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Social Media and Politics in Southeast Asia

This document explores the complex relationship between social media and politics in Southeast Asia, emphasizing its dual role in promoting grassroots activism while also facilitating autocratic practices. It highlights how social media influences public discourse and political engagement, exacerbating polarization and disinformation. The study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of these dynamics through interdisciplinary research and case studies across the region.

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100% found this document useful (19 votes)

177 views102 pages

Social Media and Politics in Southeast Asia

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Lim

This Element endeavors to enrich and broaden Southeast Asian

research by exploring the intricate interplay between social
media and politics. Employing an interdisciplinary approach and
grounded in extensive longitudinal research, the study uncovers
nuanced political implications, highlighting the platform’s dual
role in both fostering grassroots activism and enabling autocratic Politics and Society
practices of algorithmic politics, notably in electoral politics.
It underscores social media’s alignment with communicative in Southeast Asia
capitalism, where algorithmic marketing culture overshadows
public discourse, and perpetuates affective binary mobilization
that benefits both progressive and regressive grassroots
activism. It can facilitate oppositional forces but is susceptible

Social Media and Politics in Southeast Asia

Social Media
to authoritarian capture. The rise of algorithmic politics also
exacerbates polarization through algorithmic enclaves and
escalates disinformation, furthering autocraticizing trends.

and Politics in
Beyond Southeast Asia, the Element provides analytical and
conceptual frameworks to comprehend the mutual algorithmic/
political dynamics amidst the contestation between progressive

Southeast Asia
forces and the autocratic shaping of technological platforms.

About the Series Series Editors

The Elements series Politics and Society Edward Aspinall
in Southeast Asia includes both country- Australian National
specific and thematic studies on one of University
the world’s most dynamic regions. Each
title, written by a leading scholar of that
country or theme, combines a succinct,
Meredith L. Weiss
University at
Albany, SUNY
Merlyna Lim
comprehensive, up-to-date overview of
debates in the scholarly literature with
original analysis and a clear argument.

Cover image: tashechka/Shutterstock ISSN 2515-2998 (online)

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Elements in Politics and Society in Southeast Asia
edited by
Edward Aspinall
Australian National University
Meredith L. Weiss
University at Albany, SUNY

SOCIAL MEDIA
AND POLITICS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA

Merlyna Lim
Carleton University

Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment,

a department of the University of Cambridge.
We share the University’s mission to contribute to society through the pursuit of
education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009548076
DOI: 10.1017/9781108750745
© Merlyna Lim 2024
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions
of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take
place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment.
When citing this work, please include a reference to the DOI 10.1017/9781108750745
First published 2024
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
ISBN 978-1-009-54807-6 Hardback
ISBN 978-1-108-71934-6 Paperback
ISSN 2515-2998 (online)
ISSN 2515-298X (print)
Cambridge University Press & Assessment has no responsibility for the persistence
or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this
publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will
remain, accurate or appropriate.

Elements in Politics and Society in Southeast Asia

DOI: 10.1017/9781108750745
First published online: December 2024

Merlyna Lim
Carleton University
Author for correspondence: Merlyna Lim, [email protected]

Abstract: This Element endeavors to enrich and broaden Southeast

Asian research by exploring the intricate interplay between social
media and politics. Employing an interdisciplinary approach and
grounded in extensive longitudinal research, the study uncovers
nuanced political implications, highlighting the platform’s dual role in
both fostering grassroots activism and enabling autocratic practices of
algorithmic politics, notably in electoral politics. It underscores social
media’s alignment with communicative capitalism, where algorithmic
marketing culture overshadows public discourse, and perpetuates
aﬀective binary mobilization that beneﬁts both progressive and
regressive grassroots activism. It can facilitate oppositional forces but is
susceptible to authoritarian capture. The rise of algorithmic politics also
exacerbates polarization through algorithmic enclaves and escalates
disinformation, furthering autocraticizing trends. Beyond Southeast
Asia, the Element provides analytical and conceptual frameworks to
comprehend the mutual algorithmic/political dynamics amidst the
contestation between progressive forces and the autocratic shaping of
technological platforms.

This Element also has a video abstract: www.cambridge.org/ESEA_Lim

Keywords: social media, politics, activism, election, algorithms

© Merlyna Lim 2024

ISBNs: 9781009548076 (HB), 9781108719346 (PB), 9781108750745 (OC)
ISSNs: 2515-2998 (online), 2515-298X (print)

1 Introduction 1

2 Mapping the Terrain: Sociopolitical and Technological

Dynamics of Social Media in Southeast Asia 11

3 Revealing the Tapestry: Country Highlights on Social

Media and Politics in Southeast Asia 24

4 Dynamics of Dissent: Grassroots Activism in the Social

Media Age 38

5 Bytes and Ballots: Social Media in/for Political Campaigns

and Elections 58

6 Concluding Remarks 79

References 82

1 Introduction
In Southeast Asia, separating contemporary politics from social media usage is
unimaginable. The surfacing of mass rallies, whether located in the Independent
Square of Kuala Lumpur, the National Monument of Jakarta, the Freedom Park in
Phnom Penh, or other symbolic public spaces across the region, largely incorpor-
ates Facebook, Twitter (X), TikTok, and other social media platforms. Civil society
organizations strategically curate attention-grabbing hashtags to gain public sup-
port, while hate groups exploit these platforms with hate speech and disinformation.
Country leaders, including Prime Ministers Hun Manet of Cambodia and Lee
Hsien Loong of Singapore, maintain social media accounts. Politicians and parties
heavily depend on these platforms as primary campaign tools. While conventional
campaigning methods like television advertisements, rallies, and banners persist,
their efficacy is augmented by the proliferation of supporters’ posts, comments,
photos, and videos disseminated through social media channels.
The multifaceted utilization of social media has become indispensable to polit-
ical communication, engagement, and information dissemination in Southeast
Asia, shaping the dynamics of public discourse and political participation. As the
region undergoes profound sociopolitical transformations, the pervasive influence
of digital platforms emerges as a dynamic and manifold phenomenon, profoundly
affecting the political fabric of diverse nations within this vibrant corner of the
world. The intersection of social media and politics in Southeast Asia is paramount,
necessitating an in-depth exploration of how digital technologies intricately shape
political landscapes and vice versa.
Since its inception in 1994, the term “social media” has undergone various
definitions. Over the years, the consistent theme in defining social media has been
its role as “an enabler for human interaction as well as an avenue to connect with
other users” (Aichner et al., 2021: 219). The significance of “user-generated
content,” absent in its early definitions, has emerged as a central element in recent
conceptualizations (p. 220). For this Element, I adopt Carr and Hayes’ (2015: 50)
definition, characterizing social media as “[i]nternet-based channels that allow
users to interact opportunistically and selectively self-present, either in real-time
or asynchronously, with both broad and narrow audiences who derive value from
user-generated content and the perception of interaction with others.”
Across various academic fields, the importance of the interplay between
politics and social media is widely recognized. However, a notable constraint
within the existing body of literature is the considerable overemphasis on studies
concentrated on these dynamics within the United States, with a similar trend in
other major developed nations, such as the United Kingdom. Despite some efforts
to investigate these dynamics in diverse geopolitical contexts, notably around

dramatic political events such as the Arab Spring, research outside Western
settings remains less influential. The attempt to extrapolate insights from
Western nations to varied local contexts is often impeded by significant idiosyn-
crasies within each region’s distinct political and media systems. Consequently,
understanding and findings unearthed from these contexts may have limited
relevance and applicability elsewhere, including Southeast Asia.
Echoing Sinpeng and Tapsell (2020: 6), I concur that no other region under-
goes the dual impact of fortune and misfortune from social media as distinctly as
Southeast Asia. The region has witnessed the integration of social media
platforms in significant democratic events, such as the extensive and prolonged
pro-democracy youth protests in 2021 (see Section 4.4), alongside autocratic
utilization of the platforms in orchestrated disinformation campaigns (see
Section 5.3.2). As detailed in Section 2, Southeast Asia is one of the most
socially active regions globally on various social media platforms. Furthermore,
Southeast Asia is home to a wide array of political structures, cultural systems,
depths of political engagement, and histories. This complex tapestry defies easy
alignment with the historical timelines or categories typically employed in
assessing political change within Western settings. The unique assemblages of
forces at play underscore dramatically different political configurations among
the nation-states of this region. It is, therefore, imperative to produce knowledge
and critical insights that emerge from the empirical contexts of the region.
Over the past decade, there has been a surge of research exploring the
intersection of social media and politics in Southeast Asia. This growth is
particularly notable in individual case studies within specific countries.
Scholars have delved into the influence of social media on diverse facets such
as citizen participation, online activism, elections, state propaganda, and digital
authoritarianism. The existing literature heavily focuses on Indonesia (Beta &
Neyazi, 2022; Hui, 2020; Lim, 2013, 2017a; Leiliyanti & Irawati, 2020;
Rakhmani & Saraswati, 2021; Saraswati, 2020; Seto, 2017; Tapsell, 2017),
Malaysia (Cheong, 2020; Johns & Cheong, 2019, 2021; Lim, 2016, 2017b;
Lim, 2017; Tye et al., 2018), and the Philippines (Arugay & Baquisal, 2022;
Chua & Soriano, 2020; Ong & Cabañes, 2018; Ong, Tapsell, & Curato, 2019).
Comparative studies of the region frequently revolve around these nations (Ong
& Tapsell, 2022; Schäfer, 2018; Tapsell, 2021; Weiss, 2014). In contrast, there is
a comparatively limited body of research on Myanmar (Aung & Htut, 2019;
Kyaw, 2020; Passeri, 2019; Rio, 2021; Ryan & Tran, 2022), Thailand
(Chattharakul, 2019; Sinpeng, 2021a, 2021b; Sombatpoonsiri, 2018, 2022),
Singapore (Pang, 2020; Zhang, 2016), and Vietnam (Luong, 2020; Vu, 2017),
with even less attention given to Cambodia (Doyle, 2021; Vong & Sinpeng,
2020), Laos, Timor-Leste, and Brunei. Meanwhile, regional analyses remain

scarce (exceptions see Abbott, 2011; Bünte, 2020; Lim, 2019, 2023b; Sinpeng,
2020; Sinpeng & Tapsell, 2020).
In this Element, I aim to contribute to, enhance, and broaden the research
within this field by exploring the dialectic relationship and assessing how this
interplay played out in political communication, citizen engagement, grassroots
activism, political campaigns, and elections. Building upon existing literature,
which encompasses the works of Southeast Asian scholars mentioned earlier
and beyond, my analysis is also rooted in my longitudinal research and obser-
vation of countries in the region.
Utilizing an interdisciplinary approach, I ground my theoretical and analyt-
ical contributions on two primary sources. First, I draw on the empirical
material from my unpublished research on recent grassroots progressive and
regressive activism, political campaigns, and electoral politics (primarily from
2018 to 2023). Second, I incorporate analytical and empirical insights from my
past work on social media and activism in the region (Lim, 2019, 2023b),
including in-depth research on Indonesia and Malaysia (Lim, 2013, 2016,
2017a, 2017b), and algorithmic dynamics (Lim, 2020a, 2023a). Bringing
these together, I offer a fresh analysis with a series of arguments that evolve
from and intercede with the prevailing discourse. I specifically address three
critical domains of literature that predominantly influence academic discussions
on social media and politics: network society and democracy (Section 1.1),
social media and public spheres (Section 1.2), and, more recently, polarization
and disinformation (Section 1.3). Situating my empirical research in Southeast
Asia, I position the region not only as a research site but also as a source of
conceptual and theoretical interventions that may find relevance elsewhere,
notably in the Global South.
The principal framework of my arguments is that the relationship between
social media and politics is multifaceted and co-constituting, shaped by
dynamic and ever-changing technological, sociopolitical, and user contextual
arrangements. In this milieu, first, I argue that the rich-gets-richer tendency of
social media scale-free networks (Section 1.1) contributes to inequality and
consolidation of power. In Southeast Asia, this means that in parallel with the
exponential growth of digital networks in the last two decades, the govern-
ments, as the region’s most powerful entities, have also grown to become the
strongest hubs within the networks with increased capacity to control and
influence political trajectories. Second, I assert that social media embodies the
platform capitalism model rather than fostering the democratic public sphere
(Section 1.2). Political pursuits on social media are thus intertwined with
communicative capitalism (Section 1.2), where algorithmic marketing culture
(Section 1.3) takes precedence over civic discourse and engagement. However,

Southeast Asian cases of grassroots activism show that activists and citizens
have the agency to shape the outcomes of their social media activities while
continue negotiating their positions vis-à-vis algorithmic and marketing predis-
positions. Lastly, I argue that, in Southeast Asia, the ascent of algorithmic
politics (Section 1.3), employed by political actors with undemocratic motives,
is the principal factor in deepening polarization and escalating disinformation,
furthering autocratizing trends.

1.1 Network Society versus Democracy

Scholarly works on the intersection of digital media and politics, from early
studies of the static internet to more contemporary analyses of social media,
revolve mainly around the idea that network society and democracy mutually
reinforce each other. While works in this area are abundant, Manuel Castells
stands out as the foremost authority, evident in his The Information Age:
Economy, Society, and Culture trilogy (1996, 1997, 1998). In these volumes,
Castells explores how the rise of information and communication technologies
has led to significant societal shifts, emphasizing the crucial role of networks in
shaping modern social, economic, and political structures. He argues that
networks have replaced traditional hierarchies as the primary organizing prin-
ciple in society. Castells contends that digital communication technologies
enable these networks to reconfigure political power dynamics, potentially
fostering democratization through increased citizen participation and the emer-
gence of networked social movements. However, he acknowledges that access
inequality may hinder democratization by creating political engagement and
influence disparities.
I contend that access inequality aside, digital networks are not egalitarian
networks where citizens have equal opportunities to participate in public dis-
course. First and foremost, the internet is never inherently egalitarian. Instead,
the internet structure exhibits characteristics of a scale-free network, a network
whose degree distribution follows a power law (Barabási & Albert, 1999). This
structure arises from two mechanisms – growth and preferential attachment –
where new nodes are inclined to link with existing highly connected nodes,
which are more likely to eventually become hubs (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003).
Matthew Hindman’s research (2008, 2018) supports this preferential attach-
ment thesis. Analyzing millions of web pages, Hindman (2008) discovered that
elites exert significant control over the presentation and accessibility of political
content online. In his subsequent study, Hindman (2018) challenges expectations
of audience fragmentation and resistance to media monopolies, asserting that
giants like Google and Facebook, along with super users, dominate social media

platforms. In this environment, it is mathematically impossible for smaller

players to effectively compete with the elites, aligning with the scale-free theory.
Scale-free networks, including the internet and social media, evolve through
growth and preferential attachment processes, resulting in a growing rich-get-
richer phenomenon and an increasingly unequal distribution of connectivity. In
social media networks, highly connected hubs hold disproportionate influence.
Extreme inequality in these platforms stems from this structure, where a small
number of hubs significantly impact overall network dynamics, posing chal-
lenges to democratization.
As of 2024, contemporary social media networks are more unequal than their
earlier versions. In the intersection of social media and politics, these networks
amplify the influence of larger political entities, reinforcing power dynamics. The
ongoing growth of social media networks further enhances the dominance of
powerful entities, contributing to the accumulation of power over time by those
initially lacking control during the internet’s early stages, such as Southeast Asian
governments, including authoritarian regimes (see Section 2.3). In the region, the
governments presently stand among the strongest nodes within social media’s
scale-free networks.

1.2 Social Media and Public Spheres

Another persistent focal point within the exploration of digital technologies and
politics is the concept of the public sphere, drawing from the enduring
Habermasian idea. Habermas (1989) envisions the public sphere as a discursive
space where citizens engage in open, deliberative discourse, shaping public
opinion and political decisions. The functioning public sphere comprises com-
municative spaces facilitating the exchange of information, ideas, and debates
involving traditional mass media and contemporary digital platforms. Habermas
(1989) identifies three forms of power within the public sphere – political,
economic, and media power – each should adhere to the communicative rational-
ity of presenting facts and arguments for critical scrutiny.
In examining modern democratic practices, Habermas highlights participa-
tion decline and growing disillusionment but remains optimistic about achiev-
ing a real participatory democracy under the right conditions. Despite the
criticism of the notion of a rational deliberative public sphere, perceived as
originating from a specific hegemonic perspective with “significant exclusions”
(Fraser, 1990), the concept endures. Throughout history, from the telegraph to
the internet and social media, there has been a search for media embodying
these right conditions, prompting ongoing assessments of their potential to
fulfill the requirements for a public sphere.

Early scholarly explorations of social media and the public sphere are
numerous, and within this context, I draw attention to several prominent
contributions. Benkler (2006) introduces the concept of a networked public
sphere, suggesting that citizens in the networked information economy can
transform their relationship with the public sphere by becoming creators and
primary subjects, thus contributing to the democratization of the internet.
Papacharissi (2009), recognizing both positive and negative technological
effects, offers the term virtual sphere 2.0 to describe activities such as sharing
political opinions on blogs, engaging with content on YouTube, and participat-
ing in online discussion groups as manifestations of digital public spheres for
citizen-consumers. Burgess and Green (2009) argue that YouTube serves as
a cultural public sphere, facilitating encounters with cultural differences and
fostering political listening across belief systems and identities.
Fuchs (2014) critiques these perspectives, advocating for a cultural materialist
understanding of the concept grounded in political economy. He raises concerns
about the ownership and commercialization of these platforms, asserting that
corporate control may distort the democratic potential of the public sphere.
Meanwhile, Dean (2009) disputes that the internet, rather than fostering
a genuinely democratic public sphere, is integrated into the capitalist system,
functioning as a tool for disseminating and promoting consumer culture. Using
communicative capitalism to describe the fusion of communication technologies
with capitalist logic, Dean argues that digital platforms can reinforce capitalist
structures and influence the nature of public discourse in contemporary societies.
In recent scholarly discussions, alternative perspectives have emerged. One
viewpoint argues that the promise of a digital public sphere has been hindered by
autocratic challenges, with social media transitioning from an engine of protest to
a potential mechanism for authoritarian resilience. It gained traction around 2016,
fueled primarily by the Cambridge Analytica scandal involving the misuse of
Facebook data to influence voters, notably aiding the US Trump election and the
UK pro-Brexit campaign. Critics characterize this period as an era of disinforma-
tion order (Bennett & Livingstone, 2018) or information disorders (Schirch,
2021), an epistemic crisis (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018), and post-truth
politics (Suiter, 2016). This view aligns with the prevailing perception that digital
media has become autocratic, transforming social media from a diverse landscape
of liberal freedoms to a troubling domain fraught with antidemocratic threats.
While this narrative of technological pessimism captures certain crucial aspects, it
paints a somewhat simplified narrative that portrays social media as a distinct
realm with certain features that exacerbate real-world politics.
Another viewpoint acknowledges social media’s role in facilitating authori-
tarianism while recognizing its potential contribution to the evolution of public

spheres. In contrast to the early utopian nternet scholars, proponents of this

perspective do not perceive platforms as tools for democracy. Instead, scholars
recognize the dual nature of technology, capable of aiding both democratization
and autocratization (Schleffer & Miller, 2021; Sinpeng & Tapsell, 2020).
My perspective broadly aligns with the latter viewpoint. Drawing from my early
research on the intersection of the internet and politics (Lim, 2002, 2005) to my
most recent works on social media activism (Lim, 2017a, 2023a, 2023b),
I acknowledge the potential for both democratic and undemocratic practices facili-
tated by digital platforms. Empirical cases from diverse Southeast Asian contexts
reveal a historical pattern where social media platforms and their predecessors, such
as the static internet, were utilized by both civil and uncivil society actors, including
extremist and violent groups, pursuing progressive and regressive interests
(Bräuchler, 2003; Lim, 2005; Ong & Cabañes, 2018; Sinpeng, 2021b).
It is important to recognize that the dialectical relationship between technology
and politics goes beyond a simplistic attribution to the mirroring of real politics or
the conventional double-edged sword argument for technology. Here, I advocate
for an examination of the inherent nature of the platforms themselves. Building
upon Fuchs’ (2014) and Dean’s (2009) ideas, I assert that social media platforms
were not inherently designed for political purposes. Their inception did not
prioritize fostering reasoned communicative discourse and civic engagement.
Instead, social media platforms fundamentally align with what Srnicek (2017)
terms platform capitalism. This concept delineates a speciﬁc economic and
organizational model where digital platforms serve as intermediaries, connecting
various user groups – consumers, producers, and advertisers – within a digital
ecosystem (Srnicek, 2017).
At the heart of platform capitalism lies the acquisition and monetization of
user data. These platforms amass extensive information about user behaviors,
preferences, and interactions, utilizing data for targeted advertising to generate
revenue. Moreover, platform capitalism thrives on network effects, where
a platform’s value increases with more users, creating a self-reinforcing cycle.
The ultimate goal of platform capitalists is to continually increase dominance in
various markets, making global connectivity an imperative objective. To maxi-
mize its performance, automation and algorithmic decision-making have thus
been integrated into platform capitalism, inﬂuencing content recommendation,
user targeting, and overall platform functionality.
Social media are the epitome of the platform capitalism model. They function
with a proclivity toward marketing culture, treating users more as consumers
than citizens. I do not imply that social media are inherently detrimental to
democracy or incapable of fostering citizen participation. Social media are
neither simply a sociopolitical nor a marketing artifact, but both at the same

time. The commercialized marketing framework shapes users’ activities but

does not hold absolute power over them. Users are not simply passive subjects
who have no agency; they, too, can extend and exercise their communicative
agency on social media platforms as citizens. However, I underscore that any
political activities on social media, including citizen and grassroots activism
(see Section 4) as well as political campaigns and elections (see Section 5), are
intertwined with communicative capitalism, wherein marketing logic takes
precedence over the communicative discourse of the public spheres. Political
dynamics on these platforms are shaped by attention, visibility, and information
ﬂow, aligning more with market dynamics than traditional democratic discourse
(Lim, 2023a).

