Women, Work, and Political Participation in Lebanese Shia

Contemporary Thought: The Writings of Ayatollahs Fadlallah

and Shams al-Din

Rola el-Husseini

Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Volume
28, Number 2, 2008, pp. 273-282 (Article)

Published by Duke University Press

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/242298
Women, Work, and Political Participation
  

in Lebanese Shia Contemporary Thought:

The Writings of Ayatollahs Fadlallah
and Shams al-Din

Rola el-Husseini

n the decade following the Taif Agreement (1989), which ended the Lebanese civil
war, Ayatollahs Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din
published their first works on women’s issues.1 The development of this new gender
discourse in Lebanon was mainly the result of international interest in women’s issues on the
heels of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995), as well as a reaction to
events occurring in Iran, where Ayatollah Khomeini had recently died and where a new dis-
course on gender had begun to emerge. This shift in Iranian gender discourse was monitored
and to a certain extent mirrored in Lebanon. Renewed interest in gender issues among the
Shia in Lebanon after Khomeini’s death provided not only a platform for Lebanese clerics to
address an issue of central importance to their constituency but also an opportunity to dif-
ferentiate themselves from the Iranian position.
These ayatollahs wrote on women’s issues from a position of authority as legal scholars
and religious leaders, and their discourse can be termed “reformist.”2 While such reformist
discourse written in Iran is mainly by Muslim intellectuals, in Lebanon it is penned by the of
d ies
highest religious authorities.3 This discourse on women offered a local/national discourse di- St u
i ve
a rat an
d
mp ca
I express my gratitude to Wesley R. Dean for reading the many position of vice chairman of the SSC. When in 1978 the chairman
Co A fri
iterations of this article and for his useful suggestions. Further Musa al-Sadr disappeared during a visit to Libya, Shams al-Din ia ,
As
thanks go to Michael Desch, Jeffrey Engel, Frank Griffin, Chris- assumed the helm of the SSC. He remained deputy chairman of u th st
So Ea
topher Layne, Ellen Lust-Okar, and Hala Nassar for their insight- the SSC until 1994, when he was officially elected full chairman le
ful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The usual caveats of the council. Shams al-Din passed away in 2001. M idd
apply. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. th e
2. Ziba Mir-Hosseini has classified writings on women by Muslim 08 05
, 20 8- 0
1. Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah was born in An Najaf scholars into three categories: traditionalist, neo-traditionalist, .2
, N o
-2 00
(Iraq) in 1935. He spent the first thirty-four years of his life and reformist. She defines reformist discourse as that which 28 0 1x ss
ol. 92 Pre
around the Hawza of An Najaf. In 1966, forced to flee Iraq be- emerged at the end of the twentieth century and which “argues    V 1 08 i ty
5 / er s
121 ni v
cause of persecution by the Baath regime, Fadlallah moved to for gender equality in Islam on all fronts . . . [and ] is part of the 1 0.
d oi k eU
Lebanon. In 1981, shortly after the victory of the Iranian revo- new, Reformist religious thinking that is consolidating a con-      Du
by
lution, Fadlallah publicly recognized Ayatollah Khomeini as the ception of Islam and modernity as compatible, not opposed.”
0 08
2
wali al-faqih. After Khomeini’s death in 1989, Fadlallah began to Ziba Mir-Hosseini, “The Construction of Gender in Islamic Legal ©
distance himself from Iran. In 1995, he was declared a source of Thought and Strategies for Reform,” Hawwa 1 (2003): 20.
emulation, or marj‘a taqlid, despite resistance from Shia scholars
3. Farhad Khosrokhavar notes that reformist thinkers in Iran
in Iran and Lebanon. Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din was also
were either laymen or clergymen. According to Khosrokhavar,
born in An Najaf in 1936. He studied fiqh/jurisprudence under
“Abdolkarim Soroush, Mojtahed Shabestari, Mostafa Malekian,
Muhsin al-Hakim and Abu al-Qassem al-Khu’i. In 1969, Shams
Mohsen Kadivar and Yousef Eshkhavari are the most notable [of
al-Din returned to Lebanon to help Musa al-Sadr establish the
Supreme Shia Council (SSC), and in 1975 he was elected to the
these] intellectuals. [They have] one idea in common: the refusal
273
 27 4 rected toward reforming the role of women in of Shams al-Din are written for lay intellectuals
society, but it also was an implicit critique of the and the ulema of Shiite Islam, whereas Fadal-
Iranian understanding of women’s role in so- lah’s writings address simple believers to guide
ciety. The discourse boosted the national and them in their daily lives. 6 The importance of
international legitimacy of both Fadlallah and these works on women lies in the fact that they
Shams al-Din and bolstered Fadlallah’s claims are texts written consciously by men who speak
to the marja‘iyya.4 In that sense, their concep- from a position of authority as religious schol-
e tualization of women’s role in society became ars. Both authors translate women’s roles in so-
ra ti v
m pa in part an international dialogue and in part a ciety, the political sphere, and the legal system
Co reckoning with competitors, the most important by couching it in a Shiite discourse. It should
f
ie so
tu d
of whom was Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini’s be noted that “language and discourse play an
S ,

