The Ecumenical Committee for Peace in Chile (1973-1975): The Foundation of Moral

Opposition to Authoritarian Rule in Chile

Author(s): Pamela Lowden
Source: Bulletin of Latin American Research , May, 1993, Vol. 12, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp.
189-203
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)

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Buli Latin Am. Res., Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 189-203,1993. 0261-3050/93$6.00 + .00
Printed in Great Britain. Society for Latin American Studies
Pergamon Press Ltd

The Ecumenical Committee for Peace in Chile

(1973-1975): the Foundation of Moral
Opposition to Authoritarian Rule in Chile*
PAMELALOWDEN

St Antony's College, University of Oxford, UK

INTRODUCTION

More than any of the other military regimes inspired by National

doctrine in Latin America, that of Pinochet in Chile may be seen
concerted effort to establish a form of hegemonic authoritarianism. I
regime which aimed not only to exclude leftist, or even all, parties an
pluralist practice, but replace them altogether. In its attempt to pe
authoritarian rule, the Pinochet regime combined coercion with a s
bid for the consent of the majority of the Chilean people: hence t
hegemonic nature of its political project.
This bid for consent rested on two key elements. One was the prom
economic prosperity and the substitution of 'real' economic liberty in
market for the old political freedoms which, it was claimed, had
served to impede the country's development. From the end of the dec
the 1970s such discourse was central to the regime, and it is that
radical economic and social restructuring which accompanied it?wh
the Pinochet regime apart from its contemporary counterparts elsewh
the region. The second element of consent-seeking was less unique
but was, nevertheless, sustained with particular force and conviction b
regime precisely because it became the cutting edge of its conflictual
with the Church. This was the justification of the continuous persecut
the left, and to a lesser extent the Christian Democrats as the 'Kerens
the left'. For the Pinochet regime, adherents of leftist ideologies were n
implacably totalitarian and anti-Christian, they were also agents of a f
power. Hence the denial of nationality and citizenship rights to thousa
Chileans forced into exile. Indeed, it seems that, for the regime, leftis
not even human. Junta members, in fact, said as much; the regime's tre
of its prisoners demonstrates the effect of such an attitude.
At the time of the September 1973 coup, Chile's new rulers expec
support of the Church not only for the restoration of 'order' to the c
but also for their accompanying determination to exterminate Marxism
Marxists. Instead, the junta obtained a degree of qualified support from
hierarchy, accompanied by a concern for human rights which was to f
basis of what may be termed 'moral opposition' to its rule.

* Winner of the Harold Blakemore Essay Prize for 1993, awarded by the Society
American Studies.

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190 BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH

The term 'moral opposition' represents an attempt to point

a different phenomenon from that of political opposition; on
issues are not only explicit but form its central core. In
opposition to the abuse of human rights by the regime, and
of its actions. Moral opposition may be seen as being at onc
than political opposition, and yet also as having the potenti
and more powerful, particularly when led by the country's
and in a deeply Catholic country.
Clearly, the key immediate difference from conventional
tion is that the defence of human rights does not amount t
platform for rule, even though it implies a rejection of the
legitimation of an abusive regime. This is inherent in the nat
of human rights in authoritarian societies; it is even more th
the Church that is involved in this defence, since the Church
has its own normative reasons for preferring to avoid involv
politics or the elaboration of political programmes.
Indeed, it may be argued that the defence of human rights
opposition at all. That is, in so far as its ends are solely that
respected, then this does not imply that there must be a cha
even government, if it is possible within the ethos and aims
be to order a cessation of violations on the part of their
However, when the repressive process is integral to the pro
both in its laws and its actions, then opposition to human rig
considered, at least by the regime, as tantamount to politic
was the case in Chile.
Although the Church always insisted that its defence of human rights was a
moral and not a political issue as such, it none the less had to face the con-
sequences of its actions as the regime treated most of the Catholic religious
leaders as enemies, albeit ones more powerful and more difficult to attack
than its political enemies. Thus the moral opposition of the Church to the
Pinochet regime's human rights' violations led to a conflict that was all the
more bitter for its taking place in a context in which Christianity was the main
value system of both those who supported and those who opposed the
regime. The conflict, then, was not only a question of two opposing forms of
rule, an authoritarian versus a democratic, or even of two opposing value
systems, an atheist versus a Christian. Rather, it involved two opposing
visions of what the same value should actually signify for the country. Those
opposing visions included contrasting models both of the desirable form of
rule and of the role of the Church, even of the meaning of the Christian
religion. In that sense, therefore, the moral opposition as led by the Church
amounted to a kind of 'total opposition'.
The importance of this moral opposition in defeating the hegemonic
project of the Pinochet regime will be considered briefly at the end. This
paper aims to review the original process of how the Church's moral
opposition began rather than to study its actual effects.1 The institution which
best symbolised and most furthered that moral opposition was the Vicariate
of Solidarity of the Archdiocese of Santiago?known simply as the Vicaria?
founded in January 1976. It was, as its name implied, a functional institution

