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“An exciting and very thoughtful volume, which elegantly rethinks the trauma
word, its meanings and practices on wide, global, American and intimate scales.
This book’s finely rendered cases will be taught and taught again.”
Nancy Rose Hunt, Ph.D., Professor of History, The University of
Florida, author of A Nervous State (2016) and A Colonial Lexicon (1999)
GLOBALIZATION, DISPLACEMENT,
AND PSYCHIATRY
This book explores diasporic identities and lived experiences that emerge in
global patterns of oppression and considers the consequences of treatment and
cure when patients experience mental illness due to war, displacement and
surveillance. Going beyond psychiatric institutions and conventional psychiatric
knowledge by focusing on informal networks, socially contingent value systems,
and cultural sites of healing, this book considers how communities utilize trauma
productively for healing. The chapters in this volume consider the detection of
mental illness and its treatment through claims to citizenship and belonging as
well as denials of social identity and psychic experiences by institutions of the
state. A multidisciplinary team of contributors and international range of case
studies explore topics such as colonial trauma, feminized trauma, reproductive
violence, military mental health and more.
This book is an essential resource for psychologists, psychiatrists, political
scientists, sociologists and anthropologists, as well as scholars and those involved
in policymaking and practice.
Published Titles
List of Contributors ix
Acknowledgmentsxiii
PART 1
Trauma, Globality and Death 17
PART 2
Global Surveillance and Trauma 61
PART 3
Culture, Displacement and Healing 97
PART 4
Global Bodies, Logics and Clinics 131
Index193
CONTRIBUTORS
archives du désordre dans les cultes de possession en Afrique (Fribourg 2016) and, with
N. Gibson, Frantz Fanon, Psychiatry and Politics (New York 2017).
University. Her research investigates issues related to reproductive and infant health,
constellating across Indigenous Studies, Women and Gender Studies, Anthropology,
and Public Health while using mixed methods to interface the confluences of vary-
ing sociocultural factors that influence infant feeding practices, health and devel-
opment. Her academic training informs both the critical purview of her research
scope and the interdisciplinary approaches she uses as a community-engaged scholar
to tackle systemic issues and their underlying problems. Core to her academic prac-
tice is establishing crucial relationships that facilitate research and service while sup-
porting non-traditional, first-generation, and traditionally underserved populations.
Jie Yang is Professor of Anthropology at Simon Fraser University. She was trained
in linguistic anthropology. Her current research focuses on critical studies of men-
tal health and Indigenous and non-Indigenous psychology in China. She is editor
of the Political Economy of Affect and Emotion in East Asia (2014, Routledge) and
author of two monographs: Unknotting the Heart: Unemployment and Therapeutic
Governance (2015, Cornell University Press; 2016 winner of Francis Hsu Book
Prize) and Mental Health in China: Change, Tradition, and Therapeutic Governance
(2018, Polity Press). Currently, she is working on two projects: one delineates
troubling double binds and widespread distress among Chinese officials in the
context of anti-corruption campaigns (she is completing a new monograph on
the phenomenon of guan xinbing temporarily entitled Officials’ Heart Distress:
Bureaucracy, Inner Friction, and Psychopolitics in China); the other project delves
into Chinese classics of philosophy, literature and medicine to investigate psycho-
logical systems and classifications of mental distress and their associated modes of
treatment imbricated in these classic texts as well as their implications for contem-
porary psychological practice.
Sanaullah Khan: This volume would not have been possible without the hard
work of my co-editor, Elliott Schwebach. Our shared passion to understand the
relations between political structures, globalization and psychiatric discourses kept
us motivated. As an anthropologist in training, I learned a great deal from Elliott’s
appreciation of political theory and deep commitment to de-colonial frameworks
and epistemology. Elliott’s deep appreciation of global logics of inequality seemed
to be too grand a scale at first, given my training in anthropology as well as the
discipline’s commitments to studying people’s mundane and everyday realities.
Yet the friendship and shared passion in global mental health that Elliott and
I discovered and nurtured through our stimulating conversations led me to con-
sider interesting ways to think about the macro and micro and the individual and
the structural as part of the same story. This book is a testament to our friendship
and collaboration, but more importantly, my own journey and training, thanks
to Elliott, in a vision of scholarship inspired by social justice and ethics of care,
kindness, empathy, transparency and responsibility.
Over the past few years, I have learned a great deal from the works of various
psychiatric and psychological anthropologists as well as historians – I have yet to
meet all of them in person, but their works have continued to shape my thinking.
I want to specifically thank two of these people: Mark S. Micale, whose writing
on the global history of trauma first inspired the idea of a project in which Elliott
and I could start the story of trauma, for once, from outside the “West” instead
of taking Western psychiatry, its histories of trauma and diagnostics as our bench-
mark for how people do or do not express distress. Second, I want to thank Tanya
Luhrmann, whose work and guidance opened my eyes to what culture does to
the workings of the psyche. My ideas of human subjectivity, disembodiment and
xiv Acknowledgments
agency in contexts of healing were shaped by the works of Rebecca Lester as well
as the generous feedback on my broader work by Kamran Asdar Ali on various
occasions, but most notably at the American Institute of Pakistan Studies Emerg-
ing Scholars symposium in 2022, which encouraged me to go beyond ideas of the
“self ” based on singularity and autonomy in my understanding of trauma, illness
and treatment.
Elliott Schwebach: Firstly, thank you to Sanaullah for reaching out to me with
this fantastic idea for a project, and for inviting me so graciously to participate as
an editor. A warm thank-you to Sarah Rae, Patricia Zapf, and Katya Porter at
Routledge for bringing this project to life. To the extent that this volume bears
the influence of my devout psychoanalytic commitments, I owe a great deal to the
Washington Baltimore Center for Psychoanalysis, and especially to my cherished
classmates and friends from my time there. Finally, I am proud to acknowledge
those in my life who helped sustain me, through care, support and counsel, as
this book was being written. A special thanks to Noreen Honeycutt for helping
me unpack my own losses and traumas, to the wittiness, warmth and wisdom of
Benjamin Tellie, Julie Liebenguth, José Durán, Mohammad Murtuza, Claude
Nganzeu, Chris Hewitt, Ian Schmid, Cliff Allington and Ryanne Fujita-Conrads,
and to the love of my parents.
INTRODUCTION
Conceptualizing the Global
DOI: 10.4324/9781003311843-1
2 Sanaullah Khan and Elliott Schwebach
psychiatry, alleging to describe the shape and nature of mental and behavioral
(un)health, would be generally self-reflexive about its capacity to trace the rela-
tionships of the production and treatment of traumas to the manifold, dynamic
global forces within which they are embedded. However, concerningly, this is
largely not the case. Invocations of the global within “psy-” fields, despite some
sincere but patchy attempts at institutionalizing self-reflexivity within training,
often remain universalistic and “fraught with implicit monolithic principles
from the Euro-centric intellectual traditions” (O’Byrne, n.d.; see also Mills,
2014), particularly insofar as they attempt to “multiculturally” expand an exist-
ing scientific edifice through a recognition of cultural differences superficially
associated with broad ethnic or racial categories. And ideas of Western “excep-
tionalism” continue to pervade the politics of mental health and shape regimes
of care and policing.
This collection represents an attempt to expose, chart and carefully unpack the
global as it manifests, in its various forms, across psychological domains and socio-
political subjectivities. More specifically, these chapters explore the production,
conceptual nature, management and lived experience of traumas as they relate
to what may be identified as global or globalizing logics of power within and across
particular historical contexts. Thus, this volume examines mental health concerns
as they become variously incorporated by modern disciplinary regimes, modes
of psychiatric knowledge as they interface with overlapping cultural and political
contingencies, and narratives of trauma, resistance and healing that emerge from
global patterns of governance, migration and oppression.
Importantly, this collection aims to interrogate such global or globalizing log-
ics as they emerge psychologically or psychiatrically at manifold scales as well as
locales and forms: including the scale of the clinic but also those of the fam-
ily, community, nation, state and international world. In addition, the volume
targets conflicts and challenges of psychiatric inquiry beyond those merely at a
methodological level. How does the global bear upon epistemologies of trauma
and traumatogenesis? Among different spheres of psychiatric interaction, what
do value differences and cultural conflicts reveal to us about epistemological or
ontological occlusion, incorporation, violation or transformation with respect to
diverse understandings of subjectivity and health? And how can an attunement
to the global help psychiatry revise long-standing onto-images of the conscious
and unconscious mind, and of the mind’s relationship to the body and the wider
social sphere, in a manner more befitting the complexities of psychic reality and
treatment?