1.3 Social Media Algorithms, Polarization, and Disinformation

Amidst ongoing concerns about the autocratization of social media (see
Section 1.1), there is a growing body of scholarship that explores three inter-
related factors believed to impact democracy negatively: social media, political
polarization, and the widespread dissemination of disinformation. Here, disinfor-
mation refers to information that can create misconceptions about the actual state
of the world. Central to these concerns is the widespread hypothesis that social
media platforms generate filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011), segregating users into
ideological echo chambers (Sunstein, 2018). Some scholars emphasize the role of
social media’s echo chambers and filter bubbles in fostering hate speech, ampli-
fying disinformation, deepening polarization, and enabling the rise of extreme
populist communities (Govil & Baishya, 2018; Spohr, 2017; Sunstein, 2018).
In response, while recognizing the role of the platforms, some scholars believe
that the perceived impact of filter bubbles and echo chambers may be overstated
and contend that user information-seeking behaviors should be considered
(Dubois & Blank, 2018; Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2016). Observably, social
media users in Southeast Asia, notably in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines typically have an extensive and diverse network and are not clustered
ideologically. Polarization in these places is primarily affective, not ideological.
My previous research, focusing on the interplay between algorithms, infor-
mation exchanges, and social media users, demonstrated that the effect of social
media interactions on users hinges on the convergence of complex forces (Lim,
2020a). In essence, the surge of disinformation and the deepening division and
polarization are not causally linked to social media but are correlated. This
correlation goes beyond algorithms creating isolated bubbles. Instead, as dis-
cussed in the following texts, the impact is primarily rooted in biases within
three factors: algorithmic marketing culture, emphasizing the need for social

media algorithms to support targeted advertising; the restriction of political

choices through binary politics, leading to the formation of algorithmic
enclaves (Lim, 2020a); and the escalation of algorithmic politics (Lim,
2023b), characterized by the professionalization of social media campaigns
and the manipulation of public discourse.
Over the past decade, social media platforms have shifted from a landscape
without automated content-ﬁltering algorithms to an increasingly algorithmic envir-
onment. In this new algorithmic culture, ways in cultural practices and experiences
are increasingly shaped by algorithms (Striphas, 2015: 395). According to Striphas
(2015: 406), rather than relying on the authority of culture, algorithmic culture
depends on crowd wisdom as the source of recommendation practices. Here,
algorithmic practices and operations help the crowd by determining the “most,”
such as the “trending topics,” “the most relevant,” or the “most liked.”
Contrary to the notion of serving users or achieving crowd wisdom, I interject
that the fundamental design principle of social media algorithms primarily
revolves around revenue generation through targeted advertising. Such
a principle aligns with the inherent platform capitalism model of social media
platforms, adhering to the principles of marketing culture.
Hence, I introduce the term algorithmic marketing culture as a conceptual
framework to elucidate the interdependent interplay between algorithmic oper-
ations and marketing principles that authoritatively shape the circulation, visi-
bility, and popularity of content among social media users. At its core is
branding, which encompasses a product’s symbolic value and psychological
representation, where attaining virality is the ultimate marketing goal (Holt,
2016). Here, algorithms make no distinction between content produced and
circulated by commercial brands and ordinary users. The visibility, popularity,
and virality of user-generated content, including political content, depend not
on its inherent quality but rather on its performance as a brand (Lim, 2023a). In
marketing, a brand’s success relies heavily on the potency of affect. Affect is the
prevailing currency in the social media communication network (Lim, 2020a).
The dynamics of viral communication hinge on users being adequately stirred to
share and reshare content, with research indicating a preference for content
eliciting high-arousal emotions like joy, excitement, anxiety, and anger
(Milkman & Berger, 2012). Essentially, the bias of the algorithmic marketing
culture leans toward content that appeals to extreme affect.
While algorithmic marketing culture contributes to polarization in the social
media landscape, it is not the sole factor. Algorithmic recommendation and
ranking systems shape online communities but do not dictate users’ choices
(Lim, 2020a). I argue that users are not helplessly caught in echo chambers and
victimized by the limited exposure. Instead, users have agency. Thus, the

emergence of polarized communities on social media cannot be solely attrib-

uted to algorithms; human users and the sociopolitical contexts surrounding
them also play significant roles in shaping this phenomenon.
To capture the dynamic interplay between algorithms and social media users,
I introduced algorithmic enclaves, namely: “discursive arenas where individ-
uals, shaped by constant interactions with algorithms, engage with each other
and unite based on a perceived shared identity online to defend their beliefs and
safeguard their resources, often against a common enemy” (Lim, 2020a: 194).
Members voluntarily shape these enclaves through their agency, coalesce
around their hashtags, performing their exclusive hashtag politics.1 These
enclaves maintain a perpetual self-reinforcing loop, aiming to sustain current
users and attract potential future users through repetitive processes. Given their
ability to reinforce one another across platforms – the same user can trigger an
algorithmic response on Instagram based on their post on Facebook post – these
enclaves can become hubs for disseminating problematic message content. In
other words, the algorithmic network can amplify and propagate disinformation
(Lim, 2020a).
Beyond what transpires techno-socially on social media, in the last decade,
we also witnessed the incorporation of algorithmic politics, namely, politics that
revolves around the algorithmic manipulation of issues, primarily aimed at
dominating media spheres to influence public opinion (Lim, 2023b: 39).
Algorithmic politics encompasses a range of political maneuvers that leverage
existing algorithmic biases to influence the public. In Southeast Asia, it
becomes prominent when political actors exploit algorithms to sway citizens’
decisions during elections and everyday political matters. Hence, I contend that
the utilization of algorithmic politics by political actors plays an essential role in
undermining democracy and contributing to the autocratization trend in the
region.

1.4 Structure of This Element

This Element is organized as follows:

Section 1 situates my contribution within existing debates and literature, present-

ing the analytical framework rooted in three key domains: network society
and democracy, social media, and public spheres, and recent concerns about
polarization and disinformation.

1
Hashtag politics refers to the use of hashtags on social media platforms as a strategic tool for
political communication, activism, or engagement. It involves creating and popularizing speciﬁc
hashtags to promote, discuss, organize, and/or mobilize around shared political issues/topics,
events, or campaigns on social media platforms.

Section 2 delves into the state of social media in the region, providing
a sociopolitical and technological background for the analysis. It situates
the nexus of social media and politics in three contextual factors: the
emergence of Southeast Asia as the social media marketplace, the inter-
twining of politics in social and personal spheres, and the increased
governments’ control and autocratic tendencies.
Section 3 offers a panoramic view of social media and politics in Southeast
Asia. Examining each nation, it provides a regional overview of diverse
approaches and levels of digital freedom and states’ control, chronicling
the platforms’ employment for mobilization, activism, campaigns, and
disinformation dissemination.
Section 4 explores how activists and citizens in Southeast Asia take advan-
tage of social media affordances, contributing to heightened grassroots
activism, presenting insights from diverse country cases, and discussing
the binary and affective nature of activism.
Section 5 empirically and analytically examines the role of social media
platforms in political communication, campaigns, and electoral politics.
It discusses the utilization of algorithmic politics for manipulating the
public, disseminating disinformation, and deepening polarization.
Section 6 is offers a reﬂective summary of the comprehensive analysis
discussed throughout this Element. It encapsulates the key ﬁndings and
insights derived from exploring the intricate relationship between social
media and politics in Southeast Asia.

2 Mapping the Terrain: Sociopolitical and Technological

Dynamics of Social Media in Southeast Asia
The internet entered parts of Southeast Asia in the 1980s, primarily through
research institutions and university networks. However, its widespread avail-
ability only commenced in the mid 1990s with the advent of commercial and
public internet service providers all over the region. Due to its economic
potential, governments in the region enthusiastically embraced the technology
and made signiﬁcant investments in internet infrastructure. Malaysia estab-
lished the Multimedia Super Corridor, an advanced business center to propel
the country into the information society. Singapore invested billions in its
internet infrastructure to create an “intelligent island.” Indonesia formulated
a national internet development plan named Visi Nusantara-21 (Vision of the
Twenty-First-Century Archipelago), drawing inspiration from the US National
Information Infrastructure. Other countries followed suit, prioritizing the
internet as a crucial element of national development plans.

In the early 2000s, the internet penetration in Southeast Asia was very low,
with only Singapore and Malaysia having more than 10 percent of their online
population (Lim, 2023b). However, over two decades, the growth has been
exponential (Figure 1). In 2023, 75.6 percent of the 684 million people residing
in Southeast Asia were internet users, surpassing the global average of 64.4 per-
cent. In Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore, over 90 percent of the population was
online; Myanmar and Timor-Leste were the least-wired countries, with 44 per-
cent and 49 percent (Table 1).
In contrast to the initial phases of internet development in the 2000s, where
the online population was predominantly urban (Lim, 2019), there is now
a weaker correlation between a country’s urbanization rate and its correspond-
ing percentage of online users (Table 1). This shift is attributed to the wide-
spread use of mobile phones for internet connectivity in Southeast Asia
(Table 1, Figure 2). The ease of establishing wireless technology hubs and the
growing availability of affordable mobile devices fueled the significant expan-
sion of technology adoption beyond large urban centers. In 2023, except for
Laos, all countries had more mobile phones than people, with Vietnam leading
with 164 percent.
During the initial internet development period in the mid 1990s, governments
focused on expanding access through telephone-based internet connections and
broadband infrastructure expansion. However, the increasing popularity of
mobile phones led to the abandonment of telephone development, evident in
the steady decline of telephone line subscribers in nearly all countries
(Figure 3). Vietnam, which aggressively built its telephony infrastructure in
2003, experienced a decline in 2009. Cambodia started the development in
2009, only to halt it in 2012. In 2022, Brunei and Malaysia were the only
countries expanding their fixed telephony infrastructure. Fixed (wired)-
broadband subscriptions have remained relatively low, with all countries except
Singapore having fewer than 25 subscriptions per 100 people (Figure 4). The
sluggish progress in broadband infrastructure development and the prohibitive
cost of broadband subscriptions contributed to the shift toward mobile internet,
driving its exponential growth. In simpler terms, the significant growth of
smartphones played a significant role in driving the substantial expansion of
the online population in the region. Consequently, this propelled the exponential
growth of social media users in Southeast Asia, given that most users access
these platforms through mobile devices (mobile social media) (Table 1).
In 2021, the Philippines led the global rankings, with its users spending an
astonishing close to eleven hours a day online. By 2023, the Philippines had
slipped to the third position, logging 9:14 hours of daily online activity. Even
with this slight decline in ranking, Southeast Asian users continued to outpace

Table 1 The internet, mobile, and social media shares in Southeast Asia (2023)2

Total
population Literacy internet Mobile Mobile Social Social Mobile social
Country (million) Urban (15+) (18+) phones internet media media media (18+)
Brunei 0.4508 79.00% 97.20% 98.10% 127.80% 96.14% 94.40% 120.60% 118.19%
Cambodia 16.86 25.30% 80.50% 67.50% 131.50% 66.89% 65.00% 88.00% 87.21%
Indonesia 276.40 58.20% 96.00% 77.00% 128.00% 75.69% 60.40% 79.50% 78.15%
Laos 7.58 37.90% 84.70% 62.00% 85.10% 62.00% 44.20% 61.10% 61.10%
Malaysia 34.13 78.40% 95.00% 96.80% 129.10% 92.06% 78.50% 99.80% 94.91%
Myanmar 54.38 32.00% 89.10% 44.00% 118.80% 44.00% 27.60% 36.60% 36.60%
The Philippines 116.50 48.20% 95.30% 73.10% 144.50% 71.13% 72.50% 102.40% 99.64%
Singapore 6.00 100.00% 97.10% 96.90% 153.80% 86.73% 84.70% 89.30% 79.92%
Thailand 71.75 53.20% 93.80% 85.30% 141.00% 81.29% 72.80% 84.80% 80.81%
Timor-Leste 1.35 32.10% 68.10% 49.60% 106.60% 49.60% 26.20% 40.00% 40.00%
Vietnam 98.53 39.10% 95.80% 79.10% 164.00% 75.54% 71.00% 89.00% 88.56%

2
Compiled by author, data from Data Reportal (2023a, 2023b). The percentage of internet, mobile phones, social media, and mobile social media users were calculated as
a percentage of total population.
Figure 2 Mobile phone users (percent) in Southeast Asia (1991–2023)
Source: Author, based on World Bank (2024) and Data Reportal (2023b).
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 124.49.207.21, on 21 Jan 2025 at 09:00:39, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108750745
Figure 3 Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100 people) in Southeast Asia (1991–2022)
Source: Author, based on World Bank (2024).
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 124.49.207.21, on 21 Jan 2025 at 09:00:39, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108750745
Figure 4 Fixed (wired) broadband internet subscriptions (per 100 people) in Southeast Asia (1998–2022)
Source: Author, based on World Bank (2024).
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 124.49.207.21, on 21 Jan 2025 at 09:00:39, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108750745
18 Politics and Society in Southeast Asia

the global average for time spent online, at 6:37 hours, highlighting the region’s
sustained high level of digital connectivity and interaction. Ranked within the
top thirty globally, Malaysia clocked in at 8:07, Thailand at 8:06, Indonesia at
7:42, Singapore at 06:42, and Vietnam at 06:23 (Data Reportal, 2023a).
However, despite these impressive figures, in 2023, there were still 166.7 million
individuals who remained unconnected. It is also crucial to highlight that despite
the overall high population in the region, there exist disparities in usage.
Technologically, there is a noticeable discrepancy in connection speeds among
and within countries. While Bruneians enjoyed a swift 102.06 Mbps (megabytes
per second) in median download speeds for mobile internet connection and
Singaporeans experienced 72.18 Mbps, users in other Southeast Asian countries
faced slower connections, ranging from 17.27 Mbps in Indonesia to 39.59 Mbps in
Vietnam (Data Reportal, 2023a).
The majority of the Southeast Asian population, 63.7 percent, was active on
social media, exceeding the global average of 59.4 percent (Data Reportal, 2023a).
Facebook has maintained its status as the predominant platform in the region over
an extended period (Table 2), primarily because it has been tailored to function on
low-end feature phones that are widespread in economically challenged areas of
the region. However, Facebook and Twitter have encountered slight declines in
user numbers across various countries. In recent years, TikTok emerged as
a platform experiencing exponential growth in usage. In Malaysia, TikTok’s
popularity has exceeded Facebook’s (Table 2). In just one year, from 2022 to
2023, the number of TikTok users in Southeast Asia has doubled. Notably,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam collect-
ively represented about half of the platform’s user population in the Asia Pacific,
excluding China. For young people, particularly Gen Z, TikTok also functions as
a search engine, substituting Google (Huang, 2022). Simultaneously, WhatsApp
has established a robust regional presence (Table 2). Social media users in
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore overwhelmingly cited WhatsApp as their
favorite platform (Data Reportal, 2023a). Beyond platforms cited in Table 2,
Telegram was popular in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, Zalo in Vietnam,
and Line in Thailand. Meanwhile, in recent years, Signal reportedly started gaining
popularity among activists due to its safety and privacy protection; Signal conver-
sations are end-to-end encrypted.
With the widespread and intense adoption of social media now considered the
norm, these platforms have assumed a pivotal role in citizens’ daily lives,
exerting influence across realms such as work, family, entertainment, and
politics. Integrating social media into political dynamics is anything but
a static scenario with a predetermined outcome, be it democratization, polariza-
tion, or autocratization. The results exhibit a nuanced spectrum with diverse

Table 2 Social media platforms’ shares in Southeast Asia (2023)3

Country Facebook YouTube Twitter Instagram Messenger Tiktok WhatsApp

Brunei 71.10% 27.00% 74.10% 40.40% 45.94%
Cambodia 82.60% 3.10% 13.80% 56.90% 63.70% 33.21%
Indonesia 55.40% 55.10% 11.10% 41.20% 12.60% 56.80% 40.52%
Laos 57.40% 4.30% 8.90% 41.30% 17.15%
Malaysia 73.80% 79.80% 20.00% 50.70% 40.80% 77.70% 66.22%
Myanmar 33.9%% 3.30% 26.40% 35.31%
The Philippines 95.50% 61.60% 13.70% 20.40% 60.50% 58.20% 75.54%
Singapore 61.30% 86.00% 103.00% 50.10% 36.20% 46.50% 76.67%
Thailand 77.10% 54.30% 23.40% 27.80% 56.20% 69.10% 40.98%
Timor-Leste 36.50% 0.80% 7.00% 7.60% 21.98%
Vietnam 83.40% 68.90% 5.20% 13.00% 66.30% 68.90% 30.24%

3
Compiled by author, data from Data Reportal (2023a, 2023b) and World Population Review (2023). Facebook’s, YouTube’s, Twitter’s, and Instagram’s shares of audience
were calculated based on potential advertising audience compared to the total population aged 13+; Tiktok aged 18+. WhatsApps’ shares of users were calculated based on
their percentage of the total online population.
20 Politics and Society in Southeast Asia

outcomes (see Sections 4 and 5), transcending a simplistic dichotomy of users

as either “good guys” utilizing it positively or “bad guys” engaging negatively.
Furthermore, in Southeast Asia, politics takes place within a context fash-
ioned by three contextual factors. First, political endeavors are shaped by
marketing propensity as Southeast Asia emerges as the social media market-
place for consumers and corporations. Second, citizens engage with politics on
social media, integrating political discourse into the fabric of social and per-
sonal aspects. Lastly, the politics of social media dynamically align with
changing political contexts, especially concerning state control, repression,
and autocratizing tendencies in the regional political landscape.

2.1 Southeast Asia as the Marketplace

The statistics on social media users and engagement in Southeast Asia make the
region highly appealing for platform companies and advertisers, marking it the
fastest-growing online market globally. According to Nielsen’s report, adver-
tising spending in Southeast Asia reached US$ 44.7 billion, growing by 12 per-
cent annually, with a significant boost from a 64 percent increase in digital
advertising in 2021 (Adnews, 2023).
Southeast Asia is regarded as a digital giant comparable to China, holding
exceptional significance as a prime social media market and advertising target for
several reasons. First, it boasts a vast and rapidly expanding population, constituting
a dynamic market. The demographic is characterized by a predominantly youthful
population dedicating approximately 60 percent of their waking hours to online
activities, presenting an attractive market for brands and advertisers (Kemp, 2021).
Second, the region has witnessed remarkable digital penetration and intense
social media engagement. Third, the mobile-first connectivity trend, prevalent
in the region, offers advertisers a unique opportunity to engage with users in
a personalized and immediate manner. Fourth, the growing e-commerce sector,
with nearly $100 billion in transactions in 2022, further enhances Southeast
Asia’s appeal to investors and advertisers, creating a fertile environment for
online shopping trends (Momentum Works, 2023). Significant investments in
digital businesses are contributing to expanding platforms such as Shopee,
Lazada, InMobi, and Tokopedia.
Lastly, Southeast Asian countries are recognized as emerging markets, with
projections indicating the potential addition of approximately 51 million new
high- and upper-middle-class households by 2030 (Bain & Company, 2022).
Rising disposable incomes and evolving consumer behavior provide advertisers
with favorable opportunities to establish and fortify their brand presence in
these emerging economies.

Southeast Asia emerges as a dynamic and lucrative region for businesses

seeking to connect with a vibrant consumer base, driving market expansion.
This reality, explored further in Sections 4 and 5, has political implications
driven by two key factors: the prevalence of branding to expand user bases in
the social media marketplace (including the political marketplace) and the
inherent inﬂuence of marketing culture on politics and political activities within
social media.

2.2 Personal, Social, and Political

While this Element focuses on the intersection of social media and politics, it is
crucial to note that political engagement is not the primary motivation for
individuals using these platforms. In Southeast Asia, individuals aged sixteen
to sixty-four mainly used social media to “keep in touch with friends and
family,” with “finding information” and “keeping up-to-date with news and
events” being secondary and tertiary reasons (Data Reportal, 2023b). Politics
becomes intertwined with these diverse activities, seamlessly unfolding as users
engage in daily social and personal interactions on social media.
Political encounters and discussions are also influenced by the need to stay
informed and participate in social conversations, possibly driven by the Fear of
Missing Out (FOMO). “Seeing what’s being talked about” was a top reason
users use social media platforms (Data Reportal, 2023b).
Importantly, online and social media are overwhelmingly preferred sources
of news across Southeast Asia, with over 86 percent of the population in
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand identifying
online news as their primary source and 68 percent relying on social media
(Reuters Institute, 2022). The significance of television and print media has
diminished, including among older audiences. In 2023, trust in news media
stood at 42.6 percent, aligning closely with the global average of 40 percent.
Southeast Asian countries ranked high in the percentage of adults expressing
concerns about misinformation and fake news (Data Reportal, 2023b).
In social media, the personal, social, and political facets are intricately connected,
contributing to the heightened personalization of politics. These platforms tailor
political messages beyond politicians and parties to individual users, evident in how
citizens express their political opinions, discuss political events, and form commu-
nities around specific issues. Political content coexists with other content types,
such as cat photos, celebrity gossip, memes, music videos, Netflix series comments,
and updates from friends’ activities. For most social media users, politics is
a transient yet recurring element encountered and consumed through engagement,
interaction, and reactions to various political events and issues.

