
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . about 1,100,000 ha.
The Notes of October 29 also expressed Japan's intense desire
not only to exploit directly the petroleum resources of the Dutch
East Indies but also to participate in the capital of the East
Indies' oil companies. The Indies Government was further asked
to consider the allotment of part of the government shares in
the oil companies to Japan.
It is significant to note that the selection of areas for oil
concessions was not entirely based on hopes of finding oil. In
this the Japanese delegation (it included military advisers) was
also obviously guided by military considerations. Indeed, these
oil concessions were intended to serve as bases not only for
economic exploitation but also for a military foothold, which
would facilitate the ultimate domination of the Netherlands
East Indies. This view is corroborated by the telegram of Saito
to Foreign Minister Matsuoka on October 25, 1940. According
to this telegram, Saito pleaded complete acceptance by the J a-
panese of the Dutch offer of unexploited oil fields, in order to
neutralise the suspicion of the Indies, which would undoubtedly
be aroused when large numbers of Japanese planes and plain
clothes-troops would visit those areas for making them into
strategic bases. He further insisted that even if the Japanese
Government asked for a few fields, those should be selected
according to strategic demands. 1
However, the Indies delegation referred the Japanese proposals
to the Mining Department and refused to hurry the study. It
declined to proceed in a "piecemeal fashion" and preferred to
wait until a complete agenda could be agreed upon. 2 By the
middle of November 1940 it appeared that "the Japanese govern-
ment was not only balked but so undecided that the [Japanese]
delegates were without instructions." 3 Taking advantage of
1 Far East Mil. n·ib., Exh. No. 1316; Timetable No. 61; Herbert Feis. op. cit., pp.
130-131.
• H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 63.
• Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 131.
128 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

this fact the Dutch Minister in Tokyo handed an aide memoire on

November 15, 1940 to Ohashi, Japan's Vice-Minister of Foreign
Affairs, drawing the attention of the Japanese Government to
the fact that the negotiations had come to a standstill for lack
of subject-matter and suggesting at the same time that they
be formally discontinued. 1
Japan, however, was not prepared to admit defeat. In a note
verbale on November 20, 1940 she announced the imminent
appointment of a new special envoy who would continue the
negotiations. On November 28, 1940 K. Yoshizawa, a former
Foreign Minister and a member of the House of Peers, was
formally appointed as the successor of Kobayashi. 2
The interval of more than two months, from the departure of
Kobayashi till the arrival of Y oshizawa, was exploited by Japan
for other purposes. She had noticed with great uneasiness the
ever-increasing widening of the ban on exports to Japan by the
United States along with the stiff attitude of the Dutch East
Indies. In case the United States stopped the supply of oil,
which was called "a matter of life and death", she must be
ready to take forcible possession of the resources of the Nether-
lands East Indies. Hence, during this period when there was a
lull in the negotiations, the large staff of the Japanese delegation
and of the Consulate General, who all enjoyed diplomatic privi-
leges and immunities, were "as busy as bees" in collecting data
not only of a purely economic nature but also of military strategy,
necessary for landing operations. At the same time Japanese
propaganda was intensified, making the most of the oil deal
and threatening the "haughty" and "obstinate" Netherlands
East Indies with disastrous consequences. 3 It was apparently
an indirect attempt to make the East Indies accept Japanese
demands.
I t was again during this time that an agitation was organised
in Japan for the use of the yen, in place of the dominating dollar,
as the chief medium of exchange in the Japanese Co-Prosperity
Sphere. Behind this movement was the Japanese fear that their
1 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1309-A, p. 22; Timetable No. 65; H. J. van Mook,
op. cit., p. 64.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1309-A; Timetable Nos. 66 & 67; H. J. van Mook,
op. cit., p. 64.
3 H. J. van Mook, op. cit., pp. 64--65.
 PREPARATIONS FOR CONQUEST: NEGOTIATIONS 129

dollar balances in the United States might be frozen at any

moment. To further their designs of including the East Indies
in the yen bloc, which was one of the means of integrating the
Archipelago in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,
the chief representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank in the
Indies, Y. Imagawa, approached the delegations with a plan to
establish "a free and unlimited exchangeability between the
yen and the Netherlands Indies guilder at fixed and agreed rates,
instead of the customary mutual payments in dollars." 1 The
Netherlands East Indies, which had been following a conciliatory
policy in the absence of any definite promise either by the United
States or Great Britain to come to her rescue, if attacked by
Japan, could not possibly rej ect outright this Japanese proposal.
Hence, the direct discussion that followed between the Yokohama
Specie Bank and De ] avasche Bank (the bank of issue in the
N etherlands Indies) resulted in the "arrangement for direct
payment in yen and guilders as long as credit balances stayed
within certain narrow limits; any excess balances, however,
were to remain collectable in dollars as before." 2 This agreement
was hailed by the Japanese "as a major economic victory" and
also as a favourable moment for the renewal of the general
negotiations between the two countries.
Yoshizawa arrived in Batavia on December 28, 1940 apparently
to continue the negotiations but with the same objective: to
induce the Dutch East Indies into the economic and political
orbit of Greater East Asia. In his conversation with the Governor-
General of the Indies he stressed, like his predecessor, Kobayashi,
"the necessity of closer collaboration between the two countries,
and Japan's ardent desire to participate in the exploitation of
the Indies." 3 This indicated the nature of the Japanese demands
to be followed soon. On January 16, 1941 the Japanese presented
a memorandum which emphasised the "economic interdepen-
dence" of Japan and the Netherlands Indies and which contained
a number of sweeping demands that had already been decided
upon by the cabinet on October 25, 1940. 4 It revealed that
1 ibid., p. 65.
2 ibid.
• ibid., p. 67.
• Text of the Japanese memorandum of January 16, 1941 published in H. J. van
Mook, op. cit., pp. 67-71. The plans approved by the cabinet on October 25, 1940
have been discussed in Chapter I (Part II).
130 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Japan aimed at the complete integration of the Indies in the

Co-Prosperity Sphere.
The extravagant demands of the Japanese delegation followed
by Foreign Minister Matsuoka's assertion in the Diet on January
21, 1941 that the East Indies formed a part of the Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere raised serious doubts about the real
meaning of the term Co-Prosperity and produced strong resent-
ment in the Indies. 1 A sharp Dutch protest followed on January
31, 1941. The Dutch rejected any suggestion of having the East
Indies incorporated in a new order in Asia under the leadership
of any power whatsoever. 2 It became clear to the Japanese
that their demands would not be accepted. The stiff attitude
of the Indies Government caused Yoshizawa to send, on January
27, 1941, a gloomy report to Tokyo in which he made clear the
Indies' tendency to neglect entirely Japan's Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere, seeking support more and more from the
United States and Great Britain. The conclusion of the report
was:
"Therefore, it can be considered that unless our Empire adopts
determined resolutions or measures, not only the progress of the
J apanese-Netherlands negotiations, but also the development,
of J apanese-N etherlands relations would be extremely difficult." 3
That the Netherlands Indies would not yield to any Japanese
intimidation or threats was further reiterated in the memorandum
submitted by the Netherlands delegation on February 3, 1941. 4
Japan realised at this time that a resort to armed intervention
was inevitable, in order to bring the Indies within the Co-
Prosperity Sphere. But she was still not ready to force the issue
and discontinue the negotiations. She hoped to utilise the time
thus gained for necessary preparations - both military and
diplomatic. That she henceforth simultaneously started prepa-
rations for military conquest of the Indies is evident from the
fact that instructions were issued in January 1941 for the printing
of occupation paper money for the Indies, 5 the delivery of which
1 Telegram of Yoshizawa in Batavia to Foreign Minister Matsuoka, dated February

6, 1941. Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1319; Timetable No. 75.
2 H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 71.

3 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1318; Timetable No. 70.
• For the Dutch Memorandum of Febr. 3, 1941 see H. J. van Mook, op. cit., pp.
72-74. Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1309-A, p. 22; Timetable No. 74.
• I.P.S. Doc. 9022. See Far East Mil Trib., Exh. No. 840; Timetable No. 72.
 PREPARATIONS FOR CONQUEST: NEGOTIATIONS 131

is reported to have taken place in March 1941. 1 At the end of

February 1941, when the negotiations were resumed, the japa-
nese, therefore, showed little sign of resistance and even reduced
their demands. "The area of the coveted oil concessions was
reduced from 17.5 million hectares to 1.7 million hectares without
so much as the batting of an eyelid, and even when it was made
clear that only a concession of 0.3 million hectares could be taken
into consideration as a first instalment, they hardly offered a
protest." 2
In spite of this lenient japanese attitude, the Indies Govern-
ment displayed no indication of submission. However, she
avoided giving any direct offence to them and thought it desirable
to continue the discussions as long as possible during which time
her defences might be strengthened. For this "intransigent"
attitude of the Indies, the United States was now considered to
be mainly responsible. Tadao Matsumoto thus writes in The
Dai Aziya, February 1941: "The Netherlands East Indies
authorities at present are engaged in speedy preparations for war,
apparently with japan as their supposed enemy. America alone
is supplying them with arms and munitions for these preparations
as the Netherlands East Indies has no adequate arsenal of their
own. Entirely dependent on America for weapons, all of their
airplanes, guns and projectiles are of American make. Because they
trust the combined power of America and Britain, they remain in
the anti-German camp even after losing their mother country."
"The Netherlands East Indies," continues the same writer,
"is dependent on the United States not only for military materials
but also for national existence. By international law, their
territory still belongs to the Netherlands Empire, but in a sense
it is a part of America militarily. It is because of American
military aid that the Indies authorities dare to show a hostile
attitude towards the japanese, an attitude that must be con-
sidered a part of American antagonism." 3
1 Timetable No. 76. It may be interesting to note that while discussing the Japanese
attack on the South at the Von Ribbentrop-Matsuoka conference of March 29, 1941,
a point arose as to how to acquire the oil fields in the Indies intact. Matsuoka ex-
pressed his fear that in case of an attack on the Indies, the oil installations might
be set on fire - Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 580; Timetable No. 80; Nazi-Soviet
Relations, I939-I94I, p. 310.
• H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 79.
B Contemporary Japan, March 1941, Vol. X, No.3, pp.398-399.
132 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Yoshizawa also seems to have been convinced of the inevitable

failure of his mission, especially when the United States was
backing the Indies. In a telegram (March 1941) to Matsuoka,
he expressed the view that the attitude of the Netherlands
Indies towards Japan reflected that of the United States and
that the real problem between Japan and the United States
was not China but the Indies. Now that the United States was
pressing her "oppression" against Japan, nothing could be ex-
pected of the Indies-Japanese negotiations. The only way for
Japan to solve the problem of the Indies, he stressed, was by
exercising her real power. 1
Japan, however, was not yet prepared to act. Premier Konoye
himself found it necessary to send a telegraphic message to
Yoshizawa in Batavia on March 28, 1941, instructing him not to
be discouraged but "to push pertinaciously our original demands
for the time being, to direct your main effort to the acquisition
of resources, and to await further developments in the situation." 2
This was followed by an increase in the Japanese demands for
rubber and tin to 30,000 and 12,500 tons respectively to
be exported annually from the Indies. 3 But the Dutch
remained steadfast to their point of view and hence no progress
was made in the discussions. The Japanese at last presented
their final memorandum on May 14, 1941, detailing the terms
with regard to the entry of the Japanese into the Indies, in the
spheres of enterprise and business, traffic and communications,
trade and commerce. 4 Although this time they reduced the
figures of rubber and tin to 20,000 and 3,000 tons respectively,
they raised the requirement of oil to 1,800,000 tons. It was, how-
ever, added that the Japanese Government would be prepared
to purchase oil from the Indies up to 3,800,000 tons per year
for a period of at least five years, and the Indies Government was
requested to make, through her influence, the oil companies
concerned increase the export of oil to Japan up to this quanti-
ty. It is quite obvious that "the oil was wanted more than ever

I Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1045; Timetable No. 81.
2 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1320; Timetable No. 82.
3 H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 80.
• Japanese memorandum of May 14, 1941 published in H. J. van Mook, op. cit.,
pp. 81-87. The three tables giving japan's detailed requirements were not presented
till May 22, 1941.
 PREPARATIONS FOR CONQUEST: NEGOTIATIONS 133

as the inflow from the Western Hemisphere was being reduced." 1

The Indies Government, however, continued to deny Japan
special privileges or position. The request for the larger quantity
of oil was again referred to the oil companies; the request for
concessions was deferred. The whole dispute now seemed to
centre around the exports of rubber and tin. Licenses for the
exportation of 10,000 and 2,300 tons of rubber and tin respecti-
vely had been granted for the first six months of 1941. But as
Allied demands for these commodities increased, quota to non-
Allied countries had to be cut down. Moreover, during the first
half of 1941 it became increasingly certain that essential raw
materials like rubber and tin were reaching Germany from the
Far East through the intermediary of Japan. A successful
Allied blockade of Germany meant that the latter should be
deprived of these commodities. Yet when the Japanese requested
for an increased supply of them, the Indies Government promised
to do so, provided Japan was prepared to offer a guarantee that
these goods would not be sent to Germany.
On May 23, 1941 Matsuoka telegraphically informed Yoshi-
zawa in Batavia as well as the Japanese Ambassadors in the
United States and Great Britain about the acceleration of the
negotiations with the Netherlands Indies. He related his interview
with the British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, in
the course of which he complained of the "insolence" of the
Indies Government in asking a guarantee from Japan that
rubber-exports granted by the Indies would not be supplied
to Germany. He asserted that such an assurance could never
be given. Matsuoka further emphasised that Japan would need
the exclusive imports from Indo-China and Thailand (130,000
tons of rubber and 20,000 tons of tin per year, against which
there was an earlier Japanese consumption of 50,000 tons of
rubber and 10,000 tons of tin annually). Besides, Japan would
also want 20,000 tons for her increasing needs. Matsuoka even
threatened that the withdrawal of the Yoshizawa delegation from
Batavia would create a dangerous situation. 2 A few days later,
on May 30, 1941, Matsuoka in an informal talk stated that
"although the Japanese southward policy was primarily animated
1 Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 189.

• Fa., East Mil. T.,ib., Exh. No. 1321; Timetable No. 85.
134 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

by peaceful motives, it might be reconsidered should it be found

impossible to carry it on peacefully." 1 He obviously referred
to the stiff attitude of the Indies. At the same time the Japanese
press intensified its campaign of hostility against the "obstinate"
Netherlands Indies.
The Dutch reply to the Japansee memorandum of May 14th-
22nd, 1941 was finally presented on June 6, 1941. 2 The reply
once more firmly reiterated the fundamental principles which
guided the economic policy of the Indies Government, as already
set forth in the memorandum of February 3, 1941: "a policy,
which involves the furtherance of welfare, progress and emanci-
pation of its population, non-discrimination towards friendly
foreign powers and the avoidance of the creation of preponder-
ance of foreign interests in any particular field of activity." 3
In this final answer the Dutch offered only minor concessions
but rejected all the major Japanese demands. As Herbert Feis
writes: "The Indies Government had stood fast. On some points
it had been yielding but not on those which would have enabled
Japan to gain a special economic position in the Indies, or
conduct preparatory military or political activities there." 4 The
Dutch memorandum of June 6 caused deep disappointment
among the Japanese delegation and they did not know what
to do. Yoshizawa, through a telegram on June 7, 1941, informed
Matsuoka that the negotiations had come to a dead end. If the
talks were officially broken off on the ground that the Dutch
answer was unsatisfactory, the Japanese Government, in
Yoshizawa's view, would be compelled to adopt a strong attitude
for the maintenance of its internal prestige. But that would also
stiffen more the attitude of the Dutch and would cancel several
advantages already secured. Yoshizawa was of the opinion that
the trailing on of the negotiations might possibly cause a Dutch
demand to withdraw the Japanese delegation. In this situation
he asked for Matsuoka's telegraphic instructions. 5
However, the two delegations met once more on June 10,

1 Quoted in Amry Vandenbosch, op. cit., p. 426.

• Text of the Dutch memorandum of June 6, 1941: H. J. van Mook, op. cit., pp.
88-96.
• H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 88.
• Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 207.
• Far East Mil. Trib., E:eh. No. 1322; Timetable No. 87.
 PREPARATIONS FOR CONQUEST: NEGOTIATIONS 135

1941. The Indies Government formally refused to accede to the

Japanese demands for greater economic and political privileges
within her territories, and so "the delegations parted in a subdued
though friendly mood." 1 On June 14, 1941 Matsuoka informed
Yoshizawa that after the Dutch answer of June 6 there was no
sense in continuing the talks any longer, and that the Japanese
Government had decided to break off the negotiations and call
the delegation back to Japan. 2
In accordance with this instruction Y oshizawa sought an
audience with the Governor-General of the Indies on June 17.
After emphasising that the Dutch answer had been wholly
unsatisfactory and, therefore, could not provide a sufficient
basis for an agreement, Yoshizawa once more expressed the
hope that the Indies Government would reconsider her position.
The Governor-General, however, regretted that such reconsider-
ation was impossible. Thereupon, Y oshizawa replied that he
had been instructed to withdraw his delegation. But great care
was taken by the Japanese delegation to make the rupture seem
without any portent. Y oshizawa stated that, although the negoti-
ations had brought no agreement, his government wanted to
see the general trade and economic relations maintained as be-
fore. 3 A joint communique, drafted by the Japanese and agreed
upon by both parties after a few minor amendments, expressed
this view. It read: "Both the Netherlands and the Japanese
Delegations greatly regret that the economic negotiation, which
has been conducted between them, has unfortunately came to no
satisfactory result. It is needless, however, to add that the
discontinuation of the present negotiation will lead to no change
in the normal relations between the Netherlands Indies and
Japan." 4 The Japanese anxiety to maintain the status quo was
largely inspired by the need of preventing serious public reaction
to the breakdown of the conference. Even at this juncture they
did not want to force the issue. Besides, they needed an unhampered
flow of supplies from the Indies for the acceleration of war

1 H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 97. It may be mentioned that the attitude of the

Indies Government towards the Dutch-Japanese talks was approved by the People's
Council on June 16, 1941.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1323; Timetable No. 89.
• H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 98.
• ibid., p. 99; Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1309-A, p. 36; Timetable No. 90.
136 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

preparations. Thus came to an end Japan's attempt at "swallow-

ing" the Netherlands Indies into the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere by peaceful and piecemeal infiltration.
It may be said without any shadow of doubt that the main
cause of the failure of the conference was the Japanese demands,
which were of such nature and magnitude that the Indies Govern-
ment could not comply with them without jeopardizing the
integrity of the Archipelago. A Japanese view of the causes of
the failure of the negotiations is, however, given by Kohtaro
Ohye in Contemporary Japan in the following words: "This
unsuccessful parley was almost constantly hampered by develop-
ment of political questions which unexpectedly obtruded them-
selves on the council board in spite of the effort made from the
outset to confine discussions to purely economic matters. When
the international situation is so full of complexities as at present,
it is extremely difficult to draw distinctions between economic
and political issues or to keep them apart and separate. To this
fact more than anything else should be attributed the failure
of the Batavia Conference.
"It should also be noted that sentiment in the Netherlands
East Indies underwent a drastic change against Japan after
the conclusion of the tripartite treaty. That Japan was regarded
almost as an open enemy cannot be denied. This attitude was
shown when Japan became allied with Germany, with whom
the Netherlands were at war. It may also be said, on the psycho-
logical side, that the Netherlands East Indies depended on Bri-
tain's fighting power and on the aid and support of America
which was becoming an arsenal for the democracies. It may
equally be said that the attitude of the Netherlands East Indies
stiffened when they underrated the power of Japan, which was
misjudged to be on the verge of military and economic exhaustion
after more than four years' fighting. The Dutch opposition to the
Co-prosperity sphere of East Asia was no doubt due to the
political construction wrongly placed on the economic and
peaceful designs of the Japanese Government in consequence
of its joining the Axis countries, as well as to the strong reliance
placed by the Netherlands on Britain and America. The Dutch
argument that Japan might re-export to Germany what she
imported from the Netherlands East Indies was only too spacious.
 PREPARATIONS FOR CONQUEST: NEGOTIATIONS 137

What Japan sought from that source was to meet her expanding
industrial needs." 1
With the formal breakdown of the Batavia Conference, a
resort to force remained as the only alternative method of
bringing the Indies into the Co-Prosperity Sphere, the prepa-
rations for which were already under way. Before launching
military action, the bases in Southern Indo-China were to be
secured, since they were regarded as essential for an easy attack
on the Indies. Matsuoka admitted this to the German Ambassador
in Tokyo, Ott, on June 21, 1941. He said that there would be no
more negotiations with the Netherlands Indies, and that before
proceeding further against the Archipelago, air and naval bases
in Southern Indo-China would have to be obtained. 2 (The
Japanese troops had already occupied Northern Indo-China
following the defeat of France in June 1940).
Therefore, the Liaison Conference between the Government
and the Imperial Headquarters of June 25, 1941, which set up,
"especially in connection with the return of the Japanese
Delegate from the Dutch Indies", the programme for the South,
decided that as the first step towards the Southern drive, Japan
should hasten to obtain air bases, the use of specified harbours,
and the right to station troops in Southern Indo-China. 3 This
decision was endorsed by the Imperial Conference of July 2,
1941, and once more it was reiterated that Japan should speed
up her Southward march and remove all obstacles. 4
The occupation of Southern Indo-China by Japanese troops
1 Quoted in Amry Vandenbosch, op. cit., p. 427. An official Japanese statement
on the failure of the Conference was issued in Tokyo on June 18, 1941 by Yasushi
lhii, Chief of the Third Division of the Board of Information - See Appendix I,
ibid. pp. 429-431.
• Telegram from German Ambassador in Tokyo to German Minister of Foreign
Affairs in Berlin, Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 635; Timetable No.9!. In a telegram
of July 4,1941 from Bangkok to Berlin, a conversation between the German military
attache there and the secretary of the Japanese Embassy was reported. The latter
had said that the failure of the negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies would
compel Japan to take over the Indies' oil fields by force. Prior to this there would
be a Japanese military occupation of Southern Indo-China, "in order to procure
a concentration area and jumping-off ports against the Netherlands Indies" - Far
East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 639-A; Timetable No. 94. The same opinion was again
expressed on July 14, 1941, in a cable from Canton to Tokyo: "After the occupation
of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the
N.E.I.". It was further stated that in seizing the N.E.I. only two divisions of the
Army would be required - Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 641; Timetable No. 95.
3 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1306; Timetable No. 92.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 588; Timetable No. 93.
138 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

accordingly began on July 24, 1941. As a result, on July 28,

1941 the Netherlands Indies authorities, following the examples
of the United States, Great Britain, and the British Dominions,
issued orders, freezing all Japanese assets in the Indies and
suspending the Dutch-Japanese financial agreement. 1 American
and British repressive measures did not cause so much surprise
to the Japanese Government as did the action of the Indies.
Indeed, an official promise had been given to Japan for the
supply of certain quantities of oil, bauxite, rubber, tin, and other
raw materials. By the edict of July 28 the Indies Government
now stopped all supplies to Japan. Hence, there was great
resentment against the Indies. About the Japanese reaction
Herbert Feis writes: "Ending the inflow of oil, by means of
which Japan might have managed despite the American and
British ban, it produced shock." 2 The period of semi-appease-
ment was thus over.
Henceforward, direct relations between Japan and the Dutch
East Indies virtually came to an end. It was clear that war
between the two countries was inevitable. Japan intensified her
preparations for the intended military action. The advance bases
which had been secured in Southern Indo-China for an easy
campaign against the Indies were being strengthened. Plans
which were now prepared provided for an attack upon the Indies
simultaneously with the starting of war against Great Britain
and the United States. The so-called "Table Top Manceuvers",
held in August 1941 by the Total War Research Institute, went
into great detail as to how and when to start a campaign against
the Indies and dealt extensively with the coming military
operations, either against the Netherlands alone, or in con-
junction with a general war in the Pacific. 3 It was again during
this time that the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, General Oshima,
called on General Christiansen, commander of the German occu-
pation forces in Holland, "possibly to collect further material on
the military and political situation in the Indies from documents
in the Dutch Department of Colonies in the Hague." 4
1 H. J. van Mook, op. cit., p. 103; Far East Mil. Trib., E%h. No. 1324-A; Timetable

No. 97.
• Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 247.
• Far East Mil. Trib., E%h. Nos. 686-A, Summary Record p. 1325; 870-A, p. 1322;
871, p. 1336; Timetable No. 98.
• B. H. M. Vlekke, op. cit., p. 393.
 PREPARATIONS FOR CONQUEST: NEGOTIATIONS 139

In order to facilitate further the military campaign against

the Indies, the Japanese increased their subversive activities.
Special attention was paid to influencing the Chinese nationals
in the Indies, which totalled some one and a quarter million.
On September 2, 1941 Consul-General Ishizawa at Batavia in a
cable to Tokyo requested that more pro-Japanese Chinese agents
from the occupied regions of China be sent to the Indies, in order
to counter anti-Japanese feeling among the Chinese nationals
there. 1 It is revealed from the secret report of the Office of
East Asiatic Affairs at Batavia that as many as four big Japanese
spy organisations were operating in the Netherlands Indies. 2
At the end of October 1941 after General Tojo had become
Premier, a general re-examination of all possible questions
connected with the prospective planned war against the Nether-
lands, the United States and Great Britain took place. One of
the questions studied was the possibility of limiting the war only
to the Netherlands or the Netherlands and Great Britain. But
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a different view. They were
convinced that Great Britain and the United States would
certainly be involved in a war with the Netherlands. 3 At the
same time naval units for the operations in the Netherlands
Indies were also selected. It was further specified that certain
oil refineries in the Indies would be directly administered by the
Japanese Navy to cover its own needs. 4
Immediately after the Imperial Conference of November 5,
1941, which finally decided to go to war with the Western
Powers, detailed instructions were given for the starting of
operations, the date of which was yet to be fixed. An order was
given, for instance, to attack Dutch ships and airplanes, in
special cases, even before the declaration of war. On the day
of the declaration of war the Southern Area Force would destroy
the hostile navies in the territory of the Dutch East Indies and
co-operate with the Japanese Army in the occupation of the
Archipelago. It was further instructed that in the beginning of
the operations the strategic areas of Celebes, Dutch Borneo and

1 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1327; Timetable No. 99.
• October 27, 1941. Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1325; Timetable No. 107.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 1328 and 1329; Timetable No. 106.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 809; Timetable No. 104.
140 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Southern Sumatra would be occupied. Also strategic areas in the

Moluccas and Timor. Necessary air bases would be prepared in
these areas. After the completion of these bases the air force
would be pushed forward in order to destroy the enemy air force
in Java. After that the main body of the invasion group of the
Army would land in Java for its occupation 1
However, the final stage in the preparations by Japan for
the conquest of the Netherlands East Indies was reached towards
the end of November 1941 when Consul-General Ishizawa at
Batavia, acting on orders from Foreign Minister Togo, instructed
the Japanese consuls in various places in the Indies to report
telegraphically all movements of merchantmen and warships in
the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea zones,
giving full details of destinations of all outgoing ships. 2 "While
the Japanese government", states Vlekke, "boldly asserted that
it had never more than 35,000 men in Indo-China, it was really
massing strong forces along the boundary of Thailand and near
its new naval bases in the neighbourhood of Saigon. It was
massing air fleets at the bases northeast of the Indies, in the
archipelago of the Caroline Islands. An imposing force was
concentrating for the attack on the Indies." 3 Japan, thus fully
prepared, was waiting for the appropriate moment to launch an
invasion of the Netherlands East Indies.

1 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1252; Timetable No. 109.
• Telegram from Consul-General Ishizawa at Batavia to Japanese consuls in the
Indies, November 29, 1941. Far East Mil. Trib., Exit. No. 1330; Timetable No. 115.
a B. H. M. Vlekke, op. cit., p. 393.
 CHAPTER III

CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY

INTRODUCTION

The first Japanese invasion troops landed in the territory of

the Dutch East Indies on January 10, 1942, more than a month
after the Land of the Rising Sun had begun the great adventure
in the Pacific. It was only to facilitate an easy military conquest
of the Indies that she did not commence a simultaneous direct
offensive against her along with the attacks on Pearl Harbour,
Hongkong and Malacca on December 8, 1941. Prime Minister
Tojo, in a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy
Council, stated that Japan would not formally declare war
against the Netherlands in view of future strategic considerations. 1
The Netherlands, however, had declared war against Nippon
with other Allies on the same day. In vain Japan made a last
attempt to dissuade the determined Dutch from fighting for
the East Indies by sending, through Swedish diplomatic channels,
an official proposal that "in the name of humanity" bloodshed
and any sort of hostile action against the Nipponese forces
should be avoided. 2 This appeal was obviously motivated by
the Japanese desire "to drive a wedge into the united front of
the Allies" 3 as well as to capture intact the vital resources,
particularly the oil fields and installations of the Indies, which
was quite evident by their very first landing in the island of
Tarakan. 4
The landing of the Japanese forces in the East Indies was
followed by a declaration of the Japanese Government on January
12, 1942 in which she "regretted" being compelled to wage a war
"in view of the necessity of destroying the hostile acts of the
1 December 8,1941. Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1241; Timetable No. 122.
• B. H. M. Vlekke, op. cit., p. 400.
3 ibid., p. 399.

• See Far East Mil. Tl'ib., Exh. No. 628; Timetable No. 53.
142 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Netherlands." 1 This was again reiterated by Foreign Minister

Togo in his speech before the 79th session of the Diet on January
22, 1942.2
Indeed, the Japanese advance had gone strictly according to
plan. 3 The campaign against the Archipelago had been preceded
by the occupation of Indo-China, the penetration of Siam and
the conquest of the Malaya Peninsula. The Philippines had been
overpowered but for one area likely to fall at any moment. The
conquest of Burma and the occupation of the northern coast of
New Guinea and neighbouring islands then followed.
The conquest of the East Indies had not been very difficult.
The price that Japan had to pay for it in the form of ships and
manpower, in the opinion of Japanese leaders, had not been too
high. Only seven weeks after their first landing the Japanese set
foot on the shores of Java, the main island of the Archipelago.
The desperate resistance put up by the Dutch fleet and air force,
aided by weak Allied forces, had scarcely been able to slow down
the advance, not to speak of halting it.
Only some Dutch Indies army detachments, widely scattered
over the Outer Regions, had somewhat succeeded in prolonging
their resistance by withdrawing into the interior, but great
distances in the unbeaten area had caused the Japanese much
more delay than the meagre Dutch troops. Those in Timor
appeared to be persisting till ten months later it was possible for
them to retreat to Australia. Fourteen men of Manokwari's
garrison, which never counted more than one hundred and
thirty, found shelter in the inhospitable interior of New Guinea
till MacArthur's army expelled the intruders. In Celebes an
officer with a group of constabulary maintained themselves till
September 1942. However, none of these and other groups
could do any considerable harm to the enemy. The resistance
had never developed into a guerrilla warfare; one could at the
most avoid the enemy for a long time.
The larger part of the Indies army was concentrated on Java.
It was easy to know in advance the places where the enemy
would land, but the coastal defense was so weak that the army
1 Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1337; Timetable No. 132.

• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1330-A; Timetable No. 133.
• The plan had been decided upon on November 5,1941; see Far East Mil. Trib.,
Exh. No. 1252; Timetable No. 109.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLlCY 143

command could not avail itself of that knowledge. The mobile

striking force was not large enough to confront the enemy even
in one single landing place. 1 The mobile force had "fourteen
weak battalions" - in General Wavell's words, and of these a
section had to protect East Java and the rest the "mountain
fortress" of Bandung.
The defense on land apparently failed. A failure such as that
of the fleet and airforce, which succumbed to the overwhelming
superior force of the enemy, would not have been a humiliation.
But in the army the organisation itself collapsed. Of the pre-war
Indies army, which was accustomed to small scale fighting with
native enemies or rebels, the military command could not,
within one years's time only, build up an effective fighting force
that could compete with an equal number of Japanese in a
struggle on such a large scale. And Java's garrison had to face
Japanese troops, who outnumbered them many times and who
had already been trained in fighting for five years in China.
The native professional soldiers, who felt themselves capable of
meeting a superior enemy force of their own race in a man-to-man
fight, initially lost the courage and endurance under the fire of
better Japanese arms 2 and against an enemy renowned for
fanaticism and invincibility. It was even rumoured that some of
the officers who were conscious of the inequality of the struggle
failed in their duty to lead their troops with energy and courage.
Also certain cases of cowardly retreat, in which many were left
to their own fate, were circulated among the Dutch public before
the capitUlation. This deeply shocked the morale of the civilian
population as well as of the troops.
The reports that the Japanese acted with great cruelty against
the Europeans also contributed much to the weakening of the
morale. At the beginning of the campaign the headquarters of
Marshal Terauchi had threatened with death all those who
would wilfully destroy important industrial installations. 3 After
1 According to personal information from a Netherlands source.
2 This was clear already in Tarakan where the Amboinese soldiers could not be
induced to attack - De Militaire SPectator, April I949: "De Strijd op het eiland
Tarakan in J anuari 1942", p. 205. Others explained this failure as the lack of sufficient
and experienced soldiers in the detachment of the Amboinese, which was completely
composed of young soldiers without any fighting experience.
3 See also Far East lVlil. Trib., Exh. No. 1338-B; Timetable No. 134: on January
22, 1942, Premier Tojo also stated that the Netherlands East Indies would be de-
stroyed without hesitation, if she continued to resist Japan.
144 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

the occupation of Tarakan (January 12, 1942), where the de-

struction had been carried out in spite of this threat, the Japanese
sent a Dutch war-prisoner officer to Balikpapan in order to
repeat the threat more emphatically. 1
In Balikpapan when the whole oil industry appeared to be
destroyed, the Japanese executed their threat: one month after
the conquest, eighty-one Dutch were executed in cold blood. 2
There were also reports of arbitrary massacres in the still unoccu-
pied area: of the thirty-three government officials serving in
South and East Borneo, seven were killed by the Japanese at
the first encounter and three fell at the hands of the natives. 3
The latter also often turned against the Dutch in the Outer
Regions at the arrival of the enemy, and officers who had
remained behind in distant lonely posts had little chance to
escape with life. Sometimes, however, the advent of the Japanese
meant safety instead of death. 4 As the enemy approached
nearer and more refugees came to Java, unrest increased among
the European population and changed the temper. 5
Eight days after the first landings in Java Bandung was
occupied. The surrender of the city, government and army on
March 8, 1942 ended a long period in the history of the East
Indies. Under severe threats the Japanese command had rejected
an offer of surrender of the city and fortress of Bandung: the
1 january 20, 1942. Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 1329 and 1340; Timetable No.
138.
• February 24, 1942. Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1341; Timetable No. 140.
• "Het Binnenlands Bestuur in Zuid·Borneo tijdens de Japanse bezetting." (Vit-
gave van de Residentie-voorlichtingsdienst Zuid-Borneo, 1947).
• As an example of this characteristic attitude, one may remember how the
Controller of Atjeh's westcoast, G. C. Bruin, was protected by the government police
who spontaneously formed a circle around him, so that none of the Atjenese rebels
could touch him with their naked arms till the japanese brought the situation under
control (A. J. Piekaar, Atjeh en de Oorlog met Japan, N.V. Vitgeverij W. van Hoeve,
's-Gravenhage-Bandung 1949, p. 166). Individual cases of help and sympathy towards
the Dutch often occurred also in Atjeh which was still considered as dangerous.
• Relatively few cases of brute violence occured at the entry of the japanese. All
eyewitnesses praised the strict discipline that was maintained among the invasion
troops in spite of the fact that these soldiers had had long experience of cruel warfare
in China. Most of them were not japanese-born but Koreans and Formosans. Plun-
derers were dealt with by effective Asiatic methods.
S. Sjahrir (in his Out of Exile, translated by Charles Wolf, Jr. The john Day Compa-
ny, New York 1949, p. 237) called the first japanese troops "barbarians", but praised
(in the same passage) their strict discipline. He presented the case as if it were the
Japanese plunderers who were treated so severely; from all others sources, however,
it clearly appears that it was the Indonesian "plunderers" against whom strict
measures were taken.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 145

government and chief command should capitulate on behalf of

the Netherlands Indies, otherwise a heavy bombardment would
follow. 1
During the first days of the war, in December 1941, when the
weak and antiquated Dutch Indies airforce and submarines
were the only Allied fighting forces that had some success, many
Europeans in the Indies and outside believed that the defenders
of the East Indies would possibly put up a grand resistance. The
results, which had been of little significance in the wider context
of the war, were considered as successes because the British and
Americans at that time seemed to retreat without any resistance
before the Japanese attack.
The failure of the resistance on land came as an anti-climax to
the inflated feeling of strength that had been created. False hope
was followed by complete disillusion. Some wondered why the
Dutch Indies had not remained neutral in the war against Japan
as Russia had done, why the government had made such haste
in voluntarily declaring war. The Lieutenant Governor-General,
Dr. van Mook, defended himself against this reproach in his
historic speech in the People's Council, which held its last session
on March 6, 1942.
"We had to fight", argued van Mook, "if we did not want to
eliminate ourselves in advance with regard to peace arrangements
after the victory of our allies." Earlier Dr. van Mook had directed
also sharp reproaches to the allies, who had lacked the will to
attack. 2 He expressed in this what was in the hearts of all: the
conviction of having been "left in the lurch". Psychologically,
1945 was the normal sequel to 1942. The bitter disappointment
left behind with the Dutch a memory, which worked through
the post-war period of the Indonesian-Dutch conflict as well as
in the mutual relations with the former allies.
There was still another illusion that was rudely and
suddenly shattered. Before the invasion it was widely believed
among the Dutch that the Indonesians had willingly accepted
their authority and that there was sincere appreciation and love
for European rulers among the mass of the people, especially in
Java and in Christianised areas of the Great East. The small
1 Fa, East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 1342 and 1343-A; Timetable No. 143.
2 Radio Oranje, March 3 and 6, 1942.
146 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

number of organised nationalists was usually looked upon as a

group of uprooted people, who created unrest in a society from
which they had been separated because of their Western training.
The Dutch were too easily convinced of the loyalty of the masses
to their authority, the more so as they seemed to obey voluntarily
the hereditary heads, who in many respects were the pillars of
support for the Dutch Indies Government.
What happened shortly before and during the Japanese
occupation revealed a widespread different mentality. Already
before the invasion it appeared that, of all Indonesians, the
left-wing nationalists understood best what dangers threatened
from Japan. For them Japan was indeed the type of the most
reactionary imperialistic state. It was already so before the
threat of war became acute. Sjahrir is said to have persistently
fought the pro-Japanese tendency which developed among the
nationalists and the people, and what he tells us of this trend
agrees almost verbatim with the statements of Palar in 1939,
who considered only Gerindo among all the nationalist organ-
izations to be immune from pro-Japanese sentiments. 1 This
party called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere a
"fabrication of and for Japanese fascists", and in its statement
of August 4, 1941, it said: "The Greater East Asia idea as
propagated by Japan is exclusively designed to deprive other
peoples of their freedom by Japanese domination as happened
in Manchukuo, China, and Indo-China." 2
The conviction, however, was not very deep even with many
of them, for a number of socialist-minded nationalist leaders,
who had taken an open stand against Japan during the period
of May 1940 to March 1942, did not hesitate to co-operate with
the Japanese after the surrender of the Dutch. Or did the
stubborn refusal of the Dutch Indies Government to engage the
nationalist leaders in the defense against Japan play a part?
Mohammed Hatta had openly expressed his willingness for
co-operation with the Dutch through the Indonesian press, but
till the last moment of Dutch rule his freedom of movement was
restricted. In an article in the Malay newspaper Pemandangan
1 Notes of s. Sjahrir of August 19, 1937 and October 28, 1937 (Out 0/ E%ile, pp. 186-
188 and pp. 195-196); L. N. Palar, "De Indonesische Beweging en Japan" in Socialisme
en DemOC1'atie, I939, pp. 793 if.
• Quoted in B.H.M. Vlekke, op. cit., p. 391.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 147

of December 22, 1941, he wrote: "Our people, with the exception

of a small minority now in the armed forces, has not learned to
use arms and bears no responsibility for its own fate. Yet it
should not think that this war does not affect us . . .. If we
are convinced that the Japanese aggression endangers our ideals,
then we must resist Japanese imperialism. Even if we believe
that Japan will probably win, it remains our duty to come to the
defense of our endangered ideals. It is better to die standing than
to live kneeling .... " 1 Sukarno had often expressed the same
anti-Japanese opinion in private talks but his ardent desire to
return to Java was also prevented. Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo,
according to Sjahrir, is also said to have tried without any
success to contact the Dutch Indies authorities immediately
after the outbreak of the war in Europe in order to convince them
of the necessity of co-operation against the threatening Japanese
imperialism. 2
Among the masses, says Sjahrir, there existed for years an
increasing popularity for Japan. Indeed, in Muslim circles the
Japanese display of sympathy for Islam had some effect. There
were, however, other reasons which made the Indonesian people
look up respectfully towards Japan. Since the Japanese victory
over Russia in 1904---1905 the Empire had been admired as the
leading Asiatic power. In Atjeh, where the resistance against
the Dutch authority was still fiercely waged in 1904, the opposi-
tion leaders had in those days sent an appeal for help to Tokyo,
and in 1941 the hope of liberation by the Japanese power from
the Dutch rule was once again revived. 3 In Java, the Djojobojo
legend might have had some influence, for one of its many
versions prophesised about the restoration of the Javanese
freedom after a short period of oppression by a yellow race, and
for the masses this meant the Japanese. 4 The wide spreading of
this legend after March 8, 1942 might not be important in this
connection, but Palar already pointed out in 1939 the expectations
that were connected with the prophecy. 5 It was the Japanese
1 ibid., pp. 396-397. This is probably the article to which S. Sjahrir refers in his

book, Out of Exile, p. 232. See also New York Herald Tribune, July 30, 1944.
• Out of Exile, pp. 220 ff.
• A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 183.
• Out of Exile, p. 219. According to Prof. Berg the element of temporary rule by
a yellow race was first consciously introduced in the legend after Japan's rise.
• L. N. Palar, op. cit., p. 804.
148 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

activity before 1940, such as the flooding of the Indonesian market

with cheap industrial goods which had caused strong counter-
measures by the Indies Government, that made Japan, according
to Sjahrir, popular among the poorer section of the popUlation.
The service in the Japanese shops was good; even the natives,
says he, could enter them without hesitation. Of course, the
Japanese had made themselves guilty of violence against China
after 1931, but the Chinese after all were not so popular then
among the Indonesians, and what might be the attitude of the
Chinese towards them, if China should unexpectedly become a
great power by a victory over Japan? As regards the courteous
Japanese, the Indonesians had no inferiority feeling and, there-
fore, did not fear Japanese rule, which, according to the Dioioboio
myth, would not be permanent. 1 All this indicated a latent
spirit of antipathy towards the Dutch authority among a great
majority of the Indonesian people. This antipathy was not
directed against the Europeans as such and as individuals. It
was, however, against their privileged social position. The
character of the natives in large parts of the Archipelago made
them sympathetic to the Europeans and sympathy of the
Europeans was usually answered readily with appreciation from
the side of the Indonesians. Individually, many Westerners
enjoyed the love of the natives, and all these various sentiments
made it difficult for the Dutch to believe in the existence of a
fundamental opposition to their domination. It, nonetheless,
existed without any doubt. It was a dormant, still vaguely
formed, attitude, which was not explicit enough to stir the
masses even superficially at the time of the crisis of the invasion,
not to speak about the active support to the invaders. There
were, however, disturbances and many cases of local unrest and
plunder, but nowhere was there any revolution of the masses: a
fifth column was organised by the Japanese in many places - but
certainly not everywhere - in Atjeh where there was an armed
revolt shortly before and during the invasion. 2 The same
Japanese organisation worked in East Sumatra, where especially
the Bataks were recruited for this and it had also Chinese among
1 Both L. N. Palar and S. Sjahrir (in the already-mentioned writings) agree
almost literally in their presentation of facts.
• A. J. Piekaar amply describes the "F" (Fujiwara-Kikan) organisations, called
after Major Fujiwara, and their role in the revolt in his earlier-mentioned book.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 149

its members. 1 In Java there seemed to have been formed a fifth

column among the organised racketeers, who had tyrannised,
since time immemorial, the peasant population in certain regions
of the island and whose activity could seldom be effectively
controlled by the Indies police. 2 As guides for the landing
Japanese troops and as troublemakers behind the Dutch lines
and also as organisers of mass plunder in many places, especially
in Solo, these bands actually operated. Rebellious movements
were also reported from other areas, such as the Lesser Sunda
Islands.
It appears that the attitude of the native popUlation shortly
before and during the invasion was one of complete passivity.
However, they joyfully welcomed the Japanese as liberators and
displayed enmity towards the Dutch as soon as the superiority
of the invaders was clearly evident on the spot. But at the same
time the population, ignorant about general power-relations, had
the feeling of having been "left in the lurch" immediately after
the invasion became a fact. The attitude of the people doomed
every attempt at guerrilla warfare by the Dutch, even if it had
been possible. In South Celebes the native population refused
to help in the construction of defence work and they assisted
the Japanese in tracing the remnant Dutch troops. The same
happened in North Celebes near Gorontalo and in West Borneo.
The attitude in Minahassa (north-east Celebes) appeared to be
divided. Also in Amboina, where a part of the population
strongly backed the defense, the Japanese found support from
the part of the Muslims. In Sumatra the situation was not
different: the Europeans who fled westward from Palembang
owed their lives during their forced return to the Japanese
escort, 3 and even from Papua's neighbourhood, Manokwari, it

1 W. Brandt, De Gele Terreur (Uitgeverij W. van Hoeve, 's·Gravenhage 1946),

pp. 23 ft. This book describes (in journalistic style) the fate of the Europeans in
Sumatra's East Coast.
• D. H. Meyer, "Over het Bendewezen op Java", in lndonesie, 3e jrg., No.2, pp.
182 ft.; ibid., Japan wint den 001'1og! Documenten over Java (N.V. Leiter·Nypels,
Maastricht 1946). The writer quotes an article of Dr. Slamet Sudibio: "Perampokan"
in Asia Raya of May-June, 1942.
See also the writing of Prof. Dr. van Wulftten Palthe, Het BendewclIen op Java
(Amsterdam 1949) which treats psychologically the continued activity of these
bands down to the time of the RepUblic.
a According to a statement of Dr. Hans Meyer (a Swiss employee of the Kon.
Petro Maatschappij in Sumatra) in his lecture at Zurich on May 31,1949.
150 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

was reported that they co-operated with the Japanese in the

destruction of the small defence force. In Timor, where the
combined Australian and Dutch detachments persisted in the
struggle with success for a long time, it was necessary to fight
repeatedly against the hostile Timorese. 1
In Java, especially in Bantam and Cheribon, the Europeans
isolated there became victims to rebellious elements among the
native population. In Cheribon the Chinese also had to suffer. 2
The plunders at Solo reached such an extent that no European
house was spared. Over the whole of Java lootings and destruction
of factories took place. When order was restored under Japanese
pressure, a number of tea factories appeared to be so damaged
that they could not resume production. The damage inflicted on
sugar factories could be repaired with comparative ease. 3
Naturally, the hope for booty made thousands of people take
part in these activities, and many Javanese did not feel any
scruples after they had seen the policy of "scorched-earth"
applied by the Dutch to the extreme. The rather wide-spread
expression of rebelliousness at the last moment points, without
any doubt, to the outbreak of long suppressed sentiments against
the Dutch.
Indeed, it was a deep disappointment to the Dutch to see how,
in many places of the Archipelago, the Japanese were welcomed
with joy as liberators. Many Indonesians individually had given
proof of their loyalty and faithfulness even in the freedom-loving
Atjeh 4, and they often felt pity when they saw their erstwhile
rulers removed in the most humiliating way by the occupants.
On the whole, it was only small minorities that had supported
the Japanese invasion by open rebellion, but nowhere was there
any evidence of mass willingness to help oppose the invaders.
The Indonesians no doubt had appreciated the merits of the
Dutch rule particularly of the last seven decades, but they had
not been attached to the rulers and their authority. They had
1 See the description of the events of war in De Militaire Spectator, March 1948 ff.
• W. H. J. Elias, Indie onder Japanschen Hiel (W. van Hoeve, Deventer 1946),
pp. 55 ff.
• J. H. Voigt, "Aanteekeningen betreffende de Thee·ondernemingen op Java
gedurende de Japansche bezetting" (Econ. Weekblad voor Ned. Indiii, Aug. 24, 1946)
and G. Rodenburg, "De Suiker·industrie op Java tijdens de Japansche bezetting"
(ibid., April 13 and 20, 1946).
• For examples see A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 159.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 151

accepted it, as has been said, "as a destiny of Allah" 1, an

inevitable fate. But they thanked Allah that there came a
change, since they did not yet know the true nature of the
Japanese. Not unjustly did American observers point to the
contrast with the attitude of the Filipinos, which revealed itself
there. 2
Although a great part of the Indonesian population soon learnt
to appreciate the Japanese liberation in a different way than
during the first months of 1942, the attitude of the natives as
well as the simultaneous disappointment and surprise at the
sudden breakdown of the whole of the Dutch East Indies
authority left behind impressions which made the relations
between the Dutch and Indonesians after 1945 psychologically
extremely difficult. Most of the Dutch in the camps, says an
eyewitness, had never been able to explain to themselves the
ruin of everything to which they had so highly looked. They
had never been able to cope with this mental shock. 3 Among
the Indonesians the prestige of the Dutch had been destroyed.
The Dutch had not had the power to defend their historical
position of authority, and having failed in the defense of their
right, they had lost their claim in the eyes of the people, or, as
Mohammed Hatta is supposed to have stated shortly after the
capitulation of Bandung: "The Dutch made appeal to historical
rights, now this argument of history has been answered from
history." 4
The Dutch, on their side, felt themselves strengthened in
their historical right because they, following the example and
command of the Governor-General, did not abandon the Indies
as a lost colony and also did not evacuate in a mass scale - as
happened elsewhere - but remained there in order to share the
fate of the population. Under the Japanese authorities the lot
of the Dutch, however, appeared to be even harder to bear than
that of the natives. Nevertheless, it was borne with courage and
firm conviction in the ultimate restoration of justice. By sustained

1 J. Verkuyl, De Achtergrond van het Indonesische Vraagstuk (D. A. Daamen's

Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., 's·Gravenhage 1946), p. 29.
• The attitude of the people in the British territories of South East Asia (viz.
Burma) was, on the contrary, certainly very unfavourable for the Western Powers.
• W. H. J. Elias, op. cit., p. 62.
• J. Verkuyl, op. cit., p. 28.
152 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

suffering so courageously, the Dutch thought that they had

"rebought" what they had lost in right and prestige in 194 1- 1942.
At the end of the war it became clear, though, how rudely such
sentiments had been disturbed by reality.
For the Indonesians disillusion came soon, says Sjahrir. 1 But
the Japanese succeeded in masking their imperialistic intentions
for a long time by encouraging national popular movement and
by a well-organised propaganda, while they managed to adapt
their occupation policy to the gradually changing circumstances
of the war. Indeed, during the first eighteen months they had
cane blanche because all this time the mass of the people com-
pletely remained isolated from the 'West, and there was not even
any evidence of survival of the Allied Powers.

A. MILITARY GOVERNMENT

The conquest of the East Indies marked the culmination of a

long-cherished Japanese ambition. In February 1942 the Java-
bound fleet steamed out of the Japanese ports with the plans,
the broad outlines of which had been worked out in Tokyo by a
staff of ten, assisted by civilians, for the establishment of a
military government in Indonesia. The necessary instructions for
the rapid execution of the plans were also ready. During the
long journey (February-March) to Java it was often rehearsed
as to how they should act after the occupation of big towns. At
the same time the texts of the proclamation of the military
government as well as of many other announcements and
leaflets were also drafted. 2
By the publication of Decree No. 1 on March 7, 1942 the
Military Government in Java was formally inaugurated at
Batavia after the Dutch had declared it an open city and the
Japanese 16th Army had moved in. In this proclamation were
announced the foundations of the administration, based on the
principle of H akko I chiu. 3
During the first few months of the occupation the government
was "provisional" in character as stated in Article 1 of Decree
lOut 01 Exile, pp. 238 ft.
• Zyawa Nenkan (Java Year Book, published on July 25, 1944), Rijksinstituut voor
Oorlogsdocumentatie (Amsterdam), 016162-016168.
• ibid.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 153

No.1. A simple Central Organ, Zyawa Gunseibtt 1, was set up

under the direct control of the chief of staff of the 16th Army,
who was designated as the chief administrator. The conduct of
the administration, however, was left to the local commanders
of West, Central and East Java. The original plan to place Java,
from the beginning, under one uniform administration had to be
abandoned because of the small number of Japanese administra-
tive "experts", who had come along with the invasion troops.
These civil officials were attached to the military commanders
who acted as the executors of the military administration.
Regional and local administrative apparatus: Seimubu and
Sidoobu came into being in Surabaya, Bandung and Semarang.
The European civil service was removed to a large extent and
native administration was maintained.
The four Principalities 2 in Central Java and the capital city
of Batavia and its surroundings came directly under the Military
Command. For the conduct of the administration of these
Principalities two subordinate administrative organs were
established: Surakarta (Solo) Gunseibu and Dfokfakarta Gunseibu.
Batavia was placed under the control of a directorate: Sidoobu.
The initial period when the Military Government was part
and parcel of the Army continued till August 1942. A uniform
administration for the whole of Java could then be developed
into a separate body by the side of the occupation Army. 3
The legal basis of this apparatus was already laid down in
Decree No. 1 of March 7, 1942, by virtue of which the Commander
of the 16th Army assumed the final authority over the Military
Administration, including all powers exercised by the Governor-
General (Art. 2). His Chief of Staff (Gunseikan) became the direct
head of the Military Administration (Gunsei), in which capacity
he was assisted by a number of departments, bureaux and
organisations, forming together the Military Administration
Section (Gunseikanbu). 4
1 A. A. Zorab, De Japanse Begetting van Indonesie en haar Volkenrechtelijke Zijde
(Thesis, Leiden; Universitaire Pers, Leiden 1954), p. 31.
• Mangku Negaran, Susuhunanan of Solo, Paku Alaman and Sultanate of Djokja-
karta.
• Zyawa Nenkan, Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 016162-016168.
• Statement of K. A. de Weerd, The Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies
(Inter. Prosecution Section, Neth. Division, Nov. 1946), Document No. 2750 (Far East
Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1351), pp. 26-27.
154 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

The establishment of this permanent military authority

brought about considerable changes in the organisation of the
administration as it had existed during the Dutch rule. 1
In the new order there was no place for a Council of the Indies,
which was a historically-grown institution and of which radical
reform - even its abolition - had already been repeatedly dis-
cussed during the Dutch period. 2 The Governor-General's
cabinet, too, disappeared.
The classification in the governmental departments appeared
also to be strongly changed when the Military Government began
to function independent of the Army Command. In place of the
former General Secretariat there came into being a Department
of General Affairs (Soomubu) , which was the most important
department of the Military Government. The head of this
department (Soomubutyoo) in fact directed the Military Ad-
ministration in Java and acted as the deputy of the Gunseikan.
Besides functioning as a Government Secretariat,. it gave
guidance to the other departments, and laid down policies. The
department was divided into a number of sections 3: Tyoosasitu
dealt with administrative, economic and cultural questions;
Kagaku Gizitusitu examined problems of a technical-scientific
nature; Zinzika occupied itself with personnel matters of the
military administration; political drafts were prepared by
Kikakuka, a very important section of Soomubu; Zyoohoositu
acted as an information service; Hoozin Zimukyoku had control
over non-military Japanese in Java; persons of mixed blood,
such as the Indo-Europeans, came under the supervision of
Konketu Zyuumin. As we have seen, this organizational structure
of the upper level of the administration had been tried out in
Manchukuo and was now introduced in Indonesia.
The former departments of Education and Public Health
became divisions of Interior Affairs Department (Naimubu).
The Educational Division (Bunkyokyoku) supervised the activi-
ties of the Seinendan (the Youth Association in Java), sports

1 For administrative departments see DeCt'ee No. 27, August 5, 1942 of the Japanese

Commander.
• Ve1'slag van de Commissie tot Bestudee1'ing van Staatsrechtelijke He1'vormingen
(further cited as Report Visman), Dl. II, pp. 32, 247ft. (page numbers according to the
reprint in New York in 1944.)
• A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 35.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 155

organisations, education, libraries, museums, etc. The Public

Health section became known as Eiseikyoku. There were also
two other sections of this Department: Local Administration
section (Tihookyoku) and Labour Section (Roomukyoku), added
at a later stage. 1
The Religious Affairs Section, which used to be under the
Education and Religion Department during the Dutch regime,
was raised to an independent department (Syuumubu). The Police
section was also withdrawn from Internal Affairs and made a
separate department (Keimubu). In 1944 Police and Prosecution
Section (Kensatukyoku), hitherto under the Justice Department
(Sihoobu), were combined to form the new Department of Public
Security (Tianbu). The elevation of Police and Religious Affairs
sections to independent departments indicated the special
importance attached to them by the occupants. No less important
for these was the new Department of Propaganda (Sendenbu).
Sihoobu was "more or less a reorganisation of the former
Department of Justice." 2 At first a part of Soomubu-Kikakuka,
it later became a separate department in September 1942. The
Department was composed of five sections, but in 1944 the
organisation was simplified and the number was reduced to
three. Syoomuka (later, Soomuka) took care of archives and
personnel affairs. Minzika was the section for civil affairs. The
former orphan and insolvency chambers, the land-registry and
the office for industrial property were placed under its care.
Keizika was the division for criminal affairs, to which also
belonged the former finger print section. Prisons and the execution
of sentences were supervised by Gyookeika. Hogoka was generally
in charge of the probation system. 3 On January 1, 1944 the
offices of civil and criminal affairs were united to form a new
office of investigation (Kensatuka). Gyookeika and Hogoka were
also united.
There were also Departments of Finance (Zaimubu), Public
Works (Kootubu) and Economic Affairs (Sangyoobu). The
activities of the Public Works Department were assigned to two
sub-departments in October 1944: Public Works (Sisetu Sookyoku
1 Doc. No. 2750, p. 27.
• A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 36.
• i.e. Rehabilitation of "criminals" who have served their penance and are helped
to get work and to start anew.
156 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

and Motor Transport (Zidoosya Sookyoku). In addition, there

were also other sub-departments, such as Communications
(Tuusin Sookyoku), Transport on Land (Rikuyu Sookyoku) and
the office for supervising radio broadcasts (Hoosoo Kanri Kyoku).
The Department of Economic Affairs was split into two new
departments in July 1945: War Equipment Production Depart-
ment (Gunzyu Seisanbu) and Economic Affairs Department
(Keizaibu).l
Apart from these departments, a number of bureaux came
into being with the passage of time, such as Shipbuilding Bureau
(Zoosen Sookyoku) , Maritime Affairs Bureau (Kaizi Sookyoku) ,
Audit Bureau (Kaikei Kantokubu) and Enemy Property Ad-
ministration Bureau (Tekisan Kanribu). The exigencies of the
war also necessitated the establishment of a number of other
governmental bodies. 2 Obviously, the former Office of East
Asiatic Affairs was immediately closed down. 3 So, the structure
of the pre-war Central Administration was substituted by one
entirely modelled on the Japanese pattern.
The policy of J apanisation was also thoroughly carried out in
the reorganisation of local administration. 4 The three former
Provincial governments of West, Central and East Java, which
were instituted partly on the basis of geographical and ethnologi-
cal factors during the last decades of the Dutch rule, did not fit
in with the conception of the Japanese military administration.
It is needless to say that the provincial councils disappeared
with the abolition of the provincial governments. At lower levels
of the administration representative councils also came to an end.
Batavia became a Special Municipality (Tokubeht Si), and the
four Principalities (renamed Kooti) came to be administered by
two Bureaux (Kooti Zimukyoku) , one at Solo and the other at
Djokjakarta, each being in charge of two Principalities. The
rest of Java was divided into seventeen Syuu, comparable to the

1 A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 34.

• Doc. No. 2750, p. 28. See also the articles (already quoted) in Economisch Week-
blad voor Ned.-Indie, April 13, April 20, August 24, 1946.
• The archives of this office, the work of many years of diligent and patient
research with invaluable political and economic data about the East Asiatic countries,
which would have been useful to the Allies, were burnt before the Japanese landing.
• See Decree No. 27, August 5, 1942, supplemented by Osamu Seirei No.3, Febru-
ary 10,1945; Decree No. 28 August 7,1942; Osamu Seirei Nos. 12 and 13, April 29,
1943; Osamu Seirei No.7, February 16, 1944.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 157

former Residencies which were maintained geographically. The

heads of the various Syuu, Tokubetu Si, and Kooti Zimukyoku,
were directly responsible to the Gunseikan for the administration
of their regions.
The Syuu were subdivided into three to five Ken (each coinci-
ding geographically with the former Regencies) and a small
number of Si (coinciding with the former town municipalities).
The Ken again were subdivided into Gun (former Districts), the
Gun into Son (former Sub-Districts), and the Son into Ku
(former Desas). The Si (municipalities) were subdivided into
Siku (wards). The functionaries of these local bodies, however,
stood in an autocratic, hierarchical relation to the head of Syuu,
who, in spite of his extensive authority in the local administration,
was entirely dependent on the Central Administration. 1
The position of the four Javanese Princes also underwent a
fundamental change. They "were maintained, not, as a matter
of principle, as having a hereditary title to their position, but as
Rulers, under the name of Ko, newly invested by the Japanese." 2
Like all civilian officials in the Japanese administration, they
had to swear allegiance to the Japanese Army. Their investure
and swearing-in took place in Batavia in August 1942 at the
residence of the Japanese Commander.
The democratic and decentralised form of government existing
in 1941, established with a view to progressive realisation of
self-government, was thus set aside by one stroke of the Japanese
occupation. Centralisation replaced decentralisation by the
abolition of the representative co-governing institutions. It
seems that the main aim of the Japanese was to build up an
administrative organisation which, in its final form, would be
the logical extension of the colonial structure as existed in
Formosa and Korea. Indeed, the memoranda of the Total War
Research Institute referred to earlier made it abundantly clear
that there would be no place for a parliamentary or semi-
parliamentary system in the new Japanese realm. For parliaments
were the product of "detested" Western individualism and
liberalism. Classification, i.e. regulation according to status,
and dutiful co-operation would be the new foundation of the
1 A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 32.
, Doc. No. 2750, p. 32.
158 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Asiatic states. Democracy was objectionable, and freedom for

the subjugated people meant in the first place only the holding
of more numerous posts by the natives. Moreover, a military
occupation authority does not usually tolerate control by the
population, and certainly not, when heavy sacrifices would be
demanded of the "liberated" population who would, as Japan
expected, remain grateful for the "freedom" brought to them.
All the key positions in the Military Administration were held
by the Japanese who came mainly from Japan itself, Korea and
Formosa. This J apanisation stretched from the Gunseikanbu to
the staff of the Residency Office (Syuu). 1 A number of specialists
sent from Japan after the fall of Bandung never reached their
destination: the ship was torpedoed on the way. The Army on
its arrival was welcomed in many places by Reception Committees,
composed of representatives of the Indonesian people, apparently
self-appointed. They undoubtedly hoped to be rewarded with
good positions, and so the Army gave temporarily to the In-
donesians a greater share in the new administration than they
had had during the Dutch regime, but always under the super-
vision of the Japanese. The Army Command, however, took
care that of the above-mentioned self-recommended Indonesians,
preference was given only to the experienced ones, but even
these were replaced to a large extent by the Japanese within a
year. A stream of militarised civilian Japanese officials who
spread throughout the Archipelago in 1943 2 took over all the
important posts. Even "if an Indonesian held a seemingly

1 Of all the Residents in Java and Madura there was only one Indonesian, while
the burgomasters of the town municipalities were all Indonesians except those of
Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya.
• "Ce sont tout d'abord les J aponais qui, chasses par la guerre d'Occident, ont
refIue d'Europe ou d'Amerique, prudemment revenus avant Pearl Harbour ou
rapatries plus tard par les bateaux d'echange: diplomates, hommes d'affaires, represen-
tants des grands trusts comme Mitsui et Mitsubishi, banquiers, agents des grandes
compagnies du navigation, exportateurs, journalistes, etc. ..... Tous ces gens
continueront a former l'etat-major politique d'outre-mer, mais des regions qui leur
sont tout a fait inconnues: de chefs de bureaux a Londres, San Francisco ou Buenos
Aires, ils deviendront, sanS preparation, administrateurs ou conseillers civils a Kotah-
Baru, Balik-Papan ou dans Mindanao. On leur adjoint comme subordonnes tout ce
qu'on peut retrouver comme trafiquants ayant autrefois vendu la pacotille japonaise
entre Singapour et Rangoun, comme negociants ayant rode entre Borneo, Timor et
l' Australie, et quiconque a sous un masque divers - journalisme, affaires, entreprises
de pecheries, bureaux de tourisme, etc...... - mene naguere Ie sournois travail de
penetration et d'espionnage dans Ie Sud." - R. Guillain, Le Peuple Japonais et la
Guerre I939-I946 (Rene Julliard, Paris 1947), pp. 106-107.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 159

important post there was certain to be a Japanese in the back-

ground who was the leading executive." 1 From the Regency
(Ken) office downward, the Indonesian staff was almost wholly
maintained. It is true that there were many more Indonesians in
the administration than before, but this did not mean that they
enjoyed more power. The Military authorities interpreted the
Great Asiatic plans in their own way!
Compared with the machinery of the Dutch Indies Govern-
ment, the Japanese administration had a larger number of
officials. Java alone counted 23,242 Japanese officials in the
employment of the Military Administration on September 1,
1945. 2 Certainly, all of them were not necessary; perhaps it may
be true that the Japanese authorities had the intention to place
as many of their countrymen as possible in well-paid positions
at the cost of the conquered territories. In such a gigantic
administrative apparatus the Indonesians, down to the lowest
grade, were virtually eclipsed by the Japanese assistants.
Although the employment of the Indonesians was mainly
confined to subordinate positions in the administration, it can
hardly be denied that it "gave them self-confidence and some
training for the anticipated time when they would be in full
control." 3 By their role in administrative affairs the Indonesians,
as Elsbree has aptly expressed, "did receive a psychological
fillip which strengthened their determination to resist" 4 the
return of the Dutch rule at the end of the war.
After the establishment of the Military Administration it soon
became clear that the few Dutch, who were working as "officials
of the military government", would not be retained in their
positions. The Japanese, of course, were faced with the problem
as to how to replace them by their own compatriots who were
considered to a certain extent experts. Hundreds of them who
lived in Indonesia at the time of the outbreak of the war had
been deported to Australia before the surrender of Java. How
useful this group could have been appeared in Atjeh, where a

1 Doc. No. 2750, p. 33.

• Doc. No. 2750, p. 29.
• F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 374.
• W. H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements I940-
I945 (Harvard Univ. Press for the Institute of Pacific Relations, Cambridge, Mass.
1953), p. 167.
160 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

former planter of Sumatra's East Coast, S. Masubuchi, directed

the occupation policy, in the words of a Dutch writer, "in a
really masterly way." 1
More powers were given to the heads of the different branches
of the administration and to the Japanese Residents than the
former corresponding Dutch officials had enjoyed. 2 This was
natural in a military government which was responsible only to
the Ministries at Tokyo, and not to the representative bodies,
either local or in the mother country.
The Japanese divided the whole Archipelago into three
administrative units which also resulted in the automatic
disappearance of the Peoples' Council (Volksraad). Sumatra,
occupied by the 25th Army, was administered in a rather similar
way to Java by a Gunseikanbu at Bukit Tinggi 3, after an initial
stage during which Sumatra and Malaya formed an administrative
unit under the Commander of the 25th Army at Singapore. The
island was divided into Syuu; at lower levels there were differ-
ences, as compared to Java, in designations but not in nature. 4
The 16th and 25th Armies, the occupiers of Java and Sumatra
respectively, were under the 7th Area Army with headquarters
at Singapore. The latter constituted a part of the Chief Command
of the Southern Expeditionary forces under Field Marshal
Terauchi with headquarters first at Singapore and later near
Saigon.
Although Java and Sumatra fell hierarchically under the
same command, this did not exclude direct relations of both the
Gunseikanbu with the Ministry of War at Tokyo.
Dutch Borneo, the Celebes and all the islands east of a line
running north and south through Bali and Macassar Straits were
under the jurisdiction of the Navy. Again the terminology varied,
but the system was not different in essence.
Gunsei (Military Administration) in these areas was called
Minsei (Civil Administration), whose headquarters (Minsei/u)
was at Macassar (Celebes). Minsei differed from Gunsei more in
terminology than in principle. It had also all the characteristics
of a centralised administration conducted by a Service over
1 A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 191.
• ibid., p. 253.
• Former Fort de Kock.
• Doc. No. 2750, p. 34.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 161

civilians. The whole area governed by the Navy was divided into
four administrative regions - Borneo, the Celebes, the Moluccas
and the Lesser Sunda Islands - each administered by a branch
office (Minseibu). The Minseilu at Macassar was under the
command of the Officer commanding the Second Southern
Fleet at Surabaya, which again fell under the Officer com-
manding the 7th Southern Fleet at Singapore. 1 The Navy Ministry
at Tokyo determined the policy for the territory under Naval
occupation.
The pre-war central authority over the Archipelago was thus
eliminated by the division of the area into three occupation
zones. Co-ordination of these zonal administrations could only
take place at Tokyo by consultation between the Ministries of
War and Navy. 2 In order to promote co-operation between
the Army and Navy a Liaison office (Bukanlu) was set up at
Batavia under the supervision of Vice-Admiral Maeda. 3
The fundamental task of the Military Administration was to
contribute as much as possible to a complete Japanese victory.
The basic directives, which were issued from Japan for the
guidance of the administration, aimed at the maintenance of
law and order, the speedy disposal of important products and
materials for the prosecution of the war and the attainment of
autarchy for the occupied areas. 4
Care was also taken to provide for the legal basis, for which
the legislative authority of the Imperial Government at Tokyo
delegated a part of its powers to the Supreme Commander of the
Southern Areas (Field Marshal Terauchi). Decrees issued by
him were not published separately in Java and this seemed to
create in practice serious legal insecurity. 5 The 7th Area Army
Commander and the local commanders also possessed compe-
tence to issue decrees. The Saikoo Sikikan, commander of the
occupation Army of Java, issued Osamu Gunritu and Osamu
Seirei and the Gunseikan, Osamu Kanrei. Both Gunseikan (Java
1 ibid., p. 35.
• With regard to the financial arrangement agreement was apparently reached
before, since it was identical in all occupation zones. See H. J. Manschot, "Het Geld-,
Bank- en Credietwezen in Nederlandsch-Indie in de Bezettingsjaren 1942-1945" in
Economisch-Statistische Berichten, March 27, 1946.
• Doc. No. 2750, p. 35.
• Zyawa Nenkan, Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 016167.
• Doc. No. 2750, p.30.
162 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

and Sumatra) could issue special decrees for the execution of

decrees and orders issued at a higher level. Only the decrees of
the Commander of Java (Saikoo Sikikan) and those of Gunseikan
were published in an official fortnightly organ, Osamu Kan Po,
in the Indonesian and the Japanese language. Some secret
decrees, however, appeared only in the Japanese edition. 1
The local authorities were also empowered to issue regulations
for the execution of Osamu Seirei and Osamu Kanrei and also
for the maintenance of public law and order. 2
The institution of Advisory Councils at a later stage did not
affect the legislative position in any way.
As regards the Minseilu area, Minseirei, Kunrei, and Kokuzi,
issued by the heads of Minseilu, Minseibu and lower bodies
respectively, were published in Koohoo. 3

Judicial administration
With the elimination of the Governor-General, the Council of
the Indies, the People's Council, the Provincial, Municipal and
Regency Councils all existing competent legislative bodies
disappeared. 4 The judicial organisation of the Dutch Indies
soon was also shaken to its foundation. Even before the capitu-
lation all legal security had been undermined by the promulga-
tion of martial laws on March 2, 1942, 5 and Decree No.1 on
March 7, 1942, in which it was stated that all existing valid laws
would remain provisionally in force, in so far as they were not in
conflict with the regulations of the Military Government. 6
Decree No. 14 dated April 29, 1942 by the Commander of Java
and Madura announced the establishment of Law Courts of the
Military Government (Gunsei Hooin) and the Public Prosecution
of the Military Government (Gunsei Kensatukyoku). The existing
lower judicial institutions were taken over by the Gunsei H ooin
under Japanese names (art. 3 and 4). The former District Courts,
1 ibid.
• See Osamu Seirei No. 9/1942 and Osamu Seirei No. 13, April 29, 1943.
• A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 10.
• J. S. Sinninghe Damste, Overzicht van de Japanse Oorlogsmisdrijven gePleegd
tegen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en zijn Onderdanen, p. 40.
• Osamu Gunrei No.1 of March 2, 1942 contained some regulations of penal law,
and by Osamu Gunrei No.2 of the same date a Court Martial was instituted.
• Art. 3 of Decree No.1 of the Commander of the Japanese Army. In force from
the day of promulgation - art. 6.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 163

Police Courts, County Courts, Sub-County Courts, Courts for

Muslim Affairs and Priest Courts became respectively known
as Tihoo Hooin, Keizai Hooin, Ken Hooin, Gun Hooin, Kaikyoo
Kootoo Hooin and Sooryoo Hooin. 1 The former High Court,
Superior Courts of Law and Residency Courts ceased to exist.
In Batavia the new court began to function at the end of May
1942.
The regulation that the existing laws, if not in conflict with
the military laws, remained in force, had wide application. In
numerous judgements references were found to Dutch and
Indies jurisprudence and legal literature. 2 Even in some cases
justice was still administered "in the name of the Queen."
Japanese discontent about this state of affairs expressed itself
in the official explanation on Osamtt Seirei No. 26 of May 10,
1944, in which the spokesman of the Japanese Department of
Justice pointed out that the penal law of the Military Govern-
ment should be the focus of everything, and not the Dutch
Indies criminal laws which were applied frequently by the
Indonesian judicial officials. 3 The Japanese living in Indonesia
were wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the ordinary judges. They
could be tried only by the courts of their own country, which
administered justice according to Japanese law. Other differences
between the groups of population vanished, so that all the de-
fendants appeared before the same judicial bodies. Besides the
lower courts which were maintained and manned by the Indo-
nesian judges and the higher ones which disappeared, the Japa-
nese established a High Court (Saikoo Hooin) and a Superior
Court of Law (Kootoo Hooin) for the occupied area of Java and
Madura. 4 These higher bodies, however, had little work to do,
since the possibilities for higher appeal were practically excluded.
In certain circumstances, these courts which were mainly
occupied by the Japanese, could bring a case within their com-
petence and decide it with or without the presence of defendants
and witnesses. They had so little to do that the Saikoo Hooin
was abolished on January 14, 1944 without having settled a
1 Doc. No. 2750, p. 36.
, Dept. van J ustitie, Voorlopig overzicht van de rechtspraak tijdens de J apanse bezet-
ting (Batavia, Juni 1946), p. 12.
3 ibid, p. 24.

