Module 4b v2
Module 4b v2
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EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION (1 OF
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EXHIBIT 6.5
Interest Rate Parity (IRP)
The spot and forward exchange rates are not constantly in the state of
equilibrium described by interest rate parity.
When the market is not in equilibrium, the potential for “risk-less” or
arbitrage profit exists.
The arbitrager will exploit the imbalance by investing in whichever
currency offers the higher return on a covered basis.
See Exhibit 6.6
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EXHIBIT 6.6
Covered Interest Arbitrage (CIA)
EXHIBIT 6.7 Uncovered Interest Arbitrage (UIA): The Yen Carry Trade
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EXHIBIT 6.10
International Parity Conditions in Equilibrium (in approximate form)
Direct Intervention
The active buying and selling of the domestic currency against
foreign currencies.
If the goal is to increase the value, then the central bank buys its own
currency.
If the goal is to decrease the value, then the central bank sells its own
currency.
INTERVENTION METHODS (2 OF 3)
Indirect Intervention
The alteration of economic or financial fundamentals which are
thought to be drivers of capital to flow in and out of specific
currencies.
Increase real rates to strengthen a currency.
Decrease real rates to weaken a currency.
INTERVENTION METHODS (3 OF 3)
EMERGING MARKETS term, but the smaller and less liquid markets frequently
demonstrate behaviors that seemingly contradict the theory.
The problem lies not in the theory, but in the relevance of the
assumptions underlying the theory.
THE ASIAN CRISIS OF 1997 (1 OF 3)
The most visible roots of the crisis were the excess capital inflows into
Thailand in 1996 and early 1997.
Soon thereafter, the Thai investment markets ground to a halt and the
Thai central bank allowed the bhat to float.
The bhat fell dramatically (see Exhibit 9.4) and soon other Asian
currencies (Philippine peso, Malaysian ringgit, and the Indonesian
rupiah) came under speculative attack.
EXHIBIT 9.4 The Thai Baht and the Asian Crisis
THE ASIAN CRISIS OF 1997 (3 OF 3)
The Asian economic crisis (which was much more than just a currency
collapse) had many roots besides traditional balance of payments
difficulties:
Corporate socialism
Corporate governance cronyism
Banking instability
CRISIS OF 2002 (2
The Argentine peso was overvalued.
The currency board regime had eliminated monetary policy alternatives for
OF 3) macroeconomic policy.
The Argentine government budget deficit—and deficit spending—was out
of control.
In January 2002, the peso was devalued as a result of enormous
social pressures resulting from deteriorating economic conditions
and substantial runs on banks.
THE ARGENTINE However, the economic pain continued and the banking system
CRISIS OF 2002 (3 remained insolvent.
The longer the time horizon of the forecast, the more inaccurate,
but also the less critical the forecast is likely to be.
EXHIBIT 9.6
2. Are there indications of stress on the fixed-rate?
3. Are there capital controls or black market exchanges? 4
4. Are there indicators of government’s capability to maintain the fixed-
EXCHANGE RATE
rate?
5. Are there changes in foreign currency reserves?
Floating-Rate
1. Technical methods which capture trend
2. Forward rates as forecasts (< 30 days assume random walk; 30-90
days use forward)
FORECASTING IN
3. For periods of 90-360 days combine trend with fundamental analysis
4. Fundamental analysis of inflationary concerns
5. Government declarations and agreements regarding exchange rate
PRACTICE
goals
6. Cooperative agreements with other countries
Many of the forecast needs of the firm are short to medium term in
their time horizon and can be addressed with less theoretical
approaches.
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Summary
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Summary
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Appendix
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APPENDIX 5
Long Description for Exhibit 6.5
A diagram demonstrates how the same US dollar amount can generate very similar final amounts when it passes
through the US dollar money market and the Swiss franc money market over a 90-day period. The following list
outlines the conversion process in each market and compares the final amounts. With a start of 1,000,000 dollars
enters the U. S. dollar money market and the Swiss franc money market. The U.S. dollar money market uses the
euro dollar interest rate of 8.00 percent, which is equivalent to 2 percent for 90 days. 1,000,000 dollar times 1.02
equals 1,020,000 dollars. Before entering the Swiss franc money market, the starting amount is converted using
the spot exchange rate of SF 1.4800 equals 1.00 dollar. 1,000,000 dollar times 1.4800 equals SF 1,480,000. The
Swiss franc money market uses the Swiss franc interest rate of 4.00 percent per annum, which is equivalent to 1
percent for 90 days. SF 1,480,000 times 1.01 equals SF 1,494,800. This Swiss franc amount is then converted using
the 90-day forward rate, or F 90, of SF 1.4655 equals 1.00 dollar. SF 1,494,800 divided by 1.4655 equals 1,019,993
dollar. At the end, the final amount from the US dollar money market is 1,020,000 dollars. The final amount from
the Swiss franc money market is 1,019,993 dollars. The amounts only differ by a transaction cost of 7.00 dollars.