2.3 Control and Repression of the Autocratizing

Southeast Asia
In contrast to the earlier days of the internet when digital space was relatively
open, governments have signiﬁcantly bolstered their capabilities to monitor
and control the digital sphere. Aligned with the logic of scale-free networks
(Section 1.1), states, as powerful actors, have exponentially increased their
power within digital networks. As of 2023, the Freedom House reported that
no country in Southeast Asia has “free” internet (see Table 3). For the
“Freedom of the World” (political rights and civil liberties) index, Timor-
Leste was cited as the only “free” country in the region, while other nations
performed poorly. The region also scored low in the press freedom index, with
only Timor-Leste being deemed satisfactory. Here, it is important to take the
notion of “free” with caution, as a closer look at Timor-Leste reveals that it is
not as free as the report suggested (see Section 3.10).
The escalating use of control and repression in the region is closely tied to
the global trend of autocratization. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) reported
that in 2023 there were more autocracies than democracies worldwide, with
over 72 percent of the global population residing in autocratic regimes. The
progress in global democratic levels achieved over the past thirty-ﬁve years

Table 3 Freedom in Southeast Asia (2023)4

Internet
Freedom in the freedom index World press
world index (score/ freedom index
Country (score/category) category) (rank out of 180)
Brunei 28/Not free – 142/Difficult
Cambodia 24/Not free 44/Partly free 147/Difficult
Indonesia 58/Partly free 47/Partly free 108/Problematic
Laos 13/Not free – 160/Very serious
Malaysia 53/Partly free 61/Partly free 73/Problematic
Myanmar 9/Not free 10/Not free 173/Very serious
The Philippines 58/Partly free 61/Partly free 132/Difficult
Singapore 47/Partly free 54/Partly free 129/Difficult
Thailand 30/Not free 39/Not free 106/Problematic
Timor-Leste 72/Free – 10/Satisfactory
Vietnam 19/Not free 22/Not free 178/Very serious

4
Compiled by author, data from Freedom House (2023a) and RSF (2023).

has been erased, regressing to 1986. However, Southeast Asia’s decline is

particularly pronounced, with democratic conditions regressed to 1978 levels
(V-Dem, 2023).
V-Dem (2023) identified Malaysia as the sole nation in the region undergoing
a democratization process from 2012 to 2022, though in recent years, such
a process has been problematic (see Section 3.5). In contrast, all other Southeast
Asian countries exhibit a trajectory toward autocratization, even those already
governed by authoritarian regimes. This unsettling trend permeates the spec-
trum, impacting nations in different democratic phases, such as Indonesia and
the Philippines. Myanmar, following a military coup, transitioned from an
electoral autocracy to a closed autocracy. Thailand, since the military takeover
in 2014 and the subsequent severe repression, has ranked among the top ten
autocratizing nations globally in the last decade.
In the social media age, Southeast Asian governments have significantly
enhanced their capacity to regulate the digital landscape, employing various
technical and legal tools. Across certain nations, authorities have implemented
measures to control online speech, utilizing stringent laws and pressuring plat-
form companies to censor content, deactivate accounts, and remove posts critical
of the government. Major social media platforms, including Facebook, have
complied with government directives to remove content violating national laws.
Some governments extended existing criminal laws into the online domain, such
as Indonesia’s defamation law and Thailand’s lèse-majesté law (Section 3.9).
Additionally, cybersecurity and anti-fake news laws, often vaguely defining
criminalizable speech, provide a pretext for increased data surveillance and
crackdowns on dissent under the guise of defending cybersecurity and combating
fake news (Lim, 2023b).
Virtually every country has instituted legislation addressing electronic
transactions.5 Nine out of eleven are presently enforcing cybersecurity
regulations, while Laos and Timor-Leste have also presented drafts of their
respective laws. Ominously, cybersecurity laws in certain countries, particularly
Vietnam and Thailand, have conferred unauthorized access to private data and
computer systems to the government, facilitating the suppression of dissent. In
Cambodia, the September 2022 draft of the cybersecurity law allows the author-
ities to seize computer systems and access user data under broad circumstances
linked to national security and public order. Distinct legislative measures, such as
Vietnam’s “Decree 72” and Laos’ stringent internet law, exemplify efforts to
control online content and curtail opposition voices. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s

5
See Poetranto, Lau, and Gold (2021) for further examination of the cybersecurity in the region,
particularly Indonesia and Singapore.

Ministerial Regulation No. 5 of 2020 represents a content moderation regime

threatening freedom of expression and user privacy.
The proliferation of anti-fake news laws in countries like Cambodia, Myanmar,
Singapore, and Thailand has encountered criticism for allegedly suppressing
dissent. After repealing a much-criticized anti-fake news law in 2018, Malaysia
enacted an emergency law in early 2021 targeting fake news related to COVID-
19. Vietnam also introduced a law in 2020 to counter the spread of fake news as
a pandemic-related security measure. Beyond the pandemic, governments in the
region persist in efforts to control content through diverse mechanisms. For
instance, in December 2022, the Malaysian government established a dedicated
task force to address issues of purportedly false news and “sensitive or provoca-
tive” content about the “3Rs”: race, religion, and royalty.
These laws bear considerable repercussions for citizen engagement on social
media, with each country reportedly initiating investigations, making arrests, or
securing convictions based on these regulations. In Thailand, 164 individuals
faced lèse-majesté charges within a year since November 2020, with 83 accused
of posting critical messages about the monarchy on social media (TLHR, 2021).
Vietnam has experienced a rise in “prisoners of conscience,” escalating from 75
in 2013 to 128 in 2019, with around 70 serving jail terms, primarily for their
activities on platforms like Facebook and YouTube (Amnesty International,
2021). Meanwhile, the Indonesian government misused the transaction law
(ITE) defamation clause to criminalize journalists who exposed prominent
ﬁgures’ corrupt and unethical conduct. Online defamation cases in Indonesia
surged from merely ﬁve in 2009–2010 to 768 in 2016–2020 (Mann, 2021).
Furthermore, employing sedition laws and the Communication and Multimedia
Act, Malaysia has targeted and arrested digital activists and news organizations
critical of the government, leading to a “chilling effect” on free speech (Johns &
Cheong, 2019).
In nations undergoing autocratization, there is a discernible increase in media
censorship, repression of civil society organizations, and limitations on political
freedom. The interplay of autocratization, rising disinformation, and growing
polarization, notably evident on social media, reinforces each other in these
nations.

3 Revealing the Tapestry: Country Highlights on Social Media

and Politics in Southeast Asia
This section provides succinct narratives on the interplay between social media
and politics within every Southeast Asian nation. It focuses on critical factors
such as the degree of internet and social media freedom and control and unveils

the diverse approaches taken by each country, revealing these platforms’ impli-
cations in mobilization, activism, campaigns, and disinformation dissemin-
ation. Through the presentation of these highlights, the section aims to offer
a panoramic view, unveiling the nuanced landscape of social media and politics
in Southeast Asia.
Overall, the legal and regulatory landscape in the region has become more
restricted, with increasing state control and surveillance in all countries. Yet, there
has been a rise in grassroots politics across nearly all countries in the region, with
increased integration of social media. There are some variations across different
countries. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia, which witnessed historical
political events incorporating the static internet, continue to be the epicenters of
grassroots activism in the social media era. Authoritarian countries such as
Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, and postcoup Thailand have witnessed online
and ofﬂine dissents. Social media activism exists in Singapore but typically does
not translate into street activism. Brunei is the only country that had no activism.
Meanwhile, social media has played an increasing role in political campaigns and
elections and has helped new players, outsiders, and opposition gain a foothold.
However, authoritarian capture has emerged, where social media is used as a tool
for authoritarian resilience.
Due to the dynamic nature of both realms, providing a fresh inquiry into the
intersection of social media and politics presents a complex challenge. Despite
my efforts to capture key developments in each country and maintain the rele-
vance of any overarching observations amidst ongoing political and technological
transformations, I acknowledge the limitations of this endeavor. Therefore, my
country-by-country analysis, which concluded by December 2023,6 should be
perceived as a blend of historical consideration and current insights aimed at
illuminating, not foreseeing, conceivable future trends.

3.1 Brunei
With a GDP per capita of US$37,152, Brunei is among the world’s wealthiest
nations (World Bank, 2023). It is the only absolute Islamic monarchy in Southeast
Asia where politics is intricately linked with the state ideology of Melayu Islam
Beraja (Malay Islamic Monarchy). In this context, being Malay signiﬁes being
Muslim and loyal to the monarchy, shaping citizenship through adherence to
Islam and allegiance to the Sultanate. A decade ago, Li (2012) observed that
Bruneians’ use of digital media was guided by self-restraint and respect for the
royal family. This trend persists in 2023, with individuals practicing self-
censorship despite active participation in relatively free social media platforms.

6
Especially for Indonesia, I included selected updates around the 2024 elections.

Brunei is not a free country. For over sixty years, emergency laws have
restricted freedom of assembly to groups of no more than ten people without
a permit. The unicameral legislative council lacks independent political stand-
ing and functions under the Sultan’s appointments. Since 1962, direct legisla-
tive elections have not taken place, and political opposition remains extremely
limited, with the National Development Party (NDP) being the sole registered
party since 2005 (Freedom House, 2023b).
The Sultan’s family owns or controls the media, resulting in a lack of
diversity and freedom. The Brunei Defamation Act and the 2005 Sedition Act
further curtail freedom of expression, hindering individuals and the media from
exercising freedom of speech. Newspapers can be arbitrarily closed, and jour-
nalists may face imprisonment for up to three years for reporting deemed “libel
and slander” (Lim, 2019). Sharia-based criminal regulations were introduced in
2014, with a moratorium on capital punishment issued in May 2019 after
a mandate for death by stoning (Freedom House, 2023b).
Despite a significant increase in the internet population from 3 percent in 2000 to
over 98 percent in 2023, with nearly all adults over eighteen on social media, there
is no evidence of it fostering political resistance in Brunei. Internet access, report-
edly unrestricted, is provided by a state-owned ISP, and government control extends
to digital content through an internet practice code (Lim, 2019). The Brunei
government employs an informant system to monitor dissidents and scrutinizes
online communications for subversive content. In 2019, Shahiransheriffuddin bin
Shahrani Muhammad, who criticized the government’s halal certification policy in
a 2017 Facebook post, received an eighteen-month sentence in absentia and sought
asylum in Canada due to fears of persecution for being gay (Bandial, 2019).
Amid the controlled media landscape, there exists The Scoop, which is an
independent online news portal that supposedly is “financed primarily through
advertising revenue and independent of government or political interests” (The
Scoop, 2023). Established in September 2017, the platform articulates its
commitment to “maintaining openness and accessibility” while concentrating
on “informing and empowering Bruneians, fostering engagement with current
issues, and influencing public discourse” (The Scoop, 2023). While covering
various sociocultural issues, The Scoop maintains an apolitical tone. However,
given the nature of Bruneian media, which is largely under the Sultan’s control,
The Scoop’s commitment to independence becomes notably political.

3.2 Cambodia
Since 1985, Cambodia’s political system has been dominated by former prime
minister Hun Sen, the father of current Premier Hun Manet, and the Cambodian

People’s Party (CPP). The media landscape is marked by deep politicization

stemming from a historical legacy of factionalism and political patronage (Lim,
2019). Media magnates with close ties to the Hun Sen family own and control
the mass media market in Cambodia. Despite a 1995 press law encouraging
amicable resolution of defamation cases, authorities frequently resort to the
penal code to prosecute and apprehend journalists delving into sensitive issues,
often without a warrant. Specifically, articles 494 and 495 in criminal law
sections addressing “inciting crime” are invoked in such cases (Freedom
House, 2023c).
In 2023, 67.50 percent of the population were online users, and 88 percent of
adults over eighteen used social media. This represents a significant increase
from 1 percent of internet users recorded in 2010. Even back then, despite a low
internet penetration, the government was wary of the internet’s political poten-
tial, particularly regarding its utilization by the opposition. To control informa-
tion flow, the government designated the state-owned telephone company as the
sole operator for internet exchanges, ostensibly to filter out explicit content but
also to stifle criticisms against the CPP. Despite this control, the internet
remained a more accessible medium than others, offering space for emerging
alternative voices within certain constraints.
The late 2000s witnessed the emergence of social media in Cambodia,
providing a venue for public expression and dissent often absent in traditional
media characterized by self-censorship. This shift empowered political oppos-
ition groups, particularly the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), foster-
ing increased political discourse among young, educated voters and influencing
the 2013 elections (see Section 5.2.1) (Vong & Sinpeng, 2020). The online
presence of the opposition expanded, resulting in street protests in Phnom Penh
in January 2014, as censored accounts reached broader audiences through social
media. In response, authorities escalated repression, crackdowns, and violence
against civilians.
With lessons learned from 2013, Prime Minister Hun Sen launched
a clampdown on independent media in 2017 in preparation for the 2018
elections. During the 2018 electoral campaigns, Hun Sen extended his influence
on social media, crafting a persona while issuing conditional promises and
blending threats with notions of peace (Doyle, 2021). In 2023, Hun Sen solidi-
fied his social media campaigns in a controversial election that excluded the
opposition party (see Section 5.2.2). Just months before the election, Kem
Sokha, the former president of CNRP, was sentenced to twenty-seven years in
jail on charges of conspiring with foreign forces to overthrow the government.
The ruling party won nearly all seats, and thus, Hun Sen’s son, Hun Manet,
assumed the position of prime minister.

Presently, repression against initiatives supporting independent journalism

persists, compounded by the pro-government stance of traditional media out-
lets. Cambodians thus increasingly rely on online media for reliable news,
leveraging the widespread availability of mobile phones. Furthermore, the
government’s intent to establish a Chinese-style digital Great Wall, granting
authority to monitor and block sites, raises signiﬁcant concerns about online
freedom for Cambodians (Ratcliffe, 2022).

3.3 Indonesia
For over three decades, under the authoritarian regime of President Suharto, the
country ranked among the least free in Southeast Asia, where the media was
tightly controlled. In the mid 1990s, the internet became commercially available
in the country. The Suharto regime did not impose regulations on the emerging
online space, partially due to the novelty of the technology, making it challen-
ging for the government to control. The economic crisis further left the internet
unmanaged. Between 1996 and 1998, especially during the peak of the Asian
financial crisis, the internet became a vital platform for discussing and criticiz-
ing the regime, playing an important role in activating anti-Suharto sentiment
(Lim, 2002).
The fall of Suharto in 1998 brought significant changes to freedom of expres-
sion and increased access to information, leaving the internet largely unregulated.
However, in recent years, internet freedom and freedom of speech have declined.
Concerns persist about the politicized use of defamation and blasphemy laws and
the impact of the 2008 Information and Electronic Transactions (ITE) Law on
internet freedom. In 2020, Ministerial Regulation No. 5 introduced a content
moderation regime that threatens freedom of expression and user privacy.
Meanwhile, government critics, journalists, and internet users continue to face
criminal prosecution, violent attacks, and harassment in retaliation for their online
activities, especially by Papuan activists (Freedom House, 2023d). Internet access
in Papua continues to be routinely disrupted (Lim, 2020b).
In 2023, 77 percent of the total population was online, and nearly 80 percent
of adults over eighteen were on social media. In the last decade, digital activism
continues to exist, involving a significant portion of the urban middle class, as
seen in the anti-corruption movements in the late 2000s (Lim, 2013; Suwana,
2020) and pro-reform students’ movements in the late 2010s (Sastramidjaja,
2020) and early 2020s (Section 4.4). While social media platforms offer space
for activism across various causes, including those representing marginalized
communities such as Ahmadiyyas, Shias (Schäfer, 2018), and Papuans
(Kusumaryati, 2021), the media landscape tends to favor simplified narratives

tailored for urban middle-class consumers. Simultaneously, it is unfavorable for

complex narratives of justice, inequalities, or the poor (Lim, 2013).
Social media campaigns are central to electoral politics. In the 2012 Jakarta
gubernatorial election, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and his running mate Basuki
Purnama Tjahja (Ahok) became the ﬁrst candidates to rely heavily on social
media campaigns. Subsequent elections, including the 2014, 2019, and 2024
presidential elections and the highly divisive 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial race,
saw candidates embrace algorithmic politics to manipulate public opinions.
Notably, Prabowo Subianto’s victory in 2024 further solidiﬁed the authoritarian
turn initiated in Jokowi’s second term (Section 5.2.2).
Beyond elections, algorithmic dynamics continued to be part of political engage-
ments, contributing to deepening affective polarization, segregating Indonesians
into exclusionary algorithmic enclaves that reinforced tribal nationalism and
excluded considerations of equality and justice for others (Lim, 2017a: 444).

3.4 Laos
Laos operates as a one-party state, where the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary
Party (LPRP) exerts control over all facets of politics and imposes strict limita-
tions on civil liberties. There is an absence of organized opposition, independent
civil society, or a free and independent media sector. In 2001, the Laotian
government undertook a groundbreaking domestic media reform by introducing
the new Mass Media Bill, allowing for the establishment of private media
enterprises. This marked a departure from the established model of journalists
as government officials tasked with unifying the party, state, and masses.
However, private owners are mandated to pledge loyalty to the party’s prin-
ciples, and any reports criticizing or endorsing opposition to the government
and national policy are considered criminal (Lim, 2019).
There is a shortage of data on internet freedom status in the country. Laos has
experienced slower internet development than the rest of the region. Recent
years have seen significant progress, leading to a substantial increase in the
online population – from 2.6 percent in 2002 to 62 percent in 2023, with over
60 percent of adults aged eighteen and above active on social media. From early
on, Laotian authorities implemented strict regulations, which was evident in the
punishment of online journalists with dissenting views in the early 2000s (Lim,
2019). The repressive internet regime persisted as the online population
expanded. In 2014, a repressive internet law criminalized vaguely defined
content, “false and misleading information,” against the ruling party, and any
content undermining “the peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and prosper-
ity of Lao PDR” (Palatino, 2014). Prohibiting anonymity on social media, the

law excessively regulates online space, discouraging citizens from expressing

their opinions. In 2019, in a move claimed to curb the spread of fake news, the
government mandated registrations for disseminating news on social media,
threatening fines and prison sentences for noncompliance.
Notably, in September 2019, Houayheuang “Muay” Xayabouly received
a five-year sentence for criticizing the government on social media, highlighting
negligence in handling floods in Southern Laos. Despite international calls for
her release, Muay remains imprisoned under unfair conditions. In April 2023,
activist Anousa “Jack” Luangsuphom, a key administrator of the Facebook page
“Power by the Keyboard,” survived an attempted murder allegedly by the
state’s agent. Jack advocated for Lao youth by offering sharp critiques of the
one-state party and denouncing the increasing Chinese influence over Laos.
These incidents reveal an alarming pattern of attacks on Lao human rights
activists who use online platforms to oppose the authoritarian government.
In 2023, the government announced plans to regulate social media usage,
warning that individuals within the country using social media to share false
news, distort information, or criticize the government could face consequences
(Manushya Foundation, 2023). In reality, the government lacks the technical
capacity to control social media. Its records, however, suggest that the state
frequently utilizes targeted crackdowns and arbitrary arrests to set an example
and instill fear among the public. Despite the government’s sporadic efforts to
censor online criticism, public protests remain rare due to the massive security
presence and restrictive laws.

