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Safety Alert A001 25

A gas leak during commissioning of a new pipeline network led to a fire caused by static ignition, resulting in significant damage to adjacent facilities but no injuries. An investigation revealed that a bypass valve was left open, and multiple static ignition sources were present, contributing to the incident. Recommendations include improving safety awareness, ensuring clear procedures, and confirming accurate system documentation to prevent similar occurrences.

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10 views1 page

Safety Alert A001 25

A gas leak during commissioning of a new pipeline network led to a fire caused by static ignition, resulting in significant damage to adjacent facilities but no injuries. An investigation revealed that a bypass valve was left open, and multiple static ignition sources were present, contributing to the incident. Recommendations include improving safety awareness, ensuring clear procedures, and confirming accurate system documentation to prevent similar occurrences.

Uploaded by

mailtojg007
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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At TAQA, we stay true to our Safe value through our everyday behaviors.

Safety Alert: Gas leak and static ignition caused fire during commissioning
Outcome: Fire Issued: March 2025 Where: External (Step Change in Safety)
WHAT HAPPENED?
• A newly constructed gas gathering (pipeline) network was filled
with inert nitrogen gas
• During commissioning, methane was being introduced at low
pressure from the live gas network, to displace the nitrogen via
installed atmospheric vents
• A fire ignited at a riser valve at the Low-Pressure Header while a
worker was within 2 meters of the area
• The field team closed the main isolation valve to the site and a
second valve to limit gas volumes being ignited Fire damage to adjacent facilities
• The fire reached a height of 15m and burned for 2 hours; nobody
was hurt however adjacent facilities were severely damaged

FINDINGS
• Investigation revealed that a bypass valve was left open resulting in methane flows higher than
anticipated
• The bypass was not identified on the Piping & Instrument Diagram (P&IDs) or the commissioning
procedures, contributing to both the leak and static ignition
• A stub flange connecting the assembly to a metal sample spool was over-torqued, likely deforming
the face of the flange and allowing gas to escape. Correct torque values had not been
communicated to the Commissioning and Start-Up team
• Multiple static ignition sources were present in the vent assembly and valve pit, including an
unearthed metal spool, a flexible plastic pipe and the pit liner itself
• Static charge built up at the connection valve, arced to the plastic liner and ignited the methane gas

RECOMMENDATIONS
Improve awareness of process safety hazards at your location, ensuring robust controls are implemented:
• Ensure risk assessments consider the possibility of incorrect system line up, flammable leaks and
static ignition sources
• Ensure procedures are clear, task-specific and fit-for-purpose, and work teams are engaged in the
development and review of the procedures they are required to follow
• Ensure personnel are trained in the use of equipment and procedures
• Confirm P&IDs accurately reflect installed systems and equipment by physically “walking the line”
• Confirm an effective “Management of Change” process is in place and being followed
• Engage work teams in developing realistic work schedules/timeframes to safely execute work
• Ensure processes are in place to confirm safe isolation/correct system line up before proceeding with
commissioning/system start-up
• Ensure current site conditions are understood, checked and regularly communicated to ensure
decisions on commissioning/system operation remain fully informed
Reference: Operating Process Equipment - Fire – stepchangeinsafety.net

Ref: SA001/25 Share this Alert with your team(s) - Review the recommendations in your work environment.
Implement actions that could prevent a similar incident in your organization.

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