• Doc. No. 2750, p. 36.

164 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

single case. Art. 8 of Decree No. 14 dated April 29, 1942 provided
the curious regulation that the right of higher appeal could not
be exercised by the parties, but only by the Commander of the
Japanese Army.
In case of being found guilty they could apply for a request
for mercy to the Commander, who had assumed all powers of the
Governor-General. Compliance with such requests, as far as is
known, did not take place. According to Japanese information,
only very select persons were considered for such pardon, e.g.,
spies working for the Japanese. It must be admitted, however,
that on some occasions, for instance the birthday of the Japanese
Emperor, an absolute or partial amnesty was granted in a large
scale under certain conditions. But subjects of enemy states
were specifically excluded from this. 1
Dismissal, arrest and internment of the European officials
- according to Japanese statements 15,000 in number - 2 affected
the whole machinery. The withdrawal of these functionaries
from the judiciary, of which they formed an important part,
especially those of the higher ranks and with longer experience,
meant the deathblow for the administration of justice. 3 The
guarantee for a proper administration appeared to be lacking
because there was not a sufficient number of jurists to be found
amongst the non-European group of the popUlation, even not
a reasonable number, to occupy the vacant places. In order to
fill up the many vacancies, lay men were appointed in judicial
jobs, such as clerks of the court. As they did not master suf-
ficiently the Dutch language, it was difficult for them to
understand grammatically the Dutch written law, which was
still valid, and the application thereof. The independence of the
judge, existing to a certain degree, lost its basis after the occu-
pation; the speed of the administration of justice slowed down
and the law of evidence in criminal cases was revised in such a
way that by the application of new articles the administration
of justice, in accordance with Western conceptions of law,
should be considered out of the question. 4 Under the new regu-
lation the central point of judicial competence passed from the
1 Dept. van ]ustitie, op. cit., p. 27.
• ]. S. Sinninghe Damste, op. cit., p. 36.
• ibid, p. 41.
• ibid.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 165

neutral judge to the police, being a party which could misuse

and actually did misuse power, and worked on the arrested
people beforehand in such a way with its terrible methods that
there was no more any question of a normal law suit. The
prosecution apparatus was strongly centralised and later on even
absolutely separated from the Department of justice, just as
the Police from the Department of Interior Affairs. Both the
sections were brought together in the Department of Public
Security (Tianbu) in 1944, 1 which was under the direct control
of the Gunseikanbu. In criminal courts with Indonesian members,
a representative of the Kempeitai 2 attended the sessions, seated
next to the Indonesian Official of the Public Prosecution, there-
by exercising supervision. In practice, he determined the
sentence. 3
What it meant was further defined in a decision of the Gunsei-
kan on july 12, 1943 that the existing laws and regulations re-
mained in force as prescribed in Art. 3 of Decree No.1. The
proper way it had happened had to be made clear as soon as
possible at the investigation of criminal matters, while care
should be taken that as a result of a gap in the law nobody
would escape just punishment. Therefore, if the judge had the
belief and conviction that the defendant had committed a punish-
able offence, one legal proof of evidence would be considered
sufficient for condemnation in future. This undermining of one
of the pillars on which rested the existing legal structure led to
the breakdown of the administration of penal law by further
specifying that a statement of a fellow-defendant or an un-
sworn witness, a report of the Kempeitai, or even a written
statement made by the victim of the manner in which the matter
actually happened, might be considered as evidence.
During the session only japanese and Malay languages were
allowed. Trials by the Courts Martial proper were conducted in
japanese.
Like almost all japanese products of legislation, the decrees
with reference to the administration of justice were also very
brief. 4 The extent to which the difficulty of the translation into
1 Doc. No. 2750, pp. 27-28,37.
• The Kempeitai was somewhat similar to the German Gestapo.
S Doc. No. 2750, pp. 37-38.
• Judicial decrees: Oendang-Oendang No. 14, Batavia, dd. April 24, 1942; id. Nos.
166 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

the Indonesian language was a contributory factor cannot be

ascertained. A typical declaration of a Japanese spokesman
of the Japanese Department of Justice about the provisions of
the Penal Code that was introduced in 1944 may be quoted in
this context: "The articles are composed very carefully, so that
we consider them too long." 1 Perhaps it may be deduced from
this that the brevity of the judicial ordinances might have
been prompted by the desire to adhere to a phraseology which
could be interpreted according to the exigencies of the situation.

B. ELIMINATION OF WESTERN INFLUENCE

The Japanese came to the Archipelago with the definite aim

to eliminate all Dutch influence as quickly as possible from the
life of Indonesia. The termination of all European and American
influence - political, economic and cultural - was indeed one of
the fundamental objects of the Asiatic Co-Prosperity plan.
We have already mentioned how some Dutch in the Outer
Territories were killed during the invasion either by the Japanese
or the natives. The survivors, the great majority of whom were
still in Borneo and the Great East, were immediately placed
under control and gradually brought together in concentration
camps. 2 The threat of severe punishment which had preceded
the attacks on Borneo's oil centres was repeated with the invasion
of Java in the Army Order of March 2, 1942. 3 It was now special-
ly directed to the natives who would support the Dutch in the
defence, but was not eventually carried out. With this began the
31 and 32, dd. September 5, 1942; id. No. 34, dd. September 26, 1942; id. No. 35,
dd. October I, 1942.
OsamuSeirei No. 18, dd. December 15,1942; id. No. 21, dd. July 1,1943; Gunseikan
regulations for execution concerning evidence in criminal cases; dd. July 12, 1943;
Osamu Seirei No.2, dd. January 14, 1944; id. Nos. 25 and 26, dd. May 10, 1944 and
Osamu Gun,.itu Nos. 1 and 2, dd. March 2, 1942. For Sumatra an ordinance was an-
nounced by the Commander there on January 1, 1944 while in the area governed by
the Navy simultaneous changes were made by an ordinance Minseiburei, No. 26, dd.
Nov. I, 1943.
1 Dept. van Justitie, op. cit., p. 5.
I There were twelve camps in this part of Indonesia: four in Borneo (Balikpapan,

Tarakan, Samarinda, Bandjermasin), four in Celebes (Macassar, Menado, Aiermadidir,

Kampili), three in or near Amboina (Ambon, Haruku, Amahei in Ceram) and one
(Maoemere) in Flores. The Kuching (Sarawak) camp also contained Dutch internees.
See Verslag WerkBaamkeden van I939 tot en met I947 van bet Informatiebu,.eau van bet
Nederlandse Rode Kruis (Den Haag 1948). pp. 221-222.
• R.O. Kartodirdjo, "De Rechtspraak op Java en Madoera tijdens de Japansche
Bezetting 1942-1945", in Tijdsck,.ijt van ket Recht (Indonesie), Jaargang 1947, p. 10.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 167

separation of the Dutch from the Indonesian community. In

Sumatra the isolation and internment of the Europeans occurred
rather rapidly. The elimination of the Europeans in Java,
however, was no easy affair.
Meanwhile, the advance to the North and West coast of Suma-
tra completed the occupation of the Archipelago. Here the
action of the Japanese was more harsh than in Java: a number
of officers and soldiers were shot without any trial. In some cases
the sporadic opposition after the general capitulation by the
Chief Command in Bandung on March 8, 1942 seems to have
been the cause; in others, the killing took place at the instigation
of resistance leaders who wanted to avenge the shooting of
collaborators who were executed shortly before the arrival of
the Japanese by order of Dutch officers on charge of rebellion
against the legal authority. 1 It is true that in many cases the
Japanese custody during the first weeks proved very disagree-
able, but nevertheless, it provided a necessary protection against
attacks by natives. 2 Only in some big plantations and factories
it lasted somewhat longer before the internment took place.
In Java very few cases of murder occurred, certainly in com-
parison with what happened elsewhere and was still to happen
in Sumatra. The Europeans here were interned by a series of
measures quickly succeeding one after another. Technical
difficulties in assuming the charge of administration by the
Japanese were, however, so great that the rounding up of the
Dutch and the completion of their internment took more than
one year and a half.
Immediately after the surrender of Bandung a large number
of officials were arrested evidently on the basis of lists prepared
before. Sometimes, the Japanese needed very special information,
such as in the case of the Directors of the Java Bank who had
to give an account about the export of gold reserves. 3 It appears
that the motive of the Japanese was to facilitate the establish-
ment of the Military Administration. These measures were
1 A. ]. Piekaar, op. cit., pp. 124f£., 160, 164.
2 In Sumatra and neighbouring islands there were at least twenty-one camps:
Medan, Belawan, Brastagi, Rantau-Prapat, Aik-Pamienke, Soengei-Sengkol, Padang,
Pakan Baroe, Bangkinang, Tapanoeli, Pajacombo, Fort van de Capelle, Kendah,
Lawe Si Gale-Gale, Langsa, Koetaradja, Palembang, Belalau, Soengei-Gerong,
Muntok (Banka), and Koebang (Riouw) - Verslag Rode Kruis, op. cit., p. 221.
• W. H. ]. Elias, op. cit., p. 44.
168 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

followed by a decree, 1 by which all foreigners of more than 17

years old were required to register themselves with the Japanese
army on payment of "registration fees" 2 as well as to swear
an oath of loyalty to them. Almost at the same time raids were
started as a result of which those who looked like Europeans
were arrested. Theoretically, there were possibilities for protection
against this .measure : persons of German, Italian, or neutral
nationality could appeal on their status, and this was taken into
consideration, although not always and without further guarantee
to remain free in future. Neutrals often underwent the same
fate as the Dutch and the Allies. Those who were partly of
Indonesian origin could find a certain amount of protection if
they had not occupied any function in public services. 3
Because of technical reasons it took more than a year before
all Europeans could be removed from the Civil Service or private
enterprises. Many Dutch officials were retained provisionally
in service in order to initiate their Japanese successors. If,
however, the Japanese were faced with any difficulty, the
experts concerned were brought from the camps and temporarily
re-employed.
It seems that in the first months of the Japanese occupation
the Dutch community, especially in Java, was treated moder-
ately well. The Europeans even for some time maintained the
appearance of the continuation of the old life. 4 During this
period the civilian group, the leaders of which had been in the
1 Decree No.7, April II, 1942.
• 150 guilders for Europeans, 75 guilders for Chinese and other non-Indonesian
Asiatics.
• According to semi-official estimates, between 65 and 75 per cent of the total
242,000 (the figure of 1942) inhabitants of the Netherlands Indies who were classified
as Europeans before the war, belonged to the Indo-European group. Competent
judges, however, considered this estimate as too low and wanted to put it at 85 per
cent. About 5 per cent of the Indo-Europeans held posts commanding a high salary,
some 25 to 30 per cent were in medium grade jobs. See Charles Fisher, "The Eurasian
Question in Indonesia", in International Affairs, October I947, pp. 522, 524.
The difference in estimates may be due to a different basis: of 242,000 Europeans
about 14,000 belonged to a non-white race (7000 Japanese and 9000 legally assimila-
ted Indonesians). See Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies (1944), pp.7 ff.
This writer nevertheless estimates the percentage of the Indo-Europeans at 80. So
also De Ene. N.I., dl. VII, under "Indo-Europese Beweging". 4 per cent of the Euro-
peans below the age of 19 years were illiterate (Report Visman, dI. I., p. 66) and,
therefore, would have been entirely assimilated in the way ofliving ofthe Indonesians.
, This gives S. Sjahrir an occasion for strong comment (Out 01 Exile, p. 237). He,
however, seems to have ignored the factor of "not bowing one's will" of the Europeans
against the Japanese.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 169

Indies before the war and, therefore, knew the Dutch Govern-
ment, had some influence. As the Dutch were considered to be
good administrators, this group wanted to maintain the Dutch
element provisionally under Japanese supervision till the
different branches of the administration and economic enterprises
could be transferred to Japanese - and possibly Indonesian -
hands. A small part of the Dutch could be retained as advisers,
but the majority should be set aside by internment. In opposition
to this there was the military group, guided by high Japanese
Militarists. Although both groups were of the opinion that
the Dutch belonged to an inferior race and hence should be
removed from the society, the second group - the Military -
desired the immediate replacement of the Dutch by the Japanese,
which would, besides the elimination of the Westerners, result
in a greater contribution of Indonesia to the Japanese war
effort. Further, the disappearance of the Dutch would minimise
the chances of espionage and sabotage.
The internment of the Dutch was hastened with the appoint-
ment of ex-diplomat Hayashi, who was a member of the latter
group, as the Chief Adviser of the Gunseikanbu - the Central
Military Administration - at Batavia. After the loss of a ship-
full of Japanese economists, who had worked in the Indies before
the war, persons of military ranks who adhered to the ideas of
Hayashi - after the Japanese "governor-general" the most
powerful man in Java - were recruited. 1 Hayashi seems to have
held the view that the presence of the Dutch in the Japanese
administration and in the society of Java would, apart from the
possibility of obstruction to be caused by them, spoil the right
spirit of understanding between Japanese and Indonesians,
which might be essential for the effective prosecution of the war.
The Dutch were, therefore, discharged and interned, and re-
placed by Indonesians under Japanese supervision. The salaries
of the Dutch and other Europeans whose services were indis-
pensable were reduced, while for Indonesian employees a higher
wage scale was introduced. The Dutch women and children
were also put in concentration camps. The houses occupied by
the Dutch were handed over to the Indonesians as far as the
1 R. V.O. (referring to Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Amsterdam),
011231.
170 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Japanese did not require them for themselves. Further, the

supervision of the Dutch interned was more and more entrusted
to the Indonesians. All these decisions were also calculated
to develop a superiority-complex in the minds of the Indo-
nesians. 1 Thus, a programme which was drawn up with care
and a sense of reality, was being executed.
The accommodation in the concentration camps, primitive as
they often were, still awaited the opportunity of transportation
for the removal of war prisoners, 2 who were spread over a great
part of the Co-Prosperity Sphere from Burma to Manchukuo.
When the internment of the European group of population be-
came complete, there were in Java alone more than 70,000
persons, of which, according to Japanese statistics, 62,532 were
alive in 1945. Most of them were women and children (28,169
and 13,687 respectively). 3 If we add to this figure the prisoners
of war, then the conclusion appears to be that of 370,000 persons
who were listed in 1944 according to Dutch data and criteria
as Europeans, two-thirds, among whom almost all were Dutch
by birth, were imprisoned.
The purpose was, as we know, to exterminate the group of
population, European by birth. The Japanese did not conceal
their intention: they wanted to make the Europeans understand
that their civilising role had come to an end for ever. With
hateful sarcasm a spokesman of the new regime advised them
to emigrate to the Western world, even at the moment they
were being huddled into the concentration camps. 4
Even the imprisonment of almost the entire Dutch population
could hardly satisfy the Nipponese rulers. The radical change of
1 R.V.O., 011232. See also F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 373.

• According to the data furnished by the Dutch Red Cross, the following prisoners
of war were made by the Japanese: 65,000 men belonging to a subdivision of the
Dutch Indies or Dutch Royal Army, and 25,000 Allied troops. Of 65,000 Dutch
troops about 12,500 died in prison. According to different data found in Java at the
time of the capitulation: about 25,000 soldiers of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army,
40,000 "city guards", about 5,000 British soldiers, 4,500-6,000 R.A.F. personnel
that could not escape after the loss of the British air craft, about 3,000 Australians
and one battery of field artillery with Americans (it is said 500) - (From the data of
the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie).
3 Doc. No. 2750, p. 8. The total number of civilian internees for the whole of the

Archipelago is estimated at about 80,000, of which there were about 20,000 men,
35,000 women and 25,000 children (died about 8,000, 4,500 and 2,300 respectively) -
according to the information of the Dutch Red Cross.
• D. H. Meyer, Japan Wint den Oorlog, Documenten over Java (Maastricht 1946),
p.33.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 171

the society brought about by Japanese policy produced serious

dislocations. The appointment of so-called competent Indonesians
in important places under the supervision of often equally
incompetent Japanese officials, which also resulted in social
pressure upwards in the Indonesian society, 1 caused economic
confusion and serious corruption. Discontent began to show
itself in Java in 1943. In order to divert the attention of the
masses, the Dutch were now held responsible for the prevailing
disorder and deficiency, and "monstrous trials" were directed
against this "all-confusing" class. Indiscriminate arrests by the
Kempeitai followed with the most fantastic accusations, so
that the prisons soon got crowded. The instruments of torture
of the Ketnpeitai which worked incessantly did the rest. Con-
fessions were often extorted by inhuman tortures, as a result
of which many innocent Dutch and Indonesian sympathisers
were condemned to death. 2
Indeed, the new device had some success. The feeling of the
public once more turned against the "chaos-creating" Dutch.
This attitude, however, did not last long. The daily-growing
shortage of foodstuffs and the threatening starvation as a conse-
quence of misrule, as well as the withdrawal of many products
from the open market for the benefit of the occupation army,
were sharp weapons against the Japanese authorities them-
selves. They, therefore, looked for other means to mitigate the
economic distress. The interned Dutch were made the victims
for the second time and a new attractive solution, which suited
their plans, was found.
The Gunseikanbu and the Army decided in 1944 to reduce
considerably the quantity of food supplied to camps and prisons.
The rations were cut down in such a way that one might come
to the conclusion that the Japanese were executing a plan for
starving the prisoners and internees to death. 3 Everything was
economised. Small camps and prisons were closed, while the
1 See G. MeT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, (Cornell University
Press, New York, Ithaca 1952), p. 102.
2 Examples of these trials, of which the K empeitai itself did not believe in the

rightness of the charges and the confessions, are: the railway trial, the Magelang-
guerrilla trial, the planters' trial of Djember, the "brain-trust" trial of Semarang.
R. V.D., 011232-011233.
3 See David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London

1948), p. 4.
172 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

large ones were made overcrowded without any consideration

of the most elementary notions of hygiene. The percentage of
the sick, therefore, rose very rapidly, especially where there was
practically no medicine and clothes. The enervated victims had
still to be economically useful, for heavy manual labour was
often demanded of them. It is no wonder that the Japanese
rulers seemed satisfied when the number of the interned and
imprisoned Europeans was diminishing. 1
The Japanese at first seemed to have placed some hope on the
Eurasians who had close affinity with the Indonesians. Their
attitude towards this group of popUlation was explained in two
official declarations dated January 12, 1943 and September
19, 1943. 2 The Military Government did not consider the colla-
boration by this group impossible. One of the first Japanese
addresses to the people of Indonesia offered the Indo-Europeans
the immediate choice of either declaring themselves Indonesians
or sharing the fate of the Europeans. Otherwise, it was said,
they would be crushed like wood between the ship and the
quay. 3 Indeed, a committee of Indo-Europeans that aimed at
creating goodwill for Japan was instituted at Batavia. 4
The Japanese rulers, however, had little success in spite of
their threats and temptations, and at a later stage the Indo-
Europeans were subjected to severe measures which depended
on their blood-relationship with Europe. After compulsory
registration had been introduced, the Indo-Europeans, according
to their descent, were classified into eight categories in proportion
to the percentage of the presence of European blood. 5 A large
number of them finally shared the fate of those European-born
and almost 10 per cent of the population of the mixed race, it
is said, died in Japanese or later Indonesian internment, though
this figure is difficult to verify.
The attitude of the occupiers towards the other non-natives,
the Chinese, Indians and Arabs, was different from that which
was foreseen in the plans. One of the main tasks of the Kempeitai
1 R.V.O., 011233.
• A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 69. Osamu Kanpo (J) No.2, p. 8 and Osamu Kanpo (M)
No. 27, pp. 12-13.
• W. H. J. Elias, op. cit., p. 107. A remarkable word, seen in the light of later
events.
• W. H. J. Elias, op. cit., p. 107.
• ibid., p. 108.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 173

was to eliminate all elements loyal to the Chiang Kai-shek

regime. But other Chinese were also interned or taken to the
Kempeitai prisons, some because of assisting the Europeans,
others because of disobedience to the occupation regulations.
Still others were extirpated because of suspicion of communist
ideas. According to the plan prepared at Tokyo, a large part of
the Chinese population should have been expelled, but it never
happened. The other foreign Easterners were not disturbed
owing to their descent. "Islam" and "Liberation from the
yoke of the infidels" were propaganda slogans which were dear
to the political plan-makers in Tokyo. For this reason, discrimi-
nation against the Arabs would have fitted very badly in their
plan of action.
As the internment of the European group of population would
have to end with their complete elimination, the Japanese rulers
immediately put an end to the old social status enjoyed by
them. They were deprived of their special position in the judicial
branch of the administration, in civil affairs, and their right of
bringing criminal cases before· the Superior Courts of Justice.
Their properties were placed under the control of T ekisan Kanribu
(Enemy Property Administration Bureau). Payment of pensions
was discontinued. Their bank accounts were blocked. House
rents were reduced to half. Their income tax and property
taxes were greatly increased. 1 Cars were requisitioned. The
European schools were closed down. Dutch was no longer per-
mitted to be used in correspondence. 2 The censorship established
by the Japanese allowed only Japanese and Indonesian to be
written languages. The postal and telegraphic service followed
this example and prohibited the use of Dutch and English in
telephonic communication. 3 It was even forbidden to preach
in Dutch. The Total War Research Institute had indeed pre-
scribed that the use of Western languages should be at once
banished from the Southern Sea Areas. The possession of books
in Western languages also constituted a punishable offence,
but the Japanese did not seem to have sufficient time like Sultan
Agung of the 17th century to wipe out the knowledge of the

1 These measures had also economic-political significance as we shall see later.

a W. H. J. Elias, op. cit., pp. 46-54.
3 Kan Po, November 6, 1942.
174 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

past. Had the Japanese not left intact the libraries and archives,
their "campaign of forgetfulness" would have been a counterpart
of Sultan Agung's against the pre-Islamic tradition. 1
The immediate elimination of the Europeans from the life
of the Archipelago was meant to be a symbol of the new era
which Indonesia would experience, according to Japanese plans.
With the Europeans would disappear all the Western influence
and would also be cut off the thousand-fold connections which the
old Netherlands Indies had with the economy of the world
dominated so long by the West. To symbolise this all "colonial"
monuments were removed. 2 The statues of Coen, Van Heutz
and even the Lion of Waterloo disappeared from the public
squares.
The elimination of Western influence was accompanied by a
policy of J apanisation. As we have already seen, the experts
of the Total War Research Institute laid great emphasis on
japan's cultural hegemony in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. This
policy took shape almost immediately after the arrival of the
Japanese troops in Java. Kigenreki, the Japanese calendar,
replaced the Western one. So, 1942 became 2602. The Land of
the Rising Sun should henceforth be called Nippon or Dai
Nippon. The use of foreign names such as Japan was strongly
forbidden. 3 Dutch names of places, streets and squares, whether
they reminded the people of historical persons and facts or not,
were changed into Japanese and Indonesian. Java was thus
renamed Djawa and Batavia, Djakarta. Harmonieplein and
Oranje Boulevard respectively became Yamato Basi and Syoowa
Doori. Names of commercial concerns, trademarks, shops and
even hotels were changed into Japanese; Hotel des Indes, for
instance, came to be called Miyako Hotent. 4 The use of Japanese
words was also introduced for the designation of official services,
offices, their chiefs, etc. This use of Japanese words gradually
gained such prevalence that it was scarcely possible to read a
1 B. H. M. Vlekke, Geschiedenis van den Indischen Archipel (J. J. Romen & Zonell,
Roermond-Maaseik 1947), pp. 130-131.
• According to a Dutch view, it was necessary "because the presence of everything
Dutch reminded the Indonesian in many respects of the happy old order" (G.W.
Overdijkink, Het Indonesische Probleem, De Feiten, Martinus Nijhoff, 's-Gravenhage
1946, p. 23).
• Decree No. 15, April 29, 1942. See also A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 74.
• A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 74.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 175

Malay newspaper without some knowledge of the Japanese

language. Even the Japanese solar time was introduced, so that
the sun was no longer rose at 6 o'clock but only at half past seven
in the morning. 1
All public gatherings and meetings were commenced with the
obligatory bow in the direction of Tokyo. All Japanese days of
celebration, such as the Emperor's birthday (Tentyoosetu, April
29), Meiji day (Meijisetu, November 3), the Empire's birthday
(Kigensetu, February 11), were declared to be days of public
rejoicings. The display of any flag other than the Japanese one
was forbidden. 2 On the above-mentioned days of celebration
the Japanese flag had to be flown on all official and private
buildings. For private individuals, exact rules regarding the
measurement of the Japanese flag and the way it was to be
displayed were prescribed. 3 New days of celebration were also
introduced: the remembrance day of the outbreak of the Great
Asiatic War (December 8); the remembrance of the fall of the
Netherlands Indies authority (March 9).4
This policy of J apanisation went hand in hand with a de-
termined effort to promote the spread of the Japanese language.
"Their aim", says Elsbree, "was to make Japanese the lingua
franca of Asia and they regarded the language program as the
necessary first step in their plan to bring the blessings of Japanese
civilization to the less advanced peoples of Asia." 5 Schools
which exclusively provided the teaching of the Japanese language
appeared throughout the Archipelago. In the schools reopened
under Japanese supervision, Indonesian was no doubt the
standard language of instruction, but Japanese was made a
compulsory subject. The singing of Japanese songs and games
in the Japanese language were prescribed everywhere. In private
correspondence also, Japanese, besides Malay, was to be en-
couraged. In short, Japanese was to be considered superior to
any other language. The attention was indeed fixed in all respects
on the excellence of the Japanese, their Emperor, the Japanese
institutions and ideologies.
1 Decree No.6, March 27,1942; Doc. No. 2750, p. 16; A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 74.
2 At a later stage the display of the Indonesian flag was allowed.
• Decree No. II, April 29, 1942; Decree No.8, April 11, 1942.
• A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 74; Doc. No. 2750, p. 17.
• W. H. Elsbree, op. cit., p. 121.
176 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

"So thoroughly impregnated with the principle of Hakko Ichiu

was the whole Japanese dream of conquest that they poured
almost equal energy into moulding the Indonesians in the image
of the Japanese 'gods'." 1 The Japanese attempts at cultural
indoctrination of the Indonesian people, therefore, greatly
exceeded wartime utilitarian considerations. Their ultimate
objective appeared to have been to absorb the people of the
Archipelago into a completely Japanese-orientated East Asiatic
community.
To realize their dream the Nipponese rulers seemed to have
depended much on propaganda, the importance of which can
be estimated from the fact that a separate Department of
Propaganda (Sendenbu) was created. With the prohibition of
Dutch and the introduction of censorship, "all Dutch language
papers were closed and their printing plants taken over by the
Japanese. All semblance of a free press completely vanished." 2
The whole press was then reorganised on the basis of the Japanese
propaganda system, which permitted some Malay papers to be
published under the editorship of Japanese or mixed J apanese-
Indonesians with the main purpose of educating the Indonesian
people to the ideology of Great East Asia. Through the Djawa
Shinbun Kai (a semi-official body), the Hodohan (theciviladminis-
trative body) and the Kenetsu Han (the military administrative
body), the whole Indonesian press was socio-economically "sup-
ported", while the trend of the news was controlled by the occu-
pation administration. 3 Domei, the Japanese news agency, replaced
Aneta, the Dutch counterpart. Among the Malay papers, Asia
Raya (Greater Asia) was the most prominent. Semi-official
Japanese newspapers, such as Djawa Shimbun, were also
published from Batavia. " Anxious to reach the largest possible
number of people in their propaganda campaign, the Japanese
made use also of radios, loudspeakers, Japanese films and,
somewhat later, theatrical performances.
The re-education of the Indonesian people, however, had to

1 V. Thompson, "Japan's Blueprint for Indonesia", The Far Eastern Quarterly,

Vol V., 1945-1946, p. 201.
• M. Lubis, "The Press in Indonesia", Far Eastern Survey, June 4, 1952, p.92.
• R. Abdulgani, "The National Press and its Social Function", Indonesian Affairs,
Vol. II, No.4, August·September 1952, p. 26.
• Doc. No. 2750, p. IS, A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 100.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 177

find its completion naturally in a reform of the educational

system, since "the Japanese were much impressed with the
potentialities of education as a means of achieving their goal." 1
"The most profound of all means available to propaganda",
writes a member of the Military Administration of Singapore,
"is education. This can be shaped and altered at will to suit the
policy to be propagandised. From early childhood the child's
mind can be made to assimilate teachings which are conducive
to the creation of a feeling of loyalty and to the awakening of a
national consciousness." 2 The reformed education, therefore,
aimed at spreading the new ideology especially among the new
generation on the basis of which a stable foundation could be
laid for the future. The new educational policy had already been
determined in broad outlines at the beginning of 1942 in Tokyo. 3
With Japanese becoming the lingua franca of the Greater Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Land of the Mikado would be the only
scientific centre for that part of the world. The results of Western
science could become known in the associated territories only
through Japan. This promised little benefit for the natives'
knowledge of science in these areas, but the curtailment of
intellectual growth meant a serious blow to the new rulers.
This was particularly evident in Indonesia, where the lectures in
the Indies Medical School were resumed after one year and that
at a lower scientific level, while at the same time the Dutch
Indies Law School was reopened, in which the students in one
year's time were imparted the principles of law, enriched with
instructions in Japanese and Japanese culture, after which they
were considered eligible for acting as judges and public prose-
cutors.4 University education was indeed made possible for a
very small number of Indonesians, but only in Japan. 5
1 w. H. Elsbree, op. cit., p. 102.
2 From an article by T. Fujimori of the Propaganda Department in the Shonan
Shimbun, September 5, 1942. Quoted in W. H. Elsbree, op. cit., p. 103.
3 See the Plan of the Total War Research Institute of February 18, 1942: Hoover

Doc. No. 1621C; Summary in Timetable No. 128, referring to Far East Mil. Trib.,
Exh. No. 1335.
• R.O. Kartodirdjo, "De Rechtspraak op Java en Madoera tijdens de Japansche
Bezetting 1942-1945," op. cit., p. 17.
• In the beginning of 1943 twenty students were sent to Japan (D.H. Meyer, op.
cit., p. 43). Numbers of Atjenese got the same chance (A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., pp. 211,
226, 272). Other parts of the Archipelago also were undoubtedly given the same
chance. Students of Sumatra for medical science were not sent to Batavia, but to
Singapore, on the basis of the new political division. According to Foreign Students
178 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

So, the occupants did not care for a thorough scientific training
for their Indonesian friends. They, however, energetically pursued
the aim of increasing the number of semi-intellectuals, who were
most pliable for political indoctrination: cut off from their an-
cestral tradition and not capable of critical judgement, they
could be made fanatics for the few ideas which they had made
their own and which were their only authority for the role of
leadership pretended by them over the masses. What they had
learnt could be of use to them only in the Japanese order. These
kinds of intellectual forerunners were trained by the Japanese
in a two-fold way: more thoroughly in "Training Schools for the
youth of Great East Asia", of which one had been established in
Batavia in August 1942 and another at Singapore for Sumatra
and the Malaya Peninsula, and in short term courses: training
for government officials in three months, competence for teaching
Japanese in three months, competence for teaching Indonesian
in two months, and, besides the knowledge of many other
subjects that could be acquired in record time, such as compe-
tence for teaching in art and cultivating silkworms in one month. 1
The Training Schools for the youth of Great East Asia had to
provide "political fighters", who received training in physical
exercises, hygiene, methodology of propaganda and Japanese
orientated history and economics. In these schools the young
people were made extremist leaders, who, as later events showed,
could become equally dangerous for Japan as for the hated
Western powers with the adverse circumstances of the war. 2
The reform of the existing schools 3 was also immediately taken
up, but here the task was not so simple. As happened in other
occupied areas, all schools were initially closed. Besides the
in Japan, I896-I947 (United States Government publication. Special report prepared
by Education Research Branch, Research Unit, 1948, Dept. of State), p. 22, Table 4,
the number of Indonesian students who came to Japan during the war was as follows:
Java: 44; Sumatra: 16; Celebes: 11; Borneo: 9; Ceram: 3. See W. H. Elsbree, op. cit.,
p.106.
1 A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 270. In other areas certainly the same system was
followed.
• About the school in Batavia see G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 25 and D. H.
Meyer, op. cit., p. 43.
Meyer mentions the names of Indonesian teachers in that school: S. Mangunwirono,
M. Mochadi, H. P. L. Tobing, Dr. Raden Mochtar, Dr. Abu Hanifah, Dr. R. M.
Slamet Sudibyo, R. Samsusin, R. Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, Ir. Kastan and Moh.
Tohir.
• See A. A. Zorab. op. cit., pp. 101-103.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 179

schools of the Western type, the Chinese ones were also affected.
The former ones were paralysed by the internment of European
teachers, and the Chinese teachers certainly needed time to
reflect on what could still be said in the class and what was
not. The resumption of teaching 1 was permitted only in
Indonesian schools "with their textbooks and curricula reshaped
to inculcate anti-Western, pro-Japanese, and pan-Asiatic
doctrines." 2 In the reopened schools there was a dearth of
qualified and experienced teachers, because the Indonesians
with pre-war teachers' training could get better pay and more
influential positions during the occupation than they had had
in the past. In the Revolution of 1945 they played a great role
as officers of the new army and as higher government officials.
The teachers trained hurriedly by the Japanese lacked the expert
knowledge of their pre-war colleagues, but surpassed them with-
out any doubt in enthusiasm for physical exercises, militarism
and hero-worship, and for this reason alone the national schools
got a marked political-military character. It is difficult, however,
to trace what remained under the circumstances in 1945 of this
education for the Indonesians.
Outside Java the situation became still worse, because of the
dislike of the teachers born in Java to continue to work in a
surrounding where local or regional chauvinism made life at
least very difficult for them, if not threatened. 3 The adverse
situation of the war for the Japanese rulers, however, made
possible again many things that had been forbidden earlier,
and the Chinese, for instance, obtained limited freedom of
education.
Thus, the standard of the national schools under Japanese
supervision was bound to fall, while their direction changed.
It is true that a part of the book knowledge existing during the
Dutch rule and after the example of the schools in the mother
country in the more western styled schools disappeared. But
what did come in its place? What would be the standard of the
secondary high schools and who would be the teachers? We know
a curriculum for a secondary high school, from which again it

1 Decree No. 12, April 29, 1942.

• F. c. Jones, op. cit., p. 372.
• A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 271.
180 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

appears how education in the occupied areas was designed to

serve the Japanese policy: Five groups of subjects were intro-
duced - sixteen hours per week, which amounted to 40 per cent
of the available time, were devoted to the first group, that of
Civics, which included, inter alia, Japanese, Malay, geography
and history, especially the history of the origin of the Japanese
Empire; ten hours per week were allotted to the second group -
natural sciences; to the group of fine arts (drawing, music and
handicraft) and that of physical training and military ethics,
three hours and six hours were assigned respectively; the last
group got four hours in practical subjects, such as techni-
cal instruction and commercial knowledge. 1 Whether this
programme was ever implemented appears to be vague.
The Military Government nominally entrusted the control of
education to Indonesian hands. In Java, after some hesitation
from the Japanese side but on the insistence of Mansur, the former
Director of Education, Prof. Hussain Djajadiningrat was invited. 2
He had, however, little power or influence. Only on request he
could act as adviser to the Japanese who ruled in fact.
Seen through Indonesian eyes, the Japanese policy, though
aimed at the J apanisation of the Archipelago, led to certain
positive results. The Indonesian language, which was already
making progress before the invasion under the influence of the
rise of the nationalist movement,3 received a tremendous
impetus during the Japanese occupation. Since Japanese was
little known in the Archipelago, Indonesian, in effect, became
the only practicable means of communication. As a consequence
its development took place very rapidly, "assisted by its ab-
sorption of words and phrases from the various regional dialects
and its acquisition to some degree of a modern terminology
drawn from foreign languages." 4 The Language Commission 5,
1 A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 271.
2 The Japanese objections against H. Djajadiningrat were raised even from the
time before the occupation owing to his well-known anti-Japanese feelings and close
connections with the Dutch. His brother, Lockman Djajadiningrat had been with
Dr. van Mook in Australia and America. Sumatra had no Dept. of Education of her
own but was placed under that of Singapore (A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 252).
3 T. Alisjahbana, "The Indonesian Language: By-product of Nationalism",
Pacific Affairs, December 1949, pp. 388-389.
• F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 373. See also T. Alisjahbana, op. cit., pp. 389-390.
• A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 75; w. H. Elsbree, op. cit., pp. 122-123. Kan Po No.9,
December 1942.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 181

which was set up by the Japanese with a view to purify the

Indonesian language particularly from the use offoreign technical
terms, published from time to time in the Japanese official
organ, Kan Po, lists of Indonesian words translated from the
Dutch. Such commissions were also established in other occu-
pation zones. Besides, some Japanese books were translated
into Indonesian. Further, "unlike the Dutch system which
contained a great variety of schools, public and private, the
new one was comprised of standardized national schools for
which tuition was free and with a uniform curriculum." 1 The
introduction of only one system had some leveling influence,
since it compelled most of the formerly well-to-do Indonesians
to send their children to the national schools. 2
In pursuance of their policy of re-educating the people of the
Archipelago to the Great East Asia idea, the Japanese also
made extensive use of Keimin Bunka Sidoosyo, a cultural corpo-
ration, which was founded in Batavia in April 1943. 3 Any
artist who wanted to make public any creation of art had to
be a member of this corporation. "Paintings and other artistic
expressions were adjudged, not on their artistic value, but
solely on their merits in relation to the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere". 4 It, however, emphasised the importance
of a truly Oriental artistic expression. Along with it, exhibitions
of native arts of "New Java" were organised. It is not unlikely,
therefore, that the Japanese policy produced important effects
in stimulating some consciousness of unity among the Indonesian
people, which the Japanese rulers could hardly foresee.
Another striking feature of the Japanese policy was the
attempt to integrate the diverse Christian communities of
Indonesia. Their plans for the spiritual synthesis of Great East
Asia had reached further than the equalisation of the educational
system. Religious ties with the West would not be tolerated
like the political or economic in the long run. The leaders of the
new Japanese realm could not start fighting openly against
Christianity. Gradually, however, the Christian churches would

1 w. H. Elsbree, op. cit., p. 130.

