Flight Safety Foundation

Approach-and-landing Accident Reduction

Tool Kit
FSF ALAR Briefing Note
7.4 — Visual Approaches

Accepting an air traffic control (ATC) clearance for a visual Definition

approach or requesting a visual approach should be balanced
carefully against the following: Although slightly different definitions are provided by the
• Ceiling and visibility conditions; International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the
European Joint Aviation Authorities and the U.S. Federal
• Darkness; Aviation Administration (FAA), the following definition, from
• Weather: the FAA Aeronautical Information Manual, will be used in
this discussion:
– Wind, turbulence;
• “[A visual approach is] an approach conducted on an
– Rain or snow; and/or, instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan which authorizes
– Fog or smoke; the pilot to proceed visually and clear of clouds to the
airport;
• Crew experience with airport and airport environment:
• “The pilot must, at all times, have either the airport or
– Surrounding terrain; and/or, the preceding aircraft in sight;
– Specific airport and runway hazards (obstructions, • “[The visual] approach must be authorized and under
etc.); and, the control of the appropriate air traffic control facility;
• Runway visual aids: [and],

– Type of approach light system (ALS); and, • “Reported weather at the airport must be ceiling at or
above 1,000 feet and visibility three miles or greater.”
– Availability of visual approach slope indicator (VASI)
or precision approach path indicator (PAPI).
Visual Approach at Night

Statistical Data During a visual approach at night, fewer visual references are
usable, and visual illusions and spatial disorientation occur
The Flight Safety Foundation Approach-and-landing Accident more frequently.
Reduction (ALAR) Task Force found that visual approaches
were being conducted in 41 percent of 118 fatal approach- Visual illusions (such as the “black-hole effect”2) affect the flight
and-landing accidents worldwide in 1980 through 1996 crew’s vertical situational awareness and horizontal situational
involving jet aircraft and turboprop aircraft with maximum awareness, particularly on the base leg and when turning final.
takeoff weights above 12,500 pounds/5,700 kilograms, and in
which the type of approach being conducted was known.1 A visual approach at night should be considered only if:

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 • Weather is suitable for flight under visual flight rules
(VFR); Table 1
• A close-in pattern is used (or a published visual approach Recommended Elements
is available); Of a Stabilized Approach
• A pattern altitude is defined; and, All flights must be stabilized by 1,000 feet above
airport elevation in instrument meteorological
• The flight crew is familiar with airport hazards and
conditions (IMC) and by 500 feet above airport
obstructions. (This includes the availability of current elevation in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).
notices to airmen [NOTAMS].) An approach is stabilized when all of the following
criteria are met:
At night, whenever an instrument approach is available 1. The aircraft is on the correct flight path;
(particularly an instrument landing system [ILS] approach), an 2. Only small changes in heading/pitch are required to
instrument approach should be preferred to a visual approach. maintain the correct flight path;
3. The aircraft speed is not more than VREF + 20 knots
If a precision approach is not available, select an approach indicated airspeed and not less than VREF;
supported by VASI or PAPI. 4. The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration;
5. Sink rate is no greater than 1,000 feet per minute; if
an approach requires a sink rate greater than 1,000
Overview feet per minute, a special briefing should be
conducted;
The following overview provides a description of the various 6. Power setting is appropriate for the aircraft
phases and techniques associated with visual approaches. configuration and is not below the minimum power
for approach as defined by the aircraft operating
References manual;
7. All briefings and checklists have been conducted;
Visual approaches should be conducted with reference to 8. Specific types of approaches are stabilized if they
either: also fulfill the following: instrument landing system
(ILS) approaches must be flown within one dot of
• A published visual approach chart for the intended the glideslope and localizer; a Category II or
runway; or, Category III ILS approach must be flown within the
expanded localizer band; during a circling
• The visual approach procedure (altitude, aircraft approach, wings should be level on final when the
configuration and airspeed) published in the aircraft aircraft reaches 300 feet above airport elevation;
operating manual (AOM)/quick reference handbook and,
(QRH) or the pattern published in the AOM/QRH 9. Unique approach procedures or abnormal
conditions requiring a deviation from the above
elements of a stabilized approach require a special
Terrain Awareness briefing.
An approach that becomes unstabilized below 1,000
When selecting or accepting a visual approach, the flight crew feet above airport elevation in IMC or below 500 feet
should be aware of the surrounding terrain and man-made above airport elevation in VMC requires an immediate
obstacles. go-around.
Source: Flight Safety Foundation Approach-and-landing Accident
For example, at night, with an unlighted hillside between a Reduction (ALAR) Task Force (V1.1 November 2000)
lighted area and the runway, the flight crew may not see the
rising terrain.
Automated Systems
Objective
Automated systems (autopilot, flight director, autothrottles)
The objective of a visual approach is to conduct an approach: should be adapted to the type of visual approach (i.e., visual
approach chart or AOM/QRH visual approach procedure/
• Using visual references; and,
pattern) and to the ATC environment (radar vectors or crew
• Being stabilized by 500 feet above airport elevation navigation).
according to company standard operating procedures
(SOPs). (See Table 1.) During the final phase of the approach, the crew should
disconnect the autopilot, clear the flight director command
If the aircraft is not stabilized by 500 feet above airport bars, maintain the autothrottles in speed mode and select the
elevation or if the approach becomes unstabilized below 500 flight-path vector symbol (as available on the primary flight
feet above airport elevation, go around. display [PFD] or head-up display [HUD]).