A si a shadow still loomed large in Shia society dur- integral role in the perpetuation of existing
u th
So he ing the 1990s.5 This article proposes to answer power relations. They serve to convey prevalent
n dt
fric aa the following questions: How do contemporary power structures, and in doing so they perpetu-
A st Lebanese Shia religious leaders conceptualize ate the dominance of the ruling group.”7 In the
Ea
d le the role of women? What kinds of innovations case of women in Islam, the governing group
d
Mi
in jurisprudence have been proposed by these has been men, who have traditionally excluded
clerics? To what extent are these conceptualiza- women from the interpretative and intellectual
tions of women’s roles a hybrid of “modernness” process of legislating from the Koran, the Ha-
and tradition? In what ways are these conceptu- dith, or the Sunna.
alizations different from those promulgated by This Shiite discourse is delivered from a
Shia religious leaders in Iran? An understanding position of authority, from that of two promi-
of the importance of Fadlallah’s and Shams al- nent religious scholars. As shown by Lara Deeb,
Din’s interpretations of perennial issues such as the popular discourse of Shiism has been used
the right of women to education, women’s right by laywomen to justify their actions and beliefs
to work outside the home, and women’s partici- and is at the root of what she terms an “au-
pation in political life and in government offers thenticated” Shiite Islam. 8 Roschanack Shaery-
answers to these questions. Eisenlohr has pointed out that the way certain
Lebanese, namely, “Amal and affiliates of Sayyid
The Importance of These Texts on Women Fadlallah[,] conceive of Iranians and Iran is
Fadlallah and Shams al-Din provide quite dis- intimately connected to competition among
tinct approaches to gender issues. The works members of Shi‘ite transnational networks of

to justify the intervention of religion into politics on in 1995 following the publication of his juridical trea- Women) (Beirut: Dar al-Malak, 2003). Fadlallah has
the basis of any kind of Islamic argument.” Farhad tise in March/April of that year. Jamal Sankari, Fadlal- recently discussed and approved of issues relevant to
Khosrokhavar, “The New Intellectuals in Iran,” Social lah: The Making of a Radical Shi‘ite Leader (London: modern women, such as hair extensions, plastic sur-
Compass 51 (2004): 196. However, these men were not Al-Saqi, 2005), 256. gery, in vitro fertilization, cloning, birth control, and
exclusively interested in women’s issues. Their writ- abortion. According to Lara Deeb, the debate on such
5. My analysis of the discourse on women does not
ings rarely address it, only so far as it is part of their topics is particularly interesting as it shows “the com-
deal with Iranian reformists or with the discourse
attempt to separate religion and state. In discussing patibility of [Shia] Islam with technology, as well as
of Iranian feminists because Fadlallah and Shams
thinkers who published in women’s magazines such some of the other qualities associated with Western
al-Din do not consider them their intellectual or re-
as Zan-i-Ruz, Azadeh Kian declares that “modernist modernity.” Lara Deeb, An Enchanted Modern (Prince­
ligious peers.
clerics and religious intellectuals, include[d] Ayatol- ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 171.
lahs Yusif Sani’i and Bujnurdi, Hujat al Islams Muhsin 6. I analyze the following works by Shams al-Din in
7. Rhonda K. Reinholtz, Charlene L. Muehlenhard,
Sa‘id Zadeh and Muhaqiq-Damad. As specialists of Is- this article: Al satr wal nazar (The Gaze behind the
Joi L. Phelps, and Arthur T. Satterfield, “Sexual Dis-
lamic law and jurisprudence, they attempt to reinter- Veil) (Beirut: Al Mu‘assassa al-Dawliah lil Dirasat Wal
course and Sexual Intercourse,” in Gender, Power,
pret the Shari‘a with a view to implementing change Nashr, 1994); Ahliat al mar’a li tawalli al-sulta (Wom-
and Communication in Human Relationships, ed. Pa-
in the existing laws. It is interesting to note that po- en’s Entitlement to Power) (Beirut: Al Mu’assassa
mela J. Kalbfleisch and Michael J. Cody (Hillsdale, NJ:
litical and religious authorities, who are aware of the al-Dawliah lil Dirasat wal Nashr, 1995); and Haqq al
Lawrence Erlbaum, 1995), 144.
significant social impact of these magazines, often mar’a lil amal (The Right of Women to Employment)
respond to critical articles they publish.” Azadeh (Beirut: Al Mu‘assassa al-Dawlia lil Dirasat wal Nashr, 8. Deeb, Enchanted Modern, 20. I write here of a spe-
Kian, “Women and Politics in Post-Islamist Iran: The 2001). The works I examine by Fadlallah are Ta’amulat cific Lebanese authenticated Shiism as distinguished
Gender Conscious Drive to Change,” British Journal of islamiyya hawla al-mar’a (Islamic Reflections on from Iranian Shiism.
Middle East Studies 24 (1997): 93. Women) (Beirut: Dar al-Malak, 2001); Al-Zahra al-
qudwa (Fatima al-Zahra as a Role Model) (Beirut: Dar
4. Jamal Sankari asserts that Fadlallah ascended to
al-Malak, 2000); and Dunia al-mar’a (The World of
the marja‘iyya (i.e., he became a source of emulation)
leadership in the Shi‘ite world. Perceptions of is compared to men in honesty, bravery, loyalty, 27 5
religious authenticity play a key role in these honor, knowledge of the Qur’an and piety.”13
contexts, constituting not only competing vi- Deeb demonstrates that in Lebanon,
sions of correct Shi‘ite practices and conduct, representations of Zaynab had also seen a
but also differences over who should represent shift: instead of being portrayed as “a plaintive
and legitimately lead Shi‘ites.”9 mourner,” she is now presented in “renderings
Accordingly, it is unsurprising to see the that accentuated her courage, strength and
emergence in Lebanon of a Shiite school of resilience.”14 Deeb also argues that the “authen-