As editors, from the position of our commitments in the fields of anthropol-
ogy and political theory, we have aimed to foster inquiry that might suggest rela-
tionships between the development of traumas and their broader global realities
Introduction 3
when he writes, with reference to the context of Native American counseling but
drawing a conclusion with global significance, that both
treatment and a new narrative [can emerge] with non-Native providers. How-
ever, the non-Native providers also must be able to make a serious analysis of
their own history and take responsibility for that history. In this manner, the
providers are involved in a narrative therapy of their own, and in this honest
historical vessel the wounding itself can be healed.
(Duran, 2006, p. 28)
We believe that this holds equally true for academic scholars (not just providers)
working to better understand the traumas and treatment of oppressed subject
populations. We therefore direct the research and intended use of this volume
also to these ambitions.
similar question: if the global is violent and traumatic, can these aspects of global
relationality as they manifest psychiatrically be rectified? And if an affirmative
answer can be found, can the decolonization of approaches toward mental health
treatment reciprocally enhance global efforts at sociopolitical liberation? By pos-
ing them here, we wish for these questions to echo throughout the chapters that
follow, even when they are not explicitly addressed or answered in great detail.
Regarding psychiatry’s capacities for unsnarling its complicities with global forms
of oppression, and potentially expanding and more radically positioning the roles
it can play for healing, the chapters in this collection present a diverse set of points
of reference and inference. Taken together, they may allow the reader to form
preliminary understandings that can guide further study and thought.
If global logics of power have not only traumatized and displaced but also
shaped and forged contemporary subjectivities at least partly in their fashion, it
seems sensible to pose at the outset the assumption that liberatory global futures,
however they might be encouraged and created, would entail neither a surgi-
cal excision of present-day global relations nor a simple reversal or return to
any imagined pre-colonial or pre-imperial past. It may be possible to resurrect
minoritarian global concepts and approaches from within dominant traditions
and employ them for decolonial ends: such as, for example, conceptualizations of
foreignness in Sophistic Greek thought which oppose the Platonic/Aristotelean
hierarchy separating Greek and non-Greek by measure of “civilization” (a hier-
archy that would, in later centuries, morph into Euro-centrism and underpin
patterns of colonial and neoliberal expansion). It is ever important to decenter the
aspects of dominant power regimes that marginalize, invisibilize and other, and
to correspondingly center the voices, values and knowledge thus affected. And
global liberatory praxis may be vitalized by political strategies of reparation and/
or repatriation, strategies which must nonetheless be met with a level of mindful-
ness commensurate to the incredible complexities and challenges presented by
intersecting and overlapping histories of genocide and injustice.1
However, insofar as traumas, unconscious defenses and attachments, and pre-
liberatory subjective identifications persist, the crucial strategies invoked earlier
will be insufficient in themselves. The psychiatric legacy of Frantz Fanon helps us
to bear in mind not only the necessities of healing for decolonial work, but also the
importance of globality, and the revolution of global relations at manifold scales,
for healing itself. Even Fanon’s anti-colonial militantism was infused with a glo-
bality that transcended the immediate objectives of sovereign self-determination
and statehood:
articulated the dynamic tension between two logics of sovereignty – the trans-
cendent sovereignty of the imperial nation-states that is expansionist, divisive,
and repressive; and the immanent sovereignty of colonized peoples, which
destabilized and overthrew imperial structures of power.
(Bose, 2019, p. 673)
and set in a legitimate institutional framework” (p. 33). In other words, social
problems, including urban poverty and turns to violence, are now increasingly
“psychiatrized.” One ramification of this move has been to overdiagnose popula-
tions without addressing deep-rooted social problems. In the case of France, the
use of psychiatric discourses was used, according to Fassin, to represent the weight
of social suffering. However, in many other cases, psychiatric care is marked by
a move to conceal the relationship between mental illness and social conditions
by health experts (Scheper-Hughes, 1993). Public health in many counties now
increasingly incorporates mental health, but often public health initiatives, due to
their emphasis on population health and disease eradication, continue to neglect
the psychological effects of disease outbreaks and attempts by states to maintain
“healthy” populations, even when this means separating loved ones and divorc-
ing the vulnerable from much-needed networks of care and emotional support.
When health systems do engage with mental health of the vulnerable, the rela-
tions between punishment and care often result in stigmatizing mental health, as is
demonstrated in the case studies of postcolonial India and Pakistan in this volume.
A fundamental problem of postcolonial psychiatry raised by Franz Fanon is that
maladies in social relations are treated as personal problems rather than as patholo-
gies caused by conditions of colonialism. These social forces are now operating at
global scales in the form of pandemics, conflicts and displacements. Thus, even
as mental health screening has been made increasingly accessible, the increase in
psychiatric disorders requires us to consider a parallel story: namely about the
globalizing forces of displacement. Conditions of scarcity create new pressures on
human sociality and result in new disorders. These disorders are social in nature,
structural mainly, but also interpersonal, as wider economic and social shifts are
experienced in intimate relations (as in, perhaps, a child’s disobedience and vio-
lence toward their parents, treated as a sign of illness rather than a demoralization
created by conditions of extreme poverty) (Das, 2006). These disorders range from
problems of addiction to mental illness and give voice to structural pathologies,
albeit in ways that do not respect the standard template of a medical complaint.
There are also many ways in which structural forces have the effect of numbing
the human mind, or “dissociation,” to borrow a psychoanalytic term: to distract
oneself from precarious job markets, retrenching welfare states and the ever-
present threat of conflict and violence (Khan, 2017). The category of “accident”
(market crash, flood, etc.), as Virilio (2007) reminds us, is used by states to further
garner psychopolitical complicity. The overall numbing effect is a product of the
intensification of trauma and the experience of trauma as routine and repetitive,
with victims and perpetrators brought into the vortex of state violence: the for-
mer inflicting torture and creating conditions of death, and the latter shouldering
the unconscious burden of bearing witness to these horrors. Numbing as well as
anxiety-inducing, today’s globalizing forces also create new psychiatric subjects
and technologies of control. These new psychiatric subjects (ranging from the
8 Sanaullah Khan and Elliott Schwebach
migrant to the refugee seeker to the internally displaced) are exposed to new
forms of policing and carcerality that create the very conditions of madness or
irrationality that states paradoxically also arduously try to eradicate. Thus, the
psychiatric effects of state-led violence are continuously erased in torture cells and
prisons, just as force is used to correct pathologies and shape bodies.
While the problems are novel, the rich intellectual tradition of postcolonial psy-
chiatry offers some insights. Fanon shows how colonialism creates problems of iden-
tity which prompt the colonized to constantly ask, “In reality who am I?” In fact,
Fanon also wrote about the relevance of the social for clinical practice, especially
when he suggested that “in some circumstances the socius is more important than
the individual” (Fanon, 1961/2004, p. 105). At another point, he stated, “we are
driven from the individual back to the social structure. If there is a taint, it lies not in
the ‘soul’ of the individual but rather in that of the environment” (Ibid., p. 213). Just
as colonial authorities around the world pathologized resistance to power structures,
the figure of Fanon highlighted the potential for a different, more radical kind of
psychiatry: one that is attuned to mundane and everyday forms of suffering. In his
exploration of the effect of colonialism on conjugality, he argued that war “deepens
relations between husband and wife and cements their union. There is a simultane-
ous and effervescent emergence of the citizen, the patriot, and the modern spouse”
(1965, p. 114). At other points, he suggested that colonization leaves deep fractures
in social relations. The reason why postcolonial psychiatry requires a grounding in
Fanon is that Fanon helps us understand how psychiatric care can result both in
giving agency to patients to decide the terms of their treatment, by painstakingly
recovering the mundane pathologies that erupt in everyday experiences due to
conditions of social violence, but also in undoing state-led violence itself.
Despite the headway made by global psychiatric institutions in making psychi-
atric care accessible to populations, we are now experiencing ever-increasing risks
of what Deleuze and Guattari (1977) have detected in Freud’s fascination with
the Oedipus complex as a cause for neurosis. Deleuze and Guattari (1977) argue
that the “daddy-mommy-child” triad privileges and universalizes a specific fam-
ily structure, which is far more inflected with historical and cultural contingency
than Freud’s model acknowledges, and which fails to reflexively capture the pos-
sible tightening or social reproduction of the family unit by psychoanalysis itself.