3.5 Malaysia
From Malaysia’s independence in 1957 until 2018, the Barisan Nasional (BN,
National Alliance) coalition held power. Under the BN regime, Malaysia’s
media landscape operated under strict regulation, with the ruling coalition
exerting indirect control through proxy ownership, fostering self-censorship
among journalists and media personnel. The government chose not to censor the
internet, but practical limitations emerged due to the utilization of media-related
and libel laws to suppress dissenting voices online (Lim, 2019).
As of 2023, over 96 percent of the Malaysian population was online, and nearly
all adults over eighteen engaged in social media. Digital activism in Malaysia
traces two decades to the initial Reformasi wave in 1998–1999. The abrupt
dismissal of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim by Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohammad in September 1998, accompanied by politically motivated
charges, sparked protests that gained momentum online and eventually spilled
onto the streets, giving rise to the Reformasi movement. Alternative online

information sources like Malaysiakini played a pivotal role in expanding public

discourse and challenging the government’s mainstream media. In the 2000s,
despite declining street protests following Anwar Ibrahim’s imprisonment, digital
activism persisted through the popularity of alternative media outlets and the
emergence of blogger activists (Abbott, 2011; Lim, 2016; Pandi, 2014).
This one-decade legacy laid the groundwork for Bersih, an electoral reform
movement initiated in 2006. Bersih movement (see Section 4.2.3) successfully
organized significant street rallies from 2007 to 2017, contributing to the
growing support for oppositional coalitions, the Pakatan Harapan (PH, Hope
Alliance) and ultimately ending BN’s rule in the 2018 election (Khoo, 2020;
Johns & Cheong, 2019, 2021; Lim, 2016, 2017b; Tye et al., 2018).
This shift created opportunities for reform and brought about incremental
enhancements in civil liberties. However, the landscape is marred by state
censorship, orchestrated cyberattacks and disinformation, and ongoing threats
posed by criminal prosecutions and investigations linked to social media posts
and online expression, persisting as concerns for individuals (Cheong, 2020;
Johns & Cheong, 2019). The LGBT+ community reportedly faces persistent
online and offline harassment. In June 2021, the government proposed amend-
ments to Sharia law that would penalize social media users for insulting Islam
and “promoting the LGBT lifestyle” (Reuters, 2021). Meanwhile, self-
censorship is widespread among online journalists and users, particularly
when addressing sensitive issues like the official status of Islam, race-related
matters, and preferential treatment for Bumiputera – Malays and indigenous
people – over Chinese and Indian minorities (Freedom House, 2022).
Furthermore, following the historic 2018 election, the administration of PH
collapsed in 2020, leading to a fracturing of the coalition and factionalizing of
individual parties (Weiss & Suffian, 2023). The Bersih movement brought
expectations for pro-democracy groups aspiring to politics that transcended
the dominance of identity politics. The 2022 general election, however,
revealed a contrasting story. Thanks partly to Islamist mobilization on social
media, notably on TikTok, voters showed substantial support for Perikatan
National (PN, National Alliance), a coalition that visibly performed race- and
religious-based politics (see Section 5.3.1). Despite the “democratic transition”
in May 2018 raising hopes for a more civil liberties-friendly political climate, in
2023, those hopes remain unfulfilled (Weiss, 2023).

3.6 Myanmar
Since gaining independence in 1948, Myanmar has continued to undergo unrest
and conﬂict. The coup d’état in 1962 resulted in a military dictatorship. However,

following a 2010 general election, the military junta officially dissolved, estab-
lishing a nominally civilian government. This transition saw the release of
political prisoners, notably Aung San Suu Kyi. Suu Kyi’s party, the National
League for Democracy (NLD), won the 2012 by-elections and the 2015 general
election, resulting in improved foreign relations and eased economic sanctions. In
the 2020 general election, NLD secured a clear majority. However, in 2021, the
Burmese military orchestrated a coup d’état and has ruled the country since.
Historically, Myanmar has remarkably positioned itself as a pioneer in digital
activism within Southeast Asia, even predating the widespread availability of
the internet in the country. The genesis of this movement can be traced back to
1995, when Zarni, a Burmese student in the US, established the Free Burma
Coalition website. The website became the hub for Burmese activists in exile
and the diaspora to connect with others and disseminate materials to support the
Burmese people’s pursuit of democracy and human rights (Lim, 2019).
In 2004, Myanmar ventured online as the government granted access to
a restricted set of government-approved websites known as the Myanmar Wide
Web. However, within this controlled digital space, emails with the .mn domain
were closely monitored, and access to international websites was limited. Despite
these constraints, activists resourcefully fashioned internet cafes and skillfully
circumvented government firewalls by utilizing proxy servers to access prohib-
ited sites. This resilience was evident during the 2007 Saffron Revolution, where
Burmese bloggers and digital activists played a significant role (Aung & Htut,
2019). They blogged about “the political situation and uploaded videos and
footage of eyewitness accounts,” globalizing the event (p. 366).
Meanwhile, concerning the Rohingya population, social media, particularly
Facebook, has simultaneously heightened racial and religious tensions between
the Buddhist majority and the Muslim minority. For several years since 2012,
Facebook has functioned as a fertile ground that has fueled the rise of Buddhist
ultranationalism against the Rohingyas and intensified polarization within the
country (see Section 4.3) (Kyaw, 2020; Passeri, 2019; Rio, 2021).
As of 2023, the entire population had mobile phone access; 44 percent used
the internet, and 36.6 percent of adults aged eighteen and above engaged with
social media. Despite the postcoup increase in internet access cost, frequent
internet shutdowns (Lim, 2020b), and broad restrictions on digital content,
social media platforms remain avenues for expressing dissent, as depicted by
the 2021 anticoup d’état mass protests (Jordt, Than & Lin, 2021) (see
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.4). After the coup, the military had neither gained complete
control of the territory nor crushed online dissent, partly due to the vibrancy of
the hybrid anti-coup resistance forces, both offline and on social media (Ryan &
Tran, 2022).

3.7 The Philippines

After achieving independence in 1946, the Philippines underwent a tumultuous
journey that included the overthrow of the decades-long Marcos dictatorship in
1986. Despite often being lauded as the freest nation in Southeast Asia, the
country grapples with persistent corruption, cronyism, and nepotism, driven
primarily by a select few influential families controlling the economy and politics.
Over the past decades, the Philippines has witnessed a decline in freedom. This
decline corresponds with political and civil rights erosion under former president
Duterte, who concluded his six-year term in June 2022, and the current presi-
dency of Bongbong Marcos Jr., the son of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr.
In 2023, over 73 percent of the population was online, and nearly all adults
over eighteen were on social media. In the last two decades, the Philippines has
maintained its reputation as the most connected society. Manila was once the
capital of texting in the world, then the capital of Facebook. Filipinos are
continuously among the most active social media users in the world.
The Philippines has a long-standing history of digital activism. The internet
played a crucial role in disseminating information that fueled resistance against
President Estrada, leading to his removal from the presidency in 2001. The
advent of mobile phones translated online resistance into street protests (Rafael,
2003). In 2013, organized through platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and text
messages, hundreds of thousands gathered at Luneta Park in Manila to protest
the corruption-tainted development fund (see Section 4.2.2). In the same park,
ten years later, on the fifty-first anniversary of the martial law, protesters
gathered to oppose the Bongbong Marcos administration.
Social media is a common platform for political discussions, particularly
during elections, in the Philippines. Overall, digital activism in the country is
vibrant. However, online sources of information have become more susceptible
to manipulation by the government and other entities (Ong & Cabañes, 2018).
Duterte’s presidency and his successor’s, Bongbong Marcos’, are marked by the
prevalence of social media vigilantism, where cyber-troops7 are deployed to
distort the online information landscape, aiming to manipulate public discourse
(see Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2). Meanwhile, threats, arrests, harassment, and
attacks on journalists and media figures such as Nobel Laureate Maria Ressa
have contributed to a climate where individuals feel deterred from expressing
themselves freely online (Freedom House, 2023e).

7
Cyber-troop typically describes an individual paid to spread political propaganda online, espe-
cially on social media platforms (Lim, 2023a: 188). In Indonesia it is called buzzer (see footnote
18) and in the Philippines sometimes called keyboard warrior.

3.8 Singapore
Since 1959, Singapore’s parliamentary political system has been overwhelm-
ingly influenced by the People’s Action Party (PAP) and the legacy of Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the father of the current prime minister, Lee Hsien
Loong. While the PAP’s established electoral and legal framework allows for
a degree of political diversity, it simultaneously curtails the expansion of
opposition parties and imposes restrictions on freedoms of expression, assem-
bly, and association (Chua, 2012).
Singapore swiftly embraced the internet, establishing itself as an information
services hub. Nevertheless, right from its early stages of development, the
government implemented rigorous political control over the utilization and
distribution of information among its populace. The Singapore Broadcasting
Authority (SBA) takes charge of the internet content regulation scheme, with
a specific focus on materials about Singapore’s interests, particularly those that
have the potential to incite racial or religious hatred (SBA, 2002).
Singapore is a country marked by self-censorship. Nonetheless, the internet
offered a more critical space than traditional print media, expanding the public
sphere and providing a platform for marginalized individuals to engage with
policies (Weiss, 2014: 96). While not highly visible offline, digital activism
exists in the country. Its roots can be traced back to 1994 with the emergence of
Sintercom, an online forum featuring political content and identifying itself as
a “civic” organization (Lim, 2019).
Enduring political pressure and stringent censorship, during the 2000s and
early 2010s, digital activism in Singapore was expressed through reporting
activism and contentious journalism (George, 2006). Platforms like New
Sintercom, the satirical Talking Cock site, the newsgroup portal The Optical,
the commentary platform the Void Deck, and alternative websites such as
Sammyboy emerged during this period (Lim, 2019). While its actual impact
remains uncertain, the surge in support for the Workers’ Party and other
opposition factions in the 2006 and 2011 general elections, along with the rise
of LGBTQ+ rights movements in the country, can be partially credited to social
media activism (Lim, 2019; Pang, 2020; Zhang, 2016).
As of 2023, most of the country’s population was connected online, with over
89 percent of adults over eighteen actively participating in social media.
However, internet freedom in Singapore remains under threat, with the govern-
ment persistently exerting control over the digital landscape. Recent legislative
developments, such as the passage of the 2022 Online Safety (Miscellaneous
Amendments) Act and the 2023 Online Criminal Harms Act, exacerbate this
trend (Freedom House, 2023f). These new measures, coupled with existing laws

like the 2021 Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act and the 2019
Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act, grant authorities
extensive powers to restrict online activities (Pang, 2020).
During 2022–2023, reports emerged of internet users experiencing intimida-
tion, police scrutiny, and criminal charges for sharing political and social
content on social media (Freedom House, 2023f). Social media activism per-
sists, but the prevalent atmosphere has led journalists and regular users to
exercise self-censorship, driven by anxiety over potential repercussions, leading
to self-censorship among journalists and ordinary users.

3.9 Thailand
Apart from short periods of parliamentary democracy in the mid 1970s and
1990, Thailand has episodically alternated between military and civilian
governments. The country has experienced numerous regime oscillations
due to frequent military coups, totaling nineteen attempts since its transition
to a constitutional monarchy in 1932 (Sinpeng, 2021b). Lèse-majesté laws,
designed to combat defamation against the monarchy, have been widely
applied in Thailand, especially following the 2014 military takeover.
Despite Thailand’s recognition as one of Asia’s freest media countries since
1992, nearly 75 percent of lèse-majesté charges after 2014 were associated
with exercising freedom of expression (FIDH, 2016). The National Council
for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the junta-appointed government issued
orders prohibiting online content perceived as critical of the monarchy, the
NCPO, or the government (Freedom House, 2016). The introduction of a new
Computer-Related Crime Act in 2016 granted extensive powers to restrict free
speech, enforce surveillance, and retaliate against activists (Freedom House,
2016). The combination of century-old lèse-majesté and newer laws has
resulted in ongoing suppression of criticism and dissent, notably online.
In 2023, over 93 percent of the population was online, and nearly 85 percent of
adults over eighteen were active on social media. Thailand’s digital activism has
deep historical roots, as seen in early examples from the 1990s, such as the popular
newsgroup “soc.cul.thai” (Lim, 2019). Organizations like Thaidemocracy.org
leveraged the internet to mobilize volunteers for various causes, and websites like
Prachachon.net aimed to provide alternative political information (Lim, 2019).
With the widespread adoption of social media in the late 2010s, digital activism
has become integrated into street protests by both democratic (Sections 4.2.1 and
4.4) and antidemocratic (Section 4.3) movements (Sinpeng, 2021b). Furthermore,
recent times have witnessed digital politics mirroring on-the-ground polarization,
where social media at the center of the political contest between the Yellow Shirts

(Section 4.3) – the hyper-nationalist, ultraroyalist, and pro-monarchy – and the Red
Shirts – antiestablishment and pro-democracy (Lim, 2023b).
The restrictive control imposed by the military junta has spurred human
rights activism online, with coalitions like Thai Lawyers for Human Rights
monitoring and documenting violations. Anonymous Facebook pages, such as
Stop Fake Thailand, have over half a million followers and provide a platform
for individuals to share opinions and organize political activities (Freedom
House, 2016). In 2020–2021, social media platforms were heavily incorporated
into students’ protests against the military junta, making it one of the largest and
longest protests in the country’s history (Section 4.4).
Social media are central to the Thai elections. The 2019 elections saw the
impact of the platforms and ﬁrst-time voters. The newly established Future
Forward Party, with its youthful leader, Thanathorn, and a solid social media
presence, speciﬁcally the hashtag #Futurista, made a surprising electoral suc-
cess (Chattharakul, 2019). In 2023, the Move Forward Party (MFP), led by Pita
Limjaroenrat, repeated the #Futurista story with a more skillful social media
campaign (see Section 5.2.1). The MFP secured a majority but could not govern
due to the monarch and the junta’s intervention.

3.10 Timor-Leste
Since gaining independence in 2002, Timor-Leste (East-Timor) has effectively
navigated internal conflicts and political instability. The country remains relatively
impoverished, relying heavily on natural resources and foreign aid to sustain its
economy. Despite commendable governmental efforts, substantial challenges
persist, particularly in rural areas where 68 percent of the population resides.
Timor-Leste is a relatively young nation with a history of digital activism
intricately interwoven with its liberation fight. The internet played a crucial role
during the Indonesian occupation; it helped mobilize support and disseminate
information within the transnational movement that advocated for the human
rights of the East-Timorese and supported East-Timorese pro-independence
activists (Simpson, 2004). In 1990, pro-East-Timor activists and human rights
groups started “reg.easttimor” newsgroup that allowed information about the
East Timor situation, such as the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, to be disseminated
globally (Hill, 2002). Nearing the final years of its struggle for independence, in
1997, the internet domain for East-Timor (.tp) was established. Managed by
Connect-Ireland, the domain became the hub for collaborative efforts across
diverse international networks (Hill, 2002).
As the telecommunication infrastructure was destroyed during the 1999
political violence, the digital infrastructure only began to be restored in the

early 2000s. Though slow and limited, internet connectivity has experienced
significant growth, with over 49 percent of the population online in 2023, an
exponential increase from just 1 percent in 2009 (Lim, 2019). In contrast,
mobile phone access was widespread throughout the entire population, and
approximately 40 percent of adults aged eighteen and above were active on
social media (Data Reportal, 2023b).
Timor-Leste is regarded as one of the freest countries in Asia. Freedom
House (2023a) cited it as Southeast Asia’s only “free” country. However, the
reality on the ground paints a more complicated picture. With the rapid growth
of users, citizens have utilized social media platforms to exercise their free
speech, resulting in increased criticism directed at government officials. The
government responded by introducing new laws or provisions limiting offline
and online expression, such as the 2020 proposal to reinstate a criminal defam-
ation provision to the penal code and the 2021 draft of Cybersecurity Law (Asia
Centre, 2021).
Despite its “satisfactory” freedom press status (see Table 3), the government
has misused defamation charges to silence its critics. In 2017, Oki Raimundos
and Lourenco Martins, two journalists from the Timor Post, were charged with
defamation for publishing an article about the potential corruption involving
Prime Minister Rui Maria de Araujo (IFJ, 2022). The charges, though, were
overturned in the same year. Five years later, in 2022, Francisco Simões Belo da
Costa, the editor-in-chief of local news portal Hatutan.com, was sued for
defamation by Francisco Jerónimo, the Minister of Social Communication,
over an online report alleging ministerial corruption (IFJ, 2022).

3.11 Vietnam
Vietnam, a long-standing one-party state ruled by the Communist Party of
Vietnam (CPV), severely restricts freedom of expression, religious freedom,
and civil society activism (Freedom House, 2023g). Despite some technical
allowance for independent candidates in legislative elections, most are effect-
ively banned. The CPV not only monopolizes all media levels but also arrests
and intimidates those expressing dissenting views (Thayer, 1992).
From the early days of the internet, the state has maintained control over the
online sphere. In the late 1990s to the early 2000s, café owners were held
responsible for customer messages, leading to the establishment of a national
monitoring system to prevent access to politically or morally deemed dangerous
websites (RSF, 2003). Vietnam’s online environment is one of the most repres-
sive globally, with the government blocking websites deemed politically or
morally dangerous, including foreign news sites and those of international civil

society organizations. It ofﬁcially prohibits internet use for political opposition,

actions against national sovereignty and security, and violations of morality or
the law, often punishing violations with imprisonment.
In 2023, nearly 80 percent of the population had internet access, and almost
90 percent of adults over eighteen were on social media. Authorities have
escalated crackdowns on citizens using social media for dissent, pressuring global
internet companies for compliance. Since enacting the 2019 Cybersecurity Law,
which pressured social media companies to remove compliance, there has been
a surge in content removal. Users now share screenshots of articles they expect to
be deleted instead of sharing URLs.
Heavy ﬁnes are imposed on online publications for disseminating false
information. In 2022, the Ho Chi Minh City government ﬁned media outlets
780 million dong ($33,000) for publishing deemed illegal content. Major social
media platforms, including Facebook and Google, complied with the govern-
ment’s content restriction requests. Facebook blocked or removed 2,751 posts
labeled as false, anti-CPV, anti-state, and defaming in 2022. Google removed
7,935 YouTube videos and geo-blocked seven reactionary channels, with
95 percent of Google’s removal requests related to government criticism from
July 2022 to December 2022 (Freedom House, 2023g).
Human Rights Watch reports over 160 political prisoners, including bloggers
and activists, in Vietnam (HRW, 2024). Despite ongoing detentions and harass-
ment, digital activism persists; the growth of social media users has strength-
ened digital activism, making the internet a de facto forum for dissenting voices
(Section 4.2.1) (Luong, 2020; Vu, 2017).

4 Dynamics of Dissent: Grassroots Activism

in the Social Media Age
“Never again, never forget!” The protestors passionately chanted these words
while marching toward Rizal (Luneta) Park in Manila to commemorate the
anniversary of the declaration of martial law. On September 21, 2023, marking
ﬁfty-one years since President Ferdinand Marcos imposed martial law, many
demonstrators assembled in the streets and squares of Manila and various
locations nationwide. Organized through Facebook and other social media
platforms, these protesters expressed collective solidarity, aiming to prevent
recurring atrocities associated with martial law. Simultaneously, they voiced
opposition to corruption allegations linked to the administration of President
Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. and Vice President Sara Duterte.
The September 2023 protest in the Philippines is one among thousands that
occurred in Southeast Asia over the past decade. These movements extensively

utilized social media platforms, notably Facebook, Twitter, and, more recently,
Instagram and TikTok, in various stages – before, during, and after the protests.
Numerous studies from the early 1990s to the present have delved into online
politics, generating significant interest in understanding how digital technologies
offer avenues for citizen engagement. While certain critics dismiss political partici-
pation on social media as mere slacktivism or clicktivism (Bozarth & Budak, 2017;
Morozov, 2011) and attribute it to a lack of substantive meaning, alternative
perspectives argue that political engagement should be perceived as
a multidimensional concept involving various activities (Koc-Michalska et al.,
2014; Seto, 2017). In this context, individuals express opinions, gain insights,
form alliances, and exert influence vertically and horizontally. The argument pre-
sented here does not advocate prioritizing the digital environment over traditional
avenues like the street. Instead, it underscores the emergence of new pathways to
engagement and alternative forms of political participation. Moreover, it is evident
that, in contemporary activism, the digital and traditional venues (e.g., streets and
squares) can no longer be separated (Lim, 2018; Seto, 2017).
Digital platforms, especially social media, offer features that afford the organiza-
tion of collective action and mass mobilization. Affordances are relational concepts
defined as “action possibilities and opportunities that emerge from actors engaging
with a focal technology” (Faraj & Azad, 2012: 238). The impact of technology,
thus, arises not solely from itself or users but from the relationship between users
and the material features of the technology. These affordances encompass how
platforms facilitate user communication and interaction, create opportunities to
build relationships across geographical boundaries, and enable easy sharing and
distribution of content. Consequently, social media significantly enhances the
potential for forming and expanding information networks at a much lower cost
than ever.
In this section, the exploration centers on how activists and citizens utilize social
media platforms to engage with the power and with each other, focusing on
grassroots activism. To address this question, the subsequent texts offer insights
from diverse regional cases, presenting empirical and analytical perspectives on the
intricate issues surrounding political participation and social media. The discussion
begins with an overview of the state of mass protests and grassroots activism in
Southeast Asia, followed by sections on progressive and regressive activism and an
exploration of the region’s binary, affective, and polarized nature of activism.

4.1 Mass Protests in Southeast Asia: An Overview

Despite the prevailing trend toward autocratization (see Section 2.3), grassroots
activism and mass protests have thrived in Southeast Asia. This vitality is

Figure 5 Protests in Southeast Asia (2010–2023)

Source: Author, based on ACLED (2023).

evident in the substantial number of protests recorded throughout 2023, totaling

3,911 from January to November.8 Noteworthy differentials are apparent in
protest frequencies across nations, with Indonesia consistently standing out as
the epicenter of such events (see Table 4).9 In the meantime, the Philippines,
known for its historical embrace of protest culture, and Myanmar and Thailand,
despite contending with military junta rule, have experienced signiﬁcant protest
activities.
Thousands of protests occurred throughout Southeast Asia in the 2010s and
2020s (Figure 5). In 2021, protests reached a pinnacle, totaling 8,789 occur-
rences for the year, primarily fueled by extensive and enduring youth-led
demonstrations across multiple countries in the region (see Section 4.4). The
overarching theme of these 2021 protests was a collective reaction to perceived
threats posed by autocratic forces to civil society, and they all incorporated
social media into their protest repertoires. The extensive and widespread dem-
onstrations in opposition to the coup d’état in Myanmar in February 2021,
which persisted throughout the year, signiﬁcantly elevated the tally of protest
incidents, surpassing 5,000 occurrences in the country alone.
It is impossible to determine the exact number of protests that were organized
online. However, given the pervasiveness of mobile social media and people’s
dependence on mobile phones (see Table 1), it is unlikely for any protest not to
have some social media involvement. However, the opposite is not always true.
The pattern noted in 2023 (Table 4), along with a more extended trend (2016–2023)
(Table 5), underscores that the occurrence of protests in Southeast Asia is not
evenly distributed. While the low digital population in Laos and Timor-Leste may

8
Computed from ACLED (2023).
9
The increase in protests in October–November can be attributed to pro-Palestine rallies that were
sparked by the Israeli attacks in Gaza that ensued after the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023.

