Quijano - Modernity Identity and Utopia in Latin America - Mod
Quijano - Modernity Identity and Utopia in Latin America - Mod
Anibal Quijano
boundary 2 20:3, 1993. Copyright ? 1993 by Duke University Press. CCC 0190-3659/93/$1.50.
beginning of the 1930s, he decided to publish his worried reflections with the
cautionary title In the Shadow of Tomorrow. Our present horizon does not
necessarily have to darken with new fascisms, nazisms, Stalinisms, wars,
ovens, famines, and trials. All of this is not necessary, but it is implicated in
the debate.
None of this is foreign to Latin America. Not only because the en-
tire world is involved, but also because, for us, the debate about modernity
implies seeing ourselves from a new point of view whose perspective can
reconstitute our ambiguous relationship to our own history in a new way. A
way of ceasing to be what we have never been.
ernization," in operation especially since the Second World War. That ex-
perience blocked, in many people, any other concept of modernization; it
made us see ourselves as little more than belated and passive recipients
of modernization and could not prevent a skepticism about its promises,
because of which many of us now find ourselves ahead of the present de-
bate. Nevertheless, although Latin America may have been, in fact, a
latecomer to, and almost passive victim of, "modernization," it was, on the
other hand, an active participant in the production of modernity.
The history of modernity itself began with the violent encounter be-
tween Europe and America at the end of the fifteenth century. From then
on, there followed, in both worlds, a radical reconstitution of the image of
the universe. It is not necessary to insist here on the implications of the
Conquest for the Ptolemaic image of the universe. What was important at
the time was the recognition of the imperative to study, explain, doubt, dis-
cuss, and investigate all that exists and happens in the universe, and to
modify ideas, images, and experiences correspondingly-that is, to recon-
stitute on a new, experimental basis the relations between human beings
and the universe, and their relations with themselves.
The secularization of authority in the production and communication
of experience and knowledge was legitimized and consolidated with the
encounter between Europe and America. Henceforth, all knowledge would
owe its production and legitimacy to the employment of the characteristic
human aptitudes for making experiences common property, announcing
discoveries, translating, and developing cognitive frameworks. This new
cultural imperative, and the resources and procedures destined for its sat-
isfaction in the Europe of that time, was reason, or rationality. And the new
social intersubjectivity it brought in its wake was what we are accustomed
to calling modernity.
The primordial moment of this vast mutation of intersubjectivity, with-
out which it would have no meaning, occurs in the social image of time:
The past is replaced by the future as the privileged seat of the hopes of
humanity. Until then, all previous images of the universe lay in the past,
because they came from it. All explanations, indeed all legitimacy, were
associated with this past. Hope was an insistence on a return to a golden
age. More accurately, it was nostalgia.
What characterizes the European labyrinth of the fourteenth and fif-
teenth centuries was not only the erosion of the central institutions of society
and culture and the exacerbated violence of their conflicts but also, or per-
haps even more decisively, the loss of control or confusion about historical
alternatives. Absent a historical sense of the future, no perspective was
able to give meaning to events nor to the constitution of a social project
that envisioned a time yet to come, as opposed to the mere prolongation of
the past.
The production of the European utopias at the beginning of the six-
teenth century gives testimony that this labyrinth begins to be left behind
and that history begins to be projected toward, or charged with, the future,
with meaning. Those first forms of a new historical consciousness, in which
the beginnings of European reason and modernity were situated, were not
only a new elaboration of their own past. Their most powerful images, those
that gave the utopias their immense motivating force and their longevity,
were dependent above all on the seminal contribution of Andean rationality
to the new European imaginary that was being constituted. Andean social
institutions and forms of thought, established around reciprocity, solidarity,
the control of chance, and the joyous intersubjectivity of collective work and
communion with the world (or, in European terms, by the unity of the tree of
life) provided models for the utopias. None of this came from the European
past, and all hope of it had to be located in the future.