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 THE ECUMENICAL COMMITTEE FOR PEACE IN CHILE 191

working in the field of human rights, but one which was also an integra
of the structure of the Catholic Church. Both for that reason and the exte
its activities, it represents a unique example of Church involvement
defence of human rights. Nowhere else has any national Church taken
institutionalised and large-scale action to counter a repressive state; in
its symbolic importance rested in great part on that fact.
What follows is not, however, about the Vicaria itself, but its less-know
predecessor, the Ecumenical Peace Committee. This is in part becau
story is worth recounting, and because it is not possible to understand h
such a unique organisation as the Vicaria came into being without con
ing the previous experience of the Committee.

THE CATHOLIC HIERARCHY AND THE PINOCHET REGIME

The position of the Chilean Church as a whole vis-d-vis the Pinochet

was more complex than one simply of opposition, reflecting both
differences and the fact that the central concern of the hierarch
pursue all avenues which would lead to national reconciliation. Th
too, that the concrete, testimonial action which it took in defence of
rights was a crucial element in its overall approach to military rule a
in many respects to offset its often conciliatory position towards th
which it functioned.
Although the hierarchy had, in the main, been initially prepare
operate with the Allende government, relations became extremely st
One bone of contention had been a proposed reform of the e
system; more than that, however, Church leaders held the gov
largely responsible for the climate of violence gripping the country by
None the less, the hierarchy had done nothing to encourage military
vention. On the contrary, the primate, Cardinal Silva, facilitated
between Allende and Christian Democrat president Patricio Ayl
weeks before the coup he had hoped thereby to avoid. Time was
moreover, that the spirit behind the bishops' initial willingness to co
with the Popular Unity programme did not end with the end of that
ment, although that was not immediately apparent.
In a declaration two days after the coup, the hierarchy expressed c
that violence be avoided, but also gave an important degree of legitim
the junta by asking Chileans to co-operate with the new authorities.
Silva officiated at the traditional Independence Day Te Deum of 18
ber in the junta's presence; but, significantly, he refused the latter's
that it be held in the Military College.3 The primate's cautious we
military intervention was balanced by the desire not to take sides at
such extreme national division and emnity. The fact that, less than a
after the coup, he presided over the establishment of an ecumenical o
tion to protect the persecuted was, in many respects, a demonstratio
that desire for balance.

THE FOUNDING OF THE ECUMENICAL PEACE COMMITTEE

It was also clear to many Church leaders that the repression in the
coup was on a larger and more savage scale than the autho

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192 BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH

admitting. The offices of the archbishopric began to fill

for protection or help for themselves and family m
disappeared; the story was similar in parishes throu
Shortly after the coup there were over 7000 prisoners
Stadium alone. The military had taken control of all lev
civil society, from the presidency down to neighbou
leaving the Church as virtually the sole remaining instan
leaders' close contact with the human tragedy of tho
their considerable shock at the nature and extent ofthe
less, that this shock translated into a moral imperative
organised action to mitigate the effects ofthe repression
was due to the convergence of a number of factors.
Firstly, the shock was shared among Catholic and oth
alike; among the latter were the leader of the Luth
Helmut Frenz, and the representative of the World
Pastor Charles Harper. Harper had come to Chile shortl
co-ordinate with the UNHCR on the establishment o
evacuate foreign nationals, whose numbers the autho
Both Harper and Frenz felt, however, that the situ
hundreds of Chileans was still more critical, and c
concern that something be done on their behalf to t
himself considering such an option. Thus was concei
Peace Committee. It would be an organisation with broa
and a brief to alleviate the plight of the victims of the
Harper's ability to secure Cardinal Silva's support had, i
with the fact that they brought World Council fundin
authority to make it immediately available. Although
became forthcoming, the World Council was vital to th
donations represented nearly a half of the total $1.8 m
undertaking cost during its two-year existence. At the
was conceived, this immediate and assured finan
importance.
Another factor which should not be underestimated in terms of the
dynamics of the time was the belief among the Committee's founders that the
repression would be short-lived, thus making their own measures emergency,
transient ones, rather like the action to help foreign nationals. The
Committee was certainly not an institution created to challenge the new
regime on the grounds of its human rights' abuses. There was no awareness
that the military junta was going to be the basis of a new regime.
Yet, as well as these contingent factors, there were much deeper traditions
within the Chilean Catholic Church, and in Cardinal Silva's leadership of it,
without which it is very unlikely the Committee would ever have existed.
Even before the Second Vatican Council, the Chilean Church had established
a practice of seeking to evangelise by example, by deed and not merely word.
Demonstrations to that effect had included the Church's own internal
agrarian reform of 1963, which had preceded the effective beginning of the
national one by some four years, and had been intended to spur the lay
authorities to action. Then, too, there had been the Church's initial support