Table 4 Protest occurrences in Southeast Asia (January–November 2023)10

Country Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
Brunei 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Cambodia 9 11 7 3 8 5 3 5 10 6 6
Indonesia 172 168 274 138 319 222 204 229 217 307 331
Laos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malaysia 6 5 9 8 6 5 9 7 7 31 15
Myanmar 92 1 3 60 68 45 73 59 57 50 55
The Philippines 12 26 38 22 29 41 30 22 37 34 57
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Thailand 33 11 7 17 20 16 47 18 12 55 21
Timor-Leste 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0
Vietnam 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 0
TOTAL 326 223 312 249 450 334 369 340 341 492 475

10
Compiled by author, data from ACLED (2023).
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108750745
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 124.49.207.21, on 21 Jan 2025 at 09:00:39, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of

Table 5 Protests in Southeast Asia by country (2016–2023)11

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Brunei 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Cambodia 182 95 63 69 96 48 128 75
Indonesia 302 204 768 1,024 1,340 1,620 2,830 2,621
Laos 0 2 1 0 1 1 2 0
Malaysia N/A N/A 151 168 48 94 137 109
Myanmar 251 213 233 442 179 5,719 2,011 724
The Philippines 173 391 182 315 302 267 269 358
Singapore 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 1
Thailand 116 157 165 186 820 864 334 299
Timor-Leste 0 0 0 0 4 4 3 6
Vietnam 40 28 37 23 9 0 11 13

11
Compiled by author, data from ACLED (2023).
Social Media and Politics in Southeast Asia 43

tempt us to draw a correlation between technological readiness and the level of

activism, such a thesis quickly falls apart when considering other dynamics.
Despite its limited technological adoption, Myanmar has experienced a surge in
protests.
Meanwhile, notwithstanding a significant social media population, Brunei
remains devoid of protests. No inherent technological obstacle prevents social
media from playing a role in Brunei. It is the country’s sociopolitical dynamics
that contributes to the inactivism and absence of protests (see Section 3.1). This
reaffirms the earlier assertion that the impact of social media on politics is
primarily shaped by the sociopolitical context and user behavior within that
specific setting rather than being determined by inherent technological capabil-
ities for collective action.
As discussed in Section 2, Southeast Asia exhibits vibrant social media
usage. It is often claimed, sometimes without solid empirical evidence, that
social media platforms significantly shape public activism (Jost, Barberá &
Bonneau, 2018; Shirky, 2011). However, establishing a correlation between
the high usage level and the occurrence of protests is intricate, and identifying
the direct causes and consequences of social media use remains immensely
challenging (Jost et al., 2018).
In scrutinizing the complex entanglement of communication and media in
the making of social movements, my previous research identified that these
platforms are very part of movements’ imaginaries, practices, and trajec-
tories (Lim, 2018) (Figure 6). Social media platforms, in this context, are
part of activists’ journey through these modes, and embedded in mechan-
isms through which “social movements, communicative practices, and
actions on the grounds are interconnected and unraveled in space and
time, such as dis/connecting, brokering, bridging, framing, hybridizing
(repertoires of contention), in/visibility, intermodality, on/offline connectiv-
ity, and globalizing” (Lim, 2018: 103). These mechanisms are part of activ-
ists’ complex works, such as cultivating shared grievances, expanding
networks of resistance, and building resilience against repressions. As
such, social media platforms were not the sole cause of the proliferation of
protests in Southeast Asia. They were, however, part of activists’ repertoires
in generating grassroots activism. Furthermore, external factors, such as the
prohibition of protests and the use of force in curtailing protestors, also
played an important role.
Political protests have a long history, but the capability to access real-time
accounts of protest actions and conversations through social media plat-
forms is novel. Locating a protest without its distinctive hashtag on Twitter
has become increasingly challenging, with these hashtags linking to

Figure 6 Communications and media of social movements: an analytical

framework
Source: Lim, 2018: 104.

protestors’ messages, their profiles, and social circles. For the interested
public, the visibility of protests provides a mechanism to be connected to the
activism of their interest. Organizers of protests find social media invaluable
for quickly sharing details about various protest-related information and
updates, making it easier to coordinate activism. On the flip side, the use
of social media by potential dissidents offers governments opportunities to
track and suppress dissents. This dynamic sets the stage for an ongoing and
never-ending cat-and-mouse game between dissidents and defenders of
established authorities (Jost et al., 2018; Morozov, 2011; Shirky, 2011).
Furthermore, not all grassroots politics are progressive; the regressive actors
and groups (see Section 4.3), too, can exploit social media affordances for
mobilization.

4.2 Progressive Grassroots Activism

The years 2010s–2020s have been marked by a multitude of progressive mass
protests. These include the Bersih rallies (Section 4.2.3) in Kuala Lumpur (2007,
2011, 2012, 2015, and 2016), the oppositional protests in Phnom Penh (2013–
2014) (Section 4.2.1), and more recently, the pro-democracy protest movements
in Thailand and Myanmar in 2020 and 2021 (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.4).

It is essential to acknowledge that even before the emergence of social media,

the internet had already been involved in significant protest events during the
late 1990s and early 2000s. Events such as the Reformasi movements in
Indonesia (1998) and Malaysia (1998–2000), the “People Power II” protests
in the Philippines (2001), and Burma’s “Saffron Revolution” (2007–2008) were
all predisposed to the presence of the internet.12 In the following decades, these
countries continued to be riffed with grassroots activism, and the incorporation
of social media platforms intensified. History matters. Here, the early adoption
of digital media in grassroots politics in the late 1990s and early 2000s laid the
groundwork for the subsequent integration of social media into future activism.
Particularly noteworthy is that the two-decade history of Malaysian online–
offline activism from the 1990s played a pivotal role in the relative success of
the Bersih electoral reform movement in the 2010s (see Section 4.2.3).
The introduction of social media to Southeast Asia signals a distinct era of
digital activism. On the one hand, these platforms offer opportunities for civil
society groups and activists to communicate, build networks, distribute content,
and organize mass activism. However, the expansive nature of social media
networks, the abundance of content, short attention spans, and fragmented
conversations pose challenges (Lim, 2013: 644). In this environment, civil
society faces the task of countering the trend toward shrinking soundbites
(Lim, 2013: 651) and addressing algorithmic biases that favor simplistic and
emotionally charged extreme content (Lim, 2020a).
During this period, activism has navigated the landscape of algorithmic
politics, characterized by algorithmic enclaves (Section 1.3) and affective
binary framework (Section 4.2.2) that can both facilitate and hinder civic and
democratic pursuits. Moreover, the social media landscape in Southeast Asia,
in contrast to the early days of the internet, is intertwined with increased
state control and surveillance, operating within an autocratizing trend (see
Section 2.3).

4.2.1 Rights Activism in Authoritarian Settings

Despite facing a repressive environment, grassroots activism persists in authori-
tarian countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam. In these countries,
activists and citizens continue to express dissent despite their governments’
relentless suppression of free speech. High-proﬁle social media activists face
arrests and persecution, yet the spirit of resistance endures.

12
See Lim 2023b: 26–35 for activism in the static internet era from the 1990s and mid 2000s and
blogging activism from the mid 2000s to the early 2010s.

In Cambodia, activists utilize social media to document and record human

rights violations, especially concerning land grabs. An early exemplary case is
Venerable Luon Sovath, a Cambodian Buddhist monk who actively used his
mobile phone to document land rights abuses nationwide. In 2009, during
a forced eviction in Siem Reap province, Sovath, also known as the “multimedia
monk,” captured video evidence on his phone, revealing police shooting at
helpless villagers (Chak, 2014). In 2020, he was forced to leave Cambodia to
escape government persecution and is currently living in exile in Switzerland.
Social media played a crucial role in a series of protests in Phnom Penh,
Cambodia, peaking in late December 2013 and January 2014. The demonstrations
revolved around contested national election results in 2013 and workers’ rights,
calling for an elevated minimum wage for garment workers. Supporters of the now-
disbanded Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), the primary opposition,
united with striking workers and other dissatisfied factions. In Phnom Penh, tens of
thousands gathered, advocating for changes in the nation’s political, social, and
economic spheres. The surge in protests was fueled by increased access to infor-
mation, mainly through mobile phones and social media. Platforms like Facebook
and Twitter played a central role in swiftly disseminating information about the
social conflicts driving the protests and the protests themselves. The widespread
online sharing of photos and videos depicting state violence against demonstrators
further amplified the impact of these events.
Despite the Communist Party’s enduring control over the internet in Vietnam,
social media activism has flourished (Luong, 2020). Platforms like Facebook
have become crucial outlets for dissent against the party’s influence (Bui, 2016).
They facilitate people to express their opinions, especially on development-
related issues like land disputes and environmental concerns. One notable
instance is the Trees Movement, a citizen-led movement protesting the Hanoi
government’s decision to cut down numerous large old trees along the city’s
streets in 2015. Using social media as a platform for collective resistance and
action, the movement empowered people and raised awareness of their citizen-
ship rights, potentially influencing state–society relations in Vietnam (Vu,
2017). Additionally, amid crackdowns and activist arrests, Facebook is a vital
tool for monitoring detained activists, organizing visits and vigils, and gathering
donations for political prisoners (Wallace, 2017).
Despite severe internet freedom violations and legal restrictions in Myanmar,
activists and citizens utilized social media to share information and videos
exposing protests, repression, and human rights abuses. Following the coup
by the military junta in 2021, civil society groups and independent news outlets
employed digital platforms to monitor protests and human rights violations
through crowdsourcing and mapping applications. Simultaneously, online

petitions and social media campaigns sought international support, pressuring

governments and organizations to act against the military regime. A notable
case of social media activism arose from the case of Kyal Zin, who was shot by
security forces in Mandalay in 2021 while protesting. The phrase on Kyal Zin’s
t-shirt, “Everything will be ok,” went viral, prompting a tribute song on the We
Click YouTube Channel, renowned for supporting Myanmar’s revolutionary
movements. During the 2021 Spring Revolution, hashtag campaigns like
#WhatsHappeninginMyanmar were vital in effectively enhancing the global
call for attention. Activists in this movement strategically utilized online plat-
forms, particularly Facebook and Instagram, to generate anti-junta posts, which
were then translated into ofﬂine protests.

4.2.2 Issue-Driven Activism: Corruption and Political Scandals

In the absence of a deﬁnitive adversary akin to authoritarian governments,

grassroots activism in less-authoritarian environments takes on a different
form, diverging from traditional political engagement. Unlike traditional pro-
tests rooted predominantly in identity, this activism tends to focus more on
specific issues. In this scenario, diverse groups lacking a shared belief system
may find common ground by rallying around a shared issue or a mutual
adversary.
Issue-driven activism is apparent in the relatively open societies of Indonesia
and the Philippines. Corruption, a significant sociopolitical concern, is a central
focus of protests in these countries. It is considered one of the region’s most
widespread political issues, with most political scandals related to corruption. In
Southeast Asia, the intricate connection between business and politics gives rise
to various manifestations of corruption. Clientelist networks facilitate the
exchange of gifts or favors by politicians for political backing, while dynasties
and affluent business figures wield influence over political parties (Ufen, 2017).
At the same time, public awareness of dubious practices has grown, and citizen
activism on social media has broadened the scope to examine politicians’
lifestyles and business transactions.
In 2009, a significant and pioneering instance of corruption-related social media
activism in the region emerged. Dubbed the “one million Facebookers,” many
Indonesians mobilized on Facebook to rally behind Komisi Pemberantasan
Korupsi (KPK, Corruption Eradication Commission). This movement primarily
aimed at safeguarding KPK commissioners rather than being solely an anti-
corruption initiative. The catalyst for this activism was the threat posed by the
Indonesian National Police, particularly Bareskim (Criminal Investigation Unit),
who attempted to criminalize KPK commissioners. In a case widely known as the

“Gecko vs. Crocodile”, social media users rallied to support the gecko,
symbolizing the seemingly powerless KPK, against the formidable opponent
the crocodile represents, the police (Lim, 2013). This movement gained
traction on social media, marking Indonesia’s first significant instance of
social media activism. It subsequently translated into mass protests nation-
wide, culminating in a 5,000-person rally in Jakarta. The momentum of this
movement experienced a resurgence in 2012 and 2015, markedly with the
hashtag #SaveKPK (Suwana, 2020).
Similarly, in 2013, social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and text
messages were pivotal in orchestrating the “Million People March” in the
Philippines. The protest was fueled by the revelation of the “Pork Barrel
Scam,” a political scandal that implicated multiple Congress members in
misusing their discretionary funds for national development projects (com-
monly termed “pork barrel”) by the Philippine Daily Inquirer. The exposure
sparked the creation of the Facebook event “Million people march to Luneta
August 26: Sa araw ng mga Bayani. Protesta ng Bayan!!” (On [National]
Heroes Day. People’s Protest!!) by Arnold Pedrigal and Bernardo Bernardo,
originating from Ito Rapadas’ post condemning the scam.
The protest gained momentum with widespread support on social media,
employing hashtags #MillionPeopleMarch and #ScrapPork, effectively mobilizing
Filipinos for in-person demonstrations on August 26, 2013. On the eve of the
protests, 18,000 people had already gathered at Luneta Park, and on the day itself,
an estimated 100,000–150,000 attended the rallies. This movement evolved, featur-
ing major protests nationwide and overseas. Despite the protests’ massive visibility,
the movement’s demands, including abolishing the pork barrel system, accountabil-
ity for misused funds, and punishment for those responsible, were unmet.
Although both were labeled anti-corruption activism, these endeavors and
other corruption-related protests in the region are more accurately framed as
grassroots initiatives opposing corrupt elites (Lim, 2023b). As symbolized by
the gecko versus the crocodile and “a million people” label, they are cast as
a contestation between “we, the people” and “them, the corrupt elites,” akin to
the David versus Goliath story. At the core of this type of mobilization is the
appeal to affect. Hence, we see the ascendancy of an affective binary framework
where binary narratives and rhetoric are employed to cultivate extreme affect,
notably rage, as a method of unifying “we” against “them.” After all, politics, in
all its forms, revolves around emotions, with various parties, ideologies, and
movements mobilizing different emotions and infusing their discourse with
specific affective markers (Cossarini & Vallespín, 2019: 5).
In subsequent years, social media activism throughout Southeast Asia has
adopted a similar affective binary framework. In Malaysia, despite the threat

against freedom of speech, press, and expression, notably by the politicization

of the 2015 Sedition Act, in 2016, online journalists, bloggers, and social media
activists mobilized against Prime Minister Najib Razak over his entanglement
in a corruption scandal of the state investment firm 1MDB. Employing hashtags
such as #1MDB, #DearNajib, and #NajibletakjwtanPM, the movement success-
fully appealed to public outrage, strengthening a movement calling for Najib to
step down.
In the Philippines and Indonesia, social media mobilization continues to
revolve around political scandals that provoke public anger. Various materials
related to these scandals proliferate on Pinoy and Indonesian social media
platforms, purporting to serve as evidence of entrenched elite corruption, with
TikTok videos emerging as the dominant form in the 2020s. These materials
range from leaked videos showcasing instances of corruption to TikTok testi-
monial videos of the purported victims of bribery. In these two countries, while
social media campaigns fueled by scandals adeptly bring attention to corruption
issues, their efficacy in instigating substantial systemic change remains severely
restricted (Lim, 2023b). In Malaysia, Bersih activists incorporated the 1MDB
scandal into the electoral reform movement, making it one of the factors
influencing public discourse, resulting in the fall of BN, Najib Razak’s coali-
tion, in 2018.
The affordances of social media facilitate the swift spread of information.
Nevertheless, these features do not guarantee equal chances for all content
types to attain viral status. Virality continues to be an exception, with most
content reaching only a restricted audience. The social media landscape is
extensive, flooded with content, and characterized by short attention spans –
a phenomenon commonly referred to as the economics of attention (Lanham,
2006) – and the economics of emotion. Therefore, in the context of activism,
the potential for a message to go viral does not necessarily align with its
democratic significance. Instead, it is closely linked to its meme-ability,
referring to how much a piece of content resembles a meme – an easily
digestible package of information capable of quickly grabbing users’ atten-
tion – and its affective appeals (Lim, 2023a).
Consequently, social media activism often results in “many clicks but few
sticks,” indicating the majority of activism failed to generate mass support or
attain virality (Lim, 2013). Activists can leverage social media for various
causes, but the landscape favors activism that aligns with branding logic and
can be easily adapted into a meme format. In such a context, it becomes more
feasible for reductionist narratives, such as inherently binary issues or those
strategically mobilized with affective binary framework, to penetrate social
networks.

4.2.3 Mobilized and Deliberated Citizens: Bersih Movement in Malaysia

Although it has a mobilizing effect, social media platforms are notably
inadequate in fostering public deliberation, a critical aspect of democratic
civil society and social change. Indeed, a deliberative component is notably
lacking from the majority of progressive activism in the region.
Furthermore, the rapid mobilization facilitated by social media poses the
risk of being “too fast, too thin, and too many” (Lim, 2013). As a result, most
activism is also largely temporal and ephemeral. In both counts, Bersih,
a longitudinal movement that combined both deliberation and mobilization,
is a notable exception.
Named after the word “clean” in Malay, the Bersih movement was founded in
2006 to address concerns about electoral irregularities and lack of transparency
in Malaysia (Khoo, 2020). Advocating for clean and fair elections, electoral
reforms, and good governance, Bersih gained prominence through large-scale
rallies in 2007, 2011, 2012, 2015, and 2016. Activists, opposition politicians,
and ordinary citizens proliferated the streets and squares of Kuala Lumpur and
other cities, united in their demands for reform.
Since its inception, Bersih has recognized the central role of digital media in
propelling its movement. Its digital operations have evolved over the years, with
initial emphasis on websites, blogs, YouTube, and occasional usage of Flickr.
Blogging, a natural choice during the peak of Malaysian political blogging, was
signiﬁcant in Bersih’s early stages. The importance of blogging in the move-
ment is tied to the enduring Malaysian blogosphere since 2002, where, despite
most blogs being nonpolitical, top bloggers were often politically engaged.
A 2007 survey revealed that nine out of Malaysia’s top ﬁfty bloggers were
political, with eight expressing criticism toward the ruling coalition, BN (Lim,
2017b).
The symbiotic relationship between activists and the blogosphere created an
empowering online civic space, challenging authorities and providing reformists
a platform for alternative narratives (Johns & Cheong, 2019; Lim, 2016;
Smeltzer, 2008). While blogging facilitates conversations, its limited reach
emphasizes the need for diverse tools to advance social movements beyond the
blogosphere. Bersih’s incorporation of YouTube and Flickr in 2006, along with
Facebook in 2008 and Twitter in 2011, strategically followed the tools’ popularity
among Malaysians, especially the youth (Khoo, 2020; Lim, 2017b).
While Facebook played a crucial role in Bersih’s preparations by facilitating
discussions on protest sites and gathering locations, and Twitter coordinated the
protests and made the resistance visible (Figures 7 and 8), they fell short in enabling
in-depth deliberations on complex issues. In later years, as a substitute for blogging,

Figure 7 Twitter conversations around Bersih peaked on protest days on July 9,

2011 (Bersih 2.0 rally), and April 28, 2012 (Bersih 3.0 rally)
Source: Author.

Figure 8 Central Kuala Lumpur map of Bersih tweets, April 28, 2012, 01:00–
7:00 pm (GMT+8)
Source: Author.

Bersih utilized WhatsApp (Johns & Cheong, 2021) as a clandestine space

for democratic deliberations and small-group discussions alongside face-to-face
meetings.

The Bersih movement faced challenges, including government resistance,

police crackdowns, and legal restrictions (Johns & Cheong, 2019, 2021;
Khoo, 2020; Lim, 2017b). Despite these obstacles, Bersih has raised aware-
ness about electoral issues and advocated for democratic reforms in
Malaysia, reflecting a broader desire for transparency, accountability, and
democratic governance. In the 2018 election, the movement contributed to
the growing support for the opposition, PH, and, subsequently, the end of
BN’s ruling.
The Bersih case not only demonstrates the potential for cultivating demo-
cratic spheres in social media but also emphasizes that transformative civil
society activism requires a sustained process integrating mobilization and
deliberation across digital and in-person contexts, encompassing both public
and private spheres. However, several caveats must be noted. Despite creating
horizontal conversational networks, the reliance on social media platforms did
not help Bersih eliminate traditional boundaries of party politics or racial
dynamics. Also, while some of Bersih’s activists may have transcended ethnor-
eligious divides, these cleavages persist in Malaysian society. Furthermore, in
the post-2018 election era, Bersih’s capacity to mobilize for change is con-
strained and influenced by the dynamic political landscape marked by recurrent
breakdowns and realignments of political alliances and coalitions (Weiss &
Suffian, 2023).

