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UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000028
FBI-HJC119-CH-000029
FBI-HJC119-CH-000030
FBI-HJC119-CH-000031
Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence
and a working copy is in the share drive where we have historically kept CROWN reporting, the folder labeled Rome
Reporting, sub folder Simpson 121216. A cursory look at the files appears they are indeed CROWN reports. Please
review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets start up again
tomorrow.

Thanks,

Joe

SSA Joe Pientka III

CI-1 Washington Field Office
(NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)

(SIPR)
(SCION)
Cell - (Unavail during work hours)

Desk
STE
- ((call desk first))

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

4
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FBI-HJC119-CH-000032
 ZKtEƌĞƉŽƌƚƚƌĂĐŬŝŶŐDĂƚƌŝdž

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^ŝŵƉƐŽŶĨŝůĞĚĂƚĞΎсƚŚĞĚĂƚĞŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶƚŚƵŵďĚƌŝǀĞĨŝůĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌLJĂƐΗĚĂƚĞŵŽĚŝĨŝĞĚΗ
ϵϳΎĂŶĚϭϭϮΎͲƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƌĞĐĞŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ͕ƚŚĞ&/ŽŶůLJŚĂĚƌĞĚĂĐƚĞĚǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƚŽŽƌŶ͘

Senate HSGAC_TransitionReq_Fusion GPS Docs - FBI000015 - DOJ Review

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000034
FBI-HJC119-CH-000035
FBI-HJC119-CH-000036
FBI-HJC119-CH-000037
Joe

SSA Joe Pientka III

CI-1 Washington Field Office
(NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)

(SIPR)
(SCION)
Cell - (Unavail during work hours)

Desk
STE
NSTS - ((call desk first))

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

5
Senate HSGAC_TransitionReq_Fusion GPS Docs - FBI000020 - DOJ Review
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Image not available for this document, ID: 0.7.5133.211241 000001

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 COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/113

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION- REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE TRUMP’S

PRIOR ACTIVITIES IN ST PETERSBURG

Summary

- Two knowledgeable St Petersburg sources claim Republican candidate

TRUMP has paid bribes and engaged in sexual activities there but key
witnesses silenced and evidence hard to obtain

- Both believe Azeri business associate of TRUMP, Araz AGALAROV will

know the details

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in September 2016, two well-placed

sources based in St Petersburg, one in the political/business elite and the
other involved in the local services and tourist industry, commented on
Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP’s prior activities in
the city.

2. Both knew TRUMP had visited St Petersburg on several occasions in the

past and had been interested in doing business deals there involving real
estate. The local business/political elite figure reported that TRUMP had
paid bribes there to further his interests but very discreetly and only
through affiliated companies, making it very hard to prove. The local
services industry source reported that TRUMP had participated in sex
parties in the city too, but that all direct witnesses to this recently had
been “silenced” i.e. bribed or coerced to disappear.

3. The two St Petersburg figures cited believed an Azeri business figure,

Araz AGALAROV (with offices in Baku and London) had been closely
involved with TRUMP in Russia and would know most of the details of
what the Republican presidential candidate had got up to there.

14 September 2016

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 COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/086

RUSSIA/CYBER CRIME: A SYNOPSIS OF RUSSIAN STATE SPONSORED AND

OTHER CYBER OFFENSIVE (CRIMINAL) OPERATIONS

Summary

- Russia has extensive programme of state-sponsored offensive cyber

operations. External targets include foreign governments and big
corporations, especially banks. FSB leads on cyber within Russian
apparatus. Limited success in attacking top foreign targets like G7
governments, security services and IFIs but much more on second tier
ones through IT back doors, using corporate and other visitors to Russia

- FSB often uses coercion and blackmail to recruit most capable cyber
operatives in Russia into its state-sponsored programmes. Heavy use also,
both wittingly and unwittingly, of CIS emigres working in western
corporations and ethnic Russians employed by neighbouring
governments e.g. Latvia

- Example cited of successful Russian cyber operation targeting senior

Western business visitor. Provided back door into important Western
institutions.