Posing the figure of the schizophrenic against the oedipalized child, Deleuze and
Guattari (1977) write, “Freud never went beyond this narrow and limited con-
ception of the ego. And what prevented him from doing so was his own tripartite
formula – the Oedipal, neurotic one: daddy-mommy-me” (p. 23). Referring to
this as a type of analytic imperialism, they note,
the small child lives with his family around the clock; but within the bosom
of this family, and from the very first days of his life, he immediately begins
having an amazing nonfamilial experience that psychoanalysis has completely
failed to take into account.
Introduction 9
Posing schizo-analysis as an alternative, they write that this approach “sets out to
explore a transcendental unconscious, rather than a metaphysical one; an uncon-
scious that is material rather than ideological; schizophrenia rather than Oedipal;
nonfigurative rather than imaginary; real rather than symbolic” (pp. 109–110).
Can we return to Deleuze and Guattari’s insight to guard against contemporary
psychiatric excesses? There are several contemporary iterations of similar critiques
about how humanitarian psychiatry views specific cultural relations as inherently
pathological, without explicating the multiplicity of relations in combination
with adverse political situations that are generative of mental illness. In creating
caricatures, states create new justifications to expand political violence. Thus,
in today’s world, in which psychiatric regimes are exported abroad (employing
normative assumptions as universals, increasing distrust toward psychiatry and
unintentionally stigmatizing various forms of mental illness), a schizo-framework
acquires a new salience. The question becomes: how we can recover the specific-
ity and uniqueness of psychiatric experiences?
Symptoms of Reality
According to the DSM-V and previous iterations, traumatic experiences and
responses involve intrusion and avoidance symptoms, where exposure to trau-
matic conditions creates stress and specific avoidance mechanisms. Avoidance
mechanisms entail avoiding experiences that recall traumatic events. The critique
that has been leveled onto the use of the DSMs to understand mental illness
globally has been its emphasis on specific symptoms which may or may not be
experienced universally, such as flashbacks (Jones et al., 2003). It is also worth
questioning whether trauma necessarily follows a temporality of initial trauma,
recurrence and avoidance (Khan, 2016, 2017). Meanwhile, symptoms of psy-
chosis are viewed as necessarily bearing a disconnect with reality and are often
treated with pharmaceuticals alone. Psychosis is often treated strictly as a neuro-
chemical problem instead of (at least partly) a social one, despite the prevalence of
experiences of psychosis being interpreted through or laden with particular cul-
tural values (Sadowsky, 2020). The question of whether they represent normal or
pathological experience continues to be debated, but how patients, their families
and physicians employ different social interpretations or explanatory models for
illness is still a relevant question (Farmer, 2010). When illness and symptoms of
psychosis continue to be treated from a strictly medical framework, the solution
too remains largely medical, and not sensitive to the social and political experi-
ences that surround the illness.
Foucault historicizes and complicates the philosophy of psychiatric treatment
in Psychiatric Power. For Foucault (2008), an earlier modality of psychiatric power
represented in the works of Pinel and Esquirol entails the psychiatrist playing up
to the imaginations of the patient, where treatment is based on maintaining the
patient’s as-if structures. The psychiatrist accepts the reality of the illness imposed
10 Sanaullah Khan and Elliott Schwebach
by the patient and in that way works toward its recovery. This began to change,
however, as psychiatrists, by the turn of the 20th century, began to impose their
own meanings of the real on the patient. In other words, the psychiatrists’ under-
standing of the real is final, and the patient’s recovery is dependent upon coming
to terms with this reality, which now means that the patient will go through a
range of infra-penalties every time their version of the “real” is suggested. One
question that we can ask, borrowing from Foucault, is: how do patients, physi-
cians and their families debate what constitutes the real? Is it only the psychiatrist
who can impose a definition of the real?
Instead of simply suggesting that psychiatrists alone create definitions of the
pathological, this volume considers the multiplicity of ways cultures and peo-
ple define pathologies, while reflecting on how pathologies are situated not just
within individuals but also their broader social structures. While patients may
refer to the cause of illness as resulting from precarious situations, we also know
from existing evidence (such as from studies of patients experiencing problems of
addiction) that structural causes of illness are often ignored in medical treatment,
placing the blame for illness disproportionately on the constitutions or subjectivi-
ties of patients (Bourgois, 2009).
While madness may represent a disjuncture from reality, does that mean that
its symptoms bear no relationship to the social or political context? We contend,
by contrast, that treating symptoms and delusions as bearing no relationship with
the real is itself a political act, one that is shaped by the impulse to discredit the
relationship between trauma and oppression. When a patient refers to the social
structure as the cause of illness, both their registering of a personal reality and
their expression of a political protest are likely to be disregarded. Altogether, this
forecloses the traumatic depths of specific political events.
In line with the complicated trajectory of Freudian thought, some psycho-
dynamic and adaptational postulations from psychiatrists such as Adolf Meyer,
Abram Kardiner and Henry Stack Sullivan in the US context and Vladimir
Myasishchev in the Soviet Union considered mental illness as a response to (or
conflict with) specific social milieus, shifting from earlier theories that relied
solely on hereditary factors. Yet in many contexts, the language patients used to
describe their mental illness continued to be either ignored or treated as strictly
medical, denying their symptoms socially etiological significance. Skultans
(1998), for example, observes how Latvian subjects described their symptoms
in terms of being “short of air” or having one’s heart “on strike” as forms of
political resistance, given a history of psychiatric discourses being used for sub-
jugation (where even small acts of disobedience could be met with a psychiatric
response). This example encourages us to think about the life of psychiatric
discourses, which can humanize but also brutalize the subjects of illness, some-
times both at once.
Introduction 11
Psychiatric diagnoses also have a life as they move globally and acquire new
salience to make suffering legible or to conceal it. While, on the one hand, the
movement of psychiatric classification invokes the need to be receptive toward
culturally specific ways of expressing illness, these symptoms in most cases carry
with them signs of the broader social worlds, with symptoms, such as delusions
and psychoses, being buffered, magnified or channelized through specific cultural
experiences of senses and psyche, absorption and porosity (Luhrmann, 2012). Ill-
ness narratives offer a political critique as much as they illuminate personal injury.
While psychiatric institutions may become the voice of the state, a different,
more radical psychiatry may challenge the assumptions about what the symptoms
represent by siding with patients to turn symptoms into critique, even as the state
tries to depoliticize symptoms by enforcing a distinction between symptoms and
political reality.
Finally, a more radical psychiatry might interrogate assumptions about what
constitutes the subject of treatment. Mental illness can invite us to consider non-
human ontologies and temporalities that are ignored as part of the liberal subjec-
tivity in which agency is considered as firmly rooted within an individual (Asad,
2003). For instance, within Islamic contexts, patients refer to their afflictions and
seizures as examples of demonic possessions, where healing presents a site for
the recovery of not only the individual but the social relation causing the illness.
The psyche is thus difficult to disentangle from histories, spaces and relations.
However, for many reasons (including its complicities with Eurocentric, colonial
and racist assumption sets), we hesitate to look straight to the archetypal logic
that dominates Jungian psychiatry to acknowledge the psyche’s global relatedness.
For us, what globalizing logics prompt us to think about is how knotted experi-
ences present themselves as symptoms where neither a simple beginning can be
privileged, nor where there is a straightforward resolution through abreaction.
Modern experiences of trauma blur distinctions between the mind and the body,
the self and the other, and the human and the non-human. Thus, a question of
central importance is how the idea of the self or the causes of illness are contested
within clinical contexts. How are histories of trauma erased or subsumed in spe-
cific ways that privilege or make trauma “intelligible” to specific communities?
in myriad ways. To understand the healing of trauma caused by various levels and
intensities of oppression and subordination, we do not disregard the psychiatric
clinic (we find it rather crucially important), but we are also interested in investi-
gating the intersections between clinics and other spaces: such as nonclinical sites
of healing, domestic spaces, etc.
With this volume, we therefore hope to explore five important aspects about
trauma and the globalizing forces that shape it:
This volume does not provide the first account of the limits of western diag-
noses, nor of the differences between western or global and nonwestern or local
models of trauma. Nor is the volume unique in posing questions about the con-
fluences and intersections between psychological and physiological conditions,
of course, as this has been a persistent feature of Freud-inspired psychiatric study.