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APPENDIX 6
Long Description for Exhibit 6.6
A diagram demonstrates how the same U.S. dollar amount can generate different final amounts when it
passes through the U.S. dollar money market and the Japanese money market over a 180-day period. The
following list outlines the conversion process in each market and compares the final amounts. With a start
of 1,000,000-dollar entry the U.S. dollar money market and the Japanese yen money market. The U.S. dollar
money market uses the euro dollar interest rate of 8.00 percent, which is equivalent to 4 percent for 180
days. 1,000,000 dollar times 1.04 equals 1,040,000 dollars. Before entering the Japanese yen money market,
the starting amount is converted using the spot exchange rate 106.00 yen equals 1.00 dollar. 1,000,000
dollar times 106 equals S F 106,000,000 yen. For the Japanese yen money market, the investor uses a euro
yen account with an interest rate of 4.00 percent per annum, which is equivalent to 2 percent for 180 days.
106,000,000 yen times 1.02 equals 108,120,000 yen. This yen amount is then converted using the 180-day
forward rate, or F 180, of 103.50 yen equals 1.00 dollar. S F 108,120,000 yen divided by 103.50 equals
1,044,638 dollars.
End. The final amount from the US dollar money market is $1,040,000. The final amount from the Japanese
yen money market is $1,044,638. The amounts only differ by an arbitrage potential of $44,638.
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APPENDIX 7
Long Description for Exhibit 6.7
A diagram demonstrates how the same Japanese yen amount can generate different final amounts when it passes through
the Japanese yen money market and the U S dollar money market over a 360-day period. The following list outlines the
conversion process in each market and compares the final amounts. With a start of 10,000,000-yen entry the Japanese yen
money market and the U. S. dollar money market. For the Japanese yen money market, the investor borrows yen for 360
days at 0.40 percent per annum. 10,000,000 yen times 1.004 equals 10,040,000. Before entering the U. S. dollar money
market, the starting amount is converted using the spot exchange rate of 120.00 yen equals 1.00 dollar. 10,000,000 yen
divided by 120.00 equals 83,333.33 dollars. The investor deposits this amount in the U. S. dollar money market at 5.00
percent per annum. 83,333.33 dollar times 1.05 equals 87,500.00 dollars. The investor then converts this dollar amount back
to yen, using the expected spot exchange rate of 120.00 yen equals 1.00 dollar. 87,500.00 dollar times 120.00 equals
10,500,000 yen. At the end the final amount from the Japanese yen money market is 10,040,000, which is repaid. The final
amount from the U. S. dollar money market is 10,500,000, which is earned. The amounts differ by a profit of 4460,000 yen.
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APPENDIX 10
Long Description for Exhibit 6.10
The approximate model of equilibrium involves five relations identified by the letters A, B, C, D, and E. The
following list describes each relation based on changes to exchange rates, interest rates, and inflation for the
Japanese yen. Relation A: purchasing power parity. The forecast change in the spot exchange rate is plus 4
percent, meaning the yen strengthens. The forecast difference in rates of inflation is minus 4 percent, meaning less
in Japan. Relation B: Fisher effect. The forecast difference in rates on inflation is minus 4 percent, meaning less in
Japan. The difference in nominal interest rates is minus 4 percent, meaning less in Japan. Relation C: International
Fisher effect. The forecast change in the spot exchange rate is plus 4 percent, meaning the yen strengthens. The
difference in nominal interest rates is minus 4 percent, meaning less in Japan. Relation D: Interest rate. The
difference in nominal interest rates is minus 4 percent, meaning less in Japan. The forward premium on foreign
currency is plus 4 percent, meaning the yen strengthens. Relation E: forward rate as an unbiased predictor. The
forward premium on foreign currency is plus 4 percent, meaning the yen strengthens. The forecast change in the
spot exchange rate is plus 4 percent, meaning the yen strengthens.
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End of Module
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