ELECTRONICALLY RECEIVED

3/6/2025 12:28 PM

1 Robert G. Hulteng, Bar No. 071293

[email protected]
2 Blair C. Senesi, Bar No. 313580
[email protected]
3 Kady Poulos, Bar No. 348804
[email protected]
4 LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
101 Second Street
5 Suite 1000
San Francisco, California 94105
6 Telephone: 415.433.1940
Fax No.: 415.399.8490
7
Attorneys for Defendants
8 THE ROMERO INSTITUTE, ET AL.

9
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
10
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ
11
HEIDI HARMON, Case No. 23CV02538
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Plaintiff, [PROPOSED] JUDGMENT
13
v.
14
THE ROMERO INSTITUTE, a California
15 non-profit organization; SARA NELSON; Complaint Filed: October 25, 2023
an individual, and DOES 1-25, inclusive,
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Defendants.
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LITTLER MENDELSON,
P.C.
101 Second Street
Suite 1000 [PROPOSED] JUDGMENT
San Francisco, CA
94105 4912-0294-4804 / 125363.1001
415.433.1940
 1 Following a hearing on February 6, 2025, the Court granted Defendants The Romero

2 Institute and Sara Nelson (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment. A copy of the

3 Court’s Order granting Summary Judgment, entered February 25, 2025, is attached as Exhibit A.

4 Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED that:

5 1. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff Heidi Harmon

6 (“Plaintiff”) with respect to all causes of action.

7 2. All causes of action asserted against Defendants shall be, and hereby are, dismissed

8 with prejudice.

9 3. Plaintiff shall take nothing by way of her Complaint against Defendants.

10 4. Defendants are entitled to costs of suit, to the extent allowed by law.

11 JUDGMENT IS SO ENTERED.

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Dated: _________________, 2025
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HON. TIMOTHY SCHMAL
15 JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
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LITTLER
MENDELSON, P.C. 2.
101 Second Street
Suite 1000 [PROPOSED] JUDGMENT
San Francisco, CA
94105 4912-0294-4804 / 125363.1001
415.433.1940
EXHIBIT A
 ELECTRONICALLY RECEIVED
2/14/2025 11:19 AM

1 Robert G. Hulteng, Bar No. 071293

[email protected]
2 Blair C. Senesi, Bar No. 313580
[email protected]
3 Kady Poulos, Bar No. 348804
[email protected]
4 LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
101 Second Street
5 Suite 1000
San Francisco, California 94105
6 Telephone: 415.433.1940
Fax No.: 415.399.8490
7
Attorneys for Defendants
8 THE ROMERO INSTITUTE, ET AL.

9
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
10
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ
11
HEIDI HARMON, Case No. 23CV02538
12
Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
13 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
v.
14 Date: February 6, 2025
THE ROMERO INSTITUTE, a California Time: 8:30 a.m.
15 non-profit organization; SARA NELSON; Dept: 10
an individual, and DOES 1-25, inclusive,
16 Trial Date: None Set
Defendants. Complaint Filed: October 25, 2023
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LITTLER MENDELSON,
P.C.
101 Second Street
Suite 1000 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
San Francisco, CA
94105 4903-4832-5143
415.433.1940
 1 The Motion by Defendants THE ROMERO INSTITUTE and SARA NELSON

2 (“Defendants”) for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication came on for

3 hearing in Department 10 of this Court at 8:30 a.m. Blair Senesi appeared on behalf of Defendants.

4 Christina Humphrey appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Heidi Harmon.

5 On February 5, 2025, the Court issued a tentative ruling granting the Motion, which the

6 Court now adopts as the Final Order of the Court as follows:

7 Defendants Sara Nelson and the Romero Institute’s (“RI”) motion for summary judgment is

8 granted.