4.3 Regressive Grassroots Activism

The affective binary framework can be harnessed to unite “the people” as
“victims” in progressive activism against authoritarian forces or perceived
injustice. However, it can also be easily manipulated to mobilize the masses
against “the Others.” Such rhetoric can fuel animosity by exploiting existing
resentment or suspicion. By portraying individuals as “victims,” the binary
framework can be exploited to justify actions against “the Others” seen as
threatening their space. In Southeast Asia, this exploitation is evident in grass-
roots activism that embraces hyper/ultranationalist, antidemocratic, radical
right-wing politics, or a combination of them.
An illustrative case is Myanmar, where Facebook has served as a fertile
ground since 2012 for the right-wing Buddhist ultranationalist movement to
exploit algorithmic politics and mobilize anti-Muslim sentiment (Kyaw, 2020;
Passeri, 2019; Rio, 2021). Although the movement predates the social media
era, Facebook has streamlined the mobilization of its anti-Muslim rhetoric,
frequently employing extreme speech and disinformation. The algorithmic
dynamics of Facebook not only tolerated extreme speech targeting the

Rohingya, such as those disseminated by the 969 Buy-Buddhist campaign and

Ma Ba Tha (the Organization for Protection of Race and Religion), but also
granted it visibility (Kyaw, 2020). These dynamics promoted the creation of
exclusive anti-Rohingya algorithmic enclaves and facilitated their expansion.
Within these enclaves, particularly on Facebook, hyper/ultranationalist narra-
tives depicting Rohingya Muslims as unpatriotic, a looming threat to the
Buddhist majority, and even as terrorists deepened existing divides and anti-
Muslim sentiment in Burmese society.
In Thailand, algorithmic politics have broadly empowered the Yellow Shirts,
the antidemocratic movement centers around the monarchy and military.
Studying the 2014 Thai coup, Sinpeng (2021b) posited that social media,
particularly Facebook, helped the Yellow Shirts and like-minded ordinary
Thais rally support for authoritarianism. The platform played a pivotal role in
setting the stage for the coup by facilitating swift and widespread dissemination
of antidemocratic sentiments. She contended that social media’s ability to
amplify such voices, reaching a broad audience at unprecedented speeds,
directly contributed to lowering the overall expenses associated with initiating
a military coup, and thus significantly streamlined the process of the coup.
In Indonesia, grassroots activism around the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial race
reveals a right-wing Islamist group known as the Muslim Cyber Army (MCA)
surfaced around late 2016. The MCA activists used social media to mobilize
Muslims by propagating the idea that Islam is under threat. The public emergence
of MCA coincided with the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election when they lent
support to hardline Islamist factions such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic
Defender Front) and actively participated in mobilizing rallies against the then
governor Ahok, a Christian-Chinese Indonesian, who made an ill-advised remark
about a Quranic verse. Their strategy involved circulating disinformation and
incendiary material that was predominantly anti-Christian and anti-Chinese
Indonesian, calling Ahok’s supporters Chinese infidels, morally corrupt, haram
(forbidden), and derogatorily referred to them as pigs (Lim, 2017a).
In response, a pro-Ahok cyber-army13 emerged, comprising ardent sup-
porters of Ahok, both voluntary and paid activists. In the name of pluralism
and nationalism, the pro-Ahok cyber-army engaged in disinformation dissem-
ination and hate speech aimed at branding anti-Ahok individuals as unpatri-
otic, anti-nationalistic, and traitorous elements. Pejorative terms such as
terrorists, preman berjubah (robe-clad thugs), kaum bumi datar (flat-earth
people), bani koplak (the idiot tribe), and kaum onta (camel people) were
13
The term cyber-army is typically used in reference to a group of soldiers highly skilled in
information technology with cybersecurity skills. In the case of MCA and Ahok’s cyber-army,
the term is used as a substitute for cyber-troops (see note 7).

Figure 9 Polarized clusters of anti- and pro-Ahok on Twitter

Source: Author.

used to malign those critical of Ahok (Lim, 2017a). Both factions operated in
opposing binaries within exclusive algorithmic enclaves primarily unified by
perceived threats from “the Others” (Figure 9). The anti-Ahok cyber-army
bonded over their exclusion of Chinese and non-Muslim Indonesians (mainly
Christians), while the pro-Ahok faction excluded Arab Muslims, and some
elements displayed Islamophobia.
Meanwhile, in Malaysia, right-wing and ultranationalist groups formed rad-
ical and exclusive algorithmic enclaves that revolved around the 3Rs: race,
religion, and royalty. Historically, the Malay nationalist party UMNO (United
Malays National Organization) politicized the 3Rs and portrayed itself as the
protector of the interests of ethnic Malays, Islam, and Malaysia’s royalty/rulers.
The 3R grassroots activism became prevalent after the UMNO’s defeat in the
2018 election, which created a “vacuum where Malays need to defend Malays”
(Asia Centre, 2023). These 3R defenders engage in harmful tactics, such as
online patrolling, doxing, and using hate speech, to attack those who criticize
the 3R discourse. For example, not only did they campaign against LGBT
people but they also surveilled LGBT activists online and offline. They also
filed reports against those they disagreed with to law enforcement and internet
service providers and even incited violence (Asia Centre, 2023).

The examples reveal how emerging exclusionary algorithmic enclaves can

produce multiple forms of tribal nationalism. These enclaves, under the guise of
their own brand of nationalism, resort to exercising “freedom to hate” to limit
the freedom of “the Others” (Lim, 2017a). Whether Buddhist ultranationalists,
Thai ultraroyalists, Indonesian right-wing Islamist factions along with their
ultranationalist adversaries, or Malaysian right-wing ultranationalists, they all
construct their nationalism on tribalism rooted in shared identity politics that
unite people through an exclusionary transcendental solidarity that asserts
privileges for its members while negating the rights of “the Others.”
Furthermore, all these instances illustrate the mobilizing effect of social
media and the effectiveness of the affective binary framework in grassroots
activism. Here, it is crucial to differentiate between mobilizing and democratiz-
ing. Mobilizing is a mechanical process that can align with democratic, auto-
cratic, or other values. My intention is not to undermine the progressive nature
of the already-mentioned cases in Section 4.2. Instead, my intervention seeks to
critically examine successful social media activism, focusing speciﬁcally on the
processes and mechanisms leading to their widespread circulation and popular-
ity rather than assessing the values promoted by the activism.
While social media platforms have facilitated mobilization, they were not
designed initially to nurture democratic discourse or cater to civic practices. As
already discussed, these platforms are deeply entrenched in algorithmic marketing
culture. Consequently, the mobilizing effect for collective action is simultaneously
an outcome of activists’ efforts and issue salience and a by-product or unintended
consequence of the algorithmic and marketing-driven pursuit of virality.

4.4 Transregional Youth Activism: Hope for the New Politics?

In the context of diminishing room for civic activism and the dominance of
authoritarian practices across Southeast Asia, it is vital to recognize the impactful
wave of youth activism that has swept through the region in the past four years.
In September 2019, Indonesia experienced its most signiﬁcant youth protest in
two decades, known as #ReformasiDikorupsi (the reform was corrupted), aiming to
repeal the Criminal Code Revision Bill and legislation curbing the KPK’s authority.
Leveraging social media, #ReformasiDikorupsi involved a diverse coalition of
campus and noncampus groups, cultivating democratic values and empowering
political agency (Sastramidjaja, 2020). The protest strategically utilized hashtags on
cardboard signs, blending activism on social media and in the streets, showcasing
a keen awareness of digital connectivity as a deﬁning aspect of their movement.
Several months later, in 2020, a second wave of youth protests emerged against
the Omnibus Law for Job Creation, a stringent law aimed at streamlining labor and

investment legislation. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the protest predominantly

shifted online, using hashtags such as #TolakOmnibusLaw (reject Omnibus law)
and #MosiTidakPercaya (vote of no confidence), trending on Twitter
(Sastramidjaja & Rasidi, 2021). By September, messages opposing the Omnibus
Law dominated the online sphere. However, by mid October, the government’s pro-
Omnibus Law messages had gained traction online (Sastramidjaja & Rasidi, 2021)
(Section 5.3.2). By the year’s end, these protests waned. Nevertheless, remnants
persisted in occasional smaller protests and grassroots activism across social media
platforms, where the budding collective resistance continued to thrive.
In the same year, amidst the Thai military rule, young activists harnessed the
power of Twitter to share information and construct a collective narrative of
resistance. The hashtag #FreeYouth was employed during the initial phases of
the 2020 anti-government protests (Sinpeng, 2021a). Beyond this phase, activ-
ists continued utilizing Twitter to mobilize pro-democracy protests, resulting in
more than 1,516 street protests throughout Thailand in 2021. Through hashtags
such as #28FebMob, #18JulMob, and #7AugMob, Twitter served as a tool for
disseminating information, expressing grievances, providing moral support,
mobilizing participants, and issuing calls for action (Charoenthansakul &
Natee, 2023).
The resilience of the 2020–2021 Thai protest movements stems from innovative
strategies of the youth, particularly on social media and through cultural creativity.
Amid rising COVID-19 cases, Thai protesters, including high schoolers, con-
nected with the #MilkTeaAlliance in Hong Kong and Taiwan, embraced online
solidarity, and shifted to virtual organizing employing Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram, and TikTok. A decentralized network structure enabled swift mobiliza-
tion, reminiscent of Hong Kong’s flash mobs and guerilla “be water” tactics
(Teeratanabodee & Wasserstrom, 2024). Protesters cleverly embraced pop culture,
dressing as “Harry Potter” characters to subtly criticize the monarchy and military
junta. They adopted a meme-worthy three-finger salute from the “Hunger Games,”
the gesture that first became a pro-democracy symbol in the aftermath of the 2014
Thai coup d’état. The salute was initially seen as humor but eventually became
a symbol to convey anti-authoritarian sentiments and highlight a collective aware-
ness of restricted speech in a declining democracy.
Originating in 2020 as an anti-China meme, #MilkTeaAlliance has evolved
into a platform for online youth resistance across Asia. In Southeast Asia, it
connected various nodes of resistance against perceived authoritarian forces in
Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Myanmar. Particularly prom-
inent during Myanmar’s post-coup uprising in 2021, the #MilkTeaAlliance
facilitated information dissemination, organized pop-up rallies, and coordinated
resistance efforts. Despite a violent crackdown by the junta, activist youth

remained resilient, utilizing digital tools for communication, fundraising, and

envisioning a democratic post-junta future. The alliance fostered inclusive dis-
cussions on citizenship rights and social justice, involving Burmese overseas
students and exiles, contributing to a collective effort for positive change
(Jordt et al., 2021).
The #MilkTeaAlliance demonstrates Southeast Asian activists’ desire for
a durable transregional solidarity network and platform to exchange experi-
ences, information, and resources. Sastramidjaja (2024) proposes that the
network resembles a rhizome (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), as they are charac-
terized by connectivity, heterogeneity, multiplicity, and expandability. The
rhizomatic nature of the #MilkTeaAlliance allows for fluid participation of
diverse parties, including nonactivist groups such as K-pop fans, and the
incorporation of various injustice-related issues and demands, and increased
viability and resilience to repression (Sastramidjaja, 2024).
In the face of government repression, youth activism in the region exempli-
fies the dynamic, imaginative, and transnationally connected citizenry of
Southeast Asia’s emerging political generation. The progressive faction of the
“digital generation” plays a crucial role in shaping the political discourse and
potentially influencing the future trajectory of politics in the region. While their
physical presence may have diminished on the streets, their transnational and
interconnected networks persist. This rhizomatic movement displays the limit
of communicative capitalist logic and algorithmic marketing culture, as the
progressive youth transformed social media platforms into the spheres for
alternative and radical imagination that radically depart from the dominant
imaginaries of the state (and other sources of hegemony) (Lim, 2018: 106).
Within these spheres, the youth nurture a radical vision for the region’s future
that envisions a more democratic, just, and humane Southeast Asia. This
imaginative outlook is a foundation for fostering solidarity and continuing the
struggle against oppression.

4.5 Mobilizing but Not Always Democratizing: A Summary

This section explores the complex interplay between social media, activism,
and democracy in Southeast Asia, highlighting the potential for positive change
and the challenges activists must navigate. On the one hand, social media
platforms are instrumental in fostering activism against authoritarian regimes,
providing a space for citizens to mobilize against “corrupt elites” and address
perceived injustices. Cultivating an affective binary framework through social
media contributes to solidarity among citizens who share grievances against
oppressive regimes.

Conversely, the evolving landscape of social media, marked by algorithmic

biases, presents challenges for civil society activism. The algorithmic biases
tend to favor extreme and controversial content, making it challenging for
moderate voices and civil discourse to gain prominence. The prevalence of an
affective binary framework, facilitated by algorithmic marketing culture on
social media, can lead to the polarization of opinions and the exclusion of
nuanced perspectives. This framework, driven by the economics of attention
and emotion, raises concerns about the potential for social media to be
employed for regressive activism that disregards the rights of others.
The Bersih movement stands out among exceptional cases within this chal-
lenging algorithmic landscape. It skillfully incorporated deliberation efforts
into its activism, utilizing social media to address collective action problems
and sustain its efforts over time. By fostering public deliberation, Bersih activ-
ists prioritized long-term political reform and societal change over fleeting
issues. Nevertheless, even in this exemplary scenario, the limitations of robust
social media-driven activism in achieving democracy become apparent.
While it is crucial not to idealize the youth as an unequivocal source of hope
and avoid treating them as monolithic, it is essential to acknowledge that the
transregional engagement of youth activists in Southeast Asia introduces
a hopeful dimension to the discourse. It highlights the potential for a new type
of politics that challenges traditional power structures.
Amidst the vibrant landscape of Southeast Asian grassroots activism, chal-
lenges such as algorithmic biases, fleeting issues, and potential state interfer-
ence underscore the need for a nuanced and sustained approach to achieve
lasting democratic change. Additionally, as explored in the next section, the
state and influential groups, including populist leaders and authoritarian
regimes, may harness social media to counter progressive citizen activism,
shape narratives, and manipulate public opinion in their favor.

5 Bytes and Ballots: Social Media in/for Political Campaigns

and Elections
Throughout history, political leaders have employed diverse communication
methods to uphold authority. Roman emperors used coins for widespread
propaganda, while modern authoritarian leaders controlled mass media to
strengthen their power. Hence, contemporary leaders’ strategic use of social
media platforms for public communication is a natural evolution of this trend.
The late 2000s witnessed the initiation of this practice, and by the close of 2014,
over 76 percent of global leaders maintained an active presence on Twitter or
Facebook (Barberá & Zeitzoff, 2018).

Before the widespread adoption of the internet, whether it was tactical

communication between elites or mass communication reaching the public,
traditional communication models generally portrayed the masses as passive
recipients of elite messages (Scheufele, 2000). However, the emergence of
social media has introduced a new communication paradigm, enabling leaders,
whether in positions of power or opposition, to interact with the masses directly,
and vice versa. This circumvents traditional media gatekeeping, allowing lead-
ers to reach the public directly and communicate with their support base and
adversaries without intermediaries (Zeitzoff, 2017).
As of December 2023, nearly all national leaders in Southeast Asia maintain
a presence on social media, focusing on platforms like Facebook and Twitter
(X) (see Table 6). Leading the way, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of
Singapore was an early adopter, establishing his Twitter account in
April 2009. Notably, the most prominent leader on social media is President
Joko Widodo (Jokowi) of Indonesia, amassing over twenty million followers on
Twitter and ten million on Facebook – understandably, Indonesia is the most
populated nation in the region.
After Jokowi, Bongbong Marcos has 7.4 million and 1.3 million followers
on Facebook and Twitter, respectively. Cambodia’s new Prime Minister,
Hun Manet, is notable for his Facebook popularity, with 2.7 million follow-
ers, a significant number given the country’s population is less than
seventeen million. However, this count is considerably lower than his father,
former prime minister Hun Sen, who has over fourteen million followers. In
2023, Hun Sen and Jokowi ranked third and fourth among the most followed
world leaders on Facebook, following Narendra Modi of India and Joe Biden
of the United States. Jokowi also secured positions in the top ten most
followed world leaders on Twitter (sixth), Instagram (second), and
YouTube (third). President Bongbong Marcos of the Philippines (fourth)
and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia (ninth) have become some
of TikTok’s most followed world leaders. In the “like economy,” national
leaders, too, see the importance of numbers of followers and likes. Here, it is
important to note that it is possible to purchase fake likes and followers from
“click farmers” or “follower factories,” individuals or groups who are readily
hired to generate internet traffic in bulk for various purposes.14
Leaders may utilize social media for traditional purposes, such as communi-
cating government agendas, showcasing legislative proposals, and influencing
public opinion. While traditional goals remain, social media introduces innova-
tive strategies. Leaders can provide insights into their personal lives, offering

14
For more information about click farming, see Lindquist, 2018.

Table 6 Twitter and Facebook accounts of national leaders (by December 2023)15

Twitter Twitter Facebook

Country Names Twitter account followers following Joined Twitter Facebook account followers

Brunei Hassanal Bolkiah @HassanalBolkia2 2,067 16 February 2014 https://www.facebook.com/ 78 K

profile.php?
id=100044322075033
Cambodia Samdech Thipadei @Dr_Hunmanet_PM 48,779 3 August 2022 https://www.facebook.com/ 2.7 M
Hun Manet Dr.Hunmanetofcambodia
Indonesia Joko Widodo @jokowi 20,261,117 58 September 2011 https://www.facebook.com/ 10 M
jokowi
Laos Sonexay @sonexay_s 7 1 July 2010 https://www.facebook.com/ 363
Siphandone sonexaysiphandone.29112/
Malaysia Muhyiddin Yassin @MuhyiddinYassin 1,278,070 17 March 2011 https://www.facebook.com/ts. 2.1 M
muhyiddin
Myanmar Myanmar President https://www.facebook.com/ 1.8 M
Office myanmarpresidentoffice
.gov.mm
The Philippines Bongbong Marcos @bongbongmarcos 1,306,163 37 May 2009 https://www.facebook.com/ 7.4 M
BongbongMarcos
Singapore Lee Hsien Loong @leehsienloong 885,550 27 April 2009 https://www.facebook.com/ 1.7 M
leehsienloong
Thailand Srettha Thavisin @Thavisin 363,303 706 July 2009 https://www.facebook.com/ 175 K
Thavisin.Official
Timor-Leste José Ramos-Horta @JoseRamosHorta1 1,749 129 October 2018 https://www.facebook.com/ 198 K
officialramoshorta

15
Compiled by author from Facebook and Twitter by December 2023.
Social Media and Politics in Southeast Asia 61

glimpses of leisure time with family, usually through their accounts.

Meanwhile, social media can also serve as a tool for international outreach,
promoting tourism, and enhancing a country’s global image, typically conveyed
through the official social media accounts of institutions such as the president’s
or prime minister’s offices.
As illustrated in Table 7, the Facebook pages of Joko Widodo, Hun Sen, and
Mahathir Mohamad exhibit substantial interactions with citizens, generating
thousands of likes, comments, and shares, surpassing those of institutional
accounts. However, predictably, leaders seldom engage directly with citizens
on social media, indicating a predominantly one-way and top-down approach.
A minimal proportion of leaders’ tweets are responses, and they follow a limited
number of users (see Table 6), suggesting infrequent exposure to ordinary
citizens’ tweets.
Beyond these country leaders, politicians of all levels – national and local –
and political parties in Southeast Asia have increasingly integrated social media
platforms into their political communication strategies, significantly impacting
electoral politics in the past decade. This section delves into an empirical and
analytical exploration of how politicians and political parties utilize social
media platforms for marketing and campaigning, particularly in electoral polit-
ics. It highlights their role in shaping voter engagement, disseminating infor-
mation, and influencing and even manipulating public discourse. Furthermore,
the section discusses how these platforms extend as tools for political propa-
ganda and mobilization on various issues beyond the elections, raising concerns
about disinformation and deepening polarization.