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THE ECUMENICAL COMMITTEE FOR PEACE IN CHILE 193

for the programme of the Popular Unity, epitomised, for examp

joint attendance with Allende at acts commemorating 1 May,
1972. The progressive and often dynamic nature of the Chilea
no doubt to a great degree a reflection of the particular challeng
the need to counter a strong, ideological left. Now, in th
repression, defence of that same left was a testimonial act of faith
of the sincerity of the Church's teachings.5
However, while these deeper reasons also lay behind the later in
alisation of the defence of human rights in the form of the Vicar
Committee which, thanks to the nature of its response to th
repressive process, created the dynamic that ensured such an ins
tion occurred.

THE PEACE COMMITTEE STARTS WORK

On 6 October 1973, Chile's chief religious leaders created the

Committee of Co-operation for Peace in Chile.6 Its mission was
legal, financial, technical and spiritual assistance for those Chileans
result of recent political events, were in serious financial and perso
As well as the Catholic Church, under whose legal jurisdiction
mittee was placed, the other religious organisations involved
Lutheran, Baptist, Methodist, Methodist Pentecostal, and Greek
Churches and the Jewish community. It was agreed that its co
would be Bishops Frenz and Ariztia, the latter being auxiliary
bishop of Santiago, and that representatives of all the participating
groups would be present on its directing body. On Ariztia's rec
tion, a recently ordained Jesuit, Fernando Salas, was appointed
secretary.
Salas then began the task of finding staff. Initially he recruited a small team
of social workers and law graduates, members of the MAPU (Movimiento de
Accion Popular Unitaria), founded as a Marxist breakaway group from the
Christian Democratic Party in 1969. The particular political affiliation of the
first lay staff was not coincidental. On the one hand, they were Christians,
people whom the clerics had known for years and whom they knew they
could count on both in terms of professional ability and, moreover, personal
integrity. On the other hand, they were also supporters of the Popular Unity,
rendered unemployed by the coup, and anxious to do what they could to help
with whatever was possible to mitigate its effects on their fellows. Indeed, the
largest single party affiliation, where they had one, among the permanent
staff remained that of the MAPU. This was also because the tendency was for
much of the recruiting of staff to be done through informal friendship
networks (in part, too, for elementary reasons of security to prevent govern?
ment infilitration), thus tending to produce this relative homogeneity.
Consciousness of the politically delicate nature of the undertaking is clear
from the name finally agreed upon for the Committee: it was carefully chosen
both to be acceptable to all religious parties and to minimise government
antagonism. The new Committee's public announcements of its existence,
published in paid inserts in the press, display the same caution. The first
stated that:

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194 BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH

workers lacking resources who, as a result of the p

situation, wish for information as to how to receive th
which they are legally entitled in resolving employ
problems afflicting them, may come to the Committee
Monica St 2338 between 9.00 a.m. and 1.00 p.m. and 2.30
p.m., Monday-Friday.7

