Judgement: Meaning, Contents and Mode of

Delivery (S. 392-406)

UOI V. Prafulla Kumar Samal
Tarunjit Tejpal V. State of Goa

A Project File Submitted to

Rayat College of Law
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement of Course

B.A.LL.B Hons. For Semester Sixth

Subject: Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023-2

Under the Supervision of: Submitted by:

Dr. Sohnu Anmol Sharma

Assistant Professor Semester 6

Rayat College of Law Section A

Railmajra Roll no. 20069

RAYAT COLLEGE OF LAW (RCL)

SESSION – 2024-2025
 CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY

I am pleased to declare that this Project file titled “Judgement: Meaning, Contents and
Mode of Delivery (S. 392-406)

UOI V. Prafulla Kumar Samal and

Tarunjit Tejpal V. State of Goa” is my original work which is assigned to me as per the
syllabus under the supervision of Assistant Professor Dr.SOHNU

All sources used for this Project file has been fully and properly cited. It contains no material
which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other such paper by any
college or any university, except where due acknowledgement is made in this Project file

Dr.SOHNU Anmol Sharma

Assistant Professor Roll no.- 20069

Rayat College of Law B.A.L.L.B. Semester 6

Railmajra S.B.S Nagar (Punjab)

 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher Mr. Sonu Saini as well as
our principal Dr. Monika Sharma who gave me the golden opportunity to do this wonderful
project, which also helped me in doing a lot of Research and I came to know about so many
new things I am really thankful to them.
Secondly I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me a lot in finalizing
this project within the limited time frame.

Anmol Sharma
 INDEX

INTRODUCTION
Pronouncement of Judgement
Judgement Contents and Formalities
Compensations to victims
Filing and Forwarding Judgement
CONCLUSION
UOI V. Prafulla Kumar Samal
Tarunjit Tejpal V. State of Goa
REFRENCES
INTRODUCTION
The foundation of every fair trial lies in its outcome – the judgment. It is the final
pronouncement that encapsulates the entire process of adjudication, including the assessment
of evidence, reasoning of the court, and the conclusion regarding the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which replaced the
Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), brings in more clarity, modernization, and victim-centric
reforms to the procedural framework of criminal justice.
Sections 392 to 406 of the BNSS deal with the detailed provisions regarding the
pronouncement, content, form, and consequences of judgments. These sections aim to
ensure greater transparency, accountability, and justice not just for the accused, but also for
the victims and society at large.

In legal parlance, a judgment refers to the formal decision made by a competent court at the
conclusion of a criminal trial. It declares the finding of the court on the charges framed and
includes the reasoning, evidence assessment, and final order such as conviction or acquittal.

Definition:
While the BNSS does not explicitly define 'judgment', it is understood to mean a reasoned
decision on the guilt or innocence of the accused, culminating from a thorough judicial
examination of facts, laws, and evidence.

Although the BNSS does not provide a specific definition of the term 'judgment', it is
understood in criminal jurisprudence as the expression of the decision of a criminal court,
following a full trial. It contains:

 A summary of the proceedings,

 Evaluation of the evidence,
 Determination of guilt or innocence, and
 If applicable, the sentence imposed.

A judgment is binding, and it is the final step before the appeal or execution of the sentence.
Pronouncement of Judgment:

Section 392 of the BNSS outlines the timeline for pronouncing judgments in criminal trials.

The presiding officer in a Criminal Court of original jurisdiction must deliver the judgment
immediately after the trial's termination or within forty-five days, with notice to the parties.

The judgment can be delivered by delivering the whole content, reading out the entire
judgment, or reading out the operative part and explaining the substance in a language
understood by the accused or their advocate.

Recording and Documentation:

When the judgment is delivered, Section 392(2) requires the presiding officer to have it taken
down in shorthand if delivered by delivering the whole judgment.

This transcript must be signed, dated, and every page endorsed. If the judgment or its
operative part is read out, it needs to be dated, signed, and, if not written by the presiding
officer, every page must bear their signature.

Accessibility and Transparency:

To ensure accessibility, Section 392(4) mandates that a copy of the entire judgment or its
immediate availability must be provided to the parties or their advocates free of cost.

There is also a provision encouraging the court to upload the copy of the judgment on its
portal within seven days from the date of judgment.
Accused's Presence and Notification:

Sections 392(5) and (6) address the accused's presence during judgment pronouncement. If
in custody, the accused must be brought up to hear the judgment either in person or through
audio-video electronic means. If not in custody, attendance is generally required, except in
specific circumstances.