This copresence of Latin America in the production of modernity
not only continued but became more conscious throughout the period of
the crystallization of modernity, especially during the eighteenth and the
beginning of the nineteenth centuries. If one considers the characteristic
traits of the Enlightenment-the interest in the scientific investigation of the
universe and the resulting discoveries; the acceptance of the often radi-
cal intellectual risks implied in this behavior; the critique of existing social
reality and the complete acceptance of the idea of change; the disposition to
work for reforms, against social prejudices, arbitrary power, despotism, and
obscurantism-if these are the initial features of the movement of moder-
nity, they are as documentable in colonial America as in Europe during the
eighteenth century.
On both sides of the Atlantic, groups such as the Societies of Friends
of the Nation, were organized to pursue these goals. These intellectual and
political circles formulated the same questions, worked on similar projects,
and published and discussed common matters. That is precisely what
Humboldt would find, without being able to conceal his surprise, in the
course of his journey through America. The fruits of Enlightenment were
tasted at the same time in Europe and America.
Nor was the movement of ideas simply from Europe to America. A
Peruvian, Pablo de Olavide, forced to emigrate from Peru by the colonial
authorities, befriended Voltaire, joined the group of French encyclopedists,
and played an active part in the political experiences of the Spanish reform-
ers of that period. Persecuted by the Inquisition, Olavide was defended by
all of the European circles of the Enlightenment, and it was Diderot him-
self, also Olavide's personal friend, who published the first bibliography of
his works.
All of this was even more profoundly felt in America than in Europe
during the eighteenth century, because its colonial situation reinforced des-
potism, arbitrariness, inequality, and obscurantism. It is not surprising, then,
that the Societies of Friends not only spread throughout all of Latin America
but also frequently enjoyed a more intense activity there than in Europe.
Contrary to the usual model of cultural transmission in the narrative of
modernity, it is useful to remember, for example, that intellectual and politi-
cal nationalism, one of the clearest consequences of the reformism of the
Enlightenment, developed earlier and in more politically concrete forms in
America than in Europe, where it did not enter the arena of political debate
and conflict until almost a century later, toward the end of the nineteenth
century.
ern, less rational. This helps to explain why the liberal intelligentsia, once
colonial subjugation was ended, could not manage to liberate itself from the
chimera of a modernization of society without a revolution, and why many
intellectuals, often the most brilliant, ended up simply submitting themselves
to the servitude of the new models of power and society that were being
exported from Europe and later the United States. Modernity ceased to be
produced and coproduced from Latin American cultural soil.
"actually existing modernity" were the same thing) and the antimodernism
of a sector of the North American intelligentsia (not a few of whom are also
former leftists) are precisely dedicated to destroying what little remains of
the original association between reason and social liberation.
The postmodernists contend that after nazism and Stalinism, no one
can still believe in the "master narratives" of modernity or its promise of
liberation. The North American antimodernists, for their part, sustain that
these promises were never more than chimeras, and that order and au-
thority are the only expressions of modernity. Both of them propose that the
technology of power is the only aspect of modernity that is worth defending
anymore.
If all efforts for the liberation of men and women from domination,
servitude, social inequality, arbitrary authority, despotism, obscurantism,
and the like, are in vain, if all hopes of achieving the complete realization of
individual faculties and collective joy are chimerical, if they are only some-
thing that history reduced to "master narratives" of impossible aspirations,
then it should be admitted that the promises of modernity are not only not
rational, they are decidedly irrational. The only thing that really remains,
then, is power. The rational thing would be to surrender oneself to it. In this
way, the seduction of power offers itself to us as an alternative to modernity.
The effect of historical reason, that is, of rationality as a project for the
liberation of society, is subjugated to a new and more insidious siege. Social
and political forces equivalent to those that, like nazism and Stalinism, pro-
duced the weakening-in truth, almost the eclipse of historical reason-
emerge again in search of the definitive destruction of all projects to liberate
society from the present holders of power.
This, in essence, is the nature of the present crisis of modernity.