As is discernible from the almost coded language of the

two most pressing aspects ofthe repression which the Com
to address were politically motivated dismissals and deten
to grow in scope as the staff devised means to help resolv
saw these arising, but its principal concerns remained th
The Committee's initial working practices were som
Those arriving in its office for help were provided with i
material assistance, and were then interviewed by a socia
give further council and take note of their personal detail
where necessary, be assigned a lawyer according to th
problems. Legal assistance in matters of employment
defence, in workers' tribunals, of those dismissed and
unemployment subsidies to which they were entitled. The
the legal assistance at first centred on the defence of those
War Tribunals {Consejos de Guerrd). In total, the Com
defence in some 550 cases, both in Santiago and in t
frequently managed to secure pardon or a reduction of s
since these tribunals worked on an unsystematic, often a
offices set up in other parts of the country to co-ordinate
for these trials, which often meant a lawyer being sent fr
local professional could be found to help, also continued to
out the period.
By March 1974 the Committee estimated that it was rece
per cent ofthe cases of detention in Santiago of more than
and its lawyers had attended to some 1300 petitions for
spread quickly among the many desperate relatives of de
often meet each other knocking fruitlessly on the same of
Committee was somewhere to go for help. The initial
expanding very rapidly to meet the demand. By August
had grown to just over 100, reaching nearly 200 one year
An important initial result of the Committee's work was
public statement, in April 1974, the bishops registere
human rights' violations. The reason they did so was a co
report presenting and detailing the cases for which the C
information, including 134 cases of torture.9 The force o
lessened by the bishops' care also to praise 'the honour
goodwill of our governors', a further demonstration of t
provoke serious rupture with the new authorities.10
bishops centred on the issue of whether it was better
intercessions with the military commanders or to make
condemning human rights' violations.11 The import

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THE ECUMENICAL COMMITTEE FOR PEACE IN CHILE 195

Committee, when seen in the light of these internal tensions

hierarchy, is clear. The fact that its findings were trusted by the
already, albeit slowly, starting to shift the balance of their positio
more outspoken criticism of the government, notwithstanding the
balance of measured support.12
Nevertheless, both Generals Pinochet and Bonilla, the Interior
told the bishops that they considered the declaration 4a stab in the
ElMercurio, the major national newspaper, was at pains to publish
ments of those bishops who then sought to distance themselves
being 'clarifications' of its meaning.13 Anything less than total sup
least acquiescence, was unacceptable to Chile's new rulers. This r
a sign of what was to come, as the Committee continued to make i
more troublesome to the new regime.

THE FIRST WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE USE OF

DOCUMENTATION ON VIOLAHONS
Beyond providing defence in the War Tribunals, an increasingly p
problem faced by the Committee's legal department was how to h
hundreds of people who had simply disappeared since their detenti
decision was taken that, since the official independence of the judiciar
been assured by the junta, one concrete line of action which could b
was through the presentation of writs of habeas corpus to the courts.
well known that the judiciary was extremely biased?the Supreme
President had publicly expressed his 'delight' with the military interve
and there was considerable dispute among Committee staff as to w
such action would not be tantamount to legitimating the new regime.
ever, the imperative to take concrete action through the official c
which remained prevailed. The first such writ was a list of 131 ind
whose whereabouts was unknown and for whom there was incontro
evidence of arrest, detailed documentation of which was included.
presented on 29 March 1974 to the Appeal Court by Hector Valen
Valderrama, former President of the Chamber of Deputies and Ch
Democrat senator, and countersigned by Bishops Ariztia and Fren
Chief Rabbi, Angel Kreiman, and Fernando Salas. Deliberate
Committee sought to capitalise on its religious identity and contac
figures not of the left in the interests of securing a better hearing in th
The credentials of those presenting the writ were of little avail: the
reaction established a pattern to be repeated throughout the dicta
Although the authorities were perfunctorily requested to provid
relevant information, the validity of the writ was itself finally rejected
Supreme Court in January 1975. However, regardless of the n
response, this case established the practice of presenting writs of
corpus. The total number presented by the Committee was to reac
although with only three successes. The legal argument of the Com
remained that the President's invocation of a State of Siege was insuff
grounds for the civil courts to refuse to assume jurisdiction ove
arrested, and, moreover, that no Constitutional norm authori
political power to keep those detained without the right of receivin