9 Plaintiff filed this action claiming her layoff in early 2023 from RI was retaliatory and not

10 related to its budget woes. Plaintiff filed suit on 10/25/23 alleging retaliation, failure to prevent

11 discrimination, aiding and abetting, wrongful termination, negligent hiring and retention, and

12 defamation. Plaintiff’s attempts to dispute material facts fail, largely because her evidence in support

13 is made up of inadmissible hearsay. The Court finds as a matter of law that (1) there are no disputed

14 material facts establishing a triable issue of fact that plaintiff’s separation from RI was retaliatory,

15 and (2) the single allegedly defamatory statement was privileged and no triable issue of malice is

16 shown.

17 I. DEFENDANT’S MOTION

18 The undisputed facts are as follows: plaintiff, who identifies as white, was hired as a senior

19 public affairs officer in August 2021 by RI, a social justice non-profit with 25 employees. RI runs

20 two wings – Lakota People’s Law Project (LPLP) and Let’s Green CA! (LGCA). Plaintiff worked

21 for LGCA in Santa Cruz and reported to its director, Benjamin Eichert. RI depends largely on

22 donations for its operations. Plaintiff’s team consisted of five members. Defendant Nelson is RI’s

23 Executive Director. (Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”), nos. 1-11, 52,

24 56.)

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LITTLER
MENDELSON, P.C. 2.
101 Second Street
Suite 1000 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
San Francisco, CA
94105 4903-4832-5143
415.433.1940
 1 In April 2022, approximately six months after her hire, plaintiff suggested that RI conduct a

2 Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (“DEI”) training. (UMF 12-18.)1 At the July 2022 Zoom training,

3 Daniel Sheehan (RI’s president and general counsel, and Nelson’s spouse) told a personal story

4 about an instance of racial discrimination he had witnessed years ago, and he twice repeated

5 verbatim the inflammatory words used by a third party which included the n-word. (UMF 19-27.)

6 Nelson recognized and acknowledged in writing that staff in the training were upset; she

7 communicated that Sheehan’s behavior was unacceptable and that RI was initiating an

8 “accountability process” overseen by HR just as it would for any paid employee; Sheehan was

9 disciplined and apologized to staff at another DEI “healing” session in early August 2022. (UMF 28-

10 36.)

11 The day after the “healing” session, plaintiff filed an internal complaint with the LGCA team,

12 HR (Juarez), and the RI board of directors related to Nelson’s and Sheehan’s racialized language in

13 the workplace, and her dissatisfaction with the final DEI “healing” session. In response, RI hired an

14 outside attorney investigator, Daniel Pyne of Hopkins Carley. (UMF 37-40.) Plaintiff met with the

15 investigator for approximately 15 minutes, learned he was not providing his report to anyone but the

16 board of directors, was unhappy with that response, and chose to thereafter not participate in the

17 investigation by answering any further questions. (UMF 41.)

18 Pyne’s report, delivered to the board in November 2022, determined that some racially

19 charged language was used in the workplace by Nelson and Sheehan but that they were not

20 perceived by employees to be bigoted or malicious, and the comments and circumstances were

21 unlikely to be found to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to rise to the level of harassment. The

22 report also found the n-word comment violated RI’s policies and/or others were inconsistent with

23 best practices, even if not violative of RI policies. Finally, the report found staff members had good

24 faith concerns regarding RI’s management, particularly related to Nelson and Sheehan’s control and

25 the board’s perceived inaction. (UMF 42-46.)

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Plaintiff’s response to UMF 12-18 state “disputed” but her evidence only serves to establish that Nelson and
HR manager Karen Juarez allegedly resisted the training, which is immaterial. The undisputed facts establish
28 the training occurred.
LITTLER
MENDELSON, P.C. 3.
101 Second Street
Suite 1000 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
San Francisco, CA
94105 4903-4832-5143
415.433.1940
 1 Within a month of the report issuance to the board, HR (Juarez) emailed plaintiff and assured

2 her that there would be no retaliation for her complaints filed previously or in the future. That same

3 day, the interim board chair issued an all-staff email summarizing the report and affirming there

4 would be no retaliation for complaints. Juarez invited plaintiff to contact her if plaintiff felt

5 retaliation, which plaintiff never did. (UMF 48-51.)