Nevertheless, it would be pointless and, worse, dangerous not to see that it
is not only a matter of the struggle between instrumental reason and histori-
cal reason. If the liberating promises of modern rationality were able to be
marginalized and subordinated to the necessities of power, first under the
hegemony of British and then later North American imperialism, and if the
alternative movements, the heirs and bearers of the promises of modernity,
ended up converting these promises into "actually existing socialism," it is
improbable that all of this should happen only because historical reason
is defended only by the weakest sectors of society. It is more likely that
in the constitution of modern rationality itself in Europe, elements that not
only weakened the liberating force of rationality but also made it possible to
disguise and to substitute this force, have been present from the beginning.
taneity. What in Europe were stages of the history of capital, for example,
here constitute both historical stages of and the present structural grounds
for capital: Forms of the "primitive accumulation," competitive capitalism,
monopoly capitalism before the Second World War, still tied to national im-
perialisms, and transnational capitalism today are all active, manifested in a
pyramid structure of levels of domination rather than stages in a sequence.
But neither could one completely deny their disposition as stages. Time in
this history is simultaneity and sequence at the same time.
It is a question of a different history of time, and of a time differ-
ent from history. This is what a lineal perspective and, worse, a unilineal
perspective of time, or a unidirectional perspective of history (such as the
"master narrative" of the dominant version of European-North American
rationalism), cannot manage to incorporate into its own ways of produc-
ing or giving "reason" meaning within its cognitive matrix. Although we are
always made anxious by the signs of its presence, we have not been able to
completely define or assume our own historical identity as a cognitive matrix
because we have not successfully liberated ourselves from the control of
this rationalism.
For many of us, this was the most genuine meaning of our searches
and confusion during the period of the agitated debates over dependency
theory. It is also true, however, that we were able to get at the question
of our identity only intermittently. It was no accident that it was not a soci-
ologist but a novelist, Gabriel Garcia M&rquez, who, by good fortune or
coincidence, found the road to this revelation, for which he won the Nobel
Prize. For by what mode, if not the aesthetic-mythic, can an account be
given of this simultaneity of all historical times in the same time? And what
but mythic time can be this time of all times? Paradoxically, this strange way
of revealing the untransferable identity of a history proves to be a kind of
rationality, which makes the specificity of that universe intelligible. That is,
in my opinion, what Garcia Marquez basically does in One Hundred Years
of Solitude. And that, without a doubt, is worth a Nobel Prize.
In Latin America, the past runs through the present in a different way
than is pictured in the premodern European imaginary: not, that is, as the
nostalgia for a golden age that is, or was, the continent of innocence. Among
ourselves, the past is, or can be, a personal experience of the present, not
its nostalgic recovery. Our past is not lost innocence but integrated wis-
dom, the unity of the tree of knowledge with the tree of life, that which the
past defends in us as the basis for an alternative rationality against the in-
strumental rationalism that dominates our present. Here, rationality is not a
disenchantment with the world, but rather the intelligibility of its totality. The
real is rational only inasmuch as rationality does not exclude its magic. Juan
Rulfo and Jose Maria Arguedas, in the privileged seats of the heritage of
the original rationality of Latin America, narrated this fact. But the formula
that names this alternative rationality for international consumption, "magi-
cal realism," a contradiction in terms for European rationalism, comes, not
by chance, from Alejo Carpentier, the most intellectual, or if you prefer the
most European, of the Latin American narrators who had the audacity and
the fortune to make (recalling one of his titles) "the trip to the seed," in the
course of which his European intellectual formation was taken to the limit of
all of its tensions and reconstituted from the recognition of what he called a
"marvelous real."
This tensile relation between past and present, simultaneity and se-
quence of historical time, and the note of duality in our sensibility, could
not be explained apart from the history of domination of Latin America
by Europe, the copresence of Latin America in the initial production of
modernity, the split between liberatory and instrumental rationality, and the
eventual hegemony of instrumental rationality.
Because of the uninterrupted reproduction of our dependence in
this history, every time there is a crisis in European rationality and, con-
sequently, in the intersubjective relations between the European and the
Latin American, the process of the sedimentation of our own identity also
enters into crisis, and we once again leave in search of our absent identity.
Today, this problem is more pressing than at other times: While the Creole-
oligarchical culture that appeared after the "metamorphosis" of modernity
has irrevocably lost the social bases of its reproduction and is in advanced
decay, it is not clearly evident yet who will have the subsequent hegemony.
after all, a project for the reconstitution of the historical meaning of society.