We hope to supplement existing approaches along these lines with a heightened
emphasis on globalization and global political structures, logics and scale, examin-
ing how they manifest within an array of local contexts and cases and bringing a
diversity of theoretical perspectives and voices to bear.
To do so, we order the volume into four parts. In Part 1, “Trauma, Globality
and Death,” Roberto Beneduce levies the psychiatric case studies of Frantz Fanon
to ask what contemporary patterns of migration, including migrant and immigrant
death, reveal about the hidden articulations and implications of trauma. Following
Roberto’s chapter, a chapter by Xiaowen Zhang and Jie Yang explores the intru-
sive uses of public health for political control, the production of death through
the medical triaging of patients, medical neglect toward non-COVID patients
to keep the health system intact, and the isolation of patients with COVID-19
from the wider society. These elements, according to the authors, served a than-
atopolitical function in the Chinese city of Wuhan during the outbreak of the
Introduction 13
and in so doing, we hope to make suffering both more complex and more mean-
ingful. It is from this basis, we believe, that better care can follow.
Note
1 Within the burgeoning literature on these complexities and challenges, which is by now
too vast to comprehensively cite, we wish to draw attention to a remarkable literature
review by Olivia Klutse entitled “Repatriation and Reparations: Land-Based Indig-
enous and Black Futurity,” recognized for an undergraduate research award in 2018.
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Native Peoples. New York: Teachers College Press.
Duran, E. & Duran, B. (1995). Native American Postcolonial Psychology. Albany: State Uni-
versity of New York Press.
Estroff, S.E., Lachicotte, W.S., Illingworth, L.C. & Johnston, A. (1991). Everybody’s got
a little mental illness: accounts of illness and self among people with severe, persistent
mental illnesses. Medical Anthropology Quarterly 5:331–369.
Fanon, F. (1965). A Dying Colonialism. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Fanon, F. (1994). Black Skin, White Masks (R. Philcox, Trans.). New York: Grove Press.
(Original work published 1952).
Fanon, F. (2004). The Wretched of the Earth (R. Philcox, Trans.). New York: Grove Press.
(Original work published 1961).
Farmer, P. (2010). Partner to the Poor: A Paul Farmer Reader. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Fassin, D. (2012). Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
Foucault, M. (2008). Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the College de France, 1973–1974. London:
Picador.
Jones, E., Vermaas, R.H., McCartney, H., Beech, C., Palmer, I., Hyams, K. & Wessely, S.
(2003). Flashbacks and post-traumatic stress disorder: the genesis of a 20th-century
diagnosis. The British Journal of Psychiatry: The Journal of Mental Science 182:158–163.
Introduction 15
Trauma, Globality
and Death
1
WHERE PSYCHE, HISTORY AND
POLITICS MERGE
Decolonizing PTSD and Traumatic Memory
With Fanon
Roberto Beneduce
Translated from Italian into English by Richard Bates
DOI: 10.4324/9781003311843-3
20 Roberto Beneduce
Guatemalans and Hondurans were found without life in a lorry in the town of
San Antonio, in the US state of Texas.
Dying frozen, dehydrated or suffocated in an attempt to cross borders has
simply become another possible way of death in the contemporary world: a side
effect of modern teichopolitics – policies of border control through the proliferation
of walls, barbed wire, barriers of every kind and highly technological surveillance
systems whose aim is to prevent illegal immigration (Ballif and Rosière, 2009;
Rosière and Jones, 2012).
According to the authors who coined this neologism, teichopolitics (drawn from
a Greek word for a fortified wall) are a recent development of biopolitics for the
control of peoples and the subjection of bodies. In the age of late-capitalist and
neo-liberal brutalism (Mbembe, 2020), the value of human life seems to waver
furiously between that of a useful body, reduced to a mere work force, that of
disposable bodies/objects, and that of a humanitarian lament that questions the
hypocritical silence of governments and institutions.
The control of mobility (kinetocracy is a term suggested by Benedetta Rossi)
(2015, p. 152), initially effected under colonization, is not just about nation-state
making, national borders, airports or checkpoints: we find new expressions of it
within our cities, where new spaces of detention isolate illegal immigrants and
invisible confines separate rich from poor areas, and where any suspicious gesture
can legitimize the most brutal violence: as happened in March 2018 in Sacra-
mento in the US state of California, where Stephon Clark, a 22-year-old Black
man, was shot and killed by the police because his cell-phone was mistaken for
a pistol.
The centrality of the racial – and postcolonial – question in the episodes just
mentioned is expressed particularly clearly in the case of Yaguine Koita and Fodd
Tounkara, two adolescents from Conakry, Guinea, found frozen to death in the
undercarriage of a Sabena airplane in Brussels. With their story, the two young
Africans were to foster a serious debate and add another chapter to the painful
archive on migration, because Yaguibe and Fodd had a letter with them, written
with “grande confiance” to the European heads of state. I quote some passages from
it as it occupies a unique place in our present-day narratives of diaspora:
that you love so dearly like life. Moreover, think of the love and kindness of
the creator, “God,” the Almighty, who has given you the good experiences,
wealth, and power to construct and organize your continent so well that it has
become the most beautiful and admirable of them all. . . .
Finally, we beseech you to forgive us for daring to write such a letter to you
important people whom we truly respect. Do not forget that it is to you that
we must plead [?] the weakness of our strength in Africa.5
up questioning the disciplines that had first defined it (i.e., psychoanalysis and war
psychiatry).7 The reflections that follow draw above all on such contributions for
its ideas, as a critical approach to trauma is able to recount what clinical sources
often ignore: the historical genealogy of our diagnostic categories, in the palimp-
sest of the symptom (Beneduce, 2016a; Kienzler, 2022; Mianji and Kirmayer,
2022).8
The perspective suggested here takes its cue from what Caruth wrote on the
success of PTSD. In her words,
the more we satisfactorily locate and classify the symptoms of PTSD, the more
we seem to have dislocated the boundaries of our modes of understanding. . . .
The phenomenon of trauma has seemed to become all-inclusive, but it has
done so precisely because it brings us to the limits of our understanding.
(Caruth, 1995, pp. 3–4)
This is undoubtedly true. Yet, I do not believe that the “limits of our understand-
ing” explored by psychoanalysis can be considered in the same way as ontological
limits of the human condition or intrinsic to traumatic experience. The limits
that Freud drew attention to do not just reveal the functioning of the uncon-
scious, but also derive from other processes: the politics of memory, the phe-
nomena of institutional concealment, the registers of verification and falsification
(Foucault, 2014). My aim in these notes is to uncover some of the areas of epis-
temic and political opacity that characterize the diagnosis of PTSD, which might
contribute to its decolonization. In doing this, I will be helped by the epistemic
break introduced by Fanon, and in particular by Chapter Five of his The Wretched
of the Earth, a chapter that may represent the high water mark of Fanon’s blending
of the political and the psychic (Beneduce, 2011, 2016b; Gibson and Beneduce,
2017; Jabr, 2019; Lazali, 2021; Sibertin-Blanc, 2014). Before summoning Fanon,
however, we need to examine another dossier.
extraordinary diorama. The first was the various changes brought about by the
processes of production, with the increased number of mishaps caused by the
appearance of new means of transport (e.g., Erichsen’s disease or “railway spine”)
or by the rhythms of factory work. Gramsci would note in 1934 that the produc-
tion of “machine-like behavior” (“atteggiamenti macchinali”) in the human body
was an explicit aim of Taylorism (Gramsci, 1970, p. 2165). Bodies were trying to
resist the accelerated tempo of modernity by struggling to adapt or by letting new
ailments emerge.10
The second context consisted of the theories that were distinguishing between
various kinds of neurosis, which debated whether observed symptoms were
caused only by psychic reactions or if their appearance necessarily connoted a
neurological lesion too. Here the background was Freud’s theory of child seduc-
tion as a cause of hysteria, which would be followed, after 1897, by the idea that
the patients’ accounts of their symptoms were laden with fantasy, and that fantasy
always bore a primary connection to the Oedipus Complex. With the introduc-
tion of the idea of “belatedness” or “afterthought” (Nachträglichkeit), which Lacan
would claim to have extracted from Freud’s work, suggesting “après-coup” in
French, a new and decisive element entered the narrative of trauma: one of tempo-
rality. This allows us to understand how traumatic events in the past encounter a
significance only a posteriori (in Freud’s model, after the “latency period”). This
is an idea of which the epistemological, clinical and political potential may not
yet have been wholly explored, particularly insofar as the notion of latency can
be extended to historical traumas (genocides, mass atrocities, mass migrations,
slavery). We can ask the question: how long can the latency of a collective trauma
be before symptoms arise? And what form will these symptoms take?