6 As to RI’s funding problems, defendants’ admissible evidence – a balance sheet for 2022 –

7 establishes that plaintiff’s team, the LGCA, earned $61,424 in revenue and spent $986,206. That

8 balance sheet also establishes that RI had a loss of $1,611,724 in 2022, as opposed to the prior year

9 when it hired plaintiff, which showed a profit of $1,318,727. In November 2022, RI laid off two

10 employees, Lorrie King and Earth Mobley, due to funding constraints. (UMF 53-55.) When a $1

11 million donation pledge did not come through in early 2023, RI/LGCA determined that further lay

12 offs were necessary. On February 10, 2023, four people were laid off and positions eliminated –

13 plaintiff, two other staff members, and one contractor. (UMF 56-61.) Those positions have not been

14 replaced. LGCA’s director and plaintiff’s boss, Eichert, quit RI in September 2023 due to RI’s

15 funding struggles. (UMF 65-66.) Plaintiff admitted she did not know who made the lay-off decision,

16 did not believe Eichert retaliated against her, and did not have any knowledge of the organization’s

17 finances. (UMF 67.)

18 Notably, as to the facts related to RI’s financial stress, plaintiff put forth inadmissible

19 evidence from her former co-workers King, Conway and Little Horn. Their declarations are based on

20 hearsay and lack foundation; see the Court’s evidentiary rulings below. (UMF 54, 55, 57, 58.)

21 II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

22 In a summary judgment motion, the court must determine from the evidence presented that

23 “there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

24 matter of law….” (CCP §437c(c).) In making this determination, the court may rely on “affidavits,

25 declarations … and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken.” (CCP §437c(b).) The

26 plaintiff “may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable

27 issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue

28 of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP §437c(p)(2).)
LITTLER
MENDELSON, P.C. 4.
101 Second Street
Suite 1000 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
San Francisco, CA
94105 4903-4832-5143
415.433.1940
 1 The court’s sole function on a motion for summary judgment is issue-finding, not issue

2 determination. To be material, the fact must relate to some claim or defense in issue under the

3 pleadings and be in some way essential to the judgment; if proved, it could change the outcome of

4 the case. “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a

5 reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in

6 accordance with the applicable standard of proof…” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25

7 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If there is a single such issue, the motion must be denied. (Versa Tech., Inc. v.

8 Superior Court (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 237, 240.)

9 Defendants moving for summary judgment bear the burden of persuasion that one or more

10 elements of the cause of action in question cannot be established or that there is a complete defense

11 thereto. In general, a moving defendant must present evidence that, if uncontradicted, “would

12 constitute a preponderance of evidence that an essential element of the plaintiff’s case cannot be

13 established….” (Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 879.) If defendant fails to

14 meet this burden, its motion must be denied and plaintiff need not make any showing at all.

15 Defendant can show that an essential element of plaintiff’s claim cannot be established by presenting

16 evidence (discovery responses, deposition testimony, etc.) that plaintiff does not possess and cannot

17 reasonably obtain needed evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891; Aguilar v.

18 Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at 855, fn. 23.)

19 A. Burdens in employment cases

20 In employment discrimination or retaliation cases, “[a]n employer defendant may meet its

21 initial burden on summary judgment, and require the employee plaintiff to present evidence

22 establishing a triable issue of material fact, by presenting evidence that either negates an element of

23 the employee’s prima facie case, or establishes a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for taking the

24 adverse employment action against the employee.” (Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist.

25 (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954, 966.) Once the defendant does so, the plaintiff “need only present

26 evidence establishing a triable issue on the specific element the [defendant] challenges.” (Id. at 968.)

27 Each material fact must have a citation to supporting evidence. (CCP §437c(b)(1).) If a

28 triable issue is raised as to any of the facts in the separate statement, the motion may be denied.
LITTLER
MENDELSON, P.C. 5.
101 Second Street
Suite 1000 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
San Francisco, CA
94105 4903-4832-5143
415.433.1940
 1 (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252.) Opposition declarations are to be

2 liberally construed while the moving party’s evidence is strictly scrutinized. (Saelzler v. Advanced

3 Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.)