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 Initial/Intermediate Approach Anticipate the crosswind effect (as applicable) to complete
the turn correctly established on the extended runway centerline
The flight management system (FMS) may be used to build with the required drift correction.
the teardrop outbound leg or the downwind leg, for enhanced
situational awareness. This should be done when programming Final Approach
the FMS before reaching the top-of-descent point.
Plan to be aligned with the runway (wings level) and stabilized
As applicable, set navaids for the instrument approach at the final approach speed by 500 feet above airport elevation.
associated with the landing runway (for monitoring and in case
of loss of visual references). Monitor groundspeed variations (for wind shear awareness)
and call altitudes and excessive flight-parameter deviations as
Review the primary elements of the visual approach and the for instrument approaches.
primary elements of the associated instrument approach.
Maintain visual scanning toward the aiming point (typically
Review the appropriate missed approach procedure. 1,000 feet from the runway threshold) to avoid any tendency
to inadvertently descend below the final approach path (use
Extend slats and fly at the corresponding maneuvering speed. raw data or the VASI/PAPI, as available, for a cross-check).

Barometric-altimeter and radio-altimeter bugs may be set (per

company SOPs) for enhanced terrain awareness. Visual Approach Factors

Outbound/Downwind Leg The following factors often are cited when discussing
unstabilized visual approaches:
To be aligned on the final approach course and stabilized at • Pressure of flight schedule (making up for delays);
500 feet above airport elevation, the crew should intercept
typically the final approach course at three nautical miles from • Crew-induced circumstances or ATC-induced
the runway threshold (time the outbound leg or downwind leg circumstances resulting in insufficient time to plan,
accordingly, as a function of the prevailing airspeed and wind prepare and conduct a safe approach;
component). • Excessive altitude or excessive airspeed (e.g., inadequate
energy management) early in the approach;
Maintain typically 1,500 feet above airport elevation (or the
charted altitude) until beginning the final descent or turning • Downwind leg too short (visual pattern) or interception
base leg. too close (direct base-leg interception);
• Inadequate awareness of tail-wind component and/or
Configure the aircraft per SOPs, typically turning base leg with crosswind component;
approach flaps, landing gear extended and ground spoilers
armed. • Incorrect anticipation of aircraft deceleration characteristics
in level flight or on a three-degree glide path;
Do not exceed a 30-degree bank angle when turning onto base • Failure to recognize deviations or failure to adhere to
leg. excessive-parameter-deviation criteria;

Base Leg • Belief that the aircraft will be stabilized at the minimum
stabilization height or shortly thereafter;
Resist the tendency to fly a continuous closing-in turn toward • Excessive confidence by the pilot not flying (PNF) that
the runway threshold. the pilot flying (PF) will achieve a timely stabilization,
or reluctance by the PNF to challenge the PF;
Before turning final (depending on the distance from the
• PF/PNF too reliant on each other to call excessive
runway threshold), extend landing flaps and begin reducing
deviations or to call for a go-around;
to the target final approach speed.
• Visual illusions;
Estimate the glide-path angle to the runway threshold based
• Inadvertent modification of the aircraft trajectory to
on available visual references (e.g., VASI) or raw data3 (ILS
maintain a constant view of visual references; and,
glideslope or altitude/distance). (Glideslope indications and
VASI indications are reliable only within 30 degrees of the • Loss of ground visual references, airport visual
final approach course.) references or runway visual references, with the PF and
the PNF both looking outside to reacquire visual
Do not exceed a 30-degree bank angle when tuning final. references.