• See ibid., p. 13l.
• A. A. Zorab, op. cit., pp. 98, 103.
, Doc. No. 2750, p. 50.
182 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

be eliminated from the East. 1 The internment of European

missionaries and the pastors and priests working among the
European congregations and parishes immediately after the
occupation of Indonesia pointed in this direction. For as far as
the native pastors and priests could not take upon themselves
the care of Indonesian Christians, the latter had to remain
without any spiritual assistance. From the very beginning the
native christians were under suspicion of pro-Allied sentiments,
and not unjustly, because throughout the Archipelago the
Amboinese officials and ex-soldiers, for instance, were involved
in every underground movement. More than one hundred pastors
in the Great East became the victims of the Japanese oppression.
The missionary schools, of course, remained closed like all other
schools with Western character. The diversity of the Protestant
churches could not be understood by the occupants and, there-
fore, they ordered a federation of the churches, which they wanted
to be conducted by Japanese clergymen. This did not succeed
and hence, the animosity towards the native christians increased. 2
Japanese priests and pastors seemed to be transferred from the
mother country only in exceptional circumstances. 3

C. ECONOMIC REORGANISATION

One of the most remarkable features of the Japanese occu-

pation policy in Indonesia was their attempt at economIC
reorganisation of the Archipelago, since its pre-war economic
structure did not fit in with their conception of an autarchic
Great East Asia.
Indonesia had been primarily a producer of raw materials for
Western Europe and America. During the Dutch rule she could
compete in the world market with other similar economic areas
in South East Asia: with the tin and rubber producers of the
Malaya peninSUla, with the sugar manufacturers of the
1 See the Plan of February 18, 1942 as well as the article of Hashimoto in Taiyo
Dai Nippon, January 5, 1942 already quoted.
• M. de Niet Gz., Zending, Indonesie en Nederland (Uitgave van het Nederlands
Jongelings Verbond, Singel 58, Amsterdam-Centrum 1946), pp. 16-19. The writer,
however, mentions also that Japanese pastors had defended the Indonesian church
in Minahassa.
• That after one year of occupation the performance of the Christian Service was
no longer permitted (W. H. J. Elias, op. cit., p. 113) is absolutely wrong.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 183

Philippines and British India, and with the tea and tobacco
planters of India, Ceylon and America. She had virtually a
monopoly in quinine. In the production of oil she had practically
no competitor in East Asia. During the World Economic Crisis
a limitation in the output was thought to be necessary, which
was arrived at by mutual consultation between the Netherlands
Indies and other producers of these materials. This agreement,
however, was reached wholly in consonance with the economic
relations with the Western world. The West organised the
production of raw materials and protected to a certain extent
the exports of the Western countries to the Indies, when they
were threatened after 1931 by the Japanese competition, con-
sidered to be unfair. The West also stimulated the food pro-
duction in certain areas, in so far as it appeared impossible for
the various parts of South East Asia to provide for their own
food. Burma, Siam and Indo-China used to supply to the ad-
jacent peninsula and the islands which were somewhat deficit
in the production of rice.
So, the Japanese had to reorientate the economy of the
Southern Sea Areas entirely in a new way, and for this purpose
they had drafted, as we have already discussed 1, plans which
were presented by a Cabinet Commission (Sixth Committee)
on December 12, 1941 and discussed, four days later, in the
Cabinet session. As to the purpose of the economic policy, the
acquisition of resources for the prosecution of the war was given
first priority, and the autarchy of the Co-Prosperity Sphere
came second. It was clearly stated in these plans that the
economy of the various territories would be directly transformed
to achieve the first objective, and every region of the Co-Prospe-
rity Sphere would be made self-sufficient, especially in food, as
much as possible.
Since the Military leaders, who were in possession of these
areas, completely failed in tackling the second aspect of their
undertaking, the implementation of the economic plans was
rudely disturbed. Even if the war had ended in a complete
victory for Japan within a short time, the reorientation of

1 See Chapter VI (Part I): Hoover Doc. No. 1492: "Outline of the Economic
Counter-Plans for the Southern Area", December 12, 1941; Summary in Timetable
No. 124, referring to Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1332.
184 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

South East Asiatic economy would have been a heavy task, which
would have inevitably caused confusion and misery in a number
of regions, even apart from the selfish Japanese intentions. As
it actually happened, much of the old was broken down and
little of the new was built up, and even that little, which lacked
any basis, disappeared in 1945. Chaos was the natural result. 1
The Japanese Empire to be founded would have comprised
most of the areas for the production of cinchona, rubber and tin
which, before 1940, satisfied a greater part of the needs of the
whole world in these materials. As a result of the occupation
of Sumatra and Borneo, that empire would be in sole possession
of the important oil fields that were being exploited in East
Asia. She would, however, have too little cotton and minerals
except tin and oil. It might have been difficult to produce within
the borders of that empire the foodstuffs necessary for her
700,000,000 inhabitants.
With the existing means of production the empire would
have produced more sugar than could be consumed, unless the
standard of living was to be raised in the different parts, which
was certainly not the intention of the Japanese for the first few
decades. The same was true in the case of the production of tea
and coffee. In other cases perhaps the capacity of production
was not too high, but the location of the production centres did
not harmonise with the Japanese plans. And because the empire
would keep out foreign economic activity as much as possible,
an enormous shortage of shipping space would be expected even
in time of peace.
Therefore, the integration of the East Asiatic countries
raised a number of problems. The Japanese could make it easier
for themselves than the planners of the European integration
of to-day, because nothing prevented them from restricting the
sovereignty of the Asiatic vassal states as they liked, and placing
the interest of Japan in the integration above everything else,
even if this brought misery for millions of co-Asiatics. On the
other hand, for the sake of the stability of the new empire,
attention had to be given to offset the possible detrimental
effects of the integration measures, lest misery and disappoint-
• Therefore, economically, according to this view, a chaotic situation would have
followed on a Japanese defeat, apart from the intentions of the Japanese in 1944-1945.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 185

ment should one day develop into a breeding ground for anti-
Japanese resistance.
The problems of co-ordination of the territories of the Co-
Prosperity Sphere, however, made it necessary to set up a new
government department at Tokyo - the Greater East Asia
Ministry on November 1, 1942. The exploitation of the occupied
areas made heavy demands upon the resources of the big Japanese
concerns, which were in need of help from the state treasury.
But this was not achieved without involving in a bitter conflict
the different groups in power - the supporters of a military
totalitarianism, the Zaibatsu, and the more conservative and
prudent personalities in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
others. Premier Tojo incessantly insisted on the merging of
smaller enterprises with bigger ones, which certainly complied
with the wishes of the Zaibatsu but which made them, in their
opinion, too dependent on the official financing institutions. 1
Tojo, who evidently felt the urgent need for total mobilisation
of the Japanese powers of production, wanted to institute from
the beginning a national distribution of labour and raw materials.
For this reason he also desired to have direct control over a
number of ministries, which should be formally made subordinate
to the Premiership. Three sessions of the Parliament appeared
to be necessary to push through the laws concerned. All this,
together with the continued defective manner in which the
economic mobilisation worked, proved that the co-operation
between the radical military clique and the financiers was not
very heartfelt. Even after six months, Tojo had made no use
of the special powers conferred on him. 2 This internal conflict
seemed to be a serious obstacle in the way of the execution of the
integration plans.
Unfortunately for the Japanese planners, the prosecution of
the war further disturbed them in their undertaking which was
already so hazardous. The greater part of the shipping space of
about 5! million tons which was available in 1942 3 had to be
1 T. A. Bisson, in japan's War Economy mentions (p. 79) the National Financial
Control Association, which was supposed to have been instituted at the desire of the
Zaibatsu. He further speaks of "a bitter struggle" in the Parliament and of strong
opposition to Tojo's dictatorship (p. 97). This resistance could not have taken place
under the then Japanese relations without powerful support by the Zaibatsu.
• T. A. Bisson, op. cit., pp. 77-102. See also F. C. Jones, op. cit., pp. 334-337.
• See J. B. Cohen, op. cit., p. 267.
186 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

placed in the service of troops and transport of supply, and even

this had begun to diminish at a rapid pace from the beginning of
1943. Practically nothing was left for the transport of goods
between the islands, Burma, Indo-China and Japan. Shipbuilding
therefore, obtained priority in the preference list of the Militarists
for the East Asiatic industry 1.
The problem of fuel supply for airplanes and ships was equally
important as that of transport. The result for Indonesia was
that the exploitation of the oil fields had to be resumed as early
as possible. The Japanese Army Command had tried its utmost
to prevent the destruction of the oil installations in Borneo and
Sumatra, but they had evidently prepared themselves, assuming
that this destruction would take place. In a short time, therefore,
several oil fields and refineries were restored to action 2.
The transport problem inexorably demanded that no ships
should remain at the disposal of the transport of foodstuffs and
other goods, except possibly small vessels with a capacity of a
maximum of 500 tons 3. And even these small ships were required
for the transport of troops, if they were motorised. In Indonesia
Japanese companies were established with government subsidies,
which would start building wooden ships of 100 to 500 tons, and
also factories for the construction of engines for ships. The plan
did not go far enough, although tens of millions of guilders were
spent. 4 "Shipbuilding, on which the Japanese concentrated their
greatest efforts and for which vast areas of Indonesia's forests
were sacrificed", observes a writer, "achieved little more than a
few coastal vessels, even according to Japanese claims. Their
inability to build engines locally derived from the same shortages
- those of machinery and of skilled and co-operative labour." 5
Therefore, first by policy and then by necessity, the Japanese

1 See Hoover Doc. No. 1492, op. cit.

• It is interesting to note that the rapid restoration of some of the oil fields was
made possible by the fact that Japan, according to the Board of Economic Warfare
(U.S.), imported substantial amounts of oil-field equipment from the United States
in the three years prior to Pearl Harbour - New York Herald Tribune, Agust 9, 1942;
Japan had "floating refineries ready for immediate exploitation of the oil fields they
planned to seize" - The Chicago Daily News, July 13, 1942.
• See Hoover Doc. No. 1492, op. cit.,
• H. J. Manschot, "Het Geld-, Bank- en Credietwezen in Nederlandsch-Indie in
de Bezettingsjaren 1942-1945" in Economisch-Statistische Berichten, March 27, 1946.
• Virginia Thompson, "Japan's Blueprint for Indonesia" in The Far Eastern
Quarterly, Vol. 5,1945-1946, p. 204.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 187

had to concentrate on the self-sufficiency of each region. "In

Japanese eyes this had the double advantage of cutting out
imports from Japan and from other islands - all of which saved
shipping space - and of making each area economically better
able to sustain a possible Allied attack." 1 The rice production
had to be increased. Land for the cultivation of rice could be
found in those enterprises which produced non-essential crops
for Japan, or those which would be "surplus" if the integration
plan was carried out. In Indonesia a major part of the tobacco
enterprises in Sumatra, and also the rubber and tea plantations
were considered to be available for this. Most of the fields leased
for sugar plant production could also be returned to the native
farmers. The war effort demanded, on the contrary, that cinchona
plantations should be retained entirely. While the palm oil
production was reduced to a fraction of the pre-war level, new
oil-producing crops to satisfy the need for lubricating oil were
introduced 2. The production of tin could be restricted, that of
nickel, copper, etc. should be stimulated, and a thorough in-
vestigation of the possibility of making available other minerals
necessary for the conduct of the war led finally to new enter-
prises. 3 According to the integration plan, the production of
silk and cotton, which Japan needed for her textile industries,
should be started in Indonesia. 4 She succeeded, however, only on
a small scale. The war did not offer time for long-lasting experi-
ments.
Very little of the integration plans was thus realised. After
more than a year the shipping space had already become the
most pressing problem. The Americans had landed on August 7,
1942 in Guadalcanal, which served as an anvil on which the
Japanese resistance was smashed to pieces during the battle.
The enormous losses suffered by Japan there abundantly de-
monstrated that she needed every sea-worthy ship for the
continuation of the struggle. The ever-increasing powerful
American submarine attacks threatened the line of communi-
cation between Japan and the Southern Areas. For this reason
1 ibid., p. 202.
• Especially Djarak. See P. M. Prillwitz, "De Ondernemingslandbouw tijdens de
J apansche Bezetting" in Economisch Weekblad voor N ederlandsch-[ ndie, March 2, 1946.
• See Hoover Doc. Nos. 1492 and 1621C, op. cit.
• Doc. No. 2750, p. 71.
188 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

also, economical use of the available shipping space was felt

to be necessary.
With this background of general events, the Japanese economic
policy in occupied Indonesia becomes clear. Shortly after the
establishment of the Military Government all enterprises were
placed under the supervision of Japanese offices (in this case
all existing central bureaux were brought under Japanese
control). By Decree No. 22 of July 5,1942 an institution for the
management of agricultural enterprises was set up. 1 Government
enterprises and private estates were supervised by separate
institutions. Private estates, especially in the region of Batavia
and Buitenzorg, were appropriated without the payment of any
compensation to the owners. This was effected by Decree No. 17
of June 1, 1942. The sugar enterprises were not included in this,
for they could be easily controlled through existing authorities.
Also smaller undertakings (rubber plantations of 25 ha. or less,
coffee plantations with a yearly output of 200 quintals or less, tea
enterprises of 50 ha. or smaller) were exempted in order to set
free the production of the popUlation and that of non-Europeans. 2
The Decree of July 5, 1942 provided for "the maintenance of
important culture enterprises" and "the protection of the welfare
of the people." The term "important" left complete freedom of
action to the Japanese as it was only the occupants who would
decide which cultures were important at a certain moment. The
monopoly of buying and selling the products of these agricultural
enterprises was given to the S.K.K.K. (the Agricultural In-
dustrial Control Board). It soon appeared that the stocks
available on March 8, 1942, either in Dutch or Allied possession,
were considered to be war booty. 3 Specially strict measures were
taken for the cinchona enterprises,4 which were obliged to
1 Saibai Kigyo Kanri Kodan. Text of this Decree is given in Economisck Week-
blad voor Nederlandsch-Indie, July 6, 1946.
• P. M. Prillwitz, "De Ondernemingslandbouw tijdens de Japansche Bezetting",
op. cit.
a Such war-booty was then shipped by the Japanese for the supplies of the mother
country and the Army, or for sale elsewhere, by which huge quantities were lost or
administratively "gotlost". After the invasion, among others, 15,000 packages of tobac-
co were removed from Deli to Singapore, a part of which was spoiled by rains in
Singapore and the rest found scattered over the whole of East Asia after the capitu-
lation ("De tabakscultuur in Deli gedurende de bezettingsjaren 1942-1945" in
Economiscke Voorlichting, August 27, 1948, according to Economisch Weekblad voor
Indonesie).
• Chapter II of Decree No. 22, July 5, 1942.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 189

supply the quantity of cinchona determined by the government.

For rubber an exactly opposite regulation was applied 1, as the
tapping of the trees was forbidden without the instruction of the
Military Administration.
The tea culture was paralysed in the same way. The plantation
of tobacco in Deli was retained for a long time under the control
of a Japanese concern, for this could be a good source for earning
foreign exchange. Here the harvests of 1942 and 1943 were
collected with success. The production of 1943 which amounted
to 40,000 bales, surpassed that of 1942. 2 After 1943, however, the
Japanese changed their policy, and the whole cultivation area
of 250,000 ha. was parcelled out amongst the population. Finally,
as the S.K.K.K. strictly kept in its own hands the financing of all
enterprises, it had consequently the means to stimulate or stop
any enterprise at any moment.
The yield of 1943 shows how effective the measures of the
occupants had been. More than 15,000 tons of cinchona were
produced, which was certainly high compared with the average
of 1937-1940. In Java the rubber production reached only one-
fifth of the level of 1941 ; in Sumatra it was even less. Of a total
of 220 tea factories 170 were put out of action. The output was
reduced to one-third of the pre-war level, and as a special drastic
measure it was ordered to cut down the tea cultivation area
from 105,000 ha. to 35,000. 3
The sugar enterprises had remained outside the jurisdiction
of the S.K.K.K., since the state of affairs in this undertaking and
its great importance to the native population of East and Central
Java had demanded immediate provision. The harvest was in the
field, and on the processing of that crop depended not only the
fate of the Western-directed enterprises, but also that of the
great mass of the Javanese, who earned their livelihood by
working in the factories and letting out their land. 4 The pro-
duction of that crop was estimated at 1,350,000 tons in the case
1 Chapter IV of Decree No. 22, July 5, 1942.
• See "De tabakscultuur in Deli gedurende de bezettingsjaren 1942-1945" in
Economische Voorlichting, August 27, 1948.
• See the earlier-mentioned article of P. M. Prillwitz, and also J. H. Voigt, "Aan-
teekeningen betreffende de Thee-ondernemingen op Java gedurende de Japansche
Bezetting", in Economisch Weekblad voor Ned.-Indie, August 24, 1946.
• G. Rodenburg, "De Suikerindustrie op Java tijdens de Japansche bezetting (I),
(II)", in Economisch Weekblad voor Ned.-Indie, April 13 and 20, 1946.
190 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

of complete processing, while for the following year a new

plantation was prepared, which would yield about 1,500,000
tons.
In the beginning the Japanese authorities appeared to be
willing to .favour the proposals of the enterprisers. The harvest
of 1942 could be entirely processed, which yielded 1,311,235 tons,
but their promise for a similar production in 1943 was annulled
by the highest authority. Such a big output by the industry in
Java did not correspond with the scheme of "integration", in
which Japan herself (including Formosa) wanted to be the
principal sugar producer. 1 On June 1, 1942 the sugar industry
was brought under the control of a Japanese bureau (Togyo
Rengo Kai) , in expectation of a regulation, which would definitely
place the industry into Japanese hands. Until all this could be
achieved, European administrators in the various industries
were maintained. After the transfer of property had taken place
and their Japanese successors had been initiated, these Europeans
were also interned. This was done in the sugar enterprises in
August 1943 and the following months, in others, sometimes
only in 1944. Meanwhile, the Japanese control had been reorgan-
ised: the different management offices for separate branches of
agriculture were brought together under the organ for the
administration of agricultural industries (S.K.K. = Saibai
Kigyo Kodan) by a Decree of June 18, 1943. This institution had
to prepare the transfer of the enterprises to Japanese buyers.
After the fulfilment of that rather easy task, it was dissolved by
a Decree of June 1, 1944 and the new Japanese owners were
placed in possession of the industries. 2 The possibility for
exploitation, however, remained absolutely dependent on the
granting of credit by the banks.
The new authorities did not consider it proper to invest the
natives with the economic position taken away from the Euro-
peans. Everything was prepared long before to provide the
1 According to Japanese estimates, the surplus production of sugar in peacetime
in Greater East Asia amounted to about 2,010,000 tons (production 4,410,000 tons,
consumption 2,400,000 tons). In order to obtain a balance the production of Java
should have been curtailed by 1,000,000 tons and that of the Philippines should have
been wholly eliminated. The Japanese production would have been maintained at
1,300,000 tons (G. Rodenburg, op. cit.).
• P. M. Prillwitz, op. cit. The new enterprises were immediately organised in a
federation (Saibai Kigyo Rengokai = S.K.R.).
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 191

Japanese capital with a firmer grip on the Indonesian com-

munity than the Western capital had ever had in the last half
a century. The intention was that Indonesia would be a territory
of low wages and prices within the Great Asiatic Sphere and,
because of that, would be able to supply cheap raw materials
for the Japanese industry. Therefore, the occupants began with
a strict wage and price control l and the lowering of the standard
of living of the European group of population, in this case the
Indos, the great majority of whom remained free from intern-
ment. The price control was enforced so severely that it stabilised
the situation for about a year in spite of the inflation, which
was the result of excessive circulation of occupation money and
of the scarcity of goods consequent upon the stoppage of imports
and production. 2 The Japanese also attempted to absorb surplus
money by means of donations to war funds, lotteries, encouraging
Chinese remittances to Nanking, and various savings campaigns.
But the inflation "continued to increase at an ever faster rate,
until by the middle of 1945 the paper money only had about a
fortieth of its original purchasing value." 3
Strict control over banking was a requisite for this policy.
Until December 1941 there were three Japanese banks that
were active in Indonesia: the Yokohama Specie Bank, the
Taiwan Bank and the Mitsui Bank. 4 After all the non-Japanese
banks had been immediately closed down, their properties were
confiscated ("voluntarily surrendered") and placed under
Japanese control until the order was given on October 20, 1942 (;
to liquidate these institutions. Their activities were taken over
by the reopened Yokohama Specie Bank and the Taiwan Bank. 6
The People's Credit Bank, which had largely Indonesian clients,

1 See Decree No. 36, dated October 1, 1942.

• H. J. Manschot, op. cit.
• Doc. No. 2750, p. 19.
• In Java there were four Dutch banks (de Javasche Bank, de Ned. Handelmaat-
schappij, de Ned.-Indische Handelsbank and de Ned.-Indische Escompto Maat-
schappij), two English (the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking corporation), and some Chinese banks (the Oversea
Chinese Banking Corporation and the Bank of China). See the article of H. J. Man-
schot, op. cit.
• Decree No. 44, October 20, 1942.
• The Mitsui Bank reopened its office in Surabaya, but seems to have obtained
no big share in the booty, yet it was in this bank that the Imperial House had great
financial interests.
192 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

was reopened in October 1942 in seventy places under Japanese

direction and a Japanese name (Syomin Ginkoo). 1
The branch offices of these Japanese banks were scattered all
over Java and Sumatra. Above them, however, was the Southern
Development Bank (Nanpo Kaihatu Kinko), which opened
eight branches on April 1, 1943 in Java and Sumatra, and began
to function as the circulation bank. Through this bank, credits
were furnished only to those industries, which were important
for the Japanese war effort, while running credits (since before
March 8, 1942) were gradually paid back. 2
The N anpo Bank was thus the instrument by which the
government at Tokyo could control the whole economic life of
Indonesia. It also served as a means of bringing the Western
property - industries and private goods - under the control of
the new, mostly Japanese, owners. The sugar industries had
already in 1942 come into the hands of half a dozen Japanese
concerns. What was found in the safes of Western banks - jewels
and precious metals - also came in possession of the Japanese.
The price that was obtained for these properties was indeed
small, but they did not mind if the buyers were the Japanese,
and naturally those who were closest profitted most. 3 The
institution for the "custody" of enemy movables (Tekisan
Kanribu) was, therefore, left in charge of only small amounts,
which were deposited in the Nanpo as proceeds of the sale on
behalf of the original owners. The administration of immovable
property, such as ground, houses, etc. was conducted by the
Hudoosan Kanri Koodan, established by Osamu Seirei No. 10,
dated October 10, 1942. 4
The Japanese rulers expected also that the occupied territories
would contribute to the production of industrial goods, which
were vital for the war. But since they did not want to set up
giant industries in these territories and since they were careful
that no shipping space would be allowed for transport between
1 A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 90. DeC1'ee No. 39, October 3, 1942. M: "Bank Rajat".
• The growing inflation made the repayment of money by Chinese and Indonesian
dealers rather easy (H. J. Manschot, op. cit.). In Borneo and the Great East the
Taiwan Bank acted as the agent of the Nanpo.
• H. J. Manschot (op. cit.) points to the remarkable fact that the Japanese showed
no interest for securities, which were found in the safe· deposit of the Javasche Bank
in Bandung after the war.
• See A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 80.
 CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY 193

the islands, they planned to scatter the existing industries over

different areas. Machines were dismantled in order to be refitted
in other places. This shifting, however, did not lead to any
fruitful result and, consequently, there was a growing shortage
of goods, although the number of industries greatly increased
between 1942 and 1945. In the Netherlands Indies of 1942 there
were 339 industrial plants including 51 sugar factories, whereas
in 1945 the number increased to 549. 1 Whether all these indus-
tries were capable of the desired production is a different question.
In the economic sphere, too, the various sections of the popu-
lation were organised in corporations with "obligatory member-
ship, unilaterally binding regulations, uniform objects and
Japanese executives." 2 To mention only a few: the Corporation
of Textile Producers (Orimono Koogyo Kumiai, 1943), the United
Corporation of Sugar Merchants in Java (Djawa Satoo Hambai
Rengoo Kumiai) , the United Corporation of Retail Shop Keepers
(Warong Kumiai Rengookai, 1943), etc. The activities of these
bodies often overlapped, but from the Japanese viewpoint of
high policy, this set-up had the advantage of enabling them to
maintain effective control and of promoting Nipponese leadership.

1 W. van Warrnelo, "De Indische Industrie gedurende de ]apansche bezetting",

in Economisch-Statistische Berichten, March 27, 1946.
• Doc. No. 2750, p. 49.
 CHAPTER IV

CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION POLICY II:

POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE

INTRODUCTION

The lines along which the Japanese policy in Indonesia would

develop in future years began to appear, though vaguely, after
some months of the occupation. During this period it became
clear to the Japanese that the Indonesians were not a static
mass of people without any principles or convictions. On the
contrary, they could perceive that there existed among the
population deep-rooted ideas and traditions, which, often con-
tradictory to each other, made the conduct of the administration
difficult. The Japanese began by committing many serious
mistakes. For the Japanese of 1942 the task in Indonesia was
much more difficult than for the Dutch a century earlier. An
occupation authority, technically seen, always has the tendency
to carryon the administration in a most irregular manner. The
occupant strives after a particular goal, and everything else is
made subordinate to that - whether it succeeds or not. It is not
even possible to set up a system of economic-colonial exploitation
of the old pattern. Apart from the inner contradictions which
invariably exist in every occupation-regime, there still remains
the difficulty that, in numerous cases, the final decision has to
be taken by the military who are hardly qualified for this.
What the Japanese aimed at in Indonesia was the establish-
ment of a politico-economic structure, which would have the
appearance of freedom for the most developed part of the
Archipelago combined with complete economic dependence and
spiritual unity with Nippon. But this appearance of freedom
failed to impress the nationalists of the middle of the twentieth
century, who had always considered the combination of political
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 195

and economic relations between their native country and

overseas as fatal, and who, therefore, on principle regarded
nationalism and socialism as the two inseparable forms of
expression of their anti-colonial activity. 1
The Dutch had, besides the Western-educated nationalists,
always relied upon the traditional respect, enjoyed hereditarily
by the local heads and on the local jurisdiction, in which all
Indonesians, high and low, were held in every community by
the traditional customs and legal relations. But they also had to
experience that this tradition was gradually crumbling away
and, consequently, their hold on the masses had already begun
to weaken. To the Japanese, this method of governing appeared
to be more difficult, because their arrival had given a rude shock
to the Indonesian society, as a result of which a large number of
people and institutions, so far maintained by the authority
within their traditional bounds, had begun to liberate themselves
from the grip of that authority. And, finally, what did the
Emperorship in Nippon and Nippon's national spirit mean to
the millions of Indonesians who, except from what had always
been locally respected, had only spiritual ties with Islam?
Would a Japanese soldier, imbued with Samurai spirit, or a
Japanese Buddhist scholar have the same natural respect for
the simple Indonesians as for the religious Muslims of Hedjaz
or Hadramaut? After all, what should be the basis of spiritual
unity with Nippon? The Japanese should begin to realise all
these problems if they wanted to fulfil their plans. The building
up of a spiritual bond and voluntary adaptation to the Japanese
ideal was an essential element that could not be abandoned.
The Japanese Military leaders and their political supporters,
after an experience of ten years in China and Manchuria, failed
to imagine that a military rule alone would not be sufficient to
hold together for an indefinite period of time the world empire
that was to be created. But how to steer clear of all these rocks?
It was expressly stated in the directives of the highest com-
mand, worked out by the Total War Research Institute that the
occupation troops and the civil Japanese officials following
them should feel themselves as equals with the conquered
1 B. H. M. Vlekke, "Communism and Nationalism in South East Asia", Inter-
national Affairs, April 1949.
196 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

peoples - an emphasis that found expression in Decree No.1,

dated March 7, 1942 which said that the Japanese and Indo-
nesians were one race. The peoples of the Archipelago should be
able to see clearly that the Japanese did not intend to form a
separate privileged ruling class like the Dutch. 1 The Indonesians
would not have to accept anything of the new rulers to which
the Japanese also were not subjected. Contrary to the expectation
of the experts of the Total War Research Institute, the ordinary
Japanese, once he put on a uniform, appeared to be harsh in his
treatment, which every Indonesian considered to be cruel and
inadmissible. Besides, every Japanese showed a kind of respect
to his highest authority, which an Indonesian, however humble
in his manners towards his own traditional authority, never
liked to demonstrate voluntarily for the sake of a foreigner. Here
difficulties arose. Every Japanese, irrespective of his rank, had
to be greeted with a salute, and even in public meetings the
whole gathering had to collectively bow in the direction of
Tokyo. The latter must have appeared to many devout In-
donesian Muslims, who during their prayers bow towards the
direction of Mecca, as .contrary to divine regulations; the former
could be dangerously offending when the ignorant Japanese
insisted on bowing with an uncovered head. The Indonesians
could hardly notice in such a situation that they were treated
equally with the Japanese; neither did they easily understand
that the use of the slap on the head was a disciplinary measure
permissible in the Japanese army and that other Great East
Asiatics were too good to deserve such a penalty 2.
Neither was there any semblance of equality when in 1943 a
mass immigration of Japanese officials started, which displaced
many Indonesians from positions acquired only a short time
ago. Every Indonesian official with pre-war experience could
perceive that the new masters were ill-equipped to administer
the country in its diverse spheres. 3 The effects of the economic
measures became gradually clear to the masses, and when they
understood the real nature of their intent, the occupants had
imperceptibly forfeited their prestige and the sympathy of a

1 See the Plan of the Total War Research Institute of February 18, 1942, op. cit.
• See Out of Exile, p. 247.
• On this point Sjahrir (Out of Exile, p. 249) entirely agrees with all Dutch writers.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 197

large section of the population. At the beginning, however, the

rural population was not much aware of the Japanese measures
excepting that land had been withdrawn from the Western-
directed cultures in favour of the native rice cultivators, that a
number of new plantation crops had been introduced on a
modest scale, and that the Japanese were eager to impart advice
to the farmers as to the know-how of rice cultivation. But
this proved to be a failure, for the method and quality
did not suit the tropical soil. Those who could not find a living
in the desa (village) and were young could become members of
Hei Ho 1, which apparently offered many advantages.
The Japanese based their rule on brute force and considered it,
according to Sjahrir, feasible to govern Indonesia with the
bayonet. 2 Evidently, there is much truth in this, since the
Japanese regime was a wartime one and the supreme authorities
were the commanders of the Army and Navy, who demanded
unquestioned obedience and no political opposition. It is, however,
not absolutely true that the Military Government depended
entirely on the bayonet, for they were certainly aware of the
typical Indonesian relations, and tried to get a firm hold by
repressing the revolutionary feeling that had been aroused during
the invasion in 1942. At a later stage of the occupation, when
defeat for Japan was in sight, all restrictions were deliberately
removed to allow the revolution to run its own course.
Many years before the Japanese occupation, a social develop-
ment, which threatened the traditional respect for authority
existing from ancient times, had gradually taken place in the
Indies. In the earlier days of Dutch rule when there was little
awareness on the part of the authorities that the Adat was the
foundation of native law, they nevertheless made use of it in
order to govern indirectly the Archipelago with a minimum
external display of power. After it was realised that the Adat
was the basis of legal rules and customs in Indonesia, a kind of
Adat cult was formed. 3
And more than anything else the mere presence of the modern
Dutch Government had helped to break down the old relations
1 See infra.

• Out of Exile, p. 249.