The fact that such a project was first lodged in the aesthetic or symbolic-
expressive sphere does nothing other than indicate, as always, that it is
within that sphere that the possible transformations of the historic totality
are prefigured. Is this not what was at issue in the debates of our European
counterparts Lukacs, Adorno, Benjamin, and Brecht before the Second
World War? Was not aesthetic liberation seen as, in effect, the antechamber
of a possible social liberation?
The Latin American utopia as the proposal of an alternative ratio-
nality acquires all of its specificity when it is confronted by what has been
perhaps the crucial question in the present debate about modernity, and
not only in Latin America: the question of the private versus the state (or, as
the current slogan has it, of society versus the state). This question is, in my
opinion, the result of a double process: on the one hand, the clustering of
postmodernists and antimodernists around a kind of neoconservatism that
sings paeans to the seductions of power; on the other hand, the discovery
that the mask and the face, the dream and the reality, were the same in
"actually existing socialism." The result is an offensive based on the en-
chantments of the power of private capital and an unexpected confusion in
the other camp that gradually gives in to these enchantments.
The private versus state question has emerged as the axis around
which not only the problems of the economic crisis are debated but also
those which concern every other instance of social reality. The private is
seen, from a political and cultural point of view, as supportive of liberty and
democracy because nationalization accompanied the despotic organization
of bureaucracy under Stalinism; from the point of view of economic ratio-
nality, the private is celebrated because the bureaucratic sclerosis caused
by nationalization ended up retarding the growth of the economy.
Despotism really exists under Stalinism, but it finds its match in the
operations of the transnational corporations, which are also despotic. It is
true that private capital is the source of the dynamic power and success
of these corporations. Capitalism, as a system capable of producing a
free and prosperous existence for the vast majority of the world's peoples,
and certainly for most of us in Latin America, however, continues to be a
chimera. For the exploited and dominated of the world, this confrontation
between unrestricted capitalist property and absolute state property can-
not be recognized as the only alternative. In truth, it is a trap that ends in
an impasse. Both are faces of the same instrumental reason and lead to
the same frustrations of "modernization" and "populism" in our countries.
Neither proposes anything other than a power always hanging over the vast
multitude of the dominated.
In Latin America, the state sphere has ended up being efficient for
the controllers of the state, the private sphere for the controllers of capi-
tal. Nevertheless, in our experience, there is not only one kind of private
sphere. There is a private sphere that effectively functioned, and functions
today, for the direct producers involved in it, not because it is capitalist but
precisely because it is not. I am thinking, of course, of what Mariategui
pointed to: The experience of the Andean communities before their adapta-
tion to mercantilism shows the possibility of a communal form of the private,
of "civil society," or institutions outside the state. This was what enabled
Arguedas to learn to love in them the joy of collective work, the freedom of
enterprises decided by all, and the effectiveness of reciprocity.
No one should think that I am proposing the return to Andean com-
munalism or to the systems of reciprocity of the ancient agrarian societies
of our continent. Neither will they return, nor would they be able to satisfy
the complex needs of contemporary society if they did. Nor do I mean to
suggest the immediate dissolution of all forms of social power except the un-
coerced association of free citizens that appears in some of the formidable
utopias of the anarchist movement. Instead, what I propose is what Argue-
das shows: that in the very center of Latin American cities, the masses of
the dominated are building new social practices founded on reciprocity, on
an assumption of equality, on collective solidarity, and at the same time on
the freedom of individual choice and on a democracy of collectively made
decisions, against all external impositions.
What is involved in this is a way of rearticulating two cultural heri-
tages: from the original Andean rationality, a sense of reciprocity and soli-
darity; from the original modern rationality, when rationality was still asso-
ciated with social liberation, a sense of individual liberty and of democracy
as a collective decision-making process founded on the free choice of its
constituent individuals. We do not have to remain prisoners of the alter-
native between the private or state forms of capitalism, nor of any of the
faces of instrumental reason. Latin America, because of its peculiar his-
tory, because of its place in the trajectory of modernity, is the most apt
historical territory to produce the articulation of elements that up to now
have been separated: the happiness of collective solidarity; the adventure
of complete individual self-fulfillment. We do not have to renounce either of
these elements because both are part of our heritage.
If one looks at the United States, one finds that the ideology of social