- Example given of US citizen of Russian origin approached by FSB and

offered incentive of “investment” in his business when visiting Moscow.

- Problems however for Russian authorities themselves in countering local

hackers and cyber criminals, operating outside state control. Central Bank
claims there were over 20 serious attacks on correspondent accounts
held by CBR in 2015, comprising Roubles several billion in fraud

- Some details given of leading non-state Russian cyber criminal groups

Details

1. Speaking in June 2016, a number of Russian figures with a detailed

knowledge of national cyber crime, both state-sponsored and otherwise,
outlined the current situation in this area. A former senior intelligence
officer divided Russian state-sponsored offensive cyber operations into
four categories (in order of priority):- targeting foreign, especially

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 western governments; penetrating leading foreign business corporations,
especially banks; domestic monitoring of the elite; and attacking political
opponents both at home and abroad. The former intelligence officer
reported that the Federal Security Service (FSB) was the lead
organization within the Russian state apparatus for cyber operations.

2. In terms of the success of Russian offensive cyber operations to date, a

senior government figure reported that there had been only limited
success in penetrating the “first tier” foreign targets. These comprised
western (especially G7 and NATO) governments, security and intelligence
services and central banks, and the IFIs. To compensate for this shortfall,
massive effort had been invested, with much greater success, in attacking
the “secondary targets”, particularly western private banks and the
governments of smaller states allied to the West. S/he mentioned Latvia
in this regard. Hundreds of agents, either consciously cooperating with
the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been
unwittingly compromised, were recruited. Many were people who had
ethnic and family ties to Russia and/or had been incentivized financially
to cooperate. Such people often would receive monetary inducements or
contractual favours from the Russian state or its agents in return. This
had created difficulties for parts of the Russian state apparatus in
obliging/indulging them e.g. the Central Bank of Russia knowingly having
to cover up for such agents’ money laundering operations through the
Russian financial system.

3. In terms of the FSB’s recruitment of capable cyber operatives to carry out

its, ideally deniable, offensive cyber operations, a Russian IT specialist
with direct knowledge reported in June 2016 that this was often done
using coercion and blackmail. In terms of ‘foreign’ agents, the FSB was
approaching US citizens of Russian (Jewish) origin on business trips to
Russia. In one case a US citizen of Russian ethnicity had been visiting
Moscow to attract investors in his new information technology program.
The FSB clearly knew this and had offered to provide seed capital to this
person in return for them being able to access and modify his IP, with a
view to targeting priority foreign targets by planting a Trojan virus in the
software. The US visitor was told this was common practice. The FSB also
had implied significant operational success as a result of installing cheap
Russian IT games containing their own malware unwittingly by targets
on their PCs and other platforms.

4. In a more advanced and successful FSB operation, an IT operator inside a

leading Russian SOE, who previously had been employed on conventional
(defensive) IT work there, had been under instruction for the last year to
conduct an offensive cyber operation against a foreign director of the
company. Although the latter was apparently an infrequent visitor to
Russia, the FSB now successfully had penetrated his personal IT and
through this had managed to access various important institutions in the
West through the back door.

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 5. In terms of other technical IT platforms, an FSB cyber operative flagged
up the ‘Telegram’ enciphered commercial system as having been of
especial concern and therefore heavily targeted by the FSB, not least
because it was used frequently by Russian internal political activists and
oppositionists. His/her understanding was that the FSB now successfully
had cracked this communications software and therefore it was no longer
secure to use.

6. The senior Russian government figure cited above also reported that
non-state sponsored cyber crime was becoming an increasing problem
inside Russia for the government and authorities there. The Central Bank
of Russia claimed that in 2015 alone there had been more than 20
attempts at serious cyber embezzlement of money from corresponding
accounts held there, comprising several billions Roubles. More generally,
s/he understood there were circa 15 major organised crime groups in the
country involved in cyber crime, all of which continued to operate largely
outside state and FSB control. These included the so-called ‘Anunak’,
‘Buktrap’ and ‘Metel’ organisations.