The third context is that of the Great War, or First World War, with the hell of
the trenches and the grenades: it led Ferenczi to say in 1917 that only cinematic
images could adequately represent the singular and, until then, unknown symp-
toms observed in soldiers who had returned from the front (muscular spasms,
awkward bearing and gait, tics, language disturbances, etc.) (Ferenczi, 1994,
pp. 124–141). Here Ferenczi seems to suggest that ordinary clinical categories
and concepts encounter a limit in describing and understanding the reality of suf-
fering brought about by a new technology of death.
As Young (1997) has shown, the category of post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) seems to forget the complex history that preceded its birth. Mixing
symptoms and diagnostic categories already present in previous classifications,
PTSD would reformulate trauma treatment and continue to expand in the years
following the context of the diagnosis’ emergence (the Vietnam War) to include
ailments caused by any kind of traumatic event (natural disasters, rapes, wars, loot-
ing, migration, etc.), irrespective of the sociocultural situation, place and role of
the subjects involved. The rapid tectonic movement of PTSD diagnoses shook
up psychiatry in the late 20th century, redefining its classificatory axes and the
24 Roberto Beneduce
very idea of trauma, but at the same time encouraging a new (mechanical) model
of memory (Young, 1997, pp. 270–279) and a singular ontologizing of human
experience itself.11
If clinicians make a serious mistake when they ignore the historical matrices
of their categories, the risks multiply when the socio-cultural maps in which they
take form and significance are ignored. The case of the Wolfman is perhaps one
of the best known.12 More recently, analyzing the case of Daniel Paul Schreber, a
German judge who suffered from schizophrenia, Santner (1996) has highlighted
the hidden links between Schreber’s illness and the prevalent anxieties of his time
surrounding the role of the nation-state and the gradual assertion of antisemitism
in German society.
But there is also another context that should be evoked in the reconstruction
of the genealogy of trauma and, later, that of PTSD: that of the colonial space and
the racial apparatus, where the violence and seduction that were its plot and wrote
its “little secret” (Mbembe, 2006) were accompanied by a particular anxiety – that
of suspicion. It was this last context that offered perhaps the most decisive (and
still underexplored) conjunction between medico-psychological theories, strategies
of subjection, epistemic anxieties and the success of some diagnostic categories. If
the analogy between criminal, woman, neurotic and “primitive” was well known,
suspicion of the working class or lumpenproletariat, and then of the colonized,
would be the common denominator of the systems designed to inspect, con-
trol and classify these masses regarded as threatening, a logic that was arguably
extended from regimes of control over slaves (Genovese, 1972). This humanity of
uncertain and threatening appearance, and modes of suffering that would gener-
ate diagnostic doubt, were later accompanied by asylum seekers, whose tales and
experiences would be subjected to increasingly detailed examination and control
(Beneduce, 2015; Beneduce, 2018). The clinical gaze fostered this ideology of
suspicion, coining innumerable diagnoses (from that of “sinistrosis,” alleging a
propensity to overexaggerate the harms suffered by minor accidents, to the more
recent “factitious disorder” and “malingering,” referring to alleged tendencies to
feign or deliberately produce illness)13 that were directed mainly at the socially
marginalized groups: subordinates, the working class, members of ethnic and
racial minorities or immigrants.
During the First World War, suspicion did not spare soldiers who manifested
symptoms of the terror experienced in the trenches (shell shock syndrome).
What is striking, once again, is the relation between suspicion, the social class of
patients, and diagnosis: while officers and higher ranks usually received diagnoses
such as neurasthenia or depression, the lowers ranks would be accused of simulat-
ing their symptoms for their own advantage (to avoid returning to the front). The
military psychiatrist Julius Wagner-Jauregg, a future Nobel Prize winner, for the
treatment of syphilis, entertained doubts as to patients’ suffering, and, to counter-
act what seemed to him simply chicanery or cowardice, prescribed electric shock
Where Psyche, History and Politics Merge 25
treatment for them. The tragic consequence was that some of them ended up
committing suicide, leading to polemics and a legal case in which Freud himself
testified.14
To understand how the diagnosis of PTSD met with such success, it is thus
important to set out a genealogy of suspicion with a critical genealogy of the idea of
trauma and the category of PTSD (Beneduce, 2010; Fassin and Rechtman, 2009;
Young, 1997). Doing so will show the colonial/racial setting as its place of origin
and its chosen image.
Colonial psychiatry had already launched a peculiar form of globalization of
the unconscious. Henry Aubin, a distinguished figure in French colonial psychia-
try and the psychiatric school directed by Antoine Porot in Algiers, and influ-
enced by psychoanalysis (particularly in its Jungian form), may be one of the most
eloquent examples of this desire. According to Bullard, by interpreting magic
thought or other religious practices as the expression of “denial” in the psycho-
analytic sense of the term, and perceiving the symptoms of Africans as similar to
those of European patients, Aubin contributed to the construction of a “global
unconscious.”15 And, unlike other psychiatrists of the period, he dismantled the
barrier of cultural difference that other psychiatrists had erected in approaching
Indigenous madness, as they described the role of superstitions and beliefs in the
ravings of Africans.16 This perspective, Bullard continues, canceled other differ-
ences too: ideas about magic or witchcraft, for example, had been “disarmed” of
their specific metaphysical and ontological value, and the global unconscious had
inexorably bent temporalities, experiences and autonomous narrative registers
within the hegemonic interpretive code of western psychoanalysis and psychiatry.
As Anderson et al. (2011) observe:
Thirty years later, the category of PTSD would carry out a similar strategy,
massively and even more effectively universalizing the significance of traumatic
experience and its clinical effects, but also the temporality typical of traumatic
memory and its treatment. Through a complex epistemic and political torsion,
the trauma of American veterans in Vietnam perpetuated that secret impulse to
globalize the significance of symptoms, experiences and treatments that psychiatry
26 Roberto Beneduce
had already tried to achieve in the colonial period. To ensure its influence, how-
ever, the diagnosis of PTSD once again had to silence other conflicts and contra-
dictions, concealing in particular the racial nature of the violence and suffering
associated with the war in Vietnam. Contempt for an enemy, hated, derided,
racialized and animalized, was necessary to perpetrate violence and atrocities even
against civilians. The zoological language that Fanon had described in detail in
the colonial context once again took center-stage in the history of the US mili-
tary. And as often happens, it was often language that preserved, like splinters of
wood embedded in flesh, the (racial) meaning of abuse, atrocity and destruction.
Consider the case of the racial slur designating the Vietnamese, “g**k,” a term
already used by US soldiers against Asian people during other colonial wars (in
Korea, and still earlier in the Philippines) and employed also against Black Hai-
tians in the early 20th century.17 The history of the term is exemplary for the
function it played to dehumanize the enemy, and further to placate any sense
of guilt, moral crisis and anguish for American soldiers. A perverse competition
developed around the number of Vietnamese killed or Vietnamese women raped,
who, after all, were no longer men or women, but simply “g**ks.”18 The idea of
a g**k syndrome, a concept coined by Lifton (1969/1970), recalls one of the most
important pages in the history of PTSD:
The men who fought the long Vietnam ground war were drawn into what
I shall call the “g**k syndrome.” The scapegoated victims of American soldier-
survivors of the ground war in Vietnam were not the North Vietnamese or
the NLF guerrillas, or even South Vietnamese civilians and soldiers. Rather,
they were the “g**ks”. . . . So predominant was the g**k syndrome that try-
ing to avoid it made one “abnormal,” and even those who consciously fought
its dehumanization were inevitably drawn into it. . . . Despite everything,
however, more humane feelings toward Vietnamese did persist. Such feelings
could be kept alive by involvements with families or by various encounters
with the suffering of individual Vietnamese. Children could play a particularly
great part in resensitizing experiences. Veterans recalled their shock at seeing
American trucks barreling through villages and running over children in the
road. These are what I call images of ultimate transgression, of ultimate “mis-
match” –the helpless young, whom adults are supposed to nurture and protect,
cruelly destroyed by all-powerful but totally unfeeling American machines.