• For a detailed study of Adat Law, see, inter alia, B. Ter Haar, Adat Law in Indo-
nesia (Translated from the Dutch, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York 1948).
198 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

in spite of all respect for tradition. 1 The introduction of Western

articles of use, means of transport, and also dress to some extent,
wiped out somewhat - whether it was meant as such or not -
the differences between the classes and ranks. Introducing the
Dutch language had its effects too. The ever increasing inter-
ference of the government with individual Indonesians under-
mined the traditional order, which so far had made them obedient
to the highest authority through the intermediary of their
village heads and their regents. The Western economic activity
also affected the old Indonesian community, and the increasing
income of the farmers made it possible for some of them to
acquire special properties outside their narrow community. In
short, it may be said that the Indonesians individually came in
contact with the political and economic set-up of the country
and became less dependent on their immediate surroundings.
In the first and second quarter of the twentieth century this
meant the beginning of a social revolution.
This revolution appeared gradually in Java where the Wes-
terners had already exercised their influence for a long time. It
is quite certain that this development which took place simul-
taneously with the increasing pressure of Java's population would
have led to serious tensions in the long run even without the
interference of Japan. The sudden disturbance in the existing
relations by the occupation, however, accelerated an outburst
within a few years, namely as soon as the force of the bayonet
ceased to repress everything. Outside Java, some of the other
factors already mentioned made themselves felt very strongly.
Among the people of Minangkabau with their system of Adat
which was difficult to maintain under the conditions of the
modern world, the traditional heads had begun to lean more
and more on the Dutch authority for the preservation of their
power under the threat from the orthodox Muslims. Muslim
zealots, together with communist agitators, had been responsible
for the outburst of 1927. Again, Muslim reformers particularly
in Sumatra welcomed the Japanese invasion hoping to see the
heads of the Adat system along with their Dutch protectors

1 See, inter alia, D. H. Burger, "Structuurveranderingen in de Javaanse Samen-

leving" in Indonesie, March 1949- May 1950.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 199

ousted from their position. 1 In Atjeh Ulamas and other opposers

of the authority of the Uleebalangs 2 constituted the nucleus of
the pro-Japanese movement, and in their radicalism they
preferred to complete the religious and social revolution till the
old order would be uprooted through bloody violence.
The old structure had already been weakened in many respects
when the Japanese power hit it. To facilitate the conquest of
the Indies, the Japanese had looked for support from many
revolutionary elements, who also responded eagerly in the
hope of materialising their revolutionary plans with the help
of Japan. But once in possession of land and people, the Japanese
did not want any more revolutions. They hoped to utilise their
radical allies to their own advantage as well as seek the support
of the traditional authorities following the Dutch policy. Tra-
ditionalism suited better in the Japanese conception of order
than radicalism. This explains the establishment of a Committee
for the Study of former Customs and Political Systems (Kyuukan
Seido Tyoosa Iinkai) in November 1942, whose aim was "to
survey and study the customs and the former governmental
systems of the country, and to contribute towards the Ad-
ministration of Java." 3
The occupants, therefore, attempted to arrest the decay of the
traditional institutions. The autonomous rulers in Java and
Sumatra were confirmed in their dignity. We have already
mentioned that in August 1942 the four Javanese princes were
summoned to Batavia to swear an oath of loyalty to Japan in
presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the 16th Army in Java.
Hereditary heads, who were set aside at the beginning of the
occupation by the revolutionary elements, were also restored
in their position. On the other hand, the Japanese rulers were
faced with the problem of satisfying their allies in the early days
of the invasion, and, therefore, they deprived the traditional
administrators of their competence, which was often in conflict
with Islamic law. They were also vigilant in certain cases as to
whether all respect was shown for Islamic laws and the popu-
1 See H. Bouman, Enige beschouwingen over de ontwikkeling van het Indonesisch
Nationalisme op Sumatra's Westkust (Thesis Leiden, J. B. Wolters, Groningen 1949);
A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., pp. 177 ff, 190, 193 ff.
S Territorial Chiefs.
• Doc. No. 2750, p. 58; Kan Po No.7, p. 3, Nov. 1942.
200 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

lation was not disturbed in observing these laws by the occupation

regulations. 1

A. POLICY TOW ARDS ISLAM 2

In their policy towards Islam, the religion of the vast majority

of Indonesians, the Japanese made a significant departure from
that followed by the former Dutch authorities. To them, Islam
appeared to be a powerful force which could be utilised for the
realisation of their aims in Indonesia. The reason of their interest
in Islam was not to further the welfare of the Muslim community
and its life, neither was it to advance an Islamic social and cultur-
al regeneration as the nationalists, or at least some of them,
aimed at. The Japanese considered Islam as one of the most
effective means to penetrate into the spiritual recesses of In-
donesian life and to infuse the influence of their own ideas and
ideals at the bottom of the society. For exactly the same reasons,
Christianity was chosen in the Philippines as an important vehicle
for ideological penetration. The importance which the Japanese
attached to religion in their occupation policy in Indonesia can be
estimated from the fact that in contrast with the pre-war situa-
tion one separate Department of Religious Affairs 3 was created.
It is true that in Islam there is no such thing as an Islamic
church or any system of regular clergy. But there has been a
socially distinct group, although unorganised as a group, of
religious leaders who usually command the respect of the masses
on account of their religious knowledge, and act as the spiritual
guides of the villagers. At the beginning of the Japanese occu-
pation, this group of Kiais and Ulamas 4 seemed to enjoy the
undisputed confidence of the masses in Indonesia. Naturally,
the Japanese, in their attempt at obtaining a firm footing in the
Indonesian world, first directed their attention to this group of
people, who could be used as a proper intermediary for re-
interpreting Japanese ideas and aims into Indonesian idioms
and communicating them to the masses. They did not hesitate
1 For Atjeh, see A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., pp. 198-199,274 ff.
• Part of the materials for this section has been drawn from C. A. O. van Nieuwen·
huijze, Japanese Islam Policy in Java I94z-I945 (MS).
• J = Syuumbu, M = Kantor Urusan Agama.
• Kiais (Malay) and Ulamas (Arabic) are the group of people who specialise in the
study of Islamic religion.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 201

to exploit the popularity and sentiments of these religious leaders

who always held the former Dutch government responsible, in
spite of their professed neutrality in religious matters, for pro-
moting Christianity at the expense of Islam. 1 Therefore, from
the very beginning of the occupation the new rulers adopted a
policy which may be described as one of appeasement towards
the adherents of Islam. The question of religion could also
easily lead to conflicts because the Japanese Emperor-God could
not take the place of the Prophet (Muhammad) for the followers
of Islam. On this point the Japanese had to grant preference
to what was not Japanese.
In December 1942 the head of the Military. Administration
(Gunseikan) addressed the Islamic leaders at Batavia in order to
convince them of the necessity for co-operation with the Japanese
and the training of the youth so as to make them into hardwork-
ing inhabitants of the Greater East Asiatic Co-Prosperity Sphere. 2
This meeting was the final stage of a propaganda campaign
which Colonel Hory, the head of the Department of Religious
Affairs, made in the autumn of 1942 throughout Java. In every
Syuu (Residency) he held meetings in which the Kiais and
Ulamas were obliged to attend. Five Japanese in Arabian dress,
assuming the title of H adji and Arabian names, graced the
company that consisted of good speakers. 3
Just as the conservative - a large section of the population in
Java - was appeased with the setting up of the Adat Commission,
the head of the Military Government promised the Islamic
leaders in December 1942 in Batavia that the Nipponese Army
would protect and respect Islam and that a thorough study of
Islam would be made in order to understand them more favour-
ably. In a typical Eastern way the Gunseikan offered excuses for
the mistakes committed so far, which might have offended the
Muslims. He also emphisised that in sharp contrast with the
Nipponese, the former Dutch rulers studied Islam with a view "to
1 The religious leaders always used to point to large sums allocated in the Dutch

Indies Government budget for Christian clergy, missionary schools and hospitals,
these being much larger than the sums spent on similar Muslim activities.
• Kan Po No.9, p. 6, December 1942; Doc. No. 2750, p. 78.
• Hadj;, = only those who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca are entitled to use
this title. These five Japanese "Hadjis" were: Abdul Hamid Ono, Abdul Munim
Inada, Saleh Suzuki, Mohammad Taufik Sasaki and Abdul Munir Watanabe - See
Doc. No. 2750, p. 78.
202 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

oppress the followers of Islam and destroy the religion" - a policy

that was "hated by the people." 1 To remove the distrust of the
Muslim community, it was clearly expressed that the Military
Authority did not aim at unification but mere co-operation of all
organisations and creeds. What was meant by this co-operation
was the education of the youth in the spirit of the Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the confidence of the people in
the power of the Nipponese Army, Navy and Airforce. 2
After the speeches were over the religious leaders were invited
to a dinner at the residence of the Commander-in-Chief of the
16th Army, who lived in the palace of the former Governor-
General. This gesture made a positive impression on these simple
people, most of whom came from the countryside.
A second practical move, seen from the Japanese viewpoint,
was the opening of a training (M = latihan) centre in Batavia,
where courses of three weeks for the Kiais and Ulamas were
organised under the supervision of Syuumubu. The purpose was
"to improve the insight of the Kiais into the circumstances of
the times and create a co-operative spirit towards the military
government." 3 From July 1943 till May 1945 seventeen courses
in total were held, each attended by sixty Kiais, specially selected
from all over Java. It is needless to add that these courses were
mainly designed to indoctrinate Japanese ideology. Every course
ended with a final recapitulation and pledge of loyalty to Japan,
in the form of a speech by one of the most loyal participants.
On the other hand, in these simple people were reflected the
feelings of the masses and, therefore, the Japanese could verify
the extent of the effect of their propaganda. Their efforts to
persuade the Islamic leaders to declare the Great East Asia war
against the Allies as a "holy war" did not, however, yield the
desired result. A holy war is only fought against Kafirs - un-
believers - by the believers. The fact that the Japanese were
Kafirs in the eyes of the Muslims was a serious hindrance to
their attempt. Whenever this subtle point was raised, they at once
used to come out with their slogans that the Japanese and In-
donesians belonged to the "common ancestry" and "common

1 A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 106.

• Kan Po No.9, p. 6, December 1942.
• Zyawa Nenkan, p. 145. See A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 107.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 203

race" and that their common destiny bound them eternally. 1

The Japanese allowed the religious schools to be reopened
with modified curricula, including Arabic - the language of the
Holy Scripture. According to the final regulation concerning
the reopening of Arabic schools issued on September 10, 1942,
Japanese and Indonesian were to be imparted next to Arabic.
Arabic text books, however, needed the approval of the Religious
Affairs Department. To placate the Indonesian Muslims further,
it was announced that plans were under way to establish a
Muslim University like the AI-Azhar at Cairo. 2 This was followed
by another announcement that a Muslim Library would be
opened. All this was obviously meant to impress the masses that
the religion of Islam would obtain more freedom than it had
during the former government.
The Japanese then turned towards their next objective in the
field of religion, viz. the creation of one all-embracing and
centralised organisation under their direct control, as a result
of which the huge Muslim mass of java's population could be
moved more easily in the direction desired by them. In this they
might have been prompted by a very limited coincidence between
Japanese and Muslim views upon the social function of religion.
To the Japanese, both religion and politics were social forces
which could be combined in promoting the glory of Dai Nippon.
There was, to them, no essential difference between the two.
To the followers of Islam also, religious and socio-political life
are so inextricably interwoven as to make it hardly possible
to distinguish between the two in practice and, therefore, the
Indonesian Muslims, so it appeared to the Nipponese, should have
no objections against mixing up religious and political issues,
these being aspects of one and the same thing. Thus, according
to the Japanese, the common Indonesian desire for more unity
and coherence - often expressed as a desire for better organisation
- of the Muslim community and its integration in Indonesian
social life could, to a large extent, be harmonised with the

1 Doc. No. 2750, p. 80; Decree No. I, March 7, 1942 of the Commander of the Japa-
nese Army in Java.
I Asia Raya, June 16, 1942. This ideal proved to be fascinating for a long time even

after the occupation. Its realisation, as far as possible, has been achieved by the
establishment of a Muslim University at Djokjakarta by the government of the Repu-
blic of Indonesia.
204 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Japanese aim at centralising Muslim organisations to establish

direct control.
At the beginning, however, interference in religious affairs
and the uniting of the various religious bodies were carefully
avoided. 1 This benevolent attitude was not inspired by tolerance
but by their sheer inability to amalgamate the two powerful
Islamic organisations - the progressive M uhammadiyah and the
very orthodox Nahdat al-Ulama. Hence, they proceeded very
cautiously. To prepare the ground for an all-embracing Muslim
organisation, the importance and necessity of unity in the
Muslim community was at first systematically propagated in
numerous religious gatherings (tabligh akbar) organised by the
Religious Affairs Board as well as meetings addressed personally
by Colonel Hory. As the first practical step towards the realisation
of the Japanese goal, an Organisation for the Unity of the Islamic
Community (Badan Persatztan Ummat Islam) was created on
July 13, 1942 in Dj akarta, and soon local branches were founded
in different parts of Java. The way was thus paved for re-
establishing the Madjelis Islam Ala Indonesia (MIAI), 2 the
supreme organisation of Islamic bodies, which was dissolved
immediately after the occupation along with other political
and national organisations. It was to be the central directing
board of the unity of the Indonesian Islamic community under
the complete supervision of the Japanese. That the Japanese
sought to induce the vast Muslim population of Java to a maxi-
mum war effort through this religious organisation is quite
obvious from the numerous articles published in Suara MIAI
(Voice of MIAI). 3 In one of the articles it was stated: "Naturally,
the victory in war will not just come by praying for it in the
mosques. Prayers should be accompanied by sacrifices of lives
and possessions from the whole population. Whosoever keeps
quiet in this period without doing anything, he is a sinner against

1 Kan Po No. 14.

• MIAI, a federation of thirteen Muslim organisations, was set up in September
1937. The main stimulus which caused MIAI to come into existence was Muslim
opposition against the Dutch Government, which proposed certain legal regulations
concerning marriages of Muslims. It is said that this MIAI developed pro-Japanese
sentiments since 1938, when an article, entitled "The Voice of Japan", appeared in
the issue for September 15, 1938 of Berita Nahdat Al-Ulama (Newsletter of Nahdat
al-Ulama), in which all MIA I news was regularly published.
• The periodical of MIA!.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 205

God. God obliges the whole Muslim community to take care

of, to defend and to promote their country and their re-
ligion." 1
The dissolution of MIAI on October 24, 1943, made room for
the Mad/elis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council
of Indonesian Muslims), better known as the Mas/umi, in which
all Muslim associations were united. 2 One of the reasons why
the Japanese desired this replacement seems to have been that
MIAI, which began in 1937 as an anti-Dutch organisation, might
turn out anti-foreign again - a risk the new rulers were not
prepared to accept. The more obvious reason was that M uham-
madiyah and Nahdat al-Ulama had stayed outside MIA!. Kiai
Hadji Hashim Ashari became the leader of the new organisation.
With this the Japanese military authority succeeded in obtaining
a firm grip on the religious population, since the M asjumi set up
its branch offices in every Syuu, which closely co-operated
with the religious offices of the Military Administration. The
Masjumi was now turned into a political apparatus, though
maintaining a religious fayade. Even prayers were prescribed
by this organisation for Nippon's final victory. 3
On the other hand, the authority of the religious leaders who
had little political influence before the war was gradually
extended. The Department of Religious Affairs which was placed
under Indonesian leadership since November 1943 - though the
Japanese remained the heads of the various sections - wove
a web over the whole of Java in 1944. In every Syuu office,
a bureau of religious affairs was set up which functioned as a
sub-section of the Department at Batavia. 4 This bureau spread
its branches to the districts, sub-districts and even to the villages.
Important local Islamic leaders were invited to supervise these
branch offices and propagate Japanese ideas. The mosque
staff, formerly subordinated to the traditional native authorities
- princes and regents - was now directly employed by the state.
These functionaries thereby rose in esteem and with it the
Japanese increased their influence on them. The Islamic leaders

1Suara MIAI, October 1, 1943.

2 November 22, 1943. Kan Po No. 32, p. 26.
3 A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 107.

• Kan Po No. 44.

206 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

who were generally distrusted by the Dutch authority 1 came

as a closed group in direct contact with the highest governing
body. The hierarchical order maintained during Dutch rule
among the administrators was thus knocked down. The sepa-
ration between church and state practically came to an end.
Islam obtained a privileged position in the political system in
which, next to the secular administration, a religious apparatus
had been created. The Japanese thus brought about a funda-
mental change in the traditional method of governing, by the
increase of power for Islam.
I t is indeed difficult to explain the Japanese desire for such
a basic change. One can only speCUlate. The intention to create
serious difficulties for the Dutch or other Western Powers on
their return could hardly have existed in 1942 and the first half
of 1943, for the Japanese could not yet think that they would
have to surrender their conquered territories. It is not unlikely
that such a trend could easily have prevailed in the minds of
the Japanese in 1944 because of the adverse situation of the
war, but not before. Did the Japanese rulers imagine that the
Islamic leaders would be more loyal and submissive to them
than the traditional heads? Probably not, for Japan, the
country where the traditional obedience was so highly valued,
was no more acceptable as an authority to the orthodox Muslims
than the Netherlands and the West; perhaps even less, because
Japan as a pagan country had no share in the true teaching, of
which the Christians, according to Prophet Muhammad's
sayings, possessed at least a part. Or was it the continuation of
the movement that had already been started before the war in
Tokyo, which attempted to win as far as possible the favour of
the Muslims, in order to undermine and dislocate the age-old
Western power that rested on the traditional native authorities?
This seems to be the best explanation.
It is possible that the orthodox Muslims like Hadji Mansur
wanted to make use of the Japanese power and her pre-war
promises to conform the social relations in Java more and more
to the teachings of Islam. So it has been in Atjeh and in Sumatra's

1 It may be interesting to note that the Muslims of India also were distrusted for

more than a century by the British after they established their power there in the
middle of the 18th century.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 207

Westcoast, and the co-operation of the Ulamas and Kiais should

be viewed in this light and, therefore, as a continuation of the
Islamic influence which was already working for three hundred
years to make Indonesia a truly Islamic country after the first
superficial conversion to Islam.
In any case, the whole traditional governing system was
endangered by the position of power vested in Islam. The J apane-
se thereby placed themselves in a difficult position to carryon a
continuous policy of balance between secular and spiritual
authorities. That the equilibrium could not always be maintained
in spite of the strict vigilance of the Department of Religious
Affairs became obvious in 1944 in Tasikmalaya and Indramayu,
where sheer despair, forced delivery of rice, drafting of Ro-
mushas 1 and coercion of the Japanese system led to disturbances
and troubles. 2 The Islamic leaders had not succeeded in making
the population acquiesce in their misery. Prof. Hussain Djaja-
diningrat, the head of the Religious Affairs Department, was
blamed for this, and he was replaced by Kiai Hadji Hashim
Ashari (August 1944). After Ashari was installed in his office
in Batavia, he returned home to Djombang near Surabaya. His
investiture was purely a symbolic one. The Japanese merely
wanted to connect the name of this old influential person with
the Military Government. They had no illusions about his
actual leadership. Among the activities performed in his name
the most important were the subjection of the M asiumi to a
semi-governmental institution, the opening of an Islamic high
school at Batavia 3, and the founding there of Balai Muslimin
Indonesia, a club house where meetings concerning Islam were
held. 4
The Department of Religious Affairs also took a number of
other measures to enlist the support of the M asiumi. The
slaughter duty and inspection fees for animals that were to be
sacrificed on Islamic religious days were abolished. Muslims
who wanted to say Friday prayers were granted leave of ab-
sence from the office.
In the wave of new enthusiasm a corps of the Muslims, called
1 See infra.

• Doc. No. 2750, p. 81; Kan Po No. 39, pp. 28-31.

• July 9,1945. Kan Po No. 71, p. 15.
• July 29, 1945. Kan Po No. 72. p. 17.
208 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

the Hizbullah (Army of Allah), was formed which provided the

M asiumi with military strength. The formation of this corps
and its training were the work of "Hadji" Suzuki. 1 The Hiz-
bullah was not equipped with fire arms but was trained politi-
cally and physically for a "freedom" struggle which should be
fought with bamboo spears and wooden rifles. The training of the
Hizbullah corps began at the beginning of 1945 at Bogor (Buiten-
zorg) ,where about500youths-I8-20years old-were given a course
of two months under Japanse command. After the end of this
training these youths were posted all over Java in order to form
local Hizbullah organisations 2, for which money was placed at
the disposal of the M asjumi by the military authority. The
members of this corps, however, were not paid.

B. POLICY TOWARDS NATIONALISM

With the usual characteristics of a conqueror, the Japanese,

immediately after the occupation of Java, abruptly put an end
to all political activity. Decree No.2 of the Commander of the
16th Army, dated March 8, 1942, banned all meetings, associ-
ations, publications and the listening to foreign broadcasts, and
Decree No.3 of March 20, 1942 announced that "to discuss,
engage in activities, encourage or make propaganda concerning
the organisation and structure of the Government" would be
considered illegal. By Decree No. 23 of July 15, 1942, this
prohibition was not only explicitly maintained, but also all
associations were ordered to be dissolved. As a result of these
prohibitive regulations several Indonesian leaders were arrested
in April 1942. Later, in December 1942 and in January 1943,
severe action on a much larger scale was taken by the Kempeitai
against the suspected underground activities of Indonesians.
Capital punishment was resorted to as the best method of
suppressing anything that might possibly be construed as being
anti-Japanese. If the prisoners escaped this fate in the first
instance, death still awaited them inside the prison walls. Many
remained confined till the liberation in 1945. 3
The Japanese realised, however, that an outlet must be created
1 A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 107.
• age: 15-25 years.
• Doc. No. 2750, pp. 13, 55-56.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 209

for absorbing the political tensions and passions. Soon a solution

was found that made use of the Indonesians' political source
of energy to the Japanese purposes. Within two months after
all political activity had been prohibited, a people's movement
was initiated on April 29, 1942. The AAA Movement or Perge-
rakan Tiga A, as it was called, was intended to unite all political
forces into one powerful movement, directed towards the elimi-
nation of "pernicious" Western influences which had corrupted
the "Eastern soul", and the indoctrination of the entire popu-
lation of the Archipelago with the ideas of "Asia for the Asiatics"
and "Japan the mother of Asia." The ultimate object of this
movement was to mobilise Indonesian support for Japan's war
effort and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere with
Indonesia as a part. The AAA Movement stood for three slogans:
Japan the Leader of Asia, Japan the Protector of Asia and Japan
the Light of Asia. The Japanese seemed to have launched this
campaign for the glorification of Japan with the apparent belief
that the "liberated" Indonesian people would willingly accept
their all-powerful leadership without any real opposition and
that they would be able to attain their objectives without having
to make concessions to Indonesian nationalism. This is also
borne out by the fact that R. Samsudin, whom the Japanese
appointed as the leader of this movement, was not a nationalist
leader of the first rank. 1
This was, however, not the kind of a people's movement which
several of the top-ranking nationalist leaders had thought of.
Streams of words, parades, waving of flags, inspiring the youths
into action, etc., as a token of the blessings which that country
would bring or had brought, were all meant for the benefit of
Japan, not for their own homeland - Indonesia. The followers of
Tenno Heika - the Japanese Emperor - who thought it natural
that their superiority would be recognised by the conquered
peoples, wanted to govern in accordance with the traditional
Japanese concepts of obedience. Boastful speeches should
convince the "liberated" of the greatness of Japanese leadership.
Those who did not like to listen to them ran the risk of getting
corporal punishment that was usual in the Japanese army.
Blows in the face and on the head which the Japanese accepted
1 G. w. Overdijkink, op. cit., pp. 23-24; G. MeT. Kahin, op. cit., p. 103.
210 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

as disciplinary measures meant for the Indonesians the most

humiliating of all offences. The expectation of attaining greater
independence and high positions under the Japanese, which was
prevalent in certain circles, was lost by the very first measures
and the conduct of the Japanese. "The Japanese offered the
nationalists only puppet roles." 1 Indonesians occupying im-
portant positions experienced further disappointments when
they were replaced by the Japanese who were less able than they
themselves. Added to this, the obligatory homage to the Japanese
Emperor-God, which did not fit in with the beliefs of the In-
donesian Muslims, made it clear that the first enthusiasm for
the new rulers had cooled down considerably.
But after the demonstration of enormous power by the
Japanese, the respect that had already grown before the war
for the country of Asia's best fighters increased still further.
Consequently, most of the nationalist leaders did not see any
other solution except that of co-operation with the Japanese as
the best and possibly the only remaining choice. Hatta already
agreed to co-operate with the new rulers, who placed him "in
charge of a sort of advisory bureau for nationalist affairs." 2
Sukarno decided to follow the same method. According to
Sjahrir (but it is written post factum), both Hatta and Sukarno
did it with the intention of doing "everything legally possible
to give the nationalist struggle a broader scope." 3 But Sjahrir
himself wanted to keep aloof from all politics and secretly work
for the building up of a resistance movement. It was further
"agreed that political concessions from the Japanese for the
nationalists must be pressed for in return." 4 The veteran of the
1 Republic of the United States of Indonesia: "History of Indonesia's National
Movement" (Washington, July 1, 1949), p. 13.
• Out of Exile, p. 241.
• ibid., p. 246.
• ibid .. After the war a controversy arose over the charges of collaboration with
the Japanese brought by the Dutch particularly against Sukarno and Hatta. The
Indonesians, however, maintained that these nationalist leaders co-operated only
with a view to consolidate and further Indonesian nationalism among the masses,
and not for their own selfish personal ends (See Political Manifesto of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Indonesia, issued at Djakarta, November 1, 1945. English
text from The Voice of Free Indonesia, No.2, Djakarta, November 1945 published
in New Cycle in Asia, Selected Documents on Maior International Developments in the
Far East, I943-I947, Ed. by Harold R. Isaacs, Institute of Pacific Relations, New
York 1947, pp. 182-188). "It is important to note", says a writer, "that the standards
used to define quislings in the West during World War II did not automatically hold
among Asian subject populations. In this case the overwhelming endorsement of
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 211

nationalist movement, Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo, had com-

pletely retired in the meanwhile, since he was staunchly opposed
to any contact with the new authorities.
The nationalists of the Parindra group accepted the new
situation more easily than the leftist groups, although only a
few of them (and they, too, only for a short period) decided on
co-operation with the Japanese. Some had to display their
collaboration so as not to fall immediately into the hands of the
Japanese secret police. 1 Within a few weeks it appeared that
the police had succeeded in exercising a strict supervision over
almost everyone, whether collaborator or opposer of the new
regime, and over anyone who held a position, high or low. The
rapidity with which an extensive secret service was established
in a short time was a proof of the organisational capacity, such
as the Japanese could seldom develop in other fields. 2
Meanwhile, the AAA Movement yielded little result for the
Japanese. Indeed, only a small section of the less advanced
population believed that they had reached the threshold of that
paradise when the Japanese, with their powerful AAA propa-
ganda, announced that everything that was old, Western and
Sukarno by the Indonesian people after the war, despite his prominent role under the
Japanese, shows that his collaboration was accepted as arising from national rather
than servile or personal motives" (Lawrence K. Rosinger & Associates, The State of Asia,
American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York 1953, p. 412). "Actually, an accurate
appraisal of the collaborationist charges which have been directed against the Re-
public's leaders", observes another author, "depends primarily on an initial adjust-
ment in viewpoint. In analyzing collaboration with the Japanese in Indonesia a
basically different approach must be adopted from that applied to the same issue in
the occupied countries of Europe" (Charles Wolf, Jr., The Indonesian Story, American
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York 1948, p. II). Even Dr. Van Mook, one of the
Dutch authorities who brought charges of collaboration in 1945, seems to have
revised his opinion after three years. Writing at the beginning of 1949 he stated:
"Uit later gevonden documenten is weI gebleken, dat ook bij al zijn afkeurenswaar-
dige handelingen het streven naar een onafhankelijk Indonesie hem steeds heeft be-
stuurd" (H. J. van Mook, Indonesie, Nederland en de Wereld, Amsterdam 1949,
p. 103). In this connection it may be of further interest to note that substantially
the same charges were made by Soviet spokesmen in early 1949 against both Sukarno
and Hatta but Moscow seemed to have gradually dropped the charge when an
approach was made by Indonesia in the summer of 1950 for formal exchange of
recognition. In the beginning of 1951 the press and radio of Communist China also
spoke in the same critical tune as that initiated by Moscow in early 1949 (George
MeT. Kahin, op. cit., pp. 104--105).
1 As Sjarifuddin tried to do in vain. See C. Smit, De Indonesische Quaestie (E. J.

Brill, Leiden 1952), pp. 34-35.

• Evidently, the Japanese immediately engaged many Indonesian informers who
had also worked for the Dutch Indies police (Out of Exile, p. 238). The police school
at Sukabumi was at once reformed by the occupiers and reopened. In every Syuu
headquarters a similar police school was also opened (Doc. No. 2750, p. 39).
212 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

bad would be replaced by the new, the better, the Japanese,

the ideal of the Great East Asiatic. The Japanese, within a few
months of occupation, understood that Indonesia was no empty
vessel, where the wine of propaganda only needed to be poured
in in order to make everyone drink and get drunk with joy for
the arrival of the new rulers. They realised that they would
have to reckon with the Indonesian nationalist movement,
which had been nurtured mostly by Western-educated intellectu-
als and had already gained roots particularly in Java - much
deeper roots, as a matter of fact, than many members of the
Dutch ruling group had ever perceived. The Japanese, therefore,
had to abandon the idea of autocratic rule and the AAA
Movement died an early death.
In a different way Japan now tried to win the sympathy and
support of the Indonesians, especially of the intellectuals who
were hardly impressed with the AAA propaganda. Contact was
sought with those nationalists who were non-eo-operative with
the Dutch Indies Government as well as those Indonesian
intellectuals who had shown no antipathy towards the former
regime and held important positions thereunder. Sukarno was
considered to be the best representative of the former group,
and so, he was brought over from Sumatra, where he had been
interned by the Dutch, to Java in July 1942. With three other
nationalists he formed the Four-Leaved Clover - Ampat Se-
rangkai - that assumed the leadership, under Japanese super-
vision, of those Indonesians who were prepared to co-operate
with Japan. 1 The Adat Commission, which was set up in De-
cember 1942 to satisfy in general the conservative elements in
Java, as stated earlier, was also meant to appease the second
group of Indonesians. Besides the nine Japanese - the chairman
was to be one of them - and the Four-Leaved Clover as leaders
of the people, six other Indonesian members of this commission
were former chiefs of the Departments, professors and prominent
personalities in the People's Council 2, who generally had been
regarded as the pillars of support of the Dutch rule. This body,
which was not destined to perform any important work, never
1 Doc. No. 2750, p. 57; G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 26; W. H. Elshree,
op. cit., pp. 79-80. The other three nationalists were Moh. Hatta, K. H. Dewantara
and Kiai H. M. Mansur.
2 Doc. No. 2750, p. 58.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 213

played a great role. When the need for more effective partici-
pation of the Indonesian people in the Japanese war effort was
felt, they established the Central Advisory Council and Local
Advisory Councils in October 1943, and with it the Adat Com-
mission quietly disappeared.
In the meantime the Four-Leaved Clover made an attempt to
strengthen their position vis-a.-vis the Japanese. It was rightly
felt that such an effort could produce success only by obtaining
the support of the masses. However, the possibility for this was
dependent on the permission to take part in politics, which
would have to be granted by the military authority. To exert
pressure on the new rulers for the creation of a political party
became, therefore, the principal aim of the four co-operating
leaders since the middle of 1942. Indeed, the formation of "an
all-inclusive national organisation" had been the ideal of Su-
karno 1, but the Japanese held the rudder in their own hands,
and did not want cross-currents of a purely nationalistic In-
donesian mass propaganda. Even after the failure of the AAA
Movement, the Japanese rulers in Indonesia were still hesitant
to take a liberal view on this question. They kept the request
under consideration for several months. Meanwhile, the Japanese
advance had come to a standstill, and Japan had become
conscious that voluntary co-operation of the population of the
occupied areas was necessary in order to attain the desired
objective of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This
signified an important turning point in the attitude of the
"liberators" towards the "liberated". This change appeared,
among others, from a Gunseikan meeting - heads of military ad-
ministration of all occupied areas - held in October 1942 at Tokyo,
in consequence of which the head of the military authority in
Java called together the highest Japanese civil authorities in
the island in December 1942 to communicate some fundamental
directives about the policy of the government. The most im-
portant point that came to the forefront was the prosecution of
the war, for which all resources had to be mobilised. Also in
connection with this, there was the necessity to get hold of the
feelings of the population. The first signs of the changed attitude
of the Japanese in regard to the occupied territories appeared
lOut of Exile, p. 246.
214 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

slowly. The Commander of the 16th Army promised on Decem-

ber 8, 1942 at Batavia in a mass meeting that was held to
commemorate the first anniversary of the attack on Pearl
Harbour, that a political party, exclusively for Indonesians,
would be permitted. This promise, however, needed further
approval of Tokyo. When the permission came, another "festival
day" was awaited in accordance with the Japanese custom,
this time March 9, 1943, the first anniversary of the conquest of
Java and of the foundation of "New Java." 1
The new movement - it was not a party - Putera, which was
an abbreviation of Pusat Tenaga Rakiat 2, did not provide much
opportunity for the initiators to obtain political gain. There was
no question of an independent organisation and guidance. The
Japanese held the reins tight. As the head of the movement,
they appointed Sukamo who was assisted by the other members
of the Four-Leaved Clover. Control over the leadership was
exercised by an advisory council consisting approximately of an
equal number of Japanese and Indonesians alike, the latter
being nominated by Sukarno with the approval of the Gunseikan.
Also the appointment of local leaders was to be approved by
the Japanese Syuutyookan (Resident). Finally, the organisation
of the Putera was governed by rules framed by the Commander-
in-Chief. 3 Indeed, the question was: who gained most with the
establishment of this "party" - the nationalist leaders or the
Japanese military authority? If the Indonesian leaders had
looked to the future, then it was certainly they who had achieved
success, because they could obtain through the new movement
some influence on the population, and a basis was thus laid for
future display of power. If we take into consideration the party
programme, no other conclusion seems justified than the fact
that the Japanese were directly benefitted by the Putera, in
which the different forces were combined. Victory in the war,
increase of production, defense of Great East Asia, and the
spreading of the Japanese language were the main points along
with some other ones, which aimed more at the direct interests
of the Indonesians. Because of the lack of any possibility to
1 Doc. No. 2750, p. 58; G. w. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 25; George MeT. Kahin, op.
cit., p. 106.
• "Centre of People's Power." Putera means; Knight's son.
a Doc. No. 2750, p. 59.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 215

exercise initiative, the enthusiasm for the new movement di-

minished. Moreover, when the originally-planned independent
youth movement was forbidden, and the Japanese authorities
set up instead their own youth movement, the Seinendan, the
direction of which remained entirely in their hands, the interest
in the Putera dwindled down to a minimum. 1
In the Japanese homeland the highest authorities in the
meantime had thought of new plans, by which the sympathy
and co-operation of the popUlation of the occupied areas could
be won. At the beginning of 1943 Premier Tojo, through Field
Marshal Terauchi, Commander of the Southern Territories with
headquarters at Saigon, instructed General I tagaki in Singapore 2
to conduct an investigation for the possibility of granting
independence to Indonesia. This order along the hierarchical
way reached the Commander of the 16th Army in Java, Lieute-
nant-General Harada, who in turn passed it on to the head of the
Military Government, Major-General Yamamoto. 3 The latter
had several meetings with the Staff officers of the 16th Army
in order to enquire into the possibilities of this venture. He also
sounded Sukarno about the formation of a Council, whose task
would be to advise the military authority. 4
The instruction for this investigation, however, had its special
reason. From the speech which Premier Tojo delivered on June
16, 1943 5 at the 82nd session of the Diet at Tokyo, it appeared
that it had been realised in Japan that the war had reached a
critical stage. The war effort had to be intensified. The assistance
of the conquered territories, therefore, was necessary. The bait
that could be used as a stimulant for this was known. During
the speech Tojo had promised independence to Burma and the
Philippines and participation in the government to Java. The
passage referring to this was couched in the cloak of Japanese
generosity, as if no other reasons forced the Land of the Rising
1 ibid., pp. 60-61. In the area occupied by the Navy there was no Putera. There

was, however, the Japanese youth organisation, Seinen Undo. Maeda Interrogation-
report, R. V.O., 006933.
• Commander, 7th Area Army.
• Lieutenant-General Harada had succeeded General Imamura as Commander of
the 16th Army. After him came General Nagano. Interrogation-report Saito (represen-
tative and liaison officer of Major-General Yamamoto), R. V.O., 005839-005840.
• ibid., 005840.
• Report HQ I6th Army, R.V.O., 005869; Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1345;
Timetable No. 147.
216 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Sun to show this compliance. Tojo extended the same promise

while he visited Java in July 1943. The Commander of the 16th
Army then made a declaration about the way in which the
Indonesians would be asked to participate. Among the various
measures to be taken were the institution of a Central Advisory
Council (Tyuuoo Sang-In) and Local Advisory Councils (Sang
Kai), the appointment of Indonesians in higher civil offices of
the Military Administration and increase in the number of
Indonesian advisers (San-Yo). 1 The Commander of the 16th
Army also announced the withdrawal of the Japanese admini-
strators from the Javanese Principalities. The latter measure
appeared to have aimed at two things: in the first place, to
win the favour of the four Javanese rulers and their numerous
relatives and allied family members and, in the second place,
to counterbalance the unstable structure of the Japanese ad-
ministrative apparatus that had seriously undermined the
foundation of the traditional authority. So, gradually the volun-
tary co-operation with Indonesia had assumed the greatest
importance for the Japanese and, consequently, the selection of
co-operators possessing authority had become equally important.
For Japan, which maintained so strongly in her own country
the appearance of traditional power-relations, the traditional
heads were truly the dependable allies. The occupants had no
reason to complain about their readiness to serve, in which the
preservation of the dynasty without doubt formed an important
point of consideration. The desire of the Japanese to seek the
support of the traditional authorities is demonstrated by the
fact that the four Javanese princes had been already summoned
to Batavia in August 1942 and they swore an oath of loyalty to
Japan in the presence of the Commander of the 16th Army,
Lieutenant-General Imamura. 2
Sukarno was appointed as president of the promised Central
Advisory Council, in which function he was to be assisted by
two vice-presidents. The establishment of this body and the
advisory councils for municipalities and residencies was an-