4 Plaintiff complains that defendant’s separate statement is improperly formatted as to Issues 2

5 (failure to prevent discrimination), 3 (wrongful termination), 6 (defamation), 5 (aiding and abetting),

6 and 7 (punitive damages), and the first fact in Issue 4 (negligent hiring), since each fact is not

7 separately stated. However, since the Court finds that there is no material disputed fact as to

8 retaliation – that plaintiff’s separation was not due to retaliation – the format of the separate

9 statement as to Issues 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 is immaterial. As for Issue 6, the parties overcome any

10 technical deficiency of the separate statement by adequately addressing the single defamatory

11 statement in their pleadings.

12 III. DISCUSSION

13 A. Plaintiff fails to show pretext

14 The elements of retaliation under FEHA are “(1) the employee’s engagement in a protected

15 activity …; (2) retaliatory animus on the part of the employer; (3) an adverse action by the employer;

16 (4) a causal link between the retaliatory animus and the adverse action; (5) damages; and (6)

17 causation. [Citation.]” (Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1092,

18 1105.) “The causal link may be established by an inference derived from circumstantial evidence,

19 such as the employer’s knowledge that the [employee] engaged in protected activities and the

20 proximity in time between the protected action and allegedly retaliatory employment decision.

21 [Citations.]” (Morgan v. Regents of University of Cal. (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69.) All of

22 plaintiff’s employment related claims (causes of action 1 through 5) are predicated on retaliation.

23 (Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 229 [where discrimination claim fails,

24 companion claim for wrongful termination also fail].)

25 If the employer produced evidence demonstrating the existence of a legitimate reason for the

26 adverse employment action, the burden shifts to the employee to provide substantial responsive

27 evidence that the employer’s proffered reasons were untrue or pretextual. (Bareno v. San Diego

28 Comm. College Dist. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 546, 560.) “Pretext may ... be inferred from the timing of
LITTLER
MENDELSON, P.C. 6.
101 Second Street
Suite 1000 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
San Francisco, CA
94105 4903-4832-5143
415.433.1940
 1 the company’s termination decision, by the identity of the person making the decision, and by the

2 terminated employee’s job performance before termination.” (Flait v. North American Watch Corp.

3 (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 479.)

4 As described above, defendants provide undisputed evidence of RI’s financial distress,

5 shifting the burden to plaintiff to show pretext. Plaintiff attempts to do so by presenting evidence

6 that Executive Director Nelson ultimately approved the lay off process and made a retaliatory

7 statement (UMF 62, 64) and that her lay off was in close proximity to her complaint (six months

8 later). “Although temporal proximity, by itself, may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of

9 discrimination or retaliation, it does not create a triable fact as to pretext once the employer has

10 offered evidence of a legitimate, nonprohibited reason for its action.” (Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc.

11 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 334.)

12 First, the single statement offered by plaintiff to support retaliation – Nelson’s comment to

13 all employees in the August 2022 training session to the effect that those that were unhappy could

14 leave – occurred prior to plaintiff’s complaint and therefore cannot form the basis of retaliation.

15 (UMF 36-37, 62.) Second, plaintiff’s evidence also fails to dispute that Eichert made the decision of

16 who to lay off; her evidence that Nelson mentioned that another program director (Danny Paul

17 Nelson) was involved in determining the breadth of the cuts does not alter who the decision maker

18 was. She admitted that Eichert, the decision maker, did not retaliate against her and that she was laid

19 off along with two other staffers and a consultant. (UMF 61, 64, 67.) Finally, plaintiff’s evidence of

20 ill will by Nelson and other managers as described in her supporting declarations of Little Horn,

21 Conway and King are largely inadmissible.

22 B. Defamation fails as a matter of law

23 Plaintiff must prove the following elements for defamation: (a) a publication that is (b) false,
24 (c) defamatory, (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special
25 damage. (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1259; Civil Code §§ 45, 46.) A
26 published and provably false statement that is subject to a qualified privilege is not defamatory.
27 (Civil Code § 47(c); Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 723, fn. 7 [clarifying
28
LITTLER
MENDELSON, P.C. 7.
101 Second Street
Suite 1000 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
San Francisco, CA
94105 4903-4832-5143
415.433.1940
 1 that if the occasion giving rise to the publication is privileged, the privilege is a complete defense to

2 defamation].)