Rola el-Husseini

The Writings of Ayatollahs Fadlallah and Shams al-Din

thought inspired by the advances in Iran since ticated discourses about Sayyedeh Zaynab set a
the Islamic revolution yet completely distinct. standard of behavior to which many Lebanese
This new school of thought mainly has a direct Shi‘i women aspire today.”15 Elsewhere she notes
effect on Lebanese Shiites outside Hezbollah’s that “for women, the paragon of piety and sacri-
circle of influence; however, individual mem- fice that emerges from Ashura is embodied . . .
bers of the party might be drawn to these inter- in Zaynab” and that “more than merely a role
pretations. model, Zaynab has become an idealized stan-
dard of behavior to which many of [her] inter-
Fatima: A Role Model locutors aspire.”16
Kamran Aghaie argues that in the twentieth It is perhaps between followers of Fadlal-
century, Iran had seen the emergence of a new lah and members of Hezbollah that one sees
discourse on gender and that “one of the main different role models adopted. Fadlallah aims
vehicles for expressing [the] new . . . concep- to have his followers emulate Fatima as a way
tion of gender was Karbala symbolism.”10 In the to dissociate Lebanese Shia from Iranian influ-
1960s and 1970s gender-specific models of be- ence.17 Women associated with Hezbollah tend
havior using the Karbala narrative appeared in to follow the example of Zaynab because of the
Iran. The focus of these gender-specific mod- party’s allegiance to Sayyed Ali Khamenei as
els is Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter and the the wali al-faqih. These distinct practices are em-
wife of the first imam, or her daughter, Zaynab. blematic of Shaery-Eisenlohr’s observation that
While Fatima was predominantly the role model scholars such as Fadlallah present alternative
in prerevolutionary Iran and in the early days models of behavior and conduct for Lebanese
of the Islamic Republic, Zaynab was presented Shiites. The adoption of these distinct practices
after the Islamic revolution as the ideal Muslim among his followers legitimates Fadlallah as a
woman.11 Aghaie shows how a text published in competing source of religious authority.
1997 constructs Zaynab as a role model for Mus- Stephan Rosiny’s analysis of the debate on
lim women based on her role as the “Lioness of the interpretation of an event in Fatima’s life
Karbala.”12 Indeed, in Shiite popular culture in that he calls the “tragedy of Fatima al-Zahra’”
Iran “the portrayal of Zaynab is in some ways demonstrates how the debate between the ra-
unique. . . . [It is] a modern and very liberated tionalist school to which Fadlallah belongs and
image of Zaynab. The image corresponds to a the historical school of his opponents is also a
contemporary and . . . a more politically correct struggle for religious leadership. Rosiny main-
representation of women in modern society. She tains that “many Fadlallah followers see Mur-

9. Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, “Imagining Shi’ite model of the Western woman or the traditional Mus- 15. Ibid., 258.
Iran: Transnationalism and Religious Authenticity in lim woman, therefore offering a new, revolutionary
16. Lara Deeb, “Living Ashura in Lebanon,” Compara-
the Muslim World,” Iranian Studies 40 (2007): 20–21. model for Muslim women.
tive Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 25
10. Kamran Aghaie, The Martyrs of Karbala (Seattle: 12. Aghaie, Martyrs of Karbala, 125–30. (2005): 136.
University of Washington Press, 2004), 113; quota-
13. F. Shirazi, “Images of Women in Shi‘i Popular Cul- 17. The early days of the Islamic republic witnessed a
tion on 116.
ture in Iran,” in The Women of Karbala, ed. Kamran cult of Fatima; soon after the revolution, Ayatollah
11. Such was especially the case after Ali Shariati’s Aghaie (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 110. Khomeini made her birthday the national celebration
famous lecture “Fatima Is Fatima” at the Husayniat of women’s day.
14. Lara Deeb, “From Mourning to Activism: Sayyedeh
­Irshad. Shariati, dubbed by scholars of contemporary
Zaynab, Lebanese Shi‘i Women, and the Transforma-
Iran as the “ideologue” of the Islamic revolution, ar-
tion of Ashura,” in Aghaie, Women of Karbala, 256.
gues for a “third way” for women, distinct from the
 27 6 tada’s book [criticizing Fadlallah’s rational and ety.24 Although Fadlallah examines Fatima’s life
modern interpretation of the tragedy of Fatima] from birth to the grave, he focuses on her mari-
as a hidden attack on the former’s reputation tal life, showing how she and her husband, Ali,
as a Marja‘ al-Taqlid.”18 Rosiny also suggests shared the responsibilities of the household. He
the whole debate on this hagiographical issue draws a lesson from this story for modern Mus-
“might also be seen as a subtle attack on an in- lims: women should not consider housework as
convenient Lebanese competitor for the highest below them and men should not be too proud
e rank of Shia theology, as ‘Ali Akbar Khamana’i to help around the house (92–93). It leads him
ra ti v
m pa regards himself as the Marja‘ of all Shiites out- to infer that women should not consider staying
Co side of Iran.”19 at home a problem or a form of imprisonment;
f
ie so
tu d
Fadlallah’s presentation of Fatima as a rather, they should see it as a choice (94–95).
S ,