1 Report HQ I6th Al'my, R.V.O., 005869; Kan Po No. 24, pp. 10-14, August 1,
1943.
• Announcement of Gunseitokyoku. See the collection of decrees and proclamations
published by Abdul Karim, Djokjakarta.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 217

nounced on September 5, 1943. 1 The function of the new bodies

was exclusively an advisory one. When the Japanese military
authority was faced with any question, in which the interest of
the population was involved and their adverse reaction was to
be feared, the leading Japanese authorities then asked for advice.
Especially the Central Advisory Council occupied itself in
congratulating the Japanese Empire "in the name of the In-
donesian people" on their brilliant victories, thanking them for
"generous" decisions in regard to the people of the Archipelago
and also in swearing loyalty in life and death. The first session
of this council was held in October 1943. After that it met once
in three or four months. Concerning further participation of
Indonesians to the military administration, the headquarters
of the 16th Army reported to the Commander of the 7th Area
Army in Singapore on October 4, 1943 that seven Indonesian
advisers had been appointed in the Japanese government-
departments and bureaux in Java. 2 There were not, however,
many proofs that there existed serious plans for a change in
Indonesia's status.
On November 5 and 6, 1943 a Great East Asiatic Conference
was held at Tokyo, to which Indonesia was not invited, not even
as an observer. 3 The subject-Indonesia was also not discussed;
in contrast, the closer co-operation between Japan, Manchukuo,
China, the Philippines, Thailand and Burma was emphasised at
the Conference 4. Evidently, the Japanese thought that they
had gone already far enough with the declaration of Premier
Tojo on June 16, 1943, in which the Indonesians had been
promised participation in the government, and as a result the
establishment of the advisory councils had been approved.
However, the fact that Indonesia had not been invited to the
Great East Asiatic Conference caused disappointment among the
Indonesians. This led to the dispatch of a delegation of the
1 G. w. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 32. For Sumatra a "Central Advisory Council"
was set up only in June 1945.
• Interrogation-report Saito, R.V.O., 005840 and Report HQ I6th Army, R.V.O.,
005869.
• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1346; Timetable No. 149.
• The "Joint Declaration" of the Conference, described as the "East Asia Charter",
was meant as a counterpart of the Atlantic Charter. It was also intended to counteract
the effects of the Moscow Conference of Russia, Great Britain and the United States,
held in October 1943- Christian Science Monitor, November 13, 1943. For the text
of the "Joint Declaration", see Doc. No. 2750, pp. 118-119.
218 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Central Advisory Council to Japan. The controlled press, how-

ever, paid little attention to this visit. After the delegation had
left on November 9, 1943 news appeared in all papers in In-
donesia only on November 15, 1943 that Sukarno, Hatta and
Ki Bagus Hadikusuma had already arrived in Tokyo. The
office "information" then stated that the purpose of the journey
was "to express, on behalf of all the inhabitants of Indonesia,
their deep felt thanks for the rapid realisation of participation
in the government." The publication ended with the words:
"The delegates will see with their own eyes how the situation is
in Japan, which is the pivot of the Greater East Asiatic Co-Pros-
perity Sphere and the centre of activity for the fulfilment of this
great war. They will see Japan that is carrying on an extremely
costly, fate-deciding war and they will feel the Japanese energy
and ideals which are holy. Therefore, it is to be hoped that these
persons will be granted the maximum possible assistance in
order to awaken the vigour of the inhabitants of Java for the
conduct of the war." 1
Two inferences may be drawn from this announcement: first,
the typical formulation of the Japanese information; and,
secondly, the first symptoms of the growing controversy between
the military authorities in Java, who wanted to see Java pressed
forward more rapidly in the direction of independence, and the
supreme military authorities in Japan, who allowed themselves
to be compelled only by the circumstances of the war. It seems
that the initiative of sending a delegation of the Central Ad-
visory Council to Tokyo came primarily from the Japanese
authorities in Java. Their motive was to remove the discontent
from the minds of the Indonesians for their not being invited
to the Great East Asiatic Conference. They also wanted their
viewpoint to gain strength in Tokyo - the viewpoint which had
been determined by the pressure exerted from the Indonesian
side also.
After the return of Sukarno from Japan, where he received
a non-committal answer from Premier Tojo on the question of
independence and where he also sought in vain the permission
for singing the national anthem and hoisting the red-white flag,
he mentioned in a report that he went to Japan on the in-
I R.V.O., 001854.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 219

stmctions of the Commander in Java, who asked him to com-

municate the thanks of the Indonesian people. Further, "His
Majesty the Emperor permitted us to be received and uttered
kindly words. And not only this, we were presented by His
Majesty with high decorations. We are not able to express in
words our feelings for this mark of honour. But all marks of
honour, which we received, we see mainly directed to the In-
donesian people in Java." 1
The efforts of the Japanese in Japan proper were, however,
continuously aimed at obtaining a firmer hold on the popu-
lations of the occupied territories. The prevention and sup-
pression of unrest and turmoil was one reason, and the necessity
of an appreciable increase in production, a second one. During
the period 1943-44 when Japan had been pushed more and more
on the defensive and the American advance on the Marshall
and Gilbert Islands, the Marianas and Carolines had clearly
threatened the Japanese lines of communication, the third
motive originated out of the necessity of engaging wide layers
of the population in the war effort. The period of impressing the
masses in a one-sided way by Japan's power and glory had come
to an end, and the passive obedience and submissiveness was
also considered to be no longer satisfactory. "Live or die with
Japan" and the "Rise or fall of the whole of Asia depends on the
Japanese victory" became the new slogans. Japan placed herself
on the pedestal of the protector of an Asia again threatened by
the West. The common fate of all East Asiatic peoples was
based on this fact and, therefore, still more co-operation than
ever before was considered to be necessary in order to face
every military setback. The situation of the war demanded more
participation of and greater control on the Indonesians. Therefore,
in the political sphere public representation was resorted to
and in the military field, military and police auxiliary organs of
Indonesians came into being. In the sphere of organisation,
effective unification of the population was aimed at, so that
it might be possible for the supreme military authority to bring
the entire human machinery into operation with one gesture.
The Putera did not seem to have fully satisfied this requirement.
I t is tme that by the foundation of the Putera an organisation
1 ibid.• See also Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 1344 and 1331; Timetable No. 150.
220 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

had been created which embraced all Indonesian political

associations, but apart from this there existed also the concen-
tration of Islamic organisations 1, the organisation of Oversea-
Chinese 2, and also the Indo-Europeans as far as they had allowed
themselves to be convinced and brought in by the Japanese
propaganda machine.
With the skill of a psychological master the Japanese looked
for a better system. And they found a solution - by which they
proved to understand well this part of the war effort - which
they allowed to be prompted by those on whom it would be
applied.
The Commander of the 16th Army placed the problem before
the Central Advisory Council as to which way the activity of the
Javanese population could best be stimulated in order to be
ready when the threatening, approaching demon of war would
also visit this island. The Central Advisory Council, at its very
first session, gave the answer. 3
But before discussing this answer, we should have an idea of
the importance of this Advisory Council and the local advisory
councils, which were set up with a good deal of show. 4 Outwardly,
they reminded the population of the former People's Council,
the Provincial and local Councils. But as to their significance,
they were completely hollowed out editions of the representative
bodies existing during the Dutch rule. The People's Council,
however, was no perfect parliament, since the government was
not required to yield before the majority of the Council in
the absence of agreement concerning the proposed legislative
measures. In case of emergencies it could lay down measures on
its own authority subject to further approval of the Dutch
legislative authority, and in other cases could place before the
Dutch legislative authority for acceptance. Further, the People's
Council consisted of partly elected and partly nominated members
1 The Masiumi.
• The Kakyoo Sookai. Doc. No. 2750, pp.82-83. See also Victor Purcell, The
Chinese in South East Asia (Oxford Univ. Press, London 1952), pp. 551-552.
• First Session, October 15-20, 1943.
• See Kan Po No. 26; Osamu Seirei No. 36, dated September 5, 1943; Osamu
Kanrei No.6, September 5,1943; Doc. No. 2750, p. 65. Twenty-three members of the
Central Advisory Council were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief. Of the re-
mainder, the advisory council of each Residency and municipality nominated from
amongst its members one representative, while two members were nominated by
the Principalities of Djokjakarta and Surakarta. Total: 43 members.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 221

and hence, it was no pure representation, elected for and by the

people. Nevertheless, the People's Council was a co-legislative
governing body, in which the government explained her whole
conduct and was subjected to criticism, and with which
agreement had to be reached regarding legislative measures,
with the reservation that the government could overrule the
council. Moreover, it had the right of initiative, amendment
and interpellation. The body that was instituted by the Japanese,
on the other hand, enjoyed few of these rights. It was created
mainly to answer the questions put by the Japanese authority.
The answers had no legal force. At best they had the force of
advice. Besides, it could - it is true that it was entirely composed
of Indonesians but strong pressure was exercised by the Japanese
directed secretariat - carry motions, which could be lodged as
notifications. That was all. Most of the decrees, including many
important ones, were issued without any reference to the Ad-
visory Council. Sukarno is reported to have said about this body:
"The old People's Council was the only organ of opposition of the
people against the Dutch rulers, but the present Central Advisory
Council is an organ of co-operation with the military authority".
Even the Indonesian press, although it completely followed the
Japanese tune, could not conceal in its first reports that some
members felt somewhat strange in the atmosphere of this new
body. But, as the Japanese adviser had explained, the members
should realise that there was no place in this body for unneces-
sary verbosity of arrogant native members. Far from being a
body in which the Japanese policy could be criticised and put
to test, it was an organ under which the military authority
shielded itself for engaging the population in total warfare.
The Central Advisory Council began its first session by
thanking the Japanese Government for her generosity to allow
the Indonesian people to participate in the government in the
way outlined above. In four resolutions the answer was given
on the question of how the activity of the people could be made
use of on a wider scale. 1 The Council advised the expansion of
the Peta that consisted of Indonesians and of the Hei Ho, re-
cruitment of native labour on a big scale, stimulation of mutual
assistance (which existed in the Indonesian society from ancient
1 Doc. No. 2750, p. 75.
222 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

times) and the adoption of measures for the stepping up of pro-

duction. 1 In the second session of the Council 2 the problem of
increasing the war effort once again came up for discussion,
and this time also the Council made various suggestions. 3
Meanwhile, the Commander of the 16th Army announced in
January 1944 - whether inspired or not by the advice of the
Central Advisory Council - the foundation of a new "movement
for communal services", the Djawa Hookoo Kai. 4 A civilian
organisation, whose ramifications should extend down to the
smallest unit of the society, was necessary. All free inhabitants
of Java of over 14 years, irrespective of nationality, rank or
social status, should fulfil their duties for the defence of their
homeland and the annihilation of the English and Americans. 5
Thus was created the Djawa Hookoo Kai, which replaced the
one-year old Putera. The supreme leaders of the new organisation
was the Gunseikan, the head of the Military Administration with
Sukamo, the principal Indonesian leader as the Chief of the
Head Office. The members had to pay one cent per month as
contribution for the new movement. 6
A few months before the creation of the Djawa Hookoo Kai,
the structure by which this organisation could penetrate deep
into the desa was already completed. The so-called Tonari
Gumi (J) or Rukun Tetangga (M) - Neighbourhood Associations,
consisting of units of ten to twenty families under the supervision
of a responsible Kumityoo (J) or neighbourhood head, were
set up. 7 New directives were issued 8, so that these Neighbour-
hood Associations could function as "breechblocks" of the local
branches of the central H ookoo Kai. In this way a chain was
forged, which connected the centre along a hierarchical way
with the outskirts of the country.
The Djawa Hookoo Kai (J) or Perhimpunan Kabaktian
Rakjat (M) - Organisation for Communal Services - had to
1 Kan Po No. 30, p. 7.
• January 29-February 2, 1944.
• Kan Po No. 35, p. 7; Kan Po No. 36, pp. 13-27.
• Kan Po No. 34, pp. 10-23.
• G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., pp. 36-37; Kan Po No. 28, P 11; Kan Po No. 29,
pp. 5-15; A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 113; George MeT Kahin, op. cit., p. 110.
o G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 37.
7 Doc. No. 2750, p. 85; A.A. Zorab, op. cit., pp.112-113; W. H. EIsbree, op. cit.,

pp. 126-127.
8 Kan Po No. 35, p. 13.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 223

implement the measures outlined by the Military Government

and support them in order to achieve the purpose of the "holy"
Great East Asiatic War in a "friendly co-operation". It was
expected that all inhabitants of Java would understand their
duty to sacrifice themselves for this "holy" war and act ac-
cordingly.l
The working method of the new system was that the ideas
and plans of the Japanese Government were made known through
councils, which formed part of the branch offices of the Djawa
Hookoo Kai. In every unit of the administrative division, from
residency down to village, there was a Hookoo Kai office. The
councils attached to all these offices had to meet once in every
six months, when ideas about the furtherance of the support to
the military authority were exchanged. 2
For the Tonari Gttmis one meeting a month was fixed. Their
duty was to look after the regional defence of the native soil in
co-operation with the organisation for protection against air
raid, fire and espionage danger - the Keiboodan. Besides, they
had to give publicity to all legal instructions and directives,
promote the production of rice and other cereals, improve the
distribution and consumption of goods, lend support in the
military field and be active in the matter of mutual assistance
between the inhabitants. 3
The logical result of the all-embracing activities of the
Djawa Hookoo Kai and Tonari Gttmi was the incorporation, in
these two organisations, of all existing associations. The Japanese
had only to deal in future with a few responsible leaders at the
top of the organisation. Japanese propaganda and instructions,
therefore, penetrated into the remotest comers by the inter-
mediary of these leaders through the local branches of the
Hookoo Kai and Tonari Gttmi.
The Tonari Gttmis, however, were not exclusively propaganda
organs. They also took care of all matters of local interests.
Moreover, the leaders acted as informers of the authority.
Through these small cells all activities, such as anti-Japanese
tendency, fifth column activity, were communicated to the

1 R. V.D., 011208.
2 ibid.
• R. V.D., 011209.
224 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

central authority. Thus they were considered to be the means

of two-way traffic - for passing on propaganda and orders to
below and supplying information to above. At all centres there
were leaders who could be held responsible for the course of
things at any moment. Not without reason was this system,
which had been in existence in Japan since ancient times,
called a "spy-hostage system" in English and American litera-
ture. 1
With the creation of the Djawa Hookoo Kai the Japanese
performed a similar act as with the building up of the new
Islamic state organisation. Along the side of the- government,
in which still many capable old hands did their work, an army
of new authorities was raised from the bottom with complete
equipment that marched across the field of authority of the
old tradition, and as a result, little was left of it.
The Japanese rulers devoted special attention to the spiritual
and physical training of the youth. They attached such im-
portance to this matter that they kept it completely in their
own hands. To the disappointment of Indonesian political leaders
they did not grant permission to start an Indonesian youth
movement along the side of the Putera, founded in March 1943.
As early as December 1942 the Japanese Commander-in-Chief
in Java declared that the training of the younger generation
to be good citizens of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
was of such paramount importance that the best Japan had to
offer was not considered sufficient. 2 From this the Japanese
leader might conclude that the best Java had to offer was even
more insufficient.
In April 1943 the youth corps Seinendan was established.
Its published aim was "to convince the youth of Java so that
they will energetically co-operate with the Military Government
and render assistance in the building up of the Co-Prosperity
Sphere in Greater East Asia." 3 In this co-operation the youth
1 The Hookoo Kai system was imported from China to Japan in the 8th Century.
In China the neighbourhood societies and their covering organisations in fact were
only used for the usual promotion and care of administrative affairs. Japan borrowed
the form of organisation but at the same time made it subservient to the totalitarian
regime by turning it into a propaganda-spying-hostage organisation_ In this form the
system was introduced in the occupied territories.
• Doc. No. 2750, p. 50.
• ibid., p. 51.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 225

should be led by instructors of their own nationality, for which

selection and training of suitable persons was necessary. In
every Syuu a training centre was set up for local instructors,
while for the higher cadre a Central Training Camp was opened
near Batavia. 1 The direction and organisation of these training
camps were entirely in the hands of the Japanese.
When the intial training of local and regional leaders was
over, it could be extended downwards. In every Ken (Regency)
and Si (town) a Youth Corps (Seinendan) was organised. Detach-
ments could be formed even in villages where there were more
than 500 youths. Also in factories and industries the Seinendan
organised its branches. In short, within a few months a youth
army was created, which, besides military training, fire aid and
air raid defence, was also engaged in sports, general education
and study of language. In fact, much time was devoted to the
teaching of the Japanese language. Above all Seinendan detach-
ments there was the Djawa Rengoo Seinendan (United Youth
Corps of Java), which acted as the covering organisation. To
demonstrate clearly the importance of the Youth Corps the
Gunseikan became the Chief of the Seinendan in Java, while
the heads of the Departments of General and Interior Affairs
functioned as deputy chiefs.
Young men of 14-25 years of age, with the exception of the
Chinese, could become members of the Seinendan. Uniforms
were not prescribed. The maximum contribution amounted
to one cent per month. 2
Spectacular work could not be performed by the Seinendan,
but considerable results were recorded in spiritually influencing
and getting a hold on the younger generation. Deeply imbued
with the Japanese ideology and inspired by race hatred carefully
fostered, the instructors, fresh from their training camps,
hurriedly conveyed their undigested ideas to the youths who
were under their guidance.
When the initiative was taken in September 1943 to build
up an Indonesian Volunteers Army, it was particularly the
young Seinendan-members who came forward for the military
service. With this the real intention of the Japanese revealed
1 Tyuuoo Seinen Kunrensyo.

• Kan Po No. 18, pp. 8-17.

226 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

itself. The principal aim of the formation and enlargement of

the Seinendan was to create a large reservoir of young people,
which could be used for any purposes, especially for military
ones. In a carefully planned way and working rapidly the
Japanese accomplished their plans with the help of the Infor-
mation Service. In a request, perhaps inspired by the Japanese,
but at any rate signed with his own blood, a well-known poli-
tician 1 asked the Japanese commander for the formation of an
Indonesian army, which would be able to defend Java against
the Allies. Within a week all Kentyoo (Regents) of Java followed
with similar requests and petitions. In the press there appeared
interviews with prominent Indonesian personalities, all of whom
were in favour of this idea. The Four-Leaved Clover also extended
their support to this request, so that it aroused no surprise when
the Commander-in-Chief declared in the beginning of October
1943 that he was favourably disposed towards these requests
and petitions. 2 The Commander said that he was willing to
comply with the expressed desire of the 50 million "original
inhabitants" of Java. 3 He considered this justified longing as
an expression of gratitude for Tojo's promise of participation
in the government and, therefore, he had given instruction for
the formation of a Volunteers Army - Kyodo Booei Giytt Gun -
for the defence of the homeland. <1
This army, Peta, unlike the earlier formed auxiliary corps
(Hei Ho), did not constitute a part of the Japanese army, but
it was certainly trained by Japanese officers and was under the
chief command of the Java Army Commander who, contrary
to international conventions, could direct this fighting force
to the battlefields outside Java. Although on paper a separate
army, the Peta, according to the Japanese view, had been "linked
up with the Japanese army." 5
1 Gatot Mangupradja. Before the war, in 1930, he, along with Sukarno and other
leaders of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), was sentenced to imprisonment by
the Dutch authorities.
• Kan Po No. 28, pp. 19-24; Osamu Seirei No. 44, Oct. 3, 1943; Doc. No. 2750.
p.68.
3 The preamble of a large number of decrees for any measure contained "the desire
of the 50 million inhabitants of Java." The curious thing is that the Military Com-
mander used the expression "original inhabitants", while the head of the Military
Administration spoke of "the Indonesian people", which was not officially allowed.
• The Indonesian name is Sukarela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air, abbreviation is Peta.
5 Kan Po No. 28, pp. 19-24.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 227

The officers received a basic training of three months, on

termination of which they were administered an oath in a big
propaganda meeting by the Commander of the 16th Army.
The non-commissioned officers obtained also a training of
equal duration. Then followed the formation of battalions, in
which a role was assigned to military "romanticism" in the form
of distribution of battalion colours. 1
The first levy of the Peta started immediately. A second and
third levy followed in April and July 1944. 2 The enthusiasm
for the Peta, however, diminished in the course of a few months,
so that the Japanese command laid down the number of "volun-
teers" each regency should furnish. The object was to form one
or more battalions of about 1000 men per Syuu. 3
In the selection of the members of the Peta preference was
given to local influential persons with a strongly developed
race-consciousness. 4 The training was imparted in the spirit
of "fight and die together with the Nipponese." The Gttnseikan
called it "to present yourself with your soul, flesh and blood
for the Javanese homeland and the Great East Asia idea." 5
At the same time racial sentiments and devotion were stimulated.
By their close contact with the "volunteers" the Japanese,
however, understood that the Indonesians would not in the long
run remain satisfied with their dependent position on the J a-
panese army. 6 A clear suspicion of the Japanese command
about these young fellow-fighters was evident from the fact
that weapons, mostly old KNIL rifles, were placed at their
disposal only during the time of training. Often they were trained
merely with wooden rifles.
With the fostering of race-consciousness and feelings of
hatred towards the former rulers, the Japanese played a danger-
ous game since they had lost the sympathy they had enjoyed
as "liberators" by their own severe oppressive rule. Only fear
of the harsh Japanese fist restrained the Indonesians from a
general revolt.

1 Doc. No. 2750, pp. 67-69.

• Kan Po No. 41, pp. 5-10; Kan Po No. 48, July 24, 1944, p. 12.
• Java had 17 Residencies (Syuu).
• Japanese report about Indo·auxiliary troops, R. V.O., 006503.
• Kan Po No. 28, pp. 19-24.
• Japanese report about Indo·auxiliary troops, R.V.O., 006504.
228 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

At the beginning of 1945, however, there was an outbreak in

Blitar (East Java). In the night of February 14-15 the Peta made
a surprise attack on the Japanese ammunition depot, in order
later to occupy the key points and buildings in the city, such as
the headquarters of the Kempeitai and the telephone office.
An orgy of plunder and murder followed, of which some Indo-
Europeans who were still free, and Japanese, Chinese, Arabs and
Indians became the victims. The uprising was partly quelled by
bloodshed and partly settled by compromise. 1 An official
explanation of what happened was given only in May 1945. Not
a word was said in this of what actually took place. Only criti-
cism was expressed about some betrayers of the Great East Asia
idea who had not properly understood the message the Japanese
had brought to their "younger brothers". Besides, the rebellion
against the "2600 year old and never-defeated Nipponese realm
that had now taken the leadership of millions of inhabitants of
Great East Asia" was characterised as something impossible. 2
Another danger in raising an Indonesian army came from the
side of the Communists, who attempted to infiltrate into the
volunteer corps in a large scale. That they succeeded in this
appeared from the Japanese intention to carry out a general
"purge" of the Peta. The end of the war, however, frustrated
this plan. 3
The nature of the training of the Peta seems to have been
strongly influenced by the course of the war. At first simple
infantry training was given, which was intended for troops that
would have to perform only garrison duties. But since the
announcement of the future independence of Indonesia - speech
of Premier Koiso in September 1944 - the instructors concen-
trated in raising a volunteers army that would become the
nucleus of the future national army. Therefore, besides infantry
training, training with other weapons was gradually introduced.
An official order for the formation of infantry, tank, motor
transport and engineers' battalions could not be executed
because of the Japanese capitulation. 4
A training in guerrilla warfare with motorised troops in
1 Doc. No. 2750, p. 107.
• Kan Po No. 67, pp. 10-14, May 19, 1945.
• Japanese report about Indo-auxiliary troops, R. V.O., 006501-006506.
• ibid.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 229

view of the expected Allied attacks was certainly completed. A

special section of the Peta - I Go Kunmu Tai - was trained for
this purpose. Uniforms were not used. After training at the
centre the officers returned to their villages to prepare the
defence.
In order to get an impression of the extent of the military and
semi-military apparatus built from the Javanese youth and
with it the influence which the Japanese had exercised on the
younger generation, it is necessary also to have a review of
other organisations.
One of the largest was the Keiboodan, a civilian organisation
spread all over Java, whose main duty was to render first aid
in case of fire and air raid. 1 The Chinese were also engaged in
this, although in a separate body - Tokobatsu Kakyo Keibootai -
which, like the Keiboodan, was directly subordinated to the
Gunseikan. Other nationalities, such as the Arabs and Indians
also participated in the Keiboodan. Only Chinese could become
members of the Chinese organisation, which seems to have
caused suspicion among the Indonesians. Owing to the lack of
interest of the Chinese, which was not stimulated by the Japanese
because of the fear of Indonesian displeasure, this corps remained
limited in size. In some places it came to an end. 2
The Hei Ho 3, mentioned earlier, was considered as a part of
the Japanese forces. The training was on equal basis with that
of the Japanese. Anti-aircraft guns, tanks, artillery and mortars
could be handled by the H ei H os, who should be able to replace
the Japanese. Many H ei H os were specially employed for
transport. Unlike the members of the Hizbullah, those of the
Hei Ho and the Peta were paid. 4
A strongly specialised organ was the Beppan, later called
Nanseitai, whose task was to furnish information, in the widest
sense of the word, to the military authority. Information had to
be given about the development of national movements, prices,
rumours, behaviour and conduct of influential Indonesians,
public reaction of the military administration, disturbances,
unrest, rebellion, frauds, activities of the Peta, etc. Therefore,
1 Kan Po No. 18, pp. 9-23.

• Japanese report, R. V.O., 006528.

• Hei: soldier, Ho: 2nd class reserve.
• Japanesel'eport, R.V.O., 006527.
230 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

the Beppan was principally an "observation apparatus", which

had to keep an eye on the movements of the different groups of
people, listen to their voice and observe their reactions, so that
the committing of mistakes by the military government could
be prevented. The Beppan in Java - there were also similar
organisations in other islands - received its orders from the
headquarters of the 16th Army and particularly from the
Intelligence Division. Its reports were directly delivered to the
head of this section. The latter sent the appropriate news to the
Department of Propaganda or Public Safety. 1
Besides the Hei Hos, who also served as auxiliary troops in the
navy, there were Indonesians who formed a part of another naval
service, the Nami Kikan, a sea reconnoitering service, which had
as its principal task the observation of enemy activity along the
coast and the immediate reporting of it to the headquarters of
the 16th Army. To camouflage the real intentions this organ-
isation possessed small ships which carried goods on behalf of
the military government. In case of enemy landings these ships
were to be destroyed. 2
There were still other military groups, nurtured by the differ-
ent social layers of the population but inspired by certain J a-
panese - of whom Shimizu of the Propaganda Department was
one of the most important - who considered a multiplicity of
organisations directed for the same purpose rather an asset than
a liability. Conflicts and rivalries seemed to have been deliberately
created and encouraged in order to awaken the Indonesian people
from their century-old attitude of submissive obedience to the tra-
ditional authority. The fostering of a revolutionary spirit among
the Indonesians fitted in better with the scheme of Japanese plans. 3
1 ilnd., 006527-006528.
• ilnd., 006529-006530.
• The figures about the strength of the different bodies rather differ in the various
reports. The nearest truth probably lies in the following ones, which were the numbers
at the time of capitulation:
Peta: 37,000.
Hei Ho: 25,000.
Hizbullah: 50,000.
Keiboodan: 1,280,000.
Pemudas (youths): 500,000-600,000.
Student Service Corps: 50,000.
Barisan Berani Mati (suicide corps): 50,000.
Pelopor (shock troops): 80,000.
See Report HQ I6th Army, R.V.O., 005124 and japanese report abO#t Indo-auxiliary
troops, R. V.O., 006501-006506, 006527.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 231

The course of the war took a decisive tum in the second half
of 1944. In Europe the Allies had succeeded in landing on the
coast of Normandy and pushed on further to the centre of
France, Belgium and the southern part of Holland after a few
weeks of embittered fighting at the bridgeheads. A dagger had
been thrust into the heart of the German "Empire".
In East Asia the Americans had conquered the most important
Japanese naval base at Saipan in July 1944 after the earlier
landings on the Carolines and Marianas. This meant a serious
threat to Japan's line of communication with the Southern
Areas. In Tokyo this fact was considered to be so serious that
it led to a cabinet crisis, as a result of which General Tojo,
Premier of Japan since 1941, had to resign. He was replaced by
Koiso.
Japan, as well as the occupied territories, now lay in the
frontline of the American attack. This completely falsified the
Japanese propaganda that was based on the invincibility of
Japan and the weakness of the Western Powers. The facts
appeared to be too much in contradiction to what the Japanese
propaganda tried to present as the truth.
The period in which any Allied threat was discounted as a
remote possibility had also passed. The Sword of Damocles was
clearly hanging over Japan's head. It was now considered
psychologically useful for Japan to develop in the occupied
territories a new idea. Not only Japan but the whole of East
Asia was threatened. The "hated" Western Powers once again
attempted to subjugate East Asia and exploit it for their own
benefit. In the trend of this new thought both Japan and In-
donesia stood with their backs against the wall. The fate of
Indonesia had been inseparably linked, as the favourite and
endlessly repeated phrase ran, with the rise and fall of Japan.
Without a Japanese victory "life was no longer worth living."
The time seemed to have arrived when some concrete form should
be given to this "common fate". But the Japanese were not yet
prepared to grant more than what was absolutely necessary.
Further promises and their realisation were, therefore, post-
poned till the moment when it appeared that delay was no
longer possible and that the Indonesian people should be fully
employed in the struggle.
232 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

It was at this decisive moment that the competent authorities

of the various ministries at Tokyo submitted to the Supreme
War Advisory Council a "Policy in regard to the Independence
of the East Indies." 1 On September 7, 1944 Premier Koiso, in
line with this policy, declared in the 85th extraordinary session
of the Diet that independence would be granted to Indonesia.
"We declare", he said, "that we intend to recognise their inde-
pendence in the future in order to ensure the eternal happiness
of the East Indian race." 2
The plan of independence prepared by the Japanese contained
the vaguely-worded principles that independence would be
granted to the whole of the former Netherlands Indies at a
moment following the completion of necessary preparations and
that the "will of the people" would be allowed to decide the
form as well as the name of the new state. 3
At the same time, the Ministry of War at Tokyo sent some
recommendations about the steps to be taken to the headquarters
of the 16th Army, which had been already informed of the
promise of independence. National feelings should be further
awakened. There no longer existed any objections against the
singing of the national anthem and the hoisting of the red-white
flag, while permission could be granted for the setting up of a
Committee of Investigation for the Preparation of Inde-
pendence. 4
In answer to the instructions of the War Ministry, the
headquarters of the 16th Army defined the course that was
suitable, seen from the local standpoint, for the smooth realisation
of the promised goal. 5 Java was to be the first to be eligible for
independence. To strengthen the national consciousness it was
suggested that an Academy for the Building of the State 6

1 Far East MU. Trib., Ezh. No. 1348; Timetable No. 151.
• Prosecution Doc. No. 454, Court Ezh. No. 277; Timetable No. 153.
• About the promise of independence see Kan Po No. 51, p. 11 and pp. 15--22;
Kan Po No. 52, pp. 24-28.
, Badan Penielidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (M). See Report HQ I6th Army,
R.V.O., 005871. Kabin's statement (Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. p. 102)
that the Japanese, on their arrival, "immediately" allowed the display of the red-
white Indonesian national flag and the singing of Indonesia Raja, the national
anthem, is thus absolutely wrong.
• Report submitted by HQ 16th Army was entitled "Gist of Measures for Guiding
Independence." See Doc. No. 2750, p. 103.
• Ken Koku Gakuin (j).
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 233

should be established and that participation in the adminis-

tration should be increased. The Navy Command, both in
Tokyo as well as in the various headquarters of the local com-
mands, however, showed little interest for the problem of
independence. 1
In order to execute the Imperial intentions to grant inde-
pendence to Indonesia at a date still to be fixed, the Chief of
Staff of the 16th Army addressed to the local military authorities
a notification, which is worth the trouble of further consider-
ation, because it gives an insight into the deliberate plan of
action of the Japanese military authority.
The purport of the granting of independence ought to be
thoroughly understood. It was not allowed to make any indi-
cation about the moment of realisation of the promise, the area
involved, nor the form of government until these were finally
decided. Meanwhile, national consciousness must be raised to
the highest degree and directed to the prosecution of the war
and the indissoluble unity of Java and Japan. There should
be no great alterations in the structure of the Military Govern-
ment. Only the number of leading Indonesians that constituted
a part of the administrative machinery, like the political training
in general, should be enlarged. The reins of nationalist activity
should be let loose. Aggressive nationalistic speeches should not
be opposed any longer, neither the singing of the national anthem
and the display of the red-white flag. However, any effort of the
Communists to abuse this indulgence must be strongly sup-
pressed. Under the guidance of the military authority special
attention should be paid to the preparation of the local in-
habitants for independence, while measures would be taken for
the spreading of the Japanese language, the adoption of Japanese
institutions and the infusion of the Japanese culture. The
distinction between the natives and "other races" - the J a-
panese! - should be abandoned, but this implied that the In-
donesians must co-operate with all their might for the con-
struction of the new society. Before the Japanese Militarists,
their divine mission had been laid which was based on the
principle of Hakko Ichiu. 2 No haughty and arrogant attitude
1 Report HQ I6th Army, R. V.O., 005871.
• the nations of the world belonginl{ to ODe family.
234 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

towards the population would be tolerated, nor a flattering one.

They must show friendship to the natives and guide and instruct
them in a firm way, just as parents or elder brothers and sisters
would do, without involving themselves in their mutual diffi-
culties or in the confusion that certainly would arise by the
shifting of power. Especially in this connection, strict observation
must be devoted to the military, auxiliary organisations - Peta
and Hei Ho. It was pointed out in general that the japanese
activity must not relax if, after the publication of Koiso's
declaration, great enthusiasm and festivities would create the
impression that their goal in java had already been achieved.
The last point of the circular, issued by the Chief of Staff of
the 16th Army, contained some practical measures: the 7th of
September was designated as National Independence Com-
memoration Day, and in this connection seven days would be
celebrated. The local heads would assemble on the same day in
order to hear from the Commander about the policy to be
followed. On the 8th of September a ceremony would be held,
at which the representatives of the inhabitants would express
their gratitude. On September 9 and 10, 1944 a special session
of the local councils would be convened, and on September 11,
the Central Advisory Council would meet. 1
Besides these orders, the Department of Propaganda issued
detailed instructions to organise a grand campaign for the
promised independence and the ensuing celebrations. The
japanese propaganda machine was thoroughly organised. The
japanese voice resounded throughout the whole of java. Even
in the smallest villages there appeared the so-called "singing
towers" or rather radio loudspeakers fixed on pillars, which
blared out music, morning exercises, news, information and
instructions in all directions. A sample-card of programmes was
placed before the people who had been hitherto absorbed in
their agriculture, village and family affairs. A "counter-espionage
week" followed a japanese week, an "everybody works week",
a "national health week", and a "defence week." In between
these was held a "positive victory day", a "local safety day", a
"race harmony day", a "day of the Asiatics", a "voluntary
1 Osamu San J 0 K 0 No. 142, September 7, 1944. Prosecution Doc. No. 2756. See also
Doc. No. 2750, pp. 94-98.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 235

service day", an anti-Jew campaign and a "service for all gods."