(pp. 70–71)
(1974/2012) and other feminist scholars who trace the connections between
colonialism, sex, race and social class to structurally analyze the dominant global
forms of exploitation. In my analysis, I work to distill a symptomatic understand-
ing of trauma from these premises.
of trauma, whose structure is radically different from the one characterizing the
idea of PTSD.
His first step was to consider suffering both in the colonizers and in the colo-
nized. The cases in the first group of patients (“Series A – Five cases have been
collected here, all involving Algerians or Europeans who had clearly defined symp-
toms of severe reactive disorders”; Fanon, 1963, p. 185) document, for example,
the symptoms of two colonial police officers (cases 4 and 5). Later we read of a
French woman, the daughter of a civilian, responsible for violence against Alge-
rians and “obsessed” with hunting them down. Though Fanon acknowledges the
psychic wounds of French occupiers and even of those responsible for torture,
he does not neglect the differences between those who try to question their role
(case 4) and those who ask only to be able to continue to torture without suffer-
ing (case 5), nor does he neglect the differences between mental disturbances for
aggressors and for victims. If one of the police officers displays a state of depres-
sion and a panic attack after accidentally meeting someone he had subjected to
torture, the victim, who had also recognized his tormentor and feared he had
come after him even in hospital to continue his work, has a much more serious
reaction: he attempts suicide. The conclusion is that there is no natural way in which
trauma takes its course. The trauma’s position within the sociopolitical fabric will
impose different prognoses and fates upon its differently positioned subjects. This
is what I have previously called Fanon’s “political semiotics” (Beneduce, 2011;
Gibson and Beneduce, 2017).
There is a second step by which Fanon sets forth his original theory of trauma
that is closely connected to the first. The question with which Fanon had begun
his reflections on racial alienation 20 years earlier (“What does a man want? What
does the black man want?”; Fanon, 1986, p. 10) became – after bearing witness
to the accounts of the tortured, treating their wounds, listening to the silence of
the raped women – the terrible enigma of the colonized: “Who am I in reality?”
In the colony, dehumanization, humiliation and “thingification” generate radi-
cal demands on one’s own status. This question signifies a new page in Fanon’s
phenomenology, where he insists that the violence inflicted on colonial territories
and the occupation of colonized bodies is coextensive, where he sketches a politi-
cal and clinical ecology that lays out on the same canvas the “wounds inflicted on
the colonized during a single day under a colonial regime” and the pain of places,
expropriated lands and evacuated villages:
In Algeria there is not simply domination but the decision, literally, to occupy
nothing else but a territory. The Algerians, the women dressed in haiks, the palm
groves, and the camels form a landscape, the natural backdrop for the French
presence.
(Fanon, 1963, p. 182)
Where Psyche, History and Politics Merge 29
For over sixty years the people of New York have been afflicted
with mercenary bands of lawless thieves and hoodlums who are
known to the authorities as “Gangs.” The only justification for their
existence is robbery, murder and revenge. They fight their
murderous battles on the streets of the city, and during the melee
assault and rob the people, after which they flee with the plunder.
Whenever they get into trouble, the alderman, district captain or
some other ward “heeler” comes to their rescue, and they in turn do
good service for him on election day as repeaters, stuffing ballot
boxes, and assaulting voters. Each gang is supposed to belong to
some political party, who are able to wield considerable “pull” in time
of trouble.
More than once they were responsible for a reign of terror in
many parts of the city. They were known to the police as “gangs,”
perhaps on account of their clannishness, for whenever they
participated in any local fight or riot, they usually stuck together and
fought like tigers for what they called their own rights. It is more
than likely that some of the gangs were bound together by an oath
which placed each member under pains and penalties not to reveal
their secrets. Whatever these oaths were, we are unable to say, but
we hardly think they were as rigid as the oaths of the Molly Maguires
or the Mafia?
The police records of the old New York gangs of fifty years ago,
show them to be mercenary, corrupt and dissipated, and often
revelling in riot and bloodshed; and when they desired to carry out
their evil purposes, they did not scruple at robbery or murder. For
years they have had full sway in the city on account of politics, but
when their conduct became unbearable, and oppressive, and all
irenic measures failed to break them up, the police were appealed
to, came upon them unexpectedly, clubbed the leaders, and sent
many of them to prison for long and short terms.
The most notorious of these predatory bands was known as the
Whyo Gang. They usually “hung out” in the vicinity of the Five
Points, Baxter, Leonard and Centre streets. This part of the city was
then known in police parlance as “The Bloody Sixth Precinct.” For
nearly a hundred years, crimes of every description, including a large
number of robberies, burglaries and holdups had been committed
here. For nearly three-quarters of a century, the Sixth Precinct was
known as the hotbed of crime, and the Whyo Gang found it a
profitable field for their labors.
The Whyo Gang was made up of young pickpockets and thieves of
the worst character, and many of them, if not all, spent years in jail.
Two leaders of the Whyo Gang, Dannie Lyons and Dannie Driscoll,
were convicted of the crime of murder, and hanged in the yard of
the Tombs Prison. Lyons was executed August 21st, 1886, and
Driscoll January 23d, 1888. The gang had robbed and murdered
scores of inoffensive people on the streets of the city, whose
untimely end will always remain a mystery.
“The Bloody Sixth” no longer carries the same reputation it did
forty years ago. No doubt much that was said and written of it was
not all true; nevertheless, it furnished more murders than any other
five city wards. It ought to be remembered that the “Sixth” contains
the Five Points, Mulberry Bend, the Criminal Courts Building, and the
Tombs Prison, where so many “tough” characters are harbored? The
population at the present time consists largely of Italians, Jews,
Polaks and Chinese. It has a great many squalid tenements, low
dives, groggeries, gin mills and several opium dens.
The Slaughter House Gang held forth in the Fourth Ward, and had
its headquarters over a squalid gin mill at the corner of Water street
and James Slip. It was run by a band of desperate characters, who
terrorized the neighboring water fronts. Captain Allaire took
energetic means to break it up, and succeeded only when he landed
the piratical ring leaders in prison.
The Cochran Roost Gang held forth at the corner of East Thirty-
sixth street and First avenue. It is said that this gang had pledged
themselves to kill policemen on sight. They laid wait for young and
inexperienced policemen on dark nights with bricks and stones in
their pockets. They usually hid themselves in alleyways and flat
roofs, and many sanguinary battles took place between them and
the police, in which they were usually worsted. Their headquarters
were reached by climbing a broken down staircase or ladder, which
they could hoist up with a rope, which led to an old shanty on the
corner of First avenue and Thirty-sixth street; hence the name,
Cochran’s Roost.
Handsome Harry Carlton, the last man who had the “honor” of
being hanged in the yard of the Tombs Prison, December 5th, 1889,
prior to the installation of the Electric Chair in Sing Sing Prison, was
known as one of the brilliant lights of the Cochran’s Roost Gang.
The gang known as “The Forty Thieves” held forth at Forty-second
street and Eleventh avenue. They had a local notoriety.
The Hell’s Kitchen Gang had their headquarters on Thirty-ninth
street and Eleventh avenue. They usually fought negroes with guns,
while the negroes in turn fought them with razors. The negroes and
whites are far from being friendly in this neighborhood, and many
battles have taken place in recent years.
The Gas House Gang was on Eighteenth street, near First avenue.
The Poverty Hollow Gang and the Dead Rabbit Gang were both on
the East Side, in the neighborhood of Thirty-fourth street and
Avenue A.
The two murderous associations of recent times are the Paul Kelly
and Monk Eastman Gangs. The former held out on Cherry Hill, while
the latter had their clubhouse on Stanton street, near the Bowery. A
noted police official of experience, in speaking of the many efforts to
break up the Monk Eastman and Paul Kelly Gangs, said that when
these murderous ruffians were arrested by the police and taken
before certain magistrates, the “pull” they exercised was so great
that nothing could be done to them. As long as these gangs existed,
it was impossible to have an honest election in New York. In later
years they belonged to powerful political organizations, and were
used for the purpose of controlling the city and State elections.
A few years ago Monk Eastman and some of his “pals” were sent
to Sing Sing for a term of years for assault and robbery. The
organization is still in existence, but is quiet.