A si a model is exemplified in his book Al-Zahra al- Fadlallah also refers to the education Fa-
u th
So he qudwa. He argues that an examination of her tima gave to her children, especially to Zaynab.
n dt
fric aa life is even more important in today’s world as He insists that Zaynab’s education was based on
A st we ask the following questions: What is the role Islamic principles and values and “that is why her
Ea
d le of woman in society? Is she inferior or is she role was similar to her mother’s, a jihad for a just
d
Mi
equal to man? Does she have the right to be- cause. . . . That is why Zaynab’s positions  —  like
come involved in social and political struggles, her mother’s — represent the legitimacy for
or is she supposed to remain a recluse in her women’s participation in political and jihadi
home? Does she have the right to work, and if work in an Islamic manner” (101). Fadlallah in-
so, should she receive equal pay? Fadlallah jus- sists on Fatima’s respect for education (187) and
tifies his choice of Fatima by saying that she portrays her as very knowledgeable of religion
taught Muslims how to be culturally responsible and the Sharia. He also describes Fatima as the
and how to defy injustice. He affirms that Fa- first recorder of Hadith in Islam (188).
tima’s example instructs a woman to be a per- Fadlallah illustrates how Fatima was
son, not just a female.20 Fadlallah then presents deeply involved in the public and political life
Fatima as a role model for all Muslims. He main- of her time. She participated in the discussion
tains that great women can be role models for of the caliphate upon the death of the Prophet
members of both sexes.21 According to Moulouk and defended her right to the property she in-
Berry, Fadlallah “takes the debate [on gender] a herited from him (197 – 202). Therefore, Fadlal-
step further and argues against gender as a con- lah demonstrates, “Fatima represents a political
struct. . . . he suggests that the whole debate be activist who used all available opportunities
placed within discussions on humanity, thus ar- without losing . . . any of her Muslim virtues”
guing for a ‘humanistic paradigm.’ . . . he speaks (203). In the conclusion, Fadlallah reiterates
in terms of humans . . . moving towards . . . com- that Fatima’s example provides a strong case for
pleteness, harmony in the greater cosmos.”22 In the legitimization of women’s participation in
other words, Fadlallah’s humanistic paradigm political life. He argues that contemporary Mus-
is a rejection of the Western notion of “gender lim women should follow her model and com-
equality.” He prefers to speak of a “humane plete their social and political duties (320 – 22).
equality,” an “equality [that] means . . . men and It should be noted that while Khomeini had
women’s parity in [their] humanity.”23 also offered Fatima as a role model for women,
Fatima is the ideal role model for women he emphasized “her devotion to her father and
in her actions, in the way she led her marital life husband” and chose “to ignore the more pub-
and lived her motherhood. She is the example lic aspects of [her] life; as the daughter of the
of the person who has lived the issues of her soci- prophet and the wife of Ali, she made many

18. Stephan Rosiny, “The Tragedy of Fatima al-Zahra’,” 21. Ibid., 32–34. 23. Ibid., 63.
in The Twelver Shi‘a in Modern Times, ed. Rainer Brun-
22. Moulouk Berry, “Radical Transitions: Shifting 24. Fadlallah, Al-Zahra al-qudwa, 57.
ner and Werner Ende (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 217.
Gender Discourses in Lebanese Muslim Shi‘i Jurispru-
19. Ibid., 218. dence and Ideology” (PhD diss., University of Michi-
gan, 2002), 60.
20. Fadlallah, Al-Zahra al-qudwa, 57–58.
public statements. But to Khomeini, Fatima is or fitna, women need to be constrained, their 277
exemplary for her virtue and modesty.”25 bodies by the hijab and their activities by a set of
Fadlallah presents Fatima as a role model laws that ensures their subjugation to men.
for humanity and insists that Muslim women Like Khomeini, who imposed the hijab
should aim to emulate her. He and Shams al- on Iranian women after the Islamic revolution,
Din also understand the position of contempo- Fadlallah and Shams al-Din agree with the tra-
rary women in society. Their understanding of ditional argument that veiling is mandatory for
issues such as the hijab and the right of women all Muslim women. Nevertheless, some of their