26 July 2015

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000044
FBI-HJC119-CH-000045
FBI-HJC119-CH-000046
FBI-HJC119-CH-000047
Classification:

Classified By:
Derived From:
Declassify On:
======================================================

Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence
and a working copy is in the share drive where we have historically kept CROWN reporting, the folder labeled Rome
Reporting, sub folder Simpson 121216. A cursory look at the files appears they are indeed CROWN reports. Please
review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets start up again
tomorrow.

Thanks,

Joe

SSA Joe Pientka III

CI-1 Washington Field Office
(NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)

(SIPR)
(SCION)
Cell - (Unavail during work hours)

Desk
STE
NSTS - ((call desk first))

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

5
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FBI-HJC119-CH-000048
Please pass the following - received today - to David Kramer.

BEGINS

Speaking on November 29 2016, a senior official working at the Russian MFA reported that a
rumour is currently circulating there that US President-elect TRUMP’s delay in appointing a
new Secretary of State is the result of an intervention by President PUTIN/the Kremlin. The
latter reportedly have asked that TRUMP appoint a Russia-friendly figure to this position,
who was prepared to move quickly on lifting Ukraine-related sanctions and cooperation
(“security”) in Syria.

The source assumes the Kremlin’s reported intervention was in response to the possibility
that Mitt ROMNEY, viewed as hostile to Russia, might be appointed Secretary of State.

ENDS

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From: (CD) (FB >
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:05 PM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Cc: (CD) (FBI (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN

Classification:
Classified By:
Derived From:
Declassify On:
======================================================

Thanks! I will take a look today. FYI I have a doctor’s appointment tomorrow morning and will be in later around 11.

Intelligence Analyst
C | JEH 5045

_____________________________________________
From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:04 PM
To: GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI); AUTEN,
BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI);
(WF) (FBI) (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH,
KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Latest CROWN --

Classification:
Classified By:
Derived From:
Declassify On:
======================================================

Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence
and a working copy is in the share drive where we have historically kept CROWN reporting, the folder labeled Rome
Reporting, sub folder Simpson 121216. A cursory look at the files appears they are indeed CROWN reports. Please
review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets start up again
tomorrow.

Thanks,

Joe
Senate HSGAC_TransitionReq_Fusion GPS Docs - FBI000032 - DOJ Review
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FBI-HJC119-CH-000050
FBI-HJC119-CH-000051
From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 8:16 AM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Cc: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Mikhail Fridman ??? UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
======================================================

Brian will have more background, but I got this from Bruce Ohr on Monday following his breakfast on Saturday with
Simpson:

) The New York Times story from October 3, 2016, that downplayed the connection between Alfa Bank
servers and the Trump campaign was incorrect. There was communication and it wasn't spam. Mikhail Fridman lied in
the written statement that he gave to the New York Times and Washington Post. Fridman claimed he never met Trump,
however there are pictures to the contrary.

I’ll get with Brian and check the story to see relevance to us.

Joe

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 6:34 PM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Cc: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Mikhail Fridman - ??? --- UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
======================================================

From: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2016 1:34 PM
To: BOONE, JENNIFER C. (CD) (FBI); VARACALLI, MICHAEL F. (CD) (FBI); DENNEHY, JAMES E. (CD) (FBI)
)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Mikhail Fridman - ??? --- UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
======================================================

We can check but sounds like an oligarch.

From: BOONE, JENNIFER C. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Monday, December 05, 2016 5:47 PM
Senate HSGAC_TransitionReq_Fusion GPS Docs - FBI000034 - DOJ Review
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FBI-HJC119-CH-000053
======================================================
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000055
======================================================
Classification:

======================================================
Classification:

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 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1023 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 08/02/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING
Date of Contact: 07/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
NA
Type of Contact: Telephonic

Date of Report: 08/02/2016

Substantive Case File Number

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No
Source Reporting:
CHS revised CHS' original reporting (provided 07/05/2016) CHS STEELE report dated 07/07/2016 regarding
Russian cuber efforts. Guillermo QUINTERO, a member of the ROSNEFT board of directors, is not Italian. He is
from South America and is believed to be Argentinian.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By