Special Provisions and Non-Invalidation:

Section 392(7) asserts that the absence of any party or their advocate on the day or place
notified for judgment delivery does not invalidate the judgment. It emphasizes that the
judgment remains valid despite such absence, ensuring that procedural nuances do not
compromise the validity of the court's decision.

Judgment Contents and Formalities:

Section 393 of the BNSS details the essential components of a judgment under the BNSS.
Every judgment must be written in the language of the court and contain points for
determination, decision, reasons, and specifics about the offense, section, and punishment. If
the conviction is for an offense punishable with death, special reasons for such sentence must
be stated.

Section 394 of the BNSS mandates that the State Government, in coordination with the
Central Government, prepares a scheme to provide funds for compensating victims or their
dependents who have suffered loss or injury due to the crime and require rehabilitation.
Compensation to Victims:

Section 395 of the BNSS talks about the provision of compensating victims using fines
imposed as part of sentences. The court may order the fine recovery to be applied towards
defraying prosecution expenses, compensating the victim for loss or injury, or paying
compensation to those entitled under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, in cases of offenses
leading to death.

Treatment of Victims:

Section 397 of the BNSS emphasizes the immediate provision of first-aid or medical
treatment to victims by all hospitals, public or private, free of cost.

Victim Compensation Scheme:

Section 398 of the BNSS mandates that every State Government prepares and notifies a
Witness Protection Scheme, recognizing the need to protect the witnesses who come forward
to testify.

Compensation for Wrongful Arrest:

Section 399 of BNSS introduces a mechanism to address wrongful arrests. If a person is

arrested without sufficient grounds, the court may award compensation to the wrongfully
arrested individual, not exceeding one thousand rupees.
Costs in Non-Cognizable Cases:

Section 400 of BNSS allows a court dealing with non-cognizable offenses to order the
accused to pay costs to the complainant, covering various expenses incurred during the
prosecution. In case of default, the accused may face simple imprisonment for a period not
exceeding 30 days.

Release on Probation and Other Alternatives:

Section 401 of BNSS provides the court with discretion to release offenders on probation of
good conduct or after admonition under specific circumstances.

Record of Special Reasons:

Section 402 of the BNSS requires the court to record special reasons if it chooses not to deal
with an accused person under probationary provisions or applicable juvenile justice laws.

Limitations on Alteration of Judgment:

Section 403 of BNSS imposes limitations on altering or reviewing judgments once signed,
restricting such alterations to correcting clerical or arithmetical errors. This ensures the
finality and stability of judgments.

Filing and Forwarding of Judgments:

Sections 405 and 406 of BNSS detail the procedural aspects of judgment documentation.
The original judgment is filed with the record of proceedings, and if recorded in a different
language, a translation is added. In cases tried by higher courts, copies of findings and
sentences are forwarded to the District Magistrate for documentation and coordination.
Conclusion
The new provisions under BNSS reflect a progressive shift in criminal justice procedures. By
strengthening the framework for judgments, incorporating victim rights, and recognizing
alternative sentencing (like probation and community service), the BNSS aims to deliver
justice in a more inclusive, transparent, and efficient manner.

A well-reasoned and promptly delivered judgment is not just a legal requirement, but a
cornerstone of public confidence in the judiciary. Through Sections 392–406, BNSS ensures
that judgments serve both justice and humanity.
Union Of India V. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr [1979] 3 SCC 4
Facts of the Case: -
1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. This appeal is directed
against the judgment dated 30th August, 1976 of the High Court of Orissa by which the
High Court has upheld the order of the Special Judge, Puri discharging respondents No. 1
and 2. The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and centre round an alleged
conspiracy said to have been entered into between respondents No. 1 and 2 in order to
commit offences under sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) read with section 120-B I.P.C. The main charge
against the respondents was that between 19-2-1972 to 30-3-1972 the respondent entered
into an agreement For the purpose of obtaining pecuniary advantage for respondent No. 1