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 Unstabilized Visual Approaches The following FSF ALAR Briefing Notes provide information
to supplement this discussion:
The following deviations are typical of unstabilized visual
• 1.1 — Operating Philosophy;
approaches:
• Steep approach (high and fast, with excessive rate of • 1.2 — Automation;
descent);
• 1.3 — Golden Rules;
• Shallow approach (below desired glide path);
• 1.4 — Standard Calls;
• Ground-proximity warning system (GPWS)/terrain
awareness warning system (TAWS)4 activation: • 1.5 — Normal Checklists;
– Mode 1: “sink rate”; • 1.6 — Approach Briefing;
– Mode 2A: “terrain” (less than full flaps);
• 3.1 — Barometric Altimeter and Radio Altimeter;
– Mode 2B: “terrain” (full flaps);
• 4.2 — Energy Management;
• Final-approach-course interception too close to the
runway threshold because of an inadequate outbound • 5.2 — Terrain;
teardrop leg or downwind leg;
• 5.3 — Visual Illusions; and,
• Laterally unstabilized final approach because of failure
to correct for crosswind; • 7.1 — Stabilized Approach.♦
• Excessive bank angle and maneuvering to capture the
extended runway centerline or to conduct a side-step References
maneuver;
1. Flight Safety Foundation. “Killers in Aviation: FSF Task
• Unstabilized approach with late go-around decision or
Force Presents Facts About Approach-and-landing and
no go-around decision; and,
Controlled-flight-into-terrain Accidents.” Flight Safety
• Inadvertent descent below the three-degree glide path. Digest Volume 17 (November–December 1998) and
Volume 18 (January–February 1999): 1–121. The facts
presented by the FSF ALAR Task Force were based on
Summary analyses of 287 fatal approach-and-landing accidents
(ALAs) that occurred in 1980 through 1996 involving
The following should be discussed and understood for safe turbine aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds/5,700
visual approaches: kilograms, detailed studies of 76 ALAs and serious
• Weighing the time saved against the risk; incidents in 1984 through 1997 and audits of about 3,300
flights.
• Awareness of all weather factors;
2. The black-hole effect typically occurs during a visual
• Awareness of surrounding terrain and obstacles; approach conducted on a moonless or overcast night, over
• Awareness of airport environment, airport and runway water or over dark, featureless terrain where the only visual
hazards; stimuli are lights on and/or near the airport. The absence
of visual references in the pilot’s near vision affect depth
• Use of a visual approach chart or AOM/QRH procedures/ perception and cause the illusion that the airport is closer
pattern; than it actually is and, thus, that the aircraft is too high.
• Tuning and monitoring all available navaids; The pilot may respond to this illusion by conducting an
approach below the correct flight path (i.e., a low
• Optimizing use of automation with timely reversion to approach).
hand-flying;
3. The Flight Safety Foundation Approach-and-landing
• Adhering to defined PF/PNF task-sharing (monitoring Accident Reduction (ALAR) Task Force defines raw data
by PNF of head-down references [i.e., instrument as “data received directly (not via the flight director or
references] while PF flies and looks outside); flight management computer) from basic navigation aids
• Maintaining visual contact with the runway and other (e.g., ADF, VOR, DME, barometric altimeter).”
traffic at all times; and,
4. Terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) is the term
• Announcing altitudes and excessive flight-parameter used by the European Joint Aviation Authorities and the
deviations, and adhering to the go-around policy for U.S. Federal Aviation Administration to describe
instrument approaches. equipment meeting International Civil Aviation

156 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST • AUGUST–NOVEMBER 2000

 Organization standards and recommendations for ground- Lawton, Russell. “Steep Turn by Captain During Approach
proximity warning system (GPWS) equipment that Results in Stall and Crash of DC-8 Freighter.” Accident
provides predictive terrain-hazard warnings. “Enhanced Prevention Volume 51 (October 1994).
GPWS” and “ground collision avoidance system” are other
terms used to describe TAWS equipment.
Regulatory Resources

Related Reading from FSF Publications U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Federal Aviation
Regulations. 91.175 “Takeoff and landing under IFR.” January
Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Editorial Staff. “B-757 1, 2000.
Damaged by Ground Strike During Late Go-around from
Visual Approach.” Accident Prevention Volume 56 (May FAA. Advisory Circular 60-A, Pilot’s Spatial Disorientation.
1999). February 8, 1983.

FSF Editorial Staff. “MD-88 Strikes Approach Light Structure Joint Aviation Authorities. Joint Aviation Requirements –
in Nonfatal Accident.” Accident Prevention Volume 54 Operations 1. Commercial Air Transport (Aeroplanes). 1.435
(December 1997). “Terminology.” July 1, 2000.

Notice
The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Approach-and-landing Accident • Flight management system;
Reduction (ALAR) Task Force has produced this briefing note to • Automatic ground spoilers;
help prevent ALAs, including those involving controlled flight into
terrain. The briefing note is based on the task force’s data-driven • Autobrakes;
conclusions and recommendations, as well as data from the U.S. • Thrust reversers;
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) Joint Safety Analysis
• Manufacturers’/operators’ standard operating procedures; and,
Team (JSAT) and the European Joint Aviation Authorities Safety
Strategy Initiative (JSSI). • Two-person flight crew.

The briefing note has been prepared primarily for operators and pilots This briefing note is one of 34 briefing notes that comprise a
of turbine-powered airplanes with underwing-mounted engines (but fundamental part of the FSF ALAR Tool Kit, which includes a variety
can be adapted for fuselage-mounted turbine engines, turboprop- of other safety products that have been developed to help prevent
powered aircraft and piston-powered aircraft) and with the following: ALAs.
• Glass flight deck (i.e., an electronic flight instrument system This information is not intended to supersede operators’ or
with a primary flight display and a navigation display); manufacturers’ policies, practices or requirements, and is not
• Integrated autopilot, flight director and autothrottle systems; intended to supersede government regulations.

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