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UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000057
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1023 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 07/29/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING
Date of Contact: 07/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
NA
Type of Contact: e-Mail

Date of Report: 07/29/2016

Substantive Case File Number

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No
Source Reporting:
CHS STEE provided the following information, obtained from sub-sources, regarding the murder of former
Russian Media Minister, Mikhail LESIN: Prior to his death in Washington DC in November 2015, LESIN had been in
a dispute with relatives and associates of Yuri KOVALCHUK, a Russian oligarch close to Vladimir PUTIN, regarding
the control of Russian media company, NATIONAL MEDIA GROUP (NMG). LESIN had succeeded in having
KOVALCHUK's nephew, Kirill KOVALCHUK, removed from the NMG board of directors. LESIN was asserting power
and influence and attempting to blackmail Alina KABAEVA, an associate of Kirill KOVALCHUK at NMG and former
PUTIN mistress. KABAEVA went to Yuri KOVALCHUK, who decided to "move against" LESIN. LESIN "fled" to the
U.S., staying at a hotel in the Dupont Circle area of Washington D.C. LESIN tried to reach out to various Russian
business associates and U.S. authorities without success. LESIN was approached by a "representative" of Yuri
KOVALCHUK on the evening of November 4, 2015. The two agreed to meet privately in LESIN's room on the 9th
floor, where LESIN was later found dead.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By

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UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000058
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FD-1023 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 11/17/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING
Date of Contact: 11/01/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta
Type of Contact: Telephonic

Date of Report: 11/17/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No
Source Reporting:
On October 31, 2016, the online magazine Mother Jones published the following article written by David Corn: "A
Veteran Spy Has Given the FBI Information Alleging a Russian Operation to Cultivate Donald Trump." The article
sources a "former Western Intelligence officer" as providing memos to the FBI regarding Donald Trump's
interactions with Russia. On November 1, 2016, the handling agent directly asked the CHS if the CHS spoke to the
reporter in question. The CHS responded "yes I did." The CHS added that the CHS was "concerned about the
behavior of [the FBI]" and was "troubled by the actions of [the FBI] last Friday." The CHS stated that the FBI owed
the CHS a payment for services, however, the CHS stated "the payment was a secondary issue."

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By

FD-1023 Page 1 of 1 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000059
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER
Source ID: STEELE
Date: 05/04/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Phone Number:

Payee Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Payment Name: Crown

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of
the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount
spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.
CHS was opened/re-opened on: 10/30/2013

Aggregate Total Paid: $74,000.00

Total Paid since re-open (if needed): $0.00

Total Paid in Current FY: $0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses? No

Is the CHS expected to testify? No

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs
associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding
per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC
approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not
be entered here.
Operationally justified. Expense payment for CHS for costs associated with sub-source endeavoring to set up
meetings between WMDD and individual with information. Per IOD, original request for 5500 was cancelled and the
instant request is being submitted.

The total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since
2013, the CHS has been paid $74,000 in service payments. Another request for $15,000 in
service payments is in the system.

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000060
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PAYMENT REQUEST
The Attorney General’s Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a
CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary
circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI
Agent to be the payer and only witness.
Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this No
payment?

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 06/30/2015 End: 11/30/2016

Payment Request Amount

Substantive Case File Number Financial Program Financial Subprogram

Payment Description Expense Incurred By Payment Amount

Other Miscellaneous CHS Expense $1,500.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

The total aggregate payment threshold HAS NOT been met NOR exceeded. The CHS has not been paid any
payments in this fiscal year. Moreover, the CHS has received a total of $74000 since being opened in 2013. This
DOES NOT reach the threshold. As such this is incorrectly noted above and no additional authority is required.

Warning: You have exceeded the aggregate threshold. It is recommended that you submit your request for
additional authority to your appropriate FIMU.