The other leader, Paul Kelly, died some time ago of wounds
received in a street battle. On his death bed he refused to say who
shot him, but he left it with the members of the gang, when they
come out of prison, to avenge his death.
The most recent criminal band that has sprung into prominence
the past few years, is known as the Five Points Gang. During the hot
summer spell they start out at night, robbing and assaulting East
Side storekeepers, and people who are asleep around their doors. In
one night they were able to get away with more than two thousand
dollars. Several of the gang are now in prison, while many of the
leaders are still at large.
Party politics is the one thing that fosters the Gang System in New
York. As soon as the police arrest any of the gang leaders, they are
aided in court by District Captains and leaders who have a solid pull
with the Magistrate or Judge. After their discharge, they repeat the
same lawlessness, until some person gets killed, when they are sent
to prison.
CHAPTER XXIII
To watch the selection of the jury, and see panel after panel of
intelligent men excused on the flimsiest grounds, is enough to make
the Goddess of Justice open her eyes and weep.
During the past twelve years we have witnessed some of the most
tragic murder trials in the history of the New York Bar, in which
money and brains were used on both sides. When Roland B.
Molineux, Dr. Kennedy, Albert T. Patrick and Harry K. Thaw were
placed on trial, the courts were thronged daily with gaping crowds of
men and women, breaking their necks to get a look at the
defendants, and using all sorts of “pulls” to secure a seat in the
court.
And as the jury is called and examined one by one, to read their
real character as depicted on their faces when they take their seats
to decide the fate of some weakling, a good judge of human nature
can readily discern the result of the trial long before it is finished.
Then, listen to the testimony that is presented; hear the lawyers
wrangle for and against the prisoner, and, finally, watch the judge as
he charges the jury, and then see the prisoner as he stands at the
bar for sentence or acquittal. All this becomes a fearfully interesting
piece of realism.
But the glorious uncertainty of the law leaves so many loopholes
for the real criminal to escape punishment, and the innocent to get a
term of imprisonment, that some of the rulings made in our courts
are tragic enough to make angels weep.
Some time ago, a rich murderer was tried in this city. His defence
was one that no Court in the land recognizes, viz.: the unwritten law.
During the trial, one medical expert said that the defendant suffered
from “brain storms.” In a more recent murder trial, the only defence
offered was “Confusional Insanity,” all of which is simply a foolish
way of trying to “beat” the case.
We could name a dozen of well known characters whose crimes
have been heralded all over the land, who were sent to the death
house, but after a couple of years, when the Court of Appeals
decided that they should have another trial on a mere technicality,
returned to the Tombs, and after a few abortive efforts to convict
them a second time, were liberated, as the important witnesses
were dead, or could not be found. It is difficult to say wherein lies
the trouble. But with our present elective system, we are apt to get
some very poor material as Judges. They lack educational and
experimental qualifications. Nor can we abolish the right of appeal
because some judges make foolish rulings. With such judicial
material on the bench, the right of appeal is our only safety valve,
and must be retained.
There is a widespread feeling in our day that many trials are only
a huge farce, and the “unwritten law,” “benefit of the doubt,” and
“long-drawn-out hypothetical questions” in a large number of cases
are allowed to defeat the ends of justice.
In regard to homicides, nothing would appeal to the good sense of
the community after an atrocious murder has been committed more
than to give the murderer a speedy trial and summary justice. It is
all “humbug” to keep a murderer shut up in the Tombs from six
months to a year before trying him. When he goes forth to trial, if
the witnesses are not all dead, they have forgotten nearly all of what
was once fresh in their memory. Let there be speedy trials and quick
punishment for all kinds of crime. This will deter others from
following the footsteps of evil doers. In murder cases it would be
well also if capital punishment were abolished, and life imprisonment
substituted.
In nearly all the advanced countries of Europe, in criminal trials,
swift justice is the order of the day.
In Great Britain there are no long-drawn-out trials. Nor will the
judges allow delays on mere technicalities. Each case is decided on
its own merits.
As a rule, the presiding judge exercises full control over the case,
and as a result everything is done with quickness and dispatch, and
the higher courts uphold such rulings.
In speaking of the lax conditions of our courts, a recent writer
says: “The machinery of our courts seems to be passing slowly and
inevitably into disrepute. Processes wrought out by wise and noble-
minded men for the protection of life and property and the
dispensation of justice, have been seized upon again and again by
unscrupulous pettifoggers, and every technicality of the entire legal
procedure has been converted into a loophole through which some
scalawag has escaped. The country swarms with unhung murderers,
and with thieves who walk the streets at noon unmanacled, who
ought to be wearing striped suits inside of prison walls. When
murder trials drag their weary lengths through the disgusting weeks
and months of the year, only to end at last in a new trial, or in a
pardon issued by some sentimental fool who has reached the
Governor’s chair, is it to be wondered at that hot-headed men lose
respect for statutes and judges and begin to talk of taking the law
into their own hands? It is high time that our judges and lawyers
were awake, and took measures to reform the present processes of
criminal jurisprudence so as to make the punishment of crime both
swift and certain.”
It is a great mistake to shield rich criminals from their just
desserts, as is sometimes done. Punishment should be meted out to
all alike at all hazards, else it will have no terrors for the wrongdoer.
Criminals must be impressed with the dignity and majesty of the law
—no matter what is their social or commercial standing.
A few years ago, Roland B. Molineux had a hard battle for his
liberty. He was always brave and optimistic, and believed all alone
that in the end he would be vindicated. He must have spent about
twenty months in the Tombs, and the same length of time in the
death house awaiting the decision of the Court of Appeals. As I had
always taken a deep interest in the young man, I called to see him
in the death house. Here he manifested the same hopeful spirit he
had shown all along. During his long confinement it looked
sometimes as if fate was conspiring against him, but thanks to his
gritty father, who stuck so nobly by him, and the matchless
eloquence of Governor Black, the undisputed Demosthenes of the
New York Bar, he was finally acquitted. In this trial, which was fairly
conducted, Governor Black was master of the situation, and
conquered. From this time, either in civil or criminal trials, the
Governor was the peer of any lawyer in the land. It must also be
said that there was another gentleman, who filled no inconspicuous
part in the vindication of Molineux, and that was Judge Olcott, who
was a peacemaker and diplomat of the highest order.
Greasing the Machinery of the Law
Frequently the prosecutor in a criminal court, under the cloak of
having a duty to perform, proceeds to do it with the vengeance of a
fiend, and the bias and prejudice of a persecutor, and perhaps with
murder in his heart.
Nor are we without numerous instances where the prosecutor or
some of his assistants have been known to “gear” the machinery of
the law so as to convict some unfortunate of a crime of which there
was absolutely no evidence, except what was manufactured for the
occasion. In doing such work, the police can always be relied upon
for a certain amount of help, which they never fail to give. Then
there is in every community certain degenerates, including emotional
and hysterical men and women, ready to swear to anything asked of
them, and who spring into fame during a sensational trial, not to
mention the professional juror who draws two dollars a day for
sitting around the court house, who is largely dependent on the
public prosecutor for his sinecure.
There are thousands of people who all their lives have been the
victims of cruelty, oppression and malicious persecution, but real
justice they have not known. There are innocent men in nearly all of
our penal institutions, who have suffered because of false swearers.
They may appeal to an Executive, even a righteous one, who has so
many intolerable conscientious scruples on the question of pardoning
crooks that the poor, friendless prisoner is allowed to rot in prison,
so that the righteous Governor may make no mistake.
But the innocent have this consolation, that their case has been
sent up to Heaven’s Court of Appeals, where in God’s good time a
just verdict will be rendered in their favor.
But what a crime it is to send an unfortunate to the Electric Chair,
or State Prison for life, or even a limited term in jail, on
manufactured evidence or opinions of an alienist, or a handwriting
expert, who are given large fees for their testimony! Handwriting
experts have made so many mistakes in the past that it is absolutely
impossible to believe them. They may think themselves famous as
interpreters of dots, curves, right angles and horizontal lines, but
they cannot positively tell whether John Doe or John Jones wrote
the document, and human opinions are not evidence. It is certainly a
miscarriage of justice to convict any man or woman on such absurd
testimony. If you have plenty of money, you can prove anything you
please by the use of such expert testimony, or disprove it. But
without the most absolute corroboration, expert testimony is
worthless.
Crooks at the Bar of Justice
The day of judgment for New York criminals usually falls on Friday.