Is it surprising, therefore, that the philosophically-inclined,
religious population of Java was aroused from its peaceful
reflective moods?
The fifth special session of the Central Advisory Council held
its deliberations in a similar way as the previous ones. The
Commander of the 16th Army put written questions in advance 1,
which he and after him the head of the Department of General
Affairs - and generally also the head of the Military Adminis-
tration - explained in the meeting, after which the Council
drafted the answers in the form of resolutions. 2 This special
session was convened in order to answer the questions of the
Commander in which way the inhabitants of Indonesia should
express their deep gratitude to the Imperial Japanese Govern-
ment and the Japanese Army for the generous promise of
independence and in which way the fighting spirit of the popu-
lation that would bring about the annihilation of the English
and Americans could further be enhanced.
The Council answered in accordance with the wishes which
were implied in the question of the Commander. A thousand-fold
thanks was expressed for the liberation from the Western yoke
and measures were proposed to increase the war effort. In life
and death Japan and Indonesia were one, both before and after
the achievement of independence. 3
In the sixth session of the Council, which was convened in
November 1944, Sukarno, as Chairman of the Central Advisory
Council, formulated the Five Rules for the Conduct of Life -
Pancha Dharma -, which he called the basic idea of Great
East Asia. 4
At the same time the Japanese made a fresh gesture in the
direction of co-operation by the Indonesians in the government.
A council of advisers - Dw;an San-Yo - was attached to the
office of the Gunseikan. 5 But this was also a body that had
neither power nor influence. Only questions could be answered
by this Indonesian council and even that was done under the
1 September 8, 1944. Kan Po No. 51, p. 21.
• Kan Po No. 51, pp. 23-25.
• ibid.
• Kan Po No. 55, pp. 8-20; R.V.O., 008209-008210; Doc. No. 2750, pp. 104-105.
• November 23, 1944. Kan Po No. 55, p. 6.
236 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

supervIsIon of a Japanese-controlled secretariat. Further, to

implement the recommendations received from Tokyo, which
had accompanied Premier Koiso's declaration of September 7,
1944, Indonesian assistant-Residents - Huku Syuutyokan - were
appointed in several Residencies. 1
Apart from some increase in the number of advisers in the
departments and bureaux of the Military Administration, the
promise of Koiso - September 7, 1944 - at first did not bring
results. It was not before February 1945 that a new measure
provided an increase in the number of Indonesians in the Central
Advisory Council. 2 The group of Indonesians to be appointed
by the military authority was raised from 28 to 38. According
to the Japanese this was an important step forward in the
direction of self-government.
Ordinarily, the Japanese waited for official festival days to
speak more clearly about new developments in the public life.
This also happened on the third anniversary - March 1, 1945 -
of the Japanese landings in Java, or the third anniversary of
"New Java". The Commander announced his decision of the
establishment of the Investigating Committee for the Prepa-
ration of Independence. He also decided to found an Academy
for the Building of the State and gave his consent for more
liberal treatment in public of the forthcoming independence. 3
The decision for the establishment of the Investigating Com-
mittee for the Preparation of Independence 4, was the first,
though extremely limited, step in the direction of real inde-
pendence. 5 The task of the Investigating Committee would be,
as appeared from an official explanation of the government, to
investigate into all fundamental problems relating to the foun-
dation of the new realm which would have the character of a
Great East Asiatic State. Apart from the matters which were
important for the building up of the political framework, the

1 Report HQ I6tk Army, R. V.O., 00587!.

• Kan Po No. 61, p. 8.

• Kan Po No. 62, pp. 26-27.
• Henceforth to be called: Investigating Committee.
• Dr. Radjiman Wediodiningrat was the Chairman of the Investigating Committee;
the Committee's sixty· two members included also Sukarno and Hatta, 4 Chinese,
one Arab, one Indo-European and eight Japanese "experts", hesides the other
Indonesian representatives- Report Ickibangase Yoskio, Japanese Vice-Chairman of
the Committee, R. V.O., 005850. See also G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 33.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 237

drafting of plans and programmes for the different government

departments also belonged to this. About the results of the
investigation a report must be submitted to the Gunseikan -
the head of the Military Administration -, who should collect
these reports in order to be able to present them as basic materials
to the future Committee of Preparation for Independence,
which organ should give the final decision about all questions
and problems regarding independence. Another explanation
about the Investigating Committee said that this was based on
the ardent desire for freedom which existed in the hearts of all
inhabitants of Java, while the members were recruited from all
layers of the population, by which the new body received the
character of a mobilisation of the entire people. 1
The decision for setting up an Academy for the Building of
the State taken by the Commander of the 16th Army on the
3rd anniversary of "New Java" - March 1, 1945 - was materi-
alised on the birthday of the Japanese Emperor. On April 29,
1945 the ceremonial opening of this institution took place with
one and two years' courses in theoretical and practical ad-
ministration and jurisprudence, by which the Japanese expected
to give a stimulating impulse to the national revival, based on
the Great East Asia idea. 2
Meanwhile, it became more and more clear to the Japanese
that they were dependent in a large measure on the co-operation
of the Indonesian popUlation. Moreover, the sheer weight of the
propaganda-policy had compelled the Japanese military author-
ity to accept the consequences of the policy that was followed.
The latter became apparent at Singapore during a special
conference - April 30, 1945 - of the Chiefs of General Affairs
Departments of the different administrative machineries which
were under the Command of the 7th Area Army. 3 At this
conference the Soomubutyoo of the 16th Army in Java 4 explained
how the national consciousness of the Indonesians had been
awakened and how it had reaclied a degree of inflammability,
1 R.V.O.,005899-005900.
• Report HQ r6th Army, R.V.O., 005872; Kan Po No. 63, p. 4; Kan Po No. 64:
Osamu Seil'ei No. 18, April I, 1945 and Osamu Kanrei No.5, April 3, 1945; Kan Po
No. 66, p. 39.
• including Java and Sumatra.
• Head of General Affairs Department and as such a leading figure of the Military
Administration.
238 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

which left no other alternative except the one that would lead
to independence and, therefore, to the preservation of the confi-
dence of the people. 1
In view of this problem of independence continually becoming
more pressing and in order to have a clear picture of the situation
in all Southern Areas under his command, Field Marshal Terau-
chi - headquarters at Saigon - asked for reports from all local
headquarters on the matter. The 16th Army - the occupier of
Java - promptly responded with a proposition to declare the
whole of the former Netherlands East Indies independent
within the year 1945. The hierarchy above this command - the
7th Area Army at Singapore - was, however, considerably less
decided in its utterances. The report of this headquarters clearly
avoided to mention the areas eligible for independence, while
the moment at which this would take place was described as
"too early to begin with." 2
Nevertheless, General Itagaki, Commander of the 7th Area
Army, called a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the occupied
areas at Singapore to discuss the situation on May 20, 1945.
Concerning the military aspect it was admitted in this meeting
that the war was definitely turning against Japan. 3 The acknow-
ledgment of this fact caused an accelaration in the procedure
to be followed, which should lead to the independence of In-
donesia. Java was allowed to convene a session of the Investi-
gating Committee 4
During the first session, which lasted from May 29-June 2,
1945, two-thirds of the Indonesian members present expressed
their opinion about the problems of the future independence.
The most noteworthy result of this meeting was a "declaration
of determination", which was accepted at the proposal of Su-
kama. In this it was stated, inter alia, that the Committee
resented the fact that the enemy had already occupied a part
of the Archipelago, viz. Morotai, Tarakan and Papua, tried to
land in Halmaheira, and possibly also in other parts of the
1 Report HQ I6th Army, R. V.O., 005872; Doc. No. 2750, pp. 108-109.

• Report HQ I6th Army, R.V.O., 005872; Doc. No. 2750, p. 109.

• Doc. No. 2750, p. 109.
• The decision for the establishment of this Committee was announced on March 1,
1945, see Kan Po No. 62, pp. 26-32; the official proclamation of the decision and the
establishment of the Committee took place on April 29, 1945, see Kan Po No. 66,
pp. 9-10; the installation of the Committee happened on May 29, 1945.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 239

beloved homeland, but that all members of the Committee

backed by 70 million people were prepared to fight in all sin-
cerety for the preservation of the Japanese Empire. 1
The second session, convened in July 1945, was the last one
which the Committee was allowed to hold. Among the subjects
discussed were the form of government, territory involved,
economic and financial policy, defence, education and a draft
constitution. After the termination of the meetings the chairman
and vice-chairman handed over the reports of the findings to
the head of the military authority and with it the Investigating
Committee concluded its task.
The primary task of the Central Advisory Council had been -
as we have already discussed and as the name indicated - the
tendering of advice. 2 In addition, the Council had some other
rights, viz. to make proposals and ask questions. When the
Council exercised these rights, there followed a reaction from
the side of the government just as the military commander
reacted on the answers of the Council. Thus in the third session
of the Council the government spokesman, in which function
the secretary of the Advisory Council acted, made references
to what was discussed during the first two sessions, while in the
seventh session an explanation was given on the measures which
were taken as a result of what was dealt with from the third
to the sixth sessions.
The government answers, and also the proposals made, gave
in some respects a strong impression about the burden, under
which the population of Java suffered during the Japanese
occupation. Thus the Council asked in the third session - May
1944 - for measures to satisfy the demand for cloth and improve
public health. The reply, given in the seventh session, was
that the shortage of cloth should be remedied locally by their
own effort and by expanding the cottage industry. To support
this effort weaving technicians would be trained in a centre at
Bandung and at the same time the government would look for
possibilities to make use of the formerly un-used fibres for the
spinning of yarns. 3
1 G. w. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 34; Kan Po No. 68, p. 12.
2 to the Commander of the 16th Army.
• Kan Po No. 62, pp.31-32. During the period of occupation the Japanese at-
tempted in vain to increase the production of cotton in Java on a large scale. Before
the war the experiments of the Dutch in this field likewise produced a negative result.
240 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

In order to effect an improvement in the public health,

courses on First Aid in case of Accidents were organised, while
new ways were sought for the preparation of some extremely
scarce medicines and the production of suitable food. 1 For the
latter purpose a commission was set up, which should study and
consider the possibilities of improvement of food in wartime. 2
In the fourth session of the Central Advisory Council- August
1944 - the members asked for better care of the "economic
soldiers", the Romushas, who, in thousands, leaving behind
their families, were taken away from the Javanese villages to
work elsewhere for the Japanese army. The support requested
concerned both those who had been lured away with beautiful
material promises as well as the members of the family who
stayed behind in miserable circumstances because they had to
do without the promised allowances.
The answer of the government spokesman was that an organ-
isation had already been set up - the so-called B.P. 3. - which
collected money locally, with which assistance would be rendered
to the Romushas and their families. 3 In practice this help came
to nothing, since the collection of money was very poor. The
population was not inclined to give money in the hands of the
innumerable newly-made leaders. Corruption reigned supreme
among this group. Any belief that the money would reach its
destination had already disappeared.
At the sixth session of the Central Advisory Council- Novem-
ber 1944 - the members brought up for discussion the question
of compulsory rice supplies imposed by the Japanese. The
Council ascertained that the quota fixed for each Syuu had not
been realised, because the importance of these deliveries had not
been wholly understood by the people. This was the reason why
the demand was not met with" a cheerful heart" and a maximum
possible quantity. Moreover, the Council thought that the rice-
supply had not yet been properly organised. Therefore, the
members proposed to reward the peasants for their achieve-
ments ...
1 Kan Po No. 62, p. 32.

• Pannia Memperbaiki lIat Makanan pada masa Perang.

• Kan Po No. 62, pp.38-39; Doc. No. 2750, p.75. Badan Penolong Pl'aiul'it
Pekel'ia (Body in Aid of Economic Warriors).
• Kan Po No. 55, p. 15.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 241

This was answered by the government representative in

February 1945 - seventh session of the Advisory Council - that
measures would be taken for those farmers who would fulfil
their duty to deliver the stated quantity of rice. 1
Meanwhile, the Commander of the 16th Army had submitted
the question to the Advisory Council at its seventh session as to
how the Council should propose to effect a speedy rebirth of
J ava, which would lead to victory in this war and the achieve-
ment of freedom for Indonesia. The Council offered, as usual,
its full support and expressed the opinion that there could
be no permanent freedom for Indonesia without - and here the
Japanese terminology was adopted - victory in the "holy war"
for Great East Asia. And, therefore, the Council drafted with
"flaming enthusiasm" thirty three slogans which, as basic
materials of the "Movements for the New Life", 2 should provide
"new souls" and "new blood" to the population of Java. The
sound advice which was implied in the thirty three slogans
varied from the necessity of love for the homeland to the speaking
of truth, early rising and setting to work at once, the honouring
of father and mother, the planting of every plot of land around
the houses and the development of discipline. The last point
obviously meant: "always be prepared." 3
The Council followed up this answer to the Commander of
the 16th Army by a few wishes and a resolution. Evidently,
news had reached the Council about the inhuman treatment
of the so-called "economic soldiers", Romushas, which was
indeed a fine title for the miserable forced-labourers. These
"economic soldiers" had been recruited in Java in thousands
by the Japanese and subsequently transported to Singapore,
Siam, Burma and elsewhere. The Council asked for the Romushas
a decent treatment during and after the working hours and the
provision, "if possible", of sufficient food for them. It was
further requested - and this also casts a serious reflection on the
Japanese methods - to send the labourers back home after the
termination of the labour-contract and not to leave them "half-
way to their own fate" somewhere. The Council observed that

1 Kan Po No. 62, p. 40.

• Skin Kokumin Undoo (J), Gerakan Hidup Baru (M).
• selaloelak siap sedia. Kan Po No. 62, pp. 41-42.
242 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

it was constrained to express these wishes lest the enthusiasm

to work for the Japanese should disappear completely.
Another point that was touched upon was the union of the
Diawa Hookoo Kai and the Masiumi. According to the Council,
it was necessary to unite both the organisations in order to be
able to direct the people's power in a better way. 1
As far as the wishes regarding the Romushas were concerned,
the Council did not have much success. The treatment, especially
outside Java, deteriorated with the progress of time. Countless
of these unfortunates never saw again their land of birth. 2 What
did succeed was the unification of the Diawa Hookoo Kai and the
Masiumi.
The seventh session of the Advisory Council was concluded
with a resolution, which ended with the words: "freedom or
death." 3 This battle-cry should be the guiding star of everyone
in Java. All the members of the league of dailies and periodicals-
Diawa Sinbun Kai - were summoned to hear from the head of
the Information Service that the press had the lofty task to
cultivate love for the beloved homeland and prepare the masses
for a struggle of life and death for freedom. Like the soldiers
fighting at the front, the press should mobilise an "army of
generals of the pen", which would fight under the slogan "freedom
or death." 4
Still things did not move fast enough for the Japanese, who
saw that their dream of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
was slowly but steadily disappearing. The Central Advisory
Council was again convened - eighth session, June 1945 - to
advise the Japanese commander in which way and by what
means the enthusiasm and energy of the population could further
be stimulated, so that as soon as possible complete support by
the people would be given to the preparations of independence. 5
The head of the Department of General Affairs, who explained
this question after the opening of the session, declared that
1 Kan Po No. 62, pp. 44-45.
I The correct figures of the Romushas who were transported outside Java are
not known; the official estimates of the Japanese after the capitulation mention
the figure of 270,000 men, of whom not more than 70,000 could be recovered after
the war - Doc. No. 2750, p. 74.
• Kan Po No. 62, p. 45.
• Kan Po No. 68, p. 16.
• The eighth session was held from June 18-21, 1945. See Kan Po No. 69,pp. 20-35.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 243

the war would certainly be won because, in whatever way the

war condition was considered, the situation had not developed
unfavourably but rather advantageously for Japan and her allies.
Nevertheless, blood, sweat and combative spirit would be de-
manded for this struggle. In order to emphasise the latter fact
this head of the department pointed to the threat which lay
hidden in the discussions at San Francisco - apparently referring
to the San Francisco Conference for the establishment of the
U.N. - where the Allies had already proceeded to "divide the
territories to be recovered in Asia."
After about one year of occupation of Indonesia, Radio
Tokyo broadcast: "Indonesia has become Eastern. The youth
finds football utter nonsense. The young men want to be militarily
trained." Now in July 1945 the Central Advisory Council asked
for complete armament of the Volunteers Corps (Peta), weapons
for the population and "better training in the guerrilla fight
than had so far been given." 1 Indeed, the Japanese training
had had its effects. The training, however, had made the In-
donesians also much more self-conscious. The answering of a
question placed before the Council could no longer be seen as
the docile acceptance of what the Japanese leadership ordained.
In some respects what the Council decided began even to re-
semble the advancing of demands as appeared from the other
points of this answer on the question of the Commander. The
Council asked to hand over with the greatest possible speed the
direction of the government organs, both central and local,
to the Indonesians. Moreover, it wanted a greater role to be
assigned to private initiative than had been allowed so far,
while the distribution of food and cloth should be improved.
In the same session the secretary of the Central Advisory
Council, as spokesman of the military authority, discussed the
results of the seventh session of the Council. From his speech it
appeared, inter alia, that the Japanese military authority
approved with satisfaction the plan of the Movement for the
New Life.
Shortly thereafter the Movement for the New Life was organ-
ised. 2 Sukarno, Hatta, Wiranatakusuma and Hasjim became the
1 Kan Po No. 69, pp. 30-32.
• G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
244 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

leaders. Difficulties arose, however, with the military authority

when the people's movement wanted to insert the word "Re-
public" in the statutes. The Military Government denied the
right of the movement to express its opinion about the form of
government. Some tension developed, because both sides stuck
to their viewpoints. As the Japanese military authority still
exercised its strict control, the Movement for the New Life
had to disappear. The headquarters of the 16th Army published
further a warning report about the mounting difficulties and
the increasing tension regarding the question of independence
to the military authority that was superior to this command. 1
During the last months of the Pacific War, however, an agree-
ment was finally reached among the highest Japanese govern-
ment circles about the policy to be followed with respect to the
former Dutch East Indies. Before that time there existed serious
conflicts, especially between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs,
War and Navy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the supporter
of the establishment of a puppet government in the "East-
Indies", while the Army and Navy wanted to retain a firm grip
on the Archipelago, in any case during the war, by a direct ad-
ministration. The far-seeing Total War Research Institute had
also its own ideas and considered the conquered area mainly
as a pawn for negotiation in case the war might be lost in the
long run. 2

Essentially, however, there existed no difference of opinion

about the policy to be adopted, since each of the parties desired
complete political, economic and cultural control. 3
A general line of conduct had been outlined in November 1941
during a Liaison Conference between the Imperial Headquarters
and the Japanese Government. 4 The primary aims which the
occupation army should realise were the restoration of peace and
order, the collection of products indispensable for the prosecu-
tion of the> war and the maintenance of the troops from the local
supplies. At this conference no agreement had been reached

1 Report HQ r6th Army, R.V.D., 005873.

• Doc. No. 2750, pp. 110-112.
• ibid., p. 113.
• November 20, 1941. Prosecution Doc. No. 1448.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 245

about the future status of the "East Indies." The decision was,
therefore, deferred to a later date. 1
Nevertheless, the differences of opinion about the policy to
be followed existed not only in the highest government circles
but also among the lower military commanders. The local
military authorities in Java were, from the very beginning, in
favour of strongly stimulating the dormant national feelings.
The General Headquarters of the Southern forces had been, on
the contrary, a supporter of the suppression of the national
movements. 2 The creation of the Ministry of Great East Asia
in November 1942 had added further difficulties, since this new
body had to prepare plans for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere, while the military government, which possessed the
executive power, was under the control of the supreme military
command at Tokyo. On January 4, 1943 a Liaison Conference
between the Imperial Headquarters and the Government had
been held again in which agreement had been reached with
regard to the granting of sham-independence to Burma and the
Philippines, but in which the decision about the problem of
Indonesia had to be put off once again, because of the difference
of opinion. 3 Finally, on May 31, 1943 it had been decided in
a Liaison Conference, which was attended by the Emperor,
to incorporate the "East Indies" in the Japanese Empire with
a status similar to that of Korea and Formosa. However, as a
softening measure it was accepted that the Indonesians would
be allowed to participate in the administration. The decision on
the annexation was not to be published lest it should give the
Allies material for propaganda. 4
So, the highest military command in Tokyo had had its way
for the time being. Amongst the lower military authorities -
military authorities in Java - the decision of the incorporation
had caused dissatisfaction. This had led to an attempt to have
the decision revoked by the sending of Sukarno to Premier Tojo.
This attempt, however, did not produce any results.
Meanwhile, the Philippines and Burma, the territories which
the military clique in Japan did not want from the beginning to
1 Doc. No. 2750, p. 114.

• ibid., p. 115.
a ibid., p. 116.
• ibid., p. 117; Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1344; Timetable No. 147.
246 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

annex, had obtained their so-called independence. 1 Once more

the military authorities in Java tried to make Tokyo agree to
their standpoint of granting independence to Indonesia through
the mission of the then most important political adviser, Hayashi,
to the Land of the Rising Sun. 2 This visit too was not fruitful.
Only when the Ministry of Koiso had replaced that of Tojo,
the idea of a puppet-state began gradually to gain around.
Faced with the irresistible American advance, the new cabinet
thought that it should make a political move to unify Greater
East Asia. Moreover, the cabinet wanted to show the world
that Japan indeed pursued the high ideals of the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and that this war, by no means,
had been started out of pure lust for conquests. Accordingly,
at the session of the Supreme War Direction Council of September
5, 1944, it was decided to announce that in future "independence"
would be granted to the "East Indies", in order to "win over the
natives, as well to clarify the Greater East Asia Policy to all
the world." 3 Premier Koiso subsequently - September 7, 1944-
made his famous vague declaration about the future inde-
pendence, in which neither a fixed time nor the areas which would
receive this independence were mentioned, as the Navy was
still opposed. 4
From the beginning of 1945, however, the points of view of
the Navy and Army approached each other, as the Navy,
after the fall of the Philippines which implied the inevitable
loss of the Southern Areas, had no more reason to remain in
opposition. In a meeting of the Supreme War Direction Council,
held on July 17, 1945, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shige-
nori Togo, presented a memorandum 6, in which it was proposed
to come to the definite decision to grant independence at once
to the whole of the "East Indies." According to this Minister,
such a procedure would bear more fruits than the successive
~anting of independence to various areas, which would be cer-
tainly disappointing for the Indonesian leaders. The moment

1 August and October 1943 respectively.

• Doc. No. 2750, p. 119.
• Prosecution Doc. No. 2755; Far East Mil. Trib., E%h. Nos. 1348 and 1349; Time-
table Nos. 151 and 152.
• Doc. No. 2750, p. 121; Far East Mil. Trw., E%h. No. 277; Timetable No. 153.
• Prosecution Doc. No. 2758.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 247

at which the declaration of independence should take place was

to be fixed, in view of the tum of the war and the development
of the international situation, in the beginning of the autumn
of 1945. Japan should avoid pronouncing the declaration of
independence. This should be left to an Indonesian Committee
for the Preparation of Independence, which would create the
impression that the initiative lay entirely with the "East
Indian race." 1
The Supreme War Direction Council agreed to this plan 2,
to which all ministries concerned in Japan - Foreign Affairs,
Navy, War and Great East Asia - had co-operated. That this
plan would be accepted at the session of this Council - July 17,
1945 - was so certain that it had been telegraphically communi-
cated on July 1, 1945 to the headquarters of the 16th Army.
At the same time directives were sent for the setting up of the
Committee for the Preparation of Independence. 3 Besides,
comments on the plan were also invited. The headquarters of
the 16th Army, Java, which saw near at hand the fulfilment of
its wishes, answered promptly that they completely approved
of the plan proposed.
There were, however, other voices associated with this chapter
of events. After a meeting at Singapore, where all leading figures
from the different occupation zones had expressed their points
of view on the plan through their delegations, a report was
prepared for the Commander of the Southern Areas, Field
Marshal Terauchi. 4 The latter was not so enthusiastic as the
Japanese military leaders in Java. In his report to Tokyo about
the plan, he avoided indicating clearly the territories which were
to be considered for independence. Concerning the moment to
be chosen, he suggested that this should be fixed sometime in
the second half of 1946, after the Preparatory Committee -
to be set up at the end of 1945 - had completed the necessary
work. 5
But Tokyo had a different view on the situation. The

1 Doc. No. 2750, pp. 122-123.

• Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 1344, 1340, 1350 and 1351; Timetable No. 155;
Prosecution Doc. No. 2759.
• Hereafter to be called: Preparatory Committee.
• HQ Saigon.
• Report HQ z6th Army, R.V.O., 005873.
248 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

Imperial Government was in a hurry to accomplish its plans.

On July 21, 1945 the final Tokyo plan of the different ministries,
which harmonised with the earlier plan telegraphically com-
municated to the 16th Army, reached the military command in
Java. In this latest document special emphasis was laid, upon
the necessity for safeguarding the military co-operation with the
territories to be made'independent as a result of the execution
of the plan. The Commander of the Southern Areas, Field Marshal
Terauchi, became responsible for the proper implementation of
the whole project. 1
The draft of the regulations for the execution of the plan of
independence was submitted in a meeting of the Soomubutyoo 2
in Singapore for a full discussion. 3 The general instructions for
this conference, which began on July 30, 1945, were given by
Tokyo. At the meeting an elaborate study was made of the
transfer of the economic apparatus to the Indonesians, including
finance, industry, railways and ports as well as the placing of
the Volunteers Corps exclusively under Indonesian control. In
this investigation was also involved the role which the Japanese
officers and civilian authorities would have to play and how they
would finally withdraw from the transferred machinery. 4
The Tokyo-instructions clearly left sufficient freedom for the
holders of the Conference - among whom there were representa-
tives from the Naval Occupation Zone - to make a distinction
between the different occupation zones with the fixing of the
dates of the declarations of independence. As it was generally
admitted that Java was ahead of the other occupation zones,
the meeting wanted to grant independence first to this island.
Malaya, which was considered as the least advanced, was left
completely outside the discussion. To what extent the inde-
pendence was to be conceded became obvious in the stipulation
that Java, which, "if possible", would receive the "jewel of
freedom" at the beginning of September 1945, would not acquire
the right to exchange diplomatic representatives with Japan.
The directives of Tokyo also implied the formation of the
1Sbid.
• Heads of General Affairs Departments of the Gunseskanbu.
• Report HQ I6th Al'my, R.V.O., 005873.
• Inte1'1'ogatson-l'eporl Ma;M-General O. Nishimura, Head of the General Affairs
Dept. of the Military Administration in Java, R.V.O., 005815-005818.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 249

Preparatory Committee, composed of Indonesians. General

Yamamoto, the head of the Military Administration in Java,
was authorised to see to the composition of this committee.
The Japanese, however, by no means intended to leave much
freedom for this committee. According to a well-tried Japanese
prescription, a parallel-committee, Jumbi-I-In-Kai, consisting
of only Japanese members, was created, which would exercise
a close supervision. 1
After the head of the Military Administration, General
Yamamoto, and the head of the Department of General Affairs
had returned to Batavia from Singapore at the beginning of
August 1945, the selection of the Indonesian members of the
Preparatory Committee at once commenced. In this committee
about twenty places were reserved for Java, four each for Suma-
tra and the Navy zone - Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas and the
Lesser Sunda islands. 2
The Japanese parallel-committee, which in fact should take
all important decisions, met on August 7, 1945 to discuss the
countless difficulties and problems related to the working out
of a sound plan at such a short notice. For on August 19, 1945,
the first meeting of the Indonesian Preparatory Committee
was to be held, which should lead to the proclamation of in-
dependence at the beginning of September 1945.
In spite of the opinion of the Japanese committee, which
reported to Tokyo that the preparations could be completed
at the earliest at the end of 1945, the Imperial Government
stuck to their plan of independence in the beginning of September
1945. So the Japanese committee continued its work feverishly.
Most of the problems were finally solved, although some of the
solutions deserved no other name than that of improvisations.
Concerning the financial problem it was thus settled that the
Japanese occupation-money would remain legal tender until
the Indonesian government would be able to bring a national
currency in circulation. Besides, in order to be able to function

1 This Japanese parallel-Committee was composed of high army and naval authori-
ties. The Chairman was General Itagaki, the Commander of the 7th Area Army at
Singapore and the Vice-Chairman, Lieutenant General Nagano, the Commander of
the 16th Army in Java. The Navy was represented by the well-known Vice-Admiral
Maeda, the head of the Navy Liaison Office at Batavia.
• See G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 42.
250 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

the new government should have the necessary funds at its

disposal. To satisfy this demand the Southern Development
Bank - Nanpo Kaihatu Kinko - was commissioned to finance
the Indonesian state in the first stage. 1
On August 7, 1945 at 12 o'clock noon Field Marshal Terauchi,
the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Territories, pro-
claimed throughout the area under his command that he had
granted permission for the establishment of the Committee for
the Preparation of Independence of Indonesia: 2 "By way of
acknowledgment for the effort and the sincerety of heart of the
Indonesian inhabitants, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern
Areas expresses his approval for the institution towards the
middle of August 1945 of a Committee for the Preparation of
Independence. This Committee shall accelerate the final measures
to be taken for the institution of a government of Independent
Indonesia." 3
The Commander of the 16th Army in Java precisely stated
this proclamation of Field Marshal Terauchi by officially an-
nouncing on the same day - August 7, 1945 - that Indonesia
would be declared independent as soon as the preparations were
complete. 4 Another explanation of the instructions of the Com-
mander of the Southern Areas came from the head of the Military
Government in Java. This declared frankly that independence
could be realised only under certain conditions:
"The work for the creation of a free Indonesia is being done
under the vigilance of the enemies. People should, therefore,
understand the task that will have to be performed. The first
condition for the achievement of independence is the winning of
the war with which the Indonesian people is now faced. In the
second place, Indonesia will have to develop her war-potential
in such a way that in co-operation with Dai Nippon - Great
Japan - the final victory in the war could be achieved for Great
East Asia." 5
According to the controlled Indonesian press, the news about

1 Interrogation.report Major-General O. Nishimura, R.V.O., 005815-005818.

• Report HQ r6th Army, R.V.O., 005873. Dokuritsu Junbi lin (J), Panitia Persiapan
Kermedekaan Indonesia (M).
• Asia Raya, August 7,1945, No. 189.
• ibid.
• ibid.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 251

the establishment of the Preparatory Committee and the future

independence was greeted with great enthusiasm. 1
The reports of the developments during the final phase of the
war, however, gave for Indonesia a rather confused picture of
the true course of events, which led to the proclamation of
independence on August 17, 1945. Thus, Nishimura, the head
of the General Affairs Department, declared that the visit of
Sukarno and his company to the Commander-in-Chief at Saigon,
to whom they conveyed the thanks of the Indonesian people,
took place at the instigation of the Japanese military authority
in Java. 2 From this report it would appear that there was no
question of a spontaneous reaction of gratitude in Java.
Who inspired the actual independence is another controversial
point. After the occupation of the Archipelago there were two
champions for the independence of Indonesia, the Tokyo-
ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military authorities in Java.
Towards the later stages of the war it was the Imperial Govern-
ment which insisted on the greatest possible speed, while the
lower military authorities tried to slow down the pace. According
to Nishimura, as we have already seen, the instruction to
Sukarno and his company to proceed to Saigon came from the
Military Government. The Chief of Staff of Field Marshal
Terauchi declared, however, that his Chief had taken the initia-
tive for this trip. 3 The same Chief of Staff gave, however, a
contradictory statement to this: "Indonesian independence was
a matter of high policy. Field Marshal Terauchi received his
instructions from General Anami, Minister for War." 4
Nishimura's statements (but he said this after the Japanese
capitulation) were of the same character: "On every available
occasion, we were indicated by the higher authorities that the
independence of the Netherlands East Indies areas came out
of the intention of His Majesty the Emperor and was only partly
based on the utilitarian point of view of Japan." "
In all probability, it was the Tokyo-government which, with

1 G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 38.

• Interrogation-report Numata Takazo, Chief of Staff of F. M. Terauchi, R. V.O.,
006785-006791.
• ibid.
• ibid.
• Nishimura Interrogation-report, R.V.O., 006808.
252 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

the end of the war in sight (the Atom Bomb fell on Hiroshima
on August 6, 1945), made a strenuous attempt to playa trick
on the Allies and obtain political gain in the distant future for
Japan.
However, Sukarno, Hatta and Radjiman left for Saigon on
August 9, 1945 in order to meet the Commander-in-Chief of the
Southern Areas at Dalat, after a journey of about another 300
kilometers from Saigon in the northern direction, on August 11 -
thus four days before the Japanese capitulation. The latter
informed them (this was until then still a matter of doubt for
the nationalist leaders) that the territory to be independent
would include the entire Netherlands East Indies. The date
when independence would be proclaimed was dependent upon
the stage of preparations and the fulfilment of the condition of
satisfactory military co-operation with Japan.
Sukarno and Hatta were then respectively appointed Chairman
and Vice-Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, after which
Terauchi expressed the hope that the Indonesians would obtain
independence as quickly as possible. 1
On August 14 - the day before the Japanese capitulation -
Sukarno and his company returned to Java by air. Immediately
after his arrival he delivered a speech at the airport in which
he announced the forthcoming independence. On the same day
the Imperial decree on the armistice was issued at Tokyo. 2 This
took place after Japan had already made known to the Allies
on August 10, 1945 3 - theday following the explosion of the
second Atom Bomb on Nagasaki - that the terms stated in the
Declaration of Potsdam and the unconditional surrender implied
in it would be accepted, if the Japanese Emperor was allowed
to retain his prerogatives.
The final days 4 of Japanese rule in Java may here be de-
scribed according to the statements of some of the principal
Japanese participants in the events.
1 Report HQ I6th A"my, R. V.O., 005874. The Preparatory Committee was composed
of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and 19 members, of which 11 representatives came from
Java, 3 from Sumatra, 2 from Celebes and one each from Borneo, the Lesser Sunda
Islands, and the Moluccas. See G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 42; George MeT. Kahin,
op. cit., p. 127.
• Report HQ I6th A"my, R. V.O., 005874.
• On August 8, 1945 Russia had declared war against Japan.
• August 14-17, 1945.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 253

Vice-Admiral Maeda, the head of the Liaison Office at Ba-

tavia 1, played an important role. This able officer, who suc-
ceeded in obtaining considerable influence in Indonesian leading
circles by his zeal for the Indonesian independence, felt himself
officially supported in his endeavour to assist the nationalist
movement after the promise of independence by Premier Koiso
in September 1944.
Maeda stated 2 that after the promise of Koiso he expanded
his office and increased the financial allowances for the nationa-
lists. He further explained how the training of young intellectuals
was begun and the number of propaganda tours in which Su-
karno and Hatta also participated was raised. Maeda paid for
all this from the navy-funds. According to him, it was necessary
that in future a close contact should be maintained between
Japan and the would-be independent Indonesia. For that
purpose his office should be the link.
About the Japanese capitulation, Maeda said that this came
as a heavy blow for the Japanese in Indonesia. He continued:
"Already soon the Indonesians began to move. Specially, the
youths, trained by the Japanese for Giyu Gun, Hei Ho and
Keiboodan, played an important part in this. The youths soon
went out of the hands of their leaders and became aggressive.
An example of the revolt of the Indonesians was the murder of
more than eighty Japanese soldiers in the surroundings of
Bekassi." 3
After Emperor Hirohito had announced the termination of
hostilities, the Japanese in Java took a number of measures.
Thus the Indonesian auxiliary troops and the other Indonesians
who were in Japanese service were discharged, while Japanese
forces had to concentrate.
Maeda stated the following about what happened on and
after the 15th of August, 1945: "When the news of the capitu-
lation penetrated, Sukarno, Hatta and Subardjo turned to the
Japanese Governor-General Yamamoto. They could not, how-
ever, talk to him. Afterwards they appeared in my office in the
afternoon in order to know whether it was true that an important

1 Liaison office between Army and Navy at Batavia.

• Int81'1'ogation-reporl T. Maeda, R. V.O., Nefis AJ/33126.