3 A privileged publication or broadcast is one made in a communication, without malice, to a

4 person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a

5 relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the

6 communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the

7 information. (Civil Code § 47(c).) If malice is shown, the privilege does not arise in the first

8 instance. (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 914-915, citing Brown v. Kelly

9 Broadcasting Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d at 723, fn. 7.) The common interest privilege historically

10 “protected communications made in good faith on a subject in which the speaker and hearer shared

11 an interest or duty.” (Kashian v. Harriman, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at 914.) “Communications made

12 in a commercial setting relating to the conduct of an employee have been held to fall squarely within

13 the qualified privilege for communications to interested persons.” (Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club

14 (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 949.)

15 Plaintiff alleges a single defamatory statement in her complaint: “The [investigation]

16 summary also reveals that Ms. Nelson falsely informed Pyne that Plaintiff asked for the DEI training

17 because of inappropriate, racist language that Plaintiff had used.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 48, 104.) The

18 investigation report itself states the following: “In 2022, Ms. Harmon suggested that the Romero

19 Institute provide training on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) issues to its staff. Ms. Harmon

20 told Sara Nelson that she thought training would be useful because Ms. Harmon had used vocabulary

21 inappropriately in a discussion regarding environmental justice.” (Juarez Dec., Ex. B, p. 2.) Based on

22 plaintiff’s evidence it appears that statement was made by Nelson to the investigator during the

23 investigation. (Plaintiff’s Ex. I, Pyne Deposition at 62:17-63:15 [investigator describing his

24 investigation notes].) The memo to staff summarizing the investigation and findings did not include

25 the alleged defamatory statement and while that memo notes an attached summary, neither party

26 included it in the court record.

27 Therefore, the Court finds the single statement from Nelson to the investigator is protected

28 by the common interest privilege. Nelson offered the statement during the investigation as a means
LITTLER
MENDELSON, P.C. 8.
101 Second Street
Suite 1000 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
San Francisco, CA
94105 4903-4832-5143
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 1 of explaining how the DEI training came about; it was made by the employer to the internal

2 investigator – two individuals communicating about the conduct of an employee who clearly had a

3 common interest in that setting.

4 Next, the privilege will fail if there is evidence of malice, which is shown by evidence the

5 publication was motivated by hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff or by a showing that the

6 defendant lacked reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of the publication and therefore acted in

7 reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights. (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 721.) Here, plaintiff

8 fails to offer admissible evidence of malice or that Nelson acted with reckless disregard. Plaintiff

9 claims Nelson admits the statement was false, but Nelson’s testimony establishes she was referring

10 to another person, not plaintiff, for the statement. That is entirely different than admitting the

11 statement to be false. (IMF 47.) Plaintiff’s other evidence of Nelson’s ill will is inadmissible since it

12 is supported entirely by the hearsay declaration of Shaun Little Horn. (Opposition at 21-22.)

13 Since the single statement is protected by the common interest privilege and plaintiff fails to

14 show any triable facts of malice, her defamation claim fails as a matter of law.

15 C. Punitive damages

16 As the Court has ruled there are no triable issues of fact related to retaliation and the

17 derivative causes of action, or defamation, plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages also fails.

18 IV. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

19 Defendants’ objections to plaintiff’s evidence:

20 1. Plaintiff’s Exhibit C, Little Horn Declaration, ¶ 4: Sustained, hearsay.

21 2. Plaintiff’s Ex. C, Little Horn Decl., ¶ 4: Sustained, improper opinion, speculation, lacks

22 foundation.