2. Samal and in pursuance of the said conspiracy the second respondent Debi Prasad Jena,
who was the Land Acquisition officer aided and abetted the first respondent in getting a
huge sum of money for a land acquired by the Government which in fact belonged to the
Government itself and respondent No. 1 was a skew thereof. It is averred in the
chargesheet that respondent No. 1 by abusing his official position concealed the fact that
the land which was the subject matter of acquisition and was situated in Cuttack
Cantonment was really Khasmahal land belonging to the Government and having made it
appear that he was the undisputed owner of the same, got a compensation of
Rs.4,18,642.55
3. The charge-sheet contains a number of circumstances from which the inference of the
conspiracy is sought to be drawn by the police. After the charge-sheet was submitted
before the Special Judge, the prosecution ousted him to frame a charge against the
respondents. The Special Judge, Puri after having gone through the charge-sheet and
statements made by the witnesses before the police as also other documents came to the
conclusion that there was no sufficient ground for framing a charge against the
respondents and he accordingly discharged them under section 227 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 hereinafter called the Code). The Special Judge has given
cogent reasons 231 for passing the order of discharge. The appellant went up to the High
Court in revision against the order of the Special Judge refusing to frame the charge, but
the High Court dismissed the revision petition filed by the appellant and maintained the
order of discharge passed by the Special Judge. Thereafter the appellant moved this Court
by an, application for special leave which having been granted to the appellant, the appeal
is now set for hearing before us.
Question for Determination:
The short point which arises for determination in this case is the scope and ambit of an
order of discharge to be passed by a Special Judge under section 227 of the Code. The
appeal does not raise any new question of law and there have been several authorities of
the High Courts as also of this Court on the various aspects and grounds on which an
accused person can be discharged, but as section 227 of the Code is a new section and at
the time when the application for special leave was filed, there was no direct decision of
this Court on the interpretation of section 227 of the Code, the matter was thought fit to
be given due consideration by this Court.

Held: -
1. The Court held that, so far as the present case (offences committed under the Prevention
of Corruption Act) is concerned it is regulated by the procedure laid down by the
Criminal Law Amendment Act under which the police has to submit, charge-sheet
directly to the Special Judge and the question of commitment to the Court of Session
does not arise, but the Sessions Judge has nevertheless to follow the procedure prescribed
for trial of sessions cases and the consideration governing the interpretation of section
227 of the Code apply mutatis mutandis to these proceedings after the charge-sheet is
submitted before the Special Judge.

2. The scope of section 227 of the Code was considered by a recent decision of this Court in
the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh(1) where Untwalia, J. speaking for the Court
observed as follows: “Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the
region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the
trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think
that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is
not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial
stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where
the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the
purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not.

3. This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may not take the place of the
proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge
in order to frame a charge against the accused. Even under the Code of 1898 this Court
has held that a committing Magistrate had ample powers to weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a case of commitment to the Sessions Judge
has been made out.

4. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities, the following principles emerged:

i. That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under section
227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused
has been made out:

ii. Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the
accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be, fully justified in
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

iii The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of
each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large
however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence
produced before him while (1) A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 740. (2) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 520. 235
giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be
fully within his right to discharge the accused.
iv. That in exercising his jurisdiction under section 227 of the Code the Judge which
under the present Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post
office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities
of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the
Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not
mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the
matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

5. Finally it was argued that, what was acquired by the Government was merely the lessee's
interest, but the respondent No. 1 appears to have got compensation as the owner. This is
factually incorrect. We have already referred to the circumstances which clearly show
that the Government was fully aware that it was only the lessee's interest which was
being acquired and even the fresh estimate for Rs 4,18,642. 55, which was sent to the
Government was shown as representing the Raiyyati interest. Mr. Agarwala appearing for
the respondents fairly conceded that having regard to the nature, character and situation
of the land, it could not be said that the amount of compensation awarded did not
represent the market value of the lessee's interest of the land.

6. On the other hand, in the counter-affidavit at page 87 of the paper book, it has been
alleged that 16 sale-deeds executed during the year 1970 and sale-deeds executed during
the year 1971 pertaining to the village in question were acquired at the rates varying from
Rs. 42,165 to 750,000. The High Court has also pointed out that the records before the
Trial Judge show that the Collector Vijayasekharan had valued the land at the rate of Rs.
1.70 lakhs per acre as far back 1: as 3-2-1970 and if two years later the valuation was
raised to Rs. 2 lakhs it cannot be said that the land was in any way over-valued.

7. Lastly, there does not appear to be any legal evidence to show any; meeting of mind
between respondents No. 1 and 2 at any time. Although the Collector at the time of the
acquisition was a distant relation of respondent No. 1 he had himself slashed down the
rate of compensation recommended by the Revenue officer from Rs. 2,10,000 to
Rs.2,00,000 and it was never suggested by the prosecution that the Collector was in any
way a party to the aforesaid conspiracy.

8. For these reasons, therefore, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the view
taken by the High Court that there was no sufficient ground for trying the accused in the
instant case. Moreover, this Court could be most reluctant to interfere with concurrent
findings of the two courts in the absence of any special circumstances.

9. For the reasons given above, the judgment of the High Court is affirmed and the appeal is
dismissed.

In the case of Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal and another. Where in the
Hon’ble Supreme Court formulated the following 7 guiding principles.

1. The judge while considering the question of framing the charges U/Sec. 227 Cr.P.C has
the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. To determine
prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

2. Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused
which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge
and proceeding with the trial.

3. The court can not act merely as a post office or a mouth piece of the prosecution but it has
to consider the broad probabilities of the case. There cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros
and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if a trial was being conducted.

4. On the basis of material on record if the court could form an opinion that the accused
might have committed the offence, it can frame the charge.

5. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record can not
be gone into but before framing of charge the Court must apply it’s judicial mind on the
material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission by the accused was
possible.

6. At the stage of Sec.227 and 228 Cr.P.C, the court is required to evaluatethe material and
documents on record with a view to find out the existence of all the ingredients constituting
the alleged ofence but the court cannot be expected to presume that the prosecution story is
gospel truth.

7. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished
from grave suspicion, the trial judge will be empowered to discharge the accused
irrespective of the result of the trial.
Tarun Jit Tejpal vs State of Goa, SC on 19 August, 2019
Introduction: -
The judgment passed in the case of Tarun Tejpal raised a lot of eyebrows as it was not in
compliance with the decisions made in such cases in the previous years. It was a case of rape
and sexual harassment committed by the editor-in-chief of Tehelka magazine upon one of the
leading Journalist of the magazine which happened around 7 1/2 years ago in the grand Hyatt
Hotel of Goa. The case also attracted a lot of attention from the media around the world as the
name of the victim was highlighted and secondly it was a prominent case where a man who
was in a position of superiority was charged with sexual harassment and rape with a woman
who was obviously junior to him in the profession.

Facts of the case

It was between 7th to 11th November, 2013 the THINK Fest was organised by the Tehelka
Magazine in Goa. It is alleged that during that fest, Tarun Tejpal, the then Editor-in-Chief of
Tehelka, had sexually assaulted a female journalist who worked under him in the magazine.
It is alleged that he committed the offence of wrongful confinement, sexual harassment and
rape on the victim. The prosecutrix had alleged that on 7th November 2013 by making the
excuse of waking up the American actor Robert De Niro who was the Chief Guest at the fest
and the prosecutrix was chaperoning for him and even shared a physical relationship with
him that only lasted during the fest. The accused took her to one of the guest lifts of Hotel
where he wrongfully confined her using force against her consent and committed rape on her.

Further, on the next night of 8th November 2013 the accused took her to another guest lift
and again sexually assaulted her.

Issues raised
 Whether the accused has committed rape on the prosecutrix as defined u/s 375 (b) and (d)
of Indian Penal Code?
 Whether the accused outraged the modesty of the prosecutrix using criminal force?
 Whether accused committed sexual harassment and physical contact by explicit and
unwelcomed advantages and overtures to the prosecutrix?
 Whether the accused used criminal force to disrobe the prosecutrix?
 Whether the accused was in a position of dominance over the prosecutrix?
 Whether the accused wrongfully confined the prosecutrix in the lift?
Arguments by the petitioner
 The counsel of the prosecutrix contended that the testimony of the victim in cases of rape
or sexual harassment crimes is compelling and most importantly there was an apology email
which was sent by the accused to the victim land duly presented to the court. All the
messages were systematically presented to the court in a DVD. It was contended that the
accused confined the prosecutrix with criminal force to disrobe her and then raped her inside
the lift. It was also argued that the accused was in a position of dominance over the
prosecutrix and so it was easy for him to force her and obtain advantages. It was stated the
accused was guilty of outraging a woman’s modesty by removing her underwear in a lift and
sexually assaulting her.

Arguments by Respondent
The Respondent clearly denied all the charges against him and through his counsel stated
that the alleged incident didn’t happen at all and it was just a drunken banter between the
two. The respondents counsel argued that the Investigation officer had not recorded the
statements of very important witnesses, the CCTV footage of the first floor where the
alleged crime took place was deleted and important evidence were concealed so as to
maintain the case of the prosecutrix.

The counsel on behalf of the accused contended that the IO concealed the fact the lift
couldn’t be stopped at one floor as stated by the prosecutrix and the cctv footage shows
that the lift opened twice on the ground floor, also the accused exited the lift on the first
floor and nothing happened on the night of 7th November 2013.
It was argued that the prosecutrix did not make use of physical force to stop the accused
and sustained no injuries neither she informed any police, colleagues or friends and most
importantly even after the alleged incident happened she was roaming around freely in
the hotel premises which obviously isn’t the behaviour of a rape victim.

Judgment
It was held in the Court that out of six issues raised against the accused of which only one
was against the accused rest all being in his favour, dismissed all the charges levelled against
him under Sections – 354, 354-A, 354-B, 376(2)(f), 376(2)(k), 341 and 342 IPC and
acquitted him.

In cases of rape and sexual harassment the sole testimony of the victim can be the basis of
the conviction of the accused. But this is only applicable when the testimony is of a Sterling
quality, inspires confidence and at the same time is very trustworthy. The court held that in
the present case the prosecutrix has time and again changed her statement and the court
always has heard different versions of a story from her side, Prosecutrix made many false and
inconsistent statements and also lied about her intimate relationship with one of the defence
witnesses. The court observed that the CCTV footage that was presented did not support the
statements made by the prosecutrix and glaring contradictions were seen in relation to her
statements and the CCTV footage that was captured. The court clearly stated that The CCTV
footage does not support the statement that the prosecutrix was in extreme trauma and
blinking tears as per her statement.

After scrutinising the flirtatious WhatsApp messages the court observed that it contains
various discrepancies at the same time she was again and again changing the original
version of a story and it was observed that the prosecutrix was indulged in sexual talks
with a lot of our colleagues to which the court said that the prosecutrix has
the propensity to indulge in sexual Conversations. All the WhatsApp messages
between the accused and the victim on the night of 7 November 2013 were carefully
examined by the court and it was stated that as the victim never refused the claim of the
accused of the conversation being a drunken banter the court ruled in favour of the
accused.
 There was a huge lapse in the investigation and the most important and crucial evidence
was the CCTV footage of the first floor of the Hyatt hotel in Goa where the alleged crime
was committed went missing and crucial witnesses had their statements unrecorded. All
in all the court concluded that The statement made by the prosecutrix that she was
wrongfully confined using criminal force in the lift by the accused could not be proved.
 As for the apology email that was sent by the accused to the prosecutrix the court held
that there was absolutely no confession made by the accused of any incriminating fact
that he committed assault on the prosecutrix And that email is not a reply to any mail
which was sent by the prosecutrix containing allegations of assault and that mere claim
that allegations were not denied does not amount to confession.
 Calculated actions of the prosecutrix, Sustaining no injury and not fighting back or giving
any sort of warning to the accused played against the claims of the victim and hence the
court was of the view that Allegation of rape and sexual harassment couldn’t be proved
by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Critical Analysis
This judgement passed by the Goa court is a sheer example of dissecting evidence beyond the
language of sexism. It has time and again been stated by the various courts that the sole
testimony of the victim in case of rape and sexual harassment matters is enough for the
conviction of the accused but in this case the changing stories of the victim and her false
statements in various matters took a toll onto her case. The court raised many eyebrows
when it stated that the behaviour of the victim wasn’t in compliance with that of a rape victim
at the same time she did not use all possible escapes to get out of the situation. The absence
of medical evidence and the refusal of the victim to show her email played the key role in the
acquittal of Tarun Tejpal.

It was the first case in the history of India, a case of sexual harassment and rape where

the witnesses and the evidences weighed more than testimony of the victim, ethics and

morals which govern such cases.

References

https://www.menwelfare.in/judgements/7-guiding-principles-on-
discharge-andframing-of-charge/
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1360078/
https://digiscr.sci.gov.in/view_judgment?id=MTk5NjU=
file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/728732850-uoi-v-prafulla-kumar-
1979-1.pdf
https://lawinsider.in/judgment/landmark-judgement-union-of-india-v-
prafulla-kumar-samal-1979

Bare Act: Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

Books:
 R.V. Kelkar’s Criminal Procedure
 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Code of Criminal Procedure
 Classroom Notes and Lectures