Rola el-Husseini

The Writings of Ayatollahs Fadlallah and Shams al-Din

to study, to work, and to participate in political opinions are worth further exploration as they
life clearly demonstrates their sympathy to Mus- go against the general Muslim consensus. Shams
lim women’s plight in today’s world. al-Din clearly states that veiling is mandatory for
any female who has reached puberty.30 However,
The Question of the Hijab he makes a distinction concerning the meaning
According to Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby, of the word hijab itself. He maintains that when
both Foucauldian and feminist theory see the it means total segregation, the hijab is a ruling
body as the site of power or the locus of domi- that concerns only the wives of the Prophet and
nation. 26 One sees the domination of Muslim that these injunctions do not apply to Muslim
women through the containment/constraint women in general, who are allowed to meet with
of their bodies in the hijab. In fact, the hijab is nonrelative males whether in a social or a politi-
always at the heart of discussions of women in cal setting.
Islam. It is therefore unsurprising to find it ad- Shams al-Din argues that hijab means
dressed by both Fadlallah and Shams al-Din. “hiding the body and hair from any nonrelative
Max Weiss has masterfully shown how male who has reached puberty and concealing
Shia public intellectuals and religious figures of her genital organs from everyone else except
the early twentieth century in Lebanon debated her husband.”31 However, he makes exceptions
gender roles and how a magazine, Al-Irfan, at- in the implementation of the hijab in “special
tempted to redefine gender relations.27 He con- cases,” such as the need for a physician or for the
vincingly argues that the issue of veiling/unveil- purpose of testimony in court. 32 Shams al-Din
ing was one of the prominent questions debated also agrees with other ulema that it is permis-
in the early twentieth century. Weiss shows sible for women to expose the face, the hands,
that like the classical jurists studied by Fatima and the feet.33 However, he refutes the usual de-
Mernissi and Fatnah Sabbah, Shia men writing scription of women as ‘awra, stating that in the
in the early twentieth century in Lebanon simul- legal Islamic sense, a woman is definitely not an
taneously loathed, feared, and respected wom- ‘awra.34 As it is for males, a female’s ‘awra is from
en.28 These feelings were due to women’s sexu- her navel to her knees.35 He affirms that calling
ality, understood to be not only more powerful a woman by that highly pejorative term is a so-
than men’s but also more mysterious. This leads ciopolitical practice and not a religious one.
Weiss to conclude “from this theory by both Fadlallah also follows a traditional line of
Shi‘a and Sunni jurists . . . that women’s sexual- argument when he explains that the hijab is “a
ity, if left uncontrolled by men, runs havoc and barrier in the face of instinct which prepares
is a threat to social order.”29 To avoid this chaos, one psychologically to resist the call for devi-

25 . Haleh Afshar, “Khomeini’s Teachings and Fatnah Sabbah, Woman in the Muslim Unconscious 33. Ibid., 71.
Women,” Feminist Review 12 (1982): 63. (New York: Pergamon, 1984); and Weiss, “Cultural
34. Linguistically ‘awra means “a hidden or secret
Politics of Shi‘i Modernism,” 263.
26. Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby, eds., introduc- place.” Therefore, a person’s ‘awra is the part of his
tion to Feminism and Foucault (Boulder, CO: West- 29. Mir-Hosseini, “Construction of Gender in Islamic or her body that must be kept hidden. It also refers to
view, 1988), x. Legal Thought,” 10. everything that causes shame when exposed. In the
terminology of Islamic jurisprudence, ‘awra refers to
27. Max Weiss, “The Cultural Politics of Shi‘i Modern- 30. Veiling is thus an obligation for all women once
the area of the body that must be covered with ap-
ism,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 39 they have their menses.
propriate clothing (i.e., the genital organs).
(2007): 249–70.
31. Shams al-Din, Al-satr wal-nazar, 64.
35. Shams al-Din, Al-satr wal-nazar, 188.
28. Fatima Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female
32. Ibid., 65.
Dynamics in Muslim Society (London: Al Saqi, 1985);
 278 ance.” The hijab thus helps both men and women hijab’s being an impediment. He stresses that
find “internal immunity” against their “baser the veil is not a slur on the dignity of women;
instincts.”36 Fadlallah argues that the “true the veil’s purpose, in his opinion, is to neutral-
hijab is both physical and moral” (135): its physi- ize the perception of the woman as a female in
cal part is explained by the fact that a woman order to prioritize her status as a person.39
should conceal her body, and the moral aspect
appears in the woman’s public behavior. He Women’s Education and Work
e states that “she should enter the public sphere as Contrary to Khomeini’s conception of women
ra ti v
m pa a person not as a woman” (137). In other words, as mothers and educators of the nation, Fadlal-
Co she should avoid drawing attention to herself as lah and Shams al-Din see women as members of
f
ie so
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a female. For Fadlallah, the hijab is, therefore, an society within their own rights.40 Both authors
S ,

A si a attitude expressed through physical appearance emphasize women’s right to education and to
u th
So he and moral behavior. He explains that abandon- employment outside the home.
n dt
fric aa ing the physical hijab threatens the hijab’s moral Shams al-Din openly states that “there is
A st aspect. Hence, he argues that the hijab is not only nothing in the Koran and the Sunna that sub-
Ea
d le a personal choice; it is also a societal issue (132). stantiates the assumption that it is not legal for
d
Mi
To the objection that education is enough to women to work — whether it is for profit or on a
create a moral hijab —which in turn would make volunteer basis.”41 Shams al-Din legitimates his
physical hijab unnecessary — he retorts that the claims. Citing several chapters from the Koran,
crises of modern man show that depending on he demonstrates that women are allowed to
his inner strength will lead to failure. For Fad- work for a living and that Islam has granted
lallah, societies that allow sexual freedom and them the freedom to work in all fields.42 He adds
consider moral steadfastness a personal choice a series of references from the Sunna showing
witness a greater degree of “perversion” than do that women are not barred from working for a
societies that adopt the hijab (135). living and mentions the example of women the
According to Fadlallah, Islam has not for- Prophet knew who worked in diverse fields. 43
bidden the mingling of the sexes in the public These examples allow Shams al-Din to infer that
sphere except in contexts that can lead to moral women are permitted to have a profession, even
deviance. He states that societies must reinforce if work entails mingling with men in the public
women’s capacity for logical thinking and ra- sphere (211).
tionality not only through education but also Women are therefore allowed to work,
through the experience of real life. This expe- even if the job requires going outside the home
rience of real life can only be obtained when and staying in the workplace for long hours.
a woman ventures outside the confines of her However, this type of work means that women
home. 37 He, therefore, argues that the hijab is are forced to mingle with men, as colleagues,
not an impediment to women’s freedom of supervisors, or clients. Shams al-Din maintains
movement in society. He believes that “adding that according to the Sharia, the legality of a
a piece or two or a meter or two of clothing can- woman’s working outside the home is debatable.
not change someone’s freedom of movement. Problems arise from consequences such as mix-
Freedom is above all the woman’s ability to work ing with foreign men in the workplace and meet-
and that is not something that is in contradic- ing strangers on the way to work (215). Shams
tion with the hijab.”38 Citing Islamic history as al-Din argues a woman cannot mix with men at
proof, he insists that women have worked in the the workplace if she does not follow an Islamic
agricultural and industrial fields without the code of behavior. Women cannot therefore go to