• October 19, 1945.
254 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

change in the situation had occurred. I replied that this was

rather certain, but officially I could not give any decisive answer,
because no official confirmation of the report was received. Su-
karno, Hatta and Subardjo then left the office. About mid-night
the official government-telegram arrived that confirmed the
news of the cessation of hostilities. The following morning I
tried to contact Sukarno, Hatta and Subardjo to inform them
of the latest news. Sukarno and Hatta, however, seemed to
have disappeared without any trace. A group of young men and
intellectuals had overpowered both these leaders with the purpose
of causing a large scale freedom movement, which should result
in the immediate declaration of independence. With this a
critical stage set in, because the Japanese had made no plans
as yet to suppress the possible unrest. Towards the evening a
reasonable amount of certainty existed about the whereabouts of
Sukarno and Hatta, who had been carried off in the direction of
Bandung. Subardjo, who had left for that place, succeeded in
bringing back both the leaders. They arrived at II o'clock at
night - August 16, 1945 - at my house." 1
Meanwhile, thousands of young people, full of fighting spirit,
were in Batavia, who had intended to start action at midnight,
1 Interrogation-report T. Maeda, R.V.O., Nefis AJ/33126. According to Hatta
(Verspreide Geschriften van ilfohammad Hatta, C. P. J. van der Peet, Amsterdam 1952:
"Legende en Realiteit Rondom de Proclamatie van 17 Augustus", pp. 330-340),
the kidnapping of Sukarno and Hatta to the Peta garrison at Rengasdengklok took
place because of the difference of opinion between the Sukarni-Students-Sjahrir
group and the Sukarno-Hatta group as to how the declaration of Indonesia's inde-
pendence should be made, not about the proclamation of independence as such.
The former group (see also Out of Exile, pp. 253-254) demanded an immediate decla-
ration of independence in, what they considered to be, a "revolutionary" method,
i.e. detached from everything that was in any way suggestive of Japanese sponsor-
ship. An Indonesia of Japanese fabrication, it was argued, was bound to be crushed
by the Allies. The latter group, however, was of the opinion that the proclamation
of independence should be made by the "Committee for the Preparation of Inde-
pendence", the members of which, though appointed by the Japanese, were supposed
to represent the will and the ideal of Indonesia. The Committee, it was further stated,
was thus the symbol of the inner consciousness of Indonesian unity, which was of
greater importance than the external judicial consideration.
Once the kidnappers realised that they would fail, they did not oppose the return
of Sukarno and Hatta to Djakarta.
Muhammad Dimyati's argument (in his book: Sedjarah Perdjuangan Indonesia)
that Sukarno and Hatta were carried off by force "because it was feared that the
Japanese might use them as their puppets if they would remain in their houses"
and that they were again taken back to Djakarta to resume, at the residence of Maeda,
the discussion about the immediate proclamation of Indonesia's independence which
had not yet terminated at Rengasdengklok, is clearly inconsistent, as corroborated
by Hatta.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 255

occupy the radio-station and proclaim independence. Sukarno

and Hatta succeeded with great difficulty in postponing this
development till 12 o'clock of the following day - August 17.
After this delay had been obtained, both the leaders negotiated
with the head of the Department of General Affairs, Nishimura,
about the proclamation of independence. An agreement, however,
could not be reached, because Nishimura refused to consider the
demand of Sukarno and Hatta.
They then went again to Maeda's residence, where there were
already thirty representatives of the Indonesian nationalist
groups, eagerly waiting for the outcome of the talks with
Nishimura. In the meeting that followed it was decided by
means of a motion to proclaim the independence the next day
- August 17, 1945. By day-break the meeting was over. 1
A statement, which is no less important for a better insight in
the Indonesian events, was made by Maeda in prison in Singa-
pore. 2 "In case, the war had turned out in favour of Japan or
would not have ended so soon, Sukarno would have been able
to form an Indonesian government without trouble. When
things developed in a different way the Indonesians shook off
from the Japanese and took the initiative in their own hands.
Only the landing of a large Allied force could have turned the
tide, as the Indonesians in that circumstance would have been
certainly more inclined for negotiation and co-operation." 3
Another important figure of the Japanese military authorities
was the head of the Department of General Affairs, Nishimura.
His department determined the line of action for the daily course
of events. Like Maeda, Nishimura declared that he helped to lay
the foundation for the independence of Indonesia. This officer
was, however, more an obedient military person than one who
displayed an energetic initiativeness. According to what he
said, Nishimura acted exclusively in conformity with the orders
from Tokyo, the Southern Expetidionary Force and the Com-
mandant of the 7th Area Army Corps. 4
Concerning the events on the night of August 16-17, 1945 the
interrogation of Nishimura provides some further information.
1 Interrogation-report T. Maeda, R.V.O., Nefis AJ/33126.
• June 16, 1946.
• Interrogation-report T. Maeda, R. V.O., Nefis AJ/33126.
• Interrogation-report Major-General Nishimura, R.V.O., 006792-006807.
256 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

He had a talk, it appears, with Sukarno, Hatta and Maeda

during that night when the head of the Military Administration,
General Yamamoto, refused to receive the nationalist leaders.
He says: "Sukarno and Hatta entered my office in the company
of Vice-Admiral Maeda. Both the Indonesian leaders demanded
the immediate independence of Indonesia. Thereupon Maeda
urged them to take into account the situation which had arisen
from Japan's acceptance of the Declaration of Potsdam. During
those few hours I tried to make them desist from committing
illegal acts. Sukarno and Hatta, both of whom were in a state
of great excitement, however, demanded that the meeting of the
Committee for the Preparation of Idependence should be called
at once the next morning. I refused to comply with this. They
then left my office with Vice-Admiral Maeda." 1
In all likelihood, the Japanese gave no consent, at least not
officially, to accelerate the way to independence, which was in
conflict with the terms of surrender. In any case, no permission
was granted to convene the Preparatory Committee, which was
to meet on August 19, 1945, the originally-appointed date. For
this meeting the representatives from the various parts of
Indonesia had already arrived at Djakarta.
On August 15, 1945 the members of this committee were
secretly informed of the Japanese surrender. This greatly
increased the consternation and confusion prevailing everywhere.
The population of Java, which since the surrender of the Nether-
lands Indies Army had only seen Japan's military power and not
its decay, was still uninformed. The wildest rumours, which
could be confirmed or denied by a very few, spread quickly. In
Java confusion reigned and the Japanese did nothing to clarify
the situation. The radios were sealed from the very beginning of
the occupation, so that no outside broadcasts could be heard,
not even from Tokyo. On instructions from the Commander-in-
Chief of the Southern Territories, the news of the capitUlation
was intentionally kept secret for a week. Between August 17 and
21, 1945 the information about the declaration of independence
and the new constitution of Indonesia appeared in the papers.
Only on August 21, 1945 the capitulation-address of Emperor

1 ibid.
 POLICY TOWARDS THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE 257

Hirohito, delivered on August 14, 1945, was published in the

Indonesian press. 1
Officially, the Japanese military command acted in accordance
with the Declaration of Potsdam by denying further support to
Indonesian nationalism. Some, however, hold the view that in
reality the declaration was violated not only by giving free rein
to nationalism but also by doing it purposefully. The dreaded
Japanese authority would have been able to maintain the
status quo without difficulty, such as the Potsdam-terms pre-
scribed.
After the talk with Nishimura, which did not yield the desired
result for Sukarno and Hatta, the meeting of the members of
the Preparatory Committee with Maeda, youth leaders and
other nationalists followed in the early morning hours of August
17, 1945. 2 After feverish discussions it was decided to proclaim
the independence on the same day - August 17 - at about noon.
To that end the constitution, drafted formerly by the Committee
for the Preparation of Independence, was hurriedly altered. And
thus Sukarno proclaimed the independence of Indonesia at 12
o'clock noon. 3 Nishimura said later: "About noon a shabbily
looking and confused Indonesian authority brought a dirty
paper, on which was written that the Indonesians had proclaimed
the independence." 4
Another figure, who played a role in the development of the
former Dutch Indies to the present sovereign Indonesia, was the
much-discussed person Hitoshi Shimizu. This functionary of the
Department of Propaganda in Java received, according to his
statements, instructions already in February 1944 to start
preparing the Indonesian independence. 5
The Japanese capitulation, which cut across all plans, had

1 Doc. No. 2750, pp. 128-129.

• The meeting was held at the residence of Maeda, because, according to Hatta,
the Hotel des Indes, the place where the meeting was originally to have taken place
was already closed.
• The text of the Proclamation was: "We the people of Indonesia hereby proclaim
the independence of Indonesia. The transfer of authority, everything related to it,
and other matters will be implemented properly and in the shortest possible time." -
On behalf of the People of Indonesia, Sukarno-Hatta, August 17, 1945.
• Interrogation-report Nishimura, R. V.O., 006792-006807.
• Shimizu declared to have discussed, among others, the question of independence
with Prince Higashikuni (an uncle of the Emperor of Japan), who formed the first
cabinet after japan's surrender.
258 JAPAN'S COLONIALISM AND INDONESIA

been kept secret, according to Shimizu, on instructions from

Tokyo, in order to give freedom to Indonesia before the In-
donesians came to know of the Japanese debacle. To speed up
the procedure, certain arrangements would be made after
August 14, which were to create the impression that the Japanese
stuck to the instructions of the Allied Commanders, while the
Indonesians would proceed to take the initiative. So a pro-
cession of young people, who came to demand independence,
was sent to Sukarno. 1
Shimizu further mentioned a discussion 2, as a result of which
a number of Japanese officers were appointed, who were to
evade being made prisoners of war in order to help the In-
donesians in their guerrilla war. 3
It was quite evident that this Shimizu was an intriguing
person. He organised numerous secret societies, which often had
contradictory purposes. The best known of these was the Kipas
Hitam (Black Fan). By means of these associations Shimizu
played the game of raising political passions and race-hatred.
Different from Maeda, he had many enemies. Nishimura, for
instance, could not stand him and Maeda also did not like him.
The latter declared - but this also was said post factum - that
the Japanese and English psychiatrists considered Shimizu
not right in his mind.
Thus the creation of a new state was the work of the people
of various kinds and classes, prompted by unequal motives.
Who played the most important role, who was compelled to do
certain acts, who intrigued, who practised politics or statesman-
ship with or without success - these are all questions which
cannot be answered completely. It is certain, however, that
Japanese plans as well as Indonesian nationalism existed in
August 1945. It is also certain that Sukarno, on August 17, 1945,
with or without coercion or help, proclaimed the independence
of the new Indonesia in the presence of a mass of people.
And this 17th August, 1945 was the date, which will be recorded
in the history of the nations as the birthday of the State
Indonesia.

1 Interrogation-report Hitoshi Shimizu, R. V.O., AI/2-21242.

• between Sawada Takayoshi, Nakagawara Yasujiro and Yasuoka.
• Interrogation-report Hitoshi Shimizu, R. V.O., AI/2-21242.
 LITERATURE CITED

DOCUMENTS

International Military Tribunal For the Far East:

a. Exh. Nos.: 26, 52, 277, 509, 517, 518, 519, 527, 528, 529, 541, 580, 588,
597,628,631,635, 639-A, 641, 675-A, 686-A, 809, 840, 861, 868, 870-A,
871,877,878,979, 1013, 1045, 1169, 1176, 1241, 1252, 1284, 1285, 1286,
1288, 1290-A, 1291, 1292, 1293, 1294, 1295, 1296, 1297, 1298, 1299-A,
1300, 1301, 1302, 1304, 1306, 1307-A, 1309-A, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1313,
1314, 1315, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1319, 1320, 1321, 1322, 1323, 1324-A,
1325, 1326-A, 1326-D, 1327, 1328, 1329, 1330, 1330-A, 1331, 1332.
1333-A, 1334, 1335, 1336, 1337, 1338-B, 1340, 1341, 1342, 1343-A, 1344,
1345, 1346, 1348, 1349, 1351, 3605.
b. Hoover Doc. Nos.: 837-A, 1112-A, 1448, 1492, 1611-A, 1621-C, 1987-B.
2402-B.
c. Statement of K. A. de Weerd, The japanese Occupation 01 the Nether--
lands Indies (Inter. Prosecution Section, Neth. Division, Nov. 1946),
Doc. No. 2750 (Exh. No. 1351).
d. Dissenting judgment 01 Mr. justice Roling, Member for the Netherlands
(Far East Mil. Trib.).
e. Proceedings, pp. 3,992-3,993; 8,435; 8,442; 11,649-11,650; 36,775.
Documents in the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie te Amsterdam:
001854, 005124, 005815-005818, 005839-005840, 005850, 005869,
005871-005874, 005899-005900, 006501-006506, 006527-006530,
006785-006808, 006933, 008209-008210, 011208-011209, 011231-
011233,016162-016168.
AI/2-21242, Nefis AJ/33126.
Documents on International Allairs, I932, ed. by John W. Wheeler-
Bennett, Oxford Univ. Press, London 1933.
Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. III, I94o-I94I, World
Peace Foundation, Boston 1941.
Foreign Relations 01 the U.S.: japan, I93I-I94I, Vol. II, United States
Government Printing Office, Washington 1943.
New Cycle in Asia. Selected Documents on Major International Develop-
ments in the Far East, I943-I947, ed. by Harold R. Isaacs, Institute
of Pacific Relations, New York 1947.
Nazi-Soviet Relations, I939-I94I (Documents from the Archives of the
German Foreign Office), The U.S. Department of State 1948.
Documents on German Foreign Policy, I9I8-I945 (from the Archives of
the German Foreign Ministry), Series D (I937-I945), Vol. I, United
States Government Printing Office, Washington 1949.
260 LITERATURE CITED

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MANSCHOT, H. J., "Het Geld-, Bank- en Credietwezen in Nederlandsch-
Indie in de Bezettingsjaren 1942-1945", Economisch-Statistische
Berichten, March 27, 1946.
MEYER, D. H., "Over het Bendewezen op Java", Indonesie, 3e jaargang,
No.2.
PALAR, L. N., "De Indonesische Beweging en Japan", Socialisme en
Democratie, 1939.
PRILLWITZ, P. M., "De Ondernemingslandbouw tijdens de Japansche
Bezetting", Economisch Weekblad voor Nederlandsch-Indie, March 2,
1946.
RAVENHOLT, A., "Formosa Today", Foreign Affairs, July 1952.
RODENBURG, G., "De Suiker-industrie op Java tijdens de Japansche
Bezetting", Economisch Weekblad voor Nederlandsch-Indie, April 13 &
20, 1946.
ROUCEK, JOSEPH S. "Geopolitics of Formosa", World Affairs Interpreter,
Winter 1951.
THOMPSON, V., "Japan's Blueprint for Indonesia", The Far Eastern
Quarterly, Vol. V, 1945-1946.
VAN WARMELO, W., "De Indische Industrie gedurende de Japansche
Bezetting", Economisch-Statistische Berichten, March 27, 1946.
VLEKKE, B. H. M., "Communism and Nationalism in South East Asia",
International Affairs, April 1949.
VOIGT, J. H., "Aanteekeningen betreffende de Thee-ondernemingen op
Java gedurende de J apansche bezetting", Economisch Weekblad voor
Nederlandsch-Indie, August 24, 1946.
264 LITERATURE CITED

VAN NIEUWENHUIJZE, C. A. 0., Japanese Islam Policy in Java, I94z-I945

(MS).
"De Strijd op het eiland Tarakan in J anuari 1942", De M ilitaire Spectator,
April 1949.
"De tabakscultuur in Deli gedurende de bezettingsjaren 1942-1945"
Economische Voorlichting, August 27, 1948.
"Formosa in Transition", The World Today, May 1948.
"Korea Past and Present", The World Today, April 1946.
Kan Po Nos.: 7,9, 14, 18,24,26,28,29,30,32,34,35,36,39,41,44,48,51,
52, 55, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72.
Osamu Seirei Nos.: 12 & 13, April 29, 1943; 21, July I, 1943; 36, Septem-
ber 5, 1943; 44, October 3, 1943; 2, January 14, 1944; 7, February 16,
1944; 25 & 26, May 10, 1944; 3, February 10,1945; 18, April 1, 1945.
Asia Raya, June 16, 1942; August 7, 1945.
Radio Oranje, March 3, 1942; March 6, 1942.
New York Times, April 9, 1940; June 30, 1940.
New York Herald Tribune, August 9, 1942; July 30, 1944.
The Chicago Daily News, July 13, 1942.
Christian Science Monitor, November 13, 1943.
 INDEX

AAA Movement (Pergerakan Tiga Bukan/u, 161.

A), 209, 211-213. Bunkyokyoku, 154.
Abyssinia (Ethiopia), 53, 56. Burma, 66-68, 81, 88, 96, 142, 170,
Academy for the Building of the 183, 186,215,217,241,245.
State, 232, 237. Burma Road, 62.
Agung, Sultan, 173, 174. Bushido,5.
Amau, E., 51.
Amboina, 149. Cairo Declaration (December 1943),
Anambas, 118. 16.
Anami,251. Cambodia, 68, 72, 88.
Andaman Islands, 119. Caroline Islands, 23, 140,219,231.
Aneta, 176. Celebes, 96, 102, 104, 118, 126, 139,
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 6, 26. 142, 149, 160, 161,249.
Annam, 88. Central Advisory Council (Tyuuoo
Anti-Comintern Pact (1936), 56, 59, Sang-In), 216-218, 220-222,
60,66. 234-236, 239-243.
Araki,49. Ceylon, 88, 96, 183.
Arita, 63, 64, 107-112. Chahar, 52.
Aru Archipelago, 126. Chang Hsueh-liang, 30.
Aruba, 108. Chiang Kai-shek, 60, 62, 67, 68,
Ashari, Kiai Hadji Hashim, 205, 72,81,83,95,116,173.
207. China, 4-6, 11, 12, 18, 23-25, 28,
Atjeh, 144, 147, 150, 159, 199, 206. 29, 35, 37, 43, 50, 52-54, 57-62,
Atlantic Charter, 78, 217. 67, 69, 70, 74, 75, 80, 82, 88, 90,
Australia, 25, 67, 88, 90, 91, 96, 91, 95, 96, 99, 105, 132, 139, 143,
142, 158, 159, 180. 144, 146, 148, 195, 217, 224.
Asia Raya, 176. Chinese Communist Party, 57,67.
Chosen, see Korea.
Badan Persatuan Ummat Islam, Chou dynasty, 12.
204. Christianity, 94, 96, 181, 200, 201.
Balai Muslimin Indonesia, 207. Christiansen, General, 138.
Bali, 118, 160. Christmas Island, 119.
Bank of Chosen, 19. Churchill, W. S., 73, 78.
Bank of Taiwan, 9, 191, 192. Cocos Island, 119.
Barisan Berani Mati, 230. Committee of Investigation for the
Beppan (Nanseitai) , 229, 230. Preparation of Independence,
Black Dragon Society, 50. 232,236-239.
Bonin Islands,S. Committee for the Preparation of
Borneo, 61, 67,84,86,96, 102, 104, Independence,247,249-252,254,
118, 119, 126, 139, 144, 149, 158, 256,257.
160, 161, 166, 184, 186,249. Communism, 36, 47, 58, 64, 89.
Brunei, 86, 119. Confucianism, 35, 36.
Brussels Conference, 1937, 57. Co-Prosperity Sphere, see Greater
266 INDEX

East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Gun, 157.

Craigie, Sir Robert, 133. Gun Hooin, 163.
Gunsei, 153, 160.
Dai Aziya, 131. Gunsei Hooin, 162.
Deli, 188, 189. Gunseikan, 153, 154, 157, 161, 162,
Dewantara, K. H., 212. 165, 201, 213, 214, 222, 225, 227,
Dewan San Yo, 235. 229, 235, 237.
Djajadiningrat, Hussain, 180, 207. Gunseikanbu, 153, 158, 160, 165,
Djajadiningrat, L., 180. 169, 171.
Djawa Hookoo Kai, 222-224, 242. Gunsei Kensatukyoku, 162.
Djawa Rengoo Seinendan, 225. Gunzyu Seisanbu, 156.
Djawa Satoo Hambai, 193. Gyookeika, 155.
Djawa Shimbun, 176.
Djawa Shinbun Kai, 176, 242. I Hadikusuma, Ki Bagus, 218.
Djojobojo, 147, 148. Hainan, 61, 69, 77, 88, 104.
Domei, 176. Hakko Ichiu, 3, 152, 176,233.
Halmaheira, 238.
East Asia Islamic Conference, 35. Hamaguchi,47.
Eiseikyoku, 155. Hanifah, Abu, 178.
Emperor, see Hirohito. Harada, Lt.-General, 215.
Hart-Ishizawa agreement (1937),
Five Power Treaty (1922), 26, 52. 103, 104.
Formosa (Taiwan), 4, 5, 7-13, 17, Hashimoto, 55, 96.
20, 22, 27, 30, 88, 157, 158, 190, Hata, 63.
245. Hatta, Mohammad, 146, 151, 210,
Four-Leaved Clover (Ampat Se- 212,218,236,243,252,253,255-
rangkai), 212, 213, 226. 257.
Four Power Treaty (1921),26,100. Hawaii, 73, 81, 108.
France, 6, 25, 60, 62, 63, 68, 72, Hayashi, 169,246.
109, 112, 137, 231 Hei Ho, 197, 221, 226, 229, 230,
Fukien, 23, 24. 234, 253, 254.
Fushimi, Prince, 72. Hideyoshi, 4, 22, 27, 29.
Hioki,23.
Genro, 47. Hirohito, Emperor, 13, 65, 72, 81,
Genyosha, 49. 245, 251-253, 257.
Gerindo, 146. Hirota, 51.
Germany, 6, 22, 23, 51, 53, 56, 59, Hitler, A., 51, 59, 60, 73-75, 80,
60, 62-67, 72-74, 76, 80, 96, 107, 89, 105, 112.
109-111, 117, 124, 133, 136. Hizbullah, 208, 229, 230.
Gilbert Islands, 88, 219. H ochi Shimbun, 108.
Great Britain, II, 25, 26, 28, 50, Hodohan, 176.
52, 54, 60, 63, 65, 67, 68, 72-74, Hogoka, 155.
77-82, 90, 96, 107, 109, 112, 129, Honan, 24.
130, 131, 133, 136, 138, 139. Hongkong, 62, 79, 81, 82, 88, 96,
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 141.
Sphere, 64, 66, 68-70, 72, 73, 75, Hoosoo Kanri Kyoku, 156.
76, 82, 84, 85, 87-89, 91-96, Hoozin Zimukyoku, 154.
113--117, 121, 125, 128-130, 136, Hopei, 24, 52.
146, 177, 181, 183, 185,201,202, Hory, Colonel, 201, 204.
209,213,218,224,242,245,246. Hoshino, Naoki, 70, 71.
Guadalcanal, 187. Hotta, Baron, 4, 5, 22, 29.
Guam, 23, 88. Hudoosan Kann Koodan 192.
 INDEX 267

Huku Syuutyokan, 236. Kempeitai, 165, 171-173, 208, 228.

Hull, C., 82, 108, 109. Ken, 157, 159, 225.
Ken Hooin, 163.
lhii, Yasushi, 137. Kenetsu Han, 176.
Imagawa, Y., 129. Kensatuka, 155.
Imamura, Lt.-General, 215, 216. Kensatukyoku, 155.
Imperial Way, see Kodo. Kentyoo, 226.
India, 4, 25, 29, 74, 80, 81, 91, 96, Kiais, 200-202, 206.
183. Kiangsi, 24.
Indo-China, 61, 62, 66-68, 72, 75, Kido, Marquis, 72.
77, 78, 84, 91, 96, 133, 137, 138, Kigenreki, 174.
140, 142, 146, 183, 186. Kikakuka, 154.
Industrial Bank of Manchuria, 39. Kingly Way, see Hi ang Tao.
Inouye, 47. Kipas Hitam, 258.
Inukai, 47. Ko, 157.
Investigating Committee, see Com- Kobayashi, Ichiro, 114, 121, 122,
mittee of Investigation for the 125, 128, 129.
Preparation of Independence. Kodo (Imperial Way), 35,49,54,92.
Ishizawa, Consul-General, 139, 140. Koiso, General K., 112, 228, 231,
Islam, 105, 147, 173, 195, 200-208. 232, 236, 246, 253.
Itagaki, General, 215, 238, 249. Kokoku Seinen Shoko Domei, 49.
Italy, 25, 53, 56, 64-67, 72, 74, 80, Kokumin Shimbun, 108.
124. Kokuzi, 162.
Konketu Zyuumin, 154.
Japan-Manchukuo Protocol of Al- Konoye, Prince, 58, 64, 70, 71,
liance (1932), 43. 77-79, 112, 132.
Java, 61, 96,102,118,140,142-144 Koohoo, 162.
149, 150, 152-154, 156, 158-163, Kooti, 156.
166,167,170,171,174,179,180, Kooti Zimukyoku, 156, 157.
189,192,198,202-206,208,212- Kootoo Hooin, 163.
218,223,224,226,229,230,232, Kootubu, 155.
233, 235-237, 239, 241, 245-252, Korea (Chosen), 4-7, 10, 13-20,
256,257. 22, 27, 30, 70, 157, 158, 245.
Javasche Bank, 129, 167, 191, 192. Korean Provisional Government,
Jumbi-I-In-Kai, 249. 15.
Junsenji Keizai, 38, 55. Ku, 157.
Kumityoo, 222.
Kagaku Gizitusitu, 154. Kunrei, 162.
Kaikei Kantokubu, 156. Kuomintang, 33, 57, 59.
Kaikyoo Kootoo Hooin, 163. Kuriles, 5, 81.
Kaisha, 19. Kurusu, Saburu, 81, 82.
Kaizi Soskyoku, 156. Kwantung Army, 30-32, 36, 38,
Kakyoo Sookai, 220. 40, 43, 45, 70, 89.
Kamchatka, 90. Kyuukan Seido Tyoosa Iinkai, 199.
Kastan, Ir, 178.
Kato, Baron, 22, 23.
Keiboodan, 223, 229, 230, 253. Labuan Island, 119.
Keimin Bunka Sidoosyo, 181. Lansing-Ishii agreement, 25.
Keimubu, 155. League of Nations, 25, 50, 51, 57,
Keizai Hooin, 163. 100.
Keizaibu, 156. Lesser Sunda Islands, 118, 149,
Keizika, 155. 161,249.
268 INDEX

Liaotung Peninsula, 6. Minseiju, 160, 161, 162.

Li Chiao, 35. Minseit'ei, 162.
Liu Chiu Islands (See Ryukyu Minzika, 155.
Islands). Mitsubishi, 39, 158.
Lombok, 118. Mitsui,39, 158.
London Naval Treaty of 1930, 46, Mitsui Bank, 191.
47. Mochadi, M., 178.
Lytton Commission, 50. Mochtar, Raden, 178.
Moluccas, lOS, 118, 140, 161, 249.
Madielis Islam Ala Indonesia Mongolia, 23, 29.34, 69. 70. 90.
(MIAI), 204, 205. Monroe Doctrine for Eastern Asia,
Madielis Siut'o Muslimin Indonesia 51,52.
(Masjumi), 205, 207, 208, 220, Morotai, 238.
242. Movement for the New Life, 243,
Madura, 118, 158, 162, 163. 244.
Maeda, T., 60, 161, 249, 253-258. Muhammad (the Prophet), 201,
Malaya, 67, 79, 81, 82, 84, 86, 88, 206.
91, 96, 141, 142, 160, 178, 182, Muhammadiyah, 204, 205.
248. Mukai, T., 123.
Manchukuo, see Manchuria. Munich Settlement (1938), 58, 61,
Manchukuo Islamic Society, 35. 77.
Manchuria, 6, 10, 18-20,22,23,27,
29-33, 35-45, 48, 50, 51, 54, 56, Nagano, 215, 249.
58,59,69,70,88, 89, 91, 96, 146, Nagoaka, 102.
170, 195,217. Nahdat al-Ulama, 204, 205.
Mangunkusumo, Tjipto, 147, 211. Naimubu, 154.
Mangunwirono, S., 178. Nami Kikan, 230.
Mangupradja, Gatot, 226. Nanpo Kaihatu Kinko, 192, 250.
Mangyo, 40. Nanseitai, see Beppan.
Manshu Takushoku Kabushiki Nanyo Kohatsu, 101.
Kaisha, 36, 37. Natuna Islands, 118.
Manshu Takushoku Kosha, 37. Nauru, 88.
Mansur, H., 180, 206, 212. Netherlands, the (Holland), 61, 73,
Marianas, 23, 219, 231. 79, 80, 81, 231.
Maritime Provinces, 25, 26, 91. Neutrality Acts (U.S.), 53, 57, 58.
Marshall Islands, 23, 219. New Caledonia, 66.
Masjumi, see Madielis Sjut'o Mus- New Guinea, 66, 96, 102-105, 118,
limin Indonesia. 126, 142.
Masubuchi, S., 160. New Zealand, 67. 88, 90. 96.
Matsumoto, Tadao, 131. Nicobar Islands. 119.
Matsuoka, Yosuke, 66, 70, 71, 73- Nine Power Treaty (1922),26,50,
77, 89, 90, 103, 112, 114, 122, 57.
125, 127, 130-135, 137. NiPPon Sangyo Kaisha (Nissan) ,
Meiji, Emperor, 29. 39.40.
Meiji Restoration (1868), 3, 5. Nippon Seinendan, 49.
MIAI, see Madielis Islam Ala In- Nishimura. 0 .• 251, 255. 257. 258.
donesia. Nissan. see Nippon Sangyo Kaisha.
Minahassa, 149. Nomura, Admiral, 78, 82.
Minangkabau, 198. Norway. 61, 107.
Minobe, T., 49.
Minsei, 160. Ohashi, 128.
Minseibu, 161, 162. Ohye, Kohtaro, 136.
 INDEX 269

Okada, 53. Russo-Japanese War, 6, 29.

Okinawa, 5. Ryukyu Islands (Liu Chiu) , 4, 5.
Open Door, 26, 43, 100, 101.
Oriental Development Company, Saikoo Hooin, 163.
19. Saikoo Sikikan, 161, 162.
Orimono Koogyo Kumiai, 193. Saito, Admiral, 53.
Osamu Gunritu, 161. Saito, Consul-General, 112, 122,
Osamu Kan Po, 162, 181. 127.
Osamu Kanrei, 161, 162. Sakhalin, 6, 25, 26, 27.
Osamu Seirei, 161, 162, 163, 192. Sakurai, Heigoro, 103.
Oshima, General, 78, 116, 138. Samsudin, R., 178, 209.
Ott, Ambassador, 64, 111, 124, 137. Samurai, 4, 195.
Ottawa Agreements, 54. San Francisco Conference, 243.
Sang Kai, 216.
Pact of Paris (1928), 50. Sangyoobu, 155.
Pancha Dharma, 235. San Yo, 216.
Papua, 238. Sarawak, 86, 119.
Parindra, 211. Schouten Archipelago, 126.
Partai N asional Indonesia (PNI), Seimubu, 153.
226. Seinendan (Pemudas) , 154, 215,
Pearl Harbour, 75, 76, 79, 81, 82, 224-226, 230.
95, 141. Sendenbu, 155, 176.
Pelopor, 230. Shansi, 24, 52.
Pemandangan, 146. Shantung, 23, 27, 52.
Pemudas, see Seinendan. Shimizu, H., 230, 257, 258.
People's Council, 145, 160, 212, Shimonoseki, Treaty of,S.
220,221. Shinko-Zaibatsu, 39.
People's Credit Bank, 191. Shintoism,S, 12.
Persia (Iran), 4, 74, 80. Shoin, Yoshida, 4.
Pescadores, 5. Si, 157, 225.
Peta, 221, 226-230, 234, 243, 253. Siam (Thailand), 61, 62, 66-68, 72,
Philippines, 4, 61, 67, 73, 74, 79, 77,81, 84, 88, 96, 133, 140, 142,
81, 84, 86, 88, 90, 96, Ill, 142, 183,217,241.
183, 190,200,215,217,245,246. Siberia, 6, 19, 90, 91.
Portsmouth, Treaty of, 6, 36. Sidoobu, 153.
Potsdam, Declaration of, 252, 256, Sihoobu, 155.
257. Siku, 157.
Preparatory Committee, see Com- Singapore, 61, 67, 68, 72, 74, 75,
mittee for the Preparation of 86,90.
Independence. Sinkiang, 69, 70.
Putera, 214, 215, 219, 222, 224. Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895,
P'u Yi, Henry, 30, 31, 33, 45. 6,22.
Sisetu Sookyoku, 155.
Ribbentrop, J. von, 74, 111, 124, Sjahrir, S., 146, 147, 210, 254.
131. Sjarifuddin, A., 211.
Rikuyu Sookyoku, 156. S.K.K., 190.
Romushas, 240-242. S.K.K.K., 188, 189.
Roomukyoku, 155. Socialism, 195.
Russia, see also Soviet Union,S, 6, Son, 157.
25,34. Soomubu, 154.
Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact Soomubu-Kikakuka, 155.
(1941),74. Soomubutyoo, 154, 237, 248.
ZlO INDEX

Sooryoo Hooin 163. Tojo, General Hideki, 45, 70, n,

South Manchurian Railway, 22, 73, 79, 88, 90, 139, 141, 143, 185,
28, 32, 38, 39, 70. 215-218, 226, 231, 245, 246.
Soviet Union, see also Russia, 26- Tokobatsu Kakyo Keibootai, 229.
28, 34, 39, 51, 56, 60, 63, 64, 66, Tokubetu Si, 156, 157.
67, 73-76, 80, 82, 90, 95, 96, 147. Tonari Gumi, 222, 223.
Spratly Islands, 61, 77, 104. Tongking, 68.
Stalin, 73, 74, 89. Total War Research Institute, 88-
Suara MIAI, 204. 92, 94, 95, 119, 138, 157, 173, 174,
Subardjo, 253, 254. 195, 196, 244.
Sudibyo, R.M. Slamet, 178. Townsend Harris Treaty, 4.
Sui dynasty, 12. Toyama, Mitsuru, 50.
Suiyan, 52. Triple Alliance, 60, 65, 66, 72, 73,
Sukarno, 147, 210, 212, 213, 215, 113, 114, 116, 123, 124.
216, 218, 221, 222, 226, 235, Tuusin Sookyoku, 156.
236, 243, 245, 251-258. Tyoosasitu ,154.
Sumatra, 96, 104, 118, 127, 140,
148, 149, 160, 162, 167, 178, 180, Ulamas, 199, 200-202, 206.
184,186, 187, 189, 192, 198, 199, Uleebalangs, 199.
206, 212, 249. U.S.A., 11, 20, 23, 25, 26, 29, 48,
Sumita, General, 77. 50-54, 58-60, 63, 65-67, 72-82,
Sumitomo, 39. 90,95,96,106,108-112,128-133,
Suzuki, 78, 83. 136, 138, 139, 183.
Syomin Ginkoo, 192.
Syoomuka, 155. Van Heutz, 174.
Syuu, 156-158, 160, 201, 205, 225, Van Kleffens, E. N., 108.
227,240. Van Mook, H. J., 110, 121, 145,
Syuumubu, 155, 202. 180.
Syuutyookan, 214. Van Pabst, 108, 109, 110.
Versailles, Treaty of, 26, 53.
Taiman jimukokyu, 32, 55, 70. Volcano Islands, 5.
Taiwan, see Formosa.
Taiwan Development Company, 9. Wake, 88.
Takahashi, 53. Wang Ching-wei, 62.
Tanaka, Baron, 28, 29. Wang Tao (Kingly Way), 35.
Tanaka Memorial, 29. Warong Kumiai Rengookai, 193.
Tarakan, 104, 141, 238. Washington Conference (1921-
Tekisan Kanribu, 156, 173, 192. 1922),26.
Terauchi, 80, 143, 160, 161, 215, Watanabe, 53.
238,247,248,250-252. Wavell, General, 143.
Thailand, see Siam. Wediodiningrat, Radjiman, 236,
Tianbu, 155, 165. 252.
Tihoo Hooin, 163. Wiranatakusuma, 243.
Tihookyoku, 155. Wirjopranoto, R. Sukardjo, 178.
Timor, 118, 119, 140, 142, 150, 158.
Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stac- Yamamoto, Major-General, 215,
houwer, Jonkheer, 121. 249,253,256.
To-A Kangyo, 36. Yangtse Valley, 24, 27.
Tobing, H.P.L., 178. Yasuda, 39.
Togo, Shigenori, 140, 142, 246. Yen Bloc, 38, 44, lIS, 129.
Togyo Rengo Kai, 190. Yokohama Specie Bank, 129, 191.
Tohir, Moh., 178. Yomiuri Shimbun, 27, 116.
 INDEX 271

Yoshida, Tanichiro, 103. Zaigo Guniinkai, 49.

Yoshizawa, K., 75, 128-130, 132- Zaimubu, 155.
135. Zidoosya Sookyoku, 156.
Yuan Shih-kai, 23. Zinzika, 154.
Zoosen Sookyoku, 156.
Zyawa Gunseibu, 153.
Zaibatsu, 39, 46, 47, 55, 70, 71, 185. Zyoohoositu, 154.