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196 BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH

even from lawyers or in secret places. Thus there remain

that at least some arrests would be recognised, thereby gi
margin of physical safety to the people in question.14 Oth
began also to determine the persistence in using the lega
of defending human rights.
In an immediate way, at least, they were able to p
support for the families of those detained, and it starte
ingly clear that what lay ahead was a moral battle, with p
rather than a legal one. A key part of that battle, then,
information, and, by extension, credibility. Thus, the m
which accompanying documentation on each case wa
courts became a fundamentally important characteristic
Committee. The same information was then sent to the
the relevant international organisations, notably the hum
sions of the OAS and the UN. Crucially, then, and regard
positions of the staff, the circumstances themselves i
rigour on the Committee.15 Yet, although the Committe
violations took on a central importance, it was the fac
being offered that enabled it to be collected.
The question of what to do with this information was an
one. The report on which the hierarchy's criticisms of t
been based had been kept secret precisely to protect the
upon it as they saw fit.16 Moreover, some religious o
Committee had congregations more uniformly well d
government. Thus, either those religious leaders them
reservations about the Committee's work, or they were
straints to avoid alienating their faithful, or both.17 The C
to promote peace in Chile. That included the defence of
not activity which could be construed as overt criticism
The fact that the Committee's staff were predominan
Unity supporters meant it was particularly vulnerable to
involvement and bias, both from the government and fr
religious groups.
The first crisis to bring these issues to a head cam
15 May, the Mexican El Excelsior bore the headline 'Repr
overwhelms the Chilean people'. The newspaper's direc
had managed by his own means to obtain a copy of the re
bishops, and, without the Committee's permission, was p
extracts. The Chilean press immediately made clear
regime towards such 'calumny'. With black irony, very br
of the most horrifying cases of torture were reproduced?
such things as unbelievable.18 The whole tenor of th
report was carefully omitted and the emphasis put on the
how was it possible that their membership of the Church
such as Salas and Ariztia the impunity with which to
attacks on the government. In effect, and despite its own
role ofthe Committee as an agent of denunciation of gov
working with the explicit support of the primate, was est

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THE ECUMENICAL COMMITTEE FOR PEACE IN CHILE 197

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE REGIME'S REACTION: ATTACK BY

PROPAGANDA

For the government and its supporters, the Committee represen

unacceptable form of opposition. The issue of support from the
leadership, moreover, was a particularly important one for the regime
had to do not only with the fact that the Church retained much auth
Chilean society, but also with the regime's need for what has been ter
'substitute legitimacy' of religion.19 Given that the junta could not rely
traditional source of legitimation for their continuation in power
democratic mandate?and, moreover, were using violent means to
drastic changes in Chilean society, an alternative ethical foundation
of justifying such actions was of great importance. In this context, a
authoritarianism and anti-Communism brought the military rul
alliance with representatives of reactionary Thomistic, or Integralist t
The document which epitomises the regime's initial reliance on an Inte
vision is its 'Declaration of Principles' of March 1974. Its fundam
objection to Marxism, for example, was 'its totalitarian characte
denies the human person, all of which contradicts our Christian and H
tradition'.
The existence of the Committee, then, meant that the potenti
Church-State conflict was made manifest, given the junta's determina
continue and, indeed, institutionalise its repressive policies, as demons
by the official creation of the intelligence service?the DINA?in Ju
The actions of the Committee's legal department were challengin
impunity of the security forces, and giving the hierarchy cause
questioning its actions.
The government did, in fact, secretly devise a means by which to out
Committee and even arrest its heads. It was determined that according
existing Legal Code (articles 292 and 293) the Committee could be
an illicit association, that is, one formed with the intention to attack th
order.20 Yet the government chose to avoid this course of action. The
the government held back was its fear of undermining its bid for legit
direct confrontation with the country's principal religious institution
What ensued, then, was a protracted propaganda campaign rathe
direct attack upon the Committee. The aim was to discredit both
religious leaders whom the government considered its enemies,
were the ultimate endorsers ofthe Committee's information, and the
of the information itself. Only when it seemed that the events wh
sequently transpired had in themselves provided sufficient grounds fo
attack against the Committee, did the government take final action to
the Cardinal to order its closure.
The most elaborate disinformation exercise which the regime ever
initiated was its first attempt to curtail the question of the disappearance of
detainees. The immediate prelude to it was the presentation, on 21 May
1975, of amass habeas corpus for 163 missingpersons.In fact, at the time the
Committee had some 1400 missing persons on its files; the object was again
to concentrate on cases for which there was full, witnessed evidence, both to