5.1 Elections in Southeast Asia

Elections are key events in Southeast Asia, not only in more democratic states
such as Indonesia and the Philippines but also in authoritarian states. Virtually
all countries except Brunei, including one-party states such as Vietnam and
Laos, have held elections. In democracies, elections primarily function as
a means for citizens to exercise their right to choose their representatives freely
and fairly, facilitating the expression of consent. Conversely, in authoritarian
regimes, elections fall short of illustrating this principle due to manipulation and
misconduct, depriving citizens of a genuine choice (Morgenbesser, 2016).
Within authoritarian states, ﬂawed elections are not mere superﬁcial gestures
or incremental steps toward democracy; instead, they play a crucial role in
sustaining authoritarian rule.
Morgenbesser (2016) argues that authoritarian regimes, such as Singapore,
Cambodia, and Vietnam, exploit elections for four essential functions. First,

Table 7 Interactions on Facebook pages of national leaders (by December 2019)16

Total
Country Page section Facebook Page interactions Likes Comments Shares

Brunei Government facebook.com/bnpmo Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce 91 64 11 15

of Brunei
Darussalam
Brunei Government facebook.com/govbrunei GOVBN 13,027 5,588 276 6,820
Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen facebook.com/hunsencambodia Samdech Hun Sen, 20,489,727 14,243,012 1,127,741 3,394,476
Cambodian Prime
Minister
Timor-Leste Presidency facebook.com/ Eis Presidente da 30,724 25,800 2,474 1,491
EisPresidentiRDTL Republica de Timor-
Leste
Indonesia President Joko Widodo facebook.com/Jokowi Presiden Joko Widodo 39,168,579 29,964,501 2,874,602 2,664,610
Indonesia Presidency facebook.com/ Kantor Staf Presiden 98,159 72,505 3,100 14,863
KantorStafPresidenRI Republik Indonesia
Malaysia Prime Minister facebook.com/TunDrMahathir Dr. Mahathir bin 9,470,145 5,358,681 1,473,491 1,432,152
Mohamad
Malaysia Government facebook.com/PMOMalaysia PMO Malaysia 13,154 8,846 509 3,132

16
Compiled by author, data from Twiplomacy (2020).
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108750745
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 124.49.207.21, on 21 Jan 2025 at 09:00:39, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of

Myanmar President U Htin Kyaw facebook.com/U-Htin-Kyaw U Htin Kyaw 38,185 28,078 1,281 6,531
Myanmar Presidency facebook.com/ Myanmar President 1,578,561 1,111,072 30,364 363,461
myanmarpresidentofﬁce Ofﬁce
.gov.mm
The Philippines President Rody Duterte facebook.com/rodyduterte Rody Duterte 337,001 268,554 14,242 23,019
Philippines Presidency facebook.com/pcoogov Presidential 4,115,309 2,135,736 593,210 797,038
Communications
(Government of the
Philippines)
Singapore President Halimah Yacob facebook.com/halimahyacob Halimah Yacob 110,807 85,904 6,204 9,704
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien facebook.com/leehsienloong Lee Hsien Loong 1,404,265 1,098,115 78,934 131,449
Loong
Singapore Government https://facebook.com/gov.sg Gov.sg 199,208 127,431 9,166 45,936
Thailand Government https://facebook.com/ ไทยคู่ฟ้า 735,051 404,939 95,648 184,692
ThaigovSpokesman
Thailand Government https://facebook.com/ PR Thai Government 37,314 20,546 1,337 10,671
thailandprd
Vietnam Foreign Minister Phạm https://facebook.com/Ph%E1% Phạm Bình Minh 88 67 11 8
Bình Minh BA%A1m-B%C3%ACnh-
Minh−919861878132744
64 Politics and Society in Southeast Asia

elections provide crucial information, offering dictators insight into the level of
support for the ruling party or opposition in an environment of power insecurity.
Second, there is the legitimation function, wherein authoritarian rulers use
elections to legitimize their authority, seeking moral grounds with normative
approval from citizens. This legitimation function transforms elections into
a theatrical performance, creating the illusion that the ruling party adheres to
democratic norms. Third, the management function involves keeping political
elites in check through tactics such as clientelism, co-optation, solidarity, or
succession. Lastly, the neopatrimonialism function views elections as
a mechanism for distributing patronage to citizens in exchange for their votes
to support the ruling party.
In more open states such as Indonesia and the Philippines, elections serve as
a platform for citizens to exercise their voting rights with a certain degree of
freedom. However, this does not imply that these elections are immune to
exploitation. Although the extent of exploitation may be less pronounced, the
four functions – information, legitimation, management, and neopatrimonial-
ism – can still influence the electoral process.17
Despite the frequent elections in the region, a consistent pattern emerges,
characterized by either authoritarian governance or a binary political frame-
work. This framework typically limits opposition or choices, creating an illu-
sion of variety that often conceals the underlying reality. Consequently, voters
frequently find their options narrowed down to supporting a specific candidate
or opposing that candidate, and this cycle tends to repeat with variations. How
social media platforms are utilized for political campaigns, particularly voter
mobilization during elections, thus embody this binary structure.

5.2 Social Media Campaigns and Voter Mobilization

Mobilization is key to electoral politics. First, political parties and candidates
seek to mobilize supporters through election campaigns and get-out-to-vote
initiatives. Research indicates the effectiveness of these efforts in persuading
voters to turn out and cast their votes (Gerber & Green, 2000). Second,
interpersonal mobilization occurs when members of social networks encourage
turnout. In election campaigns, social media functions as a cascading message
environment, allowing politicians to tap into interpersonal social networks. This
potential for a cascade effect has led elected ofﬁcials and politicians to increas-
ingly use social media for mobilization, capitalizing on its affordances to tap
into the extended social networks of supporters. Social media platforms emerge
as more potent tools than traditional communication methods, facilitating

17
For a broader and deeper analysis of the elections in Southeast Asia, see Aspinall et al. (2022).

candidate appeals for money, volunteers, and votes through trusted sources –
friends and friends of friends within social networks.
The possible linkage between political campaigns and citizen grassroots
activism implies the potential for grassroots movements to coalesce around
a particular candidate. In such instances, the extensive reach of social media
enables candidates to mobilize through cascading effects within volunteer
networks and grassroots fundraising. This interplay indicates that nontraditional
or perceived outsider candidates now stand a better chance of garnering popu-
larity than historical trends, offering oppositional candidates a competitive
advantage. Subsequent discussions explore social media integration into oppos-
itional and outsiders’ campaigns in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Cambodia,
and Thailand from the late 2000s to the early 2020s to provide illustrative
examples. Illustrations include Jokowi’s campaign in Indonesia from 2012 to
2019 and the recent “Pita’s fever” case in Thailand in 2023.

5.2.1 The Oppositional and the Outsider Turn

In Malaysia, the integration of digital media began in the 1999 general elections,
but it was not until GE13 in 2008 that the platform became a central component
of campaigns. In the years leading up to the elections, grassroots activism,
notably the Bersih movement (see Section 4.2.3), leveraged social media to
bring attention to various sociopolitical issues, including the deteriorating
economic climate, corruption, money politics, and the ruling coalition’s failure
to address the concerns of ethnic minorities. The opposition coalition, along
with and supported by Bersih, utilized social media for widespread political
mobilization in urban areas. Bersih also employed intermodality, linkages
between digital and other networks, to mobilize rural voters through mobile
phones/SMS and in-person networks (Lim, 2018). The results of the 2008
election were nothing short of phenomenal for the opposition. Although the
ruling coalition secured a simple majority, its proportion of the popular vote,
parliamentary seats, and state legislatures significantly declined.
In the neighboring country, by 2007, the Singaporean PAP government eased
its control over public political discussions, permitting opposition parties to
utilize platforms like Facebook, podcasts, and Twitter for campaigning. In the
lead-up to the 2011 general elections, opposition parties strategically incorpor-
ated social media campaigns, resulting in a significant impact (Pang, 2020). The
opposition secured six elected seats, the highest number since independence,
including the Workers’ Party capturing the Aljunied Group Representative
Constituency with five members. The ruling party experienced a decline in
the popular vote from 66.6 percent to 60.1 percent, marking its lowest since

1968 (Ortmann, 2016). Various factors contributed to this shift, including social
media’s role in informing Singaporeans about the opposition, their manifestos,
and campaign activities. Social media facilitated the transition of electoral focus
from character attacks on the opposition, typically orchestrated by state-
sponsored mainstream media in previous elections, to national issues. The
platforms provided a cost-effective option for cash-strapped opposition parties
to reach a broader audience, allowing Singaporeans to witness substantial
turnout at opposition election rallies from the comfort of their homes for the
first time (Ortmann, 2016; Pang, 2020).
Meanwhile, in Indonesia, Jokowi’s ascent in the 2012 Jakarta gubernator-
ial election and the 2014 presidential election was intricately tied to an
extensive use of social media campaigns. As “outsiders” to Jakarta politics
in 2012, Jokowi and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) diverged from their
counterparts who heavily invested in television and print advertisements and
opted for a firm reliance on social media instead. Their campaigns embraced
the marketization and professionalization of social media campaigning, sup-
ported by dedicated online and offline voluntary campaigners called
JASMEV (Jokowi Ahok Social Media Volunteers). Jokowi’s Twitter account,
initially created in September 2011 for the gubernatorial election, has since
transformed into his official Twitter account and has been consistently util-
ized in subsequent elections. The Jakarta election set a crucial precedent for
social media campaigns in his later electoral pursuits, along with the trans-
formation of JASMEV from a voluntary-based group into a campaign net-
work that included paid buzzers.18
In Cambodia around 2012–2013, the newly formed Cambodian National
Rescue Party (CNRP), led by exiled Sam Rainsy, defied expectations by redu-
cing the ruling CPP’s influence in parliament. Limited access to mainstream
media led the CNRP to leverage online platforms, including blogs and social
media, as a crucial campaign tool. While the CPP controlled traditional media
outlets, the CNRP utilized social media to amplify critical voices, addressing
grievances against Prime Minister Hun Sen. Online platforms facilitated the
dissemination of content, including audio and video clips, exposing unfulfilled
promises, gaining significant traction on Facebook (Vong & Sinpeng, 2020),
involving the participation of Cambodian civil society organizations and human
rights activists in the social media campaign.
In the unfolding historical narrative, the four cases yielded divergent results.
In Malaysia, carried by Bersih activists’ efforts and Mahathir Mohamad’s
18
Buzzer is an Indonesian term to describe “a netizen who is paid by a company to disseminate
promotional information of a certain product or brand on social media sites” (Lim, 2017a: 417).
The political buzzer is synonymous with cyber-troop (see footnote 7).

leadership, the opposition triumphed in GE14, ending BN’s sixty-year rule in

2018. Despite the 2011 setback, Singapore’s ruling party, PAP, showcased
resilience with a decisive 2015 victory. It did so by partly addressing 2011
election grievances, for example, by initiating citizen feedback and engagement
programs and emphasizing constructive political mode over confrontational
democracy (Rodan, 2018). Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the Jakarta election’s
victory set a critical precedent for Jokowi’s subsequent social media campaigns,
contributing to his victories in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. In
Cambodia’s 2013 election, the opposition CNRP secured fifty-five seats against
the CPP’s sixty-eight, despite accusations of vote-rigging (Hutt, 2016).
Subsequent efforts for reelection proved unsuccessful, leading to a 2014 com-
promise as the CNRP joined the CPP in parliament. Tensions persisted until
2017 when CNRP leader Khem Sokha faced accusations of treason, and the
Supreme Court dissolved the CNRP, imposing a five-year ban on its members’
political activities ahead of the 2018 elections.
The narrative of Cambodia’s CNRP finds parallels in Thailand’s 2023
elections. In this election, a progressive center-left party opposing the military
junta, the Move Forward Party (MFP) or Pak Kao Klai, succeeded by winning
the majority of seats. The party’s effective social media campaign was crucial
in engaging and mobilizing younger voters. Pita Limjaroenrat, the MFP
charismatic leader, surpassed other figures, including the incumbent Prime
Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, in popularity. With over 2.6 million Instagram
followers, Pita shared relatable family photos resonating with ordinary Thais.
The MFP strategically campaigned on platforms like Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram, and TikTok, blending a clear message advocating reform in the
monarchy and military with Pita’s charismatic persona. This combination led
to the phenomenon known as “Pita fever,” successfully mobilizing voters,
especially the Thai youth. Despite the MFP securing a majority, military-
aligned parties and royalist forces utilized all available means to prevent Pita
from assuming the role of prime minister.
The divergent outcomes depicted in these cases show that while social media
can be pivotal in mobilization and even help the opposition and outsiders
leverage their support, it represents just one element within the intricate land-
scape of politics.

5.2.2 The Authoritarian Capture

Initially, social media campaigns were crucial for oppositional and outsider elect-
oral strategies. However, in the latter years, this approach has seen a rising adoption
by authoritarian leaders, ruling parties/coalitions, and status quo proponents.

In Cambodia, in July 2023, social media played an essential role in

a controversial election where the main opposition party was barred, and
the ruling party, led by long-time Prime Minister Hun Sen, claimed victory,
securing almost all seats. Subsequently, Hun Sen’s son, Hun Manet, became
the new prime minister. After facing rising opposition in the 2013 election,
Prime Minister Hun Sen extensively used platforms like Facebook, Twitter,
and YouTube to connect with the Cambodian public. His social media efforts
intensified leading up to the 2023 election. Anticipating a potential account
suspension by Meta, he proactively deleted his Facebook page, which had
over fourteen million followers, following the platform’s flagging of a video
for allegedly inciting violence. After the deletion, Hun Sen encouraged
Cambodians to join him on alternative platforms such as Telegram and
TikTok. Additionally, he presented a documentary detailing his life on
YouTube, signaling a shift in his online presence amid the evolving social
media landscape.
Several years prior in the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, despite his tie to the
Marcos family, orchestrated a successful campaign by successfully positioning
himself as a political “outsider” in opposition to the elites. His victory in the 2016
election marked the onset of authoritarian capture. Heavily incorporating social
media into his strategies, Duterte’s campaign successfully garnered legitimacy
from the majority despite its undemocratic practices and antidemocratic ideas.
This authoritarian consolidation was solidified in the 2022 election. Duterte’s
demagoguery style of social media campaigns and Bongbong Marcos’ positive
disinformation (see algorithmic whitebranding in Section 5.3.1) helped the son of
the long-time dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. secure the presidency (Arugay &
Baquisal, 2022).
In Indonesia, in 2014, Jokowi initially gained support from progressive and pro-
democracy segments, including human rights activists and civil society groups. In
the latter part of his first term, however, Indonesian democracy saw a decline due
to the manipulation of state institutions for partisan purposes, increased repression
of political opposition, and the rise of anti-pluralistic political Islam (Power, 2018).
Jokowi further solidified his authoritarian grip ahead of the 2024 election, exem-
plified by a controversial October ruling from the Constitutional Court allowing
his son, Gibran, to run for vice president on Prabowo’s ticket. The alliance between
Prabowo and Jokowi’s social media campaign teams, along with other resources,
has given the Prabowo–Gibran duo more leverage than any other candidate and
subsequently won the election. The authoritarian turn in Indonesia, ironically,
originates from a highly popular (including in social media) and effective presi-
dent, who was once featured on the cover of Time Magazine and portrayed as “a
new hope” and “a force of democracy” (Beech, 2014).

5.2.3 Marketing/Branding and Populist Communication Style

Whether oppositional, progressive, or authoritarian, some similarities have run
through successful social media campaigns in Southeast Asia. First is that they
embrace the principle of political marketing and branding. In the evolving
landscape of political campaigns, the influence of commercial frameworks
has grown significantly, leading to the integral role of branding in campaign
strategy (Scammell, 2007), particularly in social media. In political marketing,
“brand” extends beyond its traditional association with commercial products.
Instead, it encompasses a political entity’s symbolic value and psychological
representation, whether a candidate, party, or issue (Scammell, 2007). In this
context, a political brand functions as a powerful tool, serving as a “shortcut to
consumer choice,” enabling the differentiation of entities that may share broad
similarities by introducing a layer of emotional connection (Scammell, 2007: 177).
The idea here is that voters, much like consumers in a commercial context, are
influenced less by the tangible promises and policies put forth by a political entity
but more by the brand’s affective appeal.
As political campaigns increasingly adopt branding strategies, social media
platforms serve as dynamic arenas for cultivating and disseminating political
brands. Through visual elements, storytelling, and consistent messaging, cam-
paigns aim to shape and reinforce the symbolic value of their brand. With its
vast reach and interactive nature, social media becomes a conduit for establish-
ing and nurturing the emotional connection between the political entity and the
electorate. In this way, branding on social media becomes a strategic imperative,
especially in electoral politics, influencing how political messages are received,
interpreted, and remembered by the voting public. To optimize the chances of
content achieving virality, it is crucial for the messaging to align with a robust
political branding strategy complemented by a compelling and memorable
hashtag, thereby engaging in hashtag politics.
Whether leading up to or during election campaigns and even in nonelection
years, politicians actively adopt this political branding approach by integrating
social media into their communication strategies, resonating with the prevalent
culture of algorithmic marketing. Within this environment, popular politicians,
such as Jokowi, Duterte, and Pita, are portrayed as celebrities and idols; they
embody the brand.19
Furthermore, irrespective of political leanings – centrist, right, or left – and
party or coalition affiliations, successful social media campaigns have embraced

19
The conﬂuence of celebrity culture and social media campaigns is evident in the emergence of
celebrity politicians, referring to individuals from sports or entertainment backgrounds who
transition into politics (see Beta & Neyazi, 2022).

a populist communication style. This style involves “adversarial, emotional,

patriotic, and abrasive speech through which they connect with the discontented
often via grassroots, community-oriented, communicative practices, and spaces”
(Block & Negrine, 2017: 182). The populist style is not exclusive to authoritarian
ﬁgures like Hun Sen but is also adopted by progressive opposition leaders such as
Pita Limjaroenrat. In the prevailing algorithmic marketing culture, political
messages are not treated uniformly. Populist communication stands out due to
its heightened potential for visibility, popularity, and virality.
Like the affective binary framework for grassroots activism (see Section 4.2.2),
social media populist campaigning also emphasizes affective mobilization.
Populist communication style embraces affect and encompasses emotions and
passions as part of its political persuasion, creating a divide between “the elites”
and “the people” (Tietjen, 2023). Populist social media campaigns foster a sense
of crisis that demands swift collective action by tapping into discontent and
frustration, presenting a perception of systemic issues. Anger attributes griev-
ances to “the establishment,” while fear broadens the audience by anticipating
potential crisis effects. Hence, the populist communication style appeals to
individual emotions and nurtures a collective identity through empathetic and
sympathetic emotions, contributing to the construction of “the people.” As such,
it aligns well with social media’s algorithmic marketing culture (see Section 1.3),
which tends to favor content with extreme affect, elicit strong reactions, or adhere
to the economics of emotion (Lim, 2023a).
In this context, efforts to garner support based on policies, sociopolitical issues,
and economic agendas often fall short of evoking strong emotions, diminishing
the chances of achieving widespread visibility. On the contrary, affective mobil-
ization that focuses on candidates’ personalities, either through positive por-
trayals or intense personal attacks on their opponents, is more likely to gain
viral traction. This is due to its ability to elicit extreme affect, hate or love.
Some leaders, such as Duterte, have taken the populist communication style
to extreme levels by incorporating vulgar language to establish a connection
with ordinary citizens. For instance, in September 2016, Duterte referred to
Obama as “a son of a whore” for promising to address the issue of the deadly
“drug war.” On social media, his supporters highlighted that his use of vulgarity
demonstrated authenticity, honesty, and a representation of what ordinary
individuals wished to express but hesitated to say. Another facet involves
challenging taboos, such as opposing political correctness, by being the ﬁrst
to articulate views considered politically incorrect or impolite, thereby distin-
guishing oneself from the elite. These elements are strategically employed as
they effectively resonate with the limited attention span environment and the
prevalent algorithmic marketing culture on social media platforms.

5.3 Algorithmic Politics, Social Media Campaign Industry,

and Disinformation
From Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s victories in the Indonesian 2014, 2019, and 2024
elections to Duterte’s and Bongbong Marcos’ successes in the Philippines’ 2016
and 2022 presidential elections, and Hun Sen’s achievement in promoting his
son, Hun Manet, in the 2023 Cambodian election, the inﬂuence of the social
media campaign industry and the prevalence of algorithmic politics have
become evident.

5.3.1 Algorithmic Politics in/for Elections

This increasing integration of algorithmic politics in electoral politics is char-
acterized by three key trends. First, there is a notable professionalization and
financial backing, signifying the growing sophistication and strategic nature of
social media campaigning. Financial support from elite individuals and groups
associated with the campaign industry has emerged as a driving force,
empowering campaigns to invest substantially in advanced technologies,
tools, and expertise (Saraswati, 2020; Wijayanto & Berenschot, 2021).
The political campaign industry, comprising companies and individuals offering
services to political parties, utilizes marketing skills, social media, and algorithmic
tools to intensify social divisions for power struggles. Services range from political
consultancy to image-making, data analytics, and media consultancy, forming
interconnected clusters. The industry may consist of polling agencies, big data
companies, and digital marketing agencies offering comprehensive digital cam-
paign services to secure a candidate’s victory through strategic planning, vision
conceptualization, campaigning, and media organization (Saraswati, 2020).
The industry’s ability to offer comprehensive services relies not only on political
commercialization and shared ideology but also on alliances between candidates
and the broader political-economic power held by elites. Consequently, financially
robust actors possess greater leverage to capitalize on social media’s mobilization
effects, mainly through the utilization of algorithmic politics that exploits targeted
advertising features.
My desk research reveals that financially powerful entities behind Hun Manet
and Prabowo Subianto were among the region’s top spenders for Meta ads.20 Just
nine months before the Cambodian 2023 election, the Co-Army, Pekpenh Somalina
(a Cambodian singer), and an undisclosed account allocated US$889,734 to run
652 advertisements on behalf of Hun Manet. Meanwhile, over a brief span of
ninety days (September-December 2023), a total of US$154,458 was expended for

20
Source: Meta Ads Library, www.facebook.com/ads/library/.

1,600 ads for Prabowo Subianto under three accounts, namely: Bakti Untuk Rakyat,
Yayasan Golkar Institut SKP, and Indonesia Adil Makmur. The same accounts
collectively allotted more than $1.1 million toward financing over 10,000 ads for
Prabowo between August 2020 and December 2023.
The combination of increasing influence through financial means and the
rich-get-richer principle of scale-free networks contributes to an increasingly
unequal social media landscape. This dynamic makes it easier for powerful
political actors to exploit and further enhance their influence.
The second trend involves the strategic integration of a paid campaign
network aimed at manipulating public discourse. This network typically
employs paid buzzers or cyber-troops, cyber-trolls,21 bots,22 and social media
influencers.
In Indonesia, Jokowi’s campaign undoubtedly drew strength from genuine
grassroots activism, including support from progressive activists and civil
society groups. However, it also heavily relied on the marketing strategies of
his professional campaigners (Saraswati, 2020) to craft his image, branding him
as an “anti-corruption outsider” and a “commoner.” In the 2014 and 2019
presidential elections, Jokowi and his rival Prabowo engaged in algorithmic
politics. Their campaigns not only sought grassroots support but also utilized
cyber-trolls, buzzers, and online influencers (Rakhmani & Saraswati, 2021).
In the Philippines, Duterte’s algorithmic political strategy operated through
the utilization of paid cyber-trolls, flawed reasoning, and propaganda tech-
niques, aiming to manipulate public opinions during the 2016 presidential
campaign (Ong & Cabañes, 2018; Ong, Tapsell, & Curato, 2019). The cam-
paign deployed fake stories on Facebook pages, portraying criminal and social
issues, with the ultimate solution being Duterte as president. The campaign
gained traction as people shared these stories, unknowingly supporting
Duterte’s candidacy. Social media became a crucial battleground, with
Duterte’s supporters becoming active keyboard warriors,23 shaping public
discourse by challenging mainstream media and attacking critics. Pro-Duterte
social media influencers, such as Mocha Uson and R. J. Nieto, also played
significant roles, garnering millions of followers (Tapsell, 2021). The cam-
paign’s success resulted in these influencers being rewarded with government
positions once Duterte took office.