23 3. Plaintiff’s Ex. C, Little Horn Decl., ¶ 6: Sustained, hearsay.

24 4. Plaintiff’s Ex. C, Little Horn Decl., ¶ 7: Sustained, hearsay.

25 5. Plaintiff’s Ex. C, Little Horn Decl., ¶ 8: Sustained, hearsay.

26 6. Plaintiff’s Ex. C, Little Horn Decl., ¶ 9: Sustained, improper opinion.

27 7. Plaintiff’s Ex. C, Little Horn Decl., ¶¶ 10-13: Sustained, hearsay, improper opinion.

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LITTLER
MENDELSON, P.C. 9.
101 Second Street
Suite 1000 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
San Francisco, CA
94105 4903-4832-5143
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 1 8. Plaintiff’s Ex. C, Little Horn Decl., ¶ 14: Sustained, lacks foundation, improper opinion,

2 hearsay.

3 9. Plaintiff’s Ex. D, Conway Decl., ¶¶ 3, 6-7, 9, 10, 11, 14: Sustained, improper opinion,

4 hearsay.

5 10. Plaintiff’s Ex. D, Conway Decl., ¶ 4: Sustained, improper opinion, lacks foundation.

6 11. Plaintiff’s Ex. D, Conway Decl., ¶ 5: Overruled as to Conway’s statement; Ms. Belknap’s

7 purported statements are hearsay and inadmissible.

8 12. Plaintiff’s Ex. D, Conway Decl., ¶ 6: Sustained, improper opinion, lacks foundation.

9 13. Plaintiff’s Ex. D, Conway Decl., ¶ 7: Sustained, improper opinion.

10 14. Plaintiff’s Ex. D, Conway Decl., ¶ 8: Sustained, lacks foundation, hearsay.

11 15. Plaintiff’s Ex. D, Conway Decl., ¶ 9: Sustained, lacks foundation, improper opinion.

12 16. Plaintiff’s Ex. D, Conway Decl., ¶ 10: Sustained, improper opinion.

13 17. Plaintiff’s Ex. D, Conway Decl., ¶ 11: Sustained, lacks foundation, hearsay.

14 18. Plaintiff’s Ex. D, Conway Decl., ¶ 13: Sustained, lacks foundation, hearsay.

15 19. Plaintiff’s Ex. D, Conway Decl., ¶ 14: Overruled.

16 20. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶¶ 4-6: Sustained, relevance, hearsay as to statements

17 purportedly made by Daniel Paul Nelson.

18 21. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 8: Sustained, lacks foundation, improper opinion.

19 22. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 9: Sustained, lacks foundation, hearsay.

20 23. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 10: Sustained, lacks foundation, relevance.

21 24. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 11: Sustained, lacks foundation, relevance, improper opinion.

22 25. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 12: Sustained, lacks foundation, improper opinion.

23 26. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 13: Sustained, lacks foundation, improper opinion, relevance.

24 27. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 14: Sustained, lacks foundation, improper opinion, hearsay.

25 28. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 15: Sustained, lacks foundation, improper opinion.

26 29. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 16: Sustained, lacks foundation, improper opinion, hearsay.

27 30. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 17: Sustained, hearsay.

28 31. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 18: Sustained, hearsay.

LITTLER
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101 Second Street
Suite 1000 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
San Francisco, CA
94105 4903-4832-5143
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 1 32. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 20: Sustained, hearsay.

2 33. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 21: Sustained, lacks foundation, improper opinion.

3 34. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 22: Sustained, hearsay, improper opinion.

4 35. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶ 23: Sustained, lacks foundation, improper opinion.

5 36. Plaintiff’s Ex. E, King Decl., ¶¶ 3, 18, 21, 23: Sustained, hearsay, relevance, improper

6 opinion.

8 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: _________________, 2025
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HON. TIMOTHY SCHMAL
12 JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
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LITTLER
MENDELSON, P.C. 11.
101 Second Street
Suite 1000 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
San Francisco, CA
94105 4903-4832-5143
415.433.1940