Total CHS Services: $0.00

Total CHS Expenses: $1,500.00

Total Agent Expenses: $0.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

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UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000061
FBI-HJC119-CH-000062
FBI-HJC119-CH-000063
FBI-HJC119-CH-000064
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER
Source ID: STEELE
Date: 07/21/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Phone Number:

Payee Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Payment Name: Crown

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of
the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount
spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.
CHS was opened/re-opened on: 10/30/2013

Aggregate Total Paid: $74,000.00

Total Paid since re-open (if needed): $0.00

Total Paid in Current FY: $0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses? No

Is the CHS expected to testify? No

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs
associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding
per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC
approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not
be entered here.
Operationally justified. Service payment for CHS endeavoring with sub source(s) to respond to significant taskings
from CyD and CID. As has been the case for all prior requests, despite efforts to rectify within DELTA, the total
aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been
paid $89,000 in service payments. Additionally, as incorrectly noted in the form the "aggregate threshold" HAS NOT
been exceed. Despite numerous efforts to change this within DELTA, it incorrectly remains.

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000065
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FBI-HJC119-CH-000067
FBI-HJC119-CH-000068
FBI-HJC119-CH-000069
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER
Source ID: STEELE
Date: 09/29/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Phone Number:

Payee Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Payment Name: Crown

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of
the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount
spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.
CHS was opened/re-opened on: 10/30/2013

Aggregate Total Paid: $74,000.00

Total Paid since re-open (if needed): $0.00

Total Paid in Current FY: $0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses? No

Is the CHS expected to testify? No

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs
associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding
per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC
approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not
be entered here.
NA
The Attorney General’s Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a
CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary
circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI
Agent to be the payer and only witness.

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000070
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST
Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this No
payment?

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 06/02/2016 End: 07/30/2016

Payment Request Amount

Substantive Case File Number Financial Program Financial Subprogram

Payment Description Expense Incurred By Payment Amount

CHS Services CHS Service $7,500.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

Source has provided intelligence regarding the murder of a Russian citizen in Washington DC that ties back to
Russian OC members close to government officials in Russia. CHS has also provided significant cyber intrusion
efforts by Russian government officials and private sector (energy) principals against western entities. CHS has also
provided significant intelligence regarding criminal espionage efforts between entities in the US and Russia. This
intelligence will be the subject of an additional request prepared by CD elements at a later date.

Total CHS Services: $7,500.00

Total CHS Expenses: $0.00

Total Agent Expenses: $0.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000071
FBI-HJC119-CH-000072
FBI-HJC119-CH-000073
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER
Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/18/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Phone Number:

Payee Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Payment Name: Crown

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of
the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount
spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.
CHS was opened/re-opened on: 10/30/2013

Aggregate Total Paid: $74,000.00

Total Paid since re-open (if needed): $0.00

Total Paid in Current FY: $0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses? No

Is the CHS expected to testify? No

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs
associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding
per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC
approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not
be entered here.
$15,000 service payment initiated by Counterintelligence Division for information from July 5, 2016 to October 3,
2016, to include CHS meeting with CD representatives in Rome on October 3, 2016.
The Attorney General’s Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a
CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary
circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI
Agent to be the payer and only witness.

FD-794b Page 1 of 2 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000074
FBI-HJC119-CH-000075
FBI-HJC119-CH-000076
FBI-HJC119-CH-000077
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1023 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 07/07/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING
Date of Contact: 07/05/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta
Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED KINGDOM

City: London

Date of Report: 07/07/2016

Substantive Case File Number

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No
Source Reporting:
On July 5, 2016, CHS provided the following information:

Insiders at the Kremlin are very concerned about the current FBI criminal investigation into the Russian athletics
doping scandal. Head of the Presidental Administration, Sergei IVANOV, referred to whistleblower, Grigoriy
RODCHINKOV, as a "perebezhchik" (defector), who had access to highly sensitive information on Russian doping
activities. A Kremlin lawyer stated that the IVANOV and PUTIN were very concerned about the investigation. A
Russian public relations consultant with close ties to U.S. firm, KETCHUM, was instructed by the Kremlin to launch
a discreet PR counter offensive against RODCHINKOV, the USG, IAAF and IOC, to discredit each.