21
Cyber-troll is a certain type of cyber-troops; it refers to a user, typically anonymous, who posts
content or comments purposely to cause a negative reaction or displays hostility toward others.
22
Bots or social bots can be deﬁned as “pieces of more or less automated computer software,
programmed to mimic the behavior of human internet users” (Larsson & Moe, 2015: 362).
23
See footnote 7.

The third trend is the predominant use of disinformation, which takes both
negative and positive forms. My research in Southeast Asia reveals that social
media campaigns often involve clandestine and covert operations that primarily
rely on negative disinformation. This aligns with Tapsell’s (2021) findings that
elections have two distinct campaigns: a formal campaign driven by main-
stream media and the other involving subversive campaigns on social media
platforms based around identity politics and disinformation. However, I also
observe that social media campaigns have increasingly become a part of formal
and open election campaigns, where positive disinformation strategies are
utilized quite openly.
The negative disinformation tactic is at the heart of most electoral campaigns
in the region. The 2014 and 2019 Indonesian presidential election campaigns
predominantly revolved around candidates’ personalities. They featured per-
sonal attacks against the opponent, often accompanied by hate speech, racist
and discriminatory messages, and disinformation commonly referred to as
a hoax in the Indonesian context (Hui, 2020; Leiliyanti & Irawaty, 2020).
Such campaigns include accusations against Jokowi, alleging him to be
a communist, non-Muslim, and a puppet of a political party, and scrutiny of
Prabowo’s citizenship, temperament, and his son’s sexuality (Hui, 2020).
Following his successful disinformation campaign in 2016, disinformation
continued to worsen and manifest in various forms under the Duterte presidency
(Chua & Soriano, 2020). Continuing that trend, in the 2022 Philippines presi-
dential elections, Bongbong Marcos’ campaign employed damaging disinfor-
mation, particularly against his closest rival, Maria Leonor Robredo. Ahead of
the elections, some analysts reported that Robredo was the biggest victim of
disinformation, with the majority of false information (96 percent) directed
against her (Gonzales, 2022). On social media, a slew of doctored photos and
videos, some of which went viral, were disseminated to portray Robredo as
stupid, unfriendly toward voters, and a communist.
Meanwhile, ahead of the 2022 Malaysian general election, PN coalition
leader Muhyiddin exploited Muslim sensitive issues. In a TikTok video that
went viral, he made an accusation against rival parties, claiming that they were
influenced by Jewish and Christian agents trying to convert Malays from Islam,
which is punishable under Islamic laws. The utilization of conspiratorial rhet-
oric in this campaign is a continuation of and rooted in the entrenched narratives
of right-wing Islamist mobilization in the country (Lee, 2010).
As previously mentioned, positive disinformation has increasingly been incorp-
orated into social media campaign repertoires. As a manifestation of this tactic,
there emerged a campaign method I term algorithmic whitebranding, namely, the
utilization of digital tools and automated technologies, including AI (artificial

intelligence), to create a positive image or brand for a political candidate or public

figure who has a deeply controversial or problematic record. The strategy involves
more than just whitewashing or historical revisionism, extending to include various
political campaigns or public relations strategies aimed at rebranding individuals,
distorting the reality (of the present and/or the past), and sanitizing the discourse
from any unfavorable aspects. This emerging method has been successfully
adopted in recent elections in the Philippines and Indonesia in 2022 and 2024.
Both Bongbong and Prabowo effectively utilized algorithmic whitebranding to
appeal to the public, especially millennial voters who lack memory of their
controversial and violent pasts.
The algorithmic whitebranding was central in the 2022 Philippines election,
where Bongbong Marcos, the son of the late dictator President Ferdinand Marcos,
forged an alliance with Duterte’s daughter, Sara, as his vice president. In stark
contrast to Duterte’s polarizing strategy of dividing citizens into “good” individ-
uals and “bad” criminals deserving of death, Bongbong Marcos adopted
a reconciliatory stance. Emphasizing unity as the theme across all speeches and
interviews, his message aligns with the prevailing “influencer culture of good
vibes and toxic positivity” (Curato, 2022). This positive messaging extended to
his social media channels, blending political content with cheerful family vlogs
(video blogs). On his mother’s birthday, BongBong posted a vlog titled
“Backstories with Imelda Marcos | Projects During Her Time as First Lady” to
remind people of the glorious legacy of his father (Figure 10). With 1.2 million
TikTok followers, 2 million YouTube subscribers, and 5.3 million Facebook
followers, BongBong Marcos boasted a substantial online presence. Skillfully
employing algorithmic whitebranding, his campaign resorted to historical distor-
tions, recasting his father’s presidency as the Pinoy golden age for peace and
infrastructure, sanitizing it from human rights violations and corruption.
The 2024 Indonesian election reveals a parallel scenario as Prabowo
Subianto, the son-in-law of the late dictator President Suharto and a former
general implicated in genocidal violence, ran with Jokowi’s son, Gibran, as his
vice president. Unlike Bongbong Marcos, Prabowo did not resort to historical
revisionism. Instead, his social media campaign team utilized algorithmic
whitebranding techniques to rebrand him as a cute and cuddly grandfather
figure made for memes, nicknamed gemoy, an Indonesian slang word loosely
translated as cuddly or huggable. To further soften his image, his white and
brown stray cat, Bobby, was included in the campaign with a carefully curated
Instagram profile, @bobbykertanegara (Figure 11). There were TikTok videos
of Prabowo dancing in a distinctive shuffle style or sending heart-hand gestures
toward the audience, rebranding him as a fun-loving old man and distancing
him further from his bloody past.

Figure 11 A cartoon depicting Gemoy and Bobby @bobbykertanegara

Source: Online capture of www.instagram.com/bobbykertanegara.

The utilization of algorithmic whitebranding, as seen in the cases of

Bongbong and Prabowo, was effective not only because it aligned with the
communicative capitalist logic and the algorithmic marketing culture but also
because it was strategically employed to appeal to individuals, including the
millennials, whose participation in politics is more akin to consumerism rather
than citizenship. While both authoritarian leaders won their respective elec-
tions, they gained the legitimacy of only some of the population of their
countries. Even among the millennials, there were dissents, as evident in
numerous calls by Indonesian student executives (BEM, Badan Eksekutif
Mahasiswa) to reject Prabowo’s leadership and a lightning rally of University
of the Philippines students against Marcos-Duterte. Arguably, the algorithmic
whitebranding approach is less likely to inﬂuence segments of the population
who are critical of autocratic forces and cognizant of their agency as citizens.

5.3.2 Algorithmic Politics for Manipulating the Public Beyond the Elections

Beyond electoral events and amidst vibrant grassroots activism, the increas-
ingly autocratizing regimes and illiberally inclined governments in the region
have been employing algorithmic politics and leveraging social media mobil-
ization effects to fortify their positions while quashing critics.
In Indonesia, Jokowi’s social media campaign networks, including JASMEV,
persisted beyond elections, actively campaigning for government policies and
suppressing dissent, mainly targeting Islamist critics. During the 2019
#ReformasiDiKorupsi youth movements, the administration utilized social
media tactics against student protesters (Section 4.4). This included enlisting
influencers to back the controversial bill and deploying buzzers to promote the
opposing hashtag #SayaBersamaJokowi against #ReformasiDikorupsi.
In that same year, a similar approach was employed to sway public sentiment in
favor of the Indonesian government’s efforts to limit the authority of KPK, the
Corruption Eradication Committee. During this period, numerous Indonesians
expressed frustration at what appeared to be a blatant endeavor to weaken the
oversight of corrupt politicians. Street protests, led by students, quickly ensued.
However, within a few days, the discourse on social media took an unexpected
turn, focusing on the peculiar topic of “KPK and Taliban” using hashtag
#KPKTaliban and its variations. Utilizing paid buzzers, social media platforms
were flooded with posts suggesting that the KPK needed restraint due to alleged
infiltration by radical Muslims. Despite the seemingly implausible nature of this
assertion, the conversation gained traction on Twitter, prompting newspapers to
cover the narrative. This online campaign to portray the KPK as “Taliban” played
an essential role in swaying public opinion in favor of the government.

In the Philippines, Duterte continued employing algorithmic politics through

what has been termed the “weaponization of a digital workforce” (Ong &
Cabañes, 2018) throughout his presidency. He utilized keyboard armies to
inundate social media platforms with attacks on critics and posts promoting pro-
Duterte sentiment, notably around the “war on drugs.” Duterte exploited social
media to revive red-tagging24 activists as supporters of the communist insur-
gency. Human rights activists red-tagged as traitors reportedly faced harassment
and even death threats from those accusing them of being unpatriotic. The red-
tagging, along with the whole suit of algorithmic politics practices, continues to
be practiced in the presidency of Duterte’s successor, Bongbong Marcos.
The military regime in Thailand has systematically developed methods to
suppress dissent, where social media plays a crucial role in silencing critics. The
Thai state organizes cyber-troops, including private traditionalist citizens, to
disseminate pro-government messages. These troops monitor and report
instances of civic defiance, engage in online bullying and threats against critics,
and orchestrate offline harassment campaigns. On platforms like Facebook,
algorithmic enclaves such as the Social Sanction and the Rubbish Collection
Organization effectively mobilize supporters of lèse majesté, promoting pro-
monarchy and ultraroyalist sentiments (Sombatpoonsiri, 2022).
Employing tactics like patriotic trolling, cyber-troops in Thailand and the
Philippines attack government critics, especially those receiving international
funding, presenting it as evidence of their allegiance to the “West” and an act of
treason (Sombatpoonsiri, 2018).
In Vietnam, the Communist Party oversees a significant cyber warfare unit,
Force 47 (Lực lượng 47). Introduced in 2017, this military cyber-army is
dedicated to shaping public opinion on social media platforms and countering
what they perceive as “misguided perspectives” online (Reuters, 2017). It does so
by deploying spyware on critical government websites to monitor visitors and
flooding online spaces with the ruling party’s sponsored narratives. Performing
algorithmic whitebranding, the unit helped the Community Party’s attempt to
rewrite history by erasing war crimes committed by North Vietnam and the Viet
Cong during the Vietnam War. The primary objective is to align historical records
with the party’s agenda, presenting themselves as the exclusive “heroes” of
Vietnam while disregarding alternative viewpoints. Additionally, the unit also
employs a tactic like patriotic trolling practices in Thailand and the Philippines by

24
Red-tagging or red-baiting is “the act of labeling, naming, and accusing individuals or groups of
being left-leaning communists and enemies of the state” (Lim, 2023b: 41). In the Philippines,
red-tagging was launched in 1969 as a government-sponsored initiative formulated to counter
communist and Maoist factions, speciﬁcally targeting the New People’s Army. Over time, it has
evolved into a detrimental mechanism employed to suppress dissent.

labeling dissenters as “national traitors.” These tactics frequently incorporate

a hyper/ultranationalist tone, aiming to provoke national outrage and offering
a pretext for the government to quash support for democracy and rights.

5.4 The Populist Wave, the Ascendancy of Algorithmic Politics,

and Deepening Polarization: A Summary
Insights from Southeast Asia underscore the pivotal role of social media in
campaigns, revealing a consistent pattern of heightened division, polarization,
and a prevalence of disinformation. This section explores this dynamic, empha-
sizing that causation cannot be solely attributed to the social media landscape but
instead arises from and correlates with three primary factors. First, it stems from
the socio-technical consequences of social media and their algorithms. Second, it
is grounded in the binary politics of the regions. Third, it is influenced signifi-
cantly by political actors manipulating the public through algorithmic politics.
To highlight, these impacts – polarization and disinformation – socio-
technically originate from the algorithmic marketing culture, a dialectical inter-
play between algorithmic operations and marketing principles, mainly branding.
In this culture, content’s visibility and popularity hinge on its brand performance.
Affect, the prevailing currency in social media communication networks,
becomes crucial for content virality. This dynamic extends to electoral politics,
revealing that political content undergoes scrutiny through the lens of algorithmic
marketing culture, favoring emotionally charged content – such as those pro-
duced within the populist style – over informative political messages.
Furthermore, the escalation of algorithmic politics in electoral politics adds
fuel to the mix, characterized by the professionalization of campaigns, financial
backing, adoption of dual formal and covert strategies, and the incorporation of
paid campaign networks, with negative campaigning and algorithmic white-
branding as dominant strategies. Recently, alongside a significant increase in
social media advertising expenditures, the engagement of social media cam-
paign consultants, potentially utilizing advanced technologies such as artificial
intelligence, has risen.
Those engaging in algorithmic politics harness the algorithmic inclination
toward extreme affect within the algorithmic marketing culture. They capitalize
on the binary nature of politics, enhancing their online visibility not just for
electoral gains but also to perpetuate their power and control by segregating
citizens into polarized algorithmic enclaves. In Southeast Asia, the binary
dynamic reflected in electoral politics, combined with the influence of algorith-
mic marketing culture, presents a significant challenge for communities and
individuals whose positions differ from those of extreme binary positions. As

algorithmic enclaves around binary positions gain prominence, social media

users with dissenting views become increasingly hesitant to voice their opin-
ions, reﬂecting a spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974), where a reluctance
to discuss political issues emerges due to higher perceived disagreement with
social ties. The prevalence of algorithmic politics is poised to intensify, poten-
tially leading to greater disinformation and deeper polarization.

6 Concluding Remarks
This Element reveals that the intricate interplay between social media and
politics in Southeast Asia is multifaceted and co-constituting, sculpted by
dynamic technological, sociopolitical, and contextual arrangements. It is situ-
ated within and shaped by distinctive national contexts, ever-evolving citizen
engagements, and a dynamic political landscape. Nearly four decades since the
inception of the internet in the region, a substantial surge in the online popula-
tion has transpired, hand in hand with an augmented governmental prowess to
wield control over technology. Simultaneously, with most of the population
active on social media, this digital landscape has experienced heightened
commercialization and an increased reliance on algorithms. This has inﬂuenced
how citizens engage with politics, how political actors interact with citizens,
and, ultimately, the trajectory of political developments.
The political implications of social media platforms are multidimensional.
While scale-free networks contribute to inequality and the consolidation of
power, the underlying platform capitalism model prioritizes marketing culture
over democratic discourse. Notably, social media platforms were not initially
conceived with democratic propensity. They predominantly operate as com-
modiﬁed social spheres, where individuals consume, produce, and disseminate
information and ideas centered around personal and social pursuits. The intrin-
sic biases in algorithmic decision-making compound the challenges, intensify-
ing the dominance of algorithmic marketing culture.
While social media platforms were initially designed with marketing inten-
tions, that does not mean that marketing logic governs all activities on these
platforms. They do not predetermine the outcome of users’ actions. Users are
not merely passive bystanders without any agency. Instead, collectively, users
have the potential to shape the course of events on social media as active
citizens rather than passive agents while simultaneously negotiating their posi-
tions vis-a-vis algorithmic and marketing predispositions.
In the ever-evolving social media networks, various actors, ranging from
individuals and activists to politicians and states, persist in seizing and reshap-
ing digital media to propel their agendas forward. In Southeast Asia, grassroots

activism, especially the progressive wing of the youth, have adeptly navigated the
intricacies of communicative capitalist platforms and, by so doing, have created
a space for productive communication and engagement. They employ social
media affordances that aid groups in confronting collective action problems.
Amidst the evolving social media landscape, characterized by algorithmic
biases leaning toward extreme content, challenges emerge for civil society and
citizen activism. Algorithmic marketing culture can obstruct alignment with
democratic and civic objectives. Social media platforms hold the potential to
cultivate solidarity, nurturing shared emotions and a collective sense of victim-
hood. Nevertheless, with the ascent of an affective binary framework facilitated
by algorithmic dynamics, these platforms can be wielded for hyper/ultranation-
alist, antidemocratic, and radical right-wing politics. Social media can amplify
both progressive and regressive voices, underscoring the significance of dis-
cerning the political collectivism it tends to magnify.
Screen interactions possess the dual capacity to bring people together and
create divisions. They can shape modes of political involvement and collective
activism or potentially intensify polarization as users segregate into exclusion-
ary algorithmic enclaves. Within these enclaves, multiple forms of tribal
nationalism may emerge, bringing people together through exclusionary soli-
darity that asserts their privileges while denying the rights of “the Others.”
In the tumultuous arena of Southeast Asian politics, social media emerges as
a formidable feature for political actors, fueling electoral campaigns with
a potent mix of division, polarization, and disinformation. As elections unfold,
algorithmic politics take center stage, featuring professionalized campaigns,
substantial financial backups, and the clandestine maneuvering of paid net-
works. This orchestrated production is accompanied by a conspicuous surge
in social media advertising expenditures, with consultants employing skills and
tools to manipulate the narrative, notably through the deployment of negative
and positive disinformation strategies.
In Southeast Asia, citizens, activists, and oppositional figures have utilized
platforms’ affordances for building networks, disseminating information,
organizing, and mobilizing masses to challenge existing power structures.
However, it is essential to acknowledge that technological systems, as
embodied in social media platforms, cannot inherently conjure a realm condu-
cive to the flowering of progressive democratization where such conditions do
not already exist. More importantly, in isolation, these systems cannot instigate
reform in authoritarian regimes resistant to change, especially those adept at
employing the same platforms for autocratic and repressive purposes.
Conversely, these technological systems also lack the capacity to automatic-
ally shift the political landscape toward authoritarianism if a counterforce, both

institutional and grassroots, resists and persists. Lessons learned from recent
history show that this resistance may emerge from oppositional forces and/or
the progressive digital youth. For Southeast Asia, hope lies not in the hypothet-
ical algorithms of future technological platforms but in the hands of those who
adeptly utilize every tool, including technological and digital platforms, to resist
looming hegemony. In the dance between technology and politics, the cadence
of change may reveal itself. Though the shadows that threaten democracy loom,
the unwavering collective ﬁghting for justice may endure.

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Dedicated to all Southeast Asians who persist in the ﬁght for justice.

Edward Aspinall
Australian National University
Edward Aspinall is a professor of politics at the Coral Bell School of Asia-Paciﬁc Aﬀairs,
Australian National University. A specialist of Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, much of
his research has focused on democratisation, ethnic politics and civil society in Indonesia
and, most recently, clientelism across Southeast Asia.

Meredith L. Weiss
University at Albany, SUNY
Meredith L. Weiss is Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany, SUNY. Her
research addresses political mobilization and contention, the politics of identity and
development, and electoral politics in Southeast Asia, with particular focus on Malaysia and
Singapore.

About the Series

The Elements series Politics and Society in Southeast Asia includes both country-speciﬁc
and thematic studies on one of the world’s most dynamic regions. Each title,
written by a leading scholar of that country or theme, combines a succinct,
comprehensive, up-to-date overview of debates in the scholarly literature with
original analysis and a clear argument.

Elements in the Series

Urban Development in Southeast Asia
Rita Padawangi
Islam and Political Power in Indonesia and Malaysia: The Role of Tarbiyah
and Dakwah in the Evolution of Islamism
Joseph Chinyong Liow
Civil Society in Southeast Asia: Power Struggles and Political Regimes
Garry Rodan
The Meaning of Democracy in Southeast Asia: Liberalism, Egalitarianism
and Participation
Diego Fossati and Ferran Martinez I Coma
Organized Labor in Southeast Asia
Teri L. Caraway
The Philippines: From ‘People Power’ to Democratic Backsliding
Mark R. Thompson
Contesting Social Welfare in Southeast Asia
Andrew Rosser and John Murphy
The Politics of Cross-Border Mobility in Southeast Asia
Michele Ford
Myanmar: A Political Lexicon
Nick Cheesman
Courts and Politics in Southeast Asia
Björn Dressel
Thailand: Contestation, Polarization, and Democratic Regression
Prajak Kongkirati
Social Media and Politics in Southeast Asia
Merlyna Lim

A full series listing is available at: www.cambridge.org/ESEA

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