It not only brings many surprises, but hidden things long forgotten
are brought to light. Between the day of a man’s conviction and the
day when sentence is passed, the officers of the law have an
opportunity to look up his record, and report him in the true light to
the judge. When he comes to the bar for sentence, the court has his
life mapped out on paper. As soon as the judge begins to question
the prisoner, his character for truthfulness is put to the test. Crooks
who are as a rule notorious liars have poor memories. No matter
how cumulative their guilt is, they are always innocent!
It is interesting to watch the proceedings when some scamp has
come up for sentence. A good deal of stage work is done in Court
for the effect it has on those present. The female relatives are on
hand, weeping like steam engines, while the prisoner at the bar, who
has made many promises, is as hard as a stone. Some of the men
up for sentence are salesmen, confidential clerks and secretaries,
who, when they lose at the races, steal big sums from their
employers, and then have their friends “pull social and political
wires” to get them out of their troubles; while the poor mechanic or
day laborer who steals eight or ten dollars to keep the wolf from the
door, has not a friend in the world, and usually gets a “soaking”
when he comes to the bar. Perhaps his wife or mother has been to
see the judge at his home, where she has created a “scene,” but it
has done no good; he has got to go to prison. Not long since, Judge
Cowing, one of the best of the General Session judges (now retired),
said to a young man who had been before him on two former
occasions: “You have been in Elmira and Sing Sing, and here you are
again. Where are you going to end up? Your mother came to my
house last night. Poor woman, I felt
Hon. JOHN F. McINTYRE.
A noted criminal lawyer
Copyright. I. & M. Stienberg. N. Y.
Justice J. A. Blanchard
Justice J. W. Goff
sorry for her; but you show no feeling whatever. What’s the matter
with you? If I should grant the requests of friends for everyone who
has a good mother, the people would soon ask me to retire from the
bench altogether.” This is true. The judge must send the young
prodigal to prison to deter others.
Here is what another judge said of a young man who stole
$15,000 from an employer. The firm had only charged him with
stealing a much smaller sum, but when they examined their books,
they found it a small fortune. It was spent mostly on the races. His
wife and three small children were in court, asking for clemency: “I
have been on the bench,” said His Honor, “many years, and have
had many a sad case, but there is none sadder than the one I am
now called upon to dispose of. The great trouble in such cases is
that you are compelled to inflict punishment upon people who do
not deserve it—I mean the wives and children of men charged with
crime.”
Noted Criminal Lawyers
One of the most noted criminal lawyers of the New York bar for
thirty or forty years was the late William F. Howe, better known as
“Bill” Howe. I have often heard him plead eloquently at the bar, and
with great success. Howe was a typical advocate, and put his soul
into his client’s defence. He was humorous, pathetic and magnetic
before a jury. When he understood the case thoroughly he became a
powerful pleader. It is said that he frequently was moved to tears by
his own eloquence, and was always able to draw tears from the
most unsympathetic jury. He was called by a certain District Attorney
“The Weeping Bill Howe.”
A story is told of Howe’s tears in connection with a case in which
he appeared for the defendant, before Recorder-Hackett. Mr. Howe
had just succeeded by his eloquence, aided by his tears, in obtaining
in rapid succession the acquittal of several men charged with
homicide. The Recorder was somewhat disgruntled. Howe entered
upon the defence of a woman charged with homicide. She was
seated with her child on her knees. While Howe was pleading for her
acquittal, he was seen to scowl at his client. She gazed at him in
blank amazement. Howe moved up closer to her and the baby.
Suddenly the baby began to cry. Howe wept as the baby’s screams
suddenly ceased. Recorder Hackett looked up with a smile and
remarked: “Mr. Howe, you had better give the baby another jab with
a pin.”
Stories are told around the Criminal Courts Building of lawyers
who received retainers from well known crooks in the shape of
stolen jewelry. A lawyer who used to be a frequent visitor at the
Tombs defended a crook in return for a diamond pin which he had
received for his services. After he had convinced the jury that his
client was innocent, he wore the stolen pin in his necktie.
John F. McIntyre is one of the best of our criminal lawyers. He
always puts up a strong fight for his client. This is the one thing that
appeals to a jury. An intelligent juror can easily tell if a lawyer is
simply a “hired attorney” or a real advocate. Moore, who defended
“Doc” Kennedy, is another of that kind. When a lawyer appeals to a
jury as if he meant it, good results are sure to follow. Among a score
of noted New York criminal lawyers might be mentioned Abraham
Levy and James W. Osborne.
Strange Sentences
During many years of careful observation, I have seen some
strange sentences. If you are poor and have a mean enemy, with
the aid of the police, he can inflict great injury on you!
I knew the case of a young man, who found some worthless junk
wire outside a factory, and was sent away for a year. In the next cell
was a crook with a “record” who was aided by a cop, and a crooked
lawyer. He stole a thousand dollars. His “bit” was only six months.
Another fellow who swindled several dry goods stores out of
$17,000, was allowed to plead to petty larceny. He got off cheap—
only six months.
Such travesties of justice have often been witnessed in New York.
Indeed, men and women have been known to conspire with lawyers
and others to send innocent persons to prison, and they have
succeeded!
I knew well the case of John H. While he was in prison, his wife
suddenly became the friend of a certain police official. After he had
secured his liberty he was informed that he must keep away from his
old home. Soon after he was arrested, charged with a crime of
which he was entirely innocent. When he went to Part I, General
Sessions, to plead, a legal pettifogger who was sent there by this
man’s wife stepped up and informed him that he would take his
case. He did so, and without consulting him entered a plea of guilty.
He was then sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. He found out
afterwards that it was a conspiracy to get him out of the way. It was
a success.
I recall the case of an Italian who was charged with the murder of
his wife. He was caught “red-handed,” and two of his children told
the coroner that they saw him do the deed. John F. McIntyre ably
represented the people, and Judge Fursman presided in the Criminal
Branch of the Supreme Court. When the case came to trial, the
Italian children had evidently been tipped off to forget all about it.
As they had manifested entire ignorance and forgetfulness of the
crime, and could not remember a word of what they told the police
and the coroner, the murderer was allowed to go scot free!
We knew a man who stole $40,000, and yet received a suspended
sentence. But this should be said, that the money was taken to save
another man, and not himself, and the deficiency was made good.
Perhaps it was only fair that the sentence be suspended. We know
two young men who were in the Boys’ Prison at the same time. One
stole $10,000, the other just one dollar. The lad that stole the ten
thousand dollars had his friends make restitution, then the
complainant recommended extreme leniency. In view of his former
good character, the court gave him a suspended sentence. The boy
who stole one dollar had been in prison and was out on parole. For
this new crime he was sent to the House of Refuge.
There is the case of a young man named Sullivan, who stole a tray
of valuable jewelry from a Columbus avenue house. A morning
paper commented freely on the “pull” that gave the prisoner a
suspended sentence. The owner of the store did not relish the thief
getting off so easy. In speaking of the affair he said: “The next time
a thief visits my place, I will make no effort to bring him to justice.
What is the use, if he is let go after his guilt has been clearly
established? The robbery was carefully planned, and was well
carried out. The Court should have given the thief a medal. Why
not?”
While chaplain, I was sent for by an unfortunate girl, an inmate of
the Women’s Prison. She had the usual tale of disappointment and
misplaced confidence to tell, which was full of sadness. Most girls,
strangers in New York, and far from home, have usually a hard road
to travel. After I heard her story, I remembered that there was a
prominent lawyer in the city that came from the same place of which
she was a native. The gentleman was an ex-Assistant District
Attorney. I felt if I could only get him interested in the case, she
would have a better chance of securing her liberty. I made a
personal call on the gentleman. He had spacious offices in the
vicinity of Wall Street. As soon as I had mentioned this young
woman’s name, he at once recognized it. Indeed, he had been
intimate with the family for years, and was willing to do anything for
her. All of which was very encouraging. I then asked him to make a
note of the date when she came up for sentence. At my suggestion
he called one of the stenographers to make a memorandum. “Mary
Ann,” said my legal friend, “make a note of this,” and looking very
pious, he said, “I do this for the love of God; yes, I do this for the
love of God.” By this time the clerks and typewriters began to snicker
and laugh. Just as I had expected, all this pious talk did not amount
to anything. The poor girl was finally sent away to one of our
institutions.
CHAPTER XXIV
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