In June 2016, Russian oligarch and close PUTIN associate, Gennady TIMCHENKO, discussed rumors surrounding
the recent deaths of former heads of the Russian Anti-Doping Agency, Vyachslav SINYEV and FNU KAMAYEV.
TIMCHENKO is also worried about the criminal investigation. He stated that SINYEV died of natural causes in
February 2016. However, TIMCHENKO stated that KAMAYEV had died "like Paul I (Tsar)," who was brutally
murdered but presented as having had a sudden medical problem. TIMCHENKO implied that KAMAYEV had been
murdered on the Kremlin's orders in order to prevent him from speaking about the Russian state sponsored doping
efforts. This also served to terrify Russian sport insiders.

In June 2016, Russian olympian, Yelena ISINBAYEVA, stated that she had been paid $100,000 by the Kremlin to
lobby against the ban on Russian atheletes at the Rio Olympics. ISINBAYEVA put her name to an op-ed piece
published in the New York Times on June 15, 2016. Former Russian Athletics Federation head, Valentin
BLAKNICHEV, stated that he had been bribed by the Russian Ministry of Sport to cover up various doping cases, to
include the one against Olympic gymnast, Alina KABAEVA. KABAEVA, who became Putin's mistress, had been
trained by Irina Viner, Alishir's USMANOV's wife. The bribe to KABAEVA allowed her to "lie low" and then return to
compete internationally at the highest levels.

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000078
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1023 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

FD-1023 Page 2 of 2 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000079
FBI-HJC119-CH-000080
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1023 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No
Source Reporting:
On July 5, 2016, CHS provided the following information:

A former top level intelligence officer divided Government of Russia (GOR) state-sponsored offensive cyber
operations into the following four categories (in priority order): 1) Targeting foreign (western) governments; 2)
penetrating leading foreign business corporations, especially banks; 3) domestic monitoring of Russian elite, and;
4) attacking political opponents at home and abroad. The FSB is the lead organization within the GOR for cyber
operations.

A senior banking official within the GOR who receives cyber generated intelligence, stated the following: there had
been only "liimited success" in penetrating "first tier" foreign targets. These comprised western (especially G7 and
NATO) governments, security and intelligence services and central banks. To compensate, massive effort had been
made to penetrate with greater success, "secondary targets," particularly western private banks and governments
of smaller states allied to the West. Latvia was mentioned in this context. Hundreds of agents, consciously
cooperating with the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been compromised, were recruited in
this effort. Many such agents had/have ethnic or family ties to Russia or were incentivized financially (money or
contractual favors) to cooperate. The Russian Central Bank is complicit in the funding of this program and aiding in
the laundering of these funds. This individual also stated that non-state sponsored cyber crime is becoming an
increasing problem inside of Russia for GOR authorities. In 2015, there had been more than twenty attempts at
serious cyber efforts to steal funds from corresponding bank accounts held in Russia, comprising several billion
Roubles. Additionally, there are over 15 major organized crime groups inside of Russia operating in the cyber
"space" which are largely outside of FSB control. Some of these groups are called ANUNAK, BUKTRAP and METEL.
No further information was provided.

A Russian IT specialist reported in June 2016 that the FSB used coercion and blackmail to carry out its "deniable"
offensive cyber operations. The individual had been caught laundering money for private Russian banks through
Latvia by FSB Department K. The FSB threatened the individual with prosecution and prison if he/she did not
cooperate with the FSB. Another individual began to cooperate with the FSB after being caught running an illegal
pornographic website. The Russian IT specialist stated that Ilya OSSIPOV, a U.S. citizen of Russian/Jewish origin,
had been knowingly approached and propositioned by the FSB while on a business trip to Russia. OSSIPOV was
originally from Nizhniy Novogrod and developed the IT platform known as "I2I." OSSIPOV was in Russia to attract
investors for his new platform to upgrade it onto mobile platforms. The FSB was aware of this and offered to
provide capital to OSSIPOV in return for being able to access and modify "I2I" with a view towards targeting
priority Turkish and Arab targets. The FSB intended to plant Trojans in the software, OSSIPOV initially refused the
offer. The FSB also implied they had had success installing cheap Russian IT games containing their own malware
on targets' PC's and other platforms. It was unknown if there was any further interaction with OSSIPOV. This IT
specialist also stated that the "TELEGRAM" enciphered commercial system had been heavily targeted and likely
compromised by the FSB because it was used frequently by Russian political activists.