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198 BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH

serve as precedents and protect the integrity of th

signatories to the writs.
On 18 July the Chilean press gave second-hand coverag
an Argentinian magazine called LEA on the internecine k
Miristas in various parts of the continent. The MIR
Revolutionary Left) was the only group offering any
resistance to the military and, consequently, was the latter
week later, a Brazilian regional paper called O'Dia was r
news of 59 other similar cases in that country. The secon
printed in the evening paper La Segunda (owned by the s
El Mercurio), came with the headline 'Miristas extermina
entire press then pointed an accusing finger at those now
and malicious in seeking to blame the government for th
such individuals.
The government, or those responsible for this propa
not get things all their own way, however. Pressure from
findings of the foreign press to the effect that the L
were fictitious publications, and even disquiet in pro-reg
Pinochet to open an investigation into the veracity of the
investigation, however, came only 'official findings' in t
sworn declarations of five now resurrected Miristas that
well and living comfortably abroad. Only one minor even
Jesuit Mensaje magazine carried the Committee's own det
that 115 of the 119 named in the reports had indeed
presented on their behalf, the majority accompanied by
friends or relatives who had actually witnessed their arre
missing was pursued further that September with a
Supreme Court signed by 269 Catholic and other religiou
fared not better than previous ones.
Another key press campaign was against Lutheran bisho
It had a dual purpose: both to discredit him personally, a
into the non-Catholic groups in the Committee, and t
structure of the organisation itself. The Lutheran Churc
useful target for attack. Its Santiago-based leaders were th
evangelical groups in the Committee, and its strongest li
Council of Churches. At the same time, the bulk of the Lu
ardent supporters of the new government. The press camp
on their views as expressed by the Co-ordinating Cou
Lutheran Communities, and included a series of allegation
Marxist-Leninist and also involved in dubious financ
efforts to oust him from the leadership culminated in Jun
which provoked a schism. Immediately afterwards, th
formed Chilean Lutheran Church was warmly received
much publicity, and took advantage of the occasion t
Church certainly would not be joining the Peace Com
latter's 'political complexion'.22 The new pastor also p
afterwards in a visit to Geneva in which he declared to t
that human rights were respected in Chile.

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THE ECUMENICAL COMMITTEE FOR PEACE IN CHILE 199

The final blow to Frenz was delivered when, during a visit to

October 1975, his permission to re-enter the country was
grounds of national security. He thus joined the more than 3
Catholic priests expelled since the coup. By that time most of the
base of the Committee had been lost. When it closed in November
left only the Methodists and the Grand Rabbi, who insisted on per
the teeth of the opposition of the majority of his community.
It was possible for the government to rid itself of Frenz with littl
He did not have the really international and strictly hierarchical s
the Catholic Church behind him, but rather a looser, more d
organisation in which schism was a relatively easy matter. N
Chilean citizen. Even so, the government only took final actio
campaign against him had been added to that against the Committe
allegiance ofthe bulk of the Lutheran Church had been assured.
A much more important, but concomitantly far more problemat
the government was to rid itself of Cardinal Silva himself. The inc
critical tone of his homilies had resulted in the restriction of h
national media and in repeated press attacks against him. The latter
such that, already in November 1974, the Episcopal Conferen
moved to issue a special communication protesting in the strongest
'shameful and vile' behaviour ofthe media.23 Mere propaganda, then
as useful to the regime as actually obtaining his removal, whic
appear, was a particular obsession of Pinochet's.24 In July 1975
nuncio received an anonymous communication detailing Silva's
use of Church funds. It was an attempt to force his early retiremen
since he was able to defend himself fully to Pope Paul VI. The fierc
of all, however, came in the wake of an episode which the governm
a final reason to demand the closure of the Committee.

THE SECOND PHASE OF REGIME REACTION: THE ISSUE OF

ASYLUM AND THE CLOSURE OF THE COMMITTEE

On 15 October 1975, during a shootout between DINA agents an

remaining top leadership of the MIR, four of the latter escaped and
sheltered in Church property in Santiago. The network of Church memb
prepared to protect lives from what would be almost certain execu
swung into action. Amid other measures taken, Fernando Salas (th
longer director of the Committee) obtained the help of a British doctor
noviciate nun, Sheila Cassidy, to treat one of the Miristas who was seriou
wounded. In view of the seriousness of his condition, he and his com
were then granted asylum in the nunciature. On 4 November the news b
of Dr Cassidy's arrest for complicity in harbouring terrorists. Thi
followed by the news that five other priests, including Salas, had
arrested in connection with the same affair. The information had
extracted from Dr Cassidy under torture; a detail not, of course, include
What followed, rather, was an avalanche of accusations in the press le
against many priests and the Committee for crimes against the state.
Amid the furore, one piece of opinion-forming was of particular signi
cance since it synthesised the nub of the government's conflict wit

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200 BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH

Church and came directly from the key Catholic ideo

Jaime Guzman. He made a public address, broadcast on su
national television, in which he explicitly contradicted t
declaration on the affair. The latter had asserted that whi
gospel was against violence, fundamental to it was the pr
of all, irrespective of political creed. Guzman's argument
ing of criminals was a crime and the Cardinal's referenc
mercy, moreover, was a further moral crime against
future, of terrorism.
Denied access to the television, Cardinal Silva transmitt
radio. It was a long and authoritative reassertion ofthe t
papal authority, and due legal process; it ended, moreover
observation that Catholics who incited disobedience
bishops risked the penalty of excommunication. Guzman
arguments were clearly established for all who were incl
It was a time of hollow victories. The next was won by t
it was the prize it had most sought, other than Silva Hen
the closure of the Committee. By mid-November, 10
were under arrest, all without any visiting rights. With th
him and in the wake of the conflict with Guzman, th
Pinochet. The Supreme Chief of the Nation requested its
the Peace Committee, otherwise he would be obliged
force. The Cardinal acceded to the closure of the Co
nuanced fashion. In a written reply he included:

the express reservation that the charitable and religious

until now by the Committee [...] will continue to be pu
own respective ecclesial organisations?26
As it transpired, the creation of the Vicarfa?which follo
half later?had already virtually been announced.

CONCLUSIONS
The Peace Committee had done what no other organisation was in
position to do: challenge the impunity of the security forces. This had
been a conscious policy on the part of its directors, but had, rather, been
result of its efforts to pursue the defence of the persecuted. In effect, th
pillars on which the Committee rested had been the moral authority of
Catholic Church as the traditional and majority religion of the country
international funding, notably via the World Council of Churches.
meant that, in the interests of preserving maximum legitimacy, governm
strategy had attempted to present the Committee to public opinion as
work of a communist conspiracy, at worst supported by misguided elem
of the hierarchy.
It is not possible to measure how successful the government had been
that respect. The Committee's reports were the basis of the first, in 197
what were to become annual votes of censure against the Chilean go
ment in the UN; but at the time such events were more relevant to sec
international solidarity against the Pinochet regime?important in i

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THE ECUMENICAL COMMITTEE FOR PEACE IN CHILE 201

than within Chile itself. There, in general, people either did not wan
did not believe, or were silenced. Yet the denunciations of repressio
the Committee received, and the government's violent reactio
attempts to challenge it, convinced the Cardinal that the same
evangelical?imperative that had inspired the creation of the Comm
existed, if anything with greater force.
More than anything else, the work of the Committee had re
repression was not to be transitory or the result of isolated abuses
but rather it was systematic in the ftill sense ofthe word: that is, inh
regime's system of rule. The work of defence, therefore, would be
as long as the regime endured. It was also clear by then th
ecumenical structure was not sufficient protection for any defence
tion. Rather, the full institutional and hierarchical authority un
Catholic Church was an essential bastion to protect it. Hence, there
particular status of the Vicaria.
The Vicaria's contribution to the defence of democratic and humanitarian
values in Chile was unique, critical and irreplaceable. It represented both the
sole, if insufficient, instance of defence against political repression and, above
all, a symbol of moral opposition to authoritarianism for many thousands of
Chileans, throughout the Pinochet dictatorship. By 1988 the Vicaria had
received denunciations of 38,496 politically motivated arrests, from which
its lawyers had presented 1300 formal complaints of torture to the courts and
8706 writs of habeas corpus, and these figures represent just one dimension
of its work.27 This work won it not only a string of international prizes, but
also much respect and appreciation within Chile, and not merely from the
former Popular Unity supporters, including foreign exiles, whom it initially
set out to defend.28
Indeed, the Vicaria formed the basis of what was to become a powerful
human rights' movement in Chile, involving not only the victims of repression
and a large part of the Church, including its base organisations, but also a
swathe of civil and political society. For the first 10 years of military rule this
movement, in conjunction with that of the unions (also protected by the
Church), was the only public form of opposition to Pinochet in Chile. In
subsequent years the theme of human rights remained a key issue in the
struggle for democracy in Chile; so much so, that it may be seen as the
Achilles heel of the dictatorship. Precisely because the Pinochet regime
represented such a concerted effort to achieve hegemonic authoritarianism,
and its economic policies were so successful?at least for the elites?the
moral opposition, and in the form which it took, was of central importance in
ensuring what were the rather narrow margins of eventual democratic
victory.29 After all, Pinochet did still receive 43 per cent of the vote in 1988.30
The Vicaria was the direct successor to the Peace Committee, retaining the
latter's staff and building upon its working practices. Crucially, though, it
owed its very existence to the work of the Peace Committee and what the
Church, particularly Cardinal Silva, had learnt from that work. The
Committee, then, proved to be a far more important organisation than either
the regime or the Church itself had ever imagined. It was the foundation of
moral opposition to authoritarianism in Chile and, therefore, the beginning

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202 BULLE1TN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH

of a crucial element in the long struggle for democracy,

humanitarian values of significance far beyond the b
country.