36. Fadlallah, Duria al-mar’a, 132–33. 41. Shams al-Din, Haqq al mar’a, 193.

37. Fadlallah, Ta’amulat islamiyya hawla al-mar’a, 20. 42. Koran 67:15, 22:65, 31:20, and 45:12–13; Shams
­al-Din, Haqq al-mar’a, 194–96, 197.
38. Fadlallah, Dunia al-mar‘a, 137.
43. Shams al-Din, Haqq al-mar’a, 202–10.
39. Ibid.

40. Afshar, “Khomeini’s Teachings and Women,”

61–62.
work without a hijab, cannot wear makeup, and Women’s Political Participation 279
“cannot behave flirtatiously with men” (217 – 18). In an article written at the height of the wom-
They also cannot have tête-à-tête meetings with en’s movement in Iran, Azadeh Kian maintains
male colleagues or superiors (218). He insists that “contrary to the traditionalist clergy, Aya-
that when a man and a woman meet for work tollah Khomeini encouraged Islamist women’s
purposes, they should not meet in a room alone activities in the public sphere and criticized the
unless the door is left open to preserve propriety opposition of the traditionalists. . . . By endors-
(224 – 27). Shams al-Din concludes that women’s ing women’s political rights, however, and reiter-

Rola el-Husseini

The Writings of Ayatollahs Fadlallah and Shams al-Din

work is legal but conditional upon the existence ating their political significance [he] intended
of certain criteria such as the correct “Islamic to obtain their unconditional allegiance to the
costume that covers the woman’s body . . . and is Islamic regime.”45 However, Khomeini’s view of
not too tight” (221). Women should also demon- women’s political rights was fairly limited. He
strate appropriate behavior and avoid attracting encouraged women to vote, in order for him
the attention of men. For example, they should to benefit from their vote, yet he denied them
not wear perfume (221 – 22). Discussion between the right to be elected to the highest public of-
members of the two sexes should remain objec- fice, president of the republic. Kian notes that
tive and avoid any sexual undertone. rajul, the ambiguous term used to define the
For Fadlallah the education of women is prerequisite condition for assuming the presi-
a crucial issue in Islamic society. He maintains dency, “has allowed modernist Islamist women
that the weakness and the backwardness of [in the post-Khomeini period] to argue that the
women in Muslim societies are not innate but, Constitutional Law authorizes women to run for
rather, the result of societal negligence in build- presidential elections.”46 By contrast, the Leba-
ing their personality and mind. He reiterates nese ayatollahs are clear about their position
the traditional notion that women are psycho- that women should be allowed to run for and be
logically and physically weaker than men, but elected to high public office.
he also affirms that this weakness can be trans- Shams al-Din affirms that in Islam the pri-
formed into strength if “we strengthen women’s mary mission of a woman is to be a wife and
minds with knowledge, their reason with logic mother. However, women in Islam are allowed to
and their bodies with activities.” He also pro- undertake social and economic activities as long
poses to make women less emotive by teaching as these do not affect their chief responsibility
them how to be rational and “how to face prob- of raising a family. Shams al-Din points out that
lems in an objective manner.”44 most ulema agree that women are not allowed
Fadlallah encourages women to have a to rule a state.47 However, he demonstrates that
profession to face the difficulties of life and not women are allowed to wield political power. He
to be at the mercy of others (115). He declares affirms that “Islam has placed women equally to
that from a legal point of view women are inde- men . . . and allows them to participate in politi-
pendent: a woman’s father or husband does not cal life as long as they respect the legal boundar-
have the authority to keep her from working. ies regarding clothing, and relations with male
However, the husband has the right to voice his nonfamily members, in addition to their wifely
objection if working entails entering the pub- and motherly responsibilities” (29).
lic sphere. Fadlallah states that a woman can Shams al-Din closely examines the early
go out to work without her husband’s permis- Islamic period to show that Muslim women were
sion or even against her husband’s will if that not absent from political life. The lives of sev-
does not interfere with his marital (i.e., sexual) eral women from that period, such as Khadija,
rights (38). the Prophet’s first wife; Fatima, his daughter; or

44. Fadlallah, Ta’amulat islamiyya hawla al-mar’a, 19. 46. The Persian term rajul, etymologically from Arabic
(where it means “man”), is used in Iran, according to
45. Kian, “Women and Politics in Post-Islamist Iran,” 77.
Kian, to refer both to a man and to a famous personal-
ity, who can be either a man or a woman. Ibid., 78.

47. Shams al-Din, Ahliat al-mar’a li tawalli al-sulta,

9–11.
 280 Aisha, his favorite wife (32 – 36), are clear proof Fadlallah explains that the origins of the
that — at least elite — women were politically interdiction for women to rule stem from a ha-
active in the early days of Islam. Shams al-Din dith.48 He maintains that this particular hadith
points out that women had sworn allegiance to is not mentioned in Twelver Shiite books and
Prophet Muhammad and that after the Prophet’s points out that no other hadith on this issue
death political life revolved around the struggle exists. Fadlallah gives two reasons for allowing
for the caliphate. He argues that most women women to rule:
e did not have the intellectual ability to under-
ra ti v 1. Governing today is not a form of absolute
m pa stand the complexity of this issue and that, even rule as it was in the past. Today, a ruler has
Co if they did, social norms did not tolerate their
f
so
to obey a constitution with checks and bal-
ie
tu d
participation in political life. Shams al-Din af- ances. Hence, even if the above-mentioned
S ,

A si a firms that these norms, inherited from the pre- hadith is genuine, the circumstances of
u th
So he Islamic period, do not indicate the existence ­government today are different. Therefore
n dt women can be at the helm of government.
fric aa of a legal Islamic basis for denying women the
A 2. Those who have deduced from this hadith
st right to political participation (33 – 34). There-
Ea
d le fore the lack of women’s participation in politi- that a woman does not have the brains to
d
Mi rule have come to the wrong conclusion. In
cal life is not a religious but a cultural issue: it
chapter 27, verses 33 – 35 the Koran gives
is the product of its time and place, which leads
the example of the Queen of Sheba as a
him to conclude that this normative perception woman of greater rationality, balance, and
of the role of women in political life is inaccu- long-term planning capacity than her male
rate and inapplicable in today’s world. courtiers.49
Shams al-Din then addresses the question
Fadlallah wonders how any Muslim can
of whether the Sharia allows women to govern.
reject the presence of women in power when
He starts by defining the form of government
presented with this positive image of a female
under which he proposes to study women’s par-
ruler. He doubts the authenticity of the afore-
ticipation. This type of government can be de-
mentioned hadith because the Koran gives an
scribed as pseudodemocratic. In such a regime
opposite example. Moulouk Berry maintains
the leader is bound by the institutions of gov-
that Fadlallah
ernment. The ruler cannot govern alone as he
is accountable to other branches of power freely is the first modernist Muslim author who breaks
elected by the people (47). Deconstructing the away from classical, modernist conservative and
arguments from the Koran and the Sunna tra- fundamentalist interpretations and concentrates
ditionally used to justify the monopoly of gov- on the Qur’anic text which describes Bilqis [the
Queen of Sheba] as a female sovereign in her
ernment by men (63 – 114), Shams al-Din proves
own right. . . . The Qur’an in [his] analysis
that women can rule (114). He brushes away any
provides Bilqis as an example of a person who
objection to women’s presence in government depended on her rational faculties rather than
that is based on the issue of the hijab by main- her emotions in making decisions. The respon-
taining that meeting with men and discussing sibilities associated with her post provided her
public issues is not forbidden. It also does not with leadership skills and the necessary political
contradict the laws of hijab as long as certain expertise to command men. . . . Fadlallah con-
conditions are met. These conditions are the cludes that a woman is capable of overcoming
same ones he had delineated for women’s work aspects of her feminine weakness, which may
negatively affect her judgment and her way of
outside the home (75).
handling affairs. 50

48. “Lan yaflaha qawmun walu amrahum imra’a” (A

people ruled by a woman will not prevail). Fadlallah
maintains this hadith was mentioned in Sahih al-
Bukhari, the major compilation of hadiths accepted
in the Sunni tradition.

49. Fadlallah, Dunia al-mar’a, 119–20.

50. Berry, “Radical Transitions,” 49–51.

Fadlallah acknowledges there has been no fe- arguments they have brought to very contro- 281
male ruler in Islamic history but imputes this versial questions. The ayatollahs’ writings pro-
absence to traditions and mores rather than to vide an Islamic justification for women’s right
religion. He concludes by saying that scholars to employment, their right to participation in
are still debating the legality of women’s rule political life, and their ability to assume posi-
and that there is no clear opinion, but the proofs tions of power in government. In her analysis
against the legality of such a rule are weak and, of Fadlallah’s works, Berry maintains that “his
therefore, debatable.51 Hence, I agree with Talib reformulation of gender shook some old gender

Rola el-Husseini

The Writings of Ayatollahs Fadlallah and Shams al-Din

Aziz when he maintains that “Fadlallah argues constructs predominant in Shi‘i cultural and re-
for full rights in political participation: the right ligious circles and created space for some Shi‘i
to vote as well as the right to be nominated for women to legitimize their social and political
public office. He goes even further by arguing activities.”54 She alleges that his “impact is signif-
that women can hold leadership positions in an icant because it forges an alternative, legitimate
Islamic state and he challenges the view that model of rethinking gender in which Muslim
women are not capable to lead or that they are women can lay claim without fearing cultural
rationally deficient in comparison to men.”52 repercussions” (52). That is the main distinction
As for women’s participation in political between the discourses on gender in Iran in the
life, Fadlallah gives the example of Fatima as 1990s and those occurring in Lebanon: Iran
someone who was active in the politics of her saw women taking up the challenge of rethink-
day. Fadlallah deduces that she was the first ing their role and rights in society after a decade
opposition leader in Islam and points out that of Islamic revolutionary rule, thereby creating
all the positions she took demonstrated strong what has been termed “Islamic feminism.”55 In
political action. Fadlallah also refers to Zaynab contrast, the public face of critical gender dis-
and maintains that “the role of Zaynab was course among Shia Lebanese was led by men
similar to that of her mother. It was a struggle such as Fadlallah and Shams al-Din.
for a rightful cause . . . a challenge to injus- Instead of limiting themselves to debat-
tice. As with her mother, her positions repre- ing stereotypical issues in a purely apologetic
sent the legal participation in political life for manner — as is often the case with such types
the Muslim woman.” Hence, if Zaynab could of writing — Fadlallah and Shams al-Din have
stand strong against difficulties, it was “due to opened up the debate, showing not only knowl-
the seeds planted by Fatima in her [daughter’s] edge of the Shia tradition but also scholarship
mind, soul, heart and life.”53 Fadlallah’s prefer- in Sunni legal thought. In doing so, they have
ence for Fatima as a role model is made clear in set the stage for the emergence of a new Shia
this last statement. One is left to wonder if there school of thought in Lebanon, distinct from the
is not something in Zaynab’s militantism — used Iranian one.
by the Islamic Republic to harness the power of Shams al-Din’s ijtihad and his conclusions
women in the late 1980s and early 1990s — that are innovative yet they would have had no im-
Fadlallah finds deeply disturbing. pact on society had Fadlallah not disseminated
similar information and made it acceptable for
Conclusion a popular audience through his more accessible
The works of Ayatollahs Fadlallah and Shams approach. Fadlallah’s way of presenting new in-
al-Din are important because of the innovative formation to average believers in a clear and un-

51. Fadlallah, Dunia al-mar’a, 121–22. 54. Berry, “Radical Transitions,” 44.

52. Talib Aziz, “Fadlallah and the Remaking of the 55. According to Valentine Moghadam, the debate on
Marja‘iya,” in The Most Learned of the Shi‘a, ed. Linda S. Islamic feminism was triggered by a talk given in Feb-
Walbridge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), ruary 1994 by Harvard professor Afsaneh Naj­mabadi
209. at the School of Oriental and African Studies in Lon-
don. Valentine Moghadam, “Islamic Feminism and Its
53. Fadlallah, Al-Zahra al-qudwa, 101.
Discontents,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and
Society 27 (2002): 1135 – 1171.
 282 derstandable manner has made his and Shams has opened a space for women to start thinking
al-Din’s scholarship not only accessible but also and writing about how to reconcile faith with
more relevant to real life. Therefore it is not gender equality. This popularity among women
surprising that “Fadlallah is very popular with and their sympathizers can only bolster Fadlal-
women, whether or not they are educated. They lah’s claims for the marja‘iyya, especially among
see him as the only advocate of women’s rights Arab Shia.
among mujtahids and jurists.”56 In part, his pop-
e ularity among lay believers is due to his clearer
ra ti v
m pa style and to the medium he has often chosen to
Co present his religious rulings: interviews.
f
ie so
tu d
Still, it is important to be aware of the
S ,

A si a limitations of these discourses that are critical
u th
So he within the context of Islamic tradition but do
n dt
fric aa not fully challenge or reject generally shared te-
A st nets. Nevertheless, they can serve as a platform
Ea
d le for the emergence of a female-based Lebanese
d
Mi
Islamic feminist discourse. In a recent essay,
Omayma Abdellatif and Marina Ottaway note
that “women are beginning to play a bigger
role in shaping the politics of Islamist political
movements in the Middle East . . . [and that]
women activists have made important inroads
in Islamist movements by creating strong wom-
en’s branches and pushing for broader political
participation and representation in the upper
echelons of the entire movements.”57 The Leba-
nese Hezbollah figures notably among the sig-
nificant Islamist groups they study.
Deeb, in a seminal ethnography of gen-
der and public piety in a southern suburb of
Beirut, the Dahiyya, has already given many
clues to the role Shia women play in public and
political life. She has also shown the interplay
between the role of Hezbollah and the role
Fadlallah plays as a marja‘. The voluntary asso-
ciations where women are active emerge from
this interplay. Deeb notes that “women drew
upon Fadlullah’s progressive perspectives on
gender and other issues. [He] was especially a
source for arguments about women’s abilities to
interpret religious texts, and debate them with
men.”58 After all, Fadlallah had created the first
Shia religious seminary for women in 1978. His
encouragement of the study of jurisprudence by
women, in addition to his writings on women,

56. Aziz, “Fadlallah and the Remaking of the 57. Omayma Abdellatif and Marina O t taway,
Marja‘yia,” 211. “Women in Islamist Movements,” Carnegie Papers 2
(2007), www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec2_
women_in_islam_final1.pdf (accessed 6 August
2007).

58. Deeb, Enchanted Modern, 216.