An IT operator inside Russian energy giant ROSNEFT, who had been employed on conventional defensive IT work
for ROSNEFT, advised of the following: this IT operator had been under instruction for the last year to conduct an
offensive cyber operation against a former foreign director of ROSNEFT, Italian citizen, Guillermo QUINTERO. The
FSB has successfully penetrated QUINTERO's personal IT and through this had accessed various important
institutions in Italy and other countries through the back door, in particular, BANK INTESSA. Former GOR
intelligence official and ROSNEFT CEO, Igor SECHIN, wanted QUINTERO's movements and meetings monitored to
confirm/corroborate what QUINTERO was advising SECHIN and the ROSNEFT board. This operation has also
provided ROSNEFT and the FSB with access to ex-Italian prime minister BERLUSCONI's IT, communications and
network of international contacts. According to the IT operator, the technical expectations of this operation by the
FSB had already been exceeded. This individual also stated that it was highly likely that a similar FSB cyber
operation was conducted against an ExxonMobil member of the ROSNEFT Board (possibly Donald HUMPHREYS).

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CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

FD-1023 Page 3 of 3 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000082
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1023 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/19/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING
Date of Contact: 10/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta
Type of Contact: e-Mail

Date of Report: 10/19/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No
Source Reporting:
The attached documetn is a memo from the CHS describing intelligence that CHS received from Jon WINER, US
Department of State on October 18, 2016. CHS has stated that CHS has a business association with WINER. The
memo describes how WINER obtained the intelligence and that it is apparently from a FSB sub-source. The
information describes the FSB efforts at successfully compromising Donald TRUMP.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

FD-1023 Page 1 of 1 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000083
 UNCLASSIFIED

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CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/18/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING
Date of Contact: 10/18/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta
Type of Contact: Other
Other Contact Type: Skype

Date of Report: 10/18/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No
Source Reporting:
On October 18, 2016, in response to specific tasking from FBI HQ CI representatives investigating the subject
matter at hand, CHS STEE provided handling agent with the following information which was generated by three
different sub-sources:

Sub-Source 1:
On July 7, 2016, Carter PAGE gave a high profile lecture in Moscow. On July 8, 2016, PAGE met personally and
alone with Rosneft CEO, Igor SECHIN. The meeting may have occured in the same building as the lecture. During
this meeting, SECHIN offered the following deal to PAGE, as a representative of the Donald TRUMP campaign: if
TRUMP were to become President, SECHIN/ROSNEFT would offer 19% of ROSNEFT stock to TRUMP's
administration to be "brokered" for sale to U.S. investors, as the TRUMP administration would see fit, in exchange
for TRUMP lifting U.S. (Ukrainian-based) sanctions against Russia. PAGE's response was, "if my guy gets in, then
he will lift sanctions."

Sub Source 2:
Michael COHEN is a private attorney for Donald TRUMP. COHEN is described as a "pivotal figure" in the chain of
communication between the TRUMP campaign and the Kremlin. COHEN's wife is Russian. Her father, Yefin Fima
SHUSTERMAN, is a successful Moscow-based property developer in Russia. SHUSTERMAN owns a Dacha in
Barvikha, Russia outside of Moscow. This area is reserved only for the political and business elite. The Russian
political leadership own their Dacha's in Barvikha.

Sub-Source 3:
Within the last few days, Igor SECHIN acknowledged that TRUMP would not win the presidential campaign.
Additionally, PUTIN has admitted to senior intelligence officers that the FSB efforts to influence the US Presidential
campaign failed and were "fucked up." Those involved were dismayed at the lack of traction of material leaked
against Hillary CLINTON. They advised that the most compromising material has been put out but that they will
"drip-feed" the remaining material through WIKILEAKS. The communication chain between the Kremlin and
TRUMP's campaign is aware of this plan.