NOTES

1. A fuller analysis of the importance of moral opposition in Chile, and the process by whic
grew, is the subject of my D.Phil thesis, enritled The Vicariate of Solidarity: Moral Oppos
tion to Authoritarian Rule in Chile, 1973-1989.
2. For the dispute over the education system, see Farrell (1986). For the Church and polit
that period, the major work is Smith (1982).
3. See Cavallo (1988).
4. The total killed as a result of political violence between September and December 1973
found by President Aylwin's Commission of Truth and Reconciliation to have been 12
5. Cardinal Silva put it to me very simply: 'We saw that it was necessary to defend the weak'
emphasis) (interview 28 January 1992).
6. The most detailed published account of the founding of the Committee is Ahumada
(1989).
7. La Prensa, 5 November 1973.
8. For example, the Committee set up health centres which attended to 8138 people in the
course of its existence, and also provided over 20,000 daily meals for malnourished
children in working-class districts, measures made particularly necessary as severe
economic stabilisation plans were implemented. Comitepro Paz (1974 and 1976). These
and other major projects were continued and developed further in the Vicarfa, contributing
significantly to the dynamism and importance of the organisation.
9. The report was compiled by a small team within the Committee and its existence and exact
contents were not known to other staff.
10. 'La Reconcilacion en Chile', 24 April 1974, Documentos del Episcopado 1974-1980,
pp. 11-17, Editores Mundo (Santiago) (1982).
11. This is discussed at some length in Cardinal Silva's Memoirs (Cavallo, 1991) and confirmed
by my own interviews with members of the hierarchy, who were at pains to explain the same
issues. See also Smith (pp. 294-296).
12. Detailed theological analysis of the Episcopal Conference's declarations on human rights'
matters is made by Aldunate, Castillo and Silva (1984).
13. ElMercurio, 19 May 1974.
14. For more on the legal arguments, see Fruling (1982).
15. These points were emphasised to me by the head of the Committee's legal department, Jose
Zalaquett (interview 2 September 1991).
16. Interview with Fernando Salas, 5 November 1991.
17. See Lagos (1978), and Lagos and Chacon (1986).
18. For example, La Segunda, 16 May 1974.
19. Parker(1989).
20. Interview with Monica Madariaga, at the time personal legal adviser to her cousin, Pinochet,
HMarchl992.
21. La Segunda, 24 July 1975. This headline was singled out for criticism by the
joint declaration.
22. Las UltimasNoticias, 26 June 1975.
23. Press communique of the Episcopal Conference, 7 November 1974, Docu
1980.
24. According to his cousin, Monica Madariaga (interview with the author 11 March 1992).
25. Indeed, when Dr Cassidy left Chile at the beginning of the following year, the Chilean Press
tried to present the case that she had received good treatment. The British government saw
otherwise, and the incident provoked the recall of the British ambassador. See The Times,
31 December 1975. She later wrote her own account: Cassidy (1977).
26. The formal exchange of letters between the two men, which followed the interview, is
published in Chile-America, Nos 12-13, December 1975.
27. One summary of the Vicaria's work is Gonzalez (1990).
28. An important opinion survey carried out in 1986 found that the most prestigious institu-

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THEECUMENICALCOMMITTEEFORPEACEINCHILE 203

tions in Santiago were the Catholic Church as a whole and the Vicaria.
points out of 7, while the opposition and the government scored, respecti
(Huneeus, 1987).
29. The Church also opposed the economic policies of the regime, as did th
tion. For reasons of space, however, it is impossible to address this issue.
30. For the importance of human rights in the 1988 plebiscite, see, for exam
the International Commission of the Latin American Studies Association, a
(1991). Furthermore, opinion polls carried out shortly before also indicated
For example, a FLASCO survey showed that for 57 per cent of those intend
to Pinochet, the human rights' issue was a major factor.

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