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000084
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1023 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

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UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000085
 UNCLASSIFIED

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CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/21/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING
Date of Contact: 10/20/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta
Type of Contact: Other
Other Contact Type: Skype/email

Date of Report: 10/21/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No
Source Reporting:
On October 20, 2016, CHS STEE provided the following information, the body of which is contained in the
attached report prepared by the CHS:

Donald TRUMP's personal attorney, Michael COHEN, met with Kremlin officials in August 2016 in the Czech capital
of Prague under the cover of a Russian organization called ROSSOTRUDNICHESTEVO. Pro-PUTIN Russian Duma
member, Konstantin KOSACHEV, Head of the Foreign Relations Committee, is reported as the facilitator and a
participant of this meeting.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

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UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000086
FBI-HJC119-CH-000087
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1023 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

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Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/24/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING
Date of Contact: 10/24/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
NA
Type of Contact: e-Mail

Date of Report: 10/24/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No
Source Reporting:
On October 24, 2016, CHS STEE provided the following information, summarized below but contained in the
attached report:
Igor DIVYEKIN, the main interlocutor between TRUMP CAMPAIGN advisor, Carter PAGE, and the Kremlin, was
moved from the Presidential Administration Internal Affairs department to Charge d'Affaires at the State Duma to
give DIVYEKIN cover and "diplomatic immunity" as protection from the USG and other foreign governments.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

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UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000088
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CHS CONTACT REPORT

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Source ID: STEELE
Date: 07/07/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT
Date of Contact: 07/05/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta
Type of Contact: In Person
Country: UNITED KINGDOM

Address Line 1: London

Address Line 2:

City: London

ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:
NA
Life Changes:
NA
FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:
NA
Other:
NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

HQ Division: Criminal Investigative Division

Program: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM

Subprogram: EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized
in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.

Substantive Case File Number:

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UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000089
FBI-HJC119-CH-000090
FBI-HJC119-CH-000091
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CHS CONTACT REPORT

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Source ID: STEELE
Date: 07/29/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT
Date of Contact: 07/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
NA
Type of Contact: e-Mail

Anomalies:
NA
Life Changes:
NA
FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:
NA
Other:
NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

HQ Division: Criminal Investigative Division

Program: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM

Subprogram: EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

Substantive Case File Number:

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000092
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CHS CONTACT REPORT

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Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/19/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT
Date of Contact: 10/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta
Type of Contact: e-Mail

Anomalies:
NA
Life Changes:
NA
FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:
After discussion with SA Steve Somma (CD), CHS was made aware that a target of the 97F-HQ-2063661
investigation is aware that two private investigators have been hired to find information on the target. No other
information was provided.
Other:
NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized
in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000093
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CHS CONTACT REPORT

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Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/18/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT
Date of Contact: 10/18/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta
Type of Contact: Other
Other Contact Type: Skype

Anomalies:
NA
Life Changes:
NA
FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:
None
Other:
NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized
in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

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UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000094
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CHS CONTACT REPORT

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Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/21/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT
Date of Contact: 10/20/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta
Type of Contact: Other
Other Contact Type: Skype/email

Anomalies:
NA
Life Changes:
NA
FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:
NA
Other:
NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized
in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

FD-209a Page 1 of 1 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000095
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-209a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

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Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/24/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT
Date of Contact: 10/24/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
NA
Type of Contact: e-Mail

Anomalies:
NA
Life Changes:
NA
FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:
NA
Other:
NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized
in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

FD-209a Page 1 of 1 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000096
 UNCLASSIFIED

FD-209a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

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Source ID: STEELE
Date: 11/17/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT
Date of Contact: 11/01/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta
Type of Contact: Telephonic

Anomalies:
CHS confirmed to an outside third party that CHS has a confidential relationship with the FBI.
Life Changes:
NA
FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:
NA
Other:
CHS confirmed to an outside third party that CHS has a confidential relationship with the FBI.

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

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UNCLASSIFIED
FBI-HJC119-CH-000097
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FBI-HJC119-CH-000099
FBI-